International Migration. PDF

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InternationalMigration

P rospects and P olicies ina G lobal M arket

Edited by

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY

J . EDWARD TAYLOR

OXFORDUNIVERSITY PRESS


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VI Contents

13. International Migration, Identity, and Development in Oceania:A Synthesis of IdeasRichard Bedford

PART III. POLICIES IN RECEIVING NATIONS

14. Have the Occupational Skills of New Immigrants to the United StatesDeclined Over Time? Evidence from the Immigrant Cohortsof 1977, 1982, and 1994Guille rmina Jasso

15. Admissions Policies in EuropeC a th er in e Wi th ol d e We nd en

16. A N~w Paradigm for the European Asylum RegimeDaniele Ioly a n d A st ri Su hr ke

17. Immigrants and the Welfare State in EuropeMartin Baldwin-Edwards

18. The Legacy of Welfare Reform for U.S. ImmigrantsM ic ha el F ix a nd We nd y Z im m er ma nn

19. Controlling International Migration through Enforcement:The Case of the United StatesFrank D. B ea n a nd D av id A . S pe ne r

PART rv PROSPECTS AND POLICIES RECONSIDEREDBack to the Future: Immigration Research, Immigration Policy andGlobalization in the Twenty-first Century ,DouglasS. M a ss ey a ndJ. E d wa rd Ta yl or

Index

20.

230List of Tab les

261

2.1. Five-number summary of distributions of countries accordingto different indicators of net international migration overthe period 1960-95 18

2.2. Countries or areas identified as statist ical outliers by total netmigration, 1960-95 19

2.3. Countries or areas identified as statist ical outliers by rate of netmigration, 1960-95 21

2.4. Countries or areas identified as statist ical outliers with respect tonet migration as a percentage of natural increase, 1960-95 22

2.5. Percentage of the migrant inflow directed to selected developedcountries originating in developing countries, 1960-94 26

2.6. Gross inflow of international migrants to selected developedcountries by region of origin, 1960-94 (thousands) 28

2.7. Net number of immigrants to selected developed countries byarea of origin, 1960-94 (thousands) 29

2.8. Rate of natural increase and levels of gross and net emigration,1960-94 30

3.1. Major types of population movements in Central and EasternEuropean countries during the pre-transition and transition periods 37

5.1. Stocks of international migrants and refugees in Asian countries,1995 79

5.2. Immigration to North America, Australia, and New Zealand byregion of origin and period 81

5.3. Average annual number of immigrants to selected Europeancountries by region of origin, 1960-89 81

5.4. Classification of Asian nations by pattern of immigration/emigrationin late 1990s 83

5.5. Official deployment of overseas contract workers from Asiansending countries, 1963-98 84

5.6. Main East and Southeast Asian labor exporting countries: percentageof overseas workers deployed to Middle East and Asian destinations,1980-94 85

5.7. Growth of foreign labor in selected Asian countries, 1969-98 865.8. Employment sector of foreign workers in Taiwan and Malaysia and

from Indonesia 875.9. Main Southeast Asian labour exporting countries: workers'

remittances relative to exports and imports in US$ million, 1980-95 915.10. Estimates of the numbers of illegal migrants in selected countries

in the mid-late 1990s 94

286

295

318

335

352

373

389


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viii L is t o f Ta bl es L is t o f Tab le six

6.1. Percentage of foreign-born persons and foreigners born in border 10.2. Projected growth of nonagricultural wage employment in selected

countries of Argentina, 1869-91 105 labor-exporting countries178

6.2. Border country immigrants in Argentina by place of birth , 1869-91 106 10.3. Major types of pol icies relat ing to labor emigrat ion in Asian

6.3. Locat ion o f immigran ts born in border count ri es of Argent ina, 1991 107 countries180

604. Composi tion of total populat ion, nat ive populat ion, and border lOA. Government agencies involved in labor export act ivit ies in major

country immigrants by age, sex, and education in metropoli tan Asian nations181

Buenos Aires, 1991 109 10.5. Restrictions on female worker migration in Asian labor exporting

6.5. Education of immigrants from border countries in metropoli tan nations 184Buenos Aires, 1980-96 109 10.6. Remit tances asa proport ion of merchandise exports in selected Asian

6.6. Labor fo rce and unemploymen t rat es by sex fo r popu la ti on Aged 14+ countries191

in metropoli tan Buenos Aires , 1991 110 10.7. Nonresident Indians as a source of foreign investment for India

6.7. Worker status of employed workers in metropoli tan Buenos Aires , 1983-93192

1991 III 11.1. Recru itment feespaid by male South As ian mig rant workers in

6.8. Status of employed workers in metropoli tan Buenos Aires , 1991 112 Kuwait: December 1995208

6.9. Sector of employment by sex in metropoli tan Buenos Aires , 1991 112 11.2. Cost of migration and earnings different ial for ski lled migrants from

6.10. Posi ti on of workers in the l abor market o f met ropol it an Buenos Bangladesh (in Bangladeshi Takas)210

Aires, 1991 114 14.1. Measurement of migrant 's legal s tatus in the United States: Selected

6.11. Posit ion of border country immigrants in the employment structure U.S. data sets268

of metropolitan Buenos Aires, 1980-96 115 14.2. Occupat ional dis tribut ions, immigrants age 21-65 at admission to

6.12. Employment growth and changes in sectorial dis tribut ion ofpermanent residence: FY1977, 1982, and 1994 cohorts 274

immigrants from bordering countries 1980-91 and 1991-6, 14.3. Average occupational earnings (1979 U.S. dollars) among

Buenos Aires metropolitan area 116 immigrants age 21-65 at admission, by visa class:

6.l3. Di st ri bu tion o f border count ry mig rant s by sector and durat ion o f FY 1977, 1982, and 1994 cohorts276

residence, 1980 and 1996 118 1404. Cohort change in natural log of occupat ional earnings among

7.1. Maquiladoras and maquiladora employment, 1965-98 128 immigrants age 21-65 at admission, relat ive to 1977 cohort,

8.1. Selected socioeconomic characteristics of immigrant workers aged by visa class278

25-64 by ethnici ty and gender, 1990 l39 14.5. Average occupational earnings (1979 U.S. dollars) among8.2. Labor force participation of immigrant workers aged 25-64 by immigrants age 21-65 at admission, by region and selected

ethnici ty and gender, 1990 140 countries of birth280

8.3. D ist ri but ion o f employed male and female workers aged 25-64 by 14.6. Cohort change in natural l og o f occupat iona l earnings among

industry, occupation, and self-employment, and ethnicity 142 immigrants age 21-65 at admission, relat ive to 1977 cohort,

8.4. Underemployment among male workers aged 25-64 by ethnici ty, by region and selected countries of birth281

control ling for education and age 144 14.7. Cohort effects on natural log of occupat ional earnings among8.5. Underemployment among female workers aged 25-64 byethnici ty, immigrants age 21-65 at admission, net of visa class (ordinary least

control ling for education and age 145 squares) and net of both v isa c lass and coun try o fb i rt h ( fixed effec ts )282

8.6. Average annual earnings (1989 U.S.dollars) among employed 17.1. Residence period required to receive the status of legal permanent

workers aged 25-64 by ethnici ty and gender 146 resident323

9.1. IMF est imates of total international migrant remit tances in 1989 17.2. Characterization of immigrant's welfare rights324

(millions of 1989 U.S. dollars) 159 18.1. Cases newly approved for welfare benefits (AFDC or TANF with9.2. Changes in international migrant remit tances and incomes in Medi-Cal) in Los Angeles County by immigration status of

Michoacan Project households, 1982-8 165 household head347

9.3. Estimated village remittance multipliers, 1988 167 18.2. Children newly approved for welfare benefits (AFDC or TANF with

10.1. Asia: Major labor exporting nat ions and est imates of the number Medi-Cal) in Los Angeles County by immigration status of

of workers deployed overseas in the mid-1990s 176 household head348


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x L is t o f Tab le s

19.1. Line-watch apprehensions, line-watch hours, and line-watchapprehensions per line-watch hour, 1977-95

19.2. Average monthly l ine-watch and non-l ine-watch apprehensions andenforcement hours by sector grouping, fiscal years 1993-4(first 7 months)

19.3. Line-~atch and non-l ine-watch apprehensions per hour by sectorgroupmg, fiscal years 1993-4 (fi rs t 7 months)

19.4. Es~ir,nated_percentage o.fresident workers who enjoy border-crossingprivileges m three MeXICanborder cities, 1993

19.5. Est imates of cross-border commuting by residents of three Mexicanborder cities, 1993

19.6. Est imated legal s tatus of cross-border commuters in three Mexicanborder cities, 1993

355L ist o f F ig u re s

3592 .1. Scat te rp lo t o f the net mig ra ti on ra te aga ins t t he rat e o f natura l

increase 1960-95

2 .2. Scat te rp lo t of the net migrat ion rat e aga inst t he rat e o f naturalincrease 1960-95: countries with net emigration

2 .3. Sca tt erplot o f the ne t migrat ion rat e aga inst t he rat e o f na tu ra lincrease 1960-95: developing countries and economies in

transition11.1. Two-country migration model11.2. Fees determined by wage differentials11.3. Supply of labor for foreign employment11.4. Fees and the supply of workers17.1. The migration cycle20.1. U.S. immigration and foreign trade by decade20.2. Annual rates of trade and immigration 1900-2000

359

364

365

365

24

25

26204205207207325376377


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1

Introduction

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND J. EDWARD TAYLOR

In 2000, the total world population of immigrants-people living outside theircountry of birth or cit izenship-reached approximately 160 million. If these peo-ple were uni ted in a s ingle country, they would create a "nat ion of immigrants"with the sixth largest population on earth, larger than Japan, Pakistan, or theRussian Federation. The world population of immigrants increased at a rate of 2.8mill ion per year between 1985 and 1990 and more than 4 mi ll ion per year between1990 and 1997, compared with 0.8 mi ll ion per year between 1965 and 1975. Thebreakup of the Soviet Union and Yugos lavia added 20 mill ion new internat ionalmigrants to the world in 1991, as borders moved across people ins tead of people

across borders.Most of the world's immigrants live in developing, not developed, count ries.However, the recent growth in immigration has mostly been to developed countries.Together wi th the fact that immigrants of ten are concentrated in a few regions andeconomic sectors, this makes immigration one of the most visible and volatile issuesthroughout the "North" (the industrialized or developed countries of immigration,as opposed to the developing nations of emigrat ion in the "South"). Not only hasimmigration been ris ing; i ts composi tion is al so changing . From North Africanvenders in the s treets of F lorence to Mexican and Hmong meat packers in Iowa toBrazil ian and Indones ian factory workers in Japan, immigrants are increas inglydiverse in their origins, destinations, and characteristics.

The remi ttance income that migrants send home, according to conservativeestimates by the International Monetary Fund (1999), surpassed $95 billion in1998, outstripping total official development assistance and making migrants thechief export of many countries in terms of the foreign exchange they generate.Migrant remittances are equivalent to more than one half the value of total mer-chandise exports in the Dominican Republic, Egypt, EI Salvador, Jordan, Yemen,and Greece.

Recognizing how vital migrant remittances are to their economies, some labor-abundant developing nations have designed and implemented policies to train andplace workers abroad and to harness more of the income they earn for development.Meanwhile, migrant host countries in Europe, North America, and Asia are takingan increasingly restrictionist stance towards immigrants and refugees, insti tutingpolicies that attempt-usually without much success-to reduce the flow of


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2 D o ug la s S . M a ss ey a ndJ . E dw a rd Ta yl or

migrants into their territories. In most cases, countries do not have a clear ideaof how many immigrants they hos t or send abroad, le t alone how to cont rol immi-gration effectively or influence its impacts.

Such isthe conflicting landscape of international migration trends and policies aswe ente: the twenty-first century. The International Union for the Scientific Study ofPopul~tl~n (IUSSP) br~ught together a panel of world migration experts to assessthe ~X1stmgand emerging trends and issues surrounding international migration.TheIr :vork, presente~ at ~sympos ium convened in Barcelona on May 7 through 10,1997, I~showcased In thi s volume. The conference was organized by the IUSSPCommittee on South-North Migration and sponsored by the IUSSP together withthe Ortega and Gasset Cultural Insti tute of Spain and the Government of Catalonia.T~e subjects ~f the conference papers span a spect rum of key issues confrontingmIgrant-sendIng and hos t count ries , including international migration trends,patterns, and determinants; immigration and refugee policies; the social andeconomic integration of immigrants; and the impacts of migration and remittancesin mig~ant-sendin~ regions. The papers offer insights cri tical to understanding the?eterml~ants a~d I~pacts o~international migration and designing domestic andinternationn] mIgratIOn policies.

This volum: and the conference that created itare the second and final componentof the CommIttee on South-North Migration's work. I t complements the cr iti cal

analysis of international migration theory published in the book Worlds in Motion:Un~er s~anding Internat iona l Migra tion a t the End of the Mil lenn ium (OxfordUniversity Press, 1998; Massey et al. 1999) and in a series of journal art icles (Masseyet.al . 1993, 1994; Tayl?r et al. 1996a,b). Three themes emerge from the chapters inthis volume and the discussion they generated at the conference.

PATTERNS AND CHARACTERISTICS OFINTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT

W~rld iI_TImigration!s increasing and its character is changing. The world's population

of Im~lgrants has Increased at a rate exceeding world population growth and theP?tentJal fo~futur~ gr~wth. in international migration is nothing less than staggering.FIrst , there ISa wldenmg. mcome gap between rich and poor countries. Accordingto the World Bank, the ratio of per capita incomes in high- and low-income countrieswas 11:1 in 1870 and 52:1 in 1985. Second, the transportation and communicationrevolut ions have put migrat ion to distant lands within the reach as wel l as the im-agi~ations of n :ore.and more people. Third, newly emerging economies, in particularChma, a:e begmm~g to ente: the world labor market in a much bigger way thanbefor~. Finally, ~esplte recent I~creases in world migration, only a small share of thewor~~s peo~le (Just~.3 per cent In the mid-1990s) liveoutside of their country of birth?r clt1Ze~slllp.That IS,nearly 98 per cent of the world's population does not migratemternationally, a huge reservoir of potential emigrants. The percentage of people not

Introduction 3

migrating is even higher for Asia, which is home to 60 per cent of the world'spopulation but only 10per cent of all international migrants.

As international migration expands, i ts diversi ty in terms of origins and destina-tions , as well as social , demographic, and economic character is tics , increases.Developed countries cur rently take in a disproportionate and growing share ofthe world's internat ional migrants . Within developed countr ies, immigrants arechanging the demographic makeup of communities that previously were not major

immigrant destinations. Increasing diversi ty shows up in the number of countries oforigin represented in immigration flows to developed countries. In virtually everydeveloped country, the number of countries of origin accounting for three quartersof all immigrants rose between 1965-9 and 1990-4. For example, 18 countriesaccounted for 75 per cent of the total inflow to the United States in 1965-9. In1990-4, no fewer than 27 countr ies accounted for the same share (Zlotnik 1998) .In the case of Eastern and Cent ral Europe, an entirely new region has appeared onthe international migration stage. Meanwhile, Asian migration flows have becomeenormously more complex. Chapters in this volume document the diversification ofinternational migration in terms of gender, skills and occupations, and recruitment.

THE COMPLEXITY OF EFFECTS AT ORIGIN ANDDESTINATION

The effects of migration are becoming increasingly multifaceted, both at places ofmigrant or ig in and at migrant destinations. In the South, the economic impacts ofout-migration appear to be framed by two extremes. In some sending areas, migra-tion has set in motion a development dynamic, as income remitted by migrantsloosens var ious kinds of product ion and inves tment cons traint s that typicallyconfront households in poor developing economies. In others, relat ively lucrativemigration activities have drained local economies of their labor and capital,crowding out local production of tradable goods and leading some communities andregions to specialize in migration. . .

At migrant des tinat ions , as researchers attempt the complex calculus of tmrm-gration's costs and benefits (see Smith and Edmonston 1998; and U.S. Commissionon Immigration Reform 1997), governments implement policies to reduce the neg-ative fiscal impacts, almost certainly with adverse consequences for the economicintegration of immigrants and especially their children. Immigrants' increasing geo-graphic and socio-demographic diversity means that their influences are being felt innew areas and by new groups in host societies.

POLICY MISMATCHES AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Three kinds of policy mismatches are evident from the chapters in this volume. First ,there i s a widening rif t between migrant -export policies in sending countr ies andimmigration policies in migrant destination countries, with possibilities for heightened


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4 D o ug la s S . M a s se y a nd ]. E dw ar d Tay lo r

North-S?uth tensions over migration (see the chapters by de Wenden, Hugo, Stahl,and Battistella), Second, there are contradictions between immigration policies andreali ties in developed countries, with the consequence that immigration policiesrarely achieve their s tated goals and frequent ly produce outcomes the oppos ite ofwhat policy makers intended (see Chapter 19 by Bean and Spener) . Thi rd, there is astriking juxtaposition and, in some eyes, contradiction in the policies that increasethe free movement of goods and capital across nat ions but leave migrat ion-themovement of people-off the negotiating table (see Chapters 7 and 15by Martin and

de Wenden).

THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS BOOK

This volume is organized into three parts. Part I, which follows this Introduction, isen.title~ "Prospects." It examines emerging trends and factors influencing international~lgratlOn throughout the world. Part II, entit led "Policies in Sending Nations:' con-SIdersthe effects of immigration at places of origin and undertakes a critical evaluationof policies that have been implemented or proposed to manage them. Part III, which:ocuses on "Poli~ies.inReceiving Nations:' examines the consequences of immigrationIn pl~cesof destination and assesses the efficacy of policies that receiving nations haveused In an effort to control the number, characteristics, and effects of immigrants.

Prospects

Our assessment of the prospects for international migration begins with an analysisof the ~xtent to which international migrat ion inf luences , and is inf luenced by,population growth. Hania Zlotnik provides a straightforward demographic assess-ment of the interplay between population growth, immigration, and emigration. Shefinds that, in most countries, the net effect of international migration on populationgrowth is small. The relatively few countries where net immigration makes a sizeablecontribution to population growth are concentrated in the North, but there arealmos t as many developing count ries in which immigration subs tantial ly affectspopulation growth: Zlotnik finds no simple relationship between natural populationIncrease and net migration, That is, rapid population growth in and of itself does notfuel emigration.

~hus, the causes of international migrat ion are not demographic, but pol iti cal,social, and economic. Post-1989 polit ical transformations in Central and EasternEurope instantly added some 20 million people to the world's population of immig-rant s. Some observers forecas t massive emigrat ion from this region to western~urope ~s a resul t. Internat ional migration from Central and Eastern Europe did,indeed, mcrease dramatical ly af ter 1990. But the mass exodus to the West fai led to~~terializ~. Mare~ Ok6lski explores this paradox, investigating why sharp increases111111te:natlOn~1migration between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe didnot spill over mto extra-regional migration. He argues that the region has acquired

Introduction 5

the attributes of a self-contained migration system (Kritz et al. 1992). Whether thissys tem wil l persi st in coming years or become simply an eastward extens ion of anexpanding European migration system depends on the success of economic reformsin creating and sustaining poles of attraction linked to regions of expulsion that aredistinct from the West European system.

In Chapter 4,Aderanti Adepoju points out that African history isdeeply rooted inmigration, and that international migration from African countries persists today.Most of this migration, however, iswithin the continent rather than between Africaand the rest of the world. Adepoju examines trends in immigration within and fromAfrica, concentrating on the nexus of demographic, polit ical , ethnic, economic, andecological variables shaping African population movements. He argues that Africanmigrat ion is l ikely to increase in the future, as economic and polit ical cr ises swel lrefugee f lows and s timulate labor migration. Migrat ion networks wi ll di rect thismigration to new destinations inside and outside the African region. Extra-regionalmigration is likely to be increasingly undocumented, given restrictive immigrationand refugee policies in developed countries.

Contemporary international migration in Asia is unprecedented in terms of it sscale, divers ity, and impacts, wi th every count ry in the region and a broadeningpopulation base being influenced by migration. In its sheer magnitude, the migrationpotential in Asia is overwhelming, yet our understanding of it is quite limited.

Graeme Hugo offers a detailed analysis of emerging trends and issues inAsian-Pacif ic international migrat ion. Asian migrat ion includes very large out -flows to other regions along with complex and growing intra-regional populationmovements. No longer limited to narrowly defined social groups, Hugo argues thatinternational migration is increasingly becoming part of the "calculus of choice" byAsians assessing their future options. He foresees international migration becomingmore institutionalized, facilitated by governments and by private agencies promot-ing migration for profi t. An already huge reservoir of Asians seeking to emigrate willincrease at a faster rate than the total Asian population in coming years. This isespecially true for educated youth, due to mismatches between the supply of skilledworkers and economies' ability to absorb them. Challenging the "brain drain"paradigm, Hugo argues that the loss of highly trained individuals to international

migration is having beneficial impacts upon most sending countries.Argentina has historically been one of the world's great countries of immigration.

Alicia Maguid reviews the his tory of Argentine immigrat ion to reveal a markedt ransformation in the or igins of immigrants from Europe to bordering count ries ofSouth America. She then examines the role of border-count ry immigrants in themetropoli tan Buenos Aires labor market, which lies at the center of a Southern Conemigration subsys tem and cons ti tutes a magnet for workers from Chile, Bol ivia,Uruguay, and Paraguay. Maguid contends that the Buenos Aires labor markethas become segmented along immigrat ion l ines. Immigrants from neighboringcountries are selectively inserted into manual jobs, particularly in construction anddomestic service. These jobs are rejected by the native population because of theirlow wages, instability, limited benefits, and hazardous working conditions.


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6 D ou gla s S . M a ss ey a ndJ. E d wa rd Ta yl or

Her findings mirror those from U S h b .(l985), Taylor (1992) and th A ili 're sea rc y PIOre (1979), Dickens and Langers appear to be conc~n trat~d i~; ;ea: i e employment rat : fal ls , t he immigrant work -services, particularly dom f . gly III two economic sectors : construct ion anda llows for immigrant work :: sI~: :: :~~e~~t seems tha t the space the l abor marke t

!~,~O~':'r:::~!~7:~;::!~:7:1~t~::~~;:;rr:~:~!'d~~~a;:n:;:~As the foregoing les ill ng con mons,

un fo lds in a con text : : t : ~~o~a~i~:~~~ ~~ntem:orary internation~l migrationcountries as well as I d . . mar ets. Governments III developedas an alternative to ~~gSrae1:I~OenloPIedh~ountrlle~llcfreasi~glYregard trade liberalization. n ISana YSIS0 MeXlC US' .

sustained international flow of . h'O- .. migration, the largestmigrants anyw ere In the ld Ph T .

challenges the argument that trad lib li . . wor, 1 Ip Martinmigration, at least in the short r H 1 era IZatIOnnecessa.nl_Yoffers alternatives tothe North American Free Tradeu:. ree argues t?at eco~omlc In~egration pol icies l ikenational migration betw b g ement .on.y provide a basis for reducing inter-

likelv to i een mem er coun tnes III the long run In the short r h~re I e lYdt~Increase mig ra ti on p ressures, resu lt ing in a "migra~ion hump "Al~ ' t e

hy

eve ope In the context ofNAFTA hi . ouging the likely effect of . . ' IS ~ore arguments are relevant for understand-

Central to any cons~~;~~:~c ~~~~:~~~~o:n migration i~ othe: world regions.integration. Min Zhou's stud f al mIgratIOn IS the Issue of economicUnited States quest ions the h:;a:mc pI?tYalm~nt Phatterns among .immigrants in the

bi . api VIew t at workers' skills d t . thei: ~ sZ:~~oe :~iFo~s :e ~~~:~: i; :~:~t. Shef~nds ~vidence that huma~ ~:~:~ z:

made to believe that their labor m ess ~ immigrants. Although immigrants areskills th ft ~rket expenence should be commensurate with their

, ey 0 en encounter barners based on grou b h' .characteristics Immigrant work' p mem ers IP, not mdividuallow wages o r 't ak ing jobs for :~~ ~~ access to U.S. l abor marke ts bye ither accept ingst ra tegi es for l abor marke t ent ry ~c th ~~are ?7rqual if ied: Although funct iona l asequity. This chapter also reveals 'd '~ ac IO~sVIOate the maInstream cultural value of

nrerences III employment experien bv i .group and gender, the analysis of which reoui theoreti ce y imrrugram

equires new eoret ical frameworks.

P ol ic ie s i n s en di ng n at io n s

The effects of international migration on re io f "controversy among researchers a d li g k ns 0 ongm have been a Source offrom the c ont extual speci ficit y an;in~~r~Zr~ e rs. In ~art: th: controversy stemsraising questions like "why doe . t . IY nequal dlstnbutIOns of these effects,

SIn ernatIOna migration ap tment in some migrant-sendI'ng but nor l pear 0 promote develop-

areas ut not In other?" d " h' I .benefit from immigration, which lose and ?" s. an w IC 1 SOCIalgroupsnational migration are contentiou b ' ~hy. Thus, t?e consequences of inter-t he pol icy responses are rarely s im;l e~cause t ey are mul tI face ted and complex and

t ' For man~ year~, researchers and pol icymakers thought about the effec ts o f rniIon apart rom ItS det erminants. Re cently, a new genre of migration theoryand

Introduction 7

research, coined the new economics of labor migration (Stark 1991), has emerged tochallenge traditional migration models and suggest new policy options. It views migra-t ion deci sions as being made not by individua l economic actors, but rather, wi thinlarger uni ts of related people--famil ies, households, even communities . It also recog-nizes that the motives for migration are more diverse than simply to maximize income;they a lso may inc lude min imiz ing r isks and loosen ing const ra in ts associ at ed wi thvarious types of market fai lures common in developing countries , especially in rural

areas from which many migrants originate. This new perspective opens up an array ofpotential influences of migration and remit tances on migrant-sending and migrant-receiving areas, including indirect influences unrecognized by traditional approaches.

Drawing on insights from the new economics of labor migration, Taylor presentsevidence t o show t ha t migrant re mitta nc es c ontri but e subst antial ly to income inmigrant-sendi ng a re as, both directl y and i ndi rectly. He a rgues that many of thenegative findings of past migration-and-development research are due to researchers'fa il ure to t ake account o f the ind irec t e ffect s o f mig ra ti on and remit tances in the iranalysis. Directly, remit tances benefit the households that receive them. Indirectly,t hey loosen const ra in ts on product ion act iv it ies by providing mig rant househo ldswi th cap it al and insurance aga inst i ncome loss . Households with migran ts spendremit tances on goods and services suppl ied by others. Through these expendi tures,remi tt ances creat e income l inkages tha t t ransmit the impac ts o f remit tances f romthe remit tance-receiving households to others in the migrant-sending economy. Forpo li cymakers , unders tand ing these d irec t and indi rect i nf luences o f mig ra ti on i scrucial in designing programs and policies to harness remittances for development.

Graeme Hugo and Charl es Stahl rev iew the act ions tha t governmen ts o f mig rantsending nat ions have employed to shape the extent, character, and direction of laborexports. They consider policies designed to influence remittance flows, the reabsorp-t ion of returnees, and investments in human resource development among potentialmigrants (in ant icipat ion ofthe ski ll and occupat ional needs of labor-importing coun-tries). Hugo and Stahl conclude that there are significant differences in governments 'abi li ties to influence different types of migration, for example, labor exports throughofficially sanctioned programs versus illegal migration. Their analysis indicates that,al though government s have i mplemente d a diversity of strat egies t o i nfl uence

emigrat ion, these pol icies have been developed largely in a research vacuum.Considerabl e research has documented the powerful rol e o f networks in d riving

inte rnat ional migrati on. Al though consi derable re search has bee n carried outon migration networks, l it tle isknown about the commercialization of internationalmi gra tion-the involvement of profit-mot ivated inte rm ediaries in organizi ngmig rant f lows . Priva te f irms oft en t ake the p lace of soci al networks when the l at te rare insufficiently developed or where migration, including clandestine migration, iscomplicated by long distances and difficult border crossings. However, they do so ata p ri ce , and the fees charged by labor recru it ers reduce the economic returns f rommigration for individual migrants and their famil ies.

Manolo Abella offers an economic analysis of labor recruitment , focusing on whatdetermines the recruiters' share of the economic returns from international migration.


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8 DougLasS. M a ss ey a ndJ. E dw a rd Ta yl or

!lis an.alysis highl~ghts a policy conundrum. Intermediaries are notorious for exploit-I~g migrants, which creates a rationale for developing public recruitment insti tu-nons. However, public employment offices are usually less effective in finding joboffers abroa~ than their private counterparts. As a result, most prospective migrantsseek ~heservices of private intermediaries even when public alternatives exist, despitethe nsk of fraud and high fees.

Because of the circularity of internat ional migrat ion , the economic and socialreintegration ~f retu~n migra?ts has become an important policy concern. Emigrant

remtegration ISparticularly Important when economic crises abroad provoke thesudden return of large numbers of migrant workers. Graziano Battistel la addressesthe quest .ion of what policies can be implemented to facil itate the reintegration ofre~urn migrants. He focuses on the Philippines, but his analysis isgermane for other~l1lgrant-sending countries. Battistella concludes that, even though return migrationISa ~erm~ne~t feature of international labor migration, no country has succeeded indea!mg WIthIt ~dequately. He argues that the best policies are not those specificallydes .Igned for .nugrants , but rather, pol icies des igned for the whole populat ion onwhIc~ returning .migrants can capitalize. Successful migrant reintegration programsrequire cooperation between migrant sending and receiving countries.

~eyo~~ prod~cing economic effects,international migration shapes and is influencedby Ide~ttttes. Richard Bedford's assessment of mobility, identity, and development in

?ceama ch~l!enges conventional approaches that view fragmented microstates asIsolate? entit ies sc~ttered across a vast ocean. An enduring feature of migration inOceania, he argues, ISthe high levelof circulation of population between the islands andcountries ?f the Pacific rim. Bedford views this circulation aspart of an ongoing processof expanding worlds of action and interaction of islanders, which has been going on forcenturies in this ':sea ~f islands;' but which has accelerated very rapidly over the pasttwenty years. He identifies new trends in Oceania migration research at the end of themil!e~nium, including new perspectives on the meaning of mobility for peoples whosesocIe~Iesand ~u~tures are multi-local in character rather distinctive and separate placesof I_DIgrantongm and destination. This perspective reflects a new emphasis on trans-national communities in migration research, here as in other parts of the world.

Policies in rece iv ing na tionsNation stat~s are crucial players in international migration, designing policies thatat tempt to inf luence the scale, di rection, compos ition, and effect s of populanonmo:~ments. A great deal of research has considered the influence of immigrationpolicies on the characteristics and qualities of immigrants. A large body of literaturefor example, concludes that immigrant occupational skills have declined over time inthe Unite~ States (LaLonde and Topel 1992; Borjas 1994). Guillermina Jasso critiquesthese ~tudies for_failing to distinguish immigrants by their immigration status whenassessI~g th~ skil ls of enter ing cohorts of immigrants. She points out that morerecent imnugrants are less likely to have permanent res ident s tatus and the legalcompositions of different cohorts may be correlated with skills. '

Introduction 9

Drawing from a new survey of immigrants in the United States, Jasso tests the"declining immigrant quality" (Borjas 1994) hypothesis while controlling for immig-ration status. She finds no evidence of declining skills among female immigrants,suggesting that cohort decline in skills is only a male phenomenon. Cohort changedynamics differ not only by gender but also by visa class and origin country,producing a mix of increases and decreases in occupational earnings. Jasso attributesa significant portion of the observed decline in immigrant skills to changes inU.S. immigration law and policies other than family reunification.

Most migrant-receiving countries have moved towards increasingly restrictiveimmigration pol icies , and those in Europe are no exception. Indeed, the control ofimmigration has become a major preoccupation of the European Union. CatherineWithol de Wenden examines European immigration policies at two levels: accordsencompassing all or a subset of European states; and the tapestry of policies inspeci fic count ries . She demons trates that policies on both levels are becomingincreasingly restrictionist. She also identifies a tension between country concerns,shaped largely by public opinion, for sovereignty over borders, and the extension ofCommon European policies into the immigration arena. Despite a convergence inEuropean policies with respect to entry, disparities in policies related to stay persist,including residence, social rights, and access to nationali ty. De Wenden identifies adivergence in European country policies related to asylum and the treatment

of unauthorized or ir regular migrants. The future trend, however, wi ll be towardsa strengthening of the Europe-wide decision process with respect to immigrationpolicies.

Growing restrictionism in immigration policies extend into the asylum/refugeepolicy arena. Daniele Ioly and Astri Suhrke offer a detailed assessment of changingEuropean concepts and practices of asylum. They argue that a new asylum regimeemerged in Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s, distinguished by anattempt to limit asylum under the 1951United Nations convention. The new regimeextends beyond Europe's borders, including interventions in countries of origin in aneffort to preempt mass outflows of asylum seekers (the so-called "comprehensiverefugee policies"), and it increasingly offers only temporary protection to refugees.

Immigration presents both promise and challenges to European welfare states. On

one hand, immigration i s blamed for the f inancial cr ises endemic in sustaininggenerous wel fare arrangements . On the other, immigrants promise short- termrelief to the demographic crisis predicted for almost all European countries, in whichmany pensioners will have to be supported by a relatively small working-agepopulation. This is clearly exemplified in Germany's pension schemes, whichhave been sustained for some time by migrant workers' contributions. MartinBaldwin-Edwards assesses the implications of immigration for Europe's welfare statesand concludes that the social protection of migrants across the E.U. is fragmented andsometimes tenuous , wi th var iat ion between count ries, a t di fferent phases of theimmigrant cycle,between different legal statuses and among different nationalities. AsEuropean welfare regimes undergo radical restructuring, there is the possibili ty ofincorporating noncitizens in a rational ordered manner. However, Baldwin-Edwards


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10 D o ug la s S . M a ss ey a ndf. E dw a rd Ta yl or

finds it doubtful that European countries will be able to escape their histories of racialexclusion and construct inclusive market-based welfare systems.

The United States is by far the world's largest immigrant destination, andtraditionally it has been one of the most open in terms of immigrants' accessto the welfare s tate. S ince 1996, it has , however, become a laboratory for tes tingthe effectiveness of restrictionist immigration through welfare policies. The1996 Personal Respons ibil ity and Work Opportuni ty Reconcil ia tion Act , for ex-ample, systematically discriminates against noncitizens in the provision of U.S.public

benefits. As Fix and Zimmermann point out, this legislation signals a markeddeparture from an inclusive social welfare policy that made legal immigrants eligiblefor public benefits on largely the same terms as cit izens, to one that systematicallydiscriminates against noncitizens. The authors argue that new welfare policies in theUnited States have introduced deep structural changes related to civic membership,social policy, and federalism that will be hard to undo, even if the anti-immigrantattitudes and policies of the 1990s ultimately recede.

In the United States, restrictionism is also explici t in immigration policies such asthe 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibil ity Act, which sethigher income thresholds for immigrant sponsors and authorized new "expeditedremoval" procedures at U.S.ports of entry (Musalo et al. 2000). This legislation, how-ever, was preceded by the 1986Immigration Reform and Control Act, which iauncheda massive militarization of the 1,900-mile Mexico-U.S. border in an effort to preventthe entry of undocumented migrants. Frank Bean and David Spener assess howeffective this militarization has been. Their analysis reveals an often-contradictoryquilt of immigration policies that produce unintended consequences and raisechallenging questions about the effectiveness of states as control agents in an era thatincreasingly emphasizes the importance of relatively unrestricted global markets,especially financial and commercial ones. Spener and Bean suggest that at least certainkinds of immigrant flows are either uncontrollable or so strongly sustained by existingsocial and economic forces that effective control would be prohibitively expensive infinancial or political terms.

CONCLUSIONS

As we enter the new mil lennium, i t i s l ikely that the international migration t rendsidentified in this volume will continue, creating new challenges for sending and hostcountries and highlighting the importance of more concerted efforts to understandand address these challenges. Some of the key trends that emerge from this work include

(1) Larger and more diverse international migran t flows, driven bywidening incomeinequalit ies across nations, improvements in transportation and communica-t ions, expanding formal and informal recruitment networks, sending-countrypolicies that encourage and train people for work abroad, and structural changesin the economies and societies of migrant-sending and host countries-changesthat are themselves shaped by migration;

Introduction 11

(2) Continuing economic in tegrat ion among nat ions, including the f~rn:ation ofnew trade blocks, with labor migration largely absent from the negotiatmg tabl~.Bypromoting trade and investment, market liberalization may :ed.uce eco~omlCpressures for international migration in the long run b~ bnngmg. capital towould-be migrants in thei r home countr ies as an alter?atIve to havmg peoplemigrate to capital in developed countries. Nevertheless, m the shor: run,. mar.ketliberlization islikely to create labor-market dislocations that intensify migration

pressures; . . . d(3) Reluctance by developed countr ies to receive immrgrants ~nd refugees . ~n

integrate them into their economies and s~cieti~s. T~is may tngg~r n.ewpO!It~calconflicts between North and South in the imnugration arena, while mtensI~I~gsocial conflicts involving immigrants, their children, and other groups withindeveloped countries.

How policymakers respond to these challe~ges wi~lbe i~st.rumental in determini~gwhether the twenty-first century will be a time of intensifying North-S~~th conflictor of cooperation with regard to migra~ion. Coope.r~tive efforts are c~ItIcalto e~sepotent ial North-South migration tens ions, to faci li ta te the econo~Ic and sO~lalintegration of immigrants in host countries, a~d to enhance. the potentIal fo~turmngmigration into development in migrant-s.end~ng areas. Ul:I~ately, ec~noml~ de~el-opment in regions of populat ion expulsion ISa prerequis it e for easmg migrationpressures.

References

Borjas,GeorgeJ. (1994). "The Economics of Immigration:' Jo u rn a l o f Eco n omic Li te ra tu re , 3 2 :

1667-717. h "A .Dickens,William T.,and Lang,Kevin. (1985). "ATestof Dual LaborMarketT eory, mencan

Eco n o mic Rev iew,75:792-805. .International Monetary Fund (1999). B a la n ce o f P a ym e nt s S ta ti st ic a l Yea r bo o k.Washmgton,

DC: International Monetary Fund. . .,Kritz,Mary,Lim,Lean L. , and Zlotnik,Hania (eds.) (1992). In te rn at io n a l Mig rat ion Sy s tems :A

Global Approach.Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress. . . "LaLonde,Robert, and Topel, R. (1991). "LaborMarket Adjustments to IncreasedImmigration,in John Abowd and Richard Freeman (eds.), I mm ig ra ti on , Tra de , a nd t he L a bo r M a rk et .Chicago: University of ChicagoPress,pp. 167-200. "

Massey,Douglas S.,Arango, Joaquin, Hugo, Graeme, Kouao~ci, ~h, Pellegrino, Ad.ela,andTaylor, J. Edward (1993). "Theories of International Migration: An Integration andAppraisal," P o pu la t io n a n d D e ve lo p m en t R e vi ew,19:431-66. '"

----------(1994). "International Migration: The North Amencan Case,P o pu la t io n a n d D e ve lo p m en t R e vi ew,20: 699-751. . . '

------------ (1999). Wo rl ds I n M o ti on : U nd er st an di ng I nt er na ti on alM i gr a ti on a t t he E n d o f t he M i ll en n iu m .Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press. " .

Musalo,Karen,Gibson, Lauren,Night,Stephen, and Taylor,J. Edward (2000). The ExpeditedRemovalStudyReleasesIts Third Report;' In terpreter Releases ,77: 1189-96.


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Piore , Michael J . (1979). Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies. New York:Cambridge University Press.

Smith, James P., and Ed mo nston, Bar ry (eds.) (1998 ). The New Americans: Economic,Demographic, and FiscalEffects of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Stark, Oded (1991). The Migration ofLabor. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.Taylor, J .Edward (1992). "Earnings and Mobil ity of Legal and Illegal Immigrant Workers in

Agriculture:' American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74: 889-96.-- Massey, Douglas S.,Arango, Joaquin, Hugo, Graeme, Kouaouci, Ali ,and Pellegrino, Adela

(1996a). "Internat ional Migra tion and National Development:' Populat ion Index , 62:181-212.

---------- (1996b). "International Migration and Community Development:'Population Index, 62: 397-418.

United Sta tes Commiss ion on Immigra tion Reform (1997). Migration Between Mexico andthe Uni ted States: Binat ional Study. Mexico City: Editorial y Litog rafia Regina de losAngeles, S.A.

Wheeler, Charles (1999). "Affidavit of Support : A Year in Review: ' Immigration Bulletin, 4:97-105.

Zlotnik, Hania (1998). "Internat ional Migra tion 1965-96: An Overview," Population andDevelopment Review, 24: 429-68.

PART I

P R O S P E C T S


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2

Population Growth and International Migration

HANIA ZLOTNIK

Whereas international migration in its net form is a component of populationgrowth and therefore a direct determinant of the latt er, the nature and s trength ofpopulation growth's potential effects on international migration are debatable. Inthis chapter, I examine the influence of net international migration on populationgrowth and then consider available evidence on the influence of population growthon international migration.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AS A COMPONENT OFPOPULATION GROWTH

The growth of a population between any two points in time, to and tl, equals thenumber of births (B) minus the number of deaths (D) plus the number of immi-grants (1 ) minus the number of emigrants (E), all relative to the period to to tl Thus,if PI isthe population at t ime tl and Po is the population at t ime tn, then:

PI - Po = B - D + 1- E. (2.1 )

The number of births minus the number of deaths is defined as the naturalincrease of the population (denoted by NI), whereas the number of immigrantsminus the number of emigrants constitutes the net number of internationalmigrants gained or lost by the population and denoted by NM :

PI - Po = NI + NM . (2.2)Dividing both s ides of eqn (2.2) by the populat ion at the mid-point of the period

to to tl and by the length of that period to obtain annual rates , eqn (2.2) becomes

r= n+ m (2.3)

where r is the annual rate of growth of the population, n is the rate of naturalincrease, and m is the net migration rate.

During most of this century rates of natural increase in developed countries havediffered markedly from those of developing countries. Having undergone the demo-graphic transition earlier, developed countries were exhibiting by 1960lower rates ofnatural increase than their developing counterparts. Then, as ferti li ty began to fall inone group of developing countr ies after another, the divers if icat ion of those rates


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18 Han ia Zlo tn ik

Table 2.1. Fi ve -num be r sum m a ry of d i st r ibu ti ons of c ount r ie s a c c ord ing t o d i ff e re l lt i ndi c at o rso f n e t i nt er na ti on a l m i gr a ti on o v er t he p er io d1960-95

Indicator of net m igration Lower Lower Median Upper Upperbound quartile quar ti le bound

Net number of migrants (000) -6,733.0 -453.0 -44.0 126.0 19,837Net migration rate (%) -1.9 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 3.4

Net migration/Natural increase (%) -71.2 -11.1 -2.6 4.2 646.0Source: United Nations (J 998).

and upper bounds of the dis tribut ion, i ts upper and lower quart iles , and the median.In t erms of net int erna tional mig ra ti on , the med ian va lue for the world ind icat ed ane t loss of 44,000 persons be tween 1960 and 1995. In other words, more than ha lf ofa ll count ri es in the world must have exper ienced a net loss du ring the period . On lysixty countries experienced positive net migration over the period, including seventeenof the twenty-eight western market economies. Most developing countries experiencednet emigration. In terms of annual average rates of international migration, the medianvalue was nega tive and the quart il e po in ts imply tha t for hal f o f the count ri es o f theworld, annual ne t mig ra ti on rat es di ffered l it tl e f rom zero, rang ing f rom -0.2 to 0 .1per cent. At the upper and lower tai ls of the dis tribut ion, however, net migration wasresponsibl e for an average annual gain o f 3.4 per cen t in the Unit ed Arab Emi ra tesand an average annual loss o f 1 .9 per cen t in Samoa.

The f ive-number summary for ne t mig ra ti on as a percen tage of natural i ncreaseindicates a dis tribut ion highly skewed to the right . It i s only among coun tr ies tha texperience net gains from migration that the net balance accounts for a high propor-t ion of total populat ion growth. At the lower end of the dis tribut ion, net emigrat ioncon tr ibut ed to a reduct ion o f populat ion rang ing f rom 11 to 71 per cen t o f na turalincrease in a quarter of the countries of the world. However, most of these countrieswere very small : a majority (twenty-eight out of forty-two) had mid-period popula-t ions below four mil lion; and seventeen had less than a mil lion inhabitants .

The quart il e va lues shown in Table 2 .1 a lso ind icat e tha t in ha lf t he coun tr ies o f

the world, net migrat ion cons ti tu ted a very smal l part o f populat ion growth, e it herposit ive or negat ive (ranging from -11 t o 4 per cen t) . In genera l, t here fore, t heseest imates confirm the conclusion of Keyfi tz (1971) that the level of emigrat ion thata growing populat ion would have to sustai n over the long run i n orde r to becomestationary was not l ikely to be achieved in pract ice.

Real is ti c l evel s o f emigrat ion can be expec ted to have v ir tual ly no effec t on thelong-term demographic evolution of developing country populations.

Given the skewed nature of the dis tribut ions of these indicators of net migration,it is instructive to consider those cases that are statistical outliers (those whosedis tance to the median was twice the interquarti le range). Table 2.2 presents out lierswith respect to net number of international migrants during the period. At the upperend of the dis tribut ion, the countries experiencing the largest absolute gains through

Po p u la t io n Gro wth 19

Table 2.2. Countr i es o r a re as i den t if ie d a s s t at is t ic a l ou tl ie r s by t o ta i ne t m i gra t ion1960-95

Country or area Net migrants(thousands)

Net Rate of Net migration

migration natural aspercentage of

rate increase natural increase(percentage) (percentage)

0.25 0.77 32.5

0.29 0.04 646.0

0.48 0.91 53.4

0.94 2.69 34.9

0.19 0.49 38.6

0.01 2.01 0.7

0.03 0.85 4.1

0.61 0.93 65.0

0.15 2.82 5.4

0.47 2.76 17.0

3.42 1.84 186.0

0.12 2.71 4.4

0.87 1.68 51.5

-0.39 0.69 -56.3

-0.10 2.27 -4.2

-0.33 1.98 -16.6

-1.26 3.02 -41.7

-0.27 2.50 -10.7

-0.25 0.84 -30.1

-0.21 2.40 -8.6

-O.ll 2.17 -5.3

-0.01 1.72 -0.4

-0.10 2.75 -3.7

-0.22 2.63 -8.4

-0.13 2.38 -5.5

-0.78 2.45 -31.9

-0.30 2.72 -11.0

United States 19,837Germany 7,725Canada 3,999Saudi Arabia 3,668

France 3,459India 3,148Former USSR 3,097Australia 2,911

Iran 2,390IvoryCoast 1,435United Arab Emirates 1,379Zaire 1,270Israel 1,160

Portugal -1,275

Egypt-1,514

SriLanka -1,601Rwanda -1,750

Morocco -1,780Former Yugoslavia -1,793Colombia -1,860Vietnam -2,175

China -2,190

Pakistan -3,271Philippines -3,684Bangladesh -3,863Afghanistan -4,161Mexico -6,733

Source: United Nations (1998).

immigrat ion are the Unit ed Stat es and Germany (reun if ied) , wi th gains of nearly20 mil li on and 8 mil li on persons, respec tive ly. Aust ra li a, Canada , and Israe l, a llcountries favoring migration for settlement, are likewise among the outliers. France, aformer labor-importing country, along with current importers Saudi Arabia and theUnited Arab Emirates, also appear on the l is t, asdoes Ivory Coast , which hosts a largeexpatriate labor force. Iran islisted because of the large number of refugees it contains,and the prominence of Indi a and Zaire is also related to their status as receivers of

forced migrants.


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20 Hania Z lo tn ik

At the l ower end of the distribution, Mexico and Afghanistan a ppear as the t womain sources of emigrants, the former being the maj or source of migrants to theUnit ed Sta tes and the l at te r a major source for re fugees dur ing the 1980s .O ther out -liers i nc lude former and current labor exporting countrie s, such as Morocco,Por tuga l, and ex-Yugos lavi a (sources of l abor for European count ri es ) as well asBangladesh, Egypt , Pakis tan, the Phi lippines , and Sri Lanka (sources for western andsouth-eastern Asia) and Colombia (the main source for Venezuela). In the case of the

former Yugoslavia, forced migration also played a part in increasing i ts emigrat ion.Rwanda and Vietnam appear as out liers because they are major sources of refugees,a lt hough in the case o f Rwanda the s it ua tion i s f lu id and , a t t he t ime of thi s wri ti ng ,massive ret urn movements we re al re ady beginning. Lastly, Chi na appears as animportant source of emigrants . However, a large proport ion of these migrants wentto Hong Kong and would t echn ical ly cease to be def ined as int erna tional mig rant s asof mid-1997 when the former colony became a Special Adminis trat ive Region withinthe People's Republic of China.

Among those count ri es est imated to have received the l argest number o f immi-g rant s, net mig ra ti on made a major con tr ibut ion to populat ion g rowth in Germanyand t he Unit ed Arab Emirate s. Ge rma ny's net migrati on rat e was equivalent t o6.5 ti mes the rate of nat ural increase recorded duri ng 1960-95 and in the Unite dArab Emi ra tes the ne t mig ra ti on rat e was nearly doub le the rat e o f natural i ncrease .However, t he high rat io for Germany owed much to the low level of natural i ncreaseexpe ri enced duri ng 1960-95 (0.04 pe r c ent per annum) and does not ne cessarilyimply a high net mig ra ti on rat e. In con tras t, for the Unit ed Arab Emi ra tes, t he highnet mig ra ti on rat e of 3 .4 per cen t was st il l l arger than the s igni fi cant 1 .8per cen t rat eo fna tu ra l i ncrease , imp ly ing tha t the popu la ti on o f the count ry g rew 5 .3 per cen t perannum during 1960-95. Net migration also contributed strongly to growth inAust ra li a, Canada, and Israe l (where i t was over 50 per cen t of natural i ncrease) andmoderat ely to the g rowth of France, Saud i Arab ia , and the Uni ted Stat es (where i twas slightly over a third of natural increase).

Among the coun tr ies losing l arge numbers o f mig rant s, net emigrat ion reducedpopulat ion g rowth by the equ ival en t o f 56 per cen t o f natural i ncrease in Por tugal ,42per cent inRwanda and byabout a third of natural increase in the former Yugoslavia

and Afghan is tan. Fo r a ll other count ri es o r areas charact er ized by large numbers o femigrants , net emigrat ion general ly reduced populat ion growth equivalent only to asmall proportion of natural increase.

Tab le 2 .3 p resent s the coun tr ies or areas tha t qua li fy as ou tl ie rs according to netmigration rate. There are fifteen out liers at each end of the dis tribut ion. Among them,the major it y are count ri es wi th very smal l populat ions: t en out o f the f ift een a t theupper end had a mid -period popu la ti on under 1mi ll ion and so d id n ine of f ift een a tthe lower end of the di st ri bu tion . On ly fou r count ri es out of these thi rt y had popu la-t ions of at least 4 mil lion: Austral ia, Hong Kong, and Saudi Arabia among countriesexperiencing high net immigration and Afghanistan among those experiencing highnet emigrat ion. Table 2.3 suggests that net migration made sizeable contribut ions topopulat ion g rowth only among count ri es tha t experi enced posi ti ve ne t mig ra ti on

Popula tion Growth 21

Table 2.3. Count r ie s o r a re as i den t if ie d a s s ta t is ti c al ou tl ie r s by ra te o fn e t m i gr at io n 1 9 60 -9 5

Country or area Net Rate of Net AverageNet number

migration natural migration as population of migrants

rate increase percentage size (thousands)

(percentage) (percentage) of natural (thousands)increase

UnitedArab Emirates 3.42 1.84 186Qatar 3.15 1.70 186 296

327

Djibouti 2.31 2.01 115 342277

Western Sahara 2.23 2.17 103 140109

Macau 1.08 1.36 80 301114

SaudiArabia 0.94 2.69 35 11,1653,668

Gambia 0.92 2.04 45 732235

Israel 0.87 1.68 52 3,8201,160

Gabon 0.84 1.31 64 781231

Brunei 0.73 2.49 29 18848

Bahrain 0.70 2.51 28 35787

Bahamas 0.67 1.82 37 19446

Australia 0.61 0.93 65 14,0712,991

Luxembourg 0.61 0.13 456 361 77Hong Kong 0.60 1.30 46

4,599 961

GazaStrip -0.68 3.24 -21 547-129

Fiji -0.71 2.60 -27 589-147

Martinique -0.73 1.58 -46 331-85

Belize -0.74 2.99 -25 153-40

Barbados -0.76 1.11 -69 246-66

Afghanistan -0.78 2.45 -32 15,218-4,161

Trinidad and Tobago -0.80 1.99 -40 1,065-298

CapeVerde -0.82 2.69 -31 291-84

Lebanon -1.01 2.36 -43 2,433-857

Jamaica -1.08 2.25 -482,049 -774

Liberia -1.17 3.13 -371,581 -646

Rwanda -1.26 3.02 -42 3,963 -1,750

Guyana -1.29 2.36 -55699 -316

Suriname -1.45 2.54 -57 358-182

Samoa -1.90 2.98 -64 139-92

Source: United Nations (1998).

during 1960-95. In countri es that qua lified as outlie rs t~at had e xperience d ne temigrat ion, the relat ive impact of net migration on populat ion growth was smaller.

Table 2.4 considers out liers according to net migration as a percentage of naturali nc re ase. There are twenty-four outlie rs at the uppe r end of the distribution andfou rt een a t the lower end. Aside f rom confi rming tha t the d ist ri bu tion i smarked ly


17/203

Table 2.4. Co u n tr i es o r a reas id en t if ied as s tat is t ica l o u t li ers wi th resp ec t to n e t mig ra t io nPopula t ion Growth 23a s a p er ce n ta g e o f n a tu ra l i nc re as e 1 9 60 - 95

Country or area Net Net Rateof Average Netskewed to the r ight, the higher number of outl iers at the upper end reveals that net

migrationas migration natural population number of migration makes a larger contribution to increasing the populations of countries thatpercentage rate increase size migrants are net receivers of migrants than i t does to reducing the populations of count riesof natural (percentage) (percentage) (thousands) (thousands) that are net senders. Among some net receivers, migration isresponsible for increas-increase ing populat ion growth by at least asmuch asnatural increase and, in a few cases , by

Germany 645 0.29 0.04 77,133factors of two to six.The case of Germany has already been highlighted, net migra-

Luxembourg 7,725 tion also contr ibuted s ignif icantly to the growth of Aus tr ia , Belgium, Denmark,456 0.61 0.13 361 77United ArabEmirates 186 3.42 1.84 1,1501,379

France, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Switzerland. Even though net migration ismodest

Qatar 186 3.15 1.70 296 327 in these countries, natural increase iseven lower, yielding a relative large ratio of netAustria 146 0.22 0.15 7,547 migration to natural increase.592Djibouti 115 2.31 2.01 342 277

In traditional countries of immigration such as Australia, Canada, and the UnitedWestern Sahara 103 2.23 2.17 140 109

States, natural increase is somewhat higher so that net migration tends to make a lowerSweden 84 0.21 0.25 8,134 but s til l important contr ibution to populat ion growth. In count ries or areas such as598Macau 80 1.08 1.36 301 Gabon, Hong Kong, Israel, Macau, and Singapore, where natural increase is moderate,114Switzerland 78 0.36 0.46 6,264 788 the contribution of net migration also tends to be moderate in relative terms. Of greaterAustralia 65 0.61 0.93 14,071 interest are countries such as Brunei, Djibouti, the Gambia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, theGabon 2,991 United Arab Emirates, and the Western Sahara. In these countries natural increase is4 0.84 1.31 781 231Belgium 55 0.10 0.19 9,640 347 quite high, but net migration, nonetheless , accounts for a high proportion of totalCanada 53 0.48 0.91 23,655 growth. In contrast to the prior table, a large number of the outliers l isted in Table 2.4Israel 3,99952 0.87 1.68 3,820 1,160 have large populations, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the UnitedHong Kong

46 0.60 1.30 4,599 961 States, meaning that net international migration was making sizeable contributions toGambia 45 0.92 2.04 732 population growth in major countries in the developed world.France 23539 0.19 0.49 51,894 3,459 From the perspective of emigration, the contribution of net migration to aBahamas 37 0.67 1.82 194 46 reduction in population growth has generally been moderate. Even in the mostSaudiArabia 35 0.94 2.69 11,165 3,668 extreme case, Hungary, net migration reduced population growth by the equivalentSingapore 34 0.50 1.46 2,481 430 of 71 per cent of natural increase. However, natural increase in Hungary has histor-United States 32 0.25 0.77 226,637 19,837 i cally been very low. Net emigrat ion was more l ikely to playa s igni ficant role inDenmark 31 0.09 0.29 4,902 151 lowering growth in countries with small populations, especially in island nations.Brunei 29 0.73 2.49 188 48 Among the fourteen count ries or areas identi fied as outl iers in Table 2.4, s ix hadLiberia -37 -1.17 3.13 1,581 -646 mid-per iod populat ions below one mill ion and only three had more than 5 millionTrinidad and Tobago -40 -0.80 1.99 1,065 -298 inhabitants (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Portugal). Furthermore, six of the countriesRwanda -42 -1.26 3.02Lebanon 3,963 -1,750 listed as outliers in Table 2.4 were occupied islands.-43 -1.01 2.36 2,433 -857Malta -45 -0.37 0.83 339 -44Martinique -46 -0.73 1.58 331 -85Bulgaria -48 -0.20 0.43 8,188 -582 EFFECT OF POPULATION GROWTH ON INTERNATIONALJamaica -48 -1.08 2.25 2,049 MIGRATION774Guyana -55 -1.29 2.36 699 -1,275Portugal -56 -0.39 0.69 9,321 -1,275 Given that most Western market economy countries experienced positive netSuriname -57 -1.45 2.54 358

migration over the period 1960-95 while most developing countries experiencedSamoa -182 net emigration, a common view of the dynamics of international migration i s that64 -1.90 2.98 139 -92Barbados -69 -0.76 1.11 246 international migrants move mainly from developing to developed countries. Such a-66Hungary -71 -0.09 0.12 10,045 303 view has been reinforced by neoclassicai economics, which posits that countries with

Source: UnitedNations (1998). large endowments oflabor relative to capital will tend to have low equilibrium wages,whereas those with limited endowments of labor relative to capital will tend to have

24


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24 Hania Zlotnik

high market wages, yielding a wage differential that entices workers to move fromlow-wage to high-wage countries.

I t i s, thus , common to argue that large economic and demographic imbalancesbetween develop~d and developing countries predict rising rates of immigration todev~loped. countrI~s because developing countries will be incapable of absorbing theprojected In~rease In the labor force (Emmerij 1993; Golini, Righi, and Bonifazi 1993).Howeve:, evidence to validate this claim has generally not been provided. Given that theeCOn?mI~and demographic imbalances have existed for at least 40 years, i t isworthc.onsId~rIngwhether the data analyzed so far can shed light on the existence of a rela-tion.shIp between population growth and international migration.

FIgure ~.1 p:esents scatter diagrams of the rate of natural increase plotted againstthe ~et mIgratI.on rate, each estimated for the 1960-95 period on the basis of theOffi:Ial population estimates for 1966 and projections of the United Nations (UnitedNations 1998) . Wh~n all count rie~ are cons idered, there is no clear relat ionshipbetween the two vanables. When a line relating net migration to natural increase wasfit~ed to the obser:ations, i t yielded a negative coefficient for natural increase butneI~er that coefficienr nor the constant was statistically significant.. GIven that the i~clusion of all countries might confound the effect of naturall~crease on countnes of net immigration wi th that on countr ies of net emigrat ion ,FIg.2.2 ex~lores whether a stronger relationship might be found by considering onlythe countne~ ~f net emigration. !' l ine fit te? only to the points whose net migrationwas no~ positive produced ag~m a negatI~e slope (implying that the higher the~at~ral Increase the more negative the net rnigration became), which was statisticallys ignif icant at the 4 per cent level. That i s, among the countr ies of net emigrat ion ,

400

1 All countries3.00 - Linear (a ll coun tries )

y=-0.1311x+0.23822.00

R2=0.0317'".. .c: :0 1.00.0 '" .. . .+ + ~o

O s 0.00vZ

-1.00

-2.00

-3.000.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00

Rate of natural increase

Figure 2.1. S c at te rp lo t o f t he n et m i gr a ti on r a te a g ai ns t t he r a te o f n a tu r al i nc r ea s e 1 9 6 0 -9 5

Popula tion Growth 25

0.00

-0.20

-0040

.. . t . . . < : t+. .+ * .. . ~ .~

~ -0.60

-0.80o~ -1.00eo

O s-1.20

y=-0.0953x-0.122R2 = 0.0435

. . . . .

Z -lAO-1.60

-1.80

-2.00-1---.-----,--.,..---,---.----.----,0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50

Rate of natural increase

Countries of net emigration- Linear (cou nt ries of ne t emigra tion)

Figure 2.2. S c at te rp lo t o f t he n et m i gr a ti on r a te a g ai ns t t he r a te o f n a tu r al i nc re a se 1 9 60 -9 5 :co u n tr i es wi th n e t emig ra tio n

these data suggest that there isthe expected relation between net migration and nat-ural increase. However, the fact that countries of net emigration had to be preselectedweakens the value of the relationship found.

Las tly, in order to cont rol to some extent for the confounding effects of level ofdevelopment , a set of count ries that excluded the Western market economies wasconsidered. The third plot in Fig.2.3, labeled "developing countries and countries witheconomies in transition:' isthe result. It shows more clearly than the first diagram thatthere i s a great var iation in the rates of net migration associated wi th a given rate ofnatural increase. The inclusion of both countries experiencing net immigration andthose experiencing net emigration leads again to poor resul ts in f itt ing a line to thedata: the coefficient of natural increase is negative but not significant.

In sum, the relation between net migrat ion and natural increase according to theonly global set of es timates avai lable does not seem to be s trong enough to meritfurther exploration. Although among net emigration countries higher rates of naturalincrease are associated with somewhat higher net emigration rates, the relationshipcan go in ei ther direct ion when both count ries of net immigrat ion and countr ies ofnet emigration are considered simultaneously.

Let us consider the claims made about the relation between population growth andmigration between developing and developed countries from another perspective.The fact that, at the global level , developed countries and particularly the Westernmarket economies record a positive net migration balance with the rest of theworld does not mean that al l migrants from developing countr ies necessarily go todeveloped countries (or to Western market economy countries). When one focuses on

26


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26 Rania Zlotnik

4.00

3.00 y=-0.1559x+ 0.3006

R2=0.0234 .00

.... . . .. .~ ~ ~ r ; - - ; ~ ~ j . ~ . ~ \ ; ~ ' ~ - ~ ' ~ l ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~... :' .~ . .. . . + . .

-3.00 ~-:-::-~:-:::---r----r----,-_-.---_,-----,0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00

Rateof natural increase ExcludingWesternmarket economies

- Linear (excludingWesternmarket economies)

Figure 2.3. S c at te rp lo t o f t he ~ et m i gr a ~o n r a te a g ai ns t t he r a te o f n a tu r al i nc re a se 1 9 60 - 95 :developingcountries an d eco no mies in t ran s it io n

Table 2.5. Percentage0 1t h ~ mig ran t in flo w d i rec ted to se lec ted d eve lop ed co u n tr i esortgtnattng11 1 d eve lop in g co u n tr i es 1 9 6 0 -9 4

Receivingcountry 1960-4 1965-9 1970-4 1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 1990-4 Total1960-94

Australia 7.0 11.5 22.4 43.9 41.5 53.1 60.4Canada 12.3 20.9 31.742.5 55.6 62.1 70.8 77.3Belgium 21.7 20.5 49.6Germany (West)

22.6 29.1 28.4 26.5 24.2 24.714.2 26.4 32.8 29.0 20.6 16.0 22.3Netherlands 16.1 24.2 21.2 33.5 37.4Sweden 39.5 42.7 31.74.7 5.9 11.1 23.2 33.1 45.2 42.7United Kingdom 24.446.3 44.7 54.5 51.8 44.0 28.5United States 41.7 55.7 46.570.5 80.9 85.2 87.9 86.1 78.2

~ ~ e ~ ~ a ~ e ~ ~ : ~ : ~ ~ : : ~ ~a;:~~n~~~ ~e cYt7:!~:;ita~e:na;e~lassifiedby placeof birth; those for Belg~umKingdom a re b yplace o f previous o r i ntende . p, ose for ?ermany, Sweden, a nd the Umted1962and stop in 1990'those for Canada c d resldenc~.Data forBelgiumdo not covertheyears 1961andthose for Netherlands' Sweden an'd the J:.~r ~h~per~od 1961-92;those forGermanystop at 1992;andexcludemigrants who~estatus ~~s regulariz:d

el1nde~g~omItop at 199

R3.The data for the United States

. e mmlgratlOn erorrn and Control Act of 1986S o u r c e s :lotmk (1991, 1998). .

migrant. flows registered by ,:",~ste~nmarket economy countries, it transpires that thepria~~tlOn of tho~e flows ongmatmg in developing countries is not always high.

~ 2.5, for Instance, shows the percentage of migrants to eight develo edcountnes accounted for by developing countr ies . The data are presented in 5-:ear

Population Growth 27

periods from 1960to 1994, and the overall total for 1960-94 isalso shown. Focusingon that total, it is clear that there is a wide var iat ion in the importance of migrat ionfrom developing to developed market economies. The percentage of migrants origin-ating in developing countries varied from 22 per cent inWest Germany to 78per centin the United States. In addition, whereas Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Swedenand the United States experienced a generally increasing trend in the percentage ofmigrants or iginating in the developing world, Belgium, West Germany, and theUnited Kingdom did not.

Table 2.6 presents information on migrant inf lows to the same Western marketeconomy countries in terms of numbers rather than percentages. The data show thatnot only has the percentage of migrants originating in developing countries declinedin some receiving countr ies but, in addition, there has been a reduction in theabsolute number of migrants that originate in developing countr ies, especial lybetween 1985-9 and 1990-4. That trend is observed most clearly in Australia,Belgium, Western Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Although these reductions are generally small and, at the overall level , are morethan counterbalanced by the large increase registered by the United States, they are,nevertheless, symptomatic of changes in the policies and control practices of receiv-ing countries, which have been adopting measures to prevent the admission ofmigrants from developing countr ies . That is , those who claim that internat ional

migrat ion between developing and developed countr ies wi ll necessar ily occuras economic and demographic di sparit ies increase usually fail to take account ofthe barr iers that prevent international migrat ion from becoming a real ity in mostof the world.

Table 2.7 presents data on net migration by region of or ig in (developing versusdeveloped countr ies) for all those receiving countr ies that gather information onboth migrant inflows and outflows. These data corroborate that fact that the netnumber of migrants from developing countries declined between 1985-9 and1990-4 in several European countries and in Australia.

To examine the linkage between rates of natural increase and level s of emigra-tion to Western market economy countries more fully, data on gross and netmigration to the eight receiving countr ies li st ed in Tables 2 .6 and 2.7were used tocalculate the number of migrants originating in the various developing regions .The resulting estimates are presented in Table 2.8 in two forms: the upper panelincludes the gross number of migrants for al l countr ies ( the equivalent of data oninflows presented in Table 2.6), whereas the lower panel includes the net number ofmigrants for countr ies having information on outf lows (those li sted in Table 2.7)plus the gross inflow to Canada and the United States. Table 2.8 also shows therates of natural increase of each region cons idered and for selected per iods . Theserates are der ived from the 1996 Revision of the World Population Prospects(United Nations, 1998).

Although these data are far from ideal, they nevertheless provide a rough indica-t ion of whether a s trong relationship exis ts. In fact, the data presented probablyoverstate the relative importance of migration from developing countries todeveloped countries since many of the developed countries excluded from the group

28 H i Z l i k


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28 H a n ia Z l ot ni k

Table 2 . 6 . G r os s i n fl ow o f i nt er n at io n al m i gr a nt s t o s el ec te d d e v el op ed c o un tr ie s b y r eg io n o fo r ig in 1 9 6 0 -9 4 ( tho u sand s )

3 , 8 4 4

1 , 2 1 9

2 , 6 2 6

Receiving countryand area of origin

AustraliaTotal inflowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

CanadaTotal inflowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

BelgiumTotal inflowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

G e rm a n y ( Wes t)Total inflowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

NetherlandsTotal inflowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

SwedenTotal inflowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

Un i ted Kin g do mTotal inflowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

Un i ted S ta tes

Total inflowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

1 96 0- 4 1 96 5- 9 1 97 0- 4 1 97 5- 9 1 98 0- 4 1 98 5- 9 1 990 -4 Totru

1 9 6 0 - 9 4

1 , 4 1 9

59 2

8 27

55 8

39

52 0

35 2

43

30 9

20 7

4 5

17 5

3 , 5 3 1

50 2

3 , 0 2 9

28 9

47

24 2

14 6

71 39

1 , 0 7 8

49 9

57 8

1 , 7 5 9

1 , 0 0 0

79 5

78 1

90

6 91

9101 90

72 0

32 8

67

26 1

4 , 3 5 6

1 , 1 5 1

3 , 2 1 5

35 5

86

26 9

22 7

13

21 4

1 , 0 2 7

45 9

56 7

1 , 9 2 3

1 , 3 5 6

56 8

61 2

13 7

4 75

79 4

33 7

45 7

3 23

73

25 0

2 , 6 7 3

86 6

1 , 7 7 1

44 6

94

3 51

21 7

24

19 3

93 3

5 08

42 4

2 , 4 1 3

1 , 9 5 1

46 2

3 45

15 1

19 3

65 1

36 1

28 9

29 1

85

20 7

2 , 5 11

72 9

1 , 7 8 2

48 8

16 3

32 4

20 7

48

1 59

93 2

48 3

44 9

2 , 8 2 5

2 , 4 0 6

41 9

47 0

1 95

27 5

5 70

35 4

21 6

23 9

68

17 1

4 , 0 6 6

83 8

3 , 2 2 7

39 7

1 49

24 9

4 53

17 9

27 4

61 6

3 27

28 9

69 0

48 8

2 01

24 8

66

18 3

4 , 3 2 4

6 91

3 , 6 3 3

6 , 0 4 6

5 , 2 0 6

84 0

46 3

28 0

18 3

69 8

54 0

1 58

63

1 5

47

2 1 , 4 3 4

4 , 7 7 7

1 6 , 6 5 7

47 4

20 2

27 2

2 , 9 0 1

90 2

1 , 9 8 1

16 1

53

108

23 2

10512 7

21 7

93

12 4

1 , 4 0 7

34 3

1,064

1 , 1 6 1

51 0

65 0

3 , 5 0 7

3 , 0 8 3

42 4

95 9

36 9

58 9

6 , 0 8 8

2 , 8 2 9

3 , 2 5 8

1 9 , 9 2 8

1 5 , 5 9 3

4 , 3 3 5

Note:Data for Australia, Canada, and the United States are classified byplace of birth; those for Belgium andthe Netherlands . a re by~ountry of c i. ti zenship; and those for Germany, Sweden, and the Uni ted Kingdom are~yplace of previous or Intended res idence . Data for Belgium do not cover the years 1961and 1962 and s topIn 1990; the data for Canada cover the period 1961-92; those for Germany stop at 1992; and those forNeth.erlands, Sweden, an? the United Kingdom stop at 1993. The datu for the United States exclude migrantslegal ized under the Imrnigrat ion Reform and Control Act of 1986.Source: Zlotnik (1991 J.

4 , 6 5 5

2 , 3 1 5

2 , 3 5 0

1 , 7 0 0

41 9

1 , 2 9 4

Populat ion Growth 29

Table 2 . 7 . N e t n u mb e r o f i m mi gr a nt s t o s e l ec te d d e v el op e d c o un t ri es b y a r ea o f o r ig i n1 9 6 0 -9 4 ( th o u san d s )

Receiving Countryand area of origin

1 96 0- 64 1 96 5- 9 1 97 0- 4 1 97 5- 9 1 98 0- 4 1 98 5- 9 1 99 0- 4 T ot al

1 9 6 0 - 9 4

AustraliaTotal net FlowDeveloping countries

Developed countriesBelgiumTotal net flowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

G e rm a ny ( Wes t)Total Net FlowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

NetherlandsTotal net flowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

SwedenTotal net flowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

Un i ted Kin g do mTotal net FlowDeveloping countriesDeveloped countries

51 6

36

4 79

6 71

85

58 6

4 7 3 2 7 2

1 3 1 1 4 6

3 4 2 1 2 6

12 0

39

81

8 5 2 6

4 4 4 5

4 1 - 1 9

-5 4

22

-7 6

15

-5 2

67

18 9

12 7

62

24

36

-1 2

- 1 3 8

58-6

39 7

18 9

20 8

1 , 8 6 8

34 2

1 , 5 2 6

87

94-6

5 08

31 8

1 90

-9

22

- 30

2 , 4 3 0

38 0

2 , 0 5 0

17 5

13 0

4 5

1 22

90

32

1 21

18 9

-6 9

1 0 7 6 8 3

- 5 7 - 1 , 397

32 0

26 0

60

3 , 1 5 7

1 , 1 6 5

1 , 9 9 1

10 1

36

54

33

27

6

70

69

- 3 8 8

1 44

- 5 3 2

98 7

34 9

73 8

1 , 5 2 1 3 2

6 7 6 1 7 0

8 5 5 - 1 3 8

20

910

2 91

2 18

62

53

53

o

14 0

68

72

6 , 8 6 3

1 , 7 6 4

5 , 0 9 9

24 1

17 1

70

91 9

67 0

2 49

12 8

412 3

3 8 8 7

8 34

3 0 5 3

11176

35

5 81

2 50

3 31

- 2 5 2 - 1 0 6

7 5 1 1 0

- 3 2 7 - 2 1 6

5 0 - 7 1 3

Note: Data for Australia are classified by place of birth; those for Belgium and the Netherland.s are b~ countryofc i ti zenship; and those for Germany, Sweden, and the Uni ted Kingdom are byp~aceof previous or Intendedres idence . The data for Belgium do not cover the years 1961 and 1962 and s top In 1990; those for Germanys top a t 1992; and those for Netherlands , Sweden, and the Uni ted Kingdom stop a t 1993.

Sources: Zlotnik (1991,1998).

of receivers have tended to receive greater numbers of migrants from other devel -oped countries rather than from the developing world (Zlotnik 1994). . In any ~v~nt,Table 2.8 shows that dur ing the 1960s , when there was not a great di fferentiationamong developing regions in rates of natural increase, ~eveloping countri~s werethe source of relatively few migrants to developed countnes. Indeed, most migrantsto developed countr ies or iginated in other developed countr ies where the rate ofnatural increase was already quite low (0.96 per cent per year).

During the 1970s , the number of migrants or iginat ing in develo~i~g countr~esincreased markedly but mostly because of policies adopted by the recelvmg countnes


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30Hania Z lotn ik

Table 2.8. R at e o f n a tu ra l i nc re as e a n d l ev I,+. e s oJ g ro ss a n d n et e m ig ra ti on , 1 9 60 - 94

Region o f oriein R f'" ate 0 natural increase

Annual gross migra tion (000)1960-70 1990-5 1960-95 1960-9 1970-9 1980-9 1990-4World 2.00 1.48 1.74 1,220

Developing Countries 2.441,843 2,088 3,451

Sub-Saharan Africa1.81 2.11 326 8532.58 2.84 2.59

1,181 1,688

W.Asia and N. Mrica27

58 66.69 2.27 115Southern Asia 2.44 70 2322.34 167 214E.and S.E.Asia

1.97 2.17 272.25 74 125 172.23 1.75Latin America 2.76 43 161 318 415.82 2.27Europe in Transition 1.08

141 299 475 741.25 0.81 110Developed Countries 171 219 732

894 990 907 1,762

WorldMaximum net migra tion (000)

Developing Countries 692 906 1,251 2,436Sub-Saharan Africa 254 641 954 1,498W . A sia a nd N . Mrica 8 21 37 84Southern Asia 46 116 46 147

E. and S.E.Asia21

61 105 153Latin America 40 150 300 387Europe in Transition 134 285 461 724Developed Countries 82 62 101 442

439 265 297 938Source:ZIotnik (991) and United Nations (998).

(particularly Australia, Canada and th U .se lect ive admis sion o f persons from th ed nI~ed .Sta tes) wh ich made possibl e thewere determined by economic oliti I e eve OPIng world. The flows that ensuedto correlate well with demogr~pPh.I Ica,. abnldcultu~al considerations, and tended not

lC vana es relative t th .among the developing regions, North Africa and 0 . e region of o rigin. Thus,generated similar numbers of' . West ASIa as well as Latin America, emIgrants settlin . d Irat es o f na tu ra l i ncrease were h igh Y ct E g In eve oped countries, and theirof natural increase than even sub'S e h, ast afn~ S outheast Asia, with a lower rate. - a aran A nca 0 S h A .emIgrants than these regions put togeth rout sra generated more

Bythe early 1990s,the rates of natura~~~cremore different iated owing to the sh f T ase o~deve loping regions had becomedur ing the 1970s and 1980s Th arP

hertr ity declInes experienced by most regions

. . us t e range of "Increase among developing regions' ro f vananon of the rates of natural1960s t o. 1 .6 percentage point s in the 1 ~ ~Oro~~ scarce.ly 0.5.percentage points in thenatural Increase in developI'ng v d el e marked dIfference between rates ofb ersus eve oped' .

e tween natural i ncrease and emigrat ion I I . b reglOnS persIst ed and the rel at ioneve S ecame clearer : by the 1990s those

Popula t ion Growth 31

regions exper ienc ing the h ighest rat es o f natural i ncrease (sub-Saharan Afri ca andWestern Asia and Northern Africa) were generat ing considerably lower numbers ofemigran ts to developed coun tr ies than regions wi th lower rat es o f natural i ncrease ,including Eastern and southeastern Asia, Lat in America and, especially, the devel-oped coun tr ies. A simi la r conclus ion i s reached i f in st ead of considering the rat es o fnatural increase for 1990-5 the average annual rates for the period 1960-95 are used.Therefo re , t hese da ta do not l end suppor t t o the c la im tha t populat ion growth per seleads to international migration.

There isno other evidence linking overall emigration levelsfrom developing to devel-oped countries to populat ion growth rates in developing countries . However, somestudies have explored the determinants of emigration to the United States. Yang(1995),fo r ins tance, focuses on the det erminant s o f l egal permanent immigra tion f rom 137countries to the United Statesover the period 1982-6 and shows that the migrant s tockalready in the United States is the most important predictor of the level of emigrat ionfrom the country of origin. In addit ion, the economic, mil itary, and cul tural involve-ment of the United States in the sending country has a posit ive and significant effectonthe volume of emigrat ion from

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