The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 3 | Number 3 | Article ID 3289 | Jan 18, 2010

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International Students and U.S. Global Power in the Long20th Century　２０世紀を中心に見た留学生と米国の世界的勢力

Paul A. Kramer

International Students and U.S.Global Power in the Long 20thCentury

Paul A. Kramer

It was 1951 and Rozella Switzer, post-mistressof McPherson, Kansas, a prosperous,conservative, nearly all-white oil town of 9,000people on the Eastern edge of the wheat belt,had not seen the Nigerians coming. That Fall,seven African students, all male, in their early-and mid-20’s, had arrived in the area to attendMcPherson College and Central College. Theaccomplished young men, who counted amongthemselves a one-time math teacher, asurveyor, an accountant, a pharmacist and arailway telegrapher, had come with highprofessional aspirations to acquire training inagriculture, engineering and medicine; withinmonths, they were treated to a fairly typicalround of Jim Crow hospitality, from half-wagesat the local laundry to the segregated upper-balcony of the local movie house. While atleast one of the men had been warned by hisfather that Christians “’don’t practice whatthey preach’,” the students were apparentlyunprepared for the Midwest’s less metaphoricalchill; with the arrival of winter, officials atMcPherson College telephoned around town togather warm clothes for the men, which is howthey came to Switzer’s restless and expansiveattention. A widow in her 40’s Switzer,according to Time, “smokes Pall Malls, drinksan occasional bourbon & coke, likes politicsand people.” She was also “curious about the

African students” and invited them to her homefor coffee, music and talk.1

“What they said,” reported Time, “was anearful.” Isaac Grille, a 21-year-old surveyorand civil engineering student, passionatelydescribed a Nigeria surging towards revolutionand independence, causes to which the menhoped to lend their training. The students ablyplayed to anti-Communist fears with compellingaccounts of perilous non-alignment, telling of“Nigerian friends who study in Communistcountries, come back home ‘with plenty ofmoney for political activity, and hot with praisefor the Communists.” They apparently readSwitzer an editorial (conveniently on-hand)from the West African Pilot by their “hero”Nnamdi Az ik iwe who , whi le a “non-Communis t… hates the U . S . fo r i t ssegregation” and “writes that Communism isthe form of government most likely ‘to ensureequality of freedom to all peoples.’” All of thisgot Switzer’s attention. Discrimination, shelater recounted, had always made her “’mad,’”but this was different. “’This,’” she said,“’made me scared. All they knew aboutAmerica was what they knew about McPherson. For the first time I really saw how importantlittle things, a long way off, can be. We had tofight a one-town skirmish away out here in themiddle of the United States.’”2

I’ll set to the side for a moment what Switzerdecided to do about her guests’ perilous non-alignment and McPherson’s miniature ColdWar dilemma, and instead translate the post-mistress’ anxious political observation (thattraveling students had something to do with U.S. global power and its limits) into my own,

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historiographic one: that the history of foreignstudent migration ought to be explored as U. S.international history, that is, as related to thequestion of U. S. power in its transnational andglobal extensions.3 In this sense, my argumenthere is topical: that historians of U. S. foreignrelations might profitably study internationalstudents and, in the process, bring to the foreintersections between “student exchange” andgeopolitics.

The payoffs would be wide-ranging. Suchscholarship would enrich our knowledge of thejunctures between U. S. colleges anduniversities and American imperial power inthe 20th century. 4 To the extent thatinternational students participated in thediffusion and adaptation of social, economic,and technical models they encountered in theUnited States, such studies would contribute tothe historiography of “modernization,”“Americanization” and “development.”5 Aswitnesses, victims and sometimes challengersof racial exclusion in the United States, foreignstudents were important if still neglectedprotagonists in the politics of “Cold War civilrights.”6 Such research might explore thehistorical and institutional specificities ofstudent migration within the broader panoramaof “cultural diplomacy” efforts.7 Eventually,such histories might make possible large-scalecomparative work on the geopolitical dynamicsof student migration across educationalmetropoles.8

Work of this kind would build on rich, existinghistories, which can be usefully gathered intothree loose categories. First are histories of U.S.-based educational and governmentalinstitutions at the organizational center ofinternational student migration, among whichLiping Bu’s deeply-researched monographMaking the World Like Us, from which I drawheavily in the present essay, stands out.9 Thereis scholarship that centers on specificeducational programs such as the BoxerIndemnity Remission, the Philippine-American

pensionado program, or the FulbrightProgram.10 Finally, there is scholarship thattreats the American encounters andexperiences of foreign students, oftenorganized by nationality or region of origin.11 While it thus has a strong foundation on whichto build, an international history of studentmigration that places questions of U. S. globalpower at its center still remains to be written.

To date, one of the chief obstacles inattempting to intertwine histories of studentmigration and U. S. foreign relations has beenhistorians’ reliance on the analytic categoriesand frameworks of program architectsthemselves. Many of the earliest accounts ofthese programs were produced in-house bypractitioners (foreign student advisors andprogram officers, especially) which combinedhistor ical sketches with normat ive,technocratic assessments of program“effectiveness.”12 Thus, foreign students haveoften found a place in histories of “culturaldiplomacy” alongside radio, television, artisticand musical propaganda, and approach whichinadvertently reproduces a (somewhat sinister)aspiration from the period that “ideas” mightbe projected successfully by “wrapping them inpeople.”13 Most seductive, perhaps, is thecategory of “exchange” itself. Exchange—as in“educational exchange” or “culturalexchange”—is, after all, the peg around whichboth international student programs and ofmuch of the scholarly literature that attemptsto make sense of them quietly pivots. As agenerality and organizing concept, it doess u c c e s s f u l l y c o n v e y t h e f a c t o f amultidirectional traffic, that is, foreign studentsentering the United States and U. S. studentsgoing abroad. But it fails cartographically:student migrations to and from the UnitedStates were scarcely “exchanges” in thepedestrian sense that most foreign studentscame from countries to which U. S. students byand large did not go; Europe proved a keyexception in this regard. U. S.-centeredstudent migrations resolve themselves into

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“exchanges,” in other words, only if one eithergeneralizes from a European-American axis orflattens the rest of world into a unitary, non-American space.

“Exchange” also telegraphs a sense of equality,mutuality and gift-giving. But if the programsby and large did not involve geographicexchanges, neither were they exchanges intheir cultural economics, either. While, forexample, the organizers of “educationalexchange” often hoped for visiting students’conversion or transformation through theirencounters with American culture andinstitutions, one searches in vain for affirmativedescriptions of the radical changes that visitingstudents would introduce to American societyin return. Where “exchanges” betweenAmericans and foreign students were sketched,they were deeply asymmetrical. At most,Americans were to gain from these encountersa less “provincial” approach to the world;foreign students were, by contrast, expected totake away core lessons about the way their ownsocieties’ politics, economics and cultureshould be organized. Clifford Ketzel’s insight,in a 1955 d i sser ta t ion on the S ta teDepartment’s “foreign leader” program, caneasily be applied to cultural and educational“exchanges” more generally:

With the exception of manyprofessor and teacher exchanges,t h e o t h e r p r o g r a m s a r epredominantly ‘one-way streets,’ i.e., they primarily encourage theexport of American technicalknowledge and the development ofbetter understanding and morefriendly attitudes toward theUnited States. Only secondarily, ifat all, are they concerned with theunderstanding of other nations orthe import of technical skills andcultural values from which theUnited States, as a nation, might

profit.14

Stripping away the ideological idiom of“exchange” and examining how these projectswere actually structured, one finds instead aset of three interlocking principles in playwhich proved remarkably resilient across time,across lines of sectarian and secular politicsand across private and state sponsorship. Theprinciple of selection involved the choosing of“representatives” from among what wasbelieved to be another society’s future“directing” or “leading” class of political,cultural and intellectual elites, a processcommonly understood not as selection but as“identification,” that is, the politically-neutralrecognition of worth and leadership capacity onthe basis of universally agreed-upon criteria. The principle of diffusion involved theassumption that foreign students would returnhome and, both consciously or not, spread U. S.practices and institutions, values and goods. To the extent that this dif fusion wasanticipated to travel not only outward from theUnited States but downward across the socialscale of students’ home societies, it presumedand encouraged a vertical, top-down andauthoritarian model of society. Third, theprinciple of legitimation involved theexpectation that foreign students would,through their accounts of American life, play afavorable and vital role in aligning publicopinion in their home societies towards theUnited States.

Across the long 20th century, of course, thesesame objectives also drove thousands ofAmericans the other way, across U. S. nationalborders, as students, teachers, missionaries,off ic ials , professionals, experts andtechnicians.15 While not the subject of thepresent account, their story is nonethelessintimately bound up with it: these mobileAmericans were often decisive in constructing,shaping and maintaining the long-distancefields of interaction that would draw foreign

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students to U. S. colleges and universities:“identifying” potential student-leaders abroad;training them in the language skills requiredfor study in the United States; familiarizingthem with (often idealized) accounts ofAmerican society and education; recruitingthem for admission to U. S. educationalinstitutions; and ultimately, helping to evaluatetheir “success” (however it was defined) asagents of diffusion and legitimation upon theirreturn home. It was this dynamic of selectionand recruitment—at the intersection between“outward” and “inward” migrations—thattended to give educational networks a tight-knit and even personalist character, aglobalism of connected localities.

If my argument here is topical, it is alsoemphasizes two interpretations of internationalstudent migration to the United States in thelong 20th century. First is an argument forcontinuity: that despite a mid-century takeoff instudent migration coterminous with (if notdetermined by) rising government sponsorship,supervision and institutionalization, keylinkages—especially at the level of personnel,practices and discourses—bound earlier tolater 20th century educational programs. Thiswas because, as existing research has shown,large-scale efforts by the U. S. state to cultivatestudent migration worked through—even asthey transformed—pre-existing, private-sectorinfrastructure.16 In this respect, the role playedby the U. S. government in the development ofinternational student migration represents avariant of what Michael Hogan has called acorporatist configuration of state and privateagencies in the United States’ relations withthe global environment.17

Second, I argue that, across the long 20thcentury and down to the present day,international students in the United Stateshave been imagined by American educators,government officials, journalists and manyordinary citizens as potential instruments of U.S. national power, eventually on a global scale.

The question of how best to cultivate, directand delimit their movements to and from theUnited States, how best to craft theirexperiences while in residence, and how tomeasure their impact upon the societies towhich they returned, appeared early in the20th century as high-stakes international andforeign policy concerns. Thus while RozellaSwitzer’s “one-town skirmish” carried thissensibility both further “inward” (to a Kansasliving room) and “outward” (to a global crisis)than was common before World War II, whatmight be called a geopolitical vision ofinternational student migration was otherwisemore exemplary than exceptional. Whethersponsored and administered by missionaries,philanthropists or government agencies,migrating students figured as prospectiveagents of U. S. influence in the world to whichthey would eventually return; Americaneducational institutions came to be understood,both descriptively and prescriptively, as nodesand relays in global, U. S.-centered networks ofpower.18

I f t he re i s a case t o be made f o r aninternational history of student migration to theUnited States, it might begin with strikingcorrelations and counterpoints that bridge thetwo, usually separated spheres of foreignrelations and educational history. Without U.S. colonialism, for example, it is extremelydifficult to explain why Filipinos constitutedone of the largest groups of Asian students, andof international students in the U. S. moregenerally, in the pre-1940 period. LatinAmerican student flows, a relatively thin sliceof the foreign student population prior to themid-1930s, widened briefly to one of itsthickest, precisely during a period of deepeningU. S. government concern over hemisphericsolidarity against encroaching fascism. Postwar, state-sponsored programs in

reeducation and “democratization” helpedpushed Japan from twenty-second to tenthamong student-sending countries and Germanyfrom seventh to third. By contrast, the Soviet

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Union saw its student numbers in the UnitedStates decline during the Depression andcollapse with the onset of the Cold War,dwindling to a lonely two by 1956. All thissuggests a rough, imperfect elective affinity, inother words, between educational networksand the geopolitics of “friendship” and“enmity.”

This said, the world politics of studentmigration was always multi-layered: the imprintof U. S. state power in shaping thesemovements, for example, was uneven, felt moreforcefully in some settings and moments thanin others. Other factors, many of them far fromconventional foreign policy concerns, playedequally central roles in making and unmakingthese transits: the presence or absence of pre-existing networks that either mitigated orexacerbated the friction of travel and logistics;economic stability and prosperity sufficient togenerate necessary sponsorship locally; theavailability and desirability of modern highere d u c a t i o n c l o s e r t o h o m e , a n d t h eattractiveness of other nations’ educational andpolitical systems, for example. When it came toeducational circuits, in other words, diplomacywas not destiny.

Pier and airport greeting services like this

one, organized by private organizationslike the YMCA’s Committee for FriendlyRelations with Foreign Students, wereintended to mitigate arrival shocks andestablish positive first-impressions thatwould both buffer visiting students frommistreatment and orient their loyalties to

the United States. The two standingvolunteers wear blue armbands labeled

“Foreign Student Adviser.” From “ForeignStudents Get Welcome Here,” New York Times,

August 27, 1949, p. 15.

And things did not always (or even frequently)turn out as planned. Innumerable obstaclesinterrupted or deflected projected circuits ofpersonnel, ideas and allegiances. Selection,diffusion and legitimation, while devoutlyhoped for, sometimes spilled off the rails, whenscreenings failed to prune student radicals anddissenters, when students’ lateral solidaritiesovertook hoped-for vertical loyalties, whenstudents’ encounters with the U. S. state andcivil society proved alienating rather thanbinding. Then there were those more dramaticfailures of educational power. There was whatmight be called the Yamamoto problem, when aformer student in one’s military academy endedup using this training against one’s owncountry in war. There was the Nkrumahproblem, when foreign students developed intoradical, anti-colonial nationalists.19 There wasthe Qutb problem, when a visiting educatordiscovered in one’s society a religio-politicalenemy with whom no exchange could besuffered.20

One way to begin resolving into meaningfulhistories the nearly infinite tangle ofinternational student trajectories is to identifydistinct and recognizable projects thatanimated and organized them, and to establishsome loose chronological benchmarks. Thefirst of three periods I’ll identify here,stretching from the late-19th century to around1940, was characterized by four, parallel andoverlapping types of student movement that

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can be distinguished by their objectives,definitions of education and its utility, andstructures of authority and sponsorship:migrations aimed at self-strengthening,colonialism, evangelism, and corporateinternationalism. They are presented self-consciously here as a register of something likeideal types, subject to subdivision, in whichhistorical instances always crossed andblended. A second moment, dating from theyears leading up to World War II to thelate-1960s, saw the exponential growth anddiversification of international studentmigration to the United States, greaterparticipation of U. S. government institutions inpromoting and shaping it, and its intensifyinggeopoliticization, both structurally anddiscursively. Most of all, this period was setapart by a widespread, sharpened sense offoreign students as critical actors in the globalpolitics of the Cold War and decolonization. Athird moment, sketched only briefly here byway of conclusion, stretches from the 1970s tothe early 21st century, and is characterized bythe further increase of student migration to theUnited States at the nexus of privatizinguniversities and globalizing corporations. Here, as in the early moments, border-crossingstudents would be freighted with bothaspirations for U. S. global power, andapprehensions about its limits.

The first of my pre-1940 types comprisedoutward, “self-strengthening” movements bystudents propelled by a sense of domesticsocial crisis, the exhaustion or failure oftraditional solutions, and the perceived successof other, commensurable societies facingsimilar dilemmas. The paradigmatic sendingsociety under this heading, in many ways, wasthe United States: facing industrial capitalistconflict and social upheaval in the late-19thcentury, hundreds of American studentstraveled to German universities in search ofanswers, returning home with new, state-centered models of social reform andblueprints for the research university itself;

they would face many obstacles in their effortsto transplant what they had learned in the U. S.institutional and ideological context, but wouldremake the landscape of U. S. politics, socialthought and education in the process.21 Whilethese transits bridged powerful, industrializedregions, other self-strengthening migrationswere produced by cr ises of imperia lsubordination, when weakening statesattempted to fight off greater surrenders ofsovereignty by sending their youth abroad toselectively import the tools of their would-becolonizers, as a bulwark against completeexternal domination.22 The abortive ChineseEducational Mission of the 1870s and early1880s, which sent 120 young men to highschools in New England and some to collegesand universities, was exemplary in its hopes toprevent further greater decline through theselective borrowing of Western science andtechnology, a process that reformers called“learning from the barbarians in order tocontrol the barbarians.” The program, initiallyintended to last fifteen years and to includecollege education, collapsed after only eight, asthe students themselves chafed under thedemands of both U. S. and Confucianeducations, and as conservatives in Chinaincreasingly suspected the students ofbarbarism and disloyalty. Many of theMission’s participants nonetheless went on tooccupy places of prominence in engineering,military technology and education during thelast years of Qing rule.23

As Chinese efforts suggested, some of the mostsought-over settings for the pursuit of literalself-strengthening were U. S. militaryacademies. Attendance at the academies byinternational students began followingCongressional authorization in July 1868.24 Caribbean and Central and South Americanstates successfully presented candidates: by1913, at least two Costa Ricans had studied atthe U. S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, andWest Point had admitted students from Cuba,Honduras and Ecuador.25 “Many foreigners

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have been educated at West Point,” noted theNew York Times that year, “and to-day WestPointers are officers in nearly every regularmilitary establishment in Central America.”26 U. S. military training was also activelypursued by East Asian states attempting tofend off Western colonization. Qing attemptsto achieve their first West Point appointmentshad stalled in the 1870s, and the Chinese wouldhave to wait until 1905.27 By contrast, Japan(which appears to have pressed for the firstinternational admissions in 1868) could by1904 boast seven graduates from Annapolis,including the commander of the JapaneseSquadron of the Far East; in 1913, anothergraduate, Count Yamamoto, became premier ofJapan.28

A second category, in many ways the inverse ofthe first, consisted of colonial and neo-colonialmigrations. These were educational circuitsorganized by imperial states with the aim ofcrafting a loyal and pliable elite in thehinterlands with ties to metropolitan societyand structures of authority. An early andprivate variant in the British context was theRhodes Scholarships, which had as their goalthe integration through educational migrationof a British-imperial, Anglo-Saxon race whosedomain included the United States.29 U. S.-centered variants of such migrations wereinaugurated after 1898, most ambitiously butnot exclusively in the United States’ newempire in Asia.30 Some of these circuits woundthrough U. S. military academies. Filipinoadmission to the academies was anticipatedeven before the end of the Philippine-AmericanWar, but it was only in March 1908 thatCongress authorized the admission of sevenFilipinos to West Point, for future commissionto the Philippine Scouts.31 The 1916 Jones Actpermitted up to four Filipino midshipmen to beenrolled at the Naval Academy at one time; thefirst Filipinos arrived in 1919, and by 1959,twenty-four had graduated and returned toserve in the Philippine navy.32

More ambitious in scope was the consolidatingPhilippine-American regime’s civilianpensionado program, established in 1903,which would eventually sponsor the travel andeducation of hundreds of elite Filipinos fromacross the archipelago to colleges throughoutthe United States, with the requirement ofservice in the U. S. colonial bureaucracy. By1904, program supervisor William Sutherlandwould write optimistically if vaguely from theUnited States to the Philippines’ GovernorGeneral of “the advisability of this investmentin ‘Americanization,’... not to mention theextremely favorable political and moral effectthat this philanthropic work of the governmentproduces both here and in the Archipelago.” While the program’s objective was the“assimilation” of the pensionados and theirdiffusion of U. S. loyalties, values and practices,students traced a variety of paths from colonialattachment to nationalist estrangement; upontheir return, many played critical roles ingovernment, education and business, helpingmake possible the “Filipinization” of thecolonial regime that accelerated in the 1910sa n d c u l m i n a t e d i n t h e P h i l i p p i n eCommonwealth of the 1930s.33 A still largerproject, in a neo-colonial vein, began in 1909with the U. S. government’s remission of aChinese overpayment of the Boxer Indemnity,returned with the stipulation that the funds beused exclusively to fund educational travel tothe United States, with initial training at thejointly run Qinghua Preparatory School. Similar in goals to the pensionado program,the School and larger Remission quicklybrought neo-colonial and self-strengtheningagendas into collision, as U. S. diplomatspressured Chinese officials and educators overadministrative power, curricula, and theappointments of students, faculty and staff andas Chinese educators sought to adapt theschool to a self-consciously nationalist era.34

A third category consists of what can be calledevangelical migrations. These were mediatedby the United States’ expanding Protestant

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missions of the late 19th and early 20thcenturies, which connected promising studentsand converts from far-flung mission schools todenominational colleges throughout the UnitedStates.35 The goal here was to funnel talented“native” would-be missionaries to centers oftheological intensity and fervor in the UnitedStates and then to cycle them back to theirhome societies to spread both the Gospel andAmericanism.36 “It is of the utmost importance,both for their nations and for ours,” wrote W.Reginald Wheeler, co-editor of a 1925 YMCAsurvey of “The Foreign Student in America,”“that they return to their homes with anadequate comprehension and appraisal of thelife and spirit of America” and, especially,Christianity’s place in “building up theinstitutions and the life of our republic.”37 While the largest numbers of student convertsin the late-19th and early 20th centuries wererecruited from Asia, it was also during thisperiod that the first African students wererecruited to black colleges and universities inthe United States by African-Americanmissionaries.38 The attraction of such U. S.-educated native missionaries to Protestantdenominations would only increase after WorldWar I, as Western missionaries came to be seenin many mission fields as an intrusive,“imperialist” presence. Their appeal topotential converts grew with the missions’ turnin the early 20thcentury toward Social Gospelprojects for the delivery of medicine, socialservices and education, which allowedinternational students to locate themselveseducationally and professionally at theintersect ion of miss ionary and sel f -strengthening efforts. But even where they didnot organize or sponsor student circuitsthemselves, Protestant missionaries activelyattempted to evangelize foreign studentsstudying in the United States toward non-religious ends. Beginning in 1911, for example,the international branch of the YMCAorganized the Committee for Friendly RelationsAmong Foreign Students, an organizationwhose conversionist goals were packaged

inside a broad array of support services, fromgreeting at ports of entry, to mediation withimmigration authorities, to organized Sundaysuppers.39 Protestant groups from China,Japan, Korea and the Philippines would developas among the most well-organized foreignstudent associations of the early 20th century.40

Foreign students and visitors, and theirinstructor, a specialist in the teaching of

English as a foreign language, in anEnglish class at the American University

Language Center in Washington, DC. Suchsettings, while helping visitors to acquirenecessary cultural skills, placed many who

were not technically students in thestructural position of “students.” From the

University of Arkansas Special Collections,Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

Collection. My thanks to Vera Ekechukwu forlocating this image.

A fourth and final category of pre-1940 studentmigrations can be described as corporate-internationalist. These developed in theaftermath of World War I among educators andbusiness and philanthropic elites preoccupiedwith the causes of the war, and possible waysto forestall future conflict. They derived whatcan be called the proximity theory of peace:

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ignoring the French and German students whohad shared dormitories in continental Europebefore 1914, they hypothesized that wars werethe atavistic by-products of irrationalnationalism rooted in a society’s mostprovincial and isolated lower strata. The onlyway to reform this primitive consciousness wasfrom a society’s elites downward; the way towiden the horizons of the world’s directing elitewas to bring them physically together in thecommon setting of the university which, theypresumed, was not an arena of conflictualpolitics. While, particularly in the immediatepostwar period, corporate internationalistsacted in the name of peace, they fastened andoften subordinated pacifist idioms to projects inthe expansion of U. S. corporate power throughthe training and familiarization of foreignengineers, salespersons and administrators inU. S. techniques and products for potentialexport: world peace and unobstructed flows ofcapital and goods would be commensurable ifnot identical aims.41 If evangelical migrationsprincipally linked the United States and Asia inthe ear l y 20 th century , corpora te -internationalist networks would stretch mostthickly between the United States, Europe andLatin America. Their most prominentinstitutional hub was the Institute forInternational Education (IIE), founded in 1919,which connected interested students anduniversities with funders, primarily theCarnegie Endowment for Peace, the CarnegieCorporation and Rockefeller.42 But similarnetworks of student migration would also besponsored by private, corporate civil societyorganizations like Rotary International.43 Onthe demand side, corporate-internationalistmigration appealed to the bourgeoisies ofindustrial and industrializing societies thathoped either to draw adaptable insight fromthe United States’ technological and productivesupremacy, or to seek employment in U. S.corporations that were greatly expanding inscope in the post-World War I period.44

Al l four types o f g lobal educat ional

endeavor—and their cross-pollinations—hitsnags. Would-be self-strengtheners could findthemselves socially and politically isolatedrather than empowered on their return home,their imported ideas becoming suspect whenthey collided with nativist and exceptionalistconceptions of the proper order of things; theysometimes also found that pre-emptive self-colonization did not necessarily stave off thereal thing. Corporate-internationalists foundthat long-standing cultures of capitalism,industry and commerce in their home societiescould prove stubborn soil in which to transplantAmerican practices and institutions.45 Theproximity to the U. S. metropole wrought bycolonial and neo-colonial migrations couldfoment disaffected, nationalist sentiments aseasily as solidarities. Evangelical studentsfrequently expressed their shock at thelooseness of American sexual morality and thevulgarity of American materialism.46 Indeed,students brought to the United States as eitherconverts or colonial protégés often experiencedwhat might be called metropolitan letdown: thedeflation of the utopian images used to attractthem to the United States upon sharpencounters with American realities. 4 7

During this period, some of the starkest limitswere expressed when foreigners—especially, itseems, Asians—petitioned Congress foradmission to U. S. military academies. When inthe 1870s, requests by Qing officials for theadmission to West Point of two students fromthe Educational Mission were refused, it helpedtriggered the collapse of the program. InSpring 1906, with tensions between the UnitedStates and Japan on the rise, Congress barredforeigners from entering the Naval Academy.48

In March 1912, during a discussion of theadmission of a Cuban to West Point, SenatorGall inger of New Hampshire took theopportunity to rail against foreign admissionsmore generally. “I doubt the wisdom ofeducating these young men, who possibly maybecome troublesome to us in time of war,” hewas quoted as saying. “I am not sure that it is

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good policy to educate representatives of thewarlike Chinese people, who number fourhundred or five hundred million.”49 (The Cubanwas admitted.) Such fears even extended topeople who were not technically “foreigners.” In 1908, Senator Slayden of Texas objected tothe idea of Filipinos at West Point on thegrounds that such trainees might return hometo foment revolution in the Islands.50

The cause of networked affiliation was also nothelped by rising barriers to immigration.51 Students from China and Japan had beenlegislatively class-exempted from late-19th andearly 20th century exclusion laws, alongsidemerchants, tourists and diplomats, but inadministrative practice, port authorities tendedto see in traveling Asian students well-disguised “coolies” seeking illegal entry, andmore than one aspiring undergraduate foundthemselves detained at Angel Island.52 Much tothe frustration of both educators and students,international interest in U. S. education was onthe increase just as barriers to migration wererising. The restrictive 1924 Johnson-Reed Actdid not exempt visiting students from its rigidquota system, and students could findthemselves harassed, arrested or deported ifthey happened to arrive after their country’sannual entry quota had been filled.53 TheInstitute for International Education andCommittee on Friendly Relations intervened tomitigate these rules and to buffer studentsfrom their application, greeting students atports of entry to smooth over relations withofficials and lobbying for quota exemptions forbona fide students in exchange for tighter,university-mediated certification regimes.54 Due to the success o f these e f for ts ,restrictionist legislation and administrativepractice did not quash student migration—theregion/race most intensely targeted by thislegislation, “Asia,” was still sending the UnitedStates half of its international students in themid-1930s—but they did make it far morecomplex logistically and, when it came to thegoals of diffusion and legitimation, far more

alienating. For much of the 20th century andinto the 21st, things would get complicatedwhere students found themselves at the cross-currents that roiled between the global politicsof inclusion and exclusion.

That said, by the 1930s, the United States wasalready clearly emerging as a magnetic hub forstudent migration. While statistics for the earlyperiod were haphazardly collected, theydemonstrate a pattern of growth anddiversification, with a particular takeoff in the1920s. In an informal, early census conductedin 1905, only nine colleges registered foreignstudents; by 1912, 37 colleges did.55 By 1930,when the Committee on Friendly Relations wasconducting annual surveys, foreign studentsattended about 450 colleges and universities;by 1940, the number had grown again to 636. Reported overall student numbers grew fromabout 600 in 1905 to about 1,800 in 1912 tonearly 10,000 in 1930. Throughout this earlyperiod, the largest sending macro-region wasAsia (led by China, Japan and the Philippines),followed narrowly but consistently, until adropoff in the 1930s, by Europe (led by Russia,Germany and Britain), and then by NorthAmerica, especially Canada. Central and SouthAmerica followed, with comparatively small butgrowing numbers arriving from Africa, theMiddle East and Australasia. While no genderstatistics appear to have been collected prior tothe mid-1930s, in 1935, 22% of foreignstudents registered by census-takers werewomen, a figure that appears to have beenrelatively stable for those years, althoughspecific percentages varied by national origin.56

The rising threats of European fascism andJapanese militarism ushered in a second era inthe history of student migration to the UnitedStates characterized by both deeper stateengagement and geopoliticization. To thispoint the federal state had, throughimmigration law, arguably inhibited studentflows at least as much as it had cultivatedthem. Its promotional energies had been

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confined to colonial and neo-colonialmigrations—the Philippine and Chineseexperiments—and earlier programs associatedwith the Belgian Relief Commission and theeducation of French veterans in the UnitedStates during and after World War I. Also priorto this period, there was no particularly strongrelationship between diplomatic “friendship”and student circulation: in the 1930s, forexample, the Soviet Union consistently sentmore students to the United States than didany other European country. In contrast, by1945 student migration patterns had begun toalign with the United States geopolitically:through f inancia l support , programadministration and the granting of visas theState Department, often working through theIIE, drew student-allies close, beginning in thelate-1930s and into the 1940s with thesponsorship of Latin Americans, and Europeanand Chinese refugees. Perceived student-enemies, especially those of Japanese descent,whether U. S. citizens or otherwise were, asthreatening “foreigners,” punished andisolated.57 While the mechanisms were varied,student circuits had begun to resemblewartime patterns of alliance and enmity.

The immediate postwar decades saw theexplosive growth of student migration to theUnited States measured along every axis: in thesheer scale of student numbers, in the breadthof sending countries, in the proliferation ofsponsoring programs, and in the numbers ofreceiving colleges and universities. From atotal of 7,530 in 1945, student numbersdoubled by 1947, then again by 1951, again by1962 and yet again by 1969, reaching over120 ,000 that year . 5 8 The mount inggravitational pull of U. S. colleges and derivedfrom many causes. The massive expansion ofAmerican higher education during these yearspresented foreign students with an appealingarray of programs and fields of specialization. In war-torn and occupied stretches of Europeand Asia, the demand for reconstructionpushed further than “self-strengthening” ever

had: centers of higher education had beendestroyed, promoting an external search for thetechnical skills and resources required forsocial reconstruction. With the advent ofdecolonization, elite youth from newly-independent societies would be drawn to U. S.colleges and universities in pursuit of technical,policy and institutional frameworks suited tothe building of modern, robust nation-states;for some, this represented a self-consciousalternative to colonial-metropolitan transits.

By 1960, a unitary sense of the category“foreign student” buckled before the varieties itwas intended to contain.59 As Kenneth Holland,president of the IIE, noted in 1961, whiletwenty-five years earlier it had been customaryto speak of “’the foreign student’” as if theyshared “the same interests, the same needs,and even the same peculiar quaintness,” whatimpressed him now was “the fact of diversity.”The rising significance of international studentsto U. S. colleges, universities and public life,however, was unmistakable. Although theUnited States, as surveyed in 1959-1960,received a far smaller percentage of foreignstudents relative to its total enrollments (1.5%,as compared Morocco’s 40%; Switzerland,Austria and Tunisia’s over-30%; the UnitedKingdom’s 10.7%, and France’s and Germany’s8%, for example), the United States attractedmore total foreign students that year (48,486)than any other single country. In 1959-60,1,712 institutions of higher education in theUnited States reported having enrolled foreignstudents; eighteen of these reported over 400students and five of them (the University ofCalifornia, New York University, the Universityof Minnesota, Columbia University, and theUniversity of Michigan) had enrolled over athousand.60

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A Filipino woman named Egdona(shortened to Dona) gives a suburban

family a lesson in Philippine dance. Thisphotograph was an illustration in aDecember 1961 article in Parents’

Magazine that encouraged families towelcome foreign students and visitors intotheir homes. “Maybe you can’t travel, but

you can bring the world to your door byopening your home to foreign visitors,” it

stated. From the 1920s onward, butparticularly during and after World War II,

numerous commentators voiced theirhopes that the presence of international

students in the United States mightcultivate a "cosmopolitan" outlook among

Americans. From “Discovering the Rest of theWorld,” Parents’ Magazine, December 1961. Special Collections, University of Arkansas.

About half of the arriving students in 1959-60were undergraduates, while the rest weregraduate students or identified as “specialstudents.” About 41%, a number that was onthe rise, received outside financial support(more graduate students than undergraduates);although government aid was growing, stategrants only made possible a small percentageof student exchanges (about 7.5%). Students’specialties varied by region, but engineeringpredominated, followed by the natural andphysical sciences (particularly for studentsfrom Asia, the Middle East and Latin America),humanities, social sciences and businessadministration. Students came from a total of

141 countries and “political areas”; the largestnational contingent was, as it had always been,Canadian (12%), but the next six largestnational groups were from the “Far East” and“Near East,” beginning with Taiwan and HongKong (9.3%) and India (7.8%); with Iran, Korea,Japan and the Philippines each exceeding 1,000students (or about 2%). While studentsidentified as being from Africa comprised asmall proportion of the foreign studentpopulation in 1959-60 (about 4%, one quarterof whom were from the United Arab Emirates),this population would quadruple by 1967.61

Government involvement and geopoliticizationonly intensified in post-World War II period, bywhich point student migration becamesurrounded by, and to some degree embeddedin, a much broader state practice that came tobe known generically as the “exchange ofpersons.”62 Facilitated by the declining cost oflong-distance commercial air travel ,“exchanges of persons” involved U. S.government-sponsored visits to the UnitedStates by “identified” leader-counterparts fromother countries—and movements by Americansin the opposite direction—for the purposes ofdiffusion and legitimation. It built on prewarand wartime Latin American precedents, butmagni f ied them geographica l ly andbureaucratically: in the postwar period, aplethora of government agencies, from theState Department to the Department ofAgriculture, many initially associated with theMarshall Plan, undertook such efforts andemployed them to connect to a much largerworld that previously. In some respects,student migrations resembled “exchanges ofpersons” like the State Department’s ForeignLeader Program, but the student presence wasvaster in scale, longer term, less centrallyadministered and funded, and less directlycontrolled. If there were official confusionsbetween these categories, it was in partbecause participants in exchange programswere in many ways considered “students,”whether or not they were enrolled in school.

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In strictly numeric terms, the largest number ofexchanged persons—i f no t exac t l y“students”—were military trainees. After WorldWar II, the U. S. government’s education offoreign military personnel, affiliated with theMilitary Assistance Program (MAP) was greatlyexpanded, streamlined and systematized, someof it taking place at the U. S. militaryacademies, but the majority at other militaryschools, bases and facilities inside and outsidethe United States.63 The Latin AmericanGround School, for example, founded in thePanama Canal Zone in 1946 and later renamedthe School of the Americas, would train tens ofthousands of military officers from LatinAmerican client states in counter-insurgencytechniques that included torture.64 Suchtraining was closely tied to arms transfers toforeign governments through either grants orsales. It sought, on the one hand, to shore upAmerican global power by providing whatresearcher and advocate Ernest W. Lefevercalled “security assistance”: “promotingstability within and among participatingstates… by enhancing their capacity to defendthemselves.” It was also directed at whatLefever called “our larger political interest,”which he expressed, interestingly, in classic“internationalist” terms: “strengthening thebonds of mutual understanding through aperson-to-person program that has introducedthousands of actual or potential foreign leadersto American life and institutions.”65 By the1970s, the cartography of military trainingmapped well onto the structure of U. S. globalpower, with roughly equal numbers of militarytrainees from Western Europe, East Asia andLatin America (between 70,000-80,000 each,most of them brought to the United States),and over 150,000 from Southeast Asia, most ofthem trained in the region. “Never before inhistory,” Lefever claimed, “have so manygovernments entrusted so many men in suchsensitive positions to the training of anothergovernment.”66 By 1973, he estimated that themilitary had trained 430,000 foreign nationals,approximately twice the number of Fulbrights

granted to foreign nationals between 1949 and2007.

The state’s growing investment in a geopoliticalsense of student flows was powerfullyillustrated in the early 1950s with respect toChinese student-migrants. Facing theimminent col lapse of the National istGovernment and the cut-off of both state andprivate supports, Chinese students in theUnited States were initially providedemergency assistance by the State Department,and encouraged to return to China as “futuredemocratic forces” that would, according totwo members of Congress, be “in a uniqueposition to exert a profound influence on thefuture course of their country.” With theoutbreak of the Korean War, however, thisdiffusionist project was slammed into hardreverse, and students were barred fromreturning to China precisely on the groundsthat their technical knowledge might now helpstrengthen and modernize the economy of aCommunist enemy. Facing financial crisis,trapped in a legal black hole and stigmatized ascrypto-Communists, Chinese students wereeventually “offered” legal status most could notrefuse; the majority remained in the UnitedStates. The State Department negotiated thereturn of the rest as a trade for Americans heldby the Chinese state, a practice which gave“exchange of persons” new meaning.67

Alongside with selected curtailments, the statebecame far more actively involved infacilitating and promoting student migration inthe post-World War II period. While only afraction of international students receiveddirect financial support from the U. S.government, the state also came to playsignificant yet indirect roles. For one, it helpedsponsor the professionalization of foreignstudent advising: prior to World War II, theonly official attention most colleges paid toforeign students as such was to assign them,often haphazardly, to an interested professor. As a result, students often had to navigate a

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bewildering array of concerns—immigrationlaws, admission and certification procedures,curricular decisions and language issues,among them—more or less on their own. Butbeginning with a 1942 conference in Clevelandorganized by the IIE in cooperation of the StateDepartment, the Office of the Coordinator forInter-American Affairs, and the U. S. Office ofEducation, foreign student advisors forged aprofession with its own organization (theNational Association of Foreign StudentAdvisors, or NAFSA), defining themselvesthrough their advocacy for both students andstudent programs, and their knowledge oflabyrinthine federal regulations and aproliferating social-scientific literature onstudents’ “adjustment” and “attitudes.” NAFSA, in turn , would push for thesimplification of immigration procedures andconvince authorities to delegate somecertification tasks to advisors themselves.68

The state’s most direct and immediate postwarinterventions in international education were in“re-education”: the inculcation of “democratic”and “anti-militarist” values in conqueredGerman and Japanese citizens.69 But thearchetypal post-World War II “exchange ofpersons”—one that included not only students,but scholars, educators and experts—was theFulbright Program, heralded by the New YorkTimes in October 1947 as “ the mostcomprehensive program of student exchangeever undertaken by any nation.”70 The projectwas inaugurated in September 1945 withArkansas Senator J. William Fulbright’samendment to the Surplus Property Act of1944, “a bill authorising use of creditsestablished through the sale of surplusproperties abroad for the promotion ofinternational good will through the exchange ofstudents in the fields of education, culture andscience.”71 Cast then and since as a literalswords-into-plowshares endeavor, it authorizedCongress to enter into agreements with foreigngovernments for the sale of abandoned “warjunk,” the credits for which, administered by bi-

national commissions, would used to fundeducational travel to and from the UnitedStates. By 1964, the program stretched to 48countries, and had involved the participation ofover 21,000 Americans, and over 30,000citizens of other countries.72

Framed in a language of mutual understanding,the Fulbright Program was also from the outsetan exercise in power. In a brilliant explorationof its early formation, Sam Lebovic maps thepolitics at the core of the early program’spractice and rhetoric: American officials’insistence on bulk sales of both usable andunusable “war junk” to fund the program; asense of “educational exchange” as equivalentto other “intangible benefits” to be gained inreturn for the sales (alongside landing rights,commercial concessions for U. S. airlines,property for embassies and free tradeagreements); and successful attempts to secureU. S. majorities, many of them with close ties tothe U. S. state, on commissions that wereostensibly “private” and “binational.”73 Whether through Americans’ sponsored travelsabroad, or foreigners’ visits to the UnitedStates, the Program’s goal was a world madesafe for American leadership through thediffusion and legitimization of “American”values and institutions.

Fulbright was himself quite clear about theProgram’s foreign policy implications in a 1951article that expressed its goals in a Cold Waridiom. Strikingly, the program’s primary endwas “not the advancement of science nor thepromotion of scholarship,” but “internationalunderstanding,” which Fulbright defined as thetwo-way breaking down of national stereotypes,with an emphasis on foreign exchangees asvectors of affirmative imagery of the UnitedStates. Of the carefully-chosen example of aGreek doctor who, having recently studied atthe Mayo Clinic, had set up a successfulhospital in Tyre, he inquired: “Cannot weexpect a man like this to be influential with hisfriends and neighbors—and his 40,000

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patients—in their attitudes toward America?” He concurred with Soviet charges that theprogram was a “clever propaganda scheme”; itwas, indeed, “one of the most effectiveweapons we have to overcome the concertedattack of the Communists.” It did so in effect byturning the whole of American society into aUSIA broadcast of sorts, based on the beliefthat “when foreigners come to our shores, whatthey see will be good.” Despite what heacknowledged were the nation’s “occasionalstrange aberrations,” Fulbright believed that iffree world peoples understood the UnitedStates, “they will throw in their lot with us.”74

While the Fulbright Program clearly drew onand helped to shape post-World War II“internationalist” practices and ideologies, italso involved the synthesis and amplification ofolder educational migration forms, practices,institutions and discourses. In its sense thateducational circuits could cement global powerrelations, it self-consciously looked to colonialand neo-colonial migrations. Fulbright would,for example, cite as sources of inspiration bothhis experience of the Rhodes Scholarship—thatgreat imperial in-gathering of Anglo-Saxons—aswell as the Boxer Indemnity Remissionscholarships, which had helped develop whathe referred to as Chinese-American“friendship.” Missionary idioms andimpulses—secularized and nationalized, to besure—were also present, in the hopes thatFulbright scholars, moving to and from theUnited States, might be agents of both thediffusion and vindication of universal Americanvalues. Closer still to the Fulbright’s surfacewere corporate-internationalist migrations,whose organizing principle had been that warcould only be prevented and “progress”realized through cross-cultural understanding,which itself could only be accomplishedthrough the proximity and “exchange” ofenlightened elites. Not surprisingly, theprogram would be administered by already-existing private organizational agencies mostresponsible for giving life to these discourses

over the previous twenty-five years, especiallythe Institute for International Education. P e r h a p s m o s t v i t a l l y f o r a n e r a o freconstruction and nation-building, theFulbright program cast itself as the supply-sideof self-strengthening, providing the universaltechniques and capacities required to constructlegitimate nation-states.

The issue of nation-building was pressedforward by the postwar collapse of Europeancolonial systems and the emergence ofindependent nation-states in Africa and Asia;both sent students to American colleges anduniversities in search of both the technicalskills with which to modernize their societies’economies and infrastructure, and of politicaland social science models of development. Writing in the New York Times in 1960 ofAsian societies, for example, Harold Taylorobserved “a desperate need for educatedleaders—in the foreign service, in domesticaffairs, in medicine, transportation, industryand, above all, in education itself.” For Taylor,Asia’s modern universities were “not merelyrepositories of knowledge and communities ofscholars”; they were, instead, themselves“agencies of social change.”75

Geoffrey Baba le Onuoha converses withtwo Tennessee farmers, Ulrich Heim

and John A. Cate, both Spanish-American

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War veterans, in 1954. A Catholic-schooleducated, secondary school teacher andpostal telegraph clerk in Lagos, he was

inspired to study in the United States by aUSIA pamphlet on the Tennessee Valley

Authority, and came to attend MorristownNormal and Industrial College, a small, all-

black junior college and high schoolmaintained by the Methodist Church. From

“Onuoha and the Good People,” Life 37(November 8, 1954).

In this context, he called on the U. S.government to provide supports—fromtranslated American classroom and librarymaterials to educational exchanges—touniversity students in Asia, who had “showntheir readiness to assume responsibility forbuilding a new society.” While Taylor himselfde-emphasized Cold War competition, manyothers (including, as we’ve seen, the Nigerianstudents) referenced the Soviet Union’seducation of the youth of decolonizing societiesand, in particular, Moscow’s Patrice LumumbaFriendship University, opened in 1960. WhileAmerican educators and journalists tended tominimize the Soviet educational threat byemphasizing reports of Soviet discriminationagainst international students of color andstudent disillusionment with the communistproject, the very presence of competing Sovieteducational circuits nonetheless heightened asense of international education’s geopoliticalurgency.

The potential political stakes in winning theyouth of the Third World were on display in a1960 project to bring 250 students from Kenyaand other British-controlled areas of EastAfrica to U. S. colleges and universities. Theeffort, coordinated by labor leader Tom Mboya,was the largest such educational “airlift” tothat point, but $100,000 in promisedtransportat ion funds from the StateDepartment fell through at the last minute,jeopardizing the students’ Fall enrollments. Intrying to make up the shortfall, Mboya had the

good fortune of a competitive U. S. presidentialrace: he first approached Richard Nixon, whoseovertures to the State Department wererebuffed, then John F. Kennedy, who possessedboth private wealth and an eagerness todemonstrate support for African independence,in part as a way to send positive messages toAfrican-Americans that did not involve bindingcivil rights commitments. The resulting“Kennedy airlift” was produced by a uniqueconfluence of events, but suggested thebroader ways that, at particular junctures ofglobal and domestic U. S. politics, studentmigration could emerge as at least a symbolicpriority. It did not, however, not solve theproblems of the Kenyans who, like manyforeign students, faced poverty in the UnitedStates.76

Baseball legend Jackie Robinson, whobacked efforts to bring African students tothe United States, greets the first "AfricanAirlift" arrivals in New York in September

1959. Photo by Daniel Nilva for theAfrican-American Students Foundation.Courtesy Library of Congress, Manuscript

Division, Jackie Robinson Papers.

It was in the context of increasing investmentsby the U. S. state, expanding student numbers,global decolonization and Cold War rivalry thatwhat were long-standing emphases on foreign

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students as future leaders and potentialinstruments of American power reached theirapogee.77 “In the cold war race to controlmen’s minds and hearts,” stated the ChicagoDe fender , i n wha t wou ld become acommonplace, “the foreign student occupies animportant place.”78 Writing in May 1954 indefense of the Smith-Mundt Act, which partiallyfunded foreign student exchanges, WalterLippmann similarly drew a tight connectionbetween foreign students and the fortunes of U.S. global power. Attracting, training andaligning the elites of the decolonizing world, hemaintained—the Nigerians in Switzer’s parlor,in a sense—held the key to victory in globalCold War competition. “In any true estimate ofthe future of the enormous masses of mankindwho are awakening, who are emerging frombondage and from ancient darkness, fromforeign and native domination,” he wrote,

we mus t p resume tha t theeducated class can be, and will be,certain to decide their direction. From these elite will come thepoliticians, the civil servants, themilitary commanders and theindustrial managers of these newcountries. What these key peopleknow, and what they believe aboutthemselves and about the rest ofthe world, is the inwardness of thewhole vast movement of historicalforces.

The key to U. S. dominion—Lippmann’s focuswas Asia and the Pacific—was the affectivecapture of these aspirants and their training in“the universal principles of freedom.” As longas the United States did not become “alienatedfrom the educated class,” a “new order ofrelations between Asia and the West” waspossible. “If that alienation is allowed tohappen,” he warned, “as some of our stupidestp h i l i s t i n e s d o t h e i r b e s t t o m a k ehappen—armies and weapons and pacts and

money will be of no avail.”79

While the hope of turning student flows intonetworks of influence was more consistentlyarticulated during the post-World War IIperiod, this did not make the goal any easier torealize in practical terms. For one, there wereinstitutional tensions that had to be worked outin the corporatist nexus between state andprivate agencies. To be sure, there wereabiding reciprocities here: since the late-1930s,private organizations like the IIE had turnedeagerly to the state for sponsorship, and stateagencies had looked to the educational privatesector initially as an administrative necessityand, in the postwar period, as a virtue: theprivate-sector face of international educationeither distinguished the U. S. state’s “cultural”programming from “propaganda”—theinformational praxis of the Communistother—or, at the very least, projected theimage of non-propaganda. (It was telling thatthe distinction here was often not drawn veryclearly.)

But while the interests of state and private-sector proponents partly overlapped, therewere also places where they failed to fullyalign. Whether for reasons of professionalautonomy or “internationalist” sensibility,university educators and foreign studentadvisors, for example, tended not to share theState Department’s enthusiasm for fusing“educational” and “informational” programs.80 Indeed, educational associations lobbiedactively for the formal separation of thesefunctions; Laurence Duggan, head of the IIEbeginning in 1946, for example, wrote to theAssistant Secretary of State expressing hisconcern that student fellowships “must not be ameans whereby out government hopes toinfluence foreign students in the United statesin favor of particular policies and programs.”81 While the division here was not trivial, itsometimes mapped onto the distinctionbetween debated means and agreed-upon endsor, put temporally, between “short-term” and

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“long-term” strategies: many if not allinternational educators expressed hopes thatthe fragile desiderata of diffusion andlegitimacy might be realized, perhaps moreslowly, on their “own,” while they might bethreatened precisely by too heavy an“informational” hand. The struggle appears tohave been resolved through nominalconcessions to “educational” autonomy. TheState Department’s Office of EducationalExchange established two sub-divisions, the“informational” Division of Libraries andInstitutes and the “educational” Division ofInternational Exchange of Persons that, inpractice, worked closely together.

There was also, more fundamentally, theproblem of the U. S. state’s political andfinancial support for “student exchange” in thefirst place. While its advocates advanced anti-Communist arguments, so did its detractors:Senator Joseph McCarthy, among others, sawin such programs the undesirable government-sponsored attraction of student-subversives toAmerican shores. While the 1947 UnitedStates Information and Educational ExchangeAct, or Smith-Mundt Act, had authorizedannual Congressional appropriations to supporteducational and cultural programs, throughoutthe 1950s, Congress sliced back requestedbudgets for educational exchange programs(even as “informational” budgets grew),prompting public campaigns in their defense bya wide range of educators, journalists andpolitical f igures. While never merelyinstrumental, the Cold War idioms of advocateslike Fulbright and Lippmann should be read inpart in the context of budgetary battles theyoften lost. Supportive presidents made adifference: the Kennedy administration’sactivism in defense of educational exchange,together with a more hospitable Congressionalenvironment (one that included Fulbright asthe chair of the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee), made possible the passage of thetransformative 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act which,implementing the suggestions of a task force in

which NAFSA had played a key part, was toprovide funds to improve and extend services,training and orientation programs forinternational students.

In two major shifts, Fulbright-Hayesdramatically widened the scope of governmentsupport to all international students, ratherthan just U. S. government-financed ones (whomade up less than 10% of all internationalstudents), and simultaneously shifted programrhetoric from the Smith-Mundt Act’s pursuit of“a better understanding of the United States inother countries” toward a new emphasis onpromoting “mutual understanding between thepeople of the United States and the people ofother countries.”82 The 1966 InternationalEducation Act, sponsored by the Johnsonadministration, similarly authorized ambitiousprograms for both the support of internationalstudents in the United States and the expansionof international studies programs on Americancollege campuses. But in both cases, Congressfailed to appropriate the necessary funds. Bythe late 1960s, Johnson’s internationalism wasfocused violently on Southeast Asia;educational priorities among both politiciansand philanthropists were turning towardsdomestic, Great Society project from which,many assumed, international students mightdrain resources. While vocal, the studentexchange lobby could ultimately not competewith these other agendas. And perhaps it wasalso the case that, by the late-1960s, collegecampuses themselves seemed sub-optimal assettings for the inculcation of consensual, ColdWar values.

Finally, there was the problem of audience:foreign students could not be made into agentsof American power successfully (if at all)without their also becoming witnesses. Indeed,from early in the 20th century, proponents ofinternational education had concluded that, incausal terms, legitimacy came before diffusion:students would scarcely desire to transmit thepractices, values and institutions of a society

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that they had not come to respect. WhileFulbright and others confidently assumed thatthe warm bath of American society would(mostly) on its own vaccinate internationalstudents against Communist doctrine—or evendissolve ideological encrustations—the problemof student attitudes towards American societyalso became one of heightened concern in the1950s and 1960s. “What these foreignstudents think of us may matter even more inthe future than it does today, for they are apicked group,” the author and editor W. L.White observed in 1951, noting that the currentPresident of Ecuador, the Lebanese chairmanof the UN Human Rights Commission,Afghanistan’s General Director of Labor, andthe Guatemalan Minister of Commerce, had allonce studied in the United States. Presuming avertical, diffusionist model of society, observersthen assumed that this American-trained globalelite would automatically and successfullytransmit its perceptions throughout society.“Soon they will return to their native lands,”wrote White, “spreading over the earth’s sixcontinents what they now are seeing, learningand feeling about America.”83 Impressionsreceived would be “carried back to theuniversities and shops of their homelands,”predicted the New York Times, “to be spread, ifgood, like bountiful propaganda; if bad, like afestering virus.”84

If this anxiety was animated in part by thegrowing presence of foreign students inAmerican colleges and campus communities, italso coincided with the advent of foreignstudent advising as its own profession. If theydid not exactly invent what was sometimescalled the “foreign student problem,” advisorswould play a unique role in defining andaddressing it. And many came asking:throughout the 1950s and 1960s, surveying theattitudes and opinions of international studentsdeveloped into something of a cottage industryamong educational agencies and academicsocial scientists and their graduate students. As research, it had the advantages of apparent

novelty, “naturally” divisible populations (oftendelineated either by campus, or by nationalityor region of origin, or both) and, without toomuch difficulty, a sense of geopoliticalrelevance, often front-loaded in introductions. In surveyors’ queries, one can read alandscape of curiosity and vulnerability: a self-consciousness and sensitivity about Americanpolitical systems, consumer cultures, genderand sexual norms and, closest to home, aboutcollege institutions and attitudes aboutforeigners. While students’ responses were, ofcourse, bounded by the questions asked, thesurveys and studies that resulted from themalso registered them as agents upon whoseopinions of American society, at a particularglobal conjuncture, a great deal seemed tohinge. If students were a probing audience toAmerican society, including to what Fulbrighthimself had elusively called the “occasionalstrange aberrations” in American life, theproblem became how best to direct students’attention, insulating them from Lippmann’s“philistines” and failing that, managingstudents’ impressions of them.85

It was in this context that problems of raceassumed great prominence. The Nigerians ofMcPherson, Kansas were not alone: throughoutf irst two-thirds of the 20th century,approximately half of the students traveling tothe United States were people for whomvacancy signs tended to vanish in Americancities, and who could be casually consigned tothe backs of buses throughout the South. Andmany students who were not directly victimizedby race were onlookers: for 27% of studentssurveyed in 1961, it topped the list of American“shortcomings” (followed by “intolerance offoreigners”); 12% identified it as “personalproblem.” Some students, prepared by massmedia in their home countries, had bracedthemselves to witness and experiencesegregationist culture, although for 29% ofthose surveyed, things were worse on theground than they had anticipated.86

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International students frequentlyencountered signs like this one in bus and

train stations and other publicaccommodations throughout the South,whether in residence there, or travelingthrough on vacations; students of colorwere often denied equal access to these

facilities. When polled in 1961, studentsregistered racial discrimination and"intolerance of foreigners" as among

Americans' chief flaws. Foreign studentadvisors worked constantly to mitigate

discrimination and often explained it awayas a limited, fading and superficial aspect

of American democracy.

International students of color encounteredforms of racial exclusion on summer travelsand field trips—a site of particular trepidationfor foreign student advisors—but also at theheart of campus rituals, as when, at a June1924 college graduation ceremony in Colorado,white female graduates refused to march inpairs with Chinese male graduates who, as aresult, were asked to march with each other.87 No problem was more immediate or intractablethan the search for acceptable lodging inracially divided housing markets. One limitedsolution involved the formation of InternationalHouses which, beginning in the 1920s, broughttogether American and international studentsunder a single campus roof, simultaneouslyexpressions of “international” idealism andcosmopolitan withdrawal in the face ofresidential segregation. “No one blinked at thefact that a lack of adequate housing and

discrimination against foreign students werefactors which made the Houses desirable,”wrote Gertrude Samuels of New York’s I-Housein 1949.88

I t w a s c l e a r t o m a n y t h a t f o r e i g nstudents—whether as sufferers or observers ofrac ia l d i scr iminat ion in the Uni tedStates—might take away with them impressionsof democracy’s racial limits that mighteventually jeopardize the nation’s legitimacybefore world audiences. Especially in the post-World War II period, concerted efforts wereundertaken to explain racial discrimination inthe United States as a residual and graduallyeroding reality, perhaps one of Fulbright’s“strange aberrations.” In December 1951, forexample, the American Field Service, whichcoordinated year-long high school exchanges,took eighty European teenagers to the HarlemYMCA, where they “heard informal reports onvarious phases of Negro life in New York and inthis country.” The presentations, by Edward S.Lewis, executive director of New York’s UrbanLeague; Thomas Watkins, editor of theAmsterdam News; and two officials from theHarlem YMCA itself, told of “continueddiscrimination and gradual progress.” Lewisstated outright that the program’s purpose wasto address what he called the “’weak point indemocracy’s armor’” vis a vis Communistpropaganda, and “to correct any stereotypedimpressions among the visitors.” “’Why doesn’tthe United States help its own people first,rather than worry about the rest of the world?’”one student asked. After noting that activeefforts were underway to improve African-Americans’ standing in the United States,Lewis observed that “’Americans realize thatwhat is happening in the rest of the world isjust as important as what is happening in thiscountry. We know that our survival as a nationdepends upon what happens elsewhere.’”89

Rozella Switzer’s approach to these issues wassomewhat more confrontational. Over theweeks following her kaffe klatsch with the

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Nigerians, she apparently “moved throughMcPherson as relentlessly as a combine.” Her“crusade” began with an urgent call to thedepartment store manager, whom shepersuaded, along with three other merchants,to align each of the students with the gift of anew suit, overcoat and gloves. Switzer thentook her message—“’We've got a chance towhip some Communists, and all we have to dois act like Christians’”—to barber shops, theRitz movie-house and even the AmericanLeg ion , one o f whose members she“buttonholed,” telling him, “’I'm going to makea decent guy out of you if it takes all nextyear.’"

Switzer met resistance, as when Shorty, theonly barber in town that she had convinced tocut the Nigerians’ hair, was boycotted by whitecustomers and criticized by preachers. But bythe following December, when her story couldbe narrated as a modern-day parable ofChristmas hospitality on the pages of Time(replete with the Nigerians, “some of them innative costume” caroling with other collegestudents), Switzer’s (and the students’) “one-town skirmish” had achieved some modestresults.90 Restaurants and the movie house hadopened their seating to the Africans (althoughwhether this extended to the town’s 23 non-African black people remained unclear); highschool students in a social science class hadgone “to check up on race relations” in thecommunity. The Nigerians were still traveling35 miles to get their hair cut, but localmerchants had promised to “look into thebarbershop situation.”91

For Time, the biggest change had beenMcPherson’s unconscious “cast[ing] aside itsold measurements of comfortable solidity.” Inthis, the magazine predictably read theembattled world power into the tiny Kansastown. “”Challenged by a fragment of theworld’s demand on the U. S., McPherson wastrying—as a whole humble people wastrying—to ‘act like Christians’ and measure

up.”92 If the magazine’s desire to see theempire in small - town microcosm wasmisguided—as was its characterist ictrumpeting of humility—the article also told thestory of students who had managed, in aparticular global context, to leverage theexpectations and mandates of diffusion andlegitimation, in whatever small ways, intorecognition and opening. Unforeseen, unbiddenand uneven, here, perhaps, was something likeexchange.

While the dynamics of international studentmigration to the United States would changeafter the 1960s, in ways that can only besketched briefly here, the debate on thepresence of foreign students in Americansociety would often remained grounded ingeopolitical concerns. During this period, thelabor and technical demands of newly-industrializing regions drew internationalstudents to American colleges and universitiesin unprecedented numbers. As many publicuniversities experienced neo-liberal budgetcutbacks, particularly during and after the1980s, they became increasingly reliant onforeign student tuitions and enrollments tosustain revenue streams and the demand forkey programs, especially in engineering,computer science and mathematics. Also overthese decades, along with other new tasks thatuniversities took on as service providers forcorporations, they emerged as major placementcenters for highly trained labor. For manyobservers, the United States’ very success inattracting, training and employing foreignstudents—in a progressively more competitive,global educational environment—was both anindex and precondition of “American” nationalstrength.

But this part icular understanding ofeducational power would be challenged in thewake of terrorist attacks, particularly afterSeptember 11th and the realization that two ofthe hijackers, having entered the country ontourist visas, had been sent student visas at a

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Florida flight school.9 3 Calls for moreaggressive government surveillance andmonitoring of foreign students, understood bymany to be a population disproportionatelythreatening to the “homeland,” were met withcritical responses, particularly by universityofficials and foreign student advisors. Facedwith burdensome new regulations (sometimesracially inflected in practice), they maintained,talented students would simply pursue optionsin more open societies and their labor markets;in doing so, they would strip Americanuniversities and corporations of their skills, andthe larger consumer society of their actual andpotential earning power. Updating century-olddiscourses, the proponents of openness arguedthat international students, in fact, enhancedAmerican power, particularly as carriers ofAmerican practices and institutions, and ofpositive imagery about American society. “People-to-people diplomacy, created throughinternational education and exchanges,” statedSecretary of State Colin Powell in August 2002,“is critical to our national interests.”94 Thestruggle between proponents of what might becalled the empire of the homeland and theempire of the talent pool was not resolvedduring the first decade of the 21st century; thequestion of how deeply international studentswould transform both American global powerand domestic society remained open. Some ofthem, and some of their children—one Kenyan-Kansan from Hawaii and Indonesia comes tomind—would go far.

Paul A. Kramer is an associate professor ofhistory at Vanderbilt University, and the authorof The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, theUnited States and the Philippines (University ofNorth Carolina Press; Ateneo de ManilaUniversity Press, 2006), which was awardedthe Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize from theSociety for Historians of American ForeignRelations, and the James Rawley Prize from theOrganization of American Historians. The co-

editor of the Cornell University Press bookseries “The United States in the World,” he iscurrently at work on an imperial history of U.S. racial politics from the 1860s through the1960s. His web-site can be found here.

This is a revised version of an article that waspublished in Diplomatic History, 33, 5 (2009).

Recommended citation: Paul A. Kramer,"International Students and U.S. Global Powerin the Long 20th Century," The Asia-PacificJournal, 3-3-10, January 18, 2010.

Notes

I would like to thank Liping Bu, Rotem Giladi,Damon Salesa, Dirk Bonker and Sam Lebovicfor their insights, comments and criticisms, andVera Ekechukwu for her research and archivalassistance. Any errors are my own.

1 “The One-Town Skirmish,” Time, December29, 1952.

2 “The One-Town Skirmish.”

3 For the purposes of this paper, the term“student” largely refers to those attendingcolleges and universities, rather thanparticipating in other kinds of training. Despitetheir different connotations, I use the terms“foreign student” and “international student”interchangeably; the former term was morecommonly used in my sources to refer tostudents whose origins lay outside the UnitedStates. I use the term “student migration”rather than the more common term, “studentexchange” because of its narrower, and moreaccurate , sense o f the character o finternational student travel.

4 In my future research, I intend to approachstudent migration using the lens of empire. Forworks that examine the relationships betweenuniversities, knowledge-production andAmerican foreign relations see, for example,David C. Engerman, “American Knowledge and

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Global Power,” Diplomatic History 31:4(September 2007), 599-622; Noam Chomsky,et. al., The Cold War and the University:Toward an Intellectual History of the PostwarYears (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).

5 On modernization, see Nils Gilman,Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theoryin Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 2003); Michael Latham,Modernization as Ideology: American SocialScience and “Nation Building” in the KennedyEra (Chapel Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, 2000); David C. Engerman, et. al., eds.,Staging Growth: Modernization, Development,and the Global Cold War (Amherst: Universityof Massachusetts Press, 2003); David C.Engerman, Modernization from the OtherShore: American Intellectuals and the Romanceof Russian Development (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 2003). For a recent specialissue on the global history of modernization,see Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 3 (June2 0 0 9 ) . O n t h e h i s t o r i o g r a p h y o f“Americanization,” see Heide Fehrenbach andUta G. Poiger, “Americanization Reconsidered,”in Fehrenbach and Poiger, eds., Transactions,Transgressions, Transformations: AmericanCulture in Western Europe and Japan (NewYork: Berghahn Books, 2000), pp. xiii-xl; MaryNolan, “Americanization as a Paradigm forGerman History,” in Mark Roseman, HannaSchissler and Frank Beiss, eds., Conflict,Catastrophe and Continuity in Modern GermanHistory (New York: Berghan Books, 2006), pp.200-220; Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “Shameon U. S.? Academics, Cultural Transfer and theCold War: A Critical Review,” DiplomaticHistory, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer 2000), pp.465-94, and responses.

6 On the connections between the Cold War, theblack freedom struggle and civil rights politics,see esp. Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold Warand the Color Line: American Race Relations inthe Global Arena (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 2001); Mary Dudziak, Cold

War Civil Rights: Race and the Image ofAmerican Democracy (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2000); James Meriwether,Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americansand Africa, 1935-1961 (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press, 2002); Brenda GaylePlummer, ed., Window on Freedom: Race, CivilRights and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988 (ChapelHill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003);Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: BlackAmericans and U. S. Foreign Relations,1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press, 1996); Kevin Gaines, AmericanAfricans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and theCivil Rights Era (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina, 2006); Nikhil Pal Singh, Blackis a Country: Race and the Unfinished Strugglefor Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 2004).

7 Some of the key works in the burgeoning fieldof “cultural diplomacy” and “public diplomacy”studies include Laura A. Belmonte, Selling theAmerican Way: U. S. Propaganda and the ColdWar (Philadelphia: University of PennsylvaniaPress, 2008); Nicholas Cull, Cold War and theUnited States Informational Agency: AmericanPropaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2008); Penny Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Upthe World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004);Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, TransmissionImpossible: American Journalism as CulturalDiplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955(Louisiana State University Press, 1999);Walter Hixson, Part ing the Curtain:Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War,1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,1997), and foundational work in this field,Frank Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U. S.Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations,1938-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1981). For an exchange on publicdiplomacy scholarship, see American Quarterly,Vol. 57, No. 2 (2005).

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8 To make U. S.-centered student migrationsfully legible will ultimately require rigorouscomparative work situating the U. S. case inthe context of other educational metropoles. On the British context and colonial and post-colonial student migrations, for example, seeHakim Adi , West Afr icans in Britain,1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan-Africanism, andCommunism (London: Lawrence and Wishart,1998); Lloyd Braithwaite, Colonial West IndianStudents in Britain (Kingston: University of theWest Indies Press, 2001); Amar Kumar Singh,Indian Students in Britain (New York: AsianPublishing House, 1963). For comparativea p p r o a c h e s , s e e H a n s d e W i t ,Internationalization of Higher Education in theUnited States of America and Europe: AHistorical, Comparative, and ConceptualAnalysis (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,2002); Otto Klineberg, et. al., InternationalEducational Exchange: An Assessment of ItsNature and Its Prospects (The Hague: Mouton,1976).

9 Liping Bu, Making the World Like Us:Education, Cultural Expansion, and theAmerican Century (Westport, Conn.: Praeger,2003). See also Jennifer Leigh Gold, “Color andConscience: Student Internationalism in theUnited States and the Challenges of Race andNationality, 1886-1965” (PhD dissertation, UCBerkeley, 2002). For a recent textbookoverview, see Teresa Brawner Bevis andChristopher J. Lucas, International Students inAmerican Colleges and Universities: A History(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

10 See, for example, Hongshan Li’s excellent U.S.-China Educational Exchange: State, Society,and Intercultural Relations, 1905-1950 (NewBrunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008).

11 The exemplary work here is Weili Ye, SeekingModernity in China’s Name: Chinese Studentsin the United States, 1900-1927 (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 2001).

12 The classic example of such an in-househistory would be Walter Johnson and Francis J.Colligan, The Fulbright Program: A History(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

13 The quotation is commonly attributed toRobert Oppenheimer, although I have beenunable to track down the original source.

14 Clifford Ketzel, “Exchange of Persons andAmerican Foreign Policy: The Foreign Leaderprogram of the Department of State” (PhD,University of California, 1955), p. 70, quoted inGiles Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire: The U.S. State Department’s Foreign Leader Programin the Netherlands, France, and Britain,1950-1970 (Brussels: P. I. E. Peter Land, 2008),p. 28.

15 See, for example, Jonathan Zimmerman,Innocents Abroad: American Teachers in theAmerican Century (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 2006); Motoe Sasaki-Gayle,“American New Women Encounter China: ThePolitics of Temporality and the Paradoxes ofImperial ism, 1898-1927,” Journal ofColonialism and Colonial History, Vol. 10, No. 1(Spring 2009); Elizabeth Cobbs-Hoffman, AllYou Need is Love: The Peace Corps and theSpirit of the 1960s (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1998); Merle Curti andKendall Birr, Prelude to Point Four: AmericanTechnical Missions Overseas, 1838-1938(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1954).U. S. students were, of course, also studyingabroad. See, for example, Whitney Walton,“Internationalism and the Junior Year Abroad:American Students in France in the 1920s and1930s,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 2(2005), pp. 255-78. Especially after World WarII many programs, notably Fulbright, wouldsponsor educational travel abroad by Americanscholars and students as well as travel to theUnited States.

16 Institutional connections between early 20thcentury “internationalist” programs and U. S.-

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government sponsored ones are alsoemphasized in both Bu and Gold.

1 7 On corporatism, see Michael Hogan,“Corporatism,” in Michael J. Hogan andThomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining theHistory of American Foreign Relations (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.226-36.

18 This discourse linking international studentsin the United States to U. S. global influencecontinues down to the present: the website ofthe U. S. Department of State announces that“Tomorrow’s Leaders are Being Educated inthe U. S. Today” above a list of 207 current andpast foreign leaders who are graduates of U. S.col leges and universit ies at both theundergraduate and graduate level. Seehttp://www.educationusa.state.gov/home/education-usa/global- left-nav/information-for-u/international-students-yesterday---foreign-leaders-today3

19 On Nkrumah’s career at Lincoln University,see John Henrik Clarke, “Kwame Nkrumah: HisYears in America,” Black Scholar, Vol. 6, No. 2(1974), pp. 9-16.

20 The Egyptian philosopher Said Qtub traveledto the United States between 1948 and 1950 ona scholarship to study the U. S. educationalsystem, spending time in Washington, DC andin Greeley, Colorado at the Colorado StateCollege of Education. In his writings, he woulddevelop an intensely critical stance onAmerican life and culture, emphasizing itsdecadence, immorality and materialism. Hiswork would later inspire Al Qaeda. On Qtub,see Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: AlQaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf,2007).

21 On Americans in German universities in thelate 19th and early 20th centuries and theirengagement with European social politics, seeDaniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: SocialPolitics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge;

London: Belknap Press of Harvard UniversityPress, 1998); Dorothy Ross, The Origins ofAmerican Social Science (New York:Cambridge Univers i ty Press, 1991);Christopher John Bernet, ''Die Wanderjahre’:The Higher Education of American Students inGerman Universities, 1870-1914,” (PhDdissertation, SUNY Stonybrook, 1984).

22 Examples of two very different sendingsocieties whose students arrived with self-strengthening aspirations in the United Stateswould be Japan and Cuba. On Japan, see JamesThomas Conte, “Overseas Study in the MeijiPeriod: Japanese Students in America,1867-1902,” (PhD dissertation, PrincetonUniversity, 1977). On Cuba, see Louis A. Perez,On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality andCulture (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press, 1999), passim. In the Africancontext, Tuskegee Institute emerged in manysettings as what can be called a “self-s t reng then ing” mode l , desp i t e i t saccommodationist politics in the United States. See Michael O. West, “The Tuskegee Model ofDevelopment in Africa: Another Dimension ofthe African/African-American Connection,”Diplomatic History, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1992), pp.371-87. For American figures influenced byTuskegee, see Richard D. Ralston, “AmericanEpisodes in the Making of an African Leader: ACase Study of Alfred B. Xuma (1893-1962),”International Journal of African HistoricalStudies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1973), pp. 72-93; ThomasC. Howard, “West Africa and the AmericanSouth: Notes on James E. K. Aggrey and theIdea of a University for West Africa,” Journal ofAfrican Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1975-6), pp.445-66.

23 On the Chinese Educational Mission, seeThomas LaFargue, China’s First Hundred:Educational Mission Students in the UnitedStates, 1872-1881 (Pullman: Washington StateUniversity Press, 1987 [1942]). For portraits ofits architects and supervisors, see Edmund H.Worthy, Jr., “Yung Wing in America,” Pacific

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Historical Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1965):265-87; Edward J. M. Rhoads, “In the Shadowof Yung Wing: Zeng Laishun and the ChineseEducational Mission to the United States,”Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (2005):19-58. The mission was intimately tied toChina’s first diplomatic delegations to theWestern hemisphere: see Charles Desnoyers,“’The Thin Edge of the Wedge’: The ChineseEducational Mission and DiplomaticRepresentation in the Americas, 1872-1975,”Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1992),pp. 241-63.

24 “Japan’s Annapolis Graduates,” New YorkTimes, February 13, 1904, p. 2.

25 “Costa Rican Middy Let In,” New York Times,March 3, 1905, p. 1; “Chinese at West Point,”New York Times, June 16, 1905, p. 3; “FearsTraining Foreigners,” Washington Post, March22, 1912, p. 4.

26 “Persian for West Point: Congress Expectedto Grant Request for Entrance to ForeignStudents,” New York Times, July 13, 1913, p. 2.

27 See LaFargue, China’s First Hundred.

28 “Japan’s Annapolis Graduates”; “Uriu,Admiral of Japan; Career in America and HisNative Country of ‘The Mahan of the Mikado’sNavy,” New York Times, February 21, 1904, p.SM7; “Annapolis Graduate Premier of Japan,”New York Times, February 13, 1913, p. 4. Cross-national naval training of this kind wasone element of a transnational navalist politicswhose German-American axis is explored byDirk Bonker in “Militarizing the WesternWorld: Navalism, Empire, and State-Building inGermany and the United States before WorldWar I,” (PhD dissertation, Johns HopkinsUniversity, 2002).

29 Thomas J. Schaeper and Kathleen Schaeper,Cowboys into Gentlemen: Rhodes Scholars,Oxford, and the Question of an American Elite(New York: Berghan Books, 1998). On early

20th century inter-imperial dialogue betweenthe British Empire and the United States andits Anglo-Saxonist racial frame, see Paul A.Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule Between the British andU. S. Empires, 1880-1910,” Journal of AmericanHistory, Vol. 88 (March 2002), pp. 1315-53.

30 For colonial and neo-colonial educationalprograms between the United States and theCaribbean, see, especially, Louis A. Perez, “TheImperial Design: Politics and Pedagogy inOccup ied Cuba , 1899 -1902” CubanStudies/Estudios Cubanos, Vol. 12 (Summer1982), 1-19; Edward D. Fitchen, “The CubanTeachers and Harvard, 1900: An EarlyExperiment in Inter-American CulturalExchange,” Horizontes: Revista de laUniversidad Catolica de Puerto Rico, Vol. 26(1973), 67-71; Solsirée Del Moral, “NegotiatingColonialism: ‘Race,” Class, and Education inEarly Twentieth-Century Puerto Rico,” in AlfredW. McCoy and Francisco Scarano, eds.,Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of theModern American State (Madison: University ofWisconsin Press, 2009), pp. 135-144; PabloNavarro-Rivera, “The Imperial Enterprise andEducational Policies in Puerto Rico,” in AlfredW. McCoy and Francisco Scarano, eds.,Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of theModern American State (Madison: University ofWisconsin Press, 2009), pp. 163-174.

31 “Work for Islanders: Employment for OurNewly Acquired Peoples,” Washington Post, p.27; “Agree on Filipino Act,” Washington Post,p. 4.

3 2 H. Michael Gelfand, Sea Change atAnnapolis: The United States Naval Academy,1949-2000 (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press, 2006), p. 48.

33 On the pensionado program and Filipinostudents in the United States, see KimberlyAlidio, “Between Civilizing Mission and EthnicAssimilation: Racial Discourse, U. S. Colonial

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Education and Filipino Ethnicity, 1901-1946”(PhD dissertation, University of Michigan,2001), chapter 3; Charles Hawley, “’SavageGentlemen’: Filipinos and Colonial Subjectivityin the United States, 1903-1946,” (PhDdissertation, University of Iowa, 2000), chapter1; Lawrence Lawcock, “Filipino Students in theUnited States and the Philippine IndependenceMovement, 1900-1935,” (PhD dissertation,University of California at Berkeley, 1975);Emily Lawsin, “Pensionados, Paisanos, andPinoys: An Analysis of the Filipino StudentBulletin, 1922-1939,” Filipino AmericanNational Historical Society Journal, Vol. 4(1996) 33-33P, 50-50G; Noel V. Teodoro,“Pensionados and Workers: The Filipinos in theUnited States, 1903-1956,” Asian and PacificMigration Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (1999):157-78. For a period sociological report, seeLeopoldo T. Ruiz, “Filipino Students in theUnited States,” (MA thesis, ColumbiaUniversity, 1924). On the role of education inFilipino travel to Seattle, see Dorothy B. Fujita-Rony, American Workers, Colonial Power:Philippine Seattle and the Transpacific West,1919-1941 (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 2003), chapters 2. On Filipino studentswho remained in Chicago, see Barbara M.Posadas and Roland L. Guyotte, “UnintentionalImmigrants: Chicago’s Filipino ForeignStudents Become Settlers, 1900-1941,” Journalof American Ethnic History, Vol. 9, No. 2(1990): 26-48. Sutherland quote from Hawley,p. 35.

34 On the Boxer Indemnity Remission, seeMichael Hunt, “The American Remission of theBoxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal,” Journal ofAsian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1972): 539-60;Richard H. Werking, “The Boxer IndemnityRemission and the Hunt Thesis,” DiplomaticHistory, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1978): 103-6; Delber L.McKee, “The Boxer Indemnity Remission: ADamage Control Device?” Newsletter of theSociety for Historians of American ForeignRelations, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1991): 1-19. On boththe Remission and the Qinghua School, see

Hongshan Li, U. S.-China EducationalExchange. On returned students, see EdwinClausen, “The Eagle’s Shadow: ChineseNationalism and American EducationalInfluence, 1900-1927,” Asian Profile, Vol. 16,No. 5 (1988), pp. 413-28; Edwin Clausen,“Nationalism and Political Challenge: ChineseStudents, American Education and the End ofan Era,” Asian Profile, Vol. 16, No. 5 (1988), pp.429-440; Yung-Chen Chaing, “Chinese Studentsin America in the Early Twentieth-Century:Preliminary Reflections on a Research Topic,”Chinese Studies in History, Vol. 36, No. 3(2003), pp. 38-62; Yung-chen Chiang, “ChineseStudents Educated in the United States and theEmergence of Chinese Orientalism in the EarlyTwentieth Century,” Taiwan Journal of EastAsian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2004), pp. 37-76.

35 The literature on the American missionarymovement in the late-19th and early 20thcenturies is extensive. For some of theprincipal works, see William R. Hutchinson,Errand to the World: American ProtestantThought and Foreign Missions (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1987); Daniel H.Bays and Grant Wacker, eds., The ForeignMissionary Enterprise at Home: Explorations inNorth American Cultural History (Tuscaloosa:University of Alabama Press, 2003); UssamaMakdisi, Artillery of Heaven: AmericanMissionaries and the Failed Conversion of theMiddle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2008). On U. S.-China missions, see JaneHunter, The Gospel of Gentility: AmericanWomen Missionaries in Turn-of-the-CenturyChina (New Haven: Yale University Press,1984); Valentin H. Rabe, The Home Base ofAmerica China Miss ions, 1880-1920(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978);Lian Xi, The Conversion of Missionaries:Liberalism in American Protestant Missions inChina, 1907-1932 (Univers i ty Park:Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). OnChinese-American missionary education, seeDaniel H. Bays and Ellen Widmer, China’sChristian Colleges: Cross-Cultural Connections,

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1900-1950 (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 2009); Jessie Gregory Lutz, China andthe Christian Colleges, 1850-1950 (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1971). For onelasting international connection that wasinaugurated with missionary work, see David A.Heinlein, “The New Brunswick-JapanConnection: A History,” Journal of the RutgersUniversity Libraries, Vol. 52, No. 2 (1990), pp.1-20.

36 The specific mechanisms through whichoverseas U. S. missionaries channeled studentsto U. S. colleges remains to be exploredfurther. Dr. L. H. Pammel, president of theAssociation of Cosmopolitan Clubs of America,noted in the 1925 survey that “foreign studentsreturning to their country often recommendedthe particular institution they attended, orsome missionary in a foreign country speakshighly of a certain institution. The MethodistChurch directs foreign students from Methodistmissions to attend its institutions in thiscountry. The Presbyterian, Episcopal, andother colleges do likewise.” W. ReginaldWheeler, Henry H. King and Alexander B.Davidson, eds., The Foreign Student inAmerica: A Study by the Commission on Surveyof Foreign Students in the United States ofAmerica, under the Auspices of the FriendlyRelations Committees of the Young Men’sChristian Association and the Young Women’sChristian Association (New York: AssociationPress, 1925), 270.

37 Wheeler, et. al., eds., The Foreign Student inAmerica, xiii.

38 Walter L. Williams, “Ethnic Relations ofAfrican Students in the United States, withBlack Americans, 1870-1900,” The Journal ofNegro History, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 1980),pp. 228-49. On African-American missions toAfrica, see Sylvia M. Jacobs, ed., BlackAmericans and the Missionary Movement inAfrica (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,1982).

39 On the Committee on Friendly Relationsamong Foreign Students, see Bu, Making theWorld Like Us, esp. chapter 1; Gold, “Color andConscience.”

40 See, for example, the annual reports of theCommittee on Friendly Relations which containreports from Chinese, Japanese, Korean andFilipino Protestant associations. UnofficialAmbassadors (New York: Committee onFriendly Relations among Foreign Students,1929-1953). On the Chinese Students ChristianAssociation (CSCA), see Timothy Tseng,“Religious Liberalism, International Politics,and Diasporic Realities: The Chinese StudentsChristian Association of North America,1909-1951,” Journal of American-East AsianRelations, Vol. 5, No. 3-4 (1996), pp. 305-330.

41 For an account of corporate-internationalistideology in Euro-American projections, seeVictoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire:America’s Advance through Twentieth-CenturyEurope (Cambridge: Belknap Press of HarvardUniversity Press, 2005).

42 On the history of the IIE, see Stephen MarkHalpern, “The Institute of InternationalEducation: A History” (PhD dissertation,Columbia University, 1969); Bu, Making theWorld Like Us, esp. chapter 2.

43 On Rotary, see Brendan Goff, “The HeartlandAbroad: The Rotary Club’s Mission of CivicInternationalism” (PhD dissertation, Universityof Michigan, 2008).

44 For German-American encounters, see MaryNolan, Visions of Modernity: AmericanBusiness and the Modernization of Germany(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

45 On tensions at the intersection of U. S. andEuropean cultures of commerce, see De Grazia,passim.

46 For worried reflections on precisely thesereactions to American culture and society, see

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Wheeler, et. al., eds., passim.

47 For disillusioned Filipino migrants see, forexample, Paul A. Kramer, The Blood ofGovernment: Race, Empire, the United Statesand the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 2006), pp. 402-7.

48 New York Times, October 24, 1906, p. 9.

49 “Fears Training Foreigners.”

50 “Against Philippine Policy,” Washington Post,March 27, 1908; “Filipino Army Officers,”Washington Post, May 28, 1908, p. 6.

51 On the rise of anti-immigrant politics in thelate-19th and early 20th centuries, see JohnHigham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns ofAmerican Nativism, 1860-1925 (NewBrunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988).

52 On the tensions between exclusionists andpromoters of Chinese student migration to theUnited States, see Qingjia Edward Wang,“Guests from the Open Door: The Reception ofChinese Students into the United States,1900s-1920s,” Journal of American-East AsianRelations, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1994), pp. 55-76.

5 3 On the 1924 Johnson-Reed act andsubsequent exclusionary state, see Mae Ngai,Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and theMaking of Modern America (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2004).

54 The IIE, for example, compiled a guide toimmigration laws as they applied to foreignstudents, for the use of both students and theiradvisors. Ruth Crawford Mitchell, ForeignStudents and the Immigration Laws of theUnited States (New York: Institute ofInternational Education, 1930).

55 For the pre-1912 period, I rely on theinformal surveys published by Rudolf Tombo in1905, 1906, 1907, 1909, and 1912 in Science. See Tombo’s similarly-titled articles: Science,

Vol. 22, No. 562, (Oct. 6, 1905), pp. 424-8; Science, Vol. 24, No. 606 (Aug. 10, 1906), pp.166-73; Science, Vol. 26, No. 656 (Jul. 26,1907), pp. 97-104; Science, Vol. 30, No. 770(October 1, 1909), pp. 427-35; Science, Vol. 36,No. 930 (Oct. 25, 1912), pp. 543-50.

56 As I pursue this research further, I hope tobuild in both a gender analysis and a discussionof the distinctiveness of female students’experiences in the United States. To date, thehistoriography of female students from outsidethe United States is limited. For a notableexception, see Huping Ling, “A History ofChinese Female Students in the United States,1880s-1990s,” Journal of American EthnicHistory, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1997), pp. 81-109.

57 On U. S.-Latin American cultural programs,see Manuel Espinosa, Inter-AmericanBeginnings of U. S. Cultural Diplomacy,1936-1948 (Washington, DC; U. S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1976). For an insider’s accountof wartime Chinese-American educationalprograms, see Wilma Fairbank, America’sCultural Experiment in China, 1942-1949(Washington: Bureau of Educational andCultural Affairs, U. S. Department of State,1976). On the tensions between U. S. andChinese officials that surrounded these efforts,see Frank Ninkovich, “Cultural Relations andAmerican China Policy, 1942-1945,” PacificHistorical Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1980), pp.471-98. On students of Japanese descent, seeGary Okihiro, Storied Lives: Japanese AmericanStudents and World War II (Seattle: Universityof Washington Press, 1999); Allan W. Austin,From Concentration Camp to Campus:Japanese American Students and World War II(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004).

5 8 Beginning in 1948, the Institute forInternational Education began publishing itsown census of international students in theUnited States, entitled Open Doors. Foradditional years, see Open Doors (New York:Institute for International Education, 1948-

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present). The initial figures here are drawnfrom Unofficial Ambassadors, the earlierCFRFS census.

59 In this paper, I use the term “foreignstudent” because it reflects contemporarycategories—the term “international student”appears to have come to prominencelater—conveying what was an important andpalpable sense of the students’ “alien”presence in the United States.

60 Kenneth Holland, “Who is He?” Annals of theAmerican Academy of Political and SocialScience, Vol. 335: The Rising Demand forInternational Education (May 1961), p. 9.

61 Holland, “Who is He?”; Ernest Boynton,“African Students Have Their Brushes withAmerican Racial Prejudice,” Chicago DailyDefender, p. 11.

6 2 On the Foreign Leader Program, anexemplary “exchange of persons” program, seeGiles Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire.

63 On the Military Assistance Program, seeChester J. Pach, Arming the Free World: TheOrigins of the United States Military AssistanceProgram, 1945-1950 (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1991). Its specificallyeducational dimensions, which may haveconstituted the single largest U. S.-governmentsponsored educational program in thepost-1945 period, remains to be studied. Onpolice training, see Jeremy Kuzmarov,“Modernizing Repression: Police Training,Political Violence and Nation-Building in the‘American Century,’” Diplomatic History, Vol.33, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 191-221.

64 Lesley Gill, School of the Americas: MilitaryTraining and Political Violence in the Americas(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

65 Ernest W. Lefever, “The Military AssistanceTraining Program,” Annals of the AmericanAcademy of Political and Social Science, Vol.

424 (March 1976), p. 88.

66 Lefever, p. 86.

67 For a detailed account of this episode, seeYelong Han, “An Untold Story: American Policytoward Chinese Students in the United States,1949-1955,” Journal of American-East AsianRelations, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1993), pp. 77-99. Quotation on p. 80.

68 On the development of NAFSA, see Bu,Making the World Like Us, esp. chapter 5. Forworks that ref lects the new, postwarprofessionalism, see Cora DuBois, ForeignStudents and Higher Education in the UnitedStates (Washington: American Council ofEducation, 1956); Edward C. Cieslak, TheForeign Student in American Colleges: ASurvey and Evaluation of AdministrativeProblems and Practices (Detroit: WayneUniversity Press, 1955).

69 On postwar German-American programs, seeKarl-Heinz Fussl, “Between Elitism andEducational Reform: German-AmericanExchange Programs, 1945-1970,” in The UnitedStates and Germany in the Era of the Cold War,1945-1990: A Handbook (Washington, DC:German Historical Institute, 2004), 409-416; O.Schmidt, “Civil Empire by Cooptation: German-American Exchange Programs as CulturalDiplomacy, 1945-1961” (PhD dissertation,Harvard, 1999); H. Kellerman, CulturalRelations as an Instrument of U. S. ForeignPolicy: The Educational Exchange Programbetween the United States and Germany,1945-1954 (Washington, DC: Department ofState, 1978). On postwar Japanese-Americanprograms, see Takeshi Matsuda, Soft Powerand Its Perils: U. S. Cultural Policy in EarlyPostwar Japan and Permanent Dependency(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

70 New York Times, quoted in Sam Lebovic, “ToFinance Out of the Sale of War Junk a World-wide System of American Scholarships”: TheOrigins of the Fulbright Program and the

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Production of American Cultural Globalism,1945 – 1950” (unpublished manuscript).

71 Arthur Power Dudden and Russell R. Dynes,The Fulbright Experience, 1946-1986:Encounters and Transformations (NewBrunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987);Richard T. Ardnt and David Lee Rubin, eds.,The Fulbright Difference, 1948-1992: Studieson Cultural Diplomacy and the FulbrightExperience (New Brunswick: TransactionPublishers, 1993); Johnson and Colligan, TheFulbright Program: A History. On Senator J.William Fulbright, see Randall Bennett Woods,Fulbright: A Biography (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1995).

72 Colligan and Johnson, pp. 3-4.

73 Lebovic, “To Finance Out of the Sale of WarJunk”

74 J. William Fulbright, “Open Doors, Not IronCurtains,” New York Times, Aug. 5, 1951, p.140.

75 Harold Taylor, “The Student: A Key Man inAsia,” New York Times, July 10, 1960, pp.SM11.

76 James H. Meriwether, “’Worth a Lot of NegroVotes’: Black Voters, Africa, and the 1960Presidential Campaign,” Journal of AmericanHistory, Vol. 95 (December 2008), pp. 737-763.

77 Seymour M. Rosen, The Development ofPeoples’ Friendship University in Moscow(Washington: Office of Education, Institute ofInternational Studies, 1973).

78 “African Students Play Key Role in Cold WarBattle for Minds,” Chicago Daily Defender, June5, 1963, p. 13.

79 Walter Lippman, “Today and Tomorrow:Wanton Carelessness,” The Washington Postand Times Herald, May 27, 1954, p. 17.

80 Liping Bu discusses these tensions in Makingthe World Like Us, pp.157-9.

81 Duggan, quoted in Bu, Making the World LikeUs, p.. 159.

82 Quoted in Bu, Making the World Like Us, p.233.

8 3 W. L. White, "Foreign Students: AnOpportunity,” The Reader’s Digest 59(September 1951), p. 116.

84 “Foreign Students Get Welcome Here,” NewYork Times, August 27, 1949, p. 15.

85 A few selected works in the much largergenre of social studies of foreign studentswould include: Richard D. Lambert and MarvinBressler, Indian Students on an AmericanCampus (Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress, 1956); The American Experience ofSwedish Students: Retrospect and Aftermath(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1956); Ralph L. Beals and Norman D.Humphrey, No Frontier to Learning: TheMexican Student in the United States(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1957); Survey of the African Student: HisAchievements and His Problems (New York:The Institute for International Education,1961); John W. Bennett, et. al., In Search ofIdentity: The Japanese Overseas Scholar inAmerica and Japan (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1958).

86 Barbara Bundschu, “African Students Find U.S . Fr iendly , but Rap Apathy , Rac ia lIntolerance,” Chicago Daily Defender, Dec. 5,1961, p. 9

87 The incident is described in Ye, SeekingModernity in China’s Name, p. 81.

88 Gertrude Samuels, “’One World’ under OneRoo f : A l l Races and Creeds L i ve a tInternational House and are Inspired toCombat Divisive Prejudices,” New York Times,

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May 8, 1949, p. SM22.

89 “Foreign Students Query Racial Bias: NegroLeaders Here Concede Weakness inDemocracy, but Stress Press, Communism HereMinimized,” New York Times, December 29,1951, p. 9.

9 0 J u s t a s I a m a w a r e o f T i m e ’ smediation/construction of this particularnarrative, I am conscious of the evidentiaryissues involved in drawing as heavily onnewspaper and magazine journalism as I havein this paper. This essay represents apreliminary framework for archival work in

foreign exchange program archives, such asthe archives of the Institute for InternationalEducation. Such research will, I hope, allowme to cross-check journalistic sources in waysthat I am still not able to do in the presentdraft.

91 “The One-Town Skirmish.”

92 “The One-Town Skirmish.”.

93 The politics of student migration to theUnited States in the post-9/11 landscape aredescribed in Bevis and Lucas, chapter 8.

94 Powell, quoted in Bevis and Lucas, p. 210.

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