International Journal of Modern Social Sciences ISSN:2169

Copyright © 2014 by Modern Scientific Press Company, Florida, USA

International Journal of Modern Social Sciences, 2014, 3(1): 9-35

International Journal of Modern Social Sciences

Journal homepage:www.ModernScientificPress.com/Journals/IJMSS.aspx

ISSN:2169-9917

Florida, USA

Article

Ethnic and Sub-Nationalist Agitations and the State of the

Nigerian Project

Ndukaeze Nwabueze

Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos, Yaba, Lagos, Nigeria

[email protected]

Article history: Received 11 November 2013, Received in revised form 14 January 2014, Accepted 16

January 2014, Published 20 January 2014.

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to argue that while ethnicity is a fundamental threat

and hindrance to the achievement of a Nigerian nation-state, the activities of ethnic militias,

though ordinarily needless, are in our case, inevitably integral to the strategies for halting the

drift towards national disintegration. This is due to the partisanship of the Nigerian state and

its structural incapacity to dispense justice among the federating groups. Moreover, it is

canvassed that events have shown that the violent resistance which characterizes the struggle

for liberation and self-determination by respective ethnic groups produces deterrence

benefits, balancing of inter-group terror, induced respect for one another, pro-active and

restorative state action, and unequivocally marking out the circles of dissatisfaction and

disaffection in the union for the dominant group(s). This is the lesson learnt from the

experiences of MEND, NDPVF, MASSOB, OPC, MOSOP, ODC in Kenya, the BaHutu

(Rwanda), SLA and JEM (Southern Sudan) and Tibetans (China). The chapter is concluded

with the reasoning that conflict, protest and inter-group hostility is not necessarily

dysfunctional in an ethnically plural society characterized by inequality of access and

participation among the component groups. The activities of militias should be defined as

ameliorative protest and as constructive sub-cultures, harnessed to support the goal of the

Nigerian Project.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Ethnic militia, Inter-group conflict, Nigerian Project, Ameliorative

conflict.

Int. J. Modern Soc. Sci. 2014, 3(1): 9-35


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1. Introduction

The appearance of this title in a book such as this on contemporary social problems in Nigeria

naturally leads to some analytically relevant questions. For instance, is ethnic pluralism a social

problem? Is sub-ethnic loyalty (ethnicity) a problem? If the answer is in the affirmative, how is this so?

Of course, if it were not, it would not be deserving of attention. So, what is the nature of the problem

and what is its effect on the country? And how does the role and activities of sub-national agitation

groups fit into this problem and into the Nigerian Project?

For the avoidance of doubt, it is not merely because there are as many as 374 distinguishable

ethno-linguistic groups in Nigeria (Otite, 1991) each characterized by differences in culture, beliefs,

language and sometimes conflicting ideals and interests with one another that constantly draws the

attention of intellectuals and politicians to the subject of ethnicity. The experience of other ethnically

plural countries such as the USA has shown that, in itself, ethnic diversity may be an issue but may not

on its face value necessarily constitute a problem. Rather, it is the attitude of the state and the power elite

in society to ethnic diversity that is the problem. It assumes a problematic dimension where the

differences are exploited to distribute common resources inequitably or to favour some groups over

others. There is unfortunately, a near ubiquitous tendency in many societies for people who seek power

not only to stand upon the primordial pedestal but, in addition, to expropriate the differences as a

launching pad to power. The ethnic resource is attractive owing to an intrinsic quality such as power

imbalance or inequality of ethnic forces among the rival groups. The conflict-promoting characteristic

abounds in differences in population size, territorial location, resource endowment, levels of socio-

economic and political development, strategic location of individual members in the state’s hierarchy of

power; factors that create subordinate as well as dominant groups in the course of relating with one

another. Those who perceive their group as having an advantage based on any of these resources spare

no effort to cash in on their relative strength often to the detriment of the disadvantaged groups.

Consequently, agitation, struggle and resistance are integral features of multi-ethnic co-existence.

In the case of Nigeria, other reasons why ethnicity is classified as a social problem are considered

briefly. One, indigeneship and place (state/region) of origin supersede national citizenship, or place of

birth or domicile in determining people’s access to valued resources in the country. Two, as evident in

the April 16, 2011 presidential election, ethnic and primordial factors rather than objective criteria still

play a major role in the voting pattern at elections. In this election, the 12 core Northern states voted

massively for their own, Gen. M. Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) while groups in

the South-South and South-East voted overwhelmingly for their own, President Goodluck E. Jonathan.

It also influenced the geographic contours of the post-election violence which was concentrated mainly

in the seven original Hausa states from where the loser Gen. M. Buhari hails (The Guardian, Monday



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April 18, 2011 p.1). The religious mix was revealed by one Opeleye, a Yoruba, resident in Kano and a

victim who escaped with machete cuts. He narrated that when the mob met him they said their ‘targets

were people like (him, Opeleye) that voted for their Christian brother’ (The Guardian, Wed. April 20,

2011 p.12). Three, even though it is a major influence in people’s choices, it is widely held in open

denial. For instance, both the Chairman of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) Prince Tony

Momoh and the presidential candidate Gen. M. Buhari opined that the post-election violence in parts of

the country had neither ethnic nor religious colouration. Four, the co-existing groups are kept together

more by force than by choice. This is at great cost to nationhood, economic growth, human life and

property destroyed. Five, by adopting the doctrine of Federal Character but continuing with the military

legacy of unitary structure of government and rejecting the institutionalization of true federalism, the

state acknowledges its existence but denies its effect. Six, the state and its structures are subordinated to

sub-ethnic and religious political structures and this has tremendous potential to compromise officialdom

and due process. Unfortunately, the result is an intimidated state, a compromised state, too weak to

govern and too afraid to take decisions that challenge those interests even where such decisions might

advance the collective good of all. Seven, in connection with these factors, a preponderance of sub-

nationalist loyalties slows economic growth and corrupts the political and administrative process.

The concern for the shift of the basis of competition and struggle between groups to ethnic forces

is connected to its negative potential of subverting citizens’ loyalty to the whole or the state while

upstaging primordial and sub-ethnic identification and loyalty (Asia, 2001:155). The Nigerian setting

has had its fair share of this. Ethnicity possesses the potential to disturb national political stability and

social cohesion among the co-existing groups. For instance, the belligerent relationship between Ife-

Modakeke, Aguleri-Umuleri, Tiv-Jukun, Urhobo-Itsekiri, Ijaw-Itsekiri-Urhobo, Hausa-Ibo, Yoruba-

Hausa, Ibo-Yoruba, and the Niger Delta crisis are different levels of ethnically structured contestations

for different scarce resources within the Nigerian state. In these instances, it is demonstrated that in

Nigeria indigeneship or place of origin supersedes citizenship. President Bill Clinton was a Governor in

the state of Arkansas. His wife went to the US Senate a decade later from the state of New York. Their

daughter may become Governor in another state. This flexibility in the US system is not possible in

Nigeria. This is what overheated passion and poisoned inter-group relations in Plateau State between the

indigenes and people of Hausa extraction whose forefathers settled in the place several generations

before. Unfortunately, over a century later, their descendants are still classified as settlers, a status which

they reject. Sub-national loyalties have therefore, tended to constitute centrifugal forces undermining the

potential for realizing the integrative objectives of the Nigerian project.

A new dimension has however emerged in inter-group agitation in Nigeria in recent years.

Particularly since the 1990s, a new dimension has been introduced into ethnic sub-nationalist agitation



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in Nigeria. In a manner similar to the Northern Ireland model of a military wing to complement the

political movement for the emancipation of Northern Ireland, some Nigerian ethnic groups including the

most populous ones have introduced ethnic militia wings to complement the age-old cultural associations

and political parties as platforms for agitation and advancement of their respective primordial identities

and interests. Some writers see this development as adding to the difficulty of nationally integrating the

constituent groups. In this connection, some clarification is imperative here. It is trite fact that ethnicity

and primordial loyalty in a multi-ethnic social structure can supplant overall national integration and

inter-group cohesion. However it is not ethnic pluralism per se but politicization of ethnicity and

ethnicization of politics that produces that socially injurious result. So while ethnicity may encourage

inter-ethnic rivalry it may not be true that sub-nationalist agitations whether peaceful or even with some

icing of force or violence is necessarily subversive of the goal of building a nation-state. As long as

societies harbour structures that reproduce and legitimize inequality and injustice, resistance to

domination, agitation against alienation and struggle for emancipation will remain inescapable

dialectical responses by the victims. Entrenched advantages are rarely given up just like that by those

that enjoy it without a fight. Some form of mass or collective action is inevitable to produce a change in

this regard. It is argued in this chapter that while primordial loyalty and inter-group rivalry might have

subverted the Nigerian Project, sub-nationalist agitations by ethnic militias do not necessarily threaten

the corporate cohesion of Nigeria. On the contrary, ethnic militias through their actions constitute part

of the recently emerging innovative devices and strategies for addressing structured inter-group

inequality, injustice and the tendency towards national disintegration. The idea that conflict is not

necessarily dysfunctional is not new. Parsons (1956) in his doctrine of consensus functionalism had

canvassed the idea that conflict may indeed be functional, constructive and restorative. Against this

background, it is argued further in this chapter that the formation of ethnic militias by some ethnic groups

including the coalitions of inter-ethnic militia by groups located in the Niger Delta, does not by its mere

existence constitute a threat to the actualization of the Nigerian Project but can rather be seen as a

significant strategy for discouraging some groups from taking others for granted and for building mutual

respect for one another by the constituent groups. The activities of the militias tend in the long run to

become conflict management and peace-building devices by drawing the attention of the parties and

suggesting that the negotiators should treat one another with seriousness to avert dire consequences.

Before the ethnic militias, the main political parties in Nigeria’s history, namely, the National

Council of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), the Action Group (AG), and the Northern Peoples’ Congress

(NPC) had their power bases among the Ibos, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani respectively. The same can be

said of several other political parties in the country. It was common to hear of Egbe Omo Oduduwa,

Mutane Arewa, Ibo State Union, Urhobo Progress Union, Ijaw National Congress, Ibibio State Union,



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Igbirra Progressive Union and Ekiti National Union etc. These were not para-military groups even

though they had potential to muster considerable violence which they did to achieve their collective

goals whenever they perceived that it was necessary. But since the 1990s a novel dimension to inter-

group relations crept into relevance in the life of the country, that is, the formation of ‘armed’ wings of

ethnic associations.

For instance, the O’dua Peoples’ Congress (Yoruba), the Movement for the Actualization of the

Sovereign State of Biafra (Ibo); Egbesu Boys (Ijaw); Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

(MEND), Arewa People’s Congress (APC) (Hausa/Fulani), are para-military wings that have awesome

potential to mobilize and unleash violence at short notice. They terrorize opponents and have been used

beyond their ethnic base to further the dreams of their respective groups by the leaders of respective

militias. Their operations have generated national concern. The government has at one time or another

detained their leaders – Chief Uwazurike of MASSOB, Dr. Fredrick Fasheun and Chief Ganiyu Adams

of the OPC and Alhaji Asari Dokubo of MEND on different charges ranging from subversion of the

national interest to treason. It is one of the objectives of this chapter to explore the circumstances leading

to the emergence of this phenomenon.

2. The ‘Failed State’ and the Failing Nigerian Project

In relation to the subversion of the national interest, the main focus of this contribution is the

exploration of the impact of ethnic and sub-primordial nationalism on the status of the Nigerian Project.

The Nigerian Project comprises of the courses of action or plans set out mainly by the state to build an

economically strong and politically integrated nation-state in which the welfare of citizens is guaranteed,

out of the diversity of ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic groups that make up Nigeria. This goal

has remained the same since independence on October 1st 1960 while the strategies for bringing it about

have been changing from one government to another and even within the tenure of respective

governments. A number of experts have judged that the state has failed to achieve expected targets (see

Nnoli, 1980; Maier, 2000; Ninalowo, 2005; Sagay, 2006; Duruji, 2008). Arriving at the verdict that the

Nigerian Project is failing presupposes that there is an operational definition of the Project as well as the

existence of a set of measurable empirical indicators of this failure.

Nominally, the evaluation of a state as a failed state is with reference to its inability to discharge

its portion of the traditionally mutually-binding social contract with the citizens which was ascribed to

it by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1779 (Plamenatz, 1981). In the case of Nigeria the failed national

project is also symptomatic of the failure of the Nigerian state which is expected to superintend its

execution. But what in concrete operational terms is the Nigerian project? We shall depend on two

sources to define it.



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The first is from the extent of realization of the dreams of the founding fathers of Nigeria for a

strong, united and prosperous country. The second is the extent that the state has succeeded in

guaranteeing the welfare of the citizens.

The dreams of the founding fathers of modern Nigerian can be extracted from the lyrics of the

first post-independence National Anthem, the relevant excerpts of which are reproduced as follows:

Nigeria, we hail thee

Our own dear native land

Though tribes and tongues may differ

In brotherhood we stand

Nigerians all are proud to serve

Our sovereign motherland

O God of all creation

Grant this our one request

Help us to build a Nation

Where no man is oppressed

And so with peace and plenty

Nigeria may be blessed

From this Anthem, the dream or vision of the Nigerian project is to build a strong and indivisible

Nigeria, a land full of opportunities, founded upon such values as justice, equality, freedom, unity and

protection of basic human rights and upholding of the rule of law. The mission of the Nigerian project

is to build a nation-state from the plurality of ethnic, religious and culturally diverse sub-nationalities, a

land of prosperity and plenty out of which all sections of the country are equitably provided for through

participatory involvement in the socio-economic and political life of the country. Regrettably, fifty years

after independence, despite the attempts at balancing delicate inter-group interests the mission has

remained a mirage. For instance, pre-independence constitutions namely, the Littleton, Richardson and

Macpherson Constitutions had this as their aim. If the mission was being fulfilled why was there the

Western Region crisis of 1964, the Nigerian civil war 1967-70 and the annulled June 12 election? Also

how can the de-jure federal but de-facto unitary structure of government be explained? With the

inequitable distribution of power and material resources as the Niger Delta struggle has come to depict,

there is no doubt that tribes and tongues differ and are not standing together; that a fractured country,

not a nation has been built because some parts lord it over others and some citizens are oppressed.

Contrary to the dreams of the founding fathers (who were mainly tribal warlords rather than nationalists)

truth and justice do not reign. What with such an unassailable level of institutionalized electoral fraud



15

and corruption of the judicial system? The banner we are handing unto our children is checkered, stained,

even torn.

This is one of the senses in which we speak of the failing Nigerian project.

The second corollary of the failing Nigerian project is implicated by some contradictory empirical

facts about the Nigeria state and the quality of life of its citizens. A notable dimension of this is the

reality of poverty in the midst of plenty depicted by the following:

One-third of Nigerian children are malnourished while the country is standing on naturally rich

arable soil.

Over 60 percent of Nigerians live below poverty line (US $1 per day) while the country is the

World’s 7th largest exporter of crude oil.

Less than 30 percent of Nigerians have access to safe, portable (drinking) water in a country so

richly endowed with abundant rainfall and tremendous underground sources of fresh water.

Fifty years after independence most Nigerian homes, factories and businesses are still powered

by privately provided electricity generating sets while the sector continuously gulps a huge

proportion of the annual budget.

Despite Nigeria being the World’s 7th largest producer of oil, its four refineries are deliberately

disabled while she imports substantial proportion of her refined energy needs from outside.

National life expectancy is low and declining at a current average of 49 years for males and 51

years for females while most of the country’s trained doctors are working abroad.

While the education sector is expanding rapidly, the real sectors of the economy are stunted and

the unemployment rate is double digit.

This is another sense in which we talk about the Nigerian project as failing project.

Thus central to the idea of a failing Nigerian Project is the apparent inability to build a nation-

state with structurally integrated units out of the plurality of ethnic nationalities. Another is the apparent

incapacity of the state to meet the basic needs of citizens in spite of the enormous resources at its disposal.

It is argued in this chapter that though the centrifugal pulls exerted on the country by ethnic sub-

nationalism is subversive of state nationalism, the militias constitute a strategic force for achieving

redistributive justice. Why those forces exert centrifugal rather than centripetal pulls upon the diverse

units is another vital issue to be explained in this chapter.

3. Ethnic Factor in Nigerian Politics at the Eve of Independence



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The factor of ethnicity played a key role in the crisis following the first general election of 1951-

52. To illustrate, Nigeria’s first general election of 1951-1952 though fought by three parties – the

NCNC, AG and NPC was a veiled contest by the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups. While

the NCNC favoured a strong centre, or a unitary system of government, the AG and NPC preferred

strong regions and a weak centre. The drama that ensued after that election is a classic case of national

political instability due to inter-ethnic rivalry. In that election, the NCNC swept the East and the NPC

swept the North. But in the West the AG got 49 out of 80 seats. Accounts had it that a number of AG

members had stood as NCNC candidates securing their tickets under that platform but subsequently

massively crossed the carpet overnight into the AG (Crowder 1972:282). By a combination of internal

antagonisms in the NCNC and the political ambush and manipulation of parliamentary positions in the

West, Dr. Azikiwe was denied nomination as candidate for the Central House from both the West and

East. In the West he could not enjoy the benefit of his party’s electoral victory. This event had gone

down in history as a fatal blow, by among other things, the ethnic factor on national unity and inter-

group trust and confidence. It is not surprising that following this and other incidents after that general

election, when an AG backbencher, Chief Anthony Enahoro, introduced a private member’s Bill in the

Central House calling for self-government by 1956, the Northern members did not support the motion.

They turned the demand down because as they opined, given their relative low level of socio-political

development, they were not ready for self-rule in a situation where they feared that the other groups

would dominate them.

4. The Ethic Factor in the Post-Independence Era

The ethnic factor continued to dominate Nigerian politics after independence on October 1st

1960. The December 1964 federal election was a watershed of a sort. It brought to a head the cacophony

of political intrigues due to the crisis of inter-group confidence before and since independence. Similarly,

the crisis that ensued after the elections prepared the ground for the military coups of 15th January and

29th July 1966 that culminated in the 30-month civil war, 1967-70. Before 1964, events over which the

ethnically-structured party politics were divided include the May 1962 National Census, the result of

which generated controversy partly due to its implication for delineation of Federal Constituencies and

for revenue allocation. The lingering disagreement over power sharing formula between the Centre and

the Regions was not resolved. The crisis in the AG in the West and the infiltration by the NPC-NCNC

central government which resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency in Western Nigeria in May

1962 by the Federal government further added heat to the smoldering political scene. In November of

the same year the trial of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and other Action Group and other political allies over

treasonable felony had begun. Also worthy of note is the creation of Mid-West Region out of Western



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Region in 1963, a move opposed by the AG for obvious reason, that is, reduction of the size of Western

Region, the party’s stronghold. Lagos was also a Federal territory to the chagrin of Western regional

political stakeholders. Another key indicator of ethnic political joggling is the crisis of political party

alliances in the months before the 1964 Federal election. To capture power was the goal and the mission

was to achieve this to the disadvantage of rival groups. Ideological differences played insignificant role

in the fission and fusion of political forces. In 1964 there were the following alliances viz: NCNC-NPC;

NCNC-AG; NPC-NNDP-MDF-NDC=NNA; NCNC-AG-NPF (NEPU and UMBC) = UPGA. Political

personalities from the different ethnic political fronts jostled for relevance behind those platforms. The

Niger Delta Congress (NDC) featured in two of those alliances; that is in UPGA and NNA. On the other

hand, about the year immediately following the 1964 General election, Crowder (1972) records political

assassination of political leaders, electoral fraud, military coup and counter-coup, inter-party fighting,

destruction of property, communal massacres, elimination of substantial portion of the nation’s military

elite, re-structuring of the state, secession and finally, the tragic three-year civil war (Crowder,

1972:326). Similarly, the pattern of assassinations (killers and victims), control of the military and

direction of use of military force, the actors in the civil war, the distribution of the spoils of war, the

victor or the vanquished, reintegration or exclusion from the Nigerian mainstream after the pogrom,

hindsight has shown, were all ethically-structured.

5. The Niger Delta Crisis and the Ethnic Dimension

The Niger Delta Crisis, the description of the struggle between the multi-ethnic groups located

in the oil rich Niger Delta and the rest of Nigerians, particularly, the three dominant groups Ibo, Hausa

and Yoruba, for the control of the resources of the area has revealed the true character of the ethnic

conflicts in Nigeria. Behind the façade of ethnic chauvinism and primordial loyalty is concealed a real

contest for greater share of the country’s economic resources by the rival groups. This is the crux of the

‘unity’ problem and the crisis of persistent underdevelopment. The desire by the respective groups to

acquire the lion share of the country’s wealth even at the expense of the areas from where these resources

are derived has led to a response of institutionalized resistance for resource control by those people

ultimately turning the region into a theatre of war, guerrilla activities, kidnapping and criminal neglect

by the state. The dilemma that bedevils the search for a solution to the crisis is also ethnically related;

that while the peoples of the Delta constitute the ethnic minority, those who are to decide on their demand

are the majority groups outside the region and the main beneficiaries of the status quo which the agitators

want to change. The peoples of the Delta want power to decide over their resources (that is control) not

necessarily get higher than 13% of revenue accruing from the region. What they demand is what the

majority does not want to give and what they are prepared to let go is not what the people of the Niger



18

Delta are asking for. Meanwhile the majority ethnic groups seize advantage of their control of the state

behind which institution they hide and use as a tool to brutalize and continue the wanton and merciless

exploitation of the Niger Delta. A violent dimension has accompanied the collective response of the

disinherited people of the Delta. The youths have formed violent militias.

6. Militant Groups in the Niger Delta

The most active and vocal militias in the Niger Delta are the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force

(NDPVF), Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBofA), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP),

National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP) and Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger

Delta (MEND). Such leaders as late Isaac AdakaBoro, late Ken Saro-Wiwa, Alhaji Asari Dokubo and a

host of others have channelled the energies of the youth to counter the offensive external incursions into

the area. The Niger Delta has been a theatre of resistance and struggle for over a century.

Before the official commencement of colonization in 1862 and long before the advent of oil in

1958 or even before 1963 when Isaac Adaka Boro declared the Republic of the Niger Delta, this area

has long been a boiling crucible of internal struggle, opposition and resistance against external

exploitation. Before those dates, local merchants and traditional rulers during legitimate and during the

slave trade took up arms against the British crown, European merchants and foreign trading interests

whenever negotiations failed to determine the terms of trade. A good illustration is the travails of the

Jaja of Opobo. The Kalabari developed warrior traditions as survival strategy in this connection. The

Ijaws and other groups have resisted Shell and other oil companies operating in the area. The Ogoni Bill

of Rights has encapsulated the desire of Ogoni people to control their resources which, they believe,

should be used for the development of Ogoni land. The one-man non-violence crusade by Ken Saro-

Wiwa and his extra-judicial execution by maximum military dictator, Gen. Sanni Abacha created

martyrdom to sustain the struggle and opposition of audacious incursion into the region by outsiders.

Those militant groups (e.g. MEND and NDPVF) bear arms and in recent times confront State

security operatives in open combat, kidnap oil company workers, highly-placed citizens of the region,

their family members, business associates who are described as apologists of State’s oppression and

exploitation and saboteurs of the Delta cause. As they say these are high profile victims with ‘kidnap

value’ meaning that they are hostages that will attract high ransom as well as its urgent and quick

redemption by the targeted interest. The reaction of the militia which is characteristically violent is in

the forms of oil bunkering, sabotage of oil instalments, and vandalization of oil pipelines. Their activities

have been said to have reduced oil production in the area by 75% (Africa Report, 2006), a factor that has

contributed to the sharp rise in global oil prices which doubled in one year by June 2008 to about

US$130.00 per barrel.



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7. The Factor of Ethnic Rivalry and the Advent of Ethnic Militia

Although ethnic militias were formed during the military era their activities became noticeably

overtly violent and frequent under civil rule from1999. In the East, the Igbo complained that they had

been marginalized since the end of the civil war in 1970 (Adejumobi, 2002; Badmus, 2006; Duruji,

2007). But for the fear of the repercussion of engaging the military in violent confrontation, disgruntled

groups had their anger substantially kept in check. Meanwhile military adventures such as the

ZongoKataf, Zaki – Biam, Bakalori and Odi expeditions, and such other events in other parts of the

country built up so much subdued emotion that the lid came off easily upon the withdrawal of the military

into the barracks. The Yoruba formed the OPC, the Igbo formed MASSOB, the Hausa/Fulani formed

APC while the youths in the Niger Delta formed MEND, NDPVF and MOSOP, Bakassi Boys, Egbesu

Boys etc. But why were these bodies formed? An answer is provided by looking at some of those bodies.

8. The O’odua People’s Congress (OPC)

Anifowose (2004) traced the origin of the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) to 1995 when

Fredrick Fasehun, a medical doctor and politician along with other Yoruba activists such as late Beko

Ransome-Kuti (also a medical doctor) and human rights activist founded the body as its national

chairman and national treasurer respectively. However, on March 1, 1999, an internal disagreement

factionalized the body. Its former secretary, 29-year old secondary school drop-out and furniture maker,

Ganiyu Adams expelled Fasehun from the OPC alleging that he was collecting bribes from candidates

and elders of Yoruba origin so as to support the 1999 general election and two OPCs emerged. Since the

annulment of the June 12 election the OPC had decided to distance the Yoruba from any subsequent

election organized by the Northern military generals until the injustice done to the Yoruba by that

annulment was redressed. However, given that in the 1999 election the two presidential candidates were

Yoruba some elders of the group felt there was no need to continue with the boycott while others

remained adamant because the northern generals could not be trusted. It was against this background

that the bribery accusation erupted. Dr. Fasehun denied the allegation though. The disagreement was

resolved later with the intervention of Yoruba elders who approved of the mission of the Congress. In

terms of the objectives of the OPC, Anifowose’s account is that the OPC was founded ‘to give an

organizational and militant thrust to the struggle to actualize the June 12 mandate’ given to late Chief

M.K.O Abiola, a Yoruba, the acclaimed winner of the June 12, 1993 election on the ticket of the Social

Democratic Party (SDP). The election was annulled by Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, a Gwari, from Niger

State, northern Nigeria as Military President in 1993. General Abacha later imprisoned Chief Abiola

when he unilaterally declared himself winner of that election at Epetedo in Lagos Island in 1994. A



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second objective was ‘to oppose the self-succession bid of the military dictator, Gen. Sani Abacha’. The

officially stated mission of the OPC was to ‘seek self-determination for the Yoruba and protect their

interests in the Nigerian federation (Anifowose, 2004). Anifowose also attributed the formation of OPC

and its violent trust to the killing of Kudirat Abiola, Alfred Rewane, Ken Saro-wiwa, Gideon Akaluko,

the incarceration of O. Obasanjo and other prominent Yorubas by the Northern ruling class under Gen.

Abacha which they saw as forcing other ethnic groups to submit to the power and will of the northern

oligarchy. Seven objectives are contained in OPC’s mission statement.

In furtherance of its mandate, the OPC unleashed violence against perceived threats to the Yoruba

cause. For example, in July 1999, the OPC fought on the side of their Yoruba kinsmen who were at war

with the Hausa settlers in Sagamu. Over 50 people were killed while the Hausa retaliated by killing over

100 Yorubas in Kano.

In August 1999, the OPC invaded Apapa Wharf to protest the perceived domination of leading

positions by the Igbos.

About the same time, the arrest of an Ijaw youth for an alleged armed robbery in Ajegnle area of

Lagos triggered a fight with the Ijaw Youth Congress that lasted over four days. The police reported that

hundreds of lives were lost and several properties destroyed.

The Ketu – Mile12 disturbances of the year 2000 where over 114 people were killed and property

worth several millions of naira destroyed was a reaction to the alleged domination and control of the

Market by Hausas in spite of the market’s location in Yoruba land.

In October 2000, OPC was involved in another clash with the Hausas which quickly spread to

Ajegunle, Ojo, Alaba-Suru, Orile, Ijora, Mile 2, Oko-Oba, Cele, Ogba, Agege and Idi-Araba. This was

precipitated by the killing of an Hausa man accused of receiving stolen goods from robbers. For four

days, OPC took control of Lagos streets, beating and killing persons and burning properties belonging

to ‘enemy’ ethnic groups. The violence claimed over 60 lives, several petrol tankers, buses and cars

(Anifowose, 2004).

9. Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)

Though the exact date of the formation of MASSOB is not clear, there is no doubt that it is a

post-civil war phenomenon. Arising from the end of the civil war in January 1970 and the defeat of the

Igbo’s and crushing of the Biafran secession attempt, two unequal power blocs evolved in Nigeria. There

was the North/West or Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba coalition of the victors on one side and a vanquished,

conquered and subdued Igbo of the East on the other side. The leader of the secession attempt Gen.

Odumegu Ojukwu, Ikemba Nnewi, kept hammering on the point that the Igbos were not fully re-



21

integrated into the commanding heights of the structure of power of the Nigerian state decades after the

end of the war.

As if to lend credence to his claim, the North and West have tended to monopolize the presidency

passing it from one to the other whether under military or civilian rule since the end of that war in a

manner that suggests that control of the state is the principal spoil of the war. The unified command of

the military, and the structure of centralization of power which is a feature of the presidential system of

government, have tended to ensure that whether under military or civilian rule, those that control the

apex of state power have disproportionate advantage in the following i.e. filling ministerial and executive

positions, in award of contracts and in distributing national resources to their own individual and group

advantage and to the neglect of those outside the locus of power. The unitary system under military rule

concentrates absolute powers on the Head of State and his supporters. The Presidential system, on the

other hand, centralizes executive powers on the civilian president and all those who serve do so at his

pleasure. Though the constitution sets some limits under the federal character principle, that is not

enough to prevent filling of key positions with the President’s supporters and the party’s choices because

the institutions that will enforce these provisions are manned by the same appointees. The Igbos have

had left for them such positions as Vice-president and Senate President; positions with relatively limited

power and influence under a presidential system of government. An Igbo academic at the University of

Lagos, Dr. Douglas Anele of the Department of Philosophy listed the evidence of marginalization of the

Igbos to include exclusion from presidency, exclusion from headship of the Armed forces or Police, and

refusal of the federal government to upgrade any airport in the Igbo heartland to international status.

Other complaints include diminution of Federal presence in Igbo land, neglect of economic and social

infrastructure such as roads, bridges, irrigation projects, erosion sites, federal estates, war museum etc.

They have complained of being principal targets of ethnic and religion-motivated violent attacks in

several northern cities and loss of property abandoned in the North and Lagos as they fled from

persecution by peoples of Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani extraction.

Against this background, Igbo youths most of whom were born after the war and who

experienced neither defeat nor conquest could not understand the reason for their exclusion. They have

joined hands together in MASSOB under the leadership of Chief Uwazurike resuscitating the threat of

secession that failed in the past as a strategy to attract attention of the other dominant groups for the re-

negotiation and possible re-integration of their group into the Nigerian mainstream (see Druji, 2008 for

more on MASSOB).

9.1. Bakkasi Boys



22

Bakassi Boys has a slightly different mission from MASSOB. Although it is also an Igbo-based

militia, its mission is to rid Igbo land of armed robbers, violent criminals, political jobbers and tugs,

economic saboteurs, individuals, groups and organizations whose activities are seen to be inimical to the

progress of Igbo society whether these be of Igbo origin or not. They operate mostly in the big cities

such as Onitsha, Aba, Enugu, and Owerri. Some governments in the region atimes hire the body to stop

armed robbers, political tugs or other social miscreants. Laudable as their mission may be, they have in

some occasions been accused of partisanship, or partiality and over-zealousness in carrying out their

mission.

9.2. Arewa People’s Congress (APC)

Although this body was formed by youths of Hausa/Fulani extraction in the North, it was never

comparable to the militias in the other parts of the country in organization, deployment of force or in

national propaganda to sell itself or to attract sympathy and recognition. It has been relatively inactive.

As the most dominant single group, the Hausa/Fulani perhaps see themselves as having a less compelling

need to rely on a militia. Under military or civil government they receive a lion share of the country’s

resource distribution because they are a constant power factor in every government. In addition the social

structure of youth organization in the Islamic North, particularly with the Almajiri system which is

exclusive to the region, ensures that a ready army of largely uneducated and disaffected youth is available

to be spontaneously mobilized after the Friday prayers to execute any project of violent civil disorder

even without formally organizing like OPC or MASSOB. However, political dominance tends to attract

to the North the envy of other groups. Similarly, the frequent cases of ethnic and religious structured

massacre of non-members in the region is a chief factor in alienating the smaller groups.

10. The Global Dimension of Ethnicity and International Political Instability

Primordial loyalty has continued to threaten nationalism and the integration of underdeveloped

states such as Nigeria throughout the whole world. Even though states like America that are

economically and technologically developed are composed of sometimes more plural ethnic and racially

diverse groups, the turbulence that this factor exerts in national cohesion tends to be comparatively less.

This implies perhaps that apart from the character of the state and the exploiting disposition of the elite,

poverty is another intervening factor in the relationship between both variables. States that have

institutionalized the structural mechanisms for ensuring distributive justice among the competing groups

and which have capacity to produce what is enough to meet the basic needs of their citizens to a

substantial degree tend to be less vulnerable to the disintegrating effect of ethnicity. This thesis is



23

empirically substantiated by the experiences of inter-ethnic hostilities in Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, East

Timor, Tibet/China, Kosovo/Serbia and Somalia to select a few examples from the Third World.

Rwanda

In Rwanda the 1994 genocide that killed close to a million BaTutsi and BaHutu was the result of

insurgent resistance by the Ba Hutu sub-nationalists against the dominant Ba Tutsi numerical minority

who make up only 16% of the country’s population. Although the BaHutu constituted 83% of the

Rwandan population at the time of the crisis, the BaTutsi minority controlled the state bureaucracy, the

military, diplomatic service, big business, the professions, the academia and intelligentsia, and the clergy

while the Ba Hutu were mainly farmers, hunters, and petty traders. The desire by the BaTutsi to maintain

the status quo stirred up BaHutu envy and resistance and led to carnage with heavy human toll. The

BaTutsi relying on their control of the military and government forced the majority BaHutu to accept

continuation of their reign which the BaHutu revolted against after decades of subservience. The fact

that the BaHutu and BaTutsi are easily distinguishable by their physical appearance, mode of dressing,

diets, complexion, occupations, and language, made the battle line so clearly drawn and the enemies and

foes so easy to identify and to attack. The genocide was total and unprecedented.

East Timor

In East Timor in all the years since the 16th century that it was under Portuguese rule up to and

during its annexation in July 1976 by Indonesia and the end of Indonesian rule in 1999, never had ethnic

tension among the 16 local tribes and dialects erupted to a socially threatening scale. But following the

1999 referendum by which East Timorese rejected and ended Indonesian rule opting instead for self-

determination, signs of ethnic divide began to appear rapidly degenerating into ethnic cleansing of entire

neigbourhoods particularly in the capital city, Dili. The reality of self-rule and the prospects for control

of state power and domination of one group by another gave rise to the search for the basis of separate

identities to serve as rallying pedestals for the contestants for power. As usual, sub-nationalistic feelings

between Loromonu (Westerners) and Lorosae (Easterners) came readily handy. The difference was

deliberately accentuated by up-staging the symbols of their separate identities. Today, these groups are

engulfed in fatal struggles for supremacy in the new state. Once these divides firmly take roots, the future

of one of the world’s newest states shall be determined by the outcome of the struggle between rival

primordial groups.

Yugoslavia



24

In old Yugoslavia, Slovenia was allowed to go by being granted independence in June 1991 as a

way of preserving peace in the remaining parts. The remaining Bosnia and Herzegovina soon engaged

in inter-ethnic war that left over 200,000 deaths; a tragic war of ethnic cleansing. In February 2008,

ethnic Albanians in Kosovo with the support of USA and the European allies unilaterally declared their

independence and separation from the Serbians in Belgrade. The Serbian government and Russia

opposed the move and refused to recognize the independent status of Kosovo. As in East Timor, this

ethnic divide which has determined political life since Yugoslavian times will continue to shape the

future of these countries for a long time in future. Russia’s invasion of the sovereign state of pro-West

Georgia in August 2008 was described as ethnic cleansing by the Georgians themselves.

Kenya

The 2007 elections in Kenya allegedly rigged by the incumbent President Kibaki threw the

opposition leader Raila Odinga and his supporters into an orgy of resistance and violent protest. The

clash between rival political supporters which was formed around these two leaders resulted in

destruction of lives and property across the entire country. The political struggle rapidly

characteristically metamorphosed into inter-ethnic conflict (Badejo, 2008).

The ethnic violence which greeted the flawed elections of December 2007 was a repeat of

experience beforehand common in Kenya. By February 2008 when the crisis got to its apogee it was

reported to have claimed 1,500 lives. A similar protest from 1992-95 killed 1,500 persons and displaced

300,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1995). The trend was said to have been repeated in the 1997 elections

and in 2002 (Badejo, 2008: 22). Members of the same party soon begin to kill one another on the basis

of ethnic differences.

Badejo (2008) captured the central drama of the crisis this way:

The controversy started on December 29, 2007. Towards the evening of

December 30, 2007, ECK (Electoral Commission of Kenya), obstructed

by ODM (Orange Democratic Movement) leaders from an open

announcement of the result went into a private room without any media

except the government-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC)

and announced that the outgoing President had been re-elected. President

Kibaki was announced to have garnered 4, 584, 721 with Hon. Raila

Odinga, his opponent being recorded as having 4, 352, 933 votes. The

ODM-Kenya candidate Kahonzo Musyoka, came a distant third with 879,

905 votes.



25

The Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) was accused of inflating President

Kibaki’s votes. Party leaders and international observers described the final stages of the electoral

process as flawed.

In providing a background for the Kenyan political crisis Badejo (2008:5) stated that there are 42

ethnic groups in Kenya. They include the Kikuyu, Merus, Embus, Kambas, Luos, Kissi, Kalenjins and

Luhyas. Others include the Maasai, Somalis, MajiKenda, Swahili, Indians, British and Bukusu among

others. Power had been oscillating among the major ethnic groups and had not been used to the benefit

of all groups. For example, Kenyatta the immediate post-independence President of Kenya, a Kikuyu

concentrated power, land and wealth in the hands of Kikuyu close associates. He secured Kalenjins and

Maasai lands grabbed by whites in colonial times and shared it among his people rather than return it to

the owners. Raila Odinga, a Luo was sometime schemed out of the KANU, the de facto single party at

the turn of independence and was interpreted as Luo marginalization. Arap Moi, a Kalenjin raked power

unto himself but did not benefit his own group. Mwai Kibaki was seen as return of the majority Kikuyu

to power. To perfect the electoral manipulation he had to elevate Evan Gichevu, a fellow Kikuyu to

office as Chief Justice to replace the Luo Chief Justice, Bernard Chungs that he had forced out. The

result of the 2007 election was announced by 5.30pm and Kibaki was sworn in by the new Chief Justice

at 6.p.m. Odinga refused to go to court because there will be no justice there. Kenya is a country of old

and bitter ethnic rivalries over land and power. By the time a Kalenjin mob burnt a Kikuyu crowd of

women and children who were taking refuge in a church, the memory of the BaHutu-BaTutsi inter-caste

massacre resonated. The world quickly rose to the occasion and forced a truce between President Kibaki

and the opposition leaders. The opposition leader, Raila Odinga in a coalition for national government

became Prime Minister.

China

In China, ethnic conflict has also erupted between minority Tibetans engaged in a struggle for

recognition and respect of their uniqueness and their right to self-determination by the government of

mainland China. The Spiritual Leader of Tibetans, exiled Dalai Lama in all his reign insisted that they

do not want to break away from China. Moreover, he argued that their right to determine what they do

with their lives and their future must however be respected and not denied. The struggle was stepped up

by Tibetans at home and in the diaspora in the wake of the global tour of the Beijing 2008 Olympic

Torch in April, 2008. With the support of some Western governments, protests were held in several cities

the world over (e.g. Los Angeles, Berlin, London, Arusha-Tanzania) even though the Government of

China clamped down on protesters at home with decisive brutality. The period of the Games was



26

calculated to be the auspicious time to draw global attention to the suppression of the desire of the people

of Tibet to self-determination.

Sudan

Ethnic conflict in the Darfur Province of South-West Sudan is currently the most serious

humanitarian disaster in the continent of Africa after the Rwandan massacre of the first half of the 1990s.

As far back as 2002, United States officials estimated that between 10,000 - 30, 000 people had been

killed and over one million people displaced (Vanguard, September 17, 2002). The conflict had persisted

and escalated and so was the resultant humanitarian crisis. In 2002, the same officials forecast that

320,000 people would have been killed in 2004. The number exceeded this figure by that date.

The crisis in Darfur is an inter-ethnic conflict. Darfur is estimated to be home to some 7 million

people, 30 ethnic groups categorized into two- Africans and Arabs. Both communities are Muslim and

several years of inter-marriage has made clear racial distinctions impossible. At the core of the current

conflict is said to be a struggle for control of resources. The largely nomadic Arab ethnic groups often

venture into the traditionally farming communities (of ethnic Africans) for water and grazing, often

triggering armed conflict between the two groups. Successive governments in Khartoum have long

neglected the African ethnic groups and done nothing to protect them against Arab militias. So in

February 2003, two rebel groups emerged to challenge the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in

Darfur. These were the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM).

They claimed that the government of Sudan discriminates against Muslim African ethnic groups in

Darfur. This conflict which now involves neighbouring African countries and superpowers such as

America and the United Nations positions the three African ethnic groups, the Fur, Zaghawa and

Massaleit against nomadic Arab ethnic groups. The Arab militia known as the Janjaweed and the

government are criticized for engaging in what UN officials describe as “ethnic cleansing” of the African

ethnic groups. Geographically, the conflict has taken a North-South dimension, the Arabs to the North

and the African ethnic groups to the South. The result is the breaking of Sudan into two countries –

Sudan and South Sudan roughly along the rival ethnic and racial divides.

North Africa and the Middle East

The wave of popular uprising and street protests that swept through North Africa and the Middle

East in late 2010 and first half of 2011 can alternatively be viewed as pro-democracy movements, as

Arab nationalism or as inter-ethnic conflict. The uprising in Egypt at a time took a religious dimension

in which Christians were targeted and churches burnt. The pro-democracy violence in Libya, Yemen

and Bahrain has equally significant underlying tribal contestation for power. In Libya, the pro-



27

democracy agitations quickly transformed into a full-scale war between Col. Mummer Quaddafi’s

government and rival tribal war lords based in Benghazi. The difference between Shiites and Sunnis

reverberated in the political log-jam and war in Sadam Hussein’s Iraq. Similarly, tribal affinity played a

key role in the military support of the Bahrain monarchy by the Saudi ruling family to quail the popular

demand by rival tribes for political reforms in the Kingdom in 2011.

What is common to all the situations of ethnic conflict inside or outside Africa is that it is often

a struggle over control of political power or economic resources. The ethnic factor is brought in as a

dependable basis of rallying support. It provides ready symbols of identity, to define the contours of

hostility and a source of demarcation of boundaries of members and outsiders, friends and foes. In a

number of cases, it is reinforced with religious differences.

11. How Ethnicity Precipitates Violent Inter-Ethnic Conflict

There is nothing wrong in people expressing loyalty to their primordial group. Inter-ethnic

conflict does not exist merely because numerous ethnic groups co-exist. Indeed inter-ethnic competition

if properly harnessed through social structures and political organizations that allow for respective

group’s self-determination and healthy rivalry, it could be a catalyst for healthy competitive socio-

economic development. This is why mainstream social science explanations of inter-ethnic conflict

which tend to assume that plurality and cultural differences will inevitably lead to conflict are

unacceptable. How is ethnic pluralism or ethnicity held to be a source of inter-ethnic conflict? Ethnic

pluralism describes a condition in which several ethnic groups co-exist competing among themselves

for the control of common scare resources. Inter-group competition such as this is said to encourage

ethnicity, that is, the attitude of emotive loyalty and allegiance to one’s group. Submission to one’s group

manifests in overt acts of identification with the expressive symbols by which that group is known. These

include language, music and dance, dressing, and other aspects of the group’s culture such as its

traditions, beliefs, life style, interests and world view. Deeper and deeper in-group identification is held

to brew hatred, neglect and hostility towards the out-group. Where this love-hate split becomes more

pronounced it could metamorphose into discriminatory preference of the in-group and discriminatory

suspicion, distrust and rejection of the out-group. In practical terms, this behaviour is held to encourage

sub-national consciousness rather than loyalty to the whole state. Prejudice, ethnic chauvinism and

ethnocentrism are constituent internal dynamics of this process. Prejudice consists in forming an

unfavourable judgment or opinion about other ethnic groups beforehand, without due examination of the

reasons a priori to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the opinion. Prejudice is said to be reinforced by

ethnocentric feeling, the belief that the culture, symbols, practices, behaviours and other characteristics

of one’s group are superior to the characteristics of other groups with which one’s group is in



28

competition, rivalry or other forms of relationship. This feeling leads one to look with disdain on other

groups the members of which may also react with rejection of ego’s ascription of inferior status to their

own group or groups. Under this situation, ethnic chauvinism festers, that is, the act of being belligerently

attached to one’s group with a devotional disposition to defend group interest against those groups with

which one’s group is in competitive relationship. Quite naturally, prejudice, chauvinism and

ethnocentrism lead to stereotyping, the act of continuously associating one’s group with positive and

favourable characteristics and other groups with negative features thereby deepening with time the

division, hatred and socio-psychological distance between interacting groups. Factors such as these are

held to favour the explanation of inter-ethnic conflict. However, Nnoli (1980) considers these

explanations as inadequate because they do not reveal the latent material essence that is central to the

inter-ethnic conflicts of such monumental and disruptive dimension as was witnessed in the Nigerian

civil war, in Rwanda and in Kenya.

While not completely disregarding the relatively weaker explanatory potency of prejudice and

stereotyping etc., more cogent explanations of the serious conflicts in Nigeria, Sudan, East Timor,

Rwanda, Kenya and other places that threatened the corporate existence of these states at one time or

another must be sought. In this connection a stronger explanation with four ingredients is hereunder

explored. This explanation dwells on the impact of horizontal inequality between ethnic groups where

groups are many and competing among themselves for common but scarce resources. The elements of

this explanation are:

(a) Horizontal inequalities;

(b) Struggle for scarce material resources and power;

(c) Opportunity to react/form of government;

(d) Politicization of ethnicity;

(e) Ethnicization of politics.

In a seminal paper on horizontal inequalities as the neglected dimension of development, Frances

Stewart recognized the impact of real or imagined inequalities among ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic

state as germane to the understanding of conflict between them. Such group inequalities, she referred to

as horizontal inequality, to distinguish it from vertical inequality as between individuals and households.

Writing on the impact of this factor on group well-being on peace or conflict she stated that:

Unequal access to political/economic/social resources by different cultural

groups can reduce individual welfare of the individuals in the losing

groups over and above what their individual position would merit, because



29

their self-esteem is bound up with the progress of the group. But of greater

consequences is the argument that where there are such inequalities in

resource access and outcomes, coinciding with cultural (ethnic)

differences, culture (ethnicity) can become a powerful mobilizing agent

that can lead to a range of political disturbances (Stewart, undated)

In explaining why this is so she said it is because membership of an ethnic group is an intrinsic aspect

of being human. And as Badejo (2008: 4) further clarified,

…situations where group membership can easily change, horizontal

inequalities may not matter seriously as a basis for conflict. But when

people cannot move easily as in primordial groups, then the lot of the

group tend to be seen more or less as the lot of the individual.

Therefore, because ethnic group membership is forever and unchangeable, losers in inter-ethnic

struggle are likely to remain losers forever unless they take decisive collective action to change their

fortunes. Writing on the same subject, Ostby (2007) defined horizontal or inter-group inequality as

“systematic inequalities that coincide with ethnic, religious or geographical cleavages in a country …..’

Applying data from 55 countries he confirmed the importance of horizontal inequalities on the conflict

generating potential of unequal access among rival groups to scarce resources in a polity. Ostby

suggested further that the ‘regime type’ in a polity would be an important consideration. Given the

existence of inequality there must be an opportunity for the disadvantaged group or groups to react.

Thus, he said, autocracies due to their tendency to suppress any reaction would be safe from conflict in

spite of horizontal inequalities. But because opportunity to react is easily available in democracies and

semi-democracies they may be more susceptible to conflict and civil wars. He concludes that political

exclusion and horizontal inequalities at the socio-economic level are potent for the risk of conflict across

primordial cleavages.

Nnoli (1980) calls attention to a number of other factors that are instrumental to the emergence

of ethnicity and inter-group conflict. These are politicization of ethnicity, which may take the form of

fractionalization within the privileged classes each faction falling back on ethnic props to gain support

and advantage in intra-class struggle. He titles this “ethnic mask over class struggle”, by which he argued

that ethnicity has been pulled over the faces of the people as a mask to conceal an exercise which, in its

true character is class struggle to achieve the limited goals of those engaged in that struggle rather than

those of their primordial groups as a whole. Politicians hide behind the ethnic factor to pursue personal

or class goals. In Kenya, East Timor, Rwanda and Sudan, as has also been the case in Nigeria, ethnicity

is continuously exploited as a strategic instrument by the political class to deal with class opponents,



30

particularly those in competing primordial groups. And talking about inter-ethnic socio-economic

competition, Nnoli (1980) makes reference to three related factors that exacerbated the struggle among

ethnic groups in Nigeria’s First Republic, 1960-66. These are regionalization of national wealth in the

Independence Constitution, inter-regional struggle for Federal resources, and rivalry in the provision of

amenities among the leading ethnic groups. To make gains in these areas politicians freely resorted to

ethnic arguments as a platform for justifying their claims. Moreover, Nnoli (1980) considers social

distance between the various groups as a strong factor in the emergence of ethnicity and inter-group

hostility. Social distance is widened by ethnic chauvinism, ethnocentrism and the ideology of ethnicity.

It is also increased by each group’s location in a geographically distinctive and separate part of the

country. The political class prevents inter-group association at political level other than inter-trade, inter-

marriage etc., relationships that quickly break down as soon as political or religious sentiments are

whipped up.

Despite the battery of concepts and explanations of ethnicity and interethnic violence, there is

one not considered by the author. This is the ethnicization of politics. It is different from politicization

of ethnicity that is, exploiting ethnic symbolism for political gains. On the contrary, ethnicization of

politics consists in infusing ethnic considerations in political decisions particularly in the distribution of

valued resources to the advantage of some groups and the disadvantage of those not favoured. It is a

source of horizontal inequality. It is manifested in the sharing of elective offices and appointive positions,

in distribution of social amenities and in location of government institutions. It also manifests in arriving

at revenue sharing formulas, in selective exploitation of federal (natural) resources in the different parts

of the country etc. It has also played a role in creation of states and local governments in the country,

that is, in deciding the number to be created in different geo-ethnic areas and the locating of the capital

towns. It has been displayed in allocating admission quota into universities and Unity Schools, and in

enlistment into the military, police and the public bureaucracies. This, rather than politicization of

ethnicity played the critical role in deciding on the 13% derivation formula for sharing of federally

pooled resources, against which decision is hinged the allegation of denial of the right of control of their

natural resources by the indigenes of the Nigerian Niger Delta region. This fact has been relied upon in

the registration and recognition of political parties. In the country ‘ethnicization’ of politics is however

relatively less politically disruptive than politicization of ethnicity because it can be a strategy for

building participatory political structures.

12. The Nigerian Ethnic Militias and the Opportunity to React

Those three conditions namely, unequal access of competing groups to socio-economic

resources, politicization of ethnicity and the opportunity to react are useful in explaining the 2007/2008



31

general election crisis in Kenya, the Arab/African conflict in Sudan, the breakaway of Kosovo from

Serbia, and the Rwandan massacre as we have earlier referred to. These factors are equally of immense

interpretative benefit in understanding the emergence of ethnic militia in Nigeria and the degeneration

of the crisis in the Niger Delta, particularly the effect of the return to civil rule in 1999. In these Nigeria

examples, it is not as if the denials complained of by the groups that formed militant wings or by the

indigenes of the Niger Delta were new. For over a century in the country there were racially, regionally

as well as ethnically-structured alienating inequalities all the way from colonial times. However, the

undemocratic essence of colonial rule from 1862 - 1960 and the dominance of the military in Nigeria’s

public life from 1966 to 1999 with a brief civil interruption in 1979-83 and the junta’s tendency to

suppress discontentment, guaranteed the impossibility of armed violent groups in those periods. The

Nigerian civil war, 1967-70 followed the opportunity to react laid during the First Republic, 1960 - 1966.

Similarly, MASSOB, OPC, MEND, NDPVF, Bakkasi Boys and Egbesu Boys have canvassed the

justifications of their agitation rather openly since 1999 as a result of the opportunity to react provided

by the advent of civilian rule from May 29, 1999. Even the arrest and trial of leaders of these Movements

have not deterred them from further action. Chief Ganiyu Adams and Dr. Fredrick Fasehun of OPC were

detained by the Obasanjo government and later released. Chief Uwazurike of MASSOB was also

detained for a longer time but MASSOB was not deterred. Similarly, two leaders of MEND, the militant

Niger Delta activists and youth leaders, namely Edward Otata and Henry Okar were arrested and changed

for illegal bunkering and espionage by the Obasanjo government. Though the tenure of that

administration came to an end on May 29, 2007, Ijaw militants were still threatening increased violent

attack on government interests and targets by April, 2008. These can be seen as the result of the

continuing opportunity for reaction presented by the succeeding civilian government.

Although organizing for violent reaction by the youths of the Niger Delta began under military

rule the scale of violence and impunity was never of the magnitude witnessed under civil rule from 1999.

Moreover, the variety of methods of attack has increased just as the boldness of militants became

unprecedented. Niger Delta militants were not restrained at the height of impunity to give prior notice

to the country of their intention to attack government targets. They changed from clandestine and

surprise attacks to open and fore-warned attacks. They challenged government security forces with

impudence and target government establishments with impunity.

Initially, the targets of kidnap used to be expatriates employed in the oil companies. At the climax

of their reign targets of kidnap included their own kith and kin, particularly those with high kidnap value

in terms of the ransom they could attract to secure their release. Such targets were described by militants

and activists as enemies of the cause or apologists of the oppressive federal government. These were

people seen as local facilitators or instrumentalities and collaborators with the federal government to



32

‘steal’ their resources. During this period, it was not only members of the local political class that were

targets; their parents, spouses, children, relatives, domestic staff, political associates, business partners

etc., were also included. Huge ransoms were demanded to effect release of hostages. The militants

continued with blowing up of oil pipelines, vandalization of installations, and oil bunkering etc. They

expanded the sources of funds for servicing their war machines. Illegal small arms proliferate in the

region. The Navy carried out regular military operations but was outmaneuvered despite their superior

firepower by the aquatic and amphibious dexterity of the Ijaw youths for whom the water is an alternative

natural habitat.

Moreover, militants exercised their freedom of speech by inviting and addressing world press

conferences. They granted press interviews and lampooned the government at every such opportunity.

Militants were seen as heroes of the cause and no more as villains or rebels by the local people and

sympathizers. Governments in the region turned negotiating with militants for release of hostages into

political weaponry to show, if only ostensibly, how sympathetic government was of the interest of the

people in the sub-region. Influential political figures charged money to discharge similar services.

On the other hand, the ethnic militias refurbished their organizations and operational modalities.

MASSOB, for instance, celebrated Biafra Day in the US. It held conferences outside the country to

discuss the future of self-determination for the Igbo. The body was mobilized to defend Igbo interest in

multi-ethnic conflicts in Kano city and in Ajegunle in Lagos State. The OPC had stood up to the Yoruba

agenda with greater courage and determination in a number of ways. It proposed to build an O’odua

World Centre which is expected to cover 200 acres of land. It was planned to comprise a ‘massive’ 12-

storey building that would house studios, theatres, museums, exhibition halls, and an academy for the

study of Yoruba civilization. An example of defense of Yoruba interest was when the Speaker of the

Federal House of Representatives Hon. Patricia Ette, a Yoruba was accused in 2007 of spending N600

million to renovate her official residence and that of her Deputy. Although many Yoruba people rose up

in vehement condemnation of the act, Dr. Fredrick Fasehun, a leader of one of the two factions of OPC

at that time, described the saga as a calculated attempt to deny the Yoruba race of their fourth position

in the national hierarchy of state power. He was however, proved wrong as investigations later revealed

the allegations to be ‘substantially true’. Moreover, another Yoruba representative in the Federal House

of Representatives, Hon. Dimeji Bankole was elected to replace the embattled Hon. Patricia Ette.

Bankole’s exit was equally mired by allegation of corrupt embezzlement of public funds although the

court exonerated him.

Thus the politicization of ethnicity, as events have shown, has prevented genuine search for

solutions to the factors resulting in continuing inter-ethnic feud in the country. Continuation in

enjoyment of political gains sometimes is tied to the persistence of ethnic differences and divisive ethnic



33

violence. This perhaps explains why ethnicity is not abating as the political class continues to fan the

members of ethnic bigotry for selfish reasons.

13. Conclusion: Ethnic Militia -not necessarily Dis-functional

In this chapter attempt was made to show that politicization of ethnicity and ethnicization of

politics and not ethnic plurality per see is the dimension of multi-ethnic relationship that threatens the

corporate survival of any country, or in particular, the achievement of the Nigerian Project. Historical

facts were adduced to illustrate the fact that these threatening dimensions have been present in Nigeria

since colonial times and inflicted deep wounds on national integration. It shaped the negotiation for

independence, the near con-federal structure of the First Republic (1960 - 66) to accommodate the

multifarious and disparate ethnic interests in the different parts of the country. It has contributed to the

shaping of the key events in the history of Nigeria such as the political crisis of 1964, the incursion of

the military into politics in 1966, the Nigerian civil war and the direction of the sail of the ship of state

since the end of the civil war. It has equally been a key variable for the determination of the groups that

monopolized control of the apparatus of state power up until the present. The dominant versus minority

group configuration of ethnic politics has complicated the crisis in the Niger Delta making any solution

elusive. Rather than ameliorate conditions ethnic politics deepens inter-group hatred, rivalry and

violence. In a number of cases, it fuses with class and religion to checkmate national development by

making it impossible to bring corrupt public officials to account for their misdeeds. It also revealed that

the tendency for the ruling class in most parts of the developing world to politicize ethnicity and land

the country in political crisis is an experience that is widespread in such places.

However, as the experience of the Oputa Panel for national reconciliation has helped to portray,

negotiation is a weak strategy for accommodating the conflicting interests of unequal contestants

particularly where a few dominant interests monopolize the control of state power and they want the

status quo to remain unchanged.

It is against that background and on the numerous experiences that ethnic militias are seen as

functional platform for constitutive co-existence. The SLA and JEM in Darfur, Southern Sudan, the

BaHutu militia in Rwanda, Raila Odinga’s party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in Kenya,

are good illustrations. In the same way, MOSOP, MEND, NDPVF in the Nigerian Niger Delta, OPC,

MOSSOB, and APC in other parts of Nigeria have operated to stabilize the situation confronting their

regions. The same argument applies to Northern Ireland. Recently, opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai

and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe used violence to force President Robert

Mugabe to accept power sharing in a government of national unity. In all these examples the conclusion

is that resistant militia whether tribal, ethnic, sectarian or political have become strategic sub-cultures



34

for creating platforms for conflict resolution and mutual accommodation in ethnically plural societies.

In all of these examples it would appear that nothing else could have brought the ‘warring’ parties to the

roundtable. The SLA and JEM in Southern Sudan showed that militia activities attract the attention of

the state, the international community and sets the dominant parties jostling for solutions. Militia

activities tend to remind all parties that violence by the weaker party produces a sense of balance of

terror whether real or imagined and has deterrence value or benefit. The activities of the Niger Delta

militants send signals out that nobody should be taken for granted no matter how disproportionate the

relative powers of the feuding parties might be. Raila Odinga and ODM in Kenya through organized

ethnic violence achieved government of national unity for his party, power that was denied at the ballot.

Substantial democratic reforms to reposition the BaHutu followed the worst humanitarian disaster in

Rwanda. The four-month (November 2010-April 2011) political stalemate in Ivory Coast between the

incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo who refused to relinquish state power after losing a general

election and the United Nations’ acclaimed winner, Alassan Quattara could not be resolved until rival

ethnic militias arose. If that platform was not provided by pro-Quattara forces, assistance by French

troops in dislodging the supporters of the usurper and his eventual capture would have been

impracticable.

Finally, rather than fritter away it seems that militias will become more and more involved in

conflict management, restoration of just social structures and peace reconstruction. This is an option

open to further analysis and critical consideration by the state in Nigeria. This might as well mean that

state operators must desist from labeling militants as outlaws and miscreants. That approach does not

add to the course of peaceful settlement of inter-ethnic conflicts. After all, authorized state officials

negotiate with these so-called ‘rebels’ here and there admittedly behind the scene. Until the political

class stops the exploitation of ethnic differences for selfish purposes, and learns to play politics by the

internationally sanctioned rules, it appears that militias will remain the only way left for peaceful co-

existence in ethnically plural societies particularly in the third world.

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International Journal of Modern Social Sciences ISSN:2169