ICON·S WORKING PAPER SERIES

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF HISTORIC BUILDINGS AND NATIONALISM:

THE ROLE OF UNESCO

Lorenzo Casini

Paper presented at the ICON·S Inaugural Conference (Florence, June 26-28, 2014)

ICON·S Working Paper – Conference Proceedings Series 1 No. 2/2015

The International Society of Public Law (ICON·S) ICON·S was established in 2014. The initiative to create it emerged from the Editorial Board of I·CON – the International Journal of Constitutional Law. To learn more: www.icon-society.org. ICON·S Working Papers – Conference Proceedings Series The ICON·S WP Conference Proceedings Series features papers presented at the Annual ICON·S Conferences. The responsibility for the content of the working papers lies entirely with the author. ICON·S makes no warranties or representations as to the accuracy or suitability of the content of the papers. The ISSN is kindly provided by the Institute for Research on Public Administration (IRPA) (www.irpa.eu).

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L. Casini, “International Regulation of Historic Buildings and Nationalism: The Role of Unesco”, ICON·S Working Paper – Conference Proceedings Series 1, no. 2/2015.

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© 2015 LORENZO CASINI

International Society of Public Law (ICON·S) (www.icon-society.org)

ICON·S Working Papers - ISSN 2280-868X

International Regulation of Historic Buildings and Nationalism:

The Role of UNESCO

Lorenzo Casini

Associate Professor of Administrative Law, University of Rome “Sapienza”

lorenzo.casini@uniroma1.it

Abstract

This article focuses on the (ambiguous) relations between nationalism and international

regulation of historic buildings. There are several tensions and reciprocal influences in this

field: nationalistic policies operate sometimes nudged by, sometimes against international

regulation, as well as sometimes in favour of, sometimes diminishing the protection of

historic buildings. The analysis deals with what is usually considered the most suitable

standpoint to unpack such problems: the activity of UNESCO. From this perspective, two

different forms of intervention can be distinguished. The first one is the creation of a world

heritage of outstanding universal value. The second one relates to the UNESCO

recommendations aimed at protecting historic urban landscape. The article shows that

UNESCO seems to favour both political and cultural forms of nationalism: this could

significantly affect the nationalistic use of historic buildings, and, on a broader level,

produce relevant effects on the very idea of Nation.

Introduction: “Two Romes” with No “Distinctive Nationhood”

“Italy may serve as an example of the difficulty a nation has in visualizing itself when

all its cities are haunted by greater memories and when these memories are deliberately

made use of to confuse its present”: Italy indeed finally “found the unity so ardently, though

for long so vainly, desired by her greatest minds. But, from this moment on, it became

clear that there are dangers in allowing a city like Rome to go on existing. The crowd-

buildings of ancient times still stood there, empty. The Coliseum was a ruin all too well

preserved; it would be easy to feel poor and outcast there. The second Rome, on the other

hand, the Rome of St. Peter, had kept much of its old power of attraction. The Church of

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St. Peter was continually filled with pilgrims from all over the world. But this second Rome

was in no way suited to be the focal point of distinctive nationhood. Its appeal was still

indiscriminately to all men, and its organization derived from a period before nations in

modern sense existed. Between these two Romes the national feeling of modern Italy was,

as it were, paralyzed. And there was no escaping this, for Rome and Romans had once

been Italy”.1

Taken from Elias Canetti’s masterpiece on relationships between crowds and power,

this portrait of the Italian post-unification process sheds light on the difficulties that Nation

States encounter in dealing with historic mass symbols like crowd-buildings. The universal

value of Roman sites introduces what is the main focus of this article: the (ambiguous)

relations between nationalism and international regulation of historic buildings. The

example of Saint-Peter, which was “in no way suited to be the focal point of distinctive

nationhood”, illustrates one of the paradoxes we see when historic monuments (and

cultural property more generally) acquire universal value: the more relevant they are to the

mankind, the less anchored they may become to a single given Nation, but, at the same

time, the more they are significant to one single Nation, the more they will be viewed as

important symbols for all mankind. (Jaime, 2005; Casini, 2010)

This is only one of the several tensions that underlie these kinds of issues.

Furthermore, on the one hand, the relationship between nationalism and architecture does

not relate exclusively to historic buildings. History teaches us that nationalistic approaches

were often characterized by projects of urban renovation and by the establishment of new

buildings: cases are numerous, such as the architecture realized in Italy and in Germany

during the 1930s or constructions built in USSR, to name but a few. On the other hand, the

international regulation can favour forms of nationalistic architecture in the opposite

direction of the policy aimed at protecting historic buildings: take, for instance, the

construction of ever increasingly spectacular sports venues – the “new cathedrals” – which

is triggered by global norms adopted by international sports federations and by the

International Olympic Committee (IOC); other examples can be found in the field of

financing development, because institutions such as the World Bank may directly or

indirectly influence the domestic decision making process related to public infrastructures.

Moreover, there have even been situations, such as during the war in Yugoslavia, in which

1 Canetti, E. 1960. Crowds and Power. 1962 ed, New York, 1962, p. 207.

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governments have deliberately destroyed historic buildings that were relevant to minorities

(see the Kordić _& Čerkez case, in which the ICTY held that a state’s deliberate

destruction of the cultural institutions of particular political, racial, or religious groups was a

crime against humanity) (Fishman, 2010; Mose, 1996).

Within this broad framework of reciprocal influences – in which nationalistic policies

operate sometimes nudged by, sometimes against international regulation, as well as

sometimes in favour of, sometimes diminishing the protection of historic buildings –, this

article focuses on what is usually considered as the most suitable standpoint to unpack

such problems: the role played by UNESCO.

In particular, UNESCO adopts two different modes of policy with differences in terms

of their supra-nationalism and binding powers. The first one is the creation of a world

heritage of outstanding universal value – which necessarily includes several historic cities

and buildings (section 2). The second one relates to the UNESCO recommendations

aimed at protecting historic urban landscape (section 3). These two types of action show

distinct ways of regulating historic buildings and influencing nationalism: whilst the system

based on the World Heritage Convention (WHC) displays “supranational” approach and a

controversial relationship with nationalistic policies in this field, the soft-law international

norms produced for protecting historic urban landscape seem to favour such policies with

a minor degree of conflict, though perhaps less effectively.

The article therefore sheds light on two highly significant issues related to the several

relationships between international regulation of historic buildings and nationalism.

First, it shows the complex and ambiguous inter-relationships between state powers

and sovereignty and international regulation/policies: States choose to bring in

international regulators and indeed are the sole official mode of bringing the latter in, but

then find themselves being regulated by an international body. From this perspective, the

case of the WHC and of the “Danger List” mechanism is a clear example.

Second, the article highlights the pressures and implications of international

regulation of historic building preservation for state powers, together with the questions

around the implications for using nationally designated historic buildings that are valued as

being of universal significance for their subsequent use in terms of nation-building and

nationalism.

6

The Outstanding Universal Value of Historic Buildings and Its International

Regulation

The first type of UNESCO intervention consists in the system based on the 1972

World Heritage Convention (WHC), a prime example of the interaction between

international institutions, States and domestic administrations (Zacharias, 2008; Battini,

2011; Casini, 2011).

Signed in 1972, the World Heritage Convention recognized the existence of a world

cultural (and natural) heritage of “outstanding universal value”, which needs to be

preserved (Francioni, 2002; Francioni and Lenzerini, 2008). According to the UNESCO

Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (para.

49), “Outstanding universal value means cultural and/ or natural significance which is so

exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for

present and future generations of all humanity. As such, the permanent protection of this

heritage is of the highest importance to the international community as a whole. The

Committee defines the criteria for the inscription of properties on the World Heritage List.”

Such criteria are listed at para. 77 of the Operational Guidelines.

According to the Convention, “cultural heritage” includes “- monuments: architectural

works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an

archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are

of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; - groups of

buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture,

their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from

the point of view of history, art or science; - sites: works of man or the combined works of

nature and of man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding

universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points of

view” (article 1).

The WHC system is built on recommendations and guidelines adopted by UNESCO

(the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention), and

it is powered by international non-governmental organizations (such as the International

Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), advisory body of UNESCO), and cooperation

between States and international institutions. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the

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system, instruments of compliance have been created, such as the “name and shame”

mechanism that can be adopted for sites in danger.

The system counts now 1007 sites, of which 779 cultural. There are therefore several

historic buildings – around 250 historic cities – included in the one thousands UNESCO

sites: a number that doubled in the last 10 years and that increases of around 40 units per

year. At first sight, this system – borne from the need to convey global efforts in preserving

cultural heritage – seems to offer an excellent tool to States which aim at enacting

nationalistic policies of protection for their architectural treasures.

However, the system has several ambiguities, which stem from the continuous

dialectic between the universal and the national (if not local) dimensions that characterizes

the functioning of the World Heritage Convention.

A first ambiguity comes from the very concept on which the system is based on, the

idea of a list. As Umberto Eco pointed out in a famous essay, lists can express two main

different kind of approaches: one is the finalized “shape”, made of a given number of

elements, where listing is a way to portray something closed and limited (such as when in

the Iliad Homer describes the shield of Achilles); the second approach is the infinite list,

created through accretion of things or thoughts connected between each other by any

possible link (such as a list of Saints or a collection of treasures) (Eco, 2008) There are of

course several nuances, as the case of the World Heritage List – and cultural heritage

more in general – can testify. The World Heritage List in fact appears to be an interesting

mix of these two approaches: there is the objective to identify a specific heritage, which

has universal value; but there is also the idea of creating an “infinite” list of sites, each of

them outstanding and, therefore, unique. It is the very notion of list, thus, that immediately

brings to the fore the dialogue between the global and the domestic level: each UNESCO

site represents what a given State recognizes as one of their “masterpieces”, one of the

most valuable of its national heritage; at the same time, once added to the list, they

become part of universal heritage. This coexistence of universal and outstanding values

suggests that UNESCO embraces different forms of “nationalisms” (Hutchinson, 1983): on

one hand, the WHC list favours the development of several different cultural nationalisms,

anchored to the identity represented by a given site; on the other, the creation of a world

heritage requires the existence of a political “supranationalism”.

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The second ambiguity of the WHC system is that only national governments can be

part of it, in so far as a site can be proposed for inscription by no other actor but the State:

the Palestine case illustrates how States recognition is crucial in the UNESCO system

(Keane and Azarov, 2013; Paradisi, 2013). This clearly emerges from the letter of the

Convention: “Whilst fully respecting the sovereignty of the States on whose territory the

cultural and natural heritage mentioned […] is situated; and without prejudice to property

rights provided by national legislation, the States Parties to this Convention recognize that

such heritage constitutes a world heritage for whose protection it is duty of the international

community as a whole to co-operate.” (article 6.1).

However, once a State chooses to play, it has to accept the rules of the game; and

these rules are out of its control: they are the Operational Guidelines for the

Implementation of the World Heritage Convention adopted by the World Heritage

Committee. Once a State decides to include its “treasures” in this system, therefore, it

ceases sovereignty: it opens the domestic decision making processes regarding its sites to

other actors – not only UNESCO and its advisory bodies (ICOMOS and IUCN), but also

foreign governments and other international organizations both governmental and non-

governmental. States also accept to be monitored by UNESCO, which may decide to

inscribe a list on the “Danger List”, should that be the case: examples are numerous, with

only two precedents, to date, of sites that have been removed from the World Heritage list.

But why should a State submit itself to such limitations? There are of course several

reasons, which range from need for funds or technical assistance to aim at increasing

tourist flows and visibility. Moreover, States may see – and this is what mostly happens –

the WHC system as a mean capable to enhance its nationalistic policy of protecting

historic buildings: one State which aims at preserving a site of its national heritage, a

symbol of its nationhood, can use the List and what it means in support of this policy.

However, what does it happen if a State wish to changes or revert such policy? Can it

have its sovereignty back?

This kind of dynamics introduces the third – and subtler – ambiguity, which is often

highlighted whenever UNESCO considers a given site in “danger”. If we reason in legal

terms, when a State opts to be part of the WHC and asks for having one of more sites

added to the list, somehow it is “constitutionalizing” part of its heritage. As to historic

buildings, the dynamics we see here is “constitutionalizing” a given architecture, which is

9

considered to be a symbol of national history and nationhood: doing so, one State decides

to attribute special values to such buildings, to the extent that it accepts to cease part of its

sovereignty in order to ensure their protection. This choice is plenty of consequences for

future generations and for urban development. As a matter of fact, what may occur – and it

did happen – is that whenever domestic public authorities would need to intervene on a

UNESCO site, they will encounter more limits than in other areas: when one scroll down

the danger list (which today counts 46 sites), beside the numerous sites which sadly fall in

war zones (such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali or Syria), the most common reason of danger

comes from projects of urban renovation or for public infrastructure. This was the case of

the city of Dresden – which however did not affect the protection of historic buildings – that

clearly highlighted the difficulties in finding a balance between preservation and

development.

The recent episode of urban renewal in the Liverpool Maritime Mercantile City is a

significant example. In June 2012, the World Heritage Committee has added this site to

the List of World Heritage in Danger, “due to the proposed construction of Liverpool

Waters, a massive redevelopment of the historic docklands north of the city centre”. In

particular, “The Committee contended that the development will extend the city centre

significantly and alter the skyline and profile of the site inscribed on the World Heritage List

in 2004. Furthermore, experts argued that the redevelopment scheme will fragment and

isolate the different dock areas visually. The Committee warned that if the project is

implemented, Liverpool may entirely lose the outstanding universal value for which it was

given World Heritage status. The site includes six areas in the historic centre and

docklands is a testimony to the development of Liverpool as one of the world’s major

trading centres in the 18th and 19th centuries.” 2 In April 2014 the World Heritage

Committee decided to retain the site in the List in Danger. On that occasion, the

Committee requested the State to: “- submit comprehensive documentation for any

proposed detailed master plans and detailed planning proposals, before they are adopted,

together with an overall vision for the property over-arching such master plans, as well as

details of the draft legal obligations and draft planning conditions for granting permission

for any future development proposals; - ensure that the process whereby master plans and

detailed plans for the Liverpool Waters scheme, when developed, takes into consideration

2 http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/890.

10

the concerns of the World Heritage Committee”. In addition, the Committe “strongly urge[d]

the State Party to consider all measures that would allow changes to the extent and scope

of the proposed Liverpool Waters scheme to ensure the continued coherence of the

architectural and town-planning attributes, and the continued safeguarding of the OUV of

the property including the conditions of authenticity and integrity”. Lastly, it requested the

United Kingdom “to submit to the World Heritage Centre, by 1 February 2015, an updated

report, including a 1-page executive summary, on the state of conservation of the property

and the implementation of the above, for examination by the World Heritage Committee at

its 39th session in 2015”.

Within this context, the role of local authorities becomes crucial. It must be

considered that all of the procedures begin at the national level, and that failed

participatory processes at the domestic level may undermine international processes

(Affolder, 2007). National Government can support UNESCO in prohibiting actions which

can undermine protection of historic buildings, but several domestic legal systems give

municipal authorities most of town and country planning functions. Thus the dynamics of

interests at stake can be extremely variegated: one State wants a site inscribed on the

World Heritage List; UNESCO rules impose to involve local communities in the proceeding

of candidacy for that site; this latter is added to the list; thereafter the local community wish

to change its urban landscape, even for “good” reasons; local authority approves a plan of

urban renewal of the site; UNESCO and national government may oppose and the site

may be also placed on the Danger List; local community pushes for renovation and the

projects goes on; the site may be deleted from the list. This is what basically happened in

Dresden, when population with a referendum chose to build a bridge instead of preserving

the outstanding value of the Elben valley landscape. But in the majority of cases local

authorities are strongly influenced by UNESCO when managing their sites: the WHC

system is therefore a mean to bring international actors and “global” interests into the

domestic administrative proceedings (Battini, 2011).

We see here a paradox: conflicts raise when States aim at developing and changing

their past, whilst UNESCO – which has been called in by States themselves – wants to

preserve it and protect it. How does this affect new nationalistic policies? And how can this

be seen as a Western bias model? Do developing countries accept this for economic

reason? All of these issues emphasize that the UNESCO WHC system enhances the

11

interplay between different political actors outside and within the country; as we will see in

the concluding section of this article, this interplay facilitates the interaction between

different forms of nationalism, namely the cultural and the political forms.

Global Norms Enhancing Nationalistic Policies: the UNESCO Recommendations on the Historic Urban Landscape

The second type of intervention is based on recommendations adopted by UNESCO

on historic sites and cities, or historic urban landscape, since the 1960s.3

As pointed out by the 1976 Recommendation concerning the Safeguarding and

Contemporary Role of Historic Areas, and again in the recent Recommendation on the

Historic Urban Landscape, including a glossary of definitions of 10 November 2011,

“‘Historic and architectural (including vernacular) areas’ shall be taken to mean any groups

of buildings, structures and open spaces including archaeological and palaeontological

sites, constituting human settlements in an urban or rural environment, the cohesion and

value of which, from the archaeological, architectural, prehistoric, historic, aesthetic or

sociocultural point of view are recognized”. According to the definition, “among these

‘areas’, which are very varied in nature, it is possible to distinguish the following “in

particular: prehistoric sites, historic towns, old urban quarters, villages and hamlets as well

as homogeneous monumental groups, it being understood that the latter should as a rule

be carefully preserved unchanged.”

Therefore UNESCO rules in this field first of all help defining what should be

considered as of historic significance and how it can be protected.4 From this perspective,

the 2011 Recommendation is the clearest example.

3 See the 1962 Recommendation concerning the Safeguarding of the Beauty and Character of Landscapes and Sites; the 1968 Recommendation concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works; the 1972 Recommendation concerning the Protection, at National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage; and the 1976 Recommendation concerning the Safeguarding and Contemporary Role of Historic Areas; and lastly the Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape, including a glossary of definitions of 10 November 2011 and the four previous ones: See also the 1964 ICOMOS International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites (Venice Charter), the 1982 ICOMOS Historic Gardens (Florence Charter), and the 1987 ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas (Washington Charter), the 2005 ICOMOS Xi’an Declaration on the Conservation of the Setting of Heritage Structures, Sites and Areas, and the 2005 Vienna Memorandum on World Heritage and Contemporary Architecture – Managing the Historic Urban Landscape.

4 See World Heritage Papers 27, Managing Historic Cities – Gérer les villes historiques, 2010.

12

On the one hand, it reproduces definitions formerly provided by other documents,

such a those of “historic urban area” (from the ICOMOS Washington Charter) and urban

heritage (from European Union research report Nº 16 (2004), Sustainable development of

Urban historical areas through and active Integration within Towns – SUIT). Historic urban

areas, large and small, “include cities, towns and historic centres or quarters, together with

their natural and man-made environments. Beyond their role as historical documents,

these areas embody the values of traditional urban cultures.” Urban heritage “comprises

three main categories: Monumental heritage of exceptional cultural value; Non-exceptional

heritage elements but present in a coherent way with a relative abundance; New urban

elements to be considered (for instance): the urban built form; the open space: streets,

public open spaces; urban infrastructures: material networks and equipment.”

On the other hand, it gives additional definitions, such as that of “historic urban

landscape”, meant as “the urban area understood as the result of a historic layering of

cultural and natural values and attributes, extending beyond the notion of ‘historic centre’

or ‘ensemble’ to include the broader urban context and its geographical setting.” This latter

definition represents “the basis for a comprehensive and integrated approach for the

identification, assessment, conservation and management of historic urban landscapes

within an overall sustainable development framework.” The Recommendation also defines

the main features of the “historic urban landscape approach”, which “learns from the

traditions and perceptions of local communities, while respecting the values of the national

and international communities.” This latter concept is clearly linked to the relationships

between urbanization and globalization, which the Recommendation expressly recalls both

as a resource and a threat.

UNESCO norms therefore constitute a significant contribution to States aiming to

ameliorate the conservation of their historic buildings. Global rules in fact provides not only

with definitions and concepts, but also with tools and policies.

As to the tools, the 2011 Recommendation list various instruments, such as civic

engagement tools, knowledge and planning tools (e.g. documentation and mapping of

cultural and natural characteristics), regulatory systems (“which should reflect local

conditions, and may include legislative and regulatory measures aimed at the conservation

and management of the tangible and intangible attributes of the urban heritage, including

their social, environmental and cultural values. Traditional and customary systems should

13

be recognized and reinforced as necessary”), financial tools (included micro-credit and

other flexible financing to support local enterprise, as well as a variety of models of

partnerships).

Regarding the policies, UNESCO norms require that “Conservation of the urban

heritage should be integrated into general policy planning and practices and those related

to the broader urban context.” Therefore, “all levels of government – local, regional,

national/federal, – aware of their responsibility – should contribute to the definition,

elaboration, implementation and assessment of urban heritage conservation policies.

These policies should be based on a participatory approach by all stakeholders and

coordinated from both the institutional and sectorial viewpoints.”

UNESCO identified some experiences which may testify the fruitfulness of adopting

such tools: one is the case of the “High Line”, the New York City public park realized on an

historic freight rail line elevated above the streets on Manhattan’s West Side. Community

residents, who saved it from demolition and who now support the Park with funds, founded

it in 1999. It is considered a perfect mix of financial tools and civic engagement tools.

In this second hypothesis of relationships between international regulation of

protection of historic buildings and nationalism, the situation is different. There is not the

complexity (and the ambiguities) of the WHC system. We find here “just” a set of soft law

norms, i.e. non binding, which provides States with principles, tools and policies aimed at

protecting historic and urban landscapes. Thus, such norms offer a useful instrument for

nationalistic policies targeted to protect historic buildings. They do not impose legal

means. However, they nudge States to adopt such tools, which can be extremely effective

when implementing policies of preserving national identity through urban planning.

Yet, we should once again keep in mind the huge diversities that differentiate one

domestic legal system from another. In several European countries, most of the UNESCO

norms are not something new: in Italy, 1939 and 1942 Acts already identified plans aimed

to protect historic buildings and landscape. On the contrary, the UNESCO urban tools may

in fact be extremely useful for developing countries or for “first comers” States in

nationalistic policies of protection as well as in building a new cultural identity. As it usually

happens with international norms aimed at favouring higher level of protection, the balance

is generally reached at a low-medium degree.

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Furthermore, although here the mechanism of regulation is even looser than in the

WHC system, one may argue whether the whole set of UNESCO norms in this field

represent another effort to impose a given “cultural pattern” of preservation based on

Western bias. These kinds of problems are often connected with questions such as “Who

own the pasts?”, and “Who can say what the past is and when it starts?”. However, when

we establish a connection between protection of historic buildings and urban development,

these kind questions should go together with other ones like “Who own the future?”. Put it

in a different way, how can we use the notion of sustainable development – which is

expressly recalled in the UNESCO 2011 Recommendation – for the management of

historic buildings? These issues, therefore, show how UNESCO can also foster forms of

cultural nationalism based on the protection of historic urban landscape, i.e. engaging in a

material cultivation of culture (Leersson, 2006).

The Multifaceted Relationship between Universal and National Dimensions in

Protecting Historic Buildings

The two above examined different forms of UNESCO intervention in regulating the

protection of historic buildings shed light on the multifarious relationship between different

levels of interests and actors in this field: global, national, local, public and private. In

particular, there is a tension between “universal” and national dimension, which reaches is

highest point in the Danger List mechanisms of the World Heritage Convention. As some

scholars argued the WHC system shows at least three different levels of action: national,

with states preparing tentative lists and nomination; intergovernmental, in the phase of

recognizing the outstanding universal value of the cultural property in question; and

international, in the phase of funding and assistance provided by the World Heritage Fund

(Anglin, 2009).

International regulation of historic buildings, therefore, operates at least in three

different ways.

First, global norms enrich the set of definitions of what historic buildings are. The

WHC system looks for an outstanding universal value, according to several criteria set

forth in the Operational Guidelines. The several Recommendations for protecting historic

landscape provide instead less ambitious notions, based on some objective characters.

These definitions are additional to those elaborated by domestic legislations, and in a way

15

less precise: there are neither time issues – such as the 50/70 years threshold applicable

in Italy or other specific hints. The World Heritage List, in particular, reproduces a

mechanism of declaration resembling those introduced already at the beginning of the

XXth century in Italy (without considering the XVIth and XVIIth centuries acts enacted by

the Pope). However, as legal scholarship already observed, one must accept that a

normative definition of cultural property (and therefor of historic buildings) is a “liminal

notion,” that is, a notion that legal norms cannot define without referring to other disciplines

or sciences (Giannini, 1976).

Second, the UNESCO international regulation makes the institutional framework of

protection of historic building much more complex. This is particularly true for the WHC,

because of the strategic role played by advisory bodies (ICOMOS and IUCN) and other

non-governmental organizations. As a matter of fact, States that have applied to have their

sites included in the World Heritage List are required to adapt their administrations to the

institutional expectations; for example, creating ad hoc bodies or enacting specific

measures. See, for example, the U.S. National Park Service and the U.S. committee of the

ICOMOS, which develop standards and procedures for nominations of American cultural

resources as World Heritage sites (Anglin, 2009). In addition, UNESCO Recommendations

as well may trigger the creation of new bodies, even hybrid public and private, aimed at

implementing specific policies of protection through civic engagement tools.

Third, a significant influence of international regulation in national policies in this field

can be identified in the procedural dimension. Both the WHC system and UNESCO

recommendations design specific procedural tools aimed at ensuring a higher number of

interests to take part in the decision-making process. In the case of world heritage sites

the Operational guidelines require a management plan: doing so, they impose to national

and local authorities a planning instrument, which is mandatory for submitting new

candidacies: in order to be eligible to be added to the World Heritage List, the cultural

property must benefit from adequate long-term legislative, regulatory, institutional and/or

traditional protection, as well as management mechanisms that can ensure their

safeguarding.5 Less strict is the mechanism that Recommendations use, though tools are

as well as made of procedural requirements such as participation and transparency.

5 See Operational Guidelines, para. 97.

16

However, one must consider that all these issues bring to the fore the more complex

theme of the relationship between international regulation and state power. Here questions

include: does recognition of a historic building by an international body such as UNESCO

affect state power? Does it increase or reduce it? Does it affect instruments or symbolic

uses? More generally, does it influence the relationship between historic buildings and

their place in nation building or nationalism? As we will see in the following section,

responses to such questions may vary according to several factors: the nature of State

(e.g. whether states already have their own cultural legislation), the role played by party

politics, the presence of ethnic and national conflicts or of economic needs.

Conclusion: the UNESCO Regulatory Framework between Political and Cultural

Nationalisms

The UNESCO system, therefore, displays the relationships between international

regulation in name of universal value and states’ ability to use historic sites for

nationalism/nation building. Such international intervention can be viewed as an instrument

for triggering forms of cultural nationalism, based on the identification of sites of

outstanding historic or artistic interest (Hutchinson, 2013). The norms seeking to protect

historic buildings are indeed a “material” form of cultivation of culture that is widespread in

Western countries (Leersson, 2006). However, one State may consider the UNESCO

WHC system also e.g. as a tool for pursuing policies of political nationalism: this may

happen whenever a site or a building is a symbol of nationhood. From this perspective,

does designation as a universal value reduce or increase a building’s value for nationalism

or nation building? How do policy makers reconcile two different logics – national value

and sovereignty, and universal value (and access and protection)? The effects and

relationships vary with state features and paradoxes can emerge: on the one hand,

UNESCO allows to become part of its system and to propose new sites to the list only to

States; and this may raise serious questions concerning contested sites, such as the

Temple Mount and the Esplanade of the Mosques in Jerusalem, or in cases where a state

does not recognize the value that a site may have for a portion of the population of a

particular country. On the other hand, States wishing to use the UNESCO systems for

enacting their policies of protection must cease part of their sovereignty.

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Thus, UNESCO recognition may significantly affect the nationalistic use of historic

buildings. The inscription of a site onto the list will likely enhance and encourage the use of

cultural heritage for national “pride”. More specifically, the complex form of UNESCO

World Heritage governance produces significant effects on the very idea of Nation in

several respects.

First, it introduces, into the domestic legal order, an additional notion of cultural

heritage and cultural value; this can boost nationalistic conceptions of historic buildings

but, at the same time, can also bring the latter within a new legal framework based on

international norms: States that wish to enhance their treasure basically accept to lose

power over them. The UNESCO system can therefore foster nationalistic policies, since it

is undeniable that the inscription of a site onto the World Heritage List highlights its

outstanding value and enhances its national identity. However, the price of entrance is

high in terms of sovereignty: the State can use the key to access the system, but must

hand this over to UNESCO once the site has been listed. Moreover, the list recognizes

both the outstanding and the universal value of a site: this means that the more famous a

site is, the more significant it is for all mankind – and not only to one nation.

Second, UNESCO recognition of a World Heritage site may have significant

consequences on the distribution of powers within a country. For example, it can increase

the power of heritage professionals, due to the importance of advisory bodies in the

process. Indeed, a key role in the listing, monitoring and de-listing procedures is played by

the UNESCO advisory bodies (IUCN and ICOMOS), which rely on experts’ assessments.

Within this context, UNESCO – namely with the WHC system – may become a supporting

actor of different levels of government, or even of single ministries in a given country: it

may cooperate with local government and/or NGOs against national policies or vice versa

(this is what happened in the Yellowstone Park case, for instance); or it may favour cultural

policies against infrastructural development (as it unsuccessfully attempted in the case of

Dresden).

Third, UNESCO can also affect the balance between national and local government.

These dynamics of course change from one country to another: while in developing

countries, the UNESCO patronage may constitute the most accessible channel for

implementing nationalistic policies based on cultural heritage, often, in connection with

tourist-based approaches, in Western countries the international prestige deriving from

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UNESCO recognition often accrues to the regional or municipal level, rather than to the

national level. As a matter of fact, although only States can apply for a candidature,

UNESCO itself requires the local community’s involvement in the procedure.

Fourth, UNESCO can truly influence the debate between preservationists and others

(e.g. developers) in a given country: beside the case of sites within war zones, the history

of the list of endangered sites clearly demonstrates that the name and shame mechanism

is often activated by NGOs or other civil society actors who oppose national or local urban

planning decisions. Most times the sole threat of adding a site to the red list has been

enough to halt the domestic process (as occurred in the well-known case of the Cologne

Cathedral: Zacharias, 2006).

As a consequence, UNESCO recognition seriously modifies the decision-making

processes of national actors. Once a site is added to the WHC list, the interests at stake

transcend national borders and a universal playground has been established: this will

allow foreign actors – or even domestic actors who do not share local or national

communities – to monitor and to act against States’ policies that may affect the

preservation of cultural heritage. UNESCO thus appears to strengthen the arguments of

preservationists who use the World Heritage label to emphasize the national importance of

UNESCO-recognised sites. The Western bias related to this approach, however, is rather

evident. International norms are progressively imposing a system of protection based on

the European legislative tradition in the field of cultural heritage. Developing countries are

reacting to this, as clearly demonstrated by the rise of natural sites inscribed in recent

years.

Yet, the degree of effectiveness of the UNESCO system and the level of its

implementation appear to be high. Not only is the number of sites constantly growing – as

is the number of applications – but also, the number of endangered sites is extremely low

(less than 5 per cent); and in over 40 years, only two sites have been deleted. The case of

Liverpool, for instance, demonstrates how UNESCO is strongly urging the United Kingdom

“to consider all measures that would allow changes to the extent and scope of the

proposed” scheme to safeguard the outstanding universal value of property, “including the

conditions of authenticity and integrity”. To date, this kind of pressure has been effective in

several cases. On the other hand, the UNESCO World Heritage constitutes a small part of

the globe, and the international law context is still dominated by politics. This means that

19

States still play the most important role, and the prospect of a global administration of

cultural heritage is far from being achieved.

All these phenomena bring to the fore an interesting relationship between different

forms of nationalism. On the one hand, UNESCO seems to favour both political

nationalism – since only States can apply for sites to be recognized and no contested sites

are admitted – and cultural nationalism, based on policies of cultivation of material culture

(Hutchinson, 2013; Leersson, 2006). On the other hand, once a site has been inscribed,

the balance of powers within the country (local government/central government,

preservationists/developers, professionals/public opinion, to name but a few) may change

and the way in which historic buildings are viewed may vary accordingly. Consequently,

political nationalism and cultural nationalism can produce conflicts, because their degree

and rhythms of development are not necessarily the same, and they can sometimes

diverge. Evidence to this effect from the very concept of “outstanding universal value”,

which brings together political and cultural issues: consider, for instance, the criteria of

forming a “democratic” World Heritage List, meaning that the highest possible number of

States should be represented.

In conclusion, there are several and ambiguous interactions between international

regulation of historic buildings and nationalism. The former can certainly enhance the latter

and vice versa. Sometimes they may even converge; more often they are in conflict, raised

by the need for developing and urban renewal. Historic buildings, therefore, cannot escape

all the ambiguities that characterize cultural property more in general and all the

controversial effects produced by globalization on this field (Jayme, 2005). Within the

UNESCO system, historic buildings sway between international and national dimensions,

and between universal and outstanding values, with the result of becoming the focal point

for more than one “distinctive nationhood”.

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