International Fund for Agricultural Development

Programme Management Department

Project Completion Digests - 2014

Contents

Asia and the Pacific Bangladesh - Market Infrastructure Development Project in Charland Regions 1

China - South Gansu Poverty-Reduction Programme 6

China - Sichuan Post-Earthquake Agriculture Rehabilitation Project 12

India - Livelihoods Improvement Project in the Himalayas 17

Pakistan - Community Development Programme (CDP) 24

Sri Lanka - Dry Zone Livelihood Support and Partnership Programme 28

East and Southern Africa Kenya - Mount Kenya East Pilot Project for Natural Resource Management 33

Rwanda - Rural Small and Microenterprise Promotion Project - Phase II 37

Rwanda - Support Project for the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture 42

Latin American and the Caribbean Guatemala - National Rural Development Programme Phase I: the Western Region 47

Nicaragua - Technical Assistance Fund Programme for the Departments of León, Chinandega and Managua (FAT) 51

Near East, North Africa and Europe Albania - Programme for Sustainable Development in Rural Mountain Areas (SDRMA) 57

Djibouti - Microfinance and Microenterprise Development Project 62

Moldova - Agricultural Revitalization Project 67

Sudan - South Kordofan Rural Development Programme 72

Sudan - Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project 77

Turkey - Sivas-Erzincan Development Project 81

Yemen - Dhamar Participatory Rural Development Project 87

Western and Central Africa Benin - Rural Development Support Programme 92

Cameroon - Roots and Tubers market-Driven Development Programme 97

Democratic Republic of Congo - Agricultural Revival Programme in Equateur Province 102

Ghana - Rural Enterprise Project - Phase II 107

Guinea Bissau - Rural Rehabilitation and Community Development Project 113

Mali - Sahelian Areas Development Fund Programme 119

Niger - Project for the Promotion of Local Initiative for Development in Aguié 125

Nigeria - Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme 130

Senegal - Promotion of Rural Entrepreneurship Project - Phase II 136


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Bangladesh - Market Infrastructure Development Project in Charland Regions

Item Assessment Remarks Rating

Country & Project Name Bangladesh - Market Infrastructure Development Project in Charland Regions (MIDPCR)

Loan No.: 681-BD

Project Id. 1322

Board Date 13 December 2005

Entry into Force 22 September 2006

Original Closing Date 31 March 2014

Final Closing Date 31 March 2014

Total Project Cost USD(M) 43 895

IFAD loan & Grant US$(M) Loan: US$24 947

Cofinanciers (if any) Netherlands: US$4 752; Local NGO: US$4 241; Government: US$8 541; Beneficiaries: US$1 414

Cooperating Institution IFAD/IFAD

Implementing Agency Local Government Engineering Department

Principal Components Four components for this project: (a) Infrastructure Development with three sub-components; (i) Market management strengthening; (ii) Market infrastructure; (iii) Transport infrastructure; (b) Production and Market Group Development to support the growth of production and trade within the selected market and its hinterland, with three sub-components: (i) The group formation and support, (ii) Support for marketable crops, (iii) The support for income-generating activities; (c) Rural Enterprise Development; and (d) Policy, Institutional and Management Support with three sub-components: (i) Policy dialogue, (ii) Project management, (iii) Monitoring and evaluation.

Project Performance

Relevance The project (MIDPCR) was well conceived to combat rural poverty in the project areas. Its design was highly relevant and consistent with Government of Bangladesh (GoB's) rural development objectives, approach and strategy at the time of appraisal. The project was designed to match with the development priorities set by the GoB and its objectives were highly relevant for accelerating agricultural, economic and social development in the project area. The design and formulation of the project were also consistent with IFAD's country strategy of upgrading and improving rural infrastructure to stimulate growth in the rural areas by increasing farmer access to inputs and technologies, improving access to urban markets, and enhancing the flow of services investment to the rural areas. The project included provision of training, technical support and micro-finance for its target beneficiaries for undertaking different kinds of IGA activities in the project areas. By linking NGO micro-credit groups with extension services provision provided by DAE (Department of Agricultural Extension), the project was in line with the new National Agriculture Extension Policy (NAEP) approved in 1998 that called amongst other things for plurality of extension service provision. The project design was sound, needs-based and it followed a people-oriented participatory approach. At MTR, the initial targets were revised in light of the available funds. The project development objectives remained relevant throughout the life of the project.

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Effectiveness The project has been effective and benefitted the entire community. The overall percentage of components' achievement is 100%. A combination of improved physical access to market through development of roads and rural markets, financial and business development services, and dissemination of agricultural production technologies has contributed to the overall improvement of beneficiaries' livelihoods. The project has completed the following targets: built 66 rural markets and 432 km union and village roads; reached 52,566 poor persons with microcredit through two partner-NGOs; provided training to 85,280 farmers on production technologies by DAE; and directly reached 18,525 persons with business development services in several sectors to enhance access to inputs, skills and market. Due to improved communication and market infrastructures, agricultural inputs have become available in local markets at a lower cost, and producers have taken their products to nearby bigger markets and growth centres for better price. Outside traders have started visiting markets and buying agricultural products from the producers directly. The project created employment opportunities during implementation of construction activities. Civil works contracts executed have resulted in the creation of 8,200 person-years of employment in the project area surpassing the project target of 6,000 person-years. It has been estimated that an additional 136,000 jobs have been created along project roads and 39,000 in the transport sector. Construction of infrastructures under the project (market, roads, ghats) also constituted a key factor for a sustainable development of project supported value-chains as it facilitated the linkage between farmers/producers and other value chain stakeholders (buyers, input suppliers, financial and non-financial service providers). Number of enterprises established, on and off-farm jobs created in enterprises, diversification of sources of income and creation of employment opportunities have been achieved also achieved through micro-finance support.

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Efficiency The project actual cost was US$42.16 million equivalent to 94% of total project cost. The overall utilization of IFAD's loan stood at 94%. The project used resources efficiently in implementing all planned activities. It maintained good control of expenditure and schedule of activities. All works and technical assistance activities were completed before the closing date of June 2013. Resource mobilization was adequate and

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timely, and thus all civil works were completed within the timeframe. The project implementation did not suffer from devaluation of local currency against the dollar and Government made counterpart funds available as needed. There has been a substantial shift in funds from the tree plantation allocation to the increase of road length and new package allocation. This was mainly due to the recommendation of Supervision Mission 2012 to realign funds to support infrastructure up-gradation. The implementation arrangements worked well at all levels. The continuous assignment of a competent and experienced project director was an important factor for the successful implementation of the project on time. The impact study evaluated the EIRR of the project, which stood at 18%, higher than the baseline value of 12.8%, indicating the high level of benefits. The level of efficiency in executing the project components is deemed satisfactory. The project also complied with the annual work plan, budgeting and financial management requirements.

Project Performance 5

Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD fielded 5 supervision missions, one MTR and one follow-up mission, at regular intervals. These missions closely monitored implementation, assessed progress, and identified problems and constraints through field visits and discussion with the Government, Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), project consultants, and other stakeholders including beneficiaries. IFAD monitored closely and acted promptly on requests for approval, disbursement, and modifications as needed from time to time. Direct supervision by IFAD increased the involvement of HQ staff and local experts in the supervision missions, which was valued by LGED and which found suggestions and recommendations made by supervision missions helpful. The actions on withdrawal application were within reasonable time limit.

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Cooperating Institution The project was directly supervised by IFAD. n.a

Government The Local Government Division under Ministry of Local Government Rural Development and Cooperatives (MLGRD&C) approved annual workplans and budget, organized and chaired interministerial steering committee meetings and chaired wrap-up meetings of supervision missions. The project had close cooperation with local government at Union and Upazila levels. At a number of markets, Union Parishads have funded land rising for markets, while Upazila Nirbahi Officers have assisted in making land available and in the leasing out to WMS. The PMU and all project staff performed well. It was very much responsive to and flexible in incorporating the suggestions for the improvement of works in all components. The PMU paid regular field visits to the project area to oversee the progress of civil works and performance of other components; the continuous and extensive field visits expedited speed of works and improved overall quality of the works. Fiduciary management was also good with qualified accounts, and timely processing of loan requests from IFAD office.

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NGO/Other Two project Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) - PRISM and PMUK (Programme for Increasing Sustainable Microfinance and Padakhep Manabik Unnayan Kendra) - have been partner organizations of PKSF (government apex funding agency for NGOs), which provides loans to PMUK and PRISM that have enabled them to reach 52,566 poor women and men with microfinance services with no-cost to the project. This has been the most significant indirect partnership that directly helped the poor and small producers.

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Cofinancier(s) The Government of Netherland was the project's cofinancier. Disbursement level by the closing of the project was 99%. Funding support from the co-financier was timely and the project management utilized the fund properly.

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Combined Partner Performance

Project implementation arrangements with partner organizations have been efficient in terms of realization of desired objective of the project.

Rural Poverty Impact

Household Income and Net Assets

The joint provision of training and micro-credit (especially seasonal credit), together with access to selective production advice, enabled project's beneficiaries to maximize output and increase farm income. The project also contributed to improve financial viability of smallholder farmers and adoption of IGAs resulting into increased incomes and improved livelihoods. The income of 53,298 poor HHs has increased by 25%. The average monthly income rose by 73.6% in project areas, while average monthly expenditure increased by 55.8%. The number of new account holders in regular bank branches rose by twice as much as MIDPCR project villages, which indicate the sign of increased savings and access to modern economy. Microcredit group members and RED (Rural Enterprise Development) participants reported increased profits, especially from fisheries, vegetables and livestock; the resulting incomes have been partly used to acquire assets and to enhance business capitals. Through the micro-credit provision by the NGOs, there was a reduction in the dependability of poor people on moneylenders, where poor people were forced to make advance sales of products at very low prices to moneylenders. Women LCS (Labour Contracting Societies) members, received a profit of BDT 16,000 (USD 200) in addition to the daily wage. Average roadside land value along the project roads went up by 88%. All small technologies promoted by DAE were financially viable, with increases in net income from 21% to up 45%. This increase was generated by savings made on inputs, increased yields and therefore, increased gross incomes. Finally, the proportion of HHs involved in agriculture has fallen from 53% to 43%, which may be due to greater opportunities in other sectors or migration to urban centers.

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Food Security The PCR mentions that the levels of chronic malnutrition among children under 5 years, measured by the 4


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proportion of stunted children, remained unchanged at around 50%. On the other hand, with concern to the indicators of acute malnutrition (the wasted and the underweight proportion), there have been some improvements in the nutritional status of under-five children in the project area. The proportion of wasted children was 16% in the baseline, which was found to be 8% in the follow-up surveys. Similarly, proportion of underweight children was 40% in the baseline and 34% in the follow-up survey. Dietary diversity was not measured in the baseline and therefore a comparison could not be made. However, according to the PCR, the HHs are now cultivating fruit trees and vegetables as a result of agricultural training received from DAE, which would improve their nutritional status.

Ag. Productivity There is not specific quantitative information on this domain. However, the PCR claimed that agricultural production has been stimulated through a set of interventions, concerning the provision of training, microcredit and better physical infrastructure. The upgrade of road access to rural markets encouraged farmers to produce high-value crops and cash crops. During implementation, farmers with access to seasonal loans noted significant yield increases for paddy, vegetables and soybean, which contributed to increased net incomes. With access to credit, farmers were able to provide for timely crop husbandry, which in itself contributed to increased yields and better prices by allowing sales of vegetables after harvest. Several new crops have been cultivated by group members after receiving training.

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Agricultural Productivity and Food Security

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Natural Resources and Environment

The PCR did not specifically address project's impact on this domain. It was just reported that the implementation of project activities contributed to improvements of natural resource environment. But how this happened, has not been mentioned.

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Human, Social Capital and Empowerment

On this domain, the project has had a notable impact. As a result of its intervention, health services have greatly increased as a result of the road construction, as people can reach health facilities in far less time. Access to schools and attendance rates have also increased, as literate males increased significantly from 69% to 85.7% and females from 65% to 88.5%. A positive impact was also achieved through the provision of training on crop production and rural-enterprise development, as well as through the provision of micro-finance for the target borrowers for undertaking different kinds of IGAs in the project area. The project identified potential producer groups in char areas and then built their capacity, developed market and communications infrastructure to be used by them. A total of 71.275 beneficiaries: i) 18.525 as direct and ii) 52.750 as indirect were supported with training, workshops, exposure visits and developing linkages between all value-chain stakeholders. 2000 new producers groups were organized by NGOs (PRISM and PMUK) and 466 existing groups were handed over to the project and provided with social, IGA training with micro-credit support.

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Inst. & Policies The project has made an impact on policy, mainly by strengthening the capacity of LGED and the local government institutions through training in various aspects of participatory planning and maintenance, management, accounting, revenue collection, and quality control. Market management and leasing also provide evidence of policy change to support modernization of policies for public markets. The MMCs are enforcing existing regulations and received 25% of annual lease money from the Upazila Parishads (Council).

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Markets The project's impact on this domain has been highly successful. The project developed physical infrastructure for markets, market facilities, farm-to-market roads and capacity for market management. The newly built infrastructure has converted the earlier markets into-economic growth centers for the area. Upgrading of market connecting roads helped increase the traffic volume of motorized traffic by 174% and saved considerable transportation time (28% reduction in travel cost). The project also supported market traders, other small businesses and primary producers (farmers, fishermen and others) and provided them with technical and management training and access to credit. The immediate impact has been the increase in number of buyers and sellers, increase in sales in terms of volumes and money values and reduction in transportation costs. A better interaction between private inputs sellers and farmers, access to larger markets through large middlemen has also been reported. Market impact study reported 33% increase in number of buyers and sellers, 44% increase in volume of trades, and new investments in the markets and neighbouring areas. The smaller markets in remote areas built under the project have attracted a large number of buyers and sellers from the neighbouring villages on market days. Numbers of new shops (drug stores, seed and fertilizer stores, furniture making stores, restaurants, etc.) have significantly increased after the development of the markets.

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Project Impact The PCR assessment of the project impact has been based on 12 completed impact studies including RIMS over the 5 years, which have provided the qualitative and quantitative data on the impacts of MIDPCR. The RIMS assessment data has compared the baseline data collected in March 2009 with the data collected in January 2013.

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Overarching Factors

Innovation The project incorporated some innovative aspects, such as the participation of LCS as a contractor, and the integration of training, micro-finance and value chain approach, which contributed to realize LGED's vision as a rural infrastructure development institution. The use of LCS as an alternative to commercial contractors to build markets and roads created employment, enhanced skills and provided cash in the hand of extremely

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poor women, thereby developed their self-esteem. A further important innovation concerned the use of seasonal lending. NGOs involved in seasonal lending have reported good loan repayment rates (100%). The project has been unique in its focus on building market management institutions, as the strengthening of Market Management Committee (MMC) as an institution has been tested in MIDPCR. MMCs have been established in all markets with stakeholder representation as per government rules. The intensive training and workshop programs in 66 market locations have opened a new horizon of knowledge for the MMC members relating to their responsibilities, tasks, and how to make the market more sustainable. Finally, although a value-chain approach to development was not new to Bangladesh, this was an innovation for LGED projects. On the RED component, it was the first time that an IFAD project in Bangladesh has linked significant farmers with large-scale formal agri-business companies for input supply and marketing.

Replicability and Scaling-up IFAD, in collaboration with ADB and GOB, designed the Coastal Climate Resilient Infrastructure Project (CCRIP) to scale up the rural roads and market component of MIDPCR. Strengthening of MMC as an institution has been tested in MIDPCR and in scaling up under a new project. Moreover, it was found that the markets developed by LCS method increased their lease-value after development and as per GoB rules, 25% of the lease value is given to MMC for creating resource base for maintenance and construction of user need base facilities. With concern to the seasonal lending, it is considered that seasonal lending could be replicated and scaled up in other areas of Bangladesh.

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Innovation, Replicability and Scaling-up

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Sustainability and Ownership

There are good prospects for the project in terms of institutional, technical, social, environmental, economic and financial sustainability. There has been given a very high importance to institutional sustainability in MIDPCR's design and implementation, as its core strategy has been implemented through sustainable institutions, as well as it has concerned the development of organizations and methodologies to ensure sustainability. A policy dialogue has been initiated by MIDPCR to secure appropriate levels of maintenance funds from the government to local institutions in charge of union/village road maintenance. A market management committee (MMC) has been formed in each market as per government guidelines, and can continue to operate after the end of the project as they are part of government policy for market management, as well as receive 25% of market-lease money to do the routine maintenance. For most markets, this share of lease value should be adequate to pay for maintenance costs, strengthen the capacity of the MMC and ensures the sustainability in the long term. With regard to micro-credit groups, both PRISM and PMUK are licensed and viable microfinance institutions, which are expected to continue their services beyond project period. DAE is expected to continue the provision of agricultural technologies with government resources. The RED sub-component follows market-based approach, therefore is expected to continue without long-term support from the project.

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Targeting The project used poverty criteria for both geographical and HH level targeting. The project has successfully selected targeted the poor by: i) selecting char areas of 20 Upazilas that were among the poorest 25% of all Upazilas in Bangladesh; ii) constructing of markets by LCS members; iii) mobilizing the landless, marginal and small farmers for support via micro-credit, IGAs and agricultural technology; iv) selecting the marginal and small farmers as the main project beneficiaries to receive training as well as access to other market supports; v) providing market infrastructure for temporary traders who are poorer than permanent shop owners. The selection process for forming LCS has effectively targeted the poorest with members including 30% women-headed HHs, 45% landless HHs and 46% living on day labour. The project NGOs has effectively recruited the target groups with almost all members (95%) from the landless, marginal and small farmer category.

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Gender The project strongly benefitted women's livelihoods. Its design had a gender focus built into its two major components: i) infrastructure development; and ii) production and market group development. All market construction work and construction of HHB roads have been allocated to LCS; these LCS all had women leaders and 90% of their members were women. Women LCS members reported that the construction work has empowered them in a number of ways, such as: i) they have invested their profits in IGAs or assets, which has enabled them to receive additional income and strengthen their livelihoods; ii) the work and earning of income has strengthened their position in the community/family; iii) increased their self-esteem, trust, abilities and motivation to take their decision; iv) the training on social issues have improved their well-being. Economic empowerment of women has also been achieved by creating special women's corners in the newly constructed markets. The project promoted opportunities for women traders, as 25% areas were reserved for women traders where physical development of market infrastructure and shops for women have been constructed. Production and market group development was the second component with a substantial gender focus. The selected NGOs have formed groups with only women members. These women have been provided with training on social issues, IGAs and agriculture. Wage and profit earned by them and later on through the investment in productive activities such as land leasing, cow rearing and small business, provided them opportunity for taking new livelihood options.

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Overall Performance 5

Estimated number of beneficiaries


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PCR Quality

Scope The main body of the PCR is fully in line with the 2006 Guidelines for PCR Preparation. 5

Quality Overall, the PCR makes a fairly good analysis of project's achievements and shortcomings. However, it seems that the PCR could have benefitted more from the assumed great availability of data, also considering the number of impact surveys being conducted by the Project.

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Lessons The lessons learned are focused on some interesting issues emerged during project's implementation. 5

Candour The PCR is objective and in line with the other project's information sources. 5


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China - South Gansu Poverty-Reduction Programme


Country & Project Name China - South Gansu Poverty-Reduction Programme

Loan No.: 673-CN

Project Id. 1271

Board Date 08 September 2005

Entry into Force 22 August 2006

Original Closing Date 30 September 2012

Final Closing Date 30 September 2012

Total Project Cost US$(M) 80 590

IFAD loan & Grant US$ (M) 29 254

Cofinanciers (if any) WFP (US$): 4 800; Government (US$): 31 849; Beneficiaries (US$): 14 687

Implementing Agency Ministry of Finance

Principal Components In order that the target population acquire productivity-enhancing assets and simultaneously fulfil the goals of a more equitable society, programme components have been designed to: (i) directly invest in rural productive infrastructure (such as irrigation, terracing, rangelands and ecological tree planting) to create the basis for economic production; and in socio-economic infrastructure (such as drinking water, health and education facilities) to improve productive capacity and living conditions; (ii) facilitate access to financial services and especially credit, allowing farmers to acquire the necessary capital inputs for productive activities; (iii) ensure that the intellectual capabilities of all children are enhanced through access to primary education; and (iv) reinforce human-development, grass-roots organizations to better assist farmers, and especially women, in influencing institutions, entering the market economy and using credit more effectively.

Project Performance

Relevance The Program was highly relevant to the needs of the rural poor. Results from stakeholder workshops indicated that 92% of the beneficiaries considered the Program activities being in conformity with their needs, and over 90% of them were highly satisfied and satisfied with the program activities in improving their livelihoods and enhancing household assets. The Program was highly relevant to the Government’s poverty reduction strategies and rural development policies, aiming at reducing poverty and enhancing rural communities through improved infrastructure, increased productivity and improved social services. The program-supported capacity building for farmers was aligned with the Government’s policies on enhancing farmers’ capacity and training “modern farmers”. Support to rural financial services through Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) credit lending was also in line with the orientation of the national rural financial reform. The program allowed flexibility in its planning and implementation, as necessary adjustments were made at MTR to well respond to the changed environment and beneficiaries’ needs. Those adjustments actually confirmed the program’s high relevance to the demands of beneficiaries and also the government’s strategy on poverty reduction and rural development in the program area. The adjustment resulted in reallocation of the program resources, including the disbursement of the IFAD loan categories. The program implementation arrangements were appropriate and effective. Among all these notable aspects of Program's relevance, the only less positive aspect highlighted by the PCR is that Program's activities covered too many sectors, which somehow increased the difficulties for coordination between sectors during implementation and somehow weakened its support strength.

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Effectiveness Nearly all the MTR targets at output level were 100% and over 100% achieved, with exceptions to a few activities which were subjected to as-required post-MTR adjustments. When considering the achievement of Programme's objective (to reduce poverty in a sustainable and gender equitable way in the vulnerable programme area), there is evidence that some of the targets set at Appraisal were overachieved: i) there was a 72% of reduction of poverty population against a foreseen 50%; ii) 59.2% of total direct beneficiaries were women against a 50%; iii) 44.5% of borrowers for program credit were women against a 30%. When assessing Program's effectiveness by analysing the impact and outcomes indicators as set in the Appraisal, as well as by using the results from households surveys (including the RIMS surveys carried out at baseline and completion), it emerges that actual outcomes for all program components were over 100% achieved against the indicators set in the Logframe. This over-achievement was detected in relation to all the outcomes: i) land improvement; ii) rangeland and livestock; iii) forestry; iv) rural financial services; v) health; vi) education; vii) income generation; viii) domestic water.

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Efficiency The total cost for the program estimated at appraisal at US$68.46 million (CNY 568.23 million), was revised to US$70.58 million (CNY 481.38 million) at MTR due to the fluctuated exchange rates between currencies. Government financing was estimated at US$34.36 million (CNY 234.34 million) or 48.7% of the total, IFAD loan US$31.52 million (CNY 214.95 million) or 44.6% of the total, beneficiaries US$4.7 million (CNY 32.09 million) or 6.7% of the total. The overall financial achievement of the program stood at 106% against the MTR target. Actual investment of the IFAD loan funds in US$ was 99.2% achieved against the MTR target, Government’s counterpart financing 113.3% and

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beneficiaries’ contribution was 98.1%. The 0.8% lag of financial achievement for IFAD loan in US$ might be caused by the fluctuated exchange rate between SDR and US$ since the amount of loan in SDR has been 100% invested. The unbalanced financial achievements between financiers could be attributed to the needed post-MTR adjustments on the implementation of program activities involving in the share of funding by financiers. A cash flow analysis was conducted for several program activities at completion over a 20 years period using a discount rate of e=12% to calculate net present value (NPV) 236.8 million CNY, economic internal return rate (EIRR) 20.6% and repayment periods 6.9 years. Results showed that outputs from physical works and key production activities under program is slightly higher than the EIRR value of 18.4% as estimated at appraisal. The program investment enjoyed high internal return rate (IRR) with operable financial analysis and minimized risk.


Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD performed well during the program implementation, particularly in its strong support to the development of AWPBs, procurement, M&E and knowledge sharing. The regular supervision, follow-up and as-required technical support helped smoothing the program implementation. Its participatory planning approach has improved the capacity of grassroots institutions and beneficiaries in self-development. Stakeholder workshops revealed that 93% of representatives from relevant agencies were satisfied with the performance of IFAD. Nevertheless, the stakeholders expressed that IFAD’s requirements for disbursement of Withdrawal Applications (WAs) seemed too complicated and in some cases it took too long, which could be improved by shifting its role from “controlling” to “facilitation” in terms of financial management, entrusting some of the expenditure review with the Government. The requirements on procurement could also be simplified. The sudden change on the requirement of program planning, M&E and reporting during the program implementation was also a problem for the Program Management Offices operation, especially when the changes were not accompanied with necessary training for the PMOs. These issues influenced the efficiency of program implementation in certain periods.

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Cooperating Institution UNOPS was responsible for supervising the program in the first year of implementation, from 2006 to 2007 with good intention to facilitate the program implementation and management, although it could not provide as-required support to the program after supervision.

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Government The capacity and adequacy of program coordination and management at a given level has been the most important contributor to the program’s success. As the lead agency of the Program, the MFO performed well in providing timely and effective policy guidance on the use and management of program resource and in communicating with IFAD in order to smooth the Program implementation and management. Responsibilities for each of the other involved agencies were well defined and performed adequately. Involvement of VIGs in the program implementation was successful and important for both effectiveness and empowerment. Particularly, inclusion of village committee members in the VIGs facilitated the program exit strategy and sustainability while strengthening their capacity in continuing village development through participatory planning. The capability of the provincial PMO was highly appreciated in terms of planning, guidance, management and coordination during the program implementation. Its timeliness and adequacy in guiding the lower levels, addressing and solving problems encountered and coordinating relevant agencies and effective management are considered as the key factor for the success in achieving the program objectives both at outcome and output levels. The PLGs established at province, prefecture and county levels were responsible for coordination of the program at respective level. They performed adequately in terms of coordination, approval of work plans and provide policy directives to the program implementation. Their as-required meetings contributed greatly to the achievement of program objectives. The DOFs/BOFs undertook the responsibilities for financial management, including the operation and maintenance of the Special Accounts, reimbursement of program expenditures incurred, and disbursing and transferring the loan funds. Their performances were appropriate and efficient and contributed greatly to the achievement of program objectives. Also, the continuity and commitment of the project director was crucial in ensuring the success of the project.

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NGO/Other The IAs for the program included the Bureaux of Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, Water Resources, Health, and Education as well as WFs and RCCs. They all did well in carrying out their respective tasks in the program implementation.

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Cofinancier(s) As per the Project's initial design, WFP was supposed to provide support by financing 4 of the 10 program counties by providing 25,953 tons of wheat, valued at US$4.80 million, as incentives to support mainly the improvement of infrastructure and social development. WFP started its activities in 2003 and ended in 2005 with an actual aid of 20,236 tons of wheat valued at US$3.74 million. Due to the delayed commencement of IFAD-supported activities, the Appraisal Report was revised by detaching the WFP-supported activities in October 2005. In spite of this, WFP contributed greatly to the selection of program counties and townships through VAM and participatory rural assessment, and its targeting approach helped the program well target the poor and women (also the government

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co-financing was significant and played a large role in the project).


The Program benefitted from good performance of all actors involved in its implementation. Moreover, good communications amongst stakeholders and between levels and exchange of experiences and information also played an invaluable role for the Program's smooth implementation.



In terms of physical assets, the Program positively contributed to the qualitative and quantitative improvement of household assets as a result of increased production and cash income. Results from the completion household survey carried out in 2012 indicate that about 63% of the 900 sampled households have improved their household asset ownership index against the program objective of 55%. The improvement mainly concerned houses, livestock pens, purchase of motorbikes, mobile phone, washing machine and refrigerator etc. Many of those assets were regarded luxury at the program start-up but they became popular for the rural households. In addition, the beneficiaries obtained from the program 5,961 ha of terraced farmland, 4,240 ha of irrigated farmland and 1,476 ha of rehabilitated rangeland. The program impact on the financial assets of beneficiaries was assessed by analysing their self-financing capacity and access to financial services. The improved beneficiaries’ self-financing capacity was reflected in the absolute and relative changes of the average annual per capita net income throughout the program implementation period. Government statistics indicate that farmers’ average annual per capita net income for the program area increased from CNY 1,224 in 2005 to CNY 3,017 in 2012, while the non-program area increased from CNY 1,603 to CNY 3,359 and the overall average of program counties increased from CNY 1,445 to CNY 3,201 in the same period. The program area showed a much higher growth rate than the non-program area, 146% vs 110% and also the overall county average, 146% vs. 122%, although they were located in a more vulnerable environment. This has actually indicated the program’s contribution to the increased income of beneficiaries though the increase was also a result of multiple factors. This positive impact was also achieved through the other program activities such as demonstrations, credit lending, technical services, and irrigation infrastructure in developing market-oriented production of remunerative products. With a total delivery of 19,511 program loans, which all went to eligible households for the Program, credit lending operated by both RCCs and WFs contributed well to improving the access of rural men and women to financial services in the program area. A large number of beneficiaries have increased their cash income by running income generating activities with the program loans, which in turn enhance their self-financing capacity. The improved effectiveness of technical services was a further important factor contributing to the increased production and income of program beneficiaries.

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Food Security The Program impact on food security of the beneficiaries was assessed by analysing the per capita food production and the length of hungry seasons suffered by the population. Government’s data indicate that the average per capita grain production for the program area (only those poorer townships in the Program counties were selected to participate in the Program) increased from 293 kg in 2005 to 465 kg in 2012, showing a higher growth rate than the overall average of program counties, 59% vs. 42% and also much higher than the non-program area, 59% vs. 27%, although the increase was not only attributable to the program but a joint effect of multi-factors. Results from the completion RIMS survey confirmed the greatly improved food security of program beneficiaries. In 2006, about 26% of 900 sampled households experienced one hungry season with average length of about 4 months and five households experienced second hungry season with average length of 2.4 months; in 2009, 10% of the sampled households experienced hungry season with average length of 2.9 months, only one household had second hungry season; by 2012, none of the sampled households experienced hungry season. The program contributed to the improved food security mainly through the extension of new technologies, land improvement and technical services, in addition to income increase from diversified production activities.

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Ag. Productivity Land-based activities of the program aimed at increasing productivity through upgraded agricultural production conditions. The provision of technical training to beneficiaries, adoption of crop varieties and animal breeds with better performance by program farmers and the popularization of more effective farming practices also contributed to the increase of agriculture productivity. The RIMS survey indicated that 92% of the sampled households reported an increased crop production, 58% increased fruit production and 35-41% increased cattle and sheep production since the program start-up. For example, the yield of corn, one of the major crops in the program area, has increased by over 35% on average, reaching about 12,000 kg per ha and the yield for potato increased by about 20-30% on dry land. Similarly, land terracing can increase crop yield by about 30% as revealed by local agricultural technical agency. As a result of increased crop production, the availability of feedstuff for sheep and cattle increased, together with improved feedstuff processing techniques and feeding management schemes, the turnover rate of livestock production increased in the program area.

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The Program designed specific activities for the restoration of environment besides addressing the root causes of rural poverty, by adopting an integrated approach towards rural poverty reduction and ecological environment improvement. The impact resulting from these interventions has been notable. Forestry activities, communal pasture rehabilitation and fodder crop production have increased vegetation cover and reduced soil erosion. Program counties have completed ecological and fuel wood forest development of about 3,000 hectares and planted about 2,000 hectare of trees along roadsides and irrigation canals, on the edge of farmland and around houses. The result of ecological forest in arresting land degradation is therefore evident. The program has also restored 1,476 ha of natural pasture through reseeding, rodent control and fencing. Fodder production on 8,084 ha together with crop residues, have provided substantial amount of feedstuff for livestock production in most of the program counties, allowing natural pasture. A total area of 5,961 ha farmland has been improved with the support of the program. Land terracing has reduced soil erosion and runoff of the watershed. Technical training, awareness building and adoption of environment sound farming techniques have not only yielded economic returns to the beneficiaries, but also reduced non-point source pollution through reducing the application of chemicals. Results of impact assessment carried out by the PCR mission indicated that nearly all beneficiaries have reduced the application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and alternatively increased the use of farm manure on crop production as a result of expansion of livestock production and the adoption of biogas technologies at farmer household level. Increased water use efficiency by reducing canal leakage and on-farm waste through the rehabilitation of irrigation facilities including lining of irrigation canal and the construction of on-farm pipeline water transportation together with water-saving irrigation techniques adopted in farm production has made it possible in the program area to expand the acreage of irrigated farmland. Water harvesting cisterns increased the availability of water resources for irrigation and the otherwise abandoned farmland has regained productivity. Although farmland terracing did not significantly increase arable land resource, it improved the quality of farmland and hence the productivity of land and labour in the Loess Plateau.

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By adopting an integrated development approach, Program's positive impact on human assets was reflected in the improved primary education, children’s nutrition, maternal health and capacity of beneficiaries. Results from the RIMS surveys indicated that: (i) the literacy rates for men and women between 15 and 24 years old increased from 85% and 69% in 2006 to 97% and 94% in 2012, respectively as a result of improved education in the program area; and (ii) the child chronic malnutrition prevalence dropped from 36% in 2006 to 12% in 2012 for boys and from 37% in 2006 to 13% in 2012 for girls, attributing to the improved livelihoods resulting from increased food production and cash income. The mortality for both pregnant/delivery women and new-borns also reduced greatly in the same period, from 0.63% to 0.18% and from 23.4% to 8.0%, respectively as a result of improved health care services. The capacity of program beneficiaries, particularly women was also enhanced by participating in the program activities. Close to 310,000 farmers received trainings on updated technologies and health care knowledge from the program and 63.3% of them were women. The program impact on social capital was reflected in the poor households’ and women’s higher active participation in the program activities as well as in household and community affairs and decision making. More importantly, the program has impacted people’s concept in the program area, such as the adoption of poverty and gender focus approaches in the implementation of government-funded projects, some RCCs were also gradually increasing the share of their lending portfolio to the poor and women with their own resources. These would have a long-term effect on the social capital. Another evidence of impact on social capital is on the increased number and effectiveness of farmer cooperatives, as a result of the Program support and the promotion of government. More and more poor farmers obtained their membership and received good services in terms of technology and marketing.

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Inst. & Policies The Program impact on institutions and services was mainly reflected in the improved conditions and capacity of institutions and the quality and effectiveness of service delivery. At management level, many government officers and staff, including those in the PMOs and IAs gained good experiences and knowledge by participating in the program implementation and management, particularly in using the Program-led participatory, poverty and gender focus approaches. Program's impact concerned several grassroots level institutions and services related to: i) agro-technical extension stations and veterinary service stations; ii) health care services. The program has also had a profound impact on some of the RCCs who are operating the program credit lending. They have to a great extent changed their previous perception of credit lending to the poor and women. As a result, the RCCs are gradually increasing the share of their lending portfolio to the poor and women with their own resources, whereas some RCCs are still cautious with lending to the poor and very poor rural households. The program’s positive impact on the village committees, which were core of VIGs for the program, was also evident. Through participating in the program, most of the village committees have greatly improved their capacity in terms of internal management and planning the villages’ development through participatory approach.

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Markets Program's direct impact on the market has mainly concerned its intervention through the relevant farmer cooperatives, by entrusting the farmers' cooperatives with implementation of some technical service activities, provision of quality inputs to farmers for market-oriented production and enhancing product quality. Although farmers’ access to remunerative markets remains to be a long-term challenge in the program area, inclusion of the farmer cooperatives improved the access of rural men and women to markets. This innovation not only improved the effectiveness of technical services but also bridged the production and remunerative markets. It proved to be successful, having the potential of shifting from the scattered subsistence farming to commercial production of higher-value remunerative products in the program area. This has become particularly important in boosting farmers’ income, after food security has been greatly improved.

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Project Impact 6

Overarching Factors

Innovation The Programme was innovative in many ways. It was innovative in changing the concept of the involved institutions from a top-down approach to a participatory approach. It adopted an innovative approach for extension of new technologies, by supporting a large number of demonstrations on crops and livestock for up-scaling of new/improved technologies, whose results have been proven successful. The Program also contributed to the development of ecologically-sound farm model, by piloting an ecologically-sound "crops-biogas-livestock" farm model in the program area in order to improve the vulnerable environment while increasing crop and livestock production. Another innovation concerned the Program's approach to mainstream women's role in the value chain from production to marketing both on-farm and off-farm by organizing sales promotion fair for sharing experiences and marketing of women-produced products. With regard to market access, the Programme was innovative in cooperating with relevant farmer cooperatives by entrusting them with the implementation of some technical service activities. The cooperatives provided specific technical services and sometimes quality inputs to farmers for market-oriented production and enhancing product quality. Another innovation concerned the development of resource-based technologies. In an effort to address the problem of pig-rearing resulted environment pollution, the program cooperated with local research institutes to introduce and adapt new technologies for livestock based on the large volume of crop residuals produced annually in the program area. The Program also implemented an innovative health-service approach, through the involvement of the IAs to go around villages to provide their services instead of mobilising their target groups to visit the hospitals. Finally, the targeting approach adopted by the Programme has also been innovative as described below in the pertinent section.

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Replicability and Scaling-up Many of the innovations promoted by the Programme have been upscaled. The provincial Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DOAL) organised a video meeting in 2011 for all the BOAs and BOLs of 87 counties within the province to introduce the successful experiences of the program. The provincial PMO is also scaling up the program experiences for poverty reduction in non-program area, including the participatory planning, targeting approach, technical extension through crop and livestock demonstrations, and capacity building for beneficiaries. Among the most successful program's initiatives, the "crops-biogas-livestock" farm model has been upscaled by about 62,000 households in the program area. The “double ridges plastic film fully-mulching” farming technique has been successfully up-scaled in remote villages and thus has greatly promoted the technique’s extension in the program area and all over the province. Stakeholders expressed that the extension approach greatly shortened the time for a new technology outreaching to the remote areas from about 6 years to 1-2 years. The technology used to address the pig-rearing resulted environment pollution, since its piloting in 2009 and extension in late 2010, has also been up-scaled by 480 pig farms and more than 1000 scattered pig-rearing households. The innovative health service approach has been up-scaled in non-program areas. Finally, the use of participatory approach has become prevailing, not only in the program area, but also in non-program areas, for the implementation of government funded-projects.

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The Program shows good chances in terms of political sustainability, social sustainability, institutional sustainability, economic and financial sustainability, environmental sustainability. Planning for a long-term sustainability of the program started from the design stage by including the county and township technical agencies as designated IAs and closely linking the composition of VIGs to the village committees. In order to ensure the sustainability and clarify the responsibilities for post-program management, the provincial PMO, jointly with the provincial DOF has issued a “SGPRP Post-Program Management Guideline” in the process of program completion. It was worked out through participatory approach by fully up-taking the proposals of grassroots level and discussing with all stakeholders of all levels. The Guideline defined that PMOs for the program would be maintained for a period of 10 years after program completion. All the county PMOs have also developed their own “Post-Program Management Measures” based on the Guideline to detail the requirements and

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responsibilities of post-program management, including the maintenance of vehicles and equipment, hand-over of physical works as well as their maintenance and operation (O&M), continuity of technical and social services, continuity of credit lending, and filing and management of program documents, etc. The actions taken by the PMOs for exit and sustainability of the program at completion are appreciable.

Targeting Targeting of the Program started at design stage. The rural population in the program area was classified into four categories based on annual per capita grain production and net income in 2005. The program appraisal estimated that 85-95% of rural households were eligible to participate in the program. Woman direct beneficiaries were expected to be no less than 50% of the total. In order to reach the eligible target groups, the program adopted targeting innovative approaches during its implementation, which included: (i) selection of eligible villages for the program through VAM; (ii) household categorization to identify the eligible target population and households; (iii) inclusion of Village Implementing Groups (VIGs) in the program implementation to sharpen the program targeting to the poor and women; (iv) tailored program activities to the capability of rural poor and women and designed women-specific activities. As a result, both poverty and gender focuses of the program have been deemed to be highly satisfactory. Over 90% of the direct beneficiary households were categorized as poor and very poor, constituting the main target groups.

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Gender The program Implementation was highly gender sensitive and women were given priorities in the implementation of all activities. Highlighting women’s participation and benefits has been an important contributor to the achievement of program’s social objectives. Improvement of women’s status and providing them with a stable income source brought benefits for the entire household. Several steps taken by the Program led to this outcome: (i) gender sensitive training for all stakeholders at each level during implementation; (ii) activities were tailored to the capability of women and included women-specific activities; (iii) working with Women Federations (WFs) which were recognised agency specialising in support to women; (iv) design activities to address the health and education concerns of women; and (v) assist women to take credit for IGAs incorporated with skill training. The total number of direct beneficiaries for the program recorded at 373,016 persons, of whom 220,770 or 59.2% were women. Results from the program RIMS surveys indicated that the proportion of women-led households increased from about 3% in 2006 to 13% in 2012. This reflected an improved social position of women in households of the program area. The inclusion of women households into the VIGs also to certain extent ensured women’s interests to be included in the program.

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Implementation of the program covered 840 administrative villages in 104 townships of 10 counties in three prefectures. At completion, a total of 207,657 households have directly benefitted from participation in the program activities, accounting for about 77% of the total number of households in the program area.

PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is fully in line with the 2006 Guidelines for PCR Preparation. All the requested annexes have been provided.

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Quality The quality of the PCR is commendable. The Program's analysis was focused, clearly presented and supported by a notable amount of information, both quantitative and qualitative. This also relied on an M&E system which functioned well and generated reliable information, as M&E data were recorded by household category and by gender. A well-articulated process, based on several stakeholder workshops, to discuss the Programme's achievements at both county and village levels, has also contributed to get to a final overall good quality of the PCR

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Lessons The lessons learned reflect an in-depth analysis of the Program's main strengths and weaknesses. They have been clearly pointed out and are an important source of learning for other similar types of projects.

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Candour The PCR is fully in line with the other Programmes' information sources. 5


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China - Sichuan Post-Earthquake Agriculture Rehabilitation Project

Item Assessment Remarks

Country & Project Name China - Sichuan Post-Earthquake Agriculture Rehabilitation Project Rating

Loan No.: 778-CN

Project Id. 1478

Board Date 30 April 2009

Entry into Force 30 September 2009




IFAD loan& Grant US$(M) Loan (USD): 28 970; Grant (USD): 1 500

Cofinanciers (if any) Government (USD): 46 552


Implementing Agency Government of the Sichuan Province

Principal Components The project has two components: sustainable rural livelihoods and project management.

Project Performance

Relevance As a part of the massive earthquake rehabilitation plan of Government of China (GOC), the project was highly relevant to the government policies and initiatives and well aligned with the context of post-disaster rehabilitation of rural livelihoods of the affected areas. While Government and other donors’ resources focused on public services and infrastructures and their coverage and sufficiency were adequate, IFAD supported the Government more at individual household level, focusing on household biogas system construction, a specific area susceptible to leveraging immediately and sustainably beneficiary households’ income generation and livelihood improvements. The project adopted a non-linear strategy towards post-disaster rehabilitation in agriculture whereby the creation and improvement of assets was closely integrated with environment-friendly rural energy and farm production. At beneficiary workshops conducted by the PCR mission, farmer beneficiary expressed high-level satisfaction towards the appropriateness and quality of delivery of project interventions in addressing their immediate and long-term needs in rehabilitating and improving daily life and farm production. Since the prime needs for shelters after the disaster were met by resources of the Government, other donors and local rural financing institutions, the entry point of IFAD into the rehabilitation efforts by addressing the specific needs of the affected rural population for asset creation and re-establishment that would help leverage immediate and long-term improvement of livelihoods, was valid and reflected the actual needs of the disaster affected population. IFAD's approach was also innovative, as the stakeholders put it at the workshops conducted by PCR mission in project counties. This was the most optimal option under the circumstances of massive destruction of rural household assets and taking into account IFAD’s priority in pursuing sustainable development. Project implementation arrangements were appropriate and effective and contributed to attaining the goal and objectives of the project.

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Effectiveness The actual delivery of the project for all its activities has reached the appraisal targets and the process over a period of three years was stable without any major hurdles or setbacks. A total number of 273,947 farmers has benefited from project implementation. Among the beneficiaries, 236,700 benefited from biogas digester system construction and reconditioning of pigpen, kitchen and toilet. Field observations and discussions with beneficiary farmers of the project indicated that the overall strategy of the project was highly effective and farmer households have garnered tangible benefits from project implementation. The project has contributed to the rehabilitation and improvement of rural farmers’ livelihoods in the project area through widespread reconstruction of biogas systems and enhancement of farmers’ access to services and new technologies. Totally 63,978 households have their biogas systems built by the project and 95% of the systems were operational; and 64,264 households have received training in safe operation of biogas systems and updated technologies for the rehabilitation and development of cropping and livestock. The biogas not only contributed to save energy costs, improve household sanitation and the ecological environment, but also provided the basis for pursuing ecologically sound agricultural production and related income generation activities at farmer household level, together with the support of training and technology transfer activities implemented through the project. Field visits confirmed that farmer households in the project area have recovered from the earthquake disaster and most of them have further improved their livelihoods compared to the baseline in 2007.

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Efficiency Project implementation started in October 2009 with an expected duration of 2 years. However, before the original completion date of the project, the physical targets had been met, leaving an unspent balance of about 3.15 million USD due to reduced unit cost of biogas digesters constructed as a result of price drop of construction materials after peak demand. After having received IFAD's "no objection", the available remaining funds were used to expand beneficiary coverage of the project in the 4 counties. Therefore, project implementation was extended for one year till September 2012. In terms of project's financing, the overall efficiency of fund flow of the project was satisfactory. The only

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exception concerned some fund flow delays in the initial months of project implementation when the time required from submission of the Withdrawal Applications (WAs) to fund replenishment to project county Bureau of Finance (BOF) was as long as half a year in some case; however, this was effectively address since 2011. The project achieved 100% of financial delivery against the appraisal. At project's appraisal, based on the main production activities, farm models and the investment and benefit of the biogas digester system, the EIRR was calculated based on IFAD loan and grant investments only, which was estimated at 12.8%. Since the project activities focused on the construction of household biogas digester systems and the renovation of pigpen, kitchen and toilet in the 4 earthquake-affected counties, the PCR mission was not required to undertake financial and economic analysis. However, with the prevailing unit cost of biogas digester construction and training of staff and beneficiary of similar projects and programs of the local and central government as a benchmark, those of the project were found to be at the same level. The use of biogas replaced conventional energy at household level and saved energy costs of the beneficiaries. The application of the by-products of the biogas system reduced the application of farm chemicals by over 20% on average, with grain crop yield increase of 15% to 20% and vegetables of 30% to 40%. In addition, environment and health gains of biogas digester system were also evident.


Partner Performance

IFAD As a co-financier of the project, IFAD provided not only loan and grant to project implementation, but also strong support to project management, particularly in terms of the development of AWPBs, procurement, M&E and knowledge sharing. The regular supervision and ad hoc support helped improve project management and its delivery. IFAD’s strategy on poverty and gender focuses also helped ensure high accuracy of targeting of the beneficiaries. Stakeholder workshops of the PCR mission revealed that 92% of the stakeholders were very satisfied with the performance of IFAD and 8% expressed moderately satisfactory. On a less positive side, stakeholders expressed that the IFAD procedure for disbursement seemed to be too complicated and in some cases it took as long as 6 months. For a post-disaster rehabilitation project like this, streamlined and speedy process of disbursement would further enhance project efficiency.

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Cooperating Institution The project has been directly supervised by IFAD. NA

Government As the Lead Agency of the project, Ministry of Finance performed well in providing timely and effective policy guidance on the use and management of project resources and in communicating with IFAD to facilitate project implementation and management. The parallel financing of the government towards to project implementation was adequate, timely and in compliance with the financing agreement. The PCR mission also acknowledged the efforts put together by the PMOs and BOFs to exercise strict financial control at all levels through adopting rigorous but efficient and effective procedures for fund disbursement to the beneficiaries and construction technicians at community level, which safeguarded the effective use of project resources. The audit reports submitted on time to IFAD during project implementation did not identify any major issue related to financial management of the project. The Project Leading Groups (PLGs) - established at prefecture and county levels - performed well their functions to coordinate the project at respective levels, approve work plans and provide policy directives to project implementation. Department of Finance at county level (DOF) and Bureau of Finance (BOF) at county level undertook the responsibilities for financial management, and were highly supportive to project implementation and helped mobilize parallel financing for project implementation. Good communication and coordination between the PMO and DOF/BOF was an important factor contributing to the success of the project. The Project Management Office (PMO) system from the provincial, prefecture to county levels was strong and its performance throughout project implementation was stable. They undertook routine coordination and management of the project including capacity building, M&E, reporting, preparation of AWPBs and inspection of project activities. Implementing agencies of the project included Bureau of Agriculture (BOA) at county level and Bureau of Livestock (BOL) at county level. Their performance during project implementation was adequate and well recognized by the beneficiaries. PCR stakeholder workshops revealed that 100% of the representatives from relevant agencies and over 95% of farmer beneficiaries were very satisfied and satisfied with the performance of the implementing agencies. The Villagers' Committees played an important role in project implementation and performed adequately in helping the project management identify and screen beneficiaries, motivate target groups’ participation in project activities, participate in M&E and supervise the construction of household biogas digester system.

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NGO/Other NA

Cofinancier(s) NA


Assessment of the PCR mission and discussions with the stakeholders revealed that the performance of project partners was adequate and contributed to the successful attainment of project goals and objectives.



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The impact of the project on the livelihoods of beneficiaries was assessed by using the results of the RIMS survey carried out at completion and available government statistics. The RIMS survey results indicated that 68.5% of the beneficiary households have improved their household asset ownership index. Project's positive impact on beneficiaries’ livelihoods can be detected both in terms of physical and financial assets. The PCR mentions that beneficiaries' physical assets have improved and/or increased, including new houses, motorcycles, refrigerators, TVs, washing machines and mobile phones. RIMS survey at project completion indicated that the index of household physical and financial assets increased by 8.5% if comparing with the baseline. In terms of financial assets, there has been an increase of farmers’ average annual per capita net income, from 4,296 CNY in 2007 to 8,929 CNY in 2012. Field visits confirmed the value of application of biogas digester by-products in the farming. Increased income would provide the conditions to farmer beneficiaries to invest in farm production or engage in other businesses and continuously improve living conditions.

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Food Security Official data indicated that the average per capita grain availability in the project area stood at 573 kg in 2012, slightly higher than the average of 568 kg/person of Mianyang Prefecture. The project contributed to improved food security mainly through the demonstration of new technologies, application of biogas by-products in farm production and improvement of technical services, which enhanced productivity and diversified agricultural activities at farmer household level. The RIMS survey results indicated no household reported hunger season; moreover, chronic child malnutrition prevalence was reduced by 72%.

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Ag. Productivity The project focused its resources and activities on biogas system construction and reconditioning of essential household assets and did not result in an increase of the already high multiple cropping indexes. However, it has made important contribution to the enhancement of agricultural productivity by empowering rural men and women with updated farming techniques and supplying high quality organic farm inputs and recycling farm wastes. The application of the by-products of biogas system could increase grain production by about 20% and vegetable production by 40%, in addition to quality gains of farm produces. Questionnaire survey carried out at project completion by the PCR mission indicated that over 95% of the beneficiaries reported increase of production of crops. Soil improvement resulted from the application of biogas fluid and sludge is also evident, which could contribute to the increase of agricultural productivity in the long run.

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The project aimed at rehabilitating essential household assets of the rural households affected by a major natural disaster, which improved the living conditions and leveraged immediate and long-term agricultural production gains and contributed to the protection of forest and improvement of rural environment. The construction of household biogas digester system helped address non-point source of pollution of agriculture by recycling animal production wastes, in which, animal wastes and some other residues of farm production were turned into excellent organic fertilizer and pesticides as well as environment-friendly renewable energy. According to studies and the calculation of the biogas specialist, biogas fluid and slurry not only could substitute part of the farm chemicals, but also increase crop production and improve the quality of farm produces, from which, the beneficiaries of the project could win better opportunities. The application of the by-products of the biogas system has reduced the application of farm chemicals by over 20% on average, with grain crop yield increase of 15% to 20% and vegetables of 30% to 40%. Biogas slurry was used as base fertilizer and the fluid of biogas digester was used as additional fertilizer and pesticides. Furthermore, the biogas system construction has improved local environment and contributed to soil erosion control. At the beneficiary workshop conducted by the PCR mission, 98.5% of the beneficiaries reported improvement of vegetation coverage of their homestead. The PCR mission also noted that project interventions did not result in expansion of arable land area or irrigated farmland, but contributed to productivity enhancement of farmland through applying organic fertilizers that significantly improved soil structure and its physical and biological properties.

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In terms of human assets, the project positively contributed to improving household sanitation conditions, through its interventions of household biogas system construction and the renovation of pigpen, kitchen and toilet that significantly improved the indoor air quality and sanitation. Studies indicated that the system could reduce flies and mosquitos by 70% and respiratory and digestive diseases by 10%. The living conditions and wellbeing of the beneficiaries have been improved significantly, as also made evident at the beneficiary workshops and through field visits. In terms of social capital and empowerment, beneficiaries’ enthusiastic and active participation in project interventions reflected the impact of the project on social capital and empowerment. In the process of project implementation, the voices of women and the poorer were heard and addressed and their role in contributing to the success of project implementation could not be overemphasized. Technical training in safe use of biogas and in farm production techniques has equipped rural men and women with updated practices and knowledge that empowered them to improve productivity and increase economic returns of production. Farmer cooperatives provided another platform to the beneficiaries to

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interact with each other and with an even stronger and wider network, which would have positive impact on their pursuit of better livelihoods.

Inst. & Policies The project generated impacts on three layers of institutions and their services: county level, grassroots level and cooperative level. At county level, the project government's implementing agencies of BOA including its Rural Energy Offices and the BOL, learnt and adopted the participatory approach and gender mainstreaming and poverty focus in delivering project interventions. These lessons learnt were valuable inputs to the improvement of their style of work and addressing rural development issues in the local context. At the grassroots level, village biogas digester service stations have been built and technicians have been technically empowered through project interventions, enabling the establishments and its personnel to timely and adequately respond to the needs of the beneficiaries. Along with increased support of the government and further improvement of the operational mechanisms, the stations and technicians will continuously enhance capacity to serve the rural audience. Farmer cooperative (as a platform where farmers learn and share experiences of farm production and a bridge that facilitates farmers to overcome the distance from farm gate to the consumer market) have been strengthened through the implementation of project activities, in terms of capacity to deliver technical services to members, certification of farm produces and establishing trademarks. The inclusion of farmer cooperatives in project implementation not only supplemented government’s extension services to project beneficiaries, but also helped farmers realize price premium resulted from quality improvement.

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Markets For the type of goal and objectives this project had aimed to, no impact can be detected on this domain. The analysis done by the PCR on this impact domain refers to some positive results mainly achieved thanks a set of interventions, including: i) the development of market economy and the advancement of technologies; ii) rapid development of information and mobile technologies; iii) the improvement of transportation network in the project area; iv) the increasing role of the farmer cooperatives). However, given the project's structure and goal, these cannot be linked to project's interventions neither directly or indirectly.

n.a

Project Impact Although the project - through its intervention - has strongly contributed to improve beneficiaries' conditions, it should be noted that the achievements of the project and its impact on beneficiary households should be understood in the context of massive government aid and rehabilitation efforts, the overall social and economic development of the project area, as well as the hard-working of the involved rural population.

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Overarching Factors

Innovation The Project was innovative in its non-linear approach towards post-disaster rehabilitation. While the project was of post-crisis aid nature and its investments were channelled to rebuilding the rural assets dramatically shattered by the earthquake, the project focused on re-establishing assets that leveraged beneficiaries’ immediate living conditions and future income generation potentials. Project implementation on the ground has proven that this was a viable approach and of good reference value to IFAD and GOC in future crisis assistance. The project's also showed technical innovations concerning the household biogas digester system construction through the adoption of moulded fiberglass dome to overcame the previously detected technical problems, these being mainly short life and gas leakage of the conventional biogas digester of brick and cement. With improved procedures of construction and strengthened supervision, including competitive selection of qualified construction technicians and the involvement of the beneficiaries, Village Committees, township government and Country Programme Management Offices (CPMOs) in the supervision of construction and quality control, the new technology not only shortened the time of construction of a digester by 3 days, but also could prolong the life of digesters to 20 years. It also increased airtightness of the digester by 26%, which means an increase of about 100m3 of biogas supply annually. The successful rate of biogas production of digesters reached 100% at the first start.

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Replicability and Scaling-up

Based on the success of the project in adopting the new technical solution and the improved construction standards, procedures and practices for the biogas digesters, the Sichuan Rural Energy Office decided to scale up the good practices of the project in household biogas digester system construction to all T-bond and other national biogas programs implemented in Sichuan Province, which was about 167,000 units in 2012 alone. It is also worth highlighting that some of the good practices of the project concerning the project-involved institutions have already been incorporated in implementing national, provincial and local governments’ programs and projects.

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Sustainability of the project has been on the agenda of the project management since day one of project implementation. With regards to the adoption of household biogas system, the demand for safe and healthy farm products is foreseen to increase, which will provide economic incentive to project beneficiaries to continue to develop environment friendly rural renewable energy and farm production practices. Good prospects have been detected also for institutional sustainability, social

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sustainability, economic and technical sustainability as well as environmental sustainability of project's interventions. Given the crucial role of household biogas system in energy conservation, emission control, environment protection and ecological agricultural production, the Government is willing to continue supporting rural biogas development and strengthen the service network at grassroots, which has been manifested by increased technical and funding support of government in the past decade. There are good reasons to believe that the government would continue its effort in advancing overall development of rural China including the project area after the project was phased out. At the final stakeholder workshop of the PCR process, the Finance system informed the workshop that the government finance would continue to increase financial inputs in the biogas service network, while the technical agencies would make extra efforts to further improve the operational mechanism the grassroots service web. The PCR mission also noted that the PMO system from the provincial to prefecture and county levels has developed an exit strategy, with clearly defined responsibilities of the stakeholders, for immediate implementation. Two main weak points were addressed by the PCR as they might negatively affect the project's sustainability. However, it has been noted that local agricultural administration and governments have taken up the issues and are already working on solutions.

Targeting Considering the context of post-disaster rehabilitation and that IFAD’s resources were part of the massive rehabilitation efforts of GOC, the project's targeting strategy and approach were highly relevant and effective. It was well aligned with the actual needs of the affected, poorer and the woman-headed farmer households and with the Reconstruction Plan of GOC. The geographical targeting approach was applied by the project to channel resources to the affected villages by following the government’s plan for rural housing reconstruction. Out of the 1,651 villages in the 4 project counties, 1,503 (91%) were identified as a result of destruction and damage assessment carried out by relevant government agencies. In the villages, farmer households were categorized by assessing the destruction and damage level imposed by the earthquake rather than the conventional wealth status. Moreover, in order to ensure fair access to project resources, the project adopted a farmer household categorization scheme to screen the eligible households and transparency of the process was ensured through consultation and information disclosure. At the beneficiary workshops undertook by the PCR mission in two project counties, beneficiaries commended the process of beneficiary screening at village level, particularly, the transparency maintained throughout project implementation. Another important factor that contributed to the success of the targeting approach was the proactive and tenacious involvement of the CPMOs, the township governments and the VCs, which carried out information dissemination and farmer household assessment in each village, helping the project strictly follow its targeting strategy and maintain a high level of gender and poverty focus. The targeting approach of the project is of good reference and value to similar post-disaster rehabilitation programs and/or projects.

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Gender The project was gender sensitive starting from its design to completion. In order to ensure that priority was given to woman-headed households, the project specifically stipulated that a focal point should be appointed in the Villagers' Committee of each project village to identify the particular needs, concerns and constraints of the woman-headed households and report them to the VC and PMOs for planning and action, which was followed through during implementation. Female beneficiaries interviewed by the PCR mission expressed satisfaction on how their specific needs were addressed during project planning and implementation. Based on RIMS data, the PMO reported that among the 63,978 beneficiary household of biogas system construction, woman-headed households accounted for 7%. Women beneficiaries were 123,800 or accounting for 52.3%; and 30,900 farmers benefitted from crop and livestock support activities with women accounting for 51.2%.

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PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is fully in line with the 2006 Project Completion Report Guidelines. 5

Quality This is a good report, which shows both GoC's and IFAD's commitment to produce a good quality paper. The PCR has benefitted from several good ingredients: i) a good M&E system; ii) appropriate IFAD's training to prepare the PCR; iii) results from the RIMS surveys. The report is clear, reads well and shows a logical flow. It is exhaustive and concise at the same time.

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Lessons The section on the key lessons learned shows a good reflection and analysis on those factors that have mostly contributed to the project's successful results.

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Candour The analysis of the project's main achievements and shortcomings is honest and in line with the other available information sources.

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India - Livelihoods Improvement Project in the Himalayas


Country &Project Name India - Livelihoods Improvement Project in the Himalayas Ratings

Loan No.: 624-IN

Project Id. 1226


Entry into Force 01 October 2004

Completion Date 31 December 2012

Final Closing Date 30 June 2013


IFAD loan& Grant US$(M) 39 920

Cofinanciers (if any) Government (Local): US$11 438; Beneficiaries: US$9 485; Dom. Fin. Inst.: US$23 443


Implementing Agency Government of India, state governments of Meghalaya and Uttaranchal and respective rural development societies

Principal Components The project will adopt a flexible, process-oriented and demand-driven approach and will also respond to the emerging opportunities for microenterprise development. Accordingly, the proposed project comprises components related to empowerment and capacity-building of communities and support organizations, livelihood enhancement and development, development of livelihood support systems, and project management. The institution building strategy adopted by the project aims to create community-owned organizations from the village level upwards, and gradually transfer project ownership and management to these institutions after suitably equipping them to perform this role.

Project Performance

Relevance The Uttarakhand Livelihood Improvement Project for the Himalayas (LIPH) and Livelihood Improvement Project in the Himalayas- Meghalaya (MLIPH) were designed as part of a two-state IFAD financed programme entitled the Livelihood improvement Project for the Himalayas (LIPH), with projects using a common approach for development of livelihoods in hill areas being implemented independently in Uttarakhand and Meghalaya. For Uttarakhand, the project was in alignment with Government of India‘s (GoI's) policies for rural development. At the time of project design, GoI was placing emphasis on SHGs as a platform for poverty alleviation and livelihood development, and also envisaged a greater role of local government. ULIPH was in line with the policy on using Self Help Groups (SHGs) as a platform for development; this was also the focus of IFAD’s COSOP at that time. Although there was a clear logic to this strategy, the approaches to project implementation showed some important flaws. Above all, it was a mistake to plan a project with two separate implementing institutions (UGVS [UttarakhandGramyaVikasSamiti] and UPASaC [UttarakhandParvatiyaAajeevikaSanvardhan Company]) delivering services to the same households. This resulted in duplication of efforts in the field, poor coordination and inability to contract local NGOs who would have been better able to deliver both the requested activities. Feedback from NGOs is that the ULIPH design was very good and highly relevant to the needs of poor people in rural Uttarakhand, but suffered due to implementation modalities and management. In Meghalaya, MLIPH was designed for a state that had a widely distributed sparse rural population. The project's design was consistent with the main issues faced by small farmers: i) agricultural production activities carried out at a subsistence level; ii) households facing the prospect of hunger for certain periods during the year; iii) severely limited financial services; iv) practice of shifting cultivation practices (Jhum); v) lack of evidence of enterprise activity and processing of agricultural produce. The components designed were very relevant for targeting the poorer sections of the population. Mobilizing them into groups in order to build social capital as also reducing cost of delivery of financial and technical services was a very apt design initiative in a sparsely populated geography with limited access to services. Introduction of new farming practices and crop varieties through a strong component of demonstration integrated with training of people filled a gap in farm-based livelihoods. Building people’s organizations to potentially deal with marketing of crops as also to facilitate supply of inputs brought badly needed institutional structures for sustaining the momentum imparted by the project. The investments made in the project for training, capacity building and creating awareness among people aimed at improving their livelihoods and quality of life through a variety of interventions in drudgery reduction, health, education, sanitation, were seen as very relevant in the context of the state and its people. On the other hand, there were two major shortcomings at design level: i) the M&E system has not been design in a manner that would appropriately serve the project; ii) the demonstrations related activities were not designed well by the project. Money was made available to the groups and individuals with general advice on inputs and marketing of outputs. This led to failure of demonstrations and abandonment in a number of cases.

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Effectiveness In Uttarakhand, after a slow start in the initial years, the project gathered momentum in its last two years. The project met most of its main physical targets for projects outputs, however, with some differences. The targets for capacity building and extension activities were exceeded, by a considerable

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margin. However, the project performance has been weak on enterprise development, as the target for the number of enterprises was unrealistic and was not achieved. Rural finance did not reach its targets for the number of borrowers and volume of lending. The equity and quasi equity investments in small-scale linkage enterprises did not materialize, as UPASaC did not disburse any of the Social Venture Capital Fund (SVCF) until the last three months of the project. In terms of outcomes, although key project activities of training and demonstrations do not seem to have been particularly effective, as being implemented more on the basis of quantity than quality, they do seem to have reached most households. Although the project met its targets in terms of mobilisation of households into CBOs and membership of savings and credit groups was 86% of that anticipated, only 39% of these members were active borrowers at the end of the project. With only 61% of SHGs being linked to banks for access to bank loans, the project was as not effective as desired in getting households to take loans for investment purposes. In Meghalaya, the project suffered as in the initial 4 years there were too many changes and too many ad-hoc project directors who were multi-tasking with other items of work with the Government. Till the MTR, the project expenditure was very low and the momentum in the project picked up only after 2010. However, within its last three years, the project experienced a frenetic pace of implementation, which at times led to loss of monitoring information and inadequate review of outcomes. Another constraint was that the M&E system and the monitoring processes had not been designed in a manner that would appropriately serve the project. The lack of a sound monitoring system and internal control did impact the project adversely and made availability of information for performance reviews difficult. Above all, project's effectiveness has been hampered by its weak performance in targeting, which went against what had been stated at appraisal, as when seen as a proportion to the number of households that were in the project area, the coverage of more affluent sections of society has been higher. The low risk taking ability of the poorest households, the enterprise instinct among the affluent families and the need to show successful models to the other households were the reasons for the coverage of better-off people. But this still does not justify the decision to go against the clear targeting strategy as outlined at appraisal.

Efficiency In total for the two states, IFAD disbursed 84% of funds committed for the project. In Uttarakhand, in terms of effectiveness lag, the time lapse between loan approval and loan effectiveness was 9.6 months, less than the IFAD average of 12.3 months, but slightly above the average for the Asia and Pacific Region (9.1 months). The pace of project implementation was held back in the initial years, with expenditures in the first four years being only 30% of appraisal allocation. Of the portion of the loan allocated to Uttarakhand, 89% was disbursed. With a total cost of INR 1,523 million (excluding bank loans), the cost per beneficiary was INR 35,533 per household/INR 7,106 per person. This compares with INR 8,025 per person for MLIPH. If around 4,000 other benefiting households are included, the cost per person falls to INR 6,481 (US$118 at current exchange rates). This is significantly higher than the average US$33 per person for all IFAD projects approved in the last five years. The base case Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) has been estimated at 18% over twenty year period. The recalculated EIRR is below the 27% forecast at appraisal, but still considered at an acceptable level, even during sensitivity analysis. In Meghalaya, the project did not start off well in the first 4 years of its implementation period and the staff costs were being incurred without significant implementation. The management and implementation structure needed to drive field interventions was not in place. Most of the physical budget had to be expended in the last 4 years of the project. The initial dormancy of about 4 years led to crowding of activities in the latter half of the project and also to loss of effectiveness. A completion, the EIRR stood at 14%, against a value of 27% calculated at Appraisal. In terms of costs and financing, of the total project outlay including rural finance and beneficiary contributions, the project is estimated to have utilized 76% at closure. The project has reported expenditure achieving about 90% of the funds allocated. The differences in the percentages of achievement are due to disallowance of expenditure in the last 10 withdrawal applications.

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Partner Performance

IFAD In Uttarakhand, IFAD took over missions in the year prior to the MTR. Project staff said that IFAD was generally supportive, took a practical approach, with disbursements made in a timely manner. IFAD also gave useful support in development of value chain approaches and in monitoring and evaluation. However, the PCR points out that some frequent changes to mission personnel (the four review missions were led by three different people) have sometimes led to inconsistent recommendations. In Meghalaya, IFAD fund releases have been found to be timely and adequate. The supervision and implementation support missions were periodic and regular. There was a feeling among the project staff that the some of the supervision missions and implementation support missions could have provided better guidance with greater clarity especially in the initial years of the project.

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Cooperating Institution In both Uttarakhand and Meghalaya, UNOPS was IFAD’s CI as the start of the project and undertook the first three annual review missions. Both UNOPS and IFAD were hampered by having to divide the

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supervision budget for the project between two states to cover both ULIPH and MLIPH. This is supposed to have contributed to the lack of any implementation support missions in the year after start-up, with the first review mission taking place in November 2005, 13 months after the project started. In Uttarakhand, feedback from project staff shows that UNOPS were supportive and flexible over issues such as NGO procurement. On a less positive side, UNOPS/IFAD review missions did not include a Financial Management/Procurement Specialist until post MTR. Thus, the opportunity of raising and resolving financial management and procurement issues earlier during the project implementation was lost. In Meghalaya, in the initial years when the CI was supervising the project, there was no systematic support to the project on procurement issues.

Government In Uttarakhand, GoI facilitated flow of funds to the project through the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA). DEA also effectively managed the interface between the project and IFAD in financial matters. The performance of the State Government was also satisfactory. Despite some delays in release of funds for the first quarter of the financial year, the project activities did not suffer as there were sufficient funds in the bank unspent from earlier years. With concern to the PMU, the PCR assessed that quality and motivation of staff were above average for IFAD projects in India. However, high turnover of staff was an issue, which stemmed from competition from other programmes of government, donors and NGOs, which were able to offer promotion and higher salaries. Some issues were also detected concerning: compliance with loan covenants, fiduciary aspects, and procurement. In Meghalaya, flow of funds through the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) was well facilitated by Government of India. There were certain problems in the release of funds in one or two years during the project life and releases effected towards the end of the financial year, but this has not affected the project, as the project was not able to utilize fully the released amount. Towards the last two years, the Government had fully released the budget requirement for the project. DEA also played an active role in following up on project performance through quarterly Tri-partite review meetings, and through the mission wrap-up meetings. With concern to the performance of project management, in the initial period of the project, the attention to securing competent management of the project was lacking. The non-availability of an exclusive project director in the initial period delayed the implementation and crowding of activities in the later stages. The setup of LIFCOM (Livelihood Improvement Finance Company) was delayed and in the absence of clear ideas on its role and functions did not become fully operational for the project purposes till the end. The project experiences some difficulties in terms of fiduciary aspects: financial management, procurement, audit. Generally, the project complied with Procurement Guidelines, but the project faced some difficulties in engaging consultancies services. Some issues were also reported concerning audit, as despite many repeated recommendations from the Supervision Missions, the project could not engage an internal auditor which would have helped the project to take timely action on many of the financial management issues.

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NGO/Other In Uttarakhand, a total of 29 NGOs were contracted to support SHGs. They generally performed well, although some suffered from a high staff turnover due to low remuneration. A number of other NGOs and consulting agencies have carried out studies and provided training, which were generally satisfactory. Banks provided loans for SHGs and individual enterprises, which have been essential in developing enterprises. In particular bank loans were effective in funding micro-dairy units in the later years of the project, removing the need for ULIPH to directly support the purchase of cows. On the other hand, access to bank faced some challenges: only 61% of SHGs got access to banks and the quantum of bank lending was much lower than was anticipated at appraisal. In Meghalaya, Resource Non-Government Organisations (RNGOs) and Facilitating Non-Government Organisations (FNGOs), played a useful role in the initial years of the project and were instrumental in ensuring social capital mobilisation and quality of SHGs.

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Cofinancier(s) In Uttarakhand, GIZ’s Regional Economic Development (RED) project gave substantial assistance to the project, mainly by supporting value chain development. RED staff participated in two supervision missions, and studies commissioned by RED in areas such as eco-tourism and off-season vegetable value chains assisted ULIPH in implementing its activities in these areas. INBAR (an international agricultural research centre) provided very useful assistance in getting UPASaC operational.

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No major issues were detected in partners' relationship.



In Uttarakhand: on physical assets, the project has improved the productivity of land, in particular with micro-irrigation systems. Farmers also reported that the productivity of land has been improved by the use of vermicomposting. On Financial assets: SHGs' members have accumulated INR 90.3 million in savings, an average of INR 2,450 per member, and 2,175 out of 3,560 SHGs are linked to banks to access additional resources for lending to their members. SHG members also report much better access to insurance and remittance services than other households. The 2012 Supervision Mission report mentioned that, according to the 2011 Annual Outcome Survey, 33% of project households had their incomes increased in the last year, while 3% saying it had decreased. In Meghalaya, the RIMS reported an increased ownership of households' physical assets. In terms of

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financial services, savings of project households through their SHGs have improved. An average of INR 1,850 had been saved by each SHG member, while more than 21,000 borrowers could avail loans through the linkages established by the project. The households that participated in the project reported income increases. The average income of participating households was about INR 56300 while the control (non-participating) households reported an average annual income of INR 29000.

Food Security In Uttarakhand, both the final RIMS survey and the 2011 AOS show only 1-2% of project and non-project households reporting food shortages, compared to 18% in the mid-term RIMS survey. The 2011 Annual Outcome Survey (AOS) reported that 24% of project participants claimed they have improved food security in the last year, compared with only 7% of control group households. This suggests that the project may have helped households feel more secure in their access to food and/or have improved the quality of food consumed, in particular through its activities in dairy, poultry and vegetable production. Data in the final impact survey showed that food consumption has increased for about two-thirds of project households compared with under half of the control group. This cannot be attributed only to the project, as much of it is likely to have come from improvements to the Public Distribution System over the last eight years as well as underlying improvements in living standards. In Meghalaya, the situation has improved with increased production and productivity. The number of families reporting food insecurity has declined significantly over the project period. However, with respect to the RIMS anchor indicator on malnutrition, the results were ambiguous. On the one hand, there was a reduction in chronic malnutrition of 28%, but on the other hand there was a reported increase in acute malnutrition by 7%. This is difficult to explain. Without data for a control group, these changes cannot be attributed to the project, and could well be following a general pattern of improvement.

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Ag. Productivity In Uttarakhand, the improvements in farming methods introduced by the project (through the adoption of new crop varieties and improved seeds, the introduction of organic fertilizers and pesticides) have increased crop yields. The AOS for 2011 shows 60% of project group members reporting increased crop yields compared to only 25% for the control group. In addition, 57% of project group members reported an increase in crop area, compared with only 17% of the control group. Data from 649 active micro-dairy units shows an average daily milk yield per cow of 3.5 litres, much more than the 1 or 2 litres that are typical for local animals. In Meghalaya, the impact on production activities was quite positive. The shifting cultivation practices had declined by 50%, as the overall Jhum acreage declined from 31% of total land used in the base line to 15.6% during the end line. The acreage under selected horticulture and agriculture crops had recorded an increase and also productivity increases had been reported by 44% of households. Crop diversification was recorded in 39% of the households which reported cultivating high-value crops. On the less positive side, demonstrations had resulted in replication of some of the successful activities though the extent of replication could have been far higher.

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In Uttarakhand, natural resource management in ULIPH focused on rainwater collection for micro-irrigation systems, and 410 ha of replanting of Van Panchayat (community) forests (out of the total area of the 62 ULIPH VPs of 2192 ha). Drudgery reduction activities also had positive, if limited, environmental impacts, although the shift to gas for cooking was due to a government subsidy programme rather than any project initiatives. The recent introduction of the solar lantern is meant to reduce kerosene use, and production of Napier grass has reduced pressure on forests. The promotion of organic farming methods should also help maintain soil fertility. In Meghalaya, the most significant beneficial impact on the environment has been through discouraging jhum farming practices. There were also promoted environmentally sound and alternative appropriate technologies such as micro-irrigation, gravity irrigation flows, grey water treatment, roof water harvesting and hydraulic rams that have led to recharge ground water, sustainable utilization of rain water and higher water retention ability of the soil, as well as lower soil erosion. Further interventions contributed to support the community conserved areas like sacred grooves, village/community forest reserves, fish sanctuaries, creation of village biodiversity register, promotion of cultivation and processing of Medicinal and Aromatic plants, creation of nurseries. Land Bank Program was another initiative where patches of biodiversity rich areas were conserved by the community and endorsed by the traditional heads.

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In Uttarakhand, there has been a general improvement in literacy rates, especially for women, although this is likely to be part of a state-wide pattern. The impact survey shows that more villages now have Anganwadi workers (women and child care), junior high schools and primary health clinics, with the increase being a little more in ULIPH than control villages. RIMS surveys show there was a significant reduction in child chronic malnutrition (i.e. stunting) from 43% to 16% (although the apparent slight increase in acute malnutrition from 10% to 16% is difficult to explain). However, these changes cannot be attributed to the project, as there are no data for a control group. Through the provision of the extensive training, there have also been built useful skills and knowledge. In particular villagers are now

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able to provide a range of services for themselves (as CRPs and group leaders), while others have the expertise to operate new types of enterprise or use new technologies. In terms of social capital and empowerment, project's impact has been notable. The formation and capacity building of women’s SHGs has enabled most women to take collective action on a number of issues at the village level. In Meghalaya, with concern to human capital, training, capacity building and handholding have led to improved confidence, positive outlook towards risk taking and receptivity to new ideas. On social capital, thanks to the project's intervention, a large number of households in the project area were formed into SHGs. Furthermore, SHGs were brought together into Cluster Level Federations and group based social and economic activities were initiated. Households were found willing to bear the cost of higher level structures.

Inst. & Policies In Uttarakhand, with regard to policy impact, the project has had some impact at a local policy level, by having the local government authorities more inclined to women's needs. Another policy impact has also been identified based on the success of Federations in the collective marketing of Medicinal and Aromatic Plants (MAP). The project has had a significant impact in terms of increasing the access of rural people to a range of services and institutions. In Meghalaya, the MLIPH has had a policy impact in the design of a programme sequel. On the less positive side, LIFCOM has not been operational to the full extent of its potential. Finally, some CLFs have begun to prepare business plans and show good potential.

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Markets In Uttarakhand, ULIPH improved market access for producers, enabling new products to be brought to market and, in some cases, significantly improving producer returns. Collective marketing through Federations (and to some extent though SHG and producer cooperatives), has enabled producers to aggregate their production, by-pass local traders, and sell directly to wholesale markets both within and outside the state. For some products, such as MAP and organic produce, contract marketing arrangements are providing producers with much better prices (six times more than before for medicinal plants), but even simple aggregation and transport of fresh peas to wholesale markets in the south of the state can double producer prices while generating a useful income for the federation. In Meghalaya, access to markets has been gradually improving with small scale aggregation taking place at SHG and CLF levels. Marketable surpluses have also been increasing, placing a demand for access to markets. Contract farming arrangements are emerging proving alternate access to markets. However, the overall impact cannot be assessed as satisfactory, as market access needs radical improvements.

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Project Impact In assessing the project's impact, though there were many positive signs of impact, the fact that they were mostly benefiting better-off households has to be taken into account.

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Overarching Factors

Innovation In Uttarakhand, innovations include: (a) Nettle fibre: along with GIZ and SRTT, UPLIH supported the programme of the Bamboo and Fibre Development Board to develop nettle as a source of fibre for weaving and value addition; (b) Federations meeting the holistic needs of communities: one federation has established a leaning centre which has been established and run by the Federation as a business; (c) Mobile phone based information system; this innovation, along with Federations as service providers, was accepted as an IFAD Learning Pathway; (d) An organic animal repellent developed by a private company has been tried by a Federation as a method of reducing damage by crops. In Meghalaya, the Cluster Level Federations are a useful institutional innovation as they may ensure continued support to SHGs and can aggregate the power of many groups for linkages to inputs and marketing. Land banks and funding of VECs for common infrastructure have also been found to be innovative and have scope for future replication. Many non-traditional IGAs and production practices have been introduced (such as maintaining guest houses, boat service, SRI technology in paddy) with positive results. Polyhouse cultivation of flowers under contract farming in a PPP mode is a further innovation introduced by the project. The increasing acreage under paddy cultivation using the SRI technique is worth highlighting as an innovation that is being upscaled.

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In Uttarakhand, replication of demonstrations has been less than expected. With a few exceptions (Napier grass, water pitchers, and solar lanterns), the number of replications has been less than the number of demonstrations – usually less than half the number, with no replications at all being recorded for 38 out of 123 different demonstration topics. With concern to scaling up, a number of initiatives of ULIPH have been, or will be, scaled up. The SHG programme is to be scaled up across the state under the National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM). The Mission headquarters in Delhi would like NRLM in the state to take lessons and expertise from ULIPH, and for UGVS to act as the implementing agency. A new project, to be supported by IFAD, the Integrated Livelihood Support Project, will scale up many of the specific livelihood sectors supported by ULIPH, along with aggregation for marketing through producer groups. In Meghalaya, replication of demonstrations has been less than expected too. In terms of scaling up, the project was considered successful by the State Government. As a result, and at the request of the State Government, a new project (Livelihoods and Access to Markets Project - LAMP), to be supported by IFAD, will scale up specific livelihood activities supported by MLIPH, in particular those focused on aggregation for marketing through producer groups. The pooled marketing activities especially in case

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of Bayleaf, arecanut, ginger and turmeric have considerable potential for upscaling and replication.


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In Uttarakhand, the project's achievements are sustainable at the political and social level. However, the technical sustainability is somewhat uncertain for some activities, as the supply of inputs could be a problem. In terms of institutional sustainability, although the project has made considerable efforts to build the capacity of SHGs and Federations, some SHGs are still not fully self-reliant (in terms of record keeping and management processes), and Federations are still too new to have firmly established good governance systems. With concern to economic and financial sustainability, while most of the enterprises established by the project appear to be profitable, and so should be sustained, a significant proportion of collective enterprises (run by SHGs, Federation or cooperatives) are not, and there is a consensus among project staff that individual enterprises do better. In Meghalaya, the different interventions have created institutions, brought in new practices and improved on products and services. There are good prospects for institutional and social sustainability, as most institutions such as SHG, CLFs, Landbanks that have been created under the project are likely to offer technical and financial services to their members in the future. However. Their sustainability will depend on continued support and handholding to transform into competent business enterprises. The technical sustainability is also positively assessed, as well as the environmental sustainability. The linkages that have been created for inputs as also markets would also be sustainable arrangements that people would use. In both areas, there has already been evidence of ownership and scaling up by the government: in Meghalaya through its influence on the Basin Development Authority, and in Uttarakhand, a large scaling-up of the same approach has been approved. Also with the continued support for the federations, there is every expectation that the main project institutions in both states will be sustainable.

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Targeting In Uttarakhand, the project's approach to targeting was partly effective. Village clusters were selected on the basis of inaccessibility (which can be taken as a proxy for poverty) and potential for livelihood development. Within the selected villages, a participatory well-being ranking, based on a sustainable livelihoods framework was carried out. The project made efforts to include the poorest households, both in terms of SHG membership and support via project services, while excluding better off households. In practice, ULIPH was not so successful in reaching the poorest households, as the poorest group were under-represented in project SHGs. In Meghalaya, at design level the targeting strategy focused on vulnerable households and women, and an intervention strategy that mobilised people into groups for building their capacities and raising their knowledge and skills for making informed choices in relation to their livelihoods. The foreseen targeting project strategy had prioritized the poorest and the mid poor categories of the people. However, during its implementation, it seemed the project did not do justice to the design objectives concerning its targeting approach, as it turned out to be biased in favour of the better-off households. Thus, while the relatively well-off households under Well Being Ranking (WBR) 3 category (moderate) had been covered to the extent of 91%, the poorer categories of WBR 1 (poorest) and WBR 2 (poor) had only been covered to the extent of 32% and 35% respectively.

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Gender In Uttarakhand, the project aimed to improve the position of women. It was envisaged that the majority of SHG members would be women. With SHGs being the platform for livelihood interventions, women would be at the centre of livelihood improvement and enterprise development. Initiatives to reduce women’s drudgery were also planned. At completion, around 95% of SHG members were women, as were 66% of people attending training, workshops and exposure visits, while 82% of demonstrations were implemented by women. More women in project villages have reported improvements in health facilities and practices, although the difference is not large. The drudgery reduction efforts have, by reducing women’s workload, improved their health. There was also good evidence of women's empowerment at the household level, with a greatly increased role in household decisions (the percentage of women saying that they are involved in household decisions increased from 17% to 75%), financial empowerment, and taking up leadership positions in SHGs, Federations and enterprises. Women have also been elected to village, regional and district councils, with 261 SHG members being elected to these forums. In Meghalaya, women's coverage has been highly effective through SHGs, drudgery reduction and allocation of funds under seed capital and demonstrations. Of the executive body members of SHGs, 58% were women. In Cluster Level Federations, 50% office bearers were women. Of the resources allocated through seed capital and demonstrations, men received an average funding of Rs 4,900 per capita while women received Rs 6,171 per capita reflecting the prioritization of women in the project. The drudgery reduction initiatives had been mostly well targeted with women reporting greater availability of time in their hands on account of easier access to water, rice mills and other such infrastructure, taking up IGAs, better sanitation and improved living standards of their family as the distinct gains.

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Overall Performance As also stated in the PSR, not only LIPH covers two different States, Uttarakhand and Meghalaya, quite 4


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distant between them, but should be considered as a two-projects under one-loan, each of them with their own independent project management structures, specific issues, etc. Hence, ratings given in the above domains are a simple average derived from the individual ratings of each single project. The same applies to this final rating about the overall project's performance. The failure in adopting a proper targeting approach has affected the rating for overall project performance.


PCR Quality

Scope For Uttarakhand and Meghalaya, the scope of the PCR is fully in line with the 2006 Guidelines. All the requested annexes have been inserted. In Uttarakhand, the PCR includes a very interesting annex about the evidence of outcomes and impact. In Meghalaya, there is an interesting section on several case studies focusing on some of the project's most successful interventions.

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Quality For Uttarakhand, the quality of the PCR is satisfactory. It was used a good analytical approach. In Meghalaya, the quality of the PCR somehow suffered from a weak M&E system, which has resulted on a limited capacity to draw robust results, at outputs, outcome and impact level.

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Lessons For both Uttarakhand and Meghalaya, the lessons learned have been well conceived, being based on an in-depth analysis of projects' main successes and shortcomings.

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Candour For Uttarakhand and Meghalaya, the project's analysis has been overall honest, despite in some assessments the PCRs were found to be slightly too positive.

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Pakistan - Community Development Programme (CDP)


Country & Project Name Pakistan - Community Development Programme (CDP) Ratings

Loan No.: 625-PK

Project Id. 1245


Entry into Force 09 April 2004

Completion Date 30 September 2012


Total Project Cost US$(M) 30.74 USD million

IFAD loan& Grant US$(M) 21.77 USD million

Cofinanciers (if any) Government: 7.11, Domestic: 8.97, Beneficiaries:1.86

Cooperating Institution UNOPS; FAO Unilateral Trust Fund

Implementing Agency Programme and Development Department, Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir

Principal Components i) Gender Sensitive Community Development; ii) Community Development Fund, iii) Natural Resource Management, iv) Programme Management.

Project Performance

Relevance The CPD's main features were consistent both with IFAD's COSOP and with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of Pakistan. The design process was participatory, and in terms of geographical focus, components and activities, the Programme was extremely relevant and well responded to the needs of the target groups. However, on the less positive side, the initial medium-long term objective and design prerogatives were overly ambitious from the outset. In addition, the initial Logical Framework had weakly defined objectives and poor linkages therein with outputs. Over its implementation period, thanks to the flexibility of its design, the Programme demonstrated a strong capacity to cope with external shocks (the Programme was severely affected by a devastating earthquake in 2005 and a major flood occurred later on), and it was effective in developing coping strategies to handle the emerging challenges. In view of the new realities imposed by the earthquake of 2005, the MTR readjusted Programme targets and realigned the budget to enable the Programme to address widespread destruction of community and small-scale infrastructure. Thus, the less complex and more delivery-oriented components and sub-components became the mainstay of the Programme after the earthquake and flooding disasters.

5

Effectiveness Prior to the MTR, the Programme was categorized as "at risk" (progress by components was ranked 3 for all of them). This was due to Programme's huge challenges in its early days due to serious management-related issues (delays in recruitment of Programme staff and the high turnover of Programme Directors) and approach inadequacies. After the 2008 MTR, a drastic improvement in the implementation progress was registered, and since 2009, the Programme made fast progress towards achieving at least its physical targets. This occurred despite the natural disasters affecting the targeted area. Its approach and allocation of funds were adjusted in the light of the changing demands (higher humanitarian requirements) caused by the above mentioned events. It seems that the emerging sense of urgency pushed the project to shift its strategic focus on delivering tangible results. At completion, the CDP has been successful in achieving almost all its targets thanks to a change in priorities and focus during the implementation. The project completion mission of June-July 2011 noted (and this was reflected in the final PSR) that the project had achieved and in many cases exceeded most of its targets, with limited exceptions.

5

Efficiency An accurate assessment of these criteria is fairly tricky due to the lack of specific information to make such a comprehensive assessment. During the first part of its implementation period, Programme's efficiency was deemed to be low (the disbursement rate accounted only to 22%). During the MTR, following the cancellation of the WFP grant, total Programme cost was revised to USD 34.38 million (against the initial amount of USD 36.88 million). After the MTR, timetables were adequately met and no cost overruns were registered. At completion, Programme's disbursement rate accounted for 94%. At the recommendation of PCR and subsequent request by the Government of AJK, the Programme completion period was extended by one year to allow for completion of the process of transfer of community mobilisation and other support functions to the AJK Rural Support Programme for ensuring sustainability of the Programme outcomes, particularly of the grassroots institutions/COs. No further information is available to calculate the efficiency of the different Programme's interventions.

5


Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD started to play a much stronger and more-proactive role after the 2005 earthquake and the MTR, by carrying out more frequent supervision and follow up missions, as well as through its stronger field presence. With IFAD assuming the Programme's direct supervision responsibilities, the Programme managed to reverse its previous "Project at Risk" status. This also coincided with IFAD being firm on the issues related to the posting and transfers of key Programme staff. IFAD showed a remarkable flexibility of its procedures which allowed the Programme to make a rapid adjustment in mid-course to

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address an anticipated priority of communities in the Programme area who were affected by the earthquake. Additionally, the relationships with partners were fruitful: indeed, the flexibility of Fund's management and design allowed the Programme to facilitate the Government in accelerating the delivery modality. Nevertheless, the PCR mentions that the downside of IFAD's performance was found to be the delay and the prolonged time taken in processing the Withdrawal Applications and the rejection of the Programme bid process for engagement of consultants for impact survey on minor procedural grounds.

Cooperating Institution UNOP's performance was moderately unsatisfactory compared to the roles defined at project's design. During the phase pre-2005 earthquake period, UNOPS was responsible for supervision and loan administration of the Programme. UNOPS level of Programme's management was fairly low because of its limited presence in the area. Indeed, UNOPS undertook only a supervision mission with lack of follow up. After the earthquake in 2005, the cooperating institution's responsibilities were still provided by UNOPS, but IFAD started to take a much stronger role, mainly through its field presence. After the MTR, IFAD became fully in charge of Programme's direct supervision, with UNOPS fading away.

3

Government Initial Government's performance has been hampered by the serious delays in recruiting Programme's staff and the high turnover of Programme's directors. These two factors caused delayed start-up of the activities and unsatisfactory performance in the first years of the Programme. All of this was noted in the MTR in 2008, which also pointed out that the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) and the Programme Technical Committee (PTC) meetings had not been held regularly, which contributed to a delay in resolving key issues confronting the Programme. Later on, there was greater regularity in PSC meetings which facilitated Programme progress in the last phase. Once the Programme Steering Committee ensured stability in the PMU, Programme performance drastically improved. It complied with loans covenants, ensured adequate staff and management, and, above all, it followed up on recommendations of donors and supervision missions. Moreover, the performance of GoAJK in implementing the exit strategy, during the extension period, has been deemed commendable. Availability and release of funds was comparatively timely and more efficient than in other projects. In fact, in case of delays in receipts of funds from IFAD due to processing of withdrawal applications, GoAJK continued implementation of the Programme activities from its own resources.

4

NGO/Other FAO provided critical technical and logistic assistance to the Programme, especially a degree of flexibility in provision of TA and in procurement. The FAO's Unilateral Fund (UTF) performed fairly well by assisting the Programme in handling heavy workload in the field of infrastructure rehabilitation after the earthquake. Grassroots organizations played a key role in the implementation of the CDP. Since Programme's development objective was to be achieved through the strengthening of existing community organizations and by establishing new ones, these subjects were the main vehicles for the delivery of Programme's interventions. They contributed to the enhancement of the capacities of the rural poor as well as they are one of the pillars of CDP's sustainability beyond its completion.

5

Cofinancier(s)


Overall, it seems that the partners worked fairly well together. Above all, they were able to redirect the Programme's course in light of the emergencies caused by the external shocks.



For this domain, as for all the others, there is limited available information, which allows making a sound assessment on the Programme's achievements. The PCR claims that interviews and observations in the field confirmed that saving and credit activities have contributed to the overall goal of increasing income of the rural population. However, it does not explain to what extent this result was achieved. In terms of physical assets, thanks to CDP's funds, communities benefitted from the construction of 210 drinking water supply schemes, 11 water storage tanks, 221 hand pumps and 58 dug well schemes. Moreover, through the distribution of livestock (cows, goats, and poultry) on a cost-sharing basis, the Programme has helped to improve or increase the beneficiary physical asset base.

4

Food Security PCR claims that households' food security was enhanced as a result of CDP's interventions. However, from the limited data available, it is not clear how and to what extent the CDP affected food availability.

n.a

Ag. Productivity It is difficult to provide an assessment on this domain, due to the lack of data. The PCR mentioned that the Programme introduced new varieties of maize and potato seed, fruits and livestock. Introduction of improved livestock and plant breeds led to higher productivity for the time being. However, except for some random surveys, no mechanism was developed to record yields. In the absence of a detailed impact study, interviews were conducted in the field and families receiving various support reported that on a daily average livestock productivity had increased up to two-fold and two to four fold increased yield was seen from improved seeds. However, the PCR also stated that the Programme was not able to meet its objective of increasing productivity in a sustainable way through enhanced natural resource management and the adoption of improved technologies and practices.

4

Food Security and Agricultural Productivity

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It seems that the side-effects of some activities undertaken in the framework of the Natural Resource Management component could have a negative impact on the environment of the target area, particularly in the long run. No training on stall feeding has been provided. Consequently, the spread of practices such free grazing for certain types of livestock (goats) has been stimulated. The latter can potentially harm any new forestation. Likewise, since poultry was mostly given to vulnerable households with limited resources to arrange accommodations, the practice of free range poultry can potentially harm the households' assets (i.e. kitchen). Finally, the Programme did not envisage any specific strategy for climate change mitigation.

3


Although there is limited information of Programme's impact on this domain, it seems that the CDP target group benefitted from the Programme-built social and economic infrastructure (roads rehabilitation; water supply schemes; micro-hydel Programmes: tube wells; first aid posts; provision of frame structured buildings for shelter schools). CDP successfully implemented about 1,352 small scale social and economic infrastructure of the priority need in all district of AJK. The Programme also contributed to enhance the knowledge and skills of the rural poor especially through the provision of training on improved techniques for crop production and animal husbandry. CDP also improved rural poor access to safe water sources by building 210 drinking water supply schemes. In terms of social capital, Programme impact was mainly based on the development of community organisation and strengthening of grassroots organizations, thus enhancing rural communities' social capital.

5

Inst. & Policies From the PCR, no evidence emerges in relation to the influence exerted by the CDP on policies and regulatory frameworks.

n.a

Markets The CDP contributed to the rehabilitation of roads thus reducing the travelling time. Communities benefitted from the construction of 358 Km of village link road. Such an output led to a drastic reduction in expenses for fuel and transportation. However, the PCR also stated that through enhanced productivity, the Programme increased local marketable surpluses of livestock, agriculture and horticultural products. However, in the absence of an exit strategy including formation of market linkages and farmer to farmer exchange, the Programme has lost the opportunity to create and influence local markets.

4

Project Impact 4

Overarching Factors

Innovation The Project has not been particularly innovative. This occurred at the start-up, because of the over ambition of the initial medium/long term objectives and design prerogatives. Then, despite the corrections made after the MTR, the Programme still continued to face a number of constrains that have reduced the possibility of innovation, such as lack of institutional knowledge retained due to continuous staff turnover, the delayed start-up of activities and some poorly designed interventions unreflective of beneficiary demand. The PCR mentions that in some instances, activities commenced with the objective of being either innovative, replicable or piloted for up-scaling, but were unable to be followed through for a variety of reasons.

3


The PCR provides scant information on this domain. It only mentions that the community-based development model implemented by the Programme demonstrated itself a successful model that could be replicated/scaled up. It has also been stated that the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (GoAJK) has decided to extend some of the Community Development Programme (CDP) activities particularly in un-served areas of the State from its own resources. For this purpose, an allocation of PKR 344 million (about US$4 million) was provided in the Annual Development Programme of 2012-13 budget.

4

Innovation, Replicability and Scaling up

4


Serious concerns were regarding sustainability of the Programme in the post completion period were expressed by the PCR 2011 Mission mainly due to the delay in transfer of community mobilisation and support functions to Azad Jammu and Kashmir Rural Support Programme (AJKRSP). The GoAJK, however, at the recommendations of PCR Mission took appropriate steps and timely actions for ensuring sustainability of the Programme benefits, the grassroots institutions and institutional arrangement for coordination during the extension period. The lengthy process of CO consolidation and maturation points to the need for continuing support in the form of support organisation. The PCR follow up mission observed that the conditions of the institutional arrangements were fulfilled by the GoAJK (Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir) by appointing AJK RSP as the lead community agency for participatory activities, putting in place the required coordination mechanism for participatory planning and implementation. Moreover, the GoAJK has made available funds from its own resources for the continuation of Programme activities for a two-year period. However, the Programme is still not fully sustainable in relation to two main factors: i) the lengthy process of CO consolidation and maturation points to the need for continuing support in the form of support organisation; ii) a varying level of operation and maintenance - across the regions - of the infrastructures built by the Programme.

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Targeting With concern to the Natural and Resource Management component, the PCR mentioned that an effective targeting approach has been applied to enhance the participation of vulnerable socio economic groups such as landless, smallholders and women-headed households. Vulnerable households were identified on the basis of participatory village wealth ranking, with indicators identified by the community. On the other hand, it also stated that there was still considerable room for improvement in targeting, although the Programme introduced the culture of proactive targeting of poor and mainstreaming gender concerns in development decision making within the line departments.

4

Gender The CDP has given women's development and empowerment a central role in its Programme and community-based development model. Women were a prioritised target group. Specific activities were targeted at their priorities, i.e. livestock, vegetable gardening, etc. A specific component was designed to address gender issues. One of its aims was the consolidation of existing community organizations. At completion, there were 34% women's community organizations. Moreover, 49% of total membership of these associations was constituted by women. Participation in women community organizations helped building leadership skills among local women. Overall, it can be claimed that the CDP played a crucial role in increasing women's empowerment capital in the targeted area.

5



123,000 households

PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is overall in line with the 2006 PCR Guidelines. Almost all the requested annexes have been provided.

5

Quality The PCR shows a fairly good quality. However, the PCR suffers from a weak section on the Programme's rural poverty impact, mainly due to the absence of a comprehensive impact assessment study, which has not allowed to provide more quantitative information on specific impact domains.

4

Lessons The section on lessons learned shows an accurate reflection process which has been conducted to compile them. They are exhaustive and well pertinent to the main issues faced by the Programme.

5

Candour Although a critical lens was adopted in analysing the Programme's achievements, it seems that the final PCR perspective has been slightly too positive in assessing Programme's performance.

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Sri Lanka - Dry Zone Livelihood Support and Partnership Programme


Country & Project Name Sri Lanka - Dry Zone Livelihood Support and Partnership Programme Ratings

Loan No.: 636-LK

Project Id. 1254


Entry into Force 22 December 2005

Original Closing Date 30 June 2013


Total Project Cost US$(M) 30.40

IFAD loan& Grant US$(M) 22.31

Cofinanciers (if any) Total: 4.66 (Canada/CIDA: 0.96; Japan: 1.14; UNDP: 1.50; WFP: 1.05) Domestic: 3.43 (GoSL: 1.73; beneficiaries: 1.70)

Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Land and Irrigation

Principal Components The programme is composed of six components, namely: (a) rainfed upland agricultural development; (b) marketing and enterprise development; (c) irrigation rehabilitation; (d) microfinance and income-generating activities; (e) priority community infrastructure development; and (f) programme management.

Project Performance

Relevance The Programme has been relevant to both IFAD and Government strategies. Some of the Programme initiatives were also relevant to the Government trade policy on agricultural products. The Programme design relied on some key features, such as: i) a decentralized mode of project management; ii) flexibility to use Service Providers (SPs) to supplement the public sector services; iii) development of linkages and partnership with other institutions and agencies; iv) adoption of a participatory approach. At the 2009 MTR, it was the Development Objectives were still valid. The Programme has shown flexibility in making changes to components where conditions required change, for example, by including a significant dairy component which was not in the original programme design. Some flaws were detected in relation to: i) the Forward Sale Contracts (FSC) and the enterprise development components, as the targets set were too high to be achieved by the implementing agencies, and ii) the poor linkages between the enterprise development component and the microfinance intervention.

5

Effectiveness The Programme suffered from a low start-up during the first two years, as it picked up performing only around 2009, since when it has made a steady progress. It could not reach all its development objectives. On one hand, it was successful in: i) increasing the rain-fed upland farm productivity and integrating it with livestock production systems; ii) rehabilitating and operating irrigation infrastructure; iii) realising priority community infrastructure; iv) expanding micro-finance services. Within this regard, the Apeksha Programme has been successful in reaching the grassroots level in its reach. The Bhagya scheme improved its effectiveness after some changes to the implementation modalities from 2010 onwards, and by November 2012, all allocated funds have been disbursed covering 93% of the target number of 5,000 beneficiaries. On the less positive side, some challenges were faced in expanding marketing opportunities and developing micro-enterprises. The enterprise development component faced several implementation issues, although targets as reported appear to have been broadly achieved. It seems that a major constraint was the ineffective use of SPs in the implementation of the enterprise development component, in those inexperienced institutions were required to provide a long term (2 years) commitment to develop a too large number of enterprises. The enterprise development component had also very little linkages with the loan schemes offered by the Programme such as Bhagya and Apeksha. The Programme was also unsuccessful in establishing forward sales contracts (FSCs), as the FSC component showed the lowest rate of achievement among the Programme components, leading to a reallocation of funds. Of a target of 20,000 FSCs under the project, only 11,443 have been signed (57%) although no data was available of the number of successful contracts. Success under contract farming was limited to long-established contract farming arrangements with large-scale buyers having established marketing channels, both within and outside programme interventions.

4

Efficiency In the PCR, the analysis of project's efficiency is mainly drawn on the comparison between the EIRR at appraisal (17.4%) and the EIRR at completion (19.6%), whereby the increase in the EIRR has led to assessing the Programme as efficient. The disbursement rate of IFAD funds at project's completion stood at 99%. However, in assessing project's efficiency, it must also be taken into account that the Programme suffered from an effectiveness lag of 15.9 months and from a delayed start-up, which led to an initial less-than satisfactory implementation performance during the first two years of implementation, when the Program management cost was also found to be abnormally high (at 85%). However, already at the 2009 MTR, the whole situation was assessed to have improved. Another factor which was reported in the supervision mission reports to have affected project's efficiency was the very high turnover of staff with long gaps between appointments which has

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undermined the continuity of the project, delivery and the build-up of expertise and knowledge.


Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD's performance was not assessed in the PCR, neither was any reference made to it in the various WB supervision reports. Update provided from the country office: the CPO's involvement in implementation support, namely review of various technical proposals, review of studies and methodologies, review of FFS methodologies in the development phase, and the CPO's role in providing the IFAD view point by commenting on almost all the supervision reports needs to be highlighted. The CPM too was closely involved in designing the land tenure study, the supervision process and providing no-objections for all required processes.

NA

Cooperating Institution The World Bank was in charge of Programme's supervision throughout its entire implementation period. Over a period of 7 years, the WB conducted 11 supervision missions, which provided an insight to the issues faced by the Programme and offered guidance at each stage towards improving Programme performance.

5

Government The Ministry of Agriculture chaired the Policy and Oversight Board which served as the apex decision-making body, with the Provincial Programme Boards providing the link to the regions. This structure effectively served to provide approvals to the various Programme interventions by meeting regularly. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka functioned as the apex body for the Bhagya loan schemes and functioned effectively; the three participating state banks, while effectively implementing the Bhagya scheme, have the potential to reach out to the Programme beneficiaries for further support from their own resources. The Programme management has been effective in adapting to changing circumstances. The strategy of operating from district programme management units enabled direct intervention with the beneficiaries and also facilitated the development of partnerships with other agencies.

5

NGO/Other The performance of the Service Providers engaged in the FSCs as well as enterprise development component was poor, due to lack of relevant capacity and experience to achieve the targets set at appraisal.

2

Cofinancier(s) The co-financing organisations envisaged at commencement withdrew from the Programme due to lack of progress during the first two years of implementation.


No major issues have been detected in the combined partner performance.



Project's impact on this domain has been quite substantial, through the incremental income generated by the major economic interventions in each DPMU. As a result of the 708 micro irrigation (MI) rehabilitation schemes implemented by the project, it has been estimated an increase of 43% in the average financial gross margin for 17,658 irrigated farmer beneficiaries (compared to the without project situation (WOP)). About 69% of the incremental income has come from expansion in irrigation coverage and 31% from modest improvement in crop productivity following the rehabilitated MI systems. Under upland agriculture, at farm level about 51,961 upland FFS crop farmers, with an average benefitted area of 0.2 ha, have improved their financial gross margin by 24% compared to WOP. Cultivation of crops such as groundnut, papaya, maize, big onion, red onion, ginger and seed potato were some of the crops that yielded substantial benefits. Similarly, about 10,296 livestock FFS farmers have improved their financial gross margin by 69%. Project target group also benefitted from the provision of credit, as the Programme trained and supported credit covering 4,631 beneficiaries, engaged in income generating activities (IGAs), of which 80% are women. A total of USD 2 million has been used as credit support by 962 groups for IGA. A study of the Programme estimated the average annual incremental income as US$613 per beneficiary per year.

5

Food Security The PCR does not provide a specific assessment of how the food security situation of project's target groups has improved. The PCR mentions that "the emphasis on improving agricultural productivity seen across the Programme components will have a significant positive impact on food security both within and outside the Programme districts". However, this impact is still to be detected and quantified. Update from country office: IMPACT ON FOOD SECURITY: Due mainly to productivity increases of around 35%, the 708 rehabilitated minor irrigation schemes will produce 12,680 MT of paddy and 5,550 MT of other field crops (OFC) representing a 37% increase over pre-project production levels. The formation of crop FFS has contributed to increasing upland crop productivity by 9% to 27% in the case of major crops like maize, seed paddy, cowpea, groundnut and onion. A 32% increase in milk production is also recorded due to project interventions. Access to the increased food production by the target population is ensured by improved income levels as a result of increases in farm margins, ranging from 24% for FFS crop farmers to 69% for livestock FFS farmers.

NA


30



Ag. Productivity Programme's impact on this domain has been notable. The interventions on micro irrigation rehabilitated schemes, by increasing the availability of water, contributed to the overall increase in the cultivated area per year. Irrigated area has increased by 1,476 ha (net) (22%) and 2,975 ha (gross) (32%) over the without project (WOP) situation. Through the adoption of the modified FFS concept, there have been possible the adoption of new technologies and new crop varieties, commercialization of agriculture and establishment of an institutional mechanism at village level. More importantly, farmers were able to shift from traditional mixed cropping to mono-cropping with improved varieties and management practices. Cultivation of crops such as groundnut, papaya, maize, big onion, red onion, ginger and seed potato were some of the crops that yielded substantial benefits. The training components such as crop management and post-harvest technology were also highly commended by farmers. Furthermore, the intervention in the dairy component, led to dairy farmers adopting intensive systems which allowed them to introduce improved breeds and management practices, access to veterinary services, and the Agricultural Instructor (AI) programme. The final benefit was a 30% increase in the cattle population and a 32% increase in household milk production. The establishment of dairy FFS and milk collection centers also contributed to regularize the milk collection process at village level and provided stronger linkages with commercial milk processors such as Milco, Nestle, and Pelwatte.

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The Programme's impact on this domain has been positive. The best management practices introduced by the Programme in upland and rice farming helped to reduce the agro-chemical inputs to the field. Although, the programme interventions in the production of seed potato have the potential for long-term negative impact, the seed production techniques used by the Programme-assisted farmers were seen to mitigate negative environmental effects where possible. A further positive impact was also linked to the irrigation rehabilitation component, which contributed to the conservation and more efficient utilization of water resources. Most of the interventions in the non-agricultural components of the Programme (enterprise development, microfinance) did not have any negative effects on the environment, since the enterprises were of small scale.

5


With regard to human capital, the project's target group benefitted from the several interventions related to the community infrastructure component (pre-schools, roads, drinking water wells, water harvesting tanks, religious places, cemeteries, school playgrounds). They also benefitted from the technical training programmes they were involved into. In terms of social capital, the Programme promoted several instances of active participation of the beneficiary groups in implementation, through the formation of farmer field schools (FFS) which were organised into federations, as well as through the group lending approach which was adopted for microfinance. With regard to the former, the formation of FFS and their subsequent federations has contributed to improving social cohesion and the FFS served as an entry point to the rural agricultural economy and as a platform for further interventions. Finally, through the microfinance societies and federations, women were provided with independence and confidence in household financial matters.

5

Inst. & Policies Programme interventions have contributed toward strengthening some of the government organisations that were partners in programme implementation. The Women's Bureau of Sri Lanka, the partner in the Apeksha programme, was able to train and develop its staff. The field staff of the Departments of Agriculture and Animal Production and Health also gained practical exposure to the operation of farmer field schools and federations.

4

Markets Project's impact on this domain was positive at the rural level, as the roads and market facilities funded by the Programme provided easier access to farmers to sell their produce. The vegetable collection centers provided an opportunity for farmers to obtain a premium price for quality produce, by channelling the produce to urban supermarkets. The Programme-supported milk collection centers also notably improved market access to rural milk producers, and served as a catalyst for a large number of them to become dairy farmers. On the other hand, the Programme's failure to pay adequate attention to link farmers to buyers or to processors in major markets is considered as a major shortfall over its implementation.

4

Project Impact 5

Overarching Factors

Innovation Some innovations had been envisaged at project's design level, although not all of them could be successfully implemented. An innovation which needs to be highlighted is the extension delivery by beneficiary-managed FFSs which was based on the participatory identification of issues/themes. The FFSs approach adopted by the project has resulted in the introduction of new crops and good practices into the farming system in the project districts. Conversely, other innovations, such as the improvement of the marketing conditions through the careful combination of forward contracting, inventory credit and the promotion of organic crops, could not be implemented.

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The PCR considers the strategies and approaches adopted by the Programme as replicable in other projects, with some caution on establishing realistic target numbers that are compatible with the implementation capacities of the agencies involved. For example, the women's credit component (the Apeksha credit programme), financed and developed since the 2009 MTR, is ready for further scaling up in the Programme area and replication elsewhere, as long as key parameters are continued. The introduction of FFS during implementation and the Programme capacity to develop and support farmer federations have allowed both the seed producers and small dairy units to move towards both a sustainable model and a basis for future scaling up. Finally, there is scope for scaling up across a spectrum of initiatives, including seed production for other vegetables (e.g. tomatoes) and the abilities to produce cattle feed supplements within the districts.

5


5


On the sustainability of project's interventions some issues need to be considered. The FFS established under the rain-fed upland agriculture component are sustainable to some extent, as only those who have encountered substantial demand and prices for their produce will continue, while others expect continued support from the Programme. Another main factor for their sustainability is the stability for the revolving fund established. On the other hand, the FFS established with the construction of milk collection centers are sustainable due to the evident viability of small scale dairy production at present as well as thanks to the well-established market linkages with private milk processors. The restoration of tanks and anicuts undertaken are highly sustainable. Since the rehabilitation process was participatory, farmers have a sense of belonging and appear determined to continue operation and maintenance (O&M) activities by themselves. For the community infrastructure, arrangements have been made to maintain the renovated roads by linking the users with local administrations to ensure participation maintenance. However, the schemes operating successfully at present have been reported as 449 which are only 16% of the total facilities developed. On the sustainability of the microfinance schemes (Apeksha and Bhagya), the main issues for sustainability concern, respectively, the availability of the revolving fund established and the adequacy of the funds available to meet the demand. The beneficiaries of both schemes will eventually have to move on to standard loan schemes available with the banks, and the participating banks should take initiatives to attract the beneficiaries to such facilities.

4

Targeting For the selection on Programme area, four districts (Anuradhapura, Kurunegala, Monaragala and Badula) were identified by considering some selection criteria. Within each district, the project aimed at covering 44 District Secretary (DS) Divisions, which were identified on the basis of both the Vulnerability Assessments carried out by the WFP, and previous IFAD presence. Within each DS Division, the poorest half of all Grama Nilhadari (GN) divisions was selected on the basis of poverty and remoteness indicators. The programme target group included all persons living in the selected poor and remote GN divisions. Within these GN divisions, the Programme was meant to focus on the needs and capabilities of the poorest, without excluding the more prosperous members of these communities. According to the 2009 MTR, selection of project villages/communities was effective, as the project has intervened in areas which are poor, remote and inaccessible. The PCR also mentions that overall the Programme targeting has been appropriate to the country context, despite some inappropriate targeting in the enterprise development component, whereby enterprises which were larger than the accepted microenterprise size norm were eligible for Programme assistance.

4

Gender At appraisal, the Programme envisaged a well-defined gender strategy including some key elements, as well as some well-defined gender-related targets were established. Women were an integral part of the target group, and some activities were to be undertaken nearly exclusively by them. As mentioned by the PCR, the involvement of women in the implementation of Programme's activities is demonstrated in the success of the Apeksha loan scheme, which was specifically targeted at women and a total of 2,714 beneficiaries (70%) of target were provided with funds which revolved among members of societies formed for the purpose. The Apeksha scheme also improved social cohesion in rural areas and resulted in well-developed women's federations, thus leading to an increased confidence and independence among the female beneficiaries. The improvement of the dairy marketing chain has also benefitted women since many dairy farmers are women. Finally, women also benefitted from the rural infrastructure provided by the Programme, such as roads and pre-schools.

5



PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is fully in line with the 2006 Guidelines for PCR preparation. Almost all the requested annexes have been provided.

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Quality The quality of the PCR is good, as notable efforts can be noted in conducting a fairly robust analysis of the project's main achievements and shortfalls.

5

Lessons The PCR has drawn some important lessons learned, although there is a sense that this section - given the tremendous amount of inputs provided by the project's analysis - could have benefitted from further reflection.

5

Candour The PCR is consistent with the other project's information sources (WB supervision mission reports and Project Status Report (PSRs).

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Kenya - Mount Kenya East Pilot Project for Natural Resource Management


Country & Project Name Kenya - Mount Kenya East Pilot Project for Natural Resource Management Ratings

Loan No.: 599

Project Id. 1234


Entry into Force 01 July 2004





Cofinanciers (if any) External cofinancing: GEF 4.87; Domestic: 4.09 (Government National: 1.78; beneficiaries: 2.31)

Implementing Agency Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Social Services (DSS), Kenya Wildlife Service, Forest Department

Principal Components The project implementation was through five components namely: Water Resources Management, Environmental Conservation, Rural Livelihoods, Community Empowerment and Project Coordination and Management.

Project Performance

Relevance The project was highly relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries and to contributing to the national development goals. It was designed based on the IFAD COSOP of 2001 and within the context of the country’s PRSP. In the course of implementation, the project was continuously adjusted to new policies and strategies such as the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (2003) and Vision 2030. The project used a wide range of strategies and approaches to achieve its objectives, all based on the principles of participation. The PRA process in particular proved to be a powerful tool for effective community planning and implementation. Communities were involved in the planning through the preparation of focal area community action plans, which reflected their actual needs and formed the basis of the AWP&B.

6

Effectiveness The project experienced a slow start due to an effectiveness lag of 18.9 months and a further delay in the release of the initial deposit. Nevertheless, important results were achieved in all areas. Water resource management led to a more efficient use and even distribution of water resources. Water-borne diseases could be reduced. The negative impact of forest degradation could be reversed through the extensive planting of tree seedlings. SWC techniques helped improve agricultural productivity and hence, households incomes and food security. Rural livelihoods could be improved through improved food security, higher incomes and increased assets. Finally, communities were empowered through mobilization, sensitization, group constitution and training in a wide range of management areas, which has changed the way they perceive and take responsibility for their own development. At the project completion, community contributions largely exceeded the expected amount (138%). Important advances could also be made in the area of women participation. A major contributing factor to the project’s success has been its overall approach based on community participation (PRA in particular) and the wide range of differentiated approaches tailored to the specificities of each component and activity. Financial management was satisfactory and procurement procedures were respected. The project’s M&E system was found to be functional and highly participatory. Communities were directly involved in the monitoring of project implementation using a community project diary. While aforementioned factors contributed to enhancing project effectiveness, negative aspects included delays during the replenishment process, i.e. between the submission of WAs and the time funds were received in the project’s account. These problems partly arose from the use of an offshore account through which funds had to transit before being channelled onto the project’s Special Account.

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Efficiency Project efficiency was satisfactory. It is assessed in terms of input/output ratio. The community empowerment and rural livelihoods components showed the highest efficiency with an input/output ratio of 0.83 and 0.91 respectively, followed by the water development and environment conservation components (both 1.01) and coordination and Management (1.02). The total input/output ratio was 1.04 and 96.2% of the targeted beneficiaries were reached.

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Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD’s support was highly satisfactory. The Fund provided appropriate advice and recommendations throughout project implementation, in particular during supervision missions. IFAD also provided timely decisions on payment requests and more important aspects such as the reallocation of funds in 2009 and 2011, and the extension of the loan closing date by one year to facilitate the design of up-scaling some activities to other river basins. The IFAD country Office played a crucial role in project implementation and supervision.

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Cooperating Institution The project was supervised by UNOPS until 2009. UNOPS supervision missions were instrumental to improve project performance. Targeting was improved and implementation shortcomings were rightly pointed out. However, delays were experienced in the processing of WA. UNOPS was i.e. responsible for the late release of half of the initial deposit. The second half was paid in 2006 only, when implementation was already well underway.

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Government GoK provided strong support through an effective project steering committee and by contributing resources beyond the loan agreement. Government contributions at completion amounted to 140%, exceeding by far the expected amount. In addition to tax exemption, Government actively contributed to civil works and capacity building. GoK was however responsible for the slow flow of funds, affecting the timely replenishment of the special account and hence, the project’s cash flow. Project management was satisfactory. The project was implemented through an elaborate structure with clearly defined roles and responsibilities. The PMU staff was highly preforming and vacancies were quickly filled. Besides its management and coordination tasks, the PMU supported capacity building that was crucial to project implementation. Staff turnover was however high (3.5 years on average).

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NGO/Other Not assessed in the PCR.

Cofinancier(s) The project received incremental funding from the GEF (US$ 4.7 million). Coordination and synchronization of activities was however difficult because: (i) GEF funding became available in year 3 of project implementation only, (ii) GEF resources were channelled through a different government agency, the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS); and (iii) implementation of the GEF “component” was done through a separate PCU placed under the oversight of KWS. Though pertinent, co-financing with the GEF proved difficult to operate.

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Performance of partners was found highly satisfactory and has contributed to the attainment of the project’s objectives. According to the PCR, stakeholder involvement was very high.



The project had a noticeable impact on household incomes and assets. Access to irrigation water contributed to the intensification and diversification of food and crop production and hence, to increased income levels. Incomes from agricultural employment could be increased from 16% to 22%, incomes from small agri-businesses from 32% to 38% and horticultural incomes from 29% to 51%. Poultry production improvements directly impacted on household incomes with increased incomes from the sale of eggs and chicken of 122% and 118% respectively. Poultry production being dominated by women, this has had positive effect on household incomes and well-being in general. Farmers who had been trained in FFS reported increased incomes from the sale of crops and livestock products by 71% and 55% respectively. Community members could also increase and diversify their incomes through the collection and sale of tree seedlings and the establishment of commercial woodlots. Other activities include charcoal production using improved kilns. The project had an important impact on the social capital of the beneficiary population (decision-making, management skills, organizations, etc.), which in turn had a positive effect on their asset base (capacity to acquire land, livestock, trees, farm equipment, tools, etc.) and their livelihoods in general (health, education, housing). Lastly, the project provided important community owned physical infrastructure and as such contributed to increasing community assets, in particular water infrastructure: 1200 ha of irrigated schemes provided, 103 community springs developed, 11 dams constructed, 70 shallow water wells developed and rehabilitated, 5 sub-surface dams and 146 boreholes rehabilitated.

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Food Security Household food security could be markedly improved, as shown by a household survey conducted in 2012. The large majority of the households reported very positive results in the area of nutrition/household diet (64%), availability of food (68%) and affordability of food (56%). Also, 60% felt that access to food had altogether improved. A main contributing factor was improved access to water and water resource management. Improved livestock production and breeding also contributed to improving household incomes and food security while poultry upgrading directly impacted on household nutrition. Training of community members had a strong impact on food security. Farmers who had been trained in FFS reported increased food security in terms of a reduction by 90% of hunger incidences. Finally, though not analysed in the PCR it can be assumed that higher household incomes have strongly contributed to improving access to food in general which now can be purchased.

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Ag. Productivity Farming in the project area was characterized by poor farming techniques, due to limited knowledge, poor soil fertility, limited access to water, low incomes levels and dilapidated roads leading to poor marketing opportunities. Introduction of SWC techniques, water harvesting, improved access to irrigation water and improved planting material have had a very positive effect on agricultural outputs, diversification and intensification. The implementation of large irrigation schemes contributed to a more efficient and even distribution of irrigation water. Now, the majority of irrigated farmers get their water from community water supply systems compared

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to only 18% before the project. Farmers who adopted soil and water conservation measures reported increased crop yields of up to 65%. Breed improvement, which included artificial insemination, dairy and meat goat upgrading as well as rabbit and poultry upgrading has greatly contributed to farmers’ incomes and household food security (see relevant sections for figures). FFS have been highly instrumental for the transfer of new technologies and approaches. Finally, improved accesses to markets (182 km of road constructed and rehabilitated) combined with higher incomes have made agricultural inputs more accessible.


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The project has had an important impact in the area of environmental conservation and climate change mitigation. An estimated 7 million tree seedlings were planted with an average survival rate of 75%. This activity has had a very positive effect on the regeneration of the forest coverage and on reducing the negative effects of climate change. Considering that each tree can sequestrate around 12 tons of carbon each year, 5.25 million trees will ensure the oxygen supply of 21 million people. In addition, the school greening programme has instilled the tree planting culture to students, teachers and parents. The impact in particularly visible in the Arid Districts where tree planting was not practiced before the project and where many tree nurseries now operate successfully and support hill top rehabilitation and agro-forestry. Finally, roadside conservation has contributed to road maintenance while avoiding erosion and river siltation. Further important conservation measures include the planting of trees along the rivers to protect riverbanks against soil erosion, forest rehabilitation and the construction of wildlife fences to improve regeneration of the vegetation cover in the forests. The project also promoted the use of efficient energy devices which allowed to cut down the use of charcoal and firewood by over 400%. Efforts to bring about sustainable NRM were further enhanced through capacity building and training of community members and implementing staff in areas such as Participatory Forest Management, Environmental Governance, Tree Nursery Management. Conservation efforts such as riverine conservation, hilltop rehabilitation, school greening programme, farm forestry, community and private tree nurseries have generally met or surpassed their targets.

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Capacity building and empowerment were key elements of the project, which contributed to its positive achievements and to ensuring sustainability of its impacts. Training was part of all components and has allowed community members to develop their technical and managerial skills in the areas of water resource management, environmental conservation, agricultural and livestock production and marketing. In addition to that, activities conducted under the community empowerment component have brought many positive impacts to the communities which are now able to take charge of their own development: (i) good governance structures and instruments in the management of community projects; (ii) improved planning and monitoring skills of community members, (iii) reduced conflicts; (iv) improved ownership and accountability by the communities. At the end of the project, community contributions stood at 138%, showing that the beneficiaries had fully adhered to the objectives of the project and developed a strong sense of ownership. The concept of community contribution coupled with the use of community project diaries and group constitutions has enormously empowered the people to become the main actors of their own development. This applies even to those communities, which felt that the government was fully responsible for bringing development. According to the household survey of 2012, social capital could be markedly improved in important areas such as decision-making capacity of the communities (86%), community advocacy skills (82%), development of local institutions (45%). The project has also had a strong impact on women empowerment and participation. They account for 15% of all leadership positions in Focal Development Areas.

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Inst. & Policies Local institutions were strengthened through the training of government staff in different aspects as identified by the training needs assessment. This training enhanced the capacity of staff in key areas such as participatory M&E, project management and planning, report writing, financial and procurement management, etc. The project made important contributions to strengthening local level institutions such as Focal Development Area Committees, Community Forest Associations, WUAs, and other CBOs in areas such as project management, gender mainstreaming, conflict resolution etc. The PCR stated that through these local level institutions, the poor had been mobilized and trained to the extent that their voices can be heard and that they are able to establish links with markets and partners.

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Markets Strong support was provided to road rehabilitation and construction. Altogether, 182.5 km of roads were provided which corresponds to 345% of the distance estimated at appraisal. This has markedly contributed to reducing transportation costs and time. Transportation time could be reduced by up to 20% and trading volumes could be increased. Some markets were expanded as a consequence of these positive developments. The project also provided marketing training to around 2000 group members.

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Overarching Factors

Innovation See section on replication and scaling up. 5


The project was designed as a pilot and therefore envisaged the replication and scaling up of successful approaches and innovations. The most significant include: (i) introduction of larger irrigation schemes which proved a better instrument to bring people out of poverty than micro irrigation; (ii) the school greening programme which was highly successful and should be replicated in other areas to sustain regreening efforts; (iii) promotion of community tree nurseries as a source of income and a forest rehabilitation tool at the same time; (iv) promotion of energy saving kilns for charcoal production; (v) farmer’s field schools for the transfer of technologies and the training of trainers; and (vi) establishment of district project coordinators to coordinate interventions of the different line ministries at district level. The latter was not foreseen in the design document but was highly instrumental in achieving the objectives of the project.

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Sustainability of project interventions is assessed as satisfactory. To maximize chances for sustainability, project activities were implemented through Government bodies, within the framework of their respective mandates. All activities emanated from the community action plans and thus reflected felt needs. The communities have demonstrated strong ownership of the project’s activities by contributing more than expected to the project’s costs. This should positively impact on overall sustainability of the project’s interventions. According to the PCR the exit strategy clearly spells out the role and responsibilities of the various stakeholders once the project is closed. Operation and maintenance of most activities have been passed on to communities. Finally, capacity building of a critical mass of both, government staff and community leaders will be a strong asset to ensure sustainability of the project’s achievements. Capacity strengthening of Focal Development Area Committees and Project Management Committees was an essential pillar of the project’s exit strategy. External shocks such as droughts will, however, remain potential risk factors.

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Targeting Proper targeting was ensured through the project’s approach based on mobilization, sensitization and participation of the beneficiaries in all stages of project implementation. The PRA approach was the project’s main targeting tool. It allowed to identify and prioritize people’s needs and was highly instrumental in reaching out to the beneficiaries. It enabled to identify potential project beneficiaries and subsequently to form the Focal Development Area Committees. Project activities were targeted at 580 000 poor, very poor households and at risk at falling into poverty. More than 96% were reached

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Gender The project has also had a strong impact on women empowerment and participation, brought about by continuous sensitization and training on gender mainstreaming. Women were perceived as the main engine of development. At the end of the project, women accounted for 15% of all leadership positions in Focal Development Areas Committees and 48-52% of leadership positions in the project area (compared to 45% before the project). 74% of the households interviewed at the end of the project indicated that the gender disparity between men and women had been reduced.

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PCR Quality

Scope The guidelines are respected, but some important annexes are missing: financial and economic analysis and environmental assessment

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Quality The PCR provides altogether a sound analysis of project performance and impact. Qualitative and quantitative information is well balanced. It also provides a good amount of quantitative date to substantiate its findings. Some areas are however weak (efficiency, gender, targeting).

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Lessons The PCR draws a number of lessons for future interventions with regard to replication, scaling up and enhancing sustainability of interventions. The PCR also clearly identifies those factors that have positively contributed to project implementation.

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Candour The PCR reflects gives and honest assessment of project performance and impact. Slightly too positive compared to other reports.

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Rwanda - Rural Small and Microenterprise Promotion Project - Phase II


Country & Project Name Rwanda - Rural Small and Microenterprise Promotion Project - Phase II Ratings

Loan No.: 613-RW

Project Id. 1276


Entry into Force 15 June 2004

Completion Date 30 June 2013

Final Closing Date 31 December 2013


IFAD loan& Grant US$(M) Loan: US$14.91

Cofinanciers (if any) Government: US$2.65


Implementing Agency Ministry of Commerce, Industry Investment Promotion, Tourism and Cooperatives

Principal Components The project implementation period was seven years and was divided into three phases. The first two-year phase dealing with the establishment of operations, the second three-year phase covering expansion, replication and consolidation. The third phase of two years entailed a gradual handing-over to local institutions. Component 1: Capacity-Building comprises three sub-components (a) Awareness-raising and community mobilization; (b) Basic capacity-building; and (c) Policy support for SMEs. Component 2: Support to Rural SMEs support three sub-components (a) Support to management and technical skills training; (b) Marketing support and Technical support and (c) assistance. Component 3: Support to Microfinance Institutions has three lines of credit: (i) seed capital; (ii) regular credit through existing institutions; and (iii) investment credit for more advanced SMEs; Support to banks and formal MFIs and Support to local financial centres. Project Component 4: Coordination and Management

Project Performance

Relevance PPPMER design was consistent with the evolving national policies, including the PRSP (2002) and the successive Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS I (2008-12) & EDPRS II (20013-17)), which objective is to reduce the number of people living in poverty by increasing the incomes of the poor families in rural areas. The project also coincided with government reforms and initiatives, which sought to promote private and cooperative enterprise development to generate off-farm jobs and supplementary incomes for rural households. It was in line with government’s strategies for an increasingly demand-driven development and for the creation of an enabling environment for rural growth. It was also in line with Government efforts towards decentralization. The project was based on relevant IFAD strategies and approaches, including the COSOP of 1999. According to the PCR, PPPMER’s objectives, strategy and activities were deemed relevant to the needs of the rural poor. Project design rightly anticipated post-conflict rural growth opportunities and the policy shift towards market-driven business and trade development. The project operated in areas where off-farm development opportunities were very limited since the end of the conflict and fully served the purpose of developing jobs and supplementary off-farm incomes for the rural poor. Major changes to the original design include: (i) provincial zone offices reduced from 7 to 4, in line with local government reforms (2006); (ii) reorientation to support policy changes in microfinance, cooperative development, poverty reduction and privatization of business support services. In 2011, all provincial project units were closed and project management was merged under the Single Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) under MINICOM (Ministry of Trade and Industry). This had the benefit to consolidate the expertise of various projects, to keep the institutional memory and to reduce operating costs of ongoing interventions. The project was designed along the FLM approach, which enabled it to be adjusted to a rapidly changing economic, social, institutional and policy environment. It also allowed the project to consolidate its achievements and to progressively disengage from operations and handover to local institutions.

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Effectiveness The PCR concluded that the project fulfilled its overall objective, which was to reduce poverty and improve the living conditions of the rural populations. At the outcome level, the project also met most of its specific objectives: (i) SMEs are organized in a network of cooperatives and value chains which will provide support services to their members in a favourable institutional and regulatory environment – the PCR concludes that significant progress could be made in this direction, although it has been observed that the economic entities and cooperatives are evolving rapidly from the theoretical model; (ii) Capacities of the most impoverished SMEs are strengthened by support services appropriate to their needs – this objective has been fully achieved; (iii) Diversification, productivity, quality of the production and profitability of the SMEs are enhanced by the promotion of new technologies and access to new markets – this objective has probably been met but could not be demonstrated, due to the lack of data. Profitability and viability of SMEs is likely but could not be verified due to the lack of data. Too little attention was given to linking

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production, processing and marketing of products; and (iv) SMEs have access to financial services tailored to their needs and granted by permanent financial institutions – this objective was achieved. The PCR qualifies project outputs as impressive: 533 SMEs were validated for support against a target of 400; 1633 SMEs have benefited from micro loans and ordinary loans amounting to RWF 158 928 426; 466 trainers have been trained for the apprenticeship programme which has benefited 11 956 individuals (women and young people); community management training was provided to 12 512 individuals; PROBAs (Proximity Business Advisors) were established in all 416 sectors and have provided services to 7252 SMEs and potential entrepreneurs. The project’s participatory approaches have been highly instrumental in strengthening the capacities of support services providers and of the rural poor. Participatory approaches were applied to both recovering communities and local government structures for the purpose of social reconstruction and enhanced cohesion. The project has further benefited from the steadily growing number of private service providers during implementation, of which many took over from NGOs. Regarding its design, the project has greatly benefited from having been conceived as an FLM, which enabled a quasi-continuous adjustment to a quickly evolving economic, social and institutional framework and to the changing needs of the beneficiaries and supported SMEs. On the less positive side, project implementation somewhat suffered from the weaknesses of the M&E system. The project almost exclusively focused on the collection of physical output data, while impact monitoring received little to no attention.

Efficiency The PPPMER II was designed as a second phase project under the FLM (2-3-2). It was granted a 2 years extension, financed with additional contributions in kind and in cash (USD 420 000 from PCRCIU and PADDEP, and USD 200 000 from UNIDO). Cost estimates in the original design have proven robust, mainly because of sound financial management at the national level, which has avoided an excessive inflation and maintained the international strength of the currency. The IFAD loan has been fully disbursed, with a slight imbalance between components, due to a reallocation at Mid-Term (Capacity building – 131%, Operational Support to SMEs 114%. Support to Rural Finance- 43%; and Programme Coordination – 142%). The PCR states that unit costs were slightly higher than those of comparable projects, and that individual rates of return were lower than those of alternative investments but still positive. Regarding the latter, it was stated, however, that individual IRRs could be calculated for some enterprises only, and not for those actually supported during implementation, making any conclusion rather arbitrary. An overall IRR could not be calculated, since the project failed to collect and monitor costs and benefits. No IRR was calculated at appraisal. The PCR states that: “[…] the project met its overall objectives of reducing rural poverty through the development of rural off-farm SMEs. The economic welfare of the intended beneficiaries improved, resulting on a positive impact on the economy, especially for the rural economically active poor. Further quantification of benefits was not possible due to the limited availability of key information for the purpose”.

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Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD was responsible for the identification, design and funding of the project. Initially, supervision was delegated to UNOPS. From 2008 onwards, IFAD took over the direct supervision of the project. Between 2008 and 2012, it has fielded 4 Implementation Support/Supervision Missions, 5 Follow-up Missions and 1 Design Extension mission together with UNIDO. The PCR provides little information about the quality of IFAD’s support during this period, but notes that the coherence and the quality of IFAD’s implementation support and management advice provided to Government has helped improve project performance and sustainability. It can be concluded that IFAD’s support was satisfactory.

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Cooperating Institution Until 2007, the project was supervised by UNOPS, Nairobi. The PCR does not provide many details about its performance, but mentions that “a satisfactory arrangement was terminated following a global change in IFAD’s operational policy on project supervision”. It can be concluded that the quality of UNOPS technical supervision and loan administration was satisfactory.

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Government Government has fulfilled its financial commitment with the release of 76% of its counterpart funds. This lower amount is due to an overestimation at appraisal. Government has also been active in overseeing project implementation through the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee met regularly and provided the expected advice and guidance on implementation problems. It also approved the AWP&B. Local Government structures have been both implementing partners and beneficiaries in terms of capacity building. In 2011, 18 months before project closure, Government brought the project under the Single Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) under the MINICOM. This implied closure of the 4 provincial antennas, helped streamline project implementation and reduce overhead costs. The PCU/SPIU was efficient in preparing periodic progress reports (technical and financial). Its financial management was very good, with the timely preparation of WAs and requests for NO. Audit reports were satisfactory. By contrast, M&E was weak and limited to tracking physical achievements (outputs) as opposed to monitoring outcomes and evaluating

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impacts. This has not been helped by a delayed baseline survey and an overly complicated original Logframe. The Logframe was revised during MTR, but did not attempt to review the outcome indicators, making it impossible for the project to generate reliable impact data. Impact was thus assessed by using proxy indicators and based on beneficiary interviews.

NGO/Other Services providers from the private sector have been the main partners during implementation. Consultants and firms have been contracted to deliver services such as training, enterprise mentoring, construction and technical assistance. Also, private entrepreneurs and former recipients of skills transfer have been employed as trainers, including under formal apprenticeship arrangements. Their performance has not been individually assessed, but it appears that altogether, they have performed satisfactorily. They have been highly instrumental in bringing the project forward and consolidating its advances in terms of building long-lasting business advisory capacities for SMEs and cooperatives.

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Cofinancier(s) UNIDO came along as development partner and co-financier of the project in 2011, with the design and implementation of a 2-year extension of the project. UNIDO contributed with its technical expertise (in kind contribution) in the area of manufacturing, employment, value chain development, marketing and enterprise development. UNIDO participated in 4 follow-up/implementation support missions as of 2011. The quality of its services is not further assessed, but it appears to be satisfactory as no issues are mentioned. UNIDO has enabled a critical and much appreciated extension of the project of 2 years.

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It appears that partners have collaborated well. No issues were mentioned



The project’s impact on household incomes and assets was positive. Proxy indicators show that project interventions in community mobilization, animation, literacy training, and especially skills transfer had a substantial impact on the income-generating potential of the target group. Individuals and leaders of groups and cooperatives who have benefited from capacity building efforts have been able to substantially increase their household incomes. At the same time, they have contributed to the creation of new off-farm jobs in the rural areas, improving the incomes of many more households. The overall impact of training and capacity strengthening activities on incomes of the rural poor is difficult to assess, given the chain effects between trainers, SMEs, individuals and households, and given also the lack of data, but can be considered substantial. It has positively impacted the livelihoods and wellbeing of the rural poor, many now self-employed, skilled and/or organized in groups and cooperatives (even union and federations). In terms of assets, investments in physical assets for SME and cooperatives, such as machinery, equipment and buildings for manufacturing, processing and marketing activities have had a significant impact on the living conditions of the poor. The PCR states that the additional income generated from increased business activities has been used to improve housing and living conditions in general through the purchase of domestic assets (bicycles, etc...). The project’s impact on the accumulation of financial assets was substantial too, including the access to formal credit and financial services. Many SMEs and cooperatives have benefited from subsidized start-up credits and, by repaying on time, have become eligible for further loans, enabling them to expand and consolidate their respective businesses. Individuals and small operators have gained access to micro-lending and have increased their private savings. By contrast, the credit line to MFIs has performed below expectations.

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Food Security According to the PCR, the project made only a modest impact on food security, since the project did not include direct activities to improve agricultural production and household nutrition. Nevertheless, food security could be improved thanks to sustainable and higher off-farm incomes, which enable better access to food.

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Ag. Productivity The project’s impact on agricultural productivity has not been as strong as expected. The creation of SMEs has added value to agricultural and livestock products, but it was only when the project shifted to a value-chain approach that production-processing/manufacturing–marketing linkages were strengthened and that farmers adopted a “business” approach by raising productivity, seeing downstream potentials.

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The project was not meant to, and thus, only had a modest impact on the physical environment and natural resource base through the conduct of off-farm economic activities. Nevertheless, due attention was given to the use of renewable energy resources and to aspects related to waste disposal. The project’s impact on natural resource and the environment is not rated.

n.a


The project contributed to capacity strengthening and empowerment of the rural poor in many ways. It has strengthened human capacities through community mobilization, animation, literacy training, and skills transfer with the objective to open up additional off-farm income opportunities

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for the target group, develop functional businesses (SMEs and cooperatives) and skills development capacities in rural areas (services providers). Capacities were developed within the public sector, to transfer technologies, business skills, mentoring and start-up capital to SME including economic common interest groups (GIE) and cooperatives. Capacity building efforts have also targeted private sector operators (individuals and groups) involved in apprenticeship and business training. As such, individuals and group leaders were both the main recipients and the main provider of capacity building efforts. More importantly, the project contributed to changing people’s mind-set. Many are now more business oriented. They are able to recognize opportunities and to develop strategies to start a business or to improve and further develop existing ones. Women and the youth have greatly benefited from these advances. Particularly good progress was achieved in the mobilization, conduct and confidence of SMSs and cooperatives, though few have reached self-sufficiency. The project’s impact on social cohesion is undeniable.

Inst. & Policies The project’s greatest impact has been in the area of institutional strengthening and policy support. The project has had a substantial impact on improving the economic operating environment of the rural poor. This is witnessed by Government’s adoption of the Proximity Business Advisor’s Scheme and the formalization of the accreditation process for the apprenticeship programme, both initiated and developed by the project. The project has also helped expanding the outreach of the institutional credit for productive purposes, in particular to the benefit of SMEs. Outreach to cooperatives was however limited, including capacity strengthening of financial intermediaries. The credit line to MFIs has performed below expectations. One of the objectives of the project was to contribute to the development of a national policy for SME development. This policy was developed and adopted within the framework of Rwanda Vision 2020. The experience of the PPPMER project has directly contributed to shaping this policy.

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Markets The project’s impact on markets has not been as important as expected. The project had an impact on broadening and deepening markets by increasing the real demand for agricultural and livestock products, providing some key infrastructure for the rural cooperatives, such as retail outlets, production units and providing basic business training for SMEs. However, despite adopting a value-chain approach in later years, the project continued to provide upstream support without ensuring that this development is driven by an existing end-product demand on markets.

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Project Impact The project is generally regarded as very successful and its impact on the rural poor is regarded as positive and substantial. Given the weakness of the M&E system, it has failed, however, to systematically record positive results and demonstrate its impact. The terminal Project Impact Assessment Study was still being drafted when the PCR was prepared. Given the lack of M&E data, its conclusions were underpinned by proxy indicators and beneficiary interviews. The PCR rightly points out that in the aftermath of the genocide, the improvements in the rural economy and living conditions over the past 20 years since the design of the first phase (1995) were massive. It is difficult to assess, however, how much is attributable to the project (PPPMER I & II).

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Overarching Factors

Innovation The project has introduced two approaches which were new to the Rwandan context: (i) willingness to support the initiatives of beneficiary groups (economic interest groups); and (ii) design and delivery of appropriate technical and material assistance to enable SMEs to become and remain viable beyond the life of the project. Another innovation under PPPMER II concerns the downsizing and merging of the PCU into the MINICOM Single Project Implementation Unit in order to consolidate expertise from related projects, retain the institutional memory and reduce overhead costs of ongoing interventions.

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The Proximity Business Advisers Scheme (PROBA) has been adopted by Government in a refined version. It has been established as interface between government and small scale private sector operators with self-employed staff at sector level, who are overseen by well-qualified business-minded facilitators attached to the district offices. PROBAs were established in all 416 sectors. All were trained in entrepreneurship and business management business plan development, PROBA scheme and voucher system, trade and trade issues for SMEs, etc. By end 2013, 7252 SMEs and potential entrepreneurs had benefited from the services of the PROBA. This can be seen as a positive example of scaling up a successful and approach and essential tool to developing small scale rural businesses.

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The project has succeeded in establishing functional business skills development capacity within the public service and professional organizations and in extending access to affordable non-farm credit to a considerable number of rural poor. A reasonable proportion of supported SMEs and cooperatives have graduated to financial viability. With the continued commitment of MINCOM,

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local government structures and professional organizations, most activities can be regarded as sustainable. The PCR concludes that most of the project’s activities are likely to go on after the project’s closure since approaches, techniques and schemes developed under the project are still relevant to many of the new partners’ institutions, such as MINICOM, the Cooperative Agency and local government structures. The project has also contributed to creating a pool of resourceful rural service providers, which are likely to remain beyond the life of the project, provided new businesses continue to emerge. Furthermore, by continuously adapting its interventions to ongoing policy changes and reforms, the project has maximized chances for sustainability. The project prepared a sound exit strategy. As part of this strategy, all business development capacities were transferred to local government and organizations, which will continue to support rural organizations and apprentices. In some cases, MoUs were signed to ensure that trained staff was retained or recruited on a permanent basis to continue the promotion of specific activities. The Proximity Business Advisory Scheme is considered fully sustainable since several institutions in support of rural enterprises and entrepreneur development have adopted it. The project has benefited from continuous political commitment and support and there is no reason to believe that this is going to stop. Concurrently, the project has contributed to shaping sectoral policies and practices related to SME development and off-farm incomes generation, which are likely to be followed on. A main contributing factor to project sustainability has been its approach focused on viable SMEs and groups with a properly articulated physical and financial business proposition.

Targeting The target groups comprised subsistence, emerging and expanding SME/cooperatives and very vulnerable groups (women, women headed households, uneducated and unemployed rural youth, households headed by children and orphans, rural landless, families affected by HIV/AIDS and former soldiers resettled in rural areas). Mostly, these different groups live side by side. In almost all cases, the project succeeded in improving their incomes by offering supplementary income earning opportunities. The target group was self-selected by the rural poor, especially women, coming together in groups to engage into off-farm income generating activities. Later, they formed cooperatives, rather than groups. The PCR concludes that the targeting as appropriate.

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Gender The project was designed to deal with the most vulnerable, which, in the particular context of Rwanda include women, women headed households, households headed by children and orphans. The gender focus was therefore strong from the outset. The project aimed in particular at providing off-farm income opportunities and group leadership positions to women, particularly for women/female/child headed households and orphans. One of the project’s main successes has been in achieving near parity in women’s participation as a result of mainstreaming gender considerations in all aspects of project design and implementation. At design, it was anticipated that 30% of the project beneficiaries would be women. This target was increase by more than 20%.

5



71 448 in total of which 35 398 women and 36 050 men.

PCR Quality

Scope The guidelines are fully respected. 5

Quality Very analytical and well written. Adopts a “Logframe approach” which makes it very well structured and easy to follow. Excellent summary table called “project completion digest” which gives a good overview of project performance and impact. Altogether, the PCR is of very good quality but missed out on the lack of impact data, due to the absence of a fully functioning M&E system. Also, by attempting to be as objective as possible, it sometimes does not give sufficient indication about the extent of the impact. For example, the performance of partners is very succinctly described, but not sufficiently assessed in qualitative terms, making it difficult for the outside reader to make a judgment. The PCRs sometimes confuses effectiveness and efficiency.

5

Lessons The lessons learned are not always true lessons learned. Many of the conclusions drawn would rather go into the assessment section.

4

Candour Very objective, sometimes even too “neutral” in its assessments. 5


42

Rwanda - Support Project for the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture


Country & Project Name Rwanda - Support Project for the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture Ratings

Loan No.: 671-RW

Project Id. 1320


Entry into Force 31 March 2006

Completion Date 31 March 2013


Total Project Cost US$(M)

35 873

IFAD loan& Grant US$(M) DSF Grants: US$4 250; Grant: US$202; Loan+sup.: US$9 458;

Cofinanciers (if any) Germany (DED): US$61; UK (DfID): US$5 412; WFP: US$2 661; Government: US$2 761; Beneficiaries: US$3 673


Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture

Principal Components The main project components are: (i) institutional support for the agricultural sector; (ii) pilot actions through innovative models; and (iii) project coordination and management.

Project Performance

Relevance The project was highly relevant as it was specifically designed to provide support to the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation (PSTA). It was fully aligned with the National Agricultural Policy and the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), which identify the agricultural sector as the main engine of growth. It also responded well to Government priorities, to the need to support the development of the SWAp and the reorganization of the MINAGRI with the view to facilitating agricultural transformation. The project provided strategic and institutional support in key areas. It also led the development of technical innovations in areas critical to lifting the main constraints to agricultural development. Project design was flexible enough to enable the project to adapt to ongoing institutional and policy reforms. The approaches introduced by the project proved to be highly relevant to the Rwandan context as shown by the results achieved, in particular in terms of community participation, ownership and replication/scaling up. All approaches were designed to maximize chances for sustainability. Beneficiaries have fully adhered to the objectives and approaches as shown by their in-kind contribution, which stood at 484% at completion, compared to the initial plan. Following the success of PAPSTA, other projects were designed along the same lines. The institutional set up of PAPSTA was deemed relevant too. PAPSTA was placed within MINAGRI and supervised by the Permanent Secretary, which enabled it to fully play its role in facilitating implementation of the PSTA and of the SWAp. At the local level, PAPSTA developed institutional structures, which were aligned with government’s decentralization efforts and remained relevant throughout. The project further worked with local services providers, which proved to be the right approach to project implementation. It can be concluded that the project was highly relevant by its goal and objectives and that it was designed to attain the objectives set.

6

Effectiveness PAPSTA was found effective. Globally, the project had a positive socio-economic impact and contributed to improving the living conditions of the beneficiaries and the environment. With regard to institutional strengthening, the project has successfully facilitated changes within MINAGRI. It has developed and elaborated a number of strategies, which were adopted by the ministry (change management, financial management, gender mainstreaming, knowledge management). It has spearheaded the formulation of PSTA II and III, facilitated its implementation in a decentralized environment and promoted the SWAp. Effectiveness of these interventions is witnessed by the fact that PAPSTA activities have attracted new donors and financing to the sector. The project has also been effective in strengthening the capacities of MINAGRI, technical agencies (which were also assisted in adapting their services to the needs of sector stakeholders) and apex farmer’s organizations. PAPSTA model for capacity building was replicated by the Ministry of Public Service and Labour. At local level, PAPSTA’s approach to building local management and supervision commissions (CLGS), community innovation centers (CCI) and cooperatives was effective, as shown by the high level of community involvement and participation in the development of watershed management plans. This was also shown by the involvement of local administrative authorities in the CLGS. With regard to piloting and replication, the project piloted the development of 9 technical innovations in 6 watersheds, which have been replicated in 5 additional watersheds. 44 180 ha of degraded land (or 443% of the appraisal target) were hedged and protected, more than 30 million agro-forestry trees (92% of target) were produced and transplanted and 683 ha layouts of progressive terracing (105%) were established. The institutionalization of knowledge management and learning within the PCU was a significant step forward and made a positive contribution to capturing innovations a success stories for replication and scaling up. The project benefited from a

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baseline and a well-functioning M&E system (though established late).

Efficiency Efficiency of PAPSTA was satisfactory. Total financing at appraisal stood at USD 20.1 million. Following a shift in co-financing (withdrawal of the Netherlands & BSF and new contribution from WFP, DED and DfID), total financing reached USD 31.25 million. The overall disbursement rate reached 100.6% and was highly satisfactory. IFAD resources (2 loans and 3 grants) were fully disbursed, while WFP and DfID failed to provide the full amount committed (43.5% and 63%). Beneficiary in-kind contributions exceeded by far the initial amount (484%) leading to a slight over-disbursement in total. The internal rate of return was estimated between 34 and 38% (compared to an estimated 26% at appraisal). After 10 years of operation, an investment of 1 RWF would have generated between 4.96 and 5.06 RWF, which is considered satisfactory. The project was implemented within the timeline. Following some changes in design and implementation, a loan amendment & reallocation of funds were approved in 2008 and 2010.

5


Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD performance was highly satisfactory. IFAD played a significant role in implementation and supervision. It provided timely and adequate support at all times. IFAD performed highly with respect to loan administration and communication with the project and the government.

5

Cooperating Institution During its first year, the project was supervised by UNOPS. Technical supervision was satisfactory. UNOPS supervision missions helped improve project performance and targeting. By contrast, UNOPS loan administration was slow. Until the project came under IFAD direct supervision, project implementation suffered from delays in approvals and no-objections.

4

Government Government’s performance was highly satisfactory. Loan covenants and financial agreements were fully respected. Government consistently released the required amount of counterpart funds. Procurement conditions were respected and audits were satisfactorily performed. Government actively participated in all supervision missions and provided necessary implementation support. More importantly, it developed appropriate sectoral policies in support of the project. Project management was performed through the SPIU (Single Project Implementation Unit). The SPIU performed well as evidenced by: the quality of the baseline survey, studies, thematic evaluations, workshops etc. Progress reports, annual review workshops, AWPB and audits were prepared and organized on time. M&E and KM were incorporated into the activity plans. Procurement and financial management were adequate. Finally, a sound financial management allowed the project to reach an overall disbursement rate of 100.6%. The SPIU received awards for good performance.

5

NGO/Other The project used various services providers for the implementation of its activities in 3 ecological zones. Results were very positive as demonstrated by the 9 technical innovations that were successfully developed, implemented and replicated. Nevertheless, it was mentioned that work plans between the SPIU and the different services providers would have deserved better harmonization and coordination.

5

Cofinancier(s) During implementation, there was a swap between co-financiers. Initial co-financiers withdrew (BSF and the Netherlands) and new ones came on board (WFP, DfID and DED). Overall, it allowed the project to reach a higher level of co-financing. WFP and DfID, however, defaulted to release some of the agreed contribution. Disbursements reached 43.6% and 63%, respectively.

4


Combined performance of partners was very positive. Beneficiary participation and collaboration was strong, as shown by a contribution in cash, kind, material and labour that far exceeded the amount expected at appraisal (484%).



The 2010 impact survey demonstrated significant improvements in household incomes and assets. The project’s investments had the following direct impacts: (i) watershed development and protection (integration of hedging with terracing and distribution of livestock) reduced soil erosion, improved soil productivity and thus, contributed to higher yields and incomes; (ii) provision of post-harvest infrastructure reduced post-harvest losses and enabled farmers to monitor their sales. These measures have had an impact on the quality and the quantity of the produce being sold, and on the prices, generating higher incomes from sale; (iii) marketability of milk could be improved through the construction of milk collection centers. However, some centers were not fully operational at project completion. Kitchen gardening also contributed to increasing the incomes of those involved. Most beneficiaries confirmed an increase in their physical assets such as TVs, radios, livestock, land, means of transportation and even shoes and other clothes. By contrast, PAPSTA’s impact on financial assets was moderate, in particular as regards the accumulation of financial assets and support to establishing viable cooperatives, which are still struggling to reach financial self-sufficiency.

5

Food Security The project’s impact on food security was highly satisfactory. 80% of those interviewed at the end of the project confirmed that PAPSTA had a significant impact on household food security. Several activities have contributed to this result. The distribution of cows and the livestock pass-on-gift

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(POG) approach have resulted into increased milk production and consumption. Milk consumption was new to some households, which have considerably improved their diets by starting to drink milk on a regular basis. Others could simply increase their milk consumption. Moreover, part of the income generated from selling milk is used for purchasing food, improving household food security and nutrition. Household food security could also be improved through improved agricultural production and productivity. Main contributing factors include investments and support to soil protection, increased use of manure and other inputs and the introduction of intensive rice cultivation systems. Household food security, nutrition and diet could also be improved through the introduction of kitchen gardens. In the short term, food-for-work helped the families while the watersheds were being developed, and until they could start using the newly developed terraced land.

Ag. Productivity The project had a significant impact on agricultural production and productivity. The project distributed cows with a high genetic potential and trained many poor farmers in proper animal husbandry techniques, incl. animal nutrition, disease control and milk production. This has not only contributed to improving livestock productivity but also to changing the mind-set of farmers in the project area. Altogether, the project contributed to “demystifying” dairy cow production. It is now widely acknowledged, not only by farmers but also by the Government and other stakeholders, that poor farmers have the capacity to manage dairy cow production. This has been a major contributing factor to the transformation and modernization of agriculture. Eight years after the launching of PAPSTA, this type of modern livestock production by small farmers has become a normal practice across the country. Other activities, which have contributed to improving agricultural productivity, include: (i) promotion of zero-grazing which has increased the availability of manure and has improved soil fertility leading to substantial improvement in agricultural production and productivity; (ii) promotion of intensive rice cultivation systems which combines specific plantation techniques with the sensible use of water and fertilizers. This approach led to high yields and was quickly adopted by the beneficiaries. Yields of other crops such as maize and beans could also be increase but the results cannot be attributable to the project only as the National Crop Intensification Programme played a key role in this process; (iii) introduction of “kitchen gardens” which has resulted in increased vegetable production. This has certainly benefited those households, which have adopted the approach. However, the promotion at a larger scale and across seasons was not effective. The overall impact of kitchen gardens on agricultural production is therefore limited; and (iv) the promotion of rain water-harvesting techniques, which have opened up new opportunities for small-scale irrigation. Altogether, it appears that POG and Farmer’s Field Schools have played an important role in productivity increases and in lifting people out of poverty.

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5


The project had a positive impact on the environment, in particular on watershed management. The watershed management and protection approach developed and replicated by the project, and later adopted by another IFAD project in Rwanda has proven to be technically sound and effective. It was developed in a participatory way, starting from the watershed management plans developed by the communities. Key features include: (i) food-for-work which helped the families during the transition period until they could start using the newly developed terraced land; (ii) the integration of fodder hedging (pennisetum grass and agro-forestry species) with terracing and other erosion control measures, and with the distribution of cows and small animals; and (iii) the “progressive” terracing which allowed targeting of the most vulnerable. Hedging was largely adopted and reached very good results, except in replication areas where the impact was limited by the lack of planting material and maintenance by the beneficiaries. More support is needed in these areas. Altogether, these measures had a very positive impact on soil protection and consolidation, improved soil fertility thanks to the availability of manure, and on land resource management in general.

5


The project had a strong impact on human and social capital in many ways. It trained many poor farmers in proper animal husbandry techniques and contributed to changing their mind set and strengthening their self-confidence by “demystifying” dairy cow production (see agricultural productivity). This has largely contributed to the transformation and modernization of agriculture to become an engine of economic growth in the rural sector. Eight years after the launching of PAPSTA, this type of modern livestock production by small farmers has become a normal practice across the country. The project’s emphasis on community mobilization and participation has further contributed to empowering communities and developing their social capital. They are now in a better position to manage their own development. The project has also provided training to: (i) government officials (MINAGRI) and staff from NGOs and other partners (mainly on-the-job); and (ii) farmers and community workers in areas of crop production, animal husbandry, planning and community development. Support to cooperative has enabled many beneficiaries to develop their economic activities, though governance and management capacities would still require further improvement.

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Inst. & Policies The project has developed and elaborated a number of strategies, which were adopted by MINAGRI (change management, financial management, gender mainstreaming, knowledge management). It has also spearheaded the formulation of PSTA II and III, and their implementation in a decentralized environment. PAPSTA played a key role in supporting the SWAp and its role in monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the EDPRS, PSTA I & II, Vision 2020 and various sub-sector strategies. Under PSTA III, it also supported the implementation of a decentralization action plan aiming to improve service delivery at the local level. At local level, the project helped establish local management and supervision committees (CLGS) in 11 watersheds. A good level of ownership and competence was reached. These CLGS have been supported by the local administration. All of them are being chaired by a district official. PAPSTA’s impact in the area is considered highly satisfactory.

6

Markets The PCR makes little reference to the project’s impact on markets. It appears that the project has had only a moderate impact in this area. The MTR already pointed out that project design failed to include a market support activity as shown by the difficulties faced by farmers in selling their produce, in particular milk. As such the sale of milk and surplus milk production remains an issue to be addressed (market access for milk producers/cooperatives).

4

Project Impact The project has definitely contributed to improving the living conditions, incomes and food security of the beneficiaries by providing knowledge and modern agricultural practices, in particular in the field of animal husbandry. New structures and jobs were created at local level in support of the decentralization process and linkages with public institutions were established to ensure long-term sustainability. Institutional strengthening has attracted further sector support, e.g. the EU which, in 2012, has increased its support from EUR 20 million to EUR 100 million. Innovations and replication have contributed to increased incomes, improved food security and better social cohesion. The percentage of poor households went down from 52% to 17% and the percentage of medium households went up from 46% to 77%.

5

Overarching Factors

Innovation With a component entitled “Pilot actions through innovative models”, the project was designed to promote innovations in four main areas: watershed protection and development, agriculture and livestock, marshland development and crop intensification and research. Innovative models for replication brought about by the project include: (i) “bocage” technique to protect and restore soil fertility through fencing with fodder shrubs and trees; (vi) Local Management and Supervision Committees (CLGS); (iii) POG scheme; (iv) Cow Health Insurance; (v) milk collection centers; (vi) Innovations Community Centers (CCI) for the dissemination of information and skills among the local communities and replication; (vii) community competition; (viii) Contact Persons and Village Intermediaries (PR&RV); and (ix) Integrated Community Approach to Sustainable Management of Watersheds;

5


The potential for replication and scaling-up is high and several activities have already taken place. All technical innovations were successfully replicated in 5 new watersheds. Also, the project’s approach to watershed management and protection was adopted and successfully replicated in another IFAD project (KWAMP). More significant is the countrywide adoption of the livestock production approach. 8 years after the project started, dairy cow production by small farmers has become a normal practice across the country and is being adopted in other countries as well. The institutionalization of knowledge management and learning within the PCU was a major contributing factor to the project’s success in this area. The project has also helped MINAGRI develop sector KM and support to peer learning groups. (CPM's additional comment: Some of PAPSTA’s innovations were replicated not only in other IFAD-funded projects but also in projects supported by other development partners (AfDB, WB). This was the case for the System of Rice Intensification (SRI) which was introduced in the Country by PAPSTA (with technical support from MADAGASCAR). It is now adopted at the national level. The other important innovation was the Irrigation Water Users Associations (WUAs). This model was so successful that the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources adopted it and decided to establish a WUA Unit under its structure.)

5


5


The project has prepared a detailed handover of its activities with an exit strategy and closing road map. This was done in close partnership with all stakeholders and includes activities such as: (i) integration of the CLGS into district development plans; (ii) integration of watershed protection areas into the sector development plans; (iii) lifting of the water fees to ensure sustainability of the WUAs; and (iv) transfer of infrastructure (Community Innovation Centers, Milk Collection Centers and the Drying Structures) and services to public partners. Sustainability of the livestock POG was satisfactory as the system was well internalized by the communities. By contrast, beneficiaries still need to gain a better ownership of the Pass on Cement and other materials scheme. The future of the Community Innovation Centers is questionable, as once handed over, these centers would need

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to generate their own resources. Regarding social capital and empowerment, sustainability prospects are good. Nevertheless, local governments need to capitalize achievements in the area of watershed management, in particular with regard to capacity strengthening of community workers and other local “links” such as relais villageois, para vets etc. Finally, the cooperatives will need further support to improve governance and management capacities.

Targeting The project was articulated to address the needs of the most vulnerable groups (women headed households, orphans, landless, HIV/IADS infected). Its targeting strategy is not explicitly assessed in the PCR. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the project’s targeting strategy was correct, given the clear contribution it made to poverty alleviation in the target area. According to the PCR, the percentage of poor households went down from 52% to 17% and the percentage of medium households went up from 46% to 77%.

5

Gender According to the baseline, 33% of the households in the project area were female headed. The project put in place mechanisms to address women specific needs, but they are not further explained in the PCR. It appears, however, that women have largely benefited from activities under the piloting and replication component.

4



PCR Quality

Scope The PCR complies with the guidelines. All required annexes are included. 6

Quality Good PCR with a well-developed analysis. However, given the amount of information available through the CPE and the 2010 Impact Assessment, the impact section could have been substantiated with more elements and data. Few elements only about gender and targeting.

4

Lessons Important lessons were learned from the implementation of PAPSTA and are well analysed in the PCR, by component and sub-component.

6

Candour Objective and well balanced assessment. 5


47

Guatemala - National Rural Development Programme Phase I: the Western Region


Country & Project Name Guatemala - National Rural Development Programme Phase I: the Western Region Ratings

Loan No.: 614-GT

Project Id. 1274







Cofinanciers (if any) OFID: US$10 000; Government: US$6 000; Beneficiaries: US$2 000


Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Nutrition (MAGA)

Principal Components Programme activities have been organized into four components, specifically: (i) Local Development Participation and Decentralization; (ii) Marketing and Rural Business; (iii) Rural Technical Services; and (iv) MAGA Institutional Strengthening. A gender-oriented strategy will crosscut all component activities. A PMU will also be established, including gender, planning, M&E, and administrative units

Project Performance

Relevance The PNDR's objectives were consistent with main features of IFAD's COSOP as well as with Government of Guatemala's (GoG) agricultural development strategies and development policies. The Programme focused on the needs of the rural poor by trying to reach all the minority and most vulnerable groups present in the area (especially the indigenous ones). However, several flaws have undermined project's relevance. The Programme's design was found to be characterized by too many objectives. A crucial weakness was that, despite some dramatic changes occurred at institutional level, the PMU did not keep up with the evolving institutional context and did not define a new strategy, but implemented with serious delays and only partially some of the original arrangements, such as those related to the decentralization and the community participation in development planning. Moreover, the strategy only considered income generation aspects related to productive development, whereas important issues related to market access were not sufficiently addressed. This is also linked to the fact that some of the experiences from past rural development programmes and IFAD's operations (such as PROCUCH and PROZACHI) were not taken into consideration, such as the need to adopt an approach to identify demand through business plans instead of production-based supply to markets. (Additional CPM comment: The programme was designed taking into account market access and the formulation of business plans by the beneficiaries’ organizations, but the PMU responsible for their implementation didn’t take into account this approach and preferred to do a classical approach that is production oriented model. It is important to point out that the experiences gained in two previous IFAD projects PRODEVER and PRODEQUI was taken into account in the project design. The project area concentrated 65% of the total indigenous population of the country.)

4

Effectiveness Programme's effectiveness has been low. The Programme was approved in September 2003, was declared effective in October 2006 and it was actually launched in July 2007. Later on, from 2007 to 2008, there were limited results also due to PMU's high staff turnover, while it was only from 2009 to 2011 that the Programme started to get some initial positive achievements, through the formulation of 109 investments projects which benefitted more than 6000 beneficiaries. At the 2011 MTR, it was recognized that the Programme had started positioning in the field, although the interventions were still only at an incipient level. A significant discontinuity in the implementation of the activities was registered during the overall Programme's life. Above all, it was recognized that the Programme's low performance had to be rooted in the political instability as well as in the inadequate and poorly efficient administrative and financial procedures both of the PMU and the MAGA (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Nutrition), which was the Executing Agency. The MTR recommended to modify several aspects of Programme's implementation as well as to adopt new procedures that were much more attuned to beneficiaries' demand. It was recognized that the Programme was putting emphasis only on the productive development, without considering the organizational, entrepreneurial and market-related strengthening process. The original logical framework was changed to include indicators and targets that were more in line with the modified implementation strategy. At MTR, it was suggested to ask for an extension to allow the Programme having more time for the new implementation strategy. However, this was not granted by IFAD, as it was deemed that another year would not lead to an impressive improvement in project's implementation. At MTR, it was stated that the Programme's development objectives had been reached at 41%. However, since 2011, the Program stood in an almost total paralysis of its actions, due to the change of Government, and also as a result of the events of 2012, when the Program

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was transferred from MAGA to FONAPAZ (Fondo Nacional para la Paz). Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that, up to August 2012, no M&E was put in place. Within this overall framework, the achievements reached at completion are quite limited compared to the targets set up at design.

Efficiency As stated in the PCR, this Programme has been highly inefficient for several reasons. Significant delays were registered since the Project's start up, as the effectiveness lag stood at 37.8 months, due to serious institutional level constraints in kicking off the project. After 6 years of implementation from 2006 to 2012, the final Programme's disbursement stood at 26%. When considering the ratio between the inputs/outputs, it is evident that this has been much higher than other comparable levels, as the Programme could have produced the same (limited) results with much less money. Above all, a further crucial element which accounts for low project's efficiency performance is the high incidence of operational and management costs compared to the ones for social and physical investments. The unexpected change of the Executing Agency during 2012 (from MAGA to FONAPAZ) also strongly contributed to lowering down the project's closing phase. (Additional CPM comment: The major percentage of use of projects funds was the payment of salaries and operating costs 65% and only 35% for investment.)

1


Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD performed well with respect to the roles defined in the Programme's loan agreement, by mobilizing adequate technical expertise in both preparatory and project's design works. Overall, IFAD was very active in trying to solve the main hurdles affecting Programme's implementation. During Programme's implementation, IFAD officially complained for the discrepancies existing between the objectives set up in the design and the results produced as well as for the lack of quantitative data affecting the Project's implementation progress. The Fund also made an effort to maintain the coordination among key partners in order to achieve the Programme's objectives. In 2012, IFAD took the right decision to not grant any further extension to the Programme, as the Programme's implementation life had been already compromised and there were very few possibilities to revert the situation.

5

Cooperating Institution This was an IFAD's directly supervised project.

Government The GoG is deemed responsible for the Programme's low achievements, mainly because of the highly changing political and institutional context that severely hindered Programme's smooth implementation. The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Nutrition (MAGA) which was the original Executing Agency, badly performed on fiduciary issues. Above all, MAGA showed an extremely low financing execution rate over project implementation as well as it did not assure an adequate and stable personnel retention and management. Other factors hindered MAGA's performance in managing the Programme: i) highly bureaucratic system to revise and approve projects; ii) huge delays in disbursing resources to finance projects; iii) lack of appropriate counterpart funding allocation; iv) lack of autonomy in budget management, purchasing and procurement; v) changes at Director's level; iv) high focus on implementing the production-oriented projects and weak focus on the market-related linkages. All these shortfalls have led to a Programme's unsatisfactory implementation level. The flows of funds and procurement procedures have also not been suitable for ensuring timely implementation. An effort was made to modify the project design during the implementation, but such adjustments were only lately made and did not have a significant positive effect on the overall project performance. Moreover, there is evidence that the recommendations stemming from donors' support missions were only partially followed up. Additionally, no effective M&E system was put in place and no sound exit strategy was planned. During the 2012, the Programme was translated from MAGA's to FONAPAZ's responsibility, without sending to previously informing IFAD to approve such substitution. This was the final stage which led to Programme's low performance.

2

NGO/Other

Cofinancier(s) OFID's loan funds started to be used since 2009. OFID performed well with respect to the role defined at Programme's design. It provided adequate support and gave a positive contribution by taking two important decisions: i) it disbursed an advanced payment of USD 1 million to Programme's account, which is something out of its regular working procedures; ii) changed the pari-passu arrangement between IFAD and OFID in order to smoothen the disbursements' management process.

5


As a whole, the quality of combined partner performance was poor, being characterized by a low level of coordination and understanding among stakeholders.



In the PCR, there is no evidence to assess Project's specific impact on this domain. Although the increase in potential economic opportunities of the rural poor was one of the objectives to be achieved by the Programme, no significant evidence is provided to demonstrate that these opportunities were actually provided to the target groups.

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Food Security Overall, from the limited data available, it is impossible to assess at what extent the rural poor improved their access to food.

n.a

Ag. Productivity No evidence has been provided in the PCR to assess a significant increase on this domain, as a result of project implementation.

n.a


(Additional CPM comment: It is important to point out the formulation of technical assistance plans for the technicians and grass roots organizations of the project regarding irrigation and greenhouses. Green houses were a good tool for the implementation of small investments projects.) However, from the PCR review, it seems there is insufficient information to make any assessment at the impact level.

n.a


No evidence accounts for the contribution made by the project to the protection and rehabilitation of natural resources. No evidence is provided in relation to a better access by local communities to natural resources as a result of project activities.

n.a


In terms of social capital, it does not seem that rural peoples' organizations and/or grassroots organizations underwent any change (despite being this one of the objectives to be pursued by the project). As per the initial project's design, beneficiaries were meant to actively participate in the Programme in several instances. However, this did not happen and their participation was just limited to the formulation of some investment projects. Also, from the available documentation, it does not emerge that the project succeeded in empowering the target group. In terms of human capital, rural poor did not seem to have benefitted from better health and education services.

2

Inst. & Policies In the PCR there is no evidence to assess Project's specific impact on this domain. n.a

Markets In the PCR there is no evidence to assess Project's specific impact on this domain. n.a

Project Impact The PCR just makes a general and brief statement about the project's overall impact, assessing that the Programme only had some impact to reduce rural poverty. However, there no analysis was made (due to lack of both qualitative and quantitative data) to assess its impact on the various impact domains.

2

Overarching Factors

Innovation At design level, the Project tried to be innovative by attempting to promote some innovative features, such as the use and consolidation of Government decentralization's processes and mechanism, as a tool to empower indigenous and not indigenous rural poor. However, because of the Project's failure, the Programme's innovation potential represents a kind of "lost opportunity" for the introduction of innovations in the project area.

1


Given the overall poor Project's performance, there are no successful examples that could be replicated and/or upscaled.

1


1


Programme's sustainability is considered to be unsatisfactory. No specific strategy was prepared and agreed upon by key partners to ensure post-project sustainability. There are no chances that projects' limited impact may be sustainable beyond project's intervention. The Programme did not consolidate business initiatives and did not promote social covenant agreements with officials of the departments and municipalities located in the geographic area of influence. Producer groups did not take responsibility to continue the project activities undertaken in areas of organizational development, the management of territoriality and commercial activities with national and international trading companies. At project completion, there was no Government's commitment in continuing the adoption of the development approach promoted by the PNDR. (Additional CPM comment: Even though the action of the project was limited, it is important to show that the involvement of 20 local council committees for a political coordination (COCODES was an important step for empowerment of the local council in the planning and prioritization of their needs regarding rural development issues.)

2

Targeting The targeting approach adopted by the PNDR aimed at including the poor and extremely poor rural households, with a focus on the indigenous population and the youth. The MTR considered the targeting approach to be correct, as the beneficiaries were the rural poor and extremely poor households from isolated villages and communities, lacking any access to technical and financial services. However, it was also observed that the beneficiaries had not been fully and clearly identified, as the Programme was attending groups and target population in a generalized way.

3

Gender Despite the fact that, at the level of design, gender was meant to be a crosscutting feature over the implementation of the Programme, this did not happen as gender issues were given little attention during project implementation, with the exception of the period 2009-2011. The only positive result was that a significant proportion of women (52%) were included in the investment projects. However, their participation was rather passive and there is no evidence that they have participated in the decision making process. No evidence is provided about significant changes occurred in women's lives as a consequence of project's implementation. Likewise no data account for an increase in women's social capital, income earning and employment opportunities.

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130,000 individuals (65% indigenous peoples)

PCR Quality

Scope The PCR covers only partially the outlined indicated in the 2006 Guidelines for PCR Preparation. However, it has also to be recognized that, given the serious limitations, a huge effort was made to produce this PCR.

4

Quality The quality of the PCR mirrors the difficult Programme's implementation period and its poor achievements. The description, analysis and conclusions are somewhat flawed. This is clearly linked to the troublesome implementation experienced by the Programme, with its several changes in Programme's Executing Agency and PMU's staff, as well as the lack of an appropriate information (both quantitative and qualitative) database and M&E system. But, as per CPM comments, the PCR quality itself is high in the context, given the limited data available and the project context.

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Lessons Lessons are clearly drawn and highly relevant to explain the reason underlying the poor performance of the project. (Additional note from the CPM on an important lesson from the project: Take into account the long process for loan approval on the Government side, it will be necessary to explore with government authorities other ways to speed up the approval process by the different actors involved. It will be necessary during the design of a new project to analyze very careful the institutional capacity of the PMU taking into accounts this experience.)

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Candour The Programme's poor performance is assessed in an objective manner: all major weaknesses and responsibilities which gave rise to the poor Programme's achievements have been identified and spelt out.

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Nicaragua - Technical Assistance Fund Programme for the Departments of León, Chinandega and Managua (FAT)


Country & Project Name Nicaragua - Technical Assistance Fund Programme for the Departments of León, Chinandega and Managua (FAT)

Ratings

Loan No.: 529-NI

Project Id. 1120







Cofinanciers (if any) World Ban: US$3.15; Switzerland/SDC: US$0.35; Government: US$1.23; Beneficiaries: US$1.65


Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

Principal Components The principal components of the projects are: (i) Promotion and organizational development; (ii) Pre-investment financing; (iii) Technical assistance services; (iv) Capacity-building support; (v) Technology adoption through small-scale investments; (vi) Information campaign and gender focus; (vii) Management, monitoring and evaluation.

Project Performance

Relevance FAT has been relevant to different actors (small and medium producers, rural entrepreneurs, suppliers of support services and institutions of the public agricultural sector) as it addressed a structural issue related to the low coverage of technical assistance (TA), with its implications on productivity and rural poverty. FAT strategy was based on the setting up of a fund which would help small and medium producers (PMP) improve their access to TA services, in order to increase their production, improve the transformation and marketing processes of agricultural and forestry products. The project was consistent with the public policy's main trends concerning the farming sector. It was also consistent with IFAD's strategy and objective of poverty reduction. FAT project was implemented in three phases, each of 4 years length. The project took into account the lessons learned from previous IFAD's projects implemented in Nicaragua, which stressed the importance of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of TA within broader and wider programmes and strategies. FAT adopted a demand-driven approach and its strategy was based on transferring public resources on a competitive and transparent scheme, also having the producers co-financing the provision of TA. Project's flexibility to adapt and respond to public strategies has been fundamental to channel resources to people living in extreme poverty conditions. During its implementation, FAT also made adjustments to its strategy by directing resource allocation for micro projects to larger projects, which apart from satisfying the survival needs, would positively affect the organizations' development as well as better economic performance. During project's implementation, it was also recognized that the TA on its own was not leading to higher incomes and better living opportunities of the poorest families. Hence, starting from Phase II and even more in Phase III, a new development objective was added to respond to one of the main public policies of Government of Nicaragua (GoN), i.e. to provide goods (such as pigs, poultry, cattle, milk, eggs, basic grains) and assets (construction material, extract, manual mills) to women with a Food Production Bond (BPA) within the framework of the Food Production Program (PPA), as well as TA services to women's organizations organized in cores (nucleos). FAT also allocated some resources to meet the demands of producers in the field of technological innovation, which were transformed into research initiatives undertaken by universities in partnership with INTA.

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Effectiveness The project was implemented through the "flexible funding mechanism", having been executed in three phases, subject to fulfilment of certain preconditions (triggers). FAT specific objective was to "ensure sustained access of families of small and medium producers and rural entrepreneurs, to the private TA, based on a competitive bid, according to their needs". Initially, FAT faced some difficulties related to: i) initial delays due to the setting up of the Executing Agency (FUNICA); ii) change in project's Executing Agency and the interruption of processes, that hindered the smooth implementation of activities. However, things positively changed during FAT implementation. Project's scope can be summarized in the following figures: a) a total of 16,000 small and medium farmers (against an initial foreseen number of 15000) were attended, where at least 7,000 women (44%) received the food production bond (BPA); b) the demand of 16,000 producers was successfully linked to the over 300 professionals, whose capacities have been developed by offering TA services to small producers; c) FAT worked with 184 organizations, implementing mostly productive projects; d) there were established partnerships with two universities; d) 1,700 farmers (80% women) were involved and trained in Rural Promotion to provide services within their communities; e) there were made available new 60 technologies, and at least 34 of them have been

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adopted by producers; f) 1,000 service contracts were set up as a coordination mechanism between suppliers and producer organizations on a demand-driven basis. Resulting from the new modalities to supply TA services, there have been: i) a diversification of both production systems and productivity levels, also adding value to primary production (in some cases for export); ii) improved organizational levels; iii) capacity building of actors both in terms of supply and demand of TA services, including the training of a considerable number of promoters (mostly women). Despite reduced funding (as the contribution of BM-SDC did not materialize), FAT was able to achieve its results due to: i) institutional support, ii) revaluation of IFAD financing (converting SDRs to U.S. dollars); iii) funds' reallocation in each phase; iv) review and adjustment of operating mechanisms; v) the initial allocation of a contingency amount (75% of planned co-financing).

Efficiency The project had an effectiveness lag of 14.3 months. Its final funding was USD$ 17.191 (16.4% reduction), since the contribution of BM-SDC did not materialize. As mentioned in the PCR, FAT efficiency changed over its 3 phases. In Phase I, it was executed 30% of the estimated amount due to: i) the low performance of the Fund, also due to the ongoing FUNICA's creation and consolidation process; ii) the financing of small initiatives, with a low investment level and high operating costs. In Phase II, the estimated amount was overcome by 7%, thanks to the measures taken by FUNICA to improve the operating model, the funding of larger proposals and lower operating costs. In Phase III, along with the mass execution of BPA, there were realized increased investments. Operating costs were over twice the initially estimated amount, as it was expected that some of these costs were funded by other sources; this did not happen and these costs were covered through the reduction of other spending categories. The ratio between expenses/investments strongly improved over project's implementation period, going from 291% in Phase I to 21% in Phase II and 33% in Phase III; the overall final level was 34%. By June 2013, disbursement of IFAD funds stood at 98%. The efficiency of the FAT is evidenced by the following: a) for every dollar invested, U.S.$ 0.11 was spent for project's execution, which is considered very satisfactory, despite a peak in Phase I (for every dollar invested, U.S.$ 0.69 was spent for the process of setting up and initial implementation of the project); b) when considering the relationship between total costs and attended producers, it emerges that project's total cost amounted to USD 14916,568, with a total cost for producer of U.S.$ 784.38, which is considered satisfactory; c) the net present value (NPV) is U.S. $ 9,572,240, whose positive value means that the investments have been profitable from an economic point of view; c) EIRR 53%, and d) the ration benefit/cost is equal to 7.62.

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Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD's long relationship with the country has been highly appreciated, also considering its ability to be flexible in adapting to and accompanying GoN's public policies. IFAD, through FAT, has contributed to: i) put on the table the issue of technological innovation; ii) strengthening policies and instruments for the transfer of resources to producers, enabling them to get better access to services, enabling mass dissemination of knowledge and technologies; and iii) improve TA services and the market in which they operate, encouraging sustainable relationships between producer groups (demanding TA) and providers (supplying TA). During phase I, IFAD conducted supervision missions jointly with WB and SDC; during phase III, IFAD managed the supervision missions on its own. These were carried out as planned and were important to improve project's development and decision making. Starting from 2010, IFAD also appointed a consultant in Nicaragua which has contributed to coordination, harmonization, monitoring and support to projects. During this period, there has also been a direct support in implementing fiduciary issues.

6

Cooperating Institution FAT was under WB's supervision until 2010. The WB was also an important stakeholder in FAT financing and implementation. It provided a notable technical support, on top of dealing with administrative and fiduciary aspects.

5

Government Three governments characterized FAT's implementation; all made good efforts to keep FAT as a new initiative for developing a market for TA services, in complementarity with government policies. GoN's funding was reported to be 45% of the projected amount. To remain in line with each underway policy, some adjustments were necessary in order to give continuity to FAT proposals and strategies. Phases I and II (2000-2009) were executed by FUNICA (a public-private organization created under the National Agricultural Technology Programme and Training), while MAGFOR acted as the leading agency. FUNICA was expected be the project's executing agency for FAT entire lifetime. However, in Phase III GoN decided to become directly in charge of FAT, through MAGFOR; this led to FAT facing an inactivity period of nearly two years, with a low implementation process and increased costs. Eventually, the difficulties were overcome and so the project was closed in a timely manner. It seems that within the transition between phases, the continuity in operations and project approach was possible through the stability of FAT staff members. FUNICA has had a satisfactory performance; some initial difficulties encountered at the beginning were

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easily overcome and satisfactory results were achieved. FUNICA adopted FAT tools and methodologies in the implementation of a project in Segovia and other own initiatives of the Foundation, by managing other financing sources (SDC and the Netherlands, among others). MAGFOR fulfilled its obligations as planned, in terms of counterpart obligations and resource management, despite the initially faced difficulties. Overall, the loan covenants were satisfactory complied. On audit, during the Phase III, some issues were detected as related to the delayed delivery of 2012 audit report, as well as concerning some ineligible expenditure; however, corrective measures were satisfactory taken.

NGO/Other INTA participated in the implementation of Technical Assistance Projects and Technology Transfer (PATT), through an implementing agreement with MAGFOR (the PATT is technically a government/ national institute of technology). Further, the performance of suppliers and universities was also satisfactory. Among other partners, SDC and Danida played an important role in FAT financing and implementation process. They also provided important technical contributions that allowed adjustments in FAT's strategy and delivery mechanisms as well as the creation and strengthening of FUNICA as the executing agency. In the second phase, through Danida funding, FAT was expanded to the region of Segovia, also by being executed by FUNICA.

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Cofinancier(s)


No controversial issues have been highlighted on stakeholders' performance.



Overall, limited information are available to measure impact at household (HH) levels. The PCR analysis is mainly based on the HHs surveys conducted at the end of FAT's Phase II and III, plus workshops with stakeholders, which have showed a positive significant difference in the level of FAT producers' income generated from agricultural activities, compared with that of the control groups, for each type of activity and at each stage. In Phase II, the agricultural production's gross margin of FAT beneficiaries was significantly higher for the three target groups, when compared to control groups, being: 25.1% for the subsistence farmers, 82% for small farmers and 48% for medium farmers. In Phase III, the agricultural production's gross margin was significantly higher compared with that of control groups, being 60% for small and medium producers (PMP), and 28% and 74% for producers involved in BPA, which received additional TA and capitalization assets which were included in the BPA 5 and 6, respectively. There is an implicit assumption that the positive impact is the direct result of one or more of the following factors: i) introduction of new crop varieties, technologies, farming and livestock practices; ii) reduction of production costs, iv) increased production yields, and v) improvement of the terms of trade thanks to the access to new or better markets, as a result of a better and more appropriate access to TA services provided by the project.

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Food Security Project's impact on this domain has been positive, mainly since the middle of Phase II and even more from Phase III, when an increased importance was given to food security of FAT's beneficiaries through the incorporation of BPA as part of a public policy aimed at benefitting rural women, above all. At least 70% of families have diversified and increased food consumption based on their own production. At least 75% of the 7,000 families that received BPA, have managed to produce over 60% of some basic commodities. Compared to control groups, it was identified an immediate positive impact on beneficiaries' food security through the production of greater quantities and more varied food within the farm. This particularly concerned: corn, beans, milk, eggs and chicken meat. In Phase III, there has been an impact on beneficiaries' food security mainly in terms of higher per capita consumption of milk, beans, egg and chicken meat. Beneficiaries of groups PMP and BPA-5 experienced a positive impact on the consumption of milk and eggs, while the beneficiaries of BPA-6 have improved their consumption of eggs and poultry consumption.

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Ag. Productivity FAT has had a positive impact on agricultural productivity. Producers, along the project's different phases, implemented new technologies and changes in agricultural production, mainly resulting from the TA services provided by the technicians. These enabled increased production yields and diversification of production systems (introduction of new crops, new technologies, new farming practices) (both with an estimate of 40%), increased stocking rate on pasture, introduction of improved pastures, rotation of pastures, breeding herd, increased milk production, animal weight and reducing production costs. According to household surveys conducted in Phases II and III, there have been significant results in the production of organic sesame, vegetables (tomato, watermelon), basic grains. These have been attributable not only to more extensive areas, but also to higher productivity (10-20% higher for FAT beneficiaries as attributable to TA). In Phase III, improvements included increased milk production (between 14% and 42%), curd (between 64% and 141%) and eggs (18%) at household level, as by-products of the goods supplied by BPA. While all three products provide a significant improvement in household diet (food security), milk

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Ratings

production has become a source of income for some households that sell the surplus.


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FAT has allowed to initiate a process of technical change in agricultural production systems that incorporate relevant aspects concerning the promotion of environmental sustainability. Environmentally-friendly interventions were implemented, such as reforestation, reduced use of chemicals in crop management, sustainable agricultural practices (such as soil conservation works and water management, crop rotation, and the recycling of waste for the production of organic fertilizers). However, while some interventions were undertaken and have had a positive contribution to the environment, it was also recognized that their effects are still very limited at farm plots level, partly because the focus of the intervention has been at farm level, and the overall family-based coverage in the area is not sufficient for a broader impact. Higher environmental impact at the farm level could only be expected through interventions at landscape-scale level or by covering a high proportion of producers in a specific area.

4


As a result of project intervention, the beneficiaries' social capital was strengthened and consolidated through the adoption of allocation and competitive transfer mechanism of resources to producer groups and cooperatives. This is evident if considering the prevalence of producers' groups and producers being organized even after project completion. At project completion, 160 organizations were still ongoing and 40% of them have been consolidated. The formation of 82 groups of the BPA, 75 cooperatives and 2 alliances or unions of cooperatives, has fostered the relationships of trust and cooperation within and between groups and organizations, as well as has reduced transaction costs. In terms of human capital, the project contributed to capacity development of TA service providers (300 professionals and small enterprises providing TA services to PMP and organizations) but also of producers and promoters. Through FAT intervention, a notable number of promoters (mostly women) were trained in the practice of Rural Promotion; these, through their linkages to PPA and INTA, are expected to provide TA services to producers in their community.

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Inst. & Policies FAT, throughout his life, played an important role as a public policy's instrument within the rural sector, providing innovative tools and methodologies. FAT took part in the national dialogue on sectoral public policies and through its executors (FUNICA in phase I and II, and particularly with MAGFOR and INTA in phase III), it was consolidated as: i) a policy instrument for technological innovation, ii) a transparent and efficient mechanism for channelling public resources to PMP, with new forms of TA. FAT interventions have been helpful in making adjustments in: i) the innovative policy frameworks, ii) working modalities and applied instruments; and iii) the creation of opportunities for discussion and analysis, taking into account women as active economic subjects. The relevance of the FAT at the institutional level is also recognized. Government officials acknowledged the valuable contribution of FAT in building a concept and approach to Rural Promotion, which is going to be strengthened in the future through the creation of a "round table on Rural Promotion" between sector institutions. Moreover, in the framework of projects financed by the International Cooperation, FAT has been a pioneer in terms of participation in the PPA, getting experience and confidence for the subsequent entry of new financing institutions. This has been recognized and valued by MAGFOR authorities.

6

Markets Through the adoption of a bottom-up approach, FAT developed more equal relations between demand and supply of TA services, thus laying the foundations of a market of more informed and equitable TA services. FAT contributed to an improved access to marketing channels, as some of the PMP cooperatives have developed their business as relatively autonomous small enterprises, which were able to insert in the national and, in some cases, even international market. FAT's strategy also concerned the organization of trade fairs, business trade exhibitions, partnerships. Better access to market conditions promoted by FAT has allowed: i) better terms of trade; ii) improvements in the quantity and/or quality of production, iii) access to new markets and better prices for volumes and quality. The results of Phase II showed that the majority of producers of sesame (directed to foreign markets) have traded between 44% to 57% of the crop through producer organizations (APRENIC, APAOs), differently from the control group which is more dependent on intermediaries and private companies. However, these results were found to be significant particularly for basic grains, which are directed to the domestic market. In Phase III, there were no improvements in basic grains' marketing processes, with a weak linkage with markets. The main reason has been that the production was mainly directed to consumption, with limited additional volumes. Only a small group of producers has managed to participate in national and international markets through organizations like UCASA and COMPACS. Additionally, grain prices show a seasonality effect in production. However, there were clear improvements in prices received for milk (between 5.56 and 33.29 %), but less for eggs (between 3.79 and 22.45%).

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Project Impact 5


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Ratings

Overarching Factors

Innovation FAT showed several innovative features, such as: a) development of a market of TA service providers; b) alliance with universities to carry out research projects demanded by producers; c) women's economic empowerment; d) rural extension approach based on Rural Promotion to expand coverage of TA services; e) flexibility in project management according to changes at government level. With concern to TA services, FAT innovative approach was based on: i) promoting the diversity of TA service providers, also by encouraging competition to improve the quality of services; ii) establishing contract negotiations and direct payments to suppliers; iii) emphasising new relations between producers and service TA suppliers through an ongoing outreach and communication; iv) promoting mechanisms and flexible resource allocation procedures to ensure the participation of the target population in resources administration; v) developing and disseminating environmental-friendly technologies as the main component for a sustainable production strategy. Through FAT were also introduced new crops, new technologies, and new farming and livestock practices. Specifically, in partnership with universities, three new technologies have been developed in the areas of beekeeping, external parasites of cattle and soil fertility. The project was also innovative in being executed by an independent entity - FUNICA (during phases I and II), under the supervision of public sector.

6


Lessons learned from the FAT are being incorporated in the work of institutions and programs. Government-related entities (MAGFOR, INTA and MEFCCA) have recognized that the experiences of the FAT, in particular concerning the provision of services under a demand-driven focus, have been useful for the design of new ongoing or future initiatives to be implemented, including PROCAVAL, PRODESEC, NICARIBE IFAD and other financed by the IDB and the World Bank-funded initiatives. FUNICA meanwhile has also adjusted and incorporated modalities and tools developed by the FAT to its institutional task, extending it to other regions (Segovia) and initiatives (Market Services). Also, thanks to FAT's long term association with MAGFOR and INTA, the PPA has infused strategies and working mechanisms whose vision coincides with that of GoN in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing production and productivity, strengthening food security and partnerships, strengthening the productive capacities of poor families with training, technical assistance, credit, inputs and adaptation to climate change.

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The activities of the FAT are likely to be sustainable both at institutional level as well as in terms of the target groups. The main pillars of FAT sustainability are: a) the institutionalization of some features of FAT strategy in public structures (INTA, MAGFOR, MEFCCA); b) the operation of small enterprises at local level that, even after the project, keep managing by their own means the TA services and resources needed to increase the income and quality of life; c) the incorporation of Rural Promotion as a mechanism to expand TA services' coverage; d) good economic and financial sustainability of the organizations benefitted during project's life. At project's completion, out of 184 beneficiary groups and organizations, 44 are still contracting TA services without FAT assistance and 162 organizations are still working. Of these latter, 40% have been consolidated and are able to secure their relationship with markets products. Within FAT sustainability and exit strategy, 15 business plans have been formulated; some of these have received the support of financial and development institutions. Out of the 300 TA providers, 70 (23%) have been formally inserted in organizations and associations, while the remaining are foreseen to keep providing their services after FAT completion. An important part of the 1,700 promoters trained by the FAT in Rural Promotion is equipped to keep providing TA services to producers within their communities. The Rural Promotion is actually an important sustainability element of BPA-supported cores and cooperatives. 34 out the 60 available technologies are being applied by producers. Some difficulties threatening FAT sustainability concern: i) insufficient coordination between agricultural development institutions to address food insecurity problems, poverty and climate change; ii) the geographical dispersion of groups and women's cooperatives of BPA which prevents cohesion and viability of these groups; iii) insufficient knowledge and low use of technology products that could solve specific problems related to the technologies promoted by the BPA (animal genetic erosion, high feed costs, etc..). The 82 new BPA-groups organized in Phase III, still require increased monitoring and support, and their viability depends on greater support from MEFCCA. Both INTA as MEFCCA are expected to keep strengthening these groups, prioritizing the poorest ones and accompanying them to their consolidation.

5

Targeting FAT has been in line with IFAD's targeting pillars. The project addressed the needs of three social groups: i) subsistence producers (vulnerable groups), with little land, no capital and poorly organized; ii) small producers integrated into the market, a little bit more capitalized and likely to make innovations, but with financial constraints; iii) consolidated producers (farmers), linked to market and more capitalized, which live on the farm, have a rural family culture, with greater

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monetary capacity to introduce technological changes; they are generally best organized. FAT interventions were mainly directed to the first two categories. During Phase III, through the support to PPA, FAT target group also included a large segment of the population with problems of food insecurity and poverty. In BPA implementation, the most vulnerable groups were prioritized; they were organized in cores and were trained in order to better manage good and assets being provided to them.

Gender FAT contributed to empower women both socially and economically, particularly through their involvement in the PPA-BPA. The implementation of BPA allowed a notable increase in the percentage of female participation, above 60% at project's completion. The decision to incorporate BPA within FAT contributed to the implementation of a public policy favouring the economic and social independence of rural women. The capitalization of 7,500 women through the BPA has allowed more equal relationships within the family and new economic opportunities for women; other important benefits related to better food security as well as increased empowerment. A huge number of women have also taken leadership roles, as about 76% of boards' members are women. FAT interventions also allowed that women involved in the BPA could enter the market. At national level, nearly 71% of BPA women have marketed their products within the community, whereas a 6% in municipal or department markets and fairs. Through their participation in BPA, women have gained US$114625 as revolving funds that have been utilized for small loans between women, as investment's counterpart, as well as to buying land and infrastructure for women's cooperatives.

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PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is fully in line with the 2006 Guidelines for PCR Preparation. Mostly all the requested annexes have been provided, with a remarkable quality.

6

Quality A good analysis has been conducted of the project's main achievements and shortcomings. Due to a weak M&E system, the PCR could not rely on a robust set of data to measure impact. Above all, the lack of a baseline for each of the project's three phases, prevented effective comparisons between baseline and the final status of the project. However, the conclusions of the report are considered reliable, as they have been supported by: household surveys conducted in Phases II and III (for Phase I there was no information available at HH's level of beneficiary producers), which entailed control groups; assessments phases; studies and systematization; supervision missions; annual reports and project plans; interviews with officials, experts, government officials and private entities; three regional workshops with over 100 beneficiaries. The conclusions of the report were discussed with government authorities and the Executive Committee of the project.

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Lessons The lessons learned reflect an in-depth reflection process on some of the project's most relevant issues.

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Candour The PCR is mostly in line with all the other information sources. 5


57

Albania - Programme for Sustainable Development in Rural Mountain Areas (SDRMA)


Country & Project Name Albania - Programme for Sustainable Development in Rural Mountain Areas (SDRMA) Ratings

Loan No.: 684-AL

Project Id. 1339


Entry into Force 14 February 2007

Completion Date 31 March 2013 (Original: 31 March 2012)

Final Closing Date 30 September 2013 (original: 30 September 2012)



Cofinanciers (if any) CEB: US$5.00; OFID: US$4.51; Government: US$5.01; Beneficiaries: US$1.74


Implementing Agency Ministry of Economy

Principal Components SDRMA would have four components, three to be realized through Mountain Areas Development Agency (MADA) and the fourth through Mountain Areas Finance Fund (MAFF). The three MADA-related components would be: (a) regional programme development; (b) private-sector development; and (c) field implementation and testing of investment approaches. The MAFF-related component would consist of the conversion of MAFF into a fully-fledged rural commercial bank.

Project Performance

Relevance SDRMA was in line with the Government of Albania (GoA's) National Strategy for Socio-Economic Development and with IFAD's 2005 COSOP. SDRMA's goal to increase household incomes in Albania’s mountain areas, particularly among the poorer rural population, has been highly relevant to the needs of the rural poor. Given the country’s location, limited natural resource base and stagnation in traditional growth areas, the SDRMA was conceptualized in the wake of a compelling need to shift the productive structure of the economy in the mountain areas to a rather limited number of underdeveloped value chain subsectors but with high growth potential, that represent strategic areas for the poor and disadvantaged groups to improve their economic opportunities, income and well-being. The Programme has been formulated, also, in consideration of the experience of the three previous IFAD-funded projects in the country, and it was in line with the IFAD country strategy in supporting projects and programmes driven by beneficiary participation both in design and implementation. The goal of SDRMA has been highly relevant to: (a) GoA's policy commitments to eradicate poverty in mountain areas and achieve social and economic cohesion through private-sector development and decentralization; (b) IFAD corporate, regional and country strategies; and (c) EU’s evolving financial policies for regional development agencies. At the same time, some design deficiencies were encountered mostly related to: i) the possibilities of MADA (Mountain Areas Development Strategy) into developing into a specialized regional organization, and MAFF (Mountain Areas Finance Fund) developing into a full-fledged commercial bank; ii) some organisational arrangements which happened to be overly complicated and without clear delineation of responsibilities leading to unintended and counterproductive working environment; iii) the human resource constraints, particularly, in the programme M&E function that resulted in, practically, no measurement of programme outcomes and impact. (CPM's comment: MADA developing into developing into a specialized regional organization and MAFF into a full-fledged commercial bank were two major objectives and these were not achieved.)

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Effectiveness Due to a poor M&E system, there has been no measurement of Programme outcomes. However, it seems that several positive achievements were attained. With concern to the Regional Programme Development component, the Programme was effective in establishing MADA as well as 21 Mountain areas FORA with 653 members. These have been instrumental for the implementation of 40 micro-projects. There were also set up a Mountain Areas National Forum and 97 commune LAPs/SDPs. A number of 167 commune and local government staff were trained in planning and drafting development strategies and plans. With regard to the Private Sector Development component, 17 SIPs were effectively implemented in 8 value-chains (1 chestnuts, 2 fruits, 4 grape production and wine processing, 2 vegetable production including potatoes, 3 livestock and milk/meat processing, 2 bee-keeping and honey processing, 2 medicinal/aromatic plants and mushrooms, and 1 tourism). 1618 individuals/businesses participated in 79 MADA promotional activities and 681 owners and business employees (40.8% women) were trained in 39 capacity building courses. In the context of the 17 SIPs, 123 mini-grants (average USD 5,173) and 41 TIGs (average USD 13,092) were disbursed. In the context of the brucellosis control, 5,625 stock owners vaccinated 306,622 small ruminants in 4 districts. In the context of SSEI (Small Scale Economic Infrastructure), there were built 10 irrigation schemes covering 820 ha; 1 water supply scheme; 20 water points; 12 rural roads; 1 bridge. Concerning MAFF transformation and expansion component, 8775 loans were disbursed totalling US$53.05 million (average loan size US$6,046) of

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which 18.6% to women. Non-performing loan (NPL) portfolio amounted to 17.8% with 17.1% for SME portfolio and 32.9% of individuals' portfolio. On the less positive side, Programme's effectiveness has been affected by the failure to institutionalize MADA in the foreseen fashion, as well as the MAFF/FAF-DC (First Albanian Financial Development Company) delayed privatisation. With regard to the latter, since the original envisaged transformation of MAFF into a fully-licensed rural commercial financial institution proved to be unfeasible, FAF-DC was licensed by the Central Bank of Albania (CBA) as a financial non-bank rural commercial institution. However, under its license, FAF-DC is not authorized to mobilise savings and deposits from the public, which has limited its growth to yearly earnings and new grants and loans.

Efficiency SDRMA effectiveness lag stood at 14.3 months, which is longer than the IFAD global average of 12.3 months. The actual programme costs amounted to US$23.35 million, accounting for 92% of the revised programme funds (US$25.38 million) and 96.3% of the original appraisal cost estimates (US$24.25 million). The overall disbursement of IFAD loan amounted to 97%. Overall, programme efficiency is moderately satisfactory with unit construction costs for the implemented SSEI in line with the market prices in Albania. However, there seems to have been too many uncoordinated layers of supervision of works, which led to faulty civil works design (e.g. reservoirs) and costly repairs. The assignment of programme implementation responsibility to existing structures, MADA and FAF-DC, and the use of existing facilities and expertise resulted in efficiency gains in terms of costs and smooth implementation. Nevertheless, the 12-month extension of the programme closing date, inevitably had a bearing on implementation intensity and efficiency. The cost of the brucellosis control sub-programme reflects a high level of efficiency, with US$57 per household and US$1.05 per ruminant. At design level, the EIRR was estimated at 19%. MADA has not calculated the actual economic rate of return, based on production increases in fruit, vegetable, crops, livestock and value chains that benefited from programme interventions. However, the PCR infers that crop, livestock and rural enterprises that have potential as market-oriented activities could be viable and would give acceptable returns to farmers and entrepreneurs.

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Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD has been effective in distilling the lessons learnt from three relevant previous interventions and in taking them into consideration at design and during implementation for ensuring the consistency of the Programme with the GoA's poverty reduction strategy and IFAD country strategic objectives. There has been an intensive and persistent follow-up by the IFAD Country Programme Manager (CPM), who liaised intensively with GoA and other stakeholders to put the Programme in the right implementation track and maintain the pace of implementation at a rather high level until its successful completion. As of mid-2007, IFAD assumed the responsibility of direct supervision of the Programme and has been effective in providing the necessary supervision support on a yearly basis and timely resolution of disbursement issues. In total, IFAD fielded 5 Supervision and 10 Implementation Support /Follow-up missions. However, contrary to the programme loan agreement, it failed to field a Mid-Term Review Mission. Furthermore, as stated in the PCR, IFAD should have provided a larger degree of support to resolve the poorly performing M&E system and ensure better quality of the baseline and impact surveys.

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Cooperating Institution As of Mid-2007, the SDRMA has been under IFAD's direct supervision and implementation support. n.a

Government The Government remained committed and supportive throughout programme implementation. It has met all its financial obligations and demonstrated a strong ownership of the Programme’s goal and objectives, which was enhanced by the Programme’s alignment with government policies and the government’s involvement as a co-financier. The Programme Board of Directors provided relevant support and guidance to Programme implementation and ensured that its portion of the funding was available, albeit at times cumbersome bureaucratic procedures.

4

NGO/Other The Programme has contracted several public and private service providers to implement various activities, including: (i) 73 individual consultants (32 for brucellosis control, 33 for FORA and SIPs implementation and 8 for infrastructure supervision and support); (ii) 6 companies for conducting SSEI feasibility studies; (iii) 50 companies for the technical design and supervision of the SSEI; (iv) 19 companies for the execution of the SSEI civil works; (v) 7 companies for supporting FORA and implementing micro projects; (vi) NGOs Albanian Organization for Sommeliers (OSHS) and Regional Center for Integrated Development (QRZHI) for training and technology transfer; and (vii) Tirana Regional Development Agency (RDA) for the baseline study and the Albanian Center for Economic Research (ACER) for the impact assessment study. By and large, the service providers delivered their products in a satisfactory manner. (CPM's comment: As regards NGO’s the project only cooperated with 3 NGO’s – who were in fact not much more than apex organizations or consultancies with whom they had a contractual relationship for delivering certain services – to me it thus remains hard to assert that they have been effective in linking up with civil society organizations and increasing the likelihood of sustainable development processes.)

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Cofinancier(s) There is no information available on cofinanciers' performance. n.a


It seems that the relationships between did not face particular challenges.



The assessment of project's impact has been hindered by the lack of a baseline as well as a poor M&E system, as there has been no measurement of Programme outcomes and impact. It has thus been based on several surveys and interviews with stakeholders. Hence, what it is presented here it's just an indication of impact. Within these limitations, it seems that SDRMA has had a positive impact on improving rural households’ access to financial resources for investment in starting or expanding their agricultural business. The availability of agricultural loans increased in the programme area and borrowing conditions improved. FAF-DC lending have contributed to positive changes at the level of HH's income; increased assets; changes in enterprises profits and enterprises assets. Moreover, the establishment of vineyards and orchards, access to improved crop and vegetable varieties and the increase in farm productivity and income have enhanced farmers' ability to generate financial resources to improve their livelihoods, pay off the investment loans and contribute to a sustainable financial viability at the farm level. The FAF-DC survey found that 60% of respondents had an increase in household income, 55% of the loan beneficiaries acquired a plot of land over the past 12 months, 39% acquired refrigerator and television set, 61% repaired or improved their homes and 22% purchased a house. At the enterprise level, 21% of the enterprises invested in small accessories, 19% in major tools, 15% in transportation means, 12% in storage capacity, and 68% of the respondents reported an increase in enterprise profits. The survey calculated, also, that each FAF-DC loan was instrumental for the creation of 1.72 new full-time jobs. The ACER (Albanian Center for Economic Research) survey also reported that there have been positive changes in physical assets, particularly grapes and horticulture, livestock (sheep, goats and bees), joint ownership of agricultural machinery, handicraft factories and other type of trade. The 41 Technology Innovation Grant (TIG)-supported enterprises increased their average net profit by US$13,489, from US$6,952 (before investment) to US$20,441 three years after the investment.

4

Food Security Little information is available on this domain. It seems that the achievements in agricultural productivity have positively affected beneficiaries' food security. Increased beneficiary income resulting from improved employment has also had a positive contribution to food security.

4

Ag. Productivity Despite a complete absence of data on incremental agriculture/livestock production, revenue and income, the MADA impact assessment survey, based on respondents’ answers, concludes that there has been an increase in agricultural and livestock production and productivity (vineyards and wine, fruit trees, vegetables, fodder, livestock) due to investments in new technologies, processing, equipment and machinery, irrigation, processing, cold stores that led to increases in food security. Part of the production is used for home consumption and there is a greater part for the market, thus increasing beneficiary incomes. Through the 44 implemented small-scale economic infrastructure projects (12 rural roads, 1 bridge, 10 small irrigation systems, 20 water points and 1 water supply system), the Programme contributed to improved production as well as to reduced losses from rejected products. The survey reported a 30% increase in the production of fruits and 34% in vineyard yields. Some 72% of the respondents of the MADA impact assessment ascribed the increase in production to the new technologies and irrigation. The control of brucellosis increased livestock production as a result of reduced reproduction losses and improved growth of animals and increased milk yields.

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Five environment management plans in five communes raised people’s awareness on protecting natural resources and the environment, and contributed to building smallholders' capacity in the integration of various natural resource management modalities and in using existing natural resources more efficiently. Furthermore, the stress of the Programme on promoting diversity of livelihoods enables the target group to respond more resiliently to challenges of climate change.

4


The impact surveys revealed that beneficiary trainings have built capacities, enhanced skills and knowledge of FORA members, farmers, processors, owners/managers of SMEs, and employees and impacted on interpersonal skills and self-confidence, which in turn contributed to increasing beneficiary employment. The 44 implemented small-scale economic infrastructure projects (12 rural roads, 1 bridge, 10 small irrigation systems, 20 water points and 1 water supply system), have also led to further benefits in terms of improved source of drinking water to humans and livestock and better social conditions for rural households. Mountain areas FORA development activities strengthened communities and contributed to increasing social capital, empowerment and motivation. Commune development activities resulted in a gradual build-up of confidence and trust between beneficiaries, ability to resolve conflicts, empowerment and motivation. Empowered mountain FORA have developed partnerships with local and regional institutions and have been

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instrumental for the implementation of projects for sustainable economic development.

Inst. & Policies The Programme supported and strengthened 21 mountain areas FORA to serve the interests of the communes in a collective fashion. Through the FORA, responsibility has been devolved to the communes and thereby the role of rural institutions in planning and managing development initiatives has been strengthened and the communes empowered for self-reliance. These institutions have derived enriching experiences with the implementation of the SDRMA and acquainted themselves with new approaches, which they have put in good use in new projects as well as in the discharge of their daily business. However, the transformation of MADA into the National Agency for Regional Development using EU funding appears questionable. The previous GoA, which left office last September, intended to merge MADA with Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Protection’s (MoAFCP’s) Paying Agency for IPARD (Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance for Rural Development). As mentioned in the PCR, the intentions of the newly formed Government are not yet known and thus the future of MADA is not clear. With concern to MAFF, the privatisation of FAF-DC was part of the project design report target and despite two attempts, the privatisation has not been successful.

4

Markets By supporting the 17 Strategic Investment Programmes (SIPs) in 8 different value chains and by building capacities of farmers, processors, entrepreneurs and of the 21 Mountain Areas FORA, SDRMA has positively addressed the key core economic constraints, linking producers with processors and markets and strengthening the institutional value chain set up (vertical and horizontal value chain integration). As a result of SDRMA's intervention, enterprise competitiveness has increased, as the industry integrated vertically in a win-win fashion and processors innovated in product quality and hygiene practices; it was also captured a market share with better marketing practices. The MADA survey reported that 58% of the respondents had an increase in the volume of the products sold, and 33% and 56% of the respondents had increases in wine and raki sold, respectively. The Programme has implemented, also, small-scale economic infrastructure, such as roads, bridges and domestic water supply systems, which contributed to access to markets and services and lower transportation cost, particularly for perishable livestock / agricultural products. However, SDRMA it seems that project's intervention has been more on the production side, while future development interventions should stress market linkages within the value chain approach with private sector focusing more on assessed market opportunities, including food safety standards (HACCP), to strengthen investment sustainability.

4

Project Impact M&E function remained weak. No quantitative data were available on actual adoption of technologies, actual changes in crop/livestock and enterprise production or actual changes in enterprise revenues and HH's income. A baseline survey, commissioned by MADA, was conducted by the Tirana Regional Development Agency (RDA) during April to August 2008, but failed to establish the situation of households at Programme start. The impact studies do not link their data to the baseline study and any reference to impact is mostly based on opinions expressed by respondent beneficiaries.

4

Overarching Factors

Innovation The SDRMA has brought about a number of innovative approaches for rural investments in Albania, whereby the major initiatives have been endorsed by the rural groups and poor households themselves, with the GoA playing a supportive and catalytic role. Such initiatives included: i) the development of mountain areas FORA as an advocacy instrument and promoter of the interests of the target groups; ii) the use of SIPs in each of the 8 supported value-chains; iii) the use of matching grants (MGs, TIGs) that have provided a complementary platform for investments in the supported value chains and transfer of knowledge, skills, new technologies and financial resources to the rural poor in the context of the SIPs/SEIP mechanism; iv) Local Action Plans /Strategic Development Plans (LAPs/SDPs) that have culminated in significant donor financing for the rehabilitation of rural small-scale economic infrastructure.

5


The project's innovative mechanisms and approaches have been replicated by GoA to promote nationwide development of fruit trees, vineyards, livestock, dairy plants, cold storage, fruit processing and small-scale economic infrastructure and the technologies have been adopted by individual farmers on a wider scale. MADA has claimed that every on-farm investment supported by the Programme resulted in about 8 adoptions /replications by neighbour farmers.

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5


The sustainability of programme investments is secured from the profitable commercial activities undertaken by rural entrepreneurs producing quality products, as well as processors and traders participating profitably in processing and in local and export markets for value added products. The matching funding of activities ensured beneficiary ownership that resulted in additional investments to further improve/expand human capital and enterprises, contributing to long term sustainability. Sustainability is further ensured by strengthening the smallholder capacity in the

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integration of various natural resource management modalities, which makes smallholders use the existing natural resources more efficiently. The long term sustainability of the mountain areas FORA may be strengthened through their transformation into LAGs and their linking and possible training by the GIZ-financed IPARD like project in the preparation of proposals for financing under the IPARD. The training of staff of the key implementing agencies was carried out not only to increase their technical competence in implementing SDRMA activities but also in providing effective services to the target group after programme completion. FAF-DC has developed into a strong institution which is sustainable over the next 10 year without external capitalisation. The level of institutional strength is better manifested by generation of some of the best performing indicators within the banking sector. In terms of institutional sustainability, MADA was supposed to be transformed into the National Agency for Regional Development and FAF-DC would be privatized. At the time of PCR, the intensions of the new Government were not yet known and thus, the original objective for MADA of keeping the focus on the mountainous areas was at stake.

Targeting At design level, there has been a clear definition of the programme main target groups, i.e. underemployed and unemployed rural men and women, economically active farmers, rural entrepreneurs engaged in and benefiting from a potentially wide range of businesses, agro-processors and traders. Thus, emphasis was placed on the poor, more vulnerable members of these populations. At implementation level, actual data to support the effectiveness of the programme targeting has been missing. Circumstantial evidence emanating from the fact that 76.5% of the total FAF-DC loans were less than USD 5,000 and 18.9% was between USD 5,000 and USD 20,000 (the two small-loan categories represent 95.4% of total loans) points to substantial targeting of poor farmers and entrepreneurs by credit investments. However, the June 2012 IFAD Supervision Mission assessed that most poor among the poorest only benefited indirectly by obtaining job and increasing self-employment through collection of forest products and estimated that the resource poor comprised 31%, compared to a potential of 51%, of the total number of people reached by the Programme.

4

Gender Programme strategy aimed at gender mainstreaming into all anticipated programme activities and outputs. Furthermore, Programme design has set targets for women at 20% as savers, borrowers, client/shareholders of MAFF, and at least 20% of SIPs and 20% participants in district and national mountain area FORA. During implementation, SDRMA had mainstreamed gender into all anticipated programme activities and outputs and women had equal opportunity for access to the knowledge/technology disseminated and to the programme resources. Available data indicates that women comprised: (i) 30.5% of the total training and capacity building activities; (ii) 34.9% of participants in the 79 promotional activities under the Business Promotion and Financial Linkage sub-component; (iii) 40.8% of trainees under the Workforce Capacity Building sub-component; (iv) 26% of mini grant and 12% of Technology Innovation grant beneficiaries; and (v) 18.6% of the FAF-DC portfolio, however 90% of the loans are signed by both husband and wife. This relatively high percentage of women participation in programme activities reflects the intentional efforts made by SDRMA, as well as the prevailing situation in the country where women are highly active in the daily running and the survival of the households.

5



PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is mostly in line with 2006 Guidelines for PCR Preparation. 6

Quality There has been an effort to present a comprehensive picture of the project's main achievements and shortcomings. However, as assessed in the same PCR, the analysis of the project's main achievements has been hindered by a very weak M&E system. With the exception of financial management, rural financial services and small-scale economic infrastructure, the Programme’s M&E system remained weak throughout programme implementation. This has severely affected the possibility to fully grasp Programme's main achievements, mostly in terms of impact.

5

Lessons It seems that few efforts have been made to reflect upon the main lessons learned generated by project's implementation.

3

Candour The PCR is honest, providing an overall objective assessment of project's main strengths and weaknesses.

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Djibouti - Microfinance and Microenterprise Development Project


Country & Project Name Djibouti - Microfinance and Microenterprise Development Project Ratings

Loan No.: 603-DJ

Project Id. 1236


Entry into Force 22 November 2004





Cofinanciers (if any) Government: US$1.09; Beneficiaries: US$0.08

Cooperating Institution UNOPS/IFAD


Principal Components The project is structured around three components, as follows: (i) Microfinance and Microenterprise Development; (ii) Institutional Capacity Building; and (iii) Project Management and Organization

Project Performance

Relevance Project objectives were well aligned with the development objectives of the Government and relevant IFAD strategies and approaches. Project design took into account lessons learned from IFAD’s experience in Djibouti and in particular the experience of the AfDB-financed Social Development Fund. Overall, project design was found relevant as per its strategy of intervention, approaches (participation and “faire-faire”), objectives, targeting and is focus on capacity strengthening in microfinance and microenterprise development. The SCAs in particular were found to be the right instrument to respond to the financing needs of the poor. The accompanying measures were rightly identified too, making it altogether a sound and well-focused design, well adapted to the needs of the beneficiaries. Problems arose with regard to the implementation modalities. Initially, the project was placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture and Sea, which objectives and priorities were however not in line with those of the project, preventing the ministry from giving the required support. In 2007, the project was moved under the direct responsibility of the Djibouti Agency for Social Development. This decision was found highly relevant and enabled the project to become fully operational. The project’s quantitative targets were revised at MTR (2009).

5

Effectiveness Despite initial delays, which have affected its effectiveness, the project has achieved notable results, especially during the past 4 years. The project has reached its overall objective, which was to reduce rural poverty by increasing household incomes through enhanced access to financial and business development services. The first component (“capacity strengthening”) has contributed to achieving the objective of developing a national microfinance strategy and implementing a regulatory and legal framework. This objective was fully achieved. The second component (“microfinance development”) has contributed to achieving the objective of developing a sustainable savings and credit system responding to the needs of the beneficiaries, especially the most vulnerable. This objective was largely achieved, but results are not fully satisfactory. Access to financial services was given to large part of the poor, especially women. Results are impressive. 16 000 individuals (members) were reached, compared to an initial target of 7000 (+138%). Also, 5530 benefited from microcredits, compared to an initial target of 3000 (+84%, of which 70% were women). The average credit size was larger than expected (+93%). The project failed, however, in reaching out to the youth. Also, financial and operational sustainability of the SCAs (CECs) and Credit Unions (CPECs) remains an issue. Many SCAs face problems related to the management of outstanding loans and will need further support and capacity strengthening to enable them to cope with these issues. In the specific case of the CPEC Djibouti, viability was also threatened by the high level of wages. The CPEC was placed under the central bank to ensure coverage of its high overhead costs. Finally, frequent changes in the implementation strategy have prevented the creation of a national association of CPECs (ANCEC), needed, however, to improve governance of the CPECs. Governance questions have also arisen following the decision about their legal status, their status of cooperatives leaving grey areas in the definition of roles and responsibilities. Finally, the merging of the 2 SCAs in Djibouti city (established respectively under the PDMM and the SDF) was done too hastily and has created implementation problems, which could not be resolved until now. Factors which have positively affected project implementation include: (i) strong institutional and financial support by the Government; (ii) direct supervision by IFAD since 2010; (iii) direct involvement of governing bodies and strong beneficiary ownership of the CPEC (mutual savings and credit banks); (iv) strong support by the Central Bank of Djibouti (CBD); and (v) technical assistance and additional training of CPEC staff by the other financial partners (UNDP and AfDB). The M&E system as planned was not implemented. A baseline study was conducted in 2007, 3 years after the project became

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affective.

Efficiency The project experienced important delays during its first three years of implementation. These delays emanated from the late hiring of the main operating partner and major weaknesses in the proposed implementation arrangements. These weaknesses were addressed by adjusting the implementation modalities of the project (see section on Government) but have affected overall efficiency of the project. A major change concerned the focus on microfinance activities to the expense of microenterprise development, after MTR. This was found necessary given the delays in (i) setting up the credit and saving institutions network, and (ii) making it fully operational, in particular in remote rural areas. Micro-enterprise activities were limited to vocational trainings for young micro entrepreneurs and project components were redefined accordingly. The changes were also reflected in an amendment of the loan agreement. Efficiency estimates based on the unit costs diverge. The unit costs for training and technical assistance are globally in line or lower than those applied by others comparable projects, with discrepancies between services providers (ADDS was deemed efficient while DID was found rather expensive and thus inefficient). Overall, expenditures for training and TA were overdrawn by 5.7% only. By contrast, the costs for construction works were found high, mainly because of the steep increase in material costs since the project was appraised in 2002. The average unit costs were found 73% higher than at appraisal. Nevertheless, this is still lower than the unit costs reached by similar projects. The project benefited from 2 reallocations of funds, the first one after the MTR (2009) and the second one in 2011. As a result, the disbursement rate by category at completion did not show any major imbalance, except for salaries, which showed a slight over disbursement. The calculated IRR (2013) is 10.3%. The benefit cost ration is acceptable (1.07).

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Partner Performance

IFAD The IFAD loan reached a disbursement rate of 97% at completion. IFAD markedly contributed to the improvement of project performance during the MTR and when the project was shifted under IFAD's direct supervision. .

5

Cooperating Institution Between 2004 and 2009, the project was supervised by UNOPS. Its performance is rated partly satisfactory. UNOPS highlighted important inadequacies in project management and coordination, and made appropriate recommendations for improvement. Technical supervision was therefore satisfactory. By contrast, it did not give sufficient attention to some fiduciary aspects, such as procurement and auditing. Also, it failed to deal with the institutional memory of the project

4

Government Government performance was satisfactory. Loan covenants were globally respected and Government increased its contribution based on the recommendations and agreements reached at MTR. Performance of the various state agencies and technical departments concerned varied. MAEM (2004-2008) was highly instrumental during the initial stages of project implementation by establishing the PCU, the steering committee and the microfinance concertation framework, and by hiring the operating partner (Development International Déjardins). However, it did not help the project to get effectively started. The steering committee was created late (in 2008) and dealt with the approval of the AWP&B only. It did not provide any strategic guidance to the project. Implementation modalities were revised in 2008. The project was placed under to overall supervision of SESN (State Secretariat for national solidarity - Secretariat d’Etat à la solidarité nationale). SESN was fully committed and responsible for the validation of the microfinance strategy and for the microfinance law to be enacted. Government contribution was increased. The PCU was established within the Djibouti Agency for Social Development (ADDS) which established a microfinance unit within its structures. This has greatly helped speed up project implementation and make up for initial delays. The ADDS was highly instrumental for the sensitization and training of SCA staff and for day-to-day support of the SCAs. The Djibouti Central Bank was responsible for the drafting of the microfinance strategy and for the implementation of the related law. It was also responsible for national supervision and oversight of the project. Its support was deemed appropriate.

5

NGO/Other The project’s main partner was DID (Développement International Déjardins). DID provided support to establishing the CPEC Djibouti with 2 service points. Despite various training and support activities, the networking did not become operational and DID contract was stopped in 2010. According to the PCR, DID support did not meet expectations.

3

Cofinancier(s) UNDP provided technical assistance to ADDS for establishing the CPEC Djibouti. Though it provided less than the original amount foreseen, it has substantially contributed to strengthening the capacities of the CPEC in establishing their business plans, and for the preparation of consolidated business plans at regional level. UNDP support was instrumental for the organization of the microfinance workshop in 2011 and the organizational and operational audit of the Djibouti CPEC. UNDP has also provided support to the central bank on legal matters and training, which has helped preparation of the National Microfinance Strategy. UNDP support was found highly satisfactory. The

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PDMM mobilized new sources of co-financing: (i) AfDB for capacity strengthening (US$0.367 million); and (ii) IsDB for the implementation of the “Islamic microcredit” (credit line of US$1 million), mobilized by ADDS as a parallel financing to further test and develop the Islamic microfinance. The respective performance of AfDB and IsDB is not further assessed in the PCR.


Collaboration between partners appears positive, though not further assessed.



Access to microcredit has contributed to increasing the incomes of the beneficiaries. 80% of the beneficiaries interviewed have stated that access to microcredit has enabled them to either maintain or further develop their IGA. 97% of the credits have contributed to creating new or maintaining existing employment opportunities. The highest net margin after credit was found for groceries shops (140 US/month), followed by handicraft, clothes and doughnuts (beignets). Other activities include services such as petty trade and money changing. Fisheries are the activity with the highest net margin, but financial needs are high. It appears that only 20% of the interviewed have used their credit to improve food security and living conditions of their families. Of the 1075 credit beneficiaries whose profile was analysed, 58% mentioned having used their credit to purchase food, clothes, domestic goods and to pay for school fees. Only 12% mentioned having used their credits to improve the housing conditions. Altogether, housing conditions have only weakly improved. The RIMS impact assessment concluded that only 5.8% of the households which have benefited from a microcredit have replaced the dirt floor with a concrete floor, 3% have increased the number of rooms and 8% have gained access to drinking water. Electrification could be increased from 76% to 84%, which has induced an increase in the ownership of TV (from 64% to 74%) and of refrigerators (from 43% to 51%).

4

Food Security The PCR states that the project did not have any significant impact on food security since less than 1.6% of the beneficiaries have a family member involved in either agricultural or livestock production. However, it can be assumed that access to microcredits has contributed to improving household food security, since these funds were partly used to purchase food.

n.a

Ag. Productivity Not assessed in the PCR since only 1.6% of the beneficiaries are involved in crop production and 6.2% in livestock production. One loan was granted for the purchase of fishing nets and another one for the purchase of agricultural production input.

n.a


n.a


Not assessed in the PCR. The project did not intend to impact on natural resources and the environment.

n.a


Capacity strengthening of policy makers, CPEC staff and beneficiaries was a central element of project interventions. The project has strongly contributed to strengthening the capacities, broadening the knowledge and thus improving the livelihoods of the populations. Training of CPEC and CEC staff has contributed to establishing a well-functioning microfinance system adapted to the needs of the rural populations. It has pointed out, however, that further capacity strengthening will be needed to ensure viability of the CPECs. In turn, sensitization and training of beneficiaries in microfinance and microenterprise development has helped them identify, develop and implement micro-businesses and other income generating activities within their reach and their capacities. It was however pointed out that stronger capacity strengthening would have reduced the risks of non-repayment of the loans. Women have particularly benefited from capacity strengthening and empowerment. In terms of functional literacy training, of the 416 beneficiaries reached between 2010 and 2012, 320 were women. The absolute number is, however, not very high. In terms of empowerment, women have become financially more independent and have improved their status within the society. Also, their involvement in IGAs has enabled them to participate in the socio-economic development of their villages. The project provided literacy training for the youth, not foreseen in the original design. Altogether, the project had a relatively strong impact on social capital and empowerment.

4

Inst. & Policies Project impact in the area of institutional and policy support has been strong. The project has helped initiate a policy dialogue at national level on microfinance. This policy dialogue has led to important results. The microfinance sector is now regulated. A national microfinance strategy was adopted and is now implementation through adequate laws and regulations. This is reinforced by a National Microfinance Commission established in 2012 and a supervision unit within the Djibouti Central Bank. A microfinance division in support of the CPEC was created within the Djibouti Agency for Social Development. It provides adequate support to the CPECs. The CPECs are operational and well equipped. They are managed and implemented locally, with the local authorities involved in their supervision. This has led to a notable improvement in the access to MF services, as shown by the growing number of CPEC members and savings. The geographical coverage is satisfactory. However, while the overall project concept was relevant, changes in the implementation approach

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has hampered the creation of a national association of CPECs. Also, the status of “cooperative” of the SCAs/CPECS has led to confusion between operation, supervision and support. This could have been resolved by creating a national apex organization. Instead, decision-makers opted for a national association, adding to already existing governance problems. Besides, this decision has contributed to keeping operating costs high, since the present structure requires regular visits of central staff to the regional CPECs. Finally, the merging of the 2 SCAs in Djibouti city (established under the IFAD-financed PDMM and the AfDB financed SDF) was done too hastily and has created implementation problems, given that they could not be resolved since then. These different issues will need to be addressed in the after-project.

Markets Not assessed in the PCR. The project had no intended direct impact on markets. n.a

Project Impact The project had a positive impact on the living conditions of the beneficiaries, as shown by the terminal impact assessment carried out in 2013. Also, the microfinance sector is regulated, supervision is ensured by the Djibouti Central Bank, Government is strongly involved. Territorial coverage is good. The associations are all operational and well equipped. Support provided by a dedicated entity within the Djibouti Agency for Social Development. The CPECs concept has been well internalized by the beneficiaries who make good use of their credits. Viability of the CPECs remains an issue, incl. loan repayment. The M&E system as planned was not implemented. Impact measurement could therefore not be performed. Project impacts were assessed using the benchmark study of 2007, various socio-economic studies carried out since the MTR and beneficiary interviews.

4

Overarching Factors

Innovation The project has brought about several important innovations. It has introduced and developed: (i) a microfinance system, managed and controlled according to a regularly framework; (ii) a new profession and new skills; (iii) a division within ADDS responsible for the implementation and supervision of microfinance interventions; and (iv) a savings culture, which was inexistent before and is now well imbedded in the mentalities. The latter has helped promote self-help and independence among the populations. Altogether, the project has been an important learning experience at different levels.

5


No explicitly addressed. However, it can be stated that the project has largely contributed to the development of the microfinance sector in the country. Project activities are worth being replicated and scaled-up.

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5


Prospects for sustainability are mixed. Political and institutional sustainability seem to be given with (i) the approval of the microfinance strategy; (ii) the creation of a microfinance department (Direction de la microfinance) which has taken over from the PCU; and (iii) the adoption of a legal and regulatory framework for governance and oversight. These achievements are signs of strong Government support and commitment, which is likely to be maintained, given the growing demand for suitable financial services among beneficiaries. On the more negative side, sustainability is compromised by: (i) the need for further capacity strengthening of CPECs; (ii) lack of clarity of respective roles and responsibilities within the microfinance sector and thus, the lack of cohesion; (iii) need to establish a risk fund; and (iv) low viability of the CPECs. Some CPECs are still weak and need further support to mobilize savings and better control the repayment of the loans. Loan non-repayment has become a major issue. The PCR mentions that the rate in Djibouti-city reached 27% (in 2012). The PCR mentions that the problem urgently needs to be addressed, but does not indicate how this will be done. Another issue concerns the viability of the CPECs, in particular in Djibouti-city where the salaries are extremely high and inflate the overhead costs of the CPEC up to an unsustainable level. The FY 2012 was closed with a 100 million DJF loss. The creation of a national apex organization would help address some of these issues.

4

Targeting Targeting is not explicitly addressed by the PCR. The project’s targeting strategy was rather broad (women, youth, crop and livestock farmers, fishermen, and microenterprises). It appears however, that the various target groups were adequately reached, especially women. Difficulties were encountered, however, in reaching out to the youth.

4

Gender The project has successfully targeted women. More than 70% of the CPEC members are women. The rest are crop and livestock farmers, fishermen or heads of household. About 50% of the credits were given to women and 27% to groups, mainly consisting of women. While the project’s focus on women was satisfactory, it failed to adequately address the need of the youth/young men.

5



The project has benefited 16 661 members (against an initial target of 7000), of which 80% are heads of household. Based on an average household size of 6.6, an estimated 90 000 individuals (men, women children) have benefited from improved access to microfinance and microenterprise development support, corresponding to 45% of the target group.


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PCR Quality

Scope Guidelines were respected and all annexes were included. 6

Quality The PCR is a good read and covers all required sections. However, the impact section has fallen short of subsistence, given that the final impact analysis was carried out very late and did not include all the indicators required. As a result, the PCR could not provide a deeper reflection of the results of the project. Also, little attention was given to microenterprise development. This was mainly due to the fact that given the delays in (i) setting up the credit and saving institutions network, and (ii) making it fully operational, in particular in remote rural areas, the MTR had recommended to focus on microfinance related activities. Micro-enterprise activities were limited to vocational trainings for young micro entrepreneurs and project components were redefined accordingly. There were little microenterprise activities for the PCR team to assess at completion. Finally, there is a slight confusion in the terminology, making it sometimes difficult for the reader to follow. (caisse – cooperative; direction – commission).

4

Lessons The PCR makes a good analysis of what worked and did not work. It also makes good and realistic recommendations for follow-up by existing structures and those implemented under the project, in critical areas such as: outreach to the youth (young men), loan repayment issues, outreach to the poorest and most vulnerable, access to larger credits enabling investments into activities with good opportunities for growth; need for an apex organization; training of CPEC staff; need for technical assistance, etc.

5

Candour Very objective. 5


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Moldova - Agricultural Revitalization Project


Country & Project Name Moldova - Agricultural Revitalization Project (ARP) Ratings

Loan No.: 629-MD

Project Id. 1265

Board Date 18 Dec 03

Entry into Force 24 Jan 06

Completion Date 30 Mar 13

Final Closing Date 30 Sep 13



Cofinanciers (if any) Beneficiaries: US$3 000; Government: US$274

Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry (MAFI)

Principal Components The project has four components: (i) Participatory community development, with two sub-components: (a) community mobilization and empowerment and (b) technical support and training; (ii) Institutional capacity-building; (iii) Community economic investments; and (iv) Project management

Project Performance

Relevance The ARP's strategies and approaches by component set out at appraisal have been relevant. The Project was designed against the Moldova's unfavourable macro socio-economic context during the 1998-2005 and ARP's design benefitted from lessons learnt from the first IFAD financed Rural Finance and Small Enterprise Development Project (RFSEDP). The project’s strategy was in line with the Government's agriculture revitalization strategy objectives, as well as with both IFAD 2003 and 2007 COSOP, as they complemented each other and shared the same strategic objectives: (i) establish market linkages for the rural poor through support for competitive commodity value chains; (ii) promote access to a full range of appropriate and mainstreamed financial services, with a particular emphasis on products that support the most vulnerable. The findings from the Impact Assessment Survey confirmed the relevance of ARP's interventions in meeting the socio-economic priorities of the target group. The actual approaches deployed by component had been guided by the principle of beneficiary ownership and participation in project implementation to achieve sustainable results and promote scaling-up. The project's strategies and approaches were adjusted during implementation to address changing circumstances on the ground with the objective to simplify the lengthy implementation modalities. The implementation arrangements in place have been considered to be adequate for achieving project objectives. The project strategy assigning the implementation management of the project to the well-established implementation unit for the first IFAD funded project to evolve into an IFAD consolidated project implementation unit (CPIU) attached to Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry (MAFI) and under its overall responsibility has been appropriate to deploy the built-in synergies in IFAD portfolio and reduced considerably the average management cost by project. A Mid Term Review (MTR) was undertaken in June 2009 and it resulted into a reallocation among categories of IFAD loan proceeds to reflect savings in some categories of goods and services and shortage in others.

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Effectiveness ARP demonstrated an overall remarkable effectiveness in achieving its stated objectives: i) employment creation and income generation through the implementation of economic investment activities; ii) development of a replicable model for agriculture revitalization and capacity building process. The project directly benefitted 564 small farm producers of which 30 % are women. The cumulative potential production assets of the 221 agribusinesses established with the project support is substantial and represents a reliable source of income and employment creation for improving the living standards of the rural population. The direct impact on employment included the creation of 3 900 jobs equivalent for family's households that are now receiving high wages and benefiting equally men and women. The investment in green houses representing 5.2% share of the total value of loans generated 17.5% of the total employment created. One ha of greenhouse generated 16 full time new jobs benefitting mainly women (73%) and an average of USD 300 monthly earning. By the end of 2012 the financed enterprises have improved most of their financial indicators. Comparing to the baseline, these enterprises have reported at the end of 2012 an average growth in total assets of 2.21 folds and an average growth in equity per enterprise of 6.80 folds. The project borrowers have reported an increase in sales of more than 2 times totalling US$25.8 million or US$1.78 per every disbursed dollar of IFAD loan (US$14.5 million).

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Efficiency The Project experienced an effectiveness lag of 25.6 months, as it was approved in December 2003 and became effective in January 2006. The actual project costs amounted to USD 34.999 million exceeding by 190% the estimated US$18.221 million cost estimates at appraisal. This increase is not due to cost overrun. It is the result of: (i) a 6 folds increase (640 %) of the actual equity contribution of beneficiaries to investments co-financed by the project credit line (this contribution was underestimated at appraisal); and (ii) the appreciation of SDR against the US dollar resulting into an increase by about 105% of the loan amount in USD terms. This increase benefitted the component of Community Economic Investment and financed additional SMEs. The final project cost at completion resulted in a

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lower co-financed by IFAD (45% versus 82% at appraisal), a much higher beneficiaries' contribution (53% versus 16% at appraisal), a higher contribution by the participating financing institutions (1.6% versus 0% at appraisal) and a lower Government contribution (0.3 % versus 2.2 %). In terms of timely implementation, the achievement of a 93% cumulative disbursement in 5 years resulting into a near completion of project activities two years ahead of schedule is a strong indicator of the high management and coordination efficiency of the CPIU. Rather than creating a new set up, MAFI and IFAD took the wise decision to assign the implementation management of the project to the well-established implementation unit for the first IFAD funded project and evolving it into an IFAD consolidated project implementation unit (CPIU) proved a high cost efficiency decision mechanism. Another relevant indicator of project efficiency is the share of management cost in total cost and the level of unit cost per output achieved. Compared to the appraisal estimates, the cost saving has been 58% in project management. The saving in average project support cost has been 89% per Business Development Plan (BDP) developed, and 73% of the average cost by Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) loan approved. The total investment per full time job created amounting to USD 8872 (including borrower equity contribution) in agriculture is considered to be efficient and lower than the cost per job created in other economic sectors. The borrower bore 97% of the cost (44% in loan and 53% in equity). The Impact Assessment Survey calculated the post project economic internal rate of return (IRR) on the basis of the incremental increase of fruit, vegetable and cereal crops from investments in irrigated farms and greenhouses, farm machinery and cold storages that benefitted from project interventions. The resulting post-project IRR estimated at 31% with an economic net present value at 12% is US$83.4 million, which justifies the investment in the project. No comparison can be made with the IRR value at appraisal, as the appraisal report did not include an analysis of the project economic rate of return.


Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD has performed smoothly its role in accordance to the Loan Agreement. As of 2009, IFAD took over the responsibility of direct supervision of the project and has been effective in closely supervising and technical backstopping the project on a yearly basis, timely resolution of disbursement issues and the fielding of an MTR mission in June 2009 and the subsequent reallocation among expenditure categories of the loan.

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Cooperating Institution Initially, ARP supervision and loan administration responsibility were outsourced to UNOPS. During the first three years (2006-2008) of project implementation, UNOPS as cooperating institution has adequately discharged its responsibilities in administering the loan.

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Government The Government of Moldova demonstrated - through the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry (MAFI) - a strong ownership of the Project's goal and objectives. They performed their statutory requirements in line with the Loan Agreement and provided timely and relevant support to project implementation. Through its Credit Line Directorate, MoF managed efficiently the revolving refinancing activities. The CPIU composed of 12 staff has efficiently collaborated with all public and private institutional partners involved in the ARP implementation. The CPIU has been effective in project financial management, procurement, direct involvement in community mobilization and empowerment at village level, supervision of PFIs and service providers. All audit reports were submitted to IFAD on time, were of good quality and contained unqualified opinion on the projects financial statements. The minor observations made regarding the accounting system and the internal control systems received immediate management response and were noted as being corrected by subsequent audits. The CPIU contributed significantly to knowledge generation and sharing among other projects and relevant decision makers in MAFI, MoF and PFIs. The M&E system put in place has been effective in planning, collection and timely reporting of data related to project activities and outputs. However, the M&E work needs to be improved in the area of impact evaluation. Being the Steering Committee of all IFAD funded projects in Moldova, the IFAD's Programme Steering Committee (IPSC) met regularly twice annually and fulfilled efficiently its function of review and approval of annual work plans and budgets, of policy guidance and coordination across the entire IFAD portfolio in the country. It played a critical role in the alignment of interest rates charged to borrowers with market rates in consultation with MoF.

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NGO/Other All of the outsourced business Service Providers has performed their activities in adequate compliance with their contractual obligations. When improvements in the quality of BDPs were pointed out by the SMEs, PFIs or CPIU, corrective measures have been taken accordingly. The performance of most of the outsourced service providers for the participatory preparation of VDPs and BDPs, improved substantially after the intensive training received by the project. The performance of the PFIs was variable, but collectively they were able to serve with good results all eligible borrowers in participating villages. All PFIs extended their financial services to eligible SMEs and disbursed in a timely manner the contracted MTLs and LTLs according to the respective subsidiary loan agreements.

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Cofinancier(s)

Combined Partner


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Performance



The PCR approached the impact assessment on financial assets through the ability of borrowers to generate sufficient financial resources to improve their livelihoods and at the same time reimburse the investment loans. The level of SMEs productivity and net profit reported by the Impact Assessment Survey (the survey covered a large sample of 104 or 47 % of benefiting SMEs across villages and investments) has been promising and resulted in timely loan repayment. The SMEs net profit is likely to increase in the coming years to achieve and sustain their financial viability. As a result of the successful fruit tree plantations and vineyards, the demonstrated high return increased the demand and the market value of agriculture land. The cumulative potential production capacity of the 221 agribusinesses is substantial and is a reliable source of income and employment creation for improving the living standards of the rural population. The direct impact generated includes employment creation for 3 900 families’ households receiving high wages impacting men and women equally. The Impact Assessment Survey report provides for the six major categories of investment, the level of net profit per year at full development stage (year 15). The results indicate that project investment generated a multiplier effect of 2.4 to 3.0 dollar per every dollar invested.

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Food Security The PCR does not provide enough information on ARP's impact on this domain. It is just reported that the levels of achievement in increased productivity, SMEs net benefit, wages and incomes contributed to improved availability of and better access to food. Thus, although is it highly likely that the project has had a positive impact on this domain, the extent to which this occurred has not been precisely estimated.

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Ag. Productivity The impact on agriculture productivity increases has been encouraging and likely to increase further in the years to come. For the major field crops, on the basis of the interactions of the PCR mission with benefitting farmers and livestock producers, the average yield per ha for wheat, corn, sunflower increased from 3.5 ton (30% increase) to 3.8 ton (40% increase) compared to the average yield of 2.7 ton per ha before the project. The increased productivity and production resulted from the use of new farm machinery and equipment, increased availability of irrigation water, increased availability of combine harvesters, and improved reproductive animals and quality animal feed. For vegetable production under the greenhouses financed by the project, the average yield achieved has been 130 ton for tomato and 120 ton for cucumber. For the rainfed plum plantations, the yield achieved ranged from 16 ton to 20 ton per ha. These yields compare well with those obtained by advanced farmers in other countries.

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The investment activities financed through the project have been selected with the objective to achieve sustainable land and better irrigation water use efficiency. The project intervention at the time of appraisal was considered Category B classification. There are no negative environmental issues reported from the type of interventions financed by the project. The CPIU has ensured that the legislated environmental requirements have been adhered to by the all the SMEs supported by the project.

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Project impact on human and social capital has been notable. Over 1480 people benefited from business advisory consultations. On social capital, the SMEs established and managed by a core group of founding members, pooling their resources and expertise associated with open access to ordinary members pledging their small plots of land through renewable leasing arrangements have been instrumental to invest in viable commercial scale agribusinesses and is the most valuable social capital for the empowerment of rural population. The SMEs helped to promote local social relations and confidence building for win-win partnerships. In addition, the traditional culture of join management of business activities between relatives had been an additional social capital deployed by the SMEs.

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Inst. & Policies ARP achieved a positive impact on institutional building to ensure the continuation of quality support services to potential entrepreneurs for scaling up. The institutions that benefitted from capacity building included: (i) over 133 village councils (Primaria) exposed to strategic planning and priority setting for community economic investments (ii) eight PFIs trained in risk and collateral management to continue their involvement in the provision of loans after project completion using the revolving fund replenished by MTLs and LTLs loan repayments; (iii) ten business service providers trained in the preparation of BDPs; (iv) MAFI in performing its oversight role to the project; (v) the CPIU in the generation of lessons learnt and impact measurement , the deployment of synergies and complementarities between all IFAD funded projects in Moldova; and finally (vi) 221 benefitting SMEs in partnerships development with commercial banks and commodity chains operators.

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Markets There is not a specific assessment of project's impact on this domain. However, it can easily be stated that, apart from its support through its marketing facilities and activities, the project gave a strong contribution by providing the investment in intensive multiannual fruit tree plantations and in cold storages which transformed the prevailing subsistence agriculture into a market oriented high value crops to meet the incremental market demand for fresh fruits and vegetables as well the demand of

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cold stores and processing plants supported by the project.

Project Impact 5

Overarching Factors

Innovation Building on the experience gained from RESEDP, the ARP consolidated several innovations in the context of Moldova business environment and institutional set up. The first innovation has been the participatory development approach, which, although not being entirely new, constitutes an innovation in the sense that it has been new to the project target group. The second innovation has been the competitive demand-driven allocation of project resources to generate viable community economic investments. This approach resulted into: (i) the selection of 103 villages (79% performance rate) out of 133 village candidates to benefit from the project; and (ii) the financing of 221 SME loan applications (76 % performance rate) out of 292 SME applications. The third innovation has been the competitive selection and capacity building of 10 SPs for the preparation of BDPs and of 8 commercial banks to channel MTLs and LTLs to project beneficiaries. The forth innovation has been the access to long term debt financing using reflows for refinancing and scaling up of rural businesses. A further innovation also laid in the creation of the Village Agricultural Revitalization Fund (VARF), where repayments from borrowers are being transferred into, finances the process of village agricultural revitalization in the project area for similar investments and on similar lending terms and conditions.

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Considering the government repayment schedule of IFAD loan and SMEs repayment schedule of principal as reflows, the loan would be used 4.28 rounds of 7 years each to provide additional financing of USD 55.1 million. Given the high profitability of the SMEs supported by the project, there is a high likelihood of their replication and up-scaling countrywide overtime through commercial banks once the financial markets develops.

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The PCR rates as high the potential sustainability in the delivery of quality BPs by the SPs and others likely to be promoted. Regarding the potential sustainability in technology transfer to producers, the rating is high for the capacity of existing network of private subject matter specialists and practitioners actively involved on cost recovery basis in the provision of technological support to commercial agribusinesses. Regarding the potential sustainability in access to markets, the rating is high because the current supply of agriculture produce is below the present demand expressed by market operators and agro processors. The sustainability of access to increased MTL and LTL financing is rated low for commercial banks from own resources and moderate for LCD revolving credit line supplied by reflows. As of 31 March 2013, this revolving fund where loan repayments from all IFAD funded projects in Moldova are deposited, disbursed an amount of USD 62.1 for additional 754 loans. The sustainability of the provision of short-term loans by commercial banks to SMEs is rated high. The absence of financial market in Moldova remains a major impediment for commercial banks to access the necessary financial resources to address the increasing demand for MTL and LTL. The project sustainability in income and employment generation by category of investment is rated: (i) high for fruit tree plantations and vineyards, agriculture machinery and equipment enterprises, rainfed and irrigated field crops, vegetable production under green houses and livestock activates. On the basis of the results of the Impact Assessment Survey as well as the PCR interactions with beneficiaries, the financed SMEs seem to be solid and well managed to warrant a high likelihood for sustainable annual growth in sales, net profits and wages; and (ii) moderate to high rating for the sustainability of cold storage, agro processing and irrigation facilities. These two categories of enterprises are exposed to the risk of inadequate supply of primary products due the competition from the fresh market in Moldova. The overlapping of VDP responsibilities with those of the Village Councils (VDCs) and the limited use of VDPs to access funds from other sources to finance investments in the village (social infrastructures such as gas reticulation; schools and kindergarten; roads; running water and sewage systems) raises the issues of the institutional sustainability of the village development committees (VDCs).

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Targeting The targeting and participatory mechanisms implemented by the project have been substantially different from those envisaged by the original project design, reflecting the evolving situation in Moldova. At the start of the project, there was little social differentiation among the farming communities and consequently all households that received land through the national privatization program had been targeted either as individual farmers or members either of a cooperative or a share company. The project targeted equally men and women headed households that had received land as a result of the Government privatization program of state and collective farms in villages where rural poverty was significant with potential for employment creation and income generation through commercially viable agribusiness enterprises. The evolved project modalities proved to be based on a local community driven process and turned to be pro rural microenterprises. It was underlined that strengthening the value chains has benefits for the rural poor as well as the entrepreneur by providing access to markets, leasing land from smallholders who do not wish to farm and creating jobs in the rural sector.

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Gender At appraisal, certain requirements were made with respect to gender issues, such as 40% of participants in the initial meetings selecting the VDCs and 40% in the VDCs should be women. Overall, the number of women in VDCs reached 299 or 26% and that in VDC leadership position to 13.8%. Similarly, the percentage of female borrowers improved over time and stood at 30.4% at project's completion. The direct project's impact on employment included the creation of 3 900 jobs equivalent for family's households that have received high wages and benefiting equally men and women.

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PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is fully in line with the 2006 Guidelines for PCR preparation. 6

Quality The overall PCR quality is good. The PCR is clear and concise. It benefitted from the results of the 2009 MTR, supervision mission reports as well as from the findings of the outsourced Impact Assessment Survey conducted during the last quarter of 2012. The PCR assessment of project impact took into consideration: (i) the findings of the Impact Assessment Survey (conducted by "Alternative Internationale de Dezvoltare"), an independent consulting firm familiar with the specifics of the project through its involvement as service provider in the preparation of BDPs; (ii) the reports generated by ARP/ M&E Unit including the RIMS data generated on a yearly basis; and (iii) the 2012 cumulative progress report and the last 2102 IFAD supervision mission report. As a hindsight, it would have been advisable to have more information on how the Impact Assessment Survey was conducted and managed (e.g. the size of the considered sample and its internal differentiation; if a control group had been taken into account, etc.).

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Lessons The lessons learned are pertinent and based on a reflection of the project's main strengths and weaknesses.

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Candour The PCR's analysis is honest and in line with the other information sources. 6


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Sudan - South Kordofan Rural Development Programme


Country & Project Name Sudan - South Kordofan Rural Development Programme Ratings

Loan No.: 00544

Project Id. 1140


Entry into Force 12 February 2001

Original Closing Date 02 May 2001




Cofinanciers (if any) External Cofinancing Total: 11.74 Netherlands: 9.64; Swedish Complementary: 2.10 ) Domestic total: 9.38 (Government Non-fiscal: 3.91; Government (National): 4.19; Domestic Financial Institutions: 0.41; Beneficiaries: 0.87)

Implementing Agency State Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources as the lead agency, with field activities undertaken by specialized cadres in agricultural extension, pest management, rural development and women in development, as well as specialists in livestock production and veterinary services in the RAUs to be directly supervised by the PMU. Additional supervisory entities included the federal programme Interministerial Steering Committee, programme executive board (PEB) and central coordination unit (CCU).

Principal Components The programme was to be implemented with five components: a) Agricultural extension and smallholder services b) Livestock production and range management c) Community support services d) Rural financial services e) Institutional strengthening

Project Performance

Relevance The programme was designed between 1996 and 1999, i.e. before the introduction of the COSOP. Its overall goal was consistent and in line with the 3 strategic objectives of the country at that time: (i) support the livelihood strategies of target groups; (ii) empower both men and women to fully participate in the development process; and (iii) promote good local governance. The choice of the area of intervention was based on the fact that despite widespread poverty, the selected regions (Southern zone of central Sudan with the population of South Kordofan being the most destitute) held inherent potential for productivity enhancement and consequently for improving the livelihoods of local communities. The experience of the SKRDP showed that the activities and approaches adopted under each of the five components were relevant to the needs of the rural populations and remained valid throughout implementation. These included essentially: (a) development of a performing extension service within the Rural Administrative Units as the engine of rural transformation; (b) implementation of animal health services on a cost-recovery basis; (c) rehabilitation and construction of community stock water facilities; (d) development of an equitable range management strategy to minimize the impact of migratory livestock on the environment; (e) community development initiatives to implement essential socio-economic infrastructure; and (d) development of sustainable financial services based on existing and well-understood traditional systems. The gender-integrated approach adopted by the programme was relevant to the project area and the country as a whole. At MTR, the target area was revised to take into account the administrative restructuring of the country. Also, the number of target communities was lifted to increase the outreach and efficiency of the programme.

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Effectiveness The programme succeeded in meeting the global objectives of increased households incomes, improved food security and better living conditions of the rural populations. The wealth indicators show that programme interventions have led to a significant decrease in the percentage share of very poor and poor households while the share of less poor and wealthy households has increased. Particularly noteworthy is the reduction of very poor households from 24% in 2004 to 9% in 2012. Strong increases could be noted in the food intake of four important commodities: fresh milk, milk products, meat and vegetables. This has contributed to improving food security, nutrition and bridging the food shortage of the most vulnerable. Besides, the programme has established an effective community-based extension network, which contributed significantly to the achievements of improved agricultural and livestock production. It has significantly strengthened the role of women within the community and improved access to basic socio-economic services (agricultural extension, veterinary services, education, health, water, rural financial services, etc.). It has also instilled a collective development culture within the communities, through the establishment of Community Development Committees. Implementation difficulties were however encountered in establishing effective animal health and veterinary services and in enabling the construction/rehabilitation of hafirs (water collection points). Until MTR, the programme benefited from an international management adviser who was largely responsible for its satisfactory implementation performance. Financial management showed important weaknesses, however, which could never be overcome, in particular the practice of mixing different sources of funding.

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Efficiency Programme efficiency was measured against the benefits achieved as a result of implementation, the number of beneficiaries having received benefits and in terms of whether the programme funds were used efficiently for the intended purposes. The PCR concluded that programme objectives by component were largely met and exceeded expectation in many cases. The programme was implemented over 10 years, in 2 phases under the FLM. Implementation of the first phase was satisfactory enabling a smooth transition into the second phase. The programme was extended by 15 months. Also, additional funding from the Netherlands was approved in 2010 allowing programme activities to be expanded to war affected areas. The programme disbursed 99 % of the IFAD loan. Funds were reallocated twice among categories to make needed adjustments i.e. following the administrative restructuring and to ensure their efficient use. By contrast, only 35% of the Dutch grant was disbursed during the period January 2011-March 2012, due to conflict and violence in the targeted RAUs. At completion, the programme showed an EIRR of 22%, which was higher than the 19%, expected at appraisal. In addition, the results of the financial analysis conducted for 3 farm models were positive and considered attractive enough for farm households to adopt the new technical packages.

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Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD provided close support throughout implementation. During the conflict period of 2003-06, IFAD was unable to visit the project offices, but held regular meetings with its staff in the Eastern part of the project area. In 2006, the programme came under the direct supervision of IFAD, which further enhanced programme implementation. Supervision missions provided constructive suggestions for overcoming implementation constraints. IFAD in turn closely followed-up on the proper implementation of these recommendations. Finally, IFAD was very supportive and flexible in approving the borrower’s request for reallocation of project funds and extension of the loan closing date.

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Cooperating Institution Until 2006, the programme was supervised by UNOPS. Technical supervision was satisfactory. UNOPS performance was not further assessed in the PCR.

n.a

Government The State Ministry of Agricultural and Natural Resources acted as lead agency. Other supervisory entities included the Interministerial Steering Committee (responsible for policy guidance and oversight of all of IFAD projects in Sudan), the Programme Executive Board (PEB – responsible for key policymaking and problem-solving body at the state level), the Central Coordination Unit (responsible for programme implementation and for organizing administrative processes) and the PMU (responsible for AWP&B and daily implementation). Project management was mostly satisfactory. Until 2005, it benefited from the support of an international management adviser. It did however not always follow-up on supervision mission recommendations, due also to the security situation. Important partnerships were established with other organizations, such as NGOs and UN agencies. The PEB held 29 meetings, which corresponds to 4 per year. Nevertheless, it failed to provide appropriate guidance on some important aspects such as the use of the revolving funds for veterinary services, the mobile clinics, and construction/rehabilitation & management of the hafirs (water collection points). Programme implementation was sometimes delayed by the late release of counterpart funds. Procurement was transparent and in accordance with IFAD guidelines. Procurement procedures were however cumbersome and delayed project implementation.

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NGO/Other Not assessed in the PCR. n.a

Cofinancier(s) The Embassy of the Netherlands provided supplementary financing in the amount of US$9 million for the period 2010-13 to enable the project to expand its activities to war-affected areas formerly controlled by the SPLM, replicating successful extension activities in those areas to increase agricultural productivity. Supplementary financing targeted 341 communities with a total population of 66 000. However, only 35% of this grant could be disbursed, due to conflict and violence in the RAU concerned. In December 2010 a Swedish grant of US$2.1 was approved to scale up Bara’ah to further 10,000 members. Bara’ah, which until then was a traditional savings and credit group, received an additional US$0.25 million from the Bank of Sudan, which has recognized it as a rural microfinance institution

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No issues were mentioned



Farming is the main source of income of the population in the programme area. Survey results revealed that between 2004 and 2012, average household incomes increased by more than 200% for all segments of the population in the programme area. In addition, the average annual income of beneficiaries is significantly higher than the average income of non-beneficiaries in the programme area. This is attributed to a steep increase in households relying on sales from farming and livestock from 58% in 2004 to 81% in 2012. The percentage of active savers also increased considerably from 13% in 2004 to 23% in 2010. Men were able to increase their saving significantly more than women (42% against 19% between 2004 and 2012), due to the sale of livestock. Beneficiaries have gained access to small loans through the Bara’ah system which was very well received by the beneficiaries. Loans were essentially used to develop small agricultural projects, livestock, small businesses and other

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income-generating activities. They were also used for post-harvest consumption or storage. Access to land could be improved. The average percentage of land cultivated to land owned increased from 66% in 2004 to 78% in 2012 for jubrakas (homegarden used for mixed cultivation). A significant improvement could be noted in the average farm size cultivated by women, which increased from 1.3 feddans in 2004 to 7.0 feddans in 2012. Beneficiaries experienced a significant increase in the number of livestock owned, in particularly cattle, sheep and goat. The percentage of households owning cattle increased from 23% in 2004 to 36% in 2008, with the most significant increase in the percentage of households owning goats from 52% in 2004 to 68% in 2008. This result was mainly attributed to improved access to veterinary services and credit for the purchase of animals. In 2012, household ownership of farm implements and hand tools was as high as 74% while heavy machinery was owned by only 13% of them. 41% owned a bicycle, 26% a donkey cart, 7% a motorbike, 67% a radio and 65% a mobile phone. However, there are no reference data to compare these figures with. Housing improved (more brick houses with an annexed room), but it is not clear to what extent this is attributable to the programme.

Food Security Higher incomes have enabled beneficiary households to increase their overall food intake as reflected in their yearly consumption of food. Between 2004 and 2006, the annual consumption of fresh milk has increased from 384 litres to 683 litres, milk products from 470 litres to 4230 litres, meat products from 181 kg to 382 kg and vegetables from 79 kg to 185 kg. This is mainly due to higher agricultural production and higher incomes from sales, such as livestock and production surpluses. The relative increase in meat production reflects a strong improvement in household diets and can be considered as a proxy indicator for improved household food security. It can be assumed that improved capacities to store food and therefore to mitigate shocks such as drought and diseases have also contributed to improving household food security. Household expenditures on food as a percentage of total household expenditures increased only slightly. This seems to indicate that income increases are directly translated into higher expenditures for food to meet basic nutritional needs.

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Ag. Productivity The percentage of households depending on farming has steadily increased from 60% in 2004 to 77% in 2008, which seems to indicate that more households are settling in the programme area. The programme supported the establishment of a community-based extension agent network in all targeted RAUs, which has significantly contributed to improving agricultural and livestock production. A total of 285 Village Extension Agents (VEAs) were trained (of 185 planned) and back-stopped to provide multi-disciplinary extension services to 39 000 smallholders (twice the target). These VEAs were considered as the primary sources of advice by 73% of the farming households. Also, 91% of the farming households surveyed knew their extension agent. The training of more than 300 contact famers (IFAD loan and Dutch Grant) in various fields has helped disseminate new technologies and practices. The programme also established seed banks, but problems were encountered with the repayment. Only 35% of the farmers paid back their loan with quality seeds. The programme also helped establish 1092 demonstration fields. Field demonstrations were however not always successful, but affected by droughts, pest infestation and the general conflict situation. Survey results of 2010 showed that 87% of small farmers in the programme area had adopted the recommended farming practices and seeds compared to 36% in 2008. This has resulted in increased crop productivity for the main crops (sorghum, millet, sesame, groundnut, cotton). However, yields remained generally low and below the average realized in research results and demonstration plots. The training of paravets has made veterinary services available not only within the communities concerned but also in neighbouring communities. Vaccination and treatment of diseases have reduced mortality rates, and guidance on supplementary feeding has led to an increase in the number of livestock. The proper use of the revolving fund for vet services by the Animal Health Authority remained, however, unresolved (misuse), threatening the sustainability of the mechanism. The programme also provided support to 64 000 households classified as very poor through the distribution of starter-packs. This was twice the targeted number at appraisal (226% outreach).

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No environmental impact study was conducted. n.a


The social capital was improved through the construction of 54 schools, 16 youth/community development centers and 10 health centers. As a result, school enrolment rates rose, family nutrition improved and young people were given skills to start small activities. An important training activity was the training of midwives, which has greatly contributed to reducing mortality rates at birth. The programme also improved access to safe water for both human and animal consumption through the rehabilitation of 25 and the construction of 2 new hafirs, which was, however, well below the target of 80 and 20 respectively. Problems were encountered with the supervision of the works and the management and legal ownership of the hafirs. Nevertheless, this activity has contributed to the reduction of diseases and to the increase of incomes from the sale of livestock. The Community Development Committees (CDCs), which the programme has helped establish, have become an

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effective and efficient community development tool and have played a significant role in mobilizing resources and empowering communities. A survey conducted in 2010 showed that 94% of the respondents were members of a CDC, interacting with the programme and participating actively in the development process of their communities. Farmer community groups were identified as the most important and useful community institution that helps identify and streamline community needs. Also, 88% of the respondents stated that they benefited from direct involvement in programme activities. Finally, the results showed that collective action and cooperation to the benefit of the community had become part of the new culture instilled to the communities. These developments have had a strong mobilizing effect on the beneficiaries and have inspired them to start their own development activities. 89% of the beneficiaries have rate very positively the community activities undertaken by the CDCs.

Inst. & Policies No intended impact on institutions and policies n.a

Markets Access to markets was improved through the upgrading of the Kadugli-Talodi dust road into an asphalted higher-grade road (118 km) and the rehabilitation of 566 km of gravel feeder roads. This has had a significant impact on the entire area by improving the marketability of agricultural produce and reducing travel costs and time. According to the PCR this also led to an increase in cropped area and investment in irrigated agriculture. Figures are, however, not provided. With the help of the Dutch grant, the programme has further provided support to the construction of the honey marketplace in Kadugli, which has contributed to boosting the honey trade (and hence the production) in the area

4

Project Impact Impact was assessed based on 4 beneficiary impact assessment studies conducted in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 respectively, using the 2004 household survey as benchmark. Between 2004 and 2012, the percentage share of very poor and poor households decreased from 24% and 42% in 2004 to 9% and 40% in 2012 while the percentage of less poor and wealthy households increased from 25% and 9% to 37% and 14% respectively. It can be concluded that the programme has had a very positive impact on reducing the share of very poor households

5

Overarching Factors

Innovation The programme showed several innovative features of which the most significant are: (i) transforming the traditional Sanduq rural financial system into a modern Bara’ah, (ii) working with new and inexperienced state structures, and (iii) decentralization of extension services while making services payable. As such and given the difficulty of the context, the programme can be considered innovative.

5


Many of the achievements of the programme became models for replication and scaling up elsewhere in the country, such as: (i) implementation of a payable extension system that has become a model for other states in Sudan; (ii) establishing a tripartite agreement between hafi user associations, the programme and the Rural Administrative Units for the management of the hafirs (iii) implementation of social services interventions via community development initiatives, a community action model that has raised interest among NGOs operating in similar fields; (iv) the Bara’ah system which could be scaled up to a state-level institution; beneficiaries in other RAUs have already expressed their interest in a similar institution

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5


Sustainability and ownership are only weakly analysed in the PCR. It states that after more than 10 years of programme implementation, the target population has benefited from substantial training in various areas, which has enhanced their sense of ownership and is an important prerequisite towards sustainability of programme achievements. Moreover, the programme has prepared an exit strategy which is based on 3 pillars: (a) the development of the consolidated community development plan for the coming five years; (b) the link of the extension team and Bara’ah whereby, the extension teams will enter into a formal contract with Bara’ah; and (c) the third pillar is to continue working with other donors in areas where there are externally funded project. This exist strategy includes a 5-year plan for the period following its closure. The financing of these activities is being budgeted for in the Agricultural Revival Programme Budget. However, continuation of programme activities is greatly threatened by the security situation, which is continuously deteriorating.

4

Targeting The programme targeted traditional smallholders, who account for 60% of the population in the region and generally represent the poorest and most disadvantaged people in the community. The programme also targeted transhumant pastoralists who have settled, at least temporarily. The targeting mechanism was village-based, using specific poverty-linked criteria: (i) extent of rural poverty; (ii) degree of civil-strife-inflicted damage; and (iii) potential for demonstrating positive economic results from agricultural production. The programme applied strict procedures for the selection of communities and beneficiaries. The extension teams in collaboration with the local administration start with the selection of poorer villages from among the targeted six Rural Administrative Units and then select in a very transparent manner the lower scoring villages. Within the villages, traditional smallholders and women were the primary target group. The 2010 beneficiary impact assessment showed that the activities of the programme were inclusive and covered all ethnic groups residing in the project area

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Gender Women were included in all SKRDP activities. In some cases, they were well ahead of men, especially in income generating activities. They accounted for 38 % of the decentralized extension team and 33 % of community representatives in CDCs. In addition, 195 women’s groups were formed across CDCs to address their specific interests. 265 women received a 12 months training as midwives. A further 42,000 women were trained in mother and child care, 298 women were trained in social skills and 198 in microenterprise. Access to land, livestock and financial services could only timidly be improved. A significant improvement could be noted in the average farm size cultivated by women, which increased from 1.3 feddans in 2004 to 7.0 feddans in 2012. By contrast, the proportion of land cultivated to land owned only slightly increased between 2004 and 2008 which seems to indicate that while overall access to land by women could be improved, this has not had a significant impact on landownership. Programme activities have led to increased awareness among beneficiaries about the important role of women in the development of their communities and in agricultural production. 95% of women participated actively in all programme activities. CDCs however account for only 33% of women.

4



The programme reached out to some 195 communities covering around 39,000 households.

PCR Quality

Scope Some annexes are missing, but overall the PCR had a good scope. 5

Quality Very good report, very analytical and detailed. Results from the impact surveys and studies of 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2012 have been well integrated to make it a very informative report.

6

Lessons The PCR depicts some useful lessons for the design and implementation of future projects. They are, however, more of administrative and organizational nature.

4

Candour The report is well written and objective. 6


77

Sudan - Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project


Country & Project Name Sudan - Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project (GSLRP) Ratings

Loan No.: 00630

Project Id. 1263


Entry into Force 12 August 2004

Completion Date 31/09/2012




Cofinanciers (if any) Government: US$8.93 million; Beneficiaries US$4.7 million; Domestic: US$0.47 million

Cooperating Institution UNOPS

Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Wealth and Irrigation (Kassala State)

Principal Components i) Irrigation Infrastructure Rehabilitation; ii) Animal production and Rangeland Management, 3) Community Development, Capacity building and empowerment; iv) Financial services and marketing; 5) Institutional support.

Project Performance

Relevance The Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project (GSLRP)'s objectives were valid and clearly focusing on addressing the high incidence of poverty in the Gash area. Also, the Project's objectives and activities implemented were very relevant to the priority needs of the target group, as the focus of the interventions was on the rehabilitation of the Gash Agricultural Scheme whose degradation was considered one of the roots of poverty in Sudan. The Project's objectives were also consistent with the main features of IFAD's COSOP as well as with the priorities expressed by the Government of Sudan (GoS). However, GSLRP's goal and purpose have proved to be ambitious and the project design for some aspects was flawed due to a complex mix of diverse interventions, multitude of institutions involved and implementation arrangements. The design modality - particularly those related to institutional arrangements - was practically partly suitable. In addition, the government decentralization process was at its beginning and the share of responsibilities between the Federal Government and the State of Kassala Government were not totally clear. Finally, it seems that the lack of an adoption of a participatory approach (particularly with reference to the involvement of all the stakeholders at design and implementation level), has been one of the main issues which have led to the failure of the land reform which was one of the objectives pursued by the GSLRP. CPM's comments include: The project approach, goal and approach was supporting livelihood approach in a given area; accordingly, it targeted all beneficiaries in that area. The main issue was the synchronization of physical infrastructure with the reform. The reform should have come first.

4

Effectiveness Programme effectiveness has been only moderately satisfactory. It seems that project's effectiveness has been affected by project area specific political and social conditions, unpredictable circumstances (floods of 2003 and 2007), which have impacted the GSLRDP execution. In relation to the first component (irrigation system rehabilitation), despite the increase in the number of areas which were cultivated and irrigated (equivalent to 19.7% and 27.4%, respectively) and the decrease in the number of farmers owning less than 3 feddans (from 19% to 3%), the project did not achieve the land reform as claimed in the project appraisal. In terms of agricultural research and technology transfer, the outreach of the extension services was very weak (only 18% of the farmers were covered by demonstrations of improved farming practices and farmers' schools). Conversely, regarding livestock production and rangeland management, the results account for a better performance: veterinary treatment caused a decrease in mortality rates, which contributed to the expansion of the average households' herd size (which went from 3.2 heads per family in 2005 to 7.78 in 2011). However, the increase in milk productivity was insignificant due to the limited interventions by the Project in this sector. In relation to the third component (community participation, empowerment and capacity building), achievements were satisfactory especially in relation to women's participation in development committees. Their involvement led to the amelioration of families' diet, the improvement of children's health and also to an increase in household's income. Finally, regarding the forth component (rural financial services), results appear to be fairly disappointing: the total number of agricultural loans disbursed to farmers account to USD 7,520 (only 31% of the appraisal target). For non-farm lending, the achievement was higher representing 44% of the target. CPM's comments: The project contributed to re-vitalization of the scheme, increase of the area seed, introduction of individual incentive; protection of Kassala city against floods, and improving access to drinking water.

4

Efficiency The Project has been implemented fairly efficiently. Timetables were adequately met, no cost overruns were noticed. Also no significant delays in loan effectiveness and implementation were registered (at closing the disbursement rate was equal to 97%). For some components, the total costs estimated at appraisal were greater than actual costs by 16%. For other components, actual project costs were greater than costs at appraisal. The EIRR at completion has been higher than the EIRR

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estimated at appraisal (12.7%) by 2.2 points. This is attributed mainly to several differences between the assumptions of the appraisal analysis and the current analysis done at Project completion.


Partner Performance

IFAD Overall, IFAD performed very well with respect to the roles defined in the project design. Since the launch of the project, IFAD has been conducting periodical reviews of progress and of emerging implementation issues, particularly in land and water governance. It mobilized adequate technical expertise both during project design and implementation (five IFAD follow up missions where fielded during 2005). A MTR was conducted in 2008, which came up with essential but demanding recommendations that have had an impact on the subsequent pace of project implementation. The Fund adopted a very collaborative approach with the other partners and demonstrated to be available to discuss about potential changes in the implementation of programme which have emerged during its performance.

5

Cooperating Institution UNOPS performed very well with respect to the roles defined in the project. It acted as the CI from 2004 to 2007. During the first years of project's implementation, UNOPS led all the supervisions and delivered all the required assistance. It also provided training to the PCU in the field of financial management. Moreover, it took prompt actions to solve the problems arising during implementation (e.g. withholding of Euro 0,64 million destined for Programme's activities because of insufficient support documentation).

5

Government The GoS was involved at project's design and it supported implementation by providing additional funding than agreed at appraisal (11.0 million versus 8.9 million). This strongly contributed to the achievement of more than was expected at appraisal concerning the Gash River training and flood control. The GoS also complied with loan covenants and allocated adequate funds for Programme operations. However, the level of funding should have been more regular and timely to enable effective planning and to ensure long term preparation and revision with particular reference to the use of water fees in funding GAS activities. All implementing agencies, with the exception of the TTEA, have performed quite well in implementing activities which were planned in the AWPB. The institutional settings as designed proved globally relevant for achieving GSLRP purpose. However, a more proactive approach in the services delivery to the target groups would have been desirable in order to produce additional benefits to the latter (particularly relating to the adoption of new technologies for poor households).

4

NGO/Other n.a

Cofinancier(s) n.a


As a whole it seems that a satisfactory teamwork has been carried out among all the partners to achieve the development objectives



From evidence provided by the PCR, it seems that the GSLRP has contributed to the increase in households' income. The average income of a household per day has increased from USD 1 in 2005 to USD 7.6 in 2011. Moreover, the 2011 Annual Assessment reflected an increase in the level of spending in the household consumption, from less than half a dollar per person per day to around USD 1.3. Around 38% of the respondents confirmed the construction of new buildings to their houses (bathrooms, sitting rooms, verandas); 4% benefitted from added electricity supply, 7% purchased gas and kerosene stoves. The majority (more than 50%) have added bed mattress and covers. At the end of 2011, around 8,629 loans have been disbursed, which contributed to the build-up of additional assets for the target group (e.g. loans in livestock were a key factor in the increase of livestock herd sizes and have contributed to the establishment of new small and microenterprises or the expansion of the existing ones). The loans were utilized in farm production, purchase of livestock and fodders, trading, processing and service enterprises.

5

Food Security The Project fairly positively affected food availability to ensure a minimum necessary intake by the target group. Around 41% of the interviewees confirmed that food consumption increased due to the project's implementation. Increased crop and livestock production have improved the food security situation and consumption. Specifically, the consumption of sorghum increased by 48% and the one of meat by 35% according to the 2011 Annual Assessment. Moreover, around 52% of the surveyed households confirmed that hunger periods were shorter and less frequent after the implementation of GSLRP compared to the period "without project".

5

Ag. Productivity The Project succeeded in the improvement of irrigated land and crop yields. Irrigated land increased from 55,000 feddans in 2003 to more than 75,000 in 2011. This contributed to increase agricultural and livestock productivity. The average area cultivated per farmer has increased by 59% and sorghum productivity increased of 23% (from 7.9 sacks per feddans to around 9.74 sacks).

4

Ag. Productivity and Food Security

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The GSLRP has significantly contributed to improve and secure access to water for spate irrigation by the target group. The rehabilitation of most of the infrastructure allowed a better control of floods as well as a better capture of river flush water which, in its turn, was diverted to cultivated areas. In this respect, the GSLRP has achieved more than expected at appraisal due to significant Government additional funding. Moreover, the availability of water for the Gash Agricultural Scheme (GAS) has been increased by the construction of strategic spurs, river training works, closure of some meander channels next to the off-takes, rising of the latter and improvements in tie bunds connecting the off-takes.

5


More than 15,000 individuals benefitted from the training provided by the project on several topics (e.g. group management, food processing and home economy, water management and sanitation, handicrafts and vocational training, agroforestry and literacy training). This led to significant benefits on households' and the community as whole, which were various and appreciable. Through the home economy and food processing training, a more rational use of food items was promoted thus producing savings in households' budgets. Skills generated from handicrafts and vocational training was used for income generation and family purposes. Conversely, no evidence is provided in relation to the strengthening of rural people organizations and grassroots institutions.

4

Inst. & Policies It does not seem that the Project exerted a strong influence on institutions, policies and regulatory frameworks. The Project did not succeed in establishing sound and effective institutional arrangements for GAS. The institution is still constrained by the lack on an integrated approach and a clear longer term business plan that would reduce dependency of GAS on GOS budgetary allocations. According to the Supervision Mission carried out in July/August 2010, the specific political and social conditions of the project area, two unpredictable floods (2003 and 2007), the unexpected resistance to project's reforms by local groups with vested interests significantly hindered the development of the institutional reforms envisaged at appraisal. Among the recommendations put forward in the PCR, the necessity to provide further support to the institutional strengthening - also in order to ensure GSLRP sustainability- is highlighted. On the positive side, the concept of WUAs has been introduced by the Project and has slowly been adopted at all levels (farmers; GAS, State, Farmers Union). An important step forward in this process has been the establishment of a WUA Unit in GAS.

3

Markets No evidence is provided in relation to the improvement of rural people's access to markets due to better transport routes and means of transportation.

3

Project Impact 4

Overarching Factors

Innovation Although the Project included agricultural research and extension among the activities to be carried out, it does not seem that it introduced significantly innovative ideas in the target area. None of the results from farm trials on cotton and sesame were transferred to farmers. Moreover, the improvement of fields’ layouts resulting from project's activities was not capitalized and used to build a realistic model of on-farm water management. Next, no on-farm improvement models have been applied to test their technical, social and financial feasibility.

3


The project has completed a design document for another phase for Gash Development Project (GDP) for the consideration of the IsDB funding as part of their commitment to support the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. The GDP is a five year project. The GDP, whenever started its implementation, should be considered as an opportunity to strengthen some GSLRP activities, to tackle major remaining issues, and to put GAS on track for an effective sustainable development.

4


4


Several factors hinder the project's sustainability. The joint IFAD/GoS mission highlighted a number of actions to be taken to secure the overall Project's sustainability (e.g. clarification of the role of GAS and adoption of a new chart for it, completion of the land tenancy reform, clarification of the Water Users Associations (WUAs) and their relationship with the GAS). Moreover, there is still a risk within the project area, if the land reform process is not consolidated and completed, that the situation that prevailed before the project will come again, which will keep poor households poor and enables the better off to accumulate land.

3

Targeting The targeting approach was very clear during the design phase. It appears that adequate criteria to enhance the participation of vulnerable socio economic groups in all the phases of project's cycle have been developed. Women were among the vulnerable individuals which seem to have most benefitted from GSLRP's intervention.

5

Gender Considering the conservative attitude among the target group regarding women's participation in public issues, the Project intervention achieved a positive impact in this respect. As a whole, women benefitted from GSLRP's activities in several ways, including renewal of house furniture and equipment, improved meals, house renovation and the construction of new buildings. Women represented 59% of those who participated in the training and in capacity development interventions. The skills they gained led to a general improvement in the families' quality of life. There were also

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established Community Development Committees (CDCs) of women, which at project completion, stood at 95.5%. The women groups formed assisted around 2000 women until December 2011 to borrow from the bank and establish productive activities.



138,000 individuals

PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is mostly in line with the 2006 PCR Guidelines. Almost all the required annexes have been included. However, the section on innovation was missing.

5

Quality This was a fairly good quality PCR. Overall, project's description, analysis and conclusion are convincing. However, there is a sense that - with regard to the project impact indicators - the project could have benefitted from more accurate information.

4

Lessons Lessons learned have been clearly drawn. They were usefully identified according to the three levels of project cycles (i) design; ii) implementation preparatory phase and iii) implementation phase).

5

Candour It seems that the performance of the Programme has been objectively assessed. 6


81

Turkey - Sivas-Erzincan Development Project


Country & Project Name Turkey - Sivas-Erzincan Development Project (SEDP) Ratings

Loan No.: 616-TR

Project Id. 1189


Entry into Force 17 January 2005

Completion Date 31 March 2013 (original: 31 March 2012)

Final Closing Date 30 September 2013 (original: 30 September 2012)



Cofinanciers (if any) OFID: US$9.90; Government: US$4.39; Beneficiaries: US$2.67


Implementing Agency Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (MFAL)

Principal Components Three main components: (a) Community and Cooperative Development with sub-components: (i) Community and cooperative capacity-building. To assist all participating villages in establishing community institutions, such as village development committees (VDCs), cooperatives, irrigation cooperatives, grazing associations and specialist producer associations; (ii) Cooperative development; (iii) Community and cooperative initiatives allocation, to lead to community confidence and competence in designing and managing socio-economic development projects aimed at improving living standards. (b) Agricultural Development with sub-components: (i) Crop production and agroforestry; (ii) Livestock development. (c) Project Management Unit. The project to be implemented under the overall authority of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) by an autonomous project management unit (PMU) based in the administrative capital of one of the project’s provinces (Sivas). After the project's redesign, there was a change in the framework under which the bulk of the project was implemented: a) Village improvement: i) Awareness raising, ii) Village infrastructure; b) Farming Support and Agricultural Marketing: i) Supply Chain Analysis, ii) Supply Chain Investments; c) Project Management and Support.

Project Performance

Relevance SEDP was designed in 2001 under the overall guidance of IFAD's COSOP for Turkey prepared in 2000 under the policy parameters prevailing then. During 2008, in view of the IFAD 2006 COSOP, the Agricultural and Rural Development strategies approved by the Government of Turkey (GoT) in 2006, and the slow implementation progress, the project went through a thoroughly redesign process in terms of reshaping components, implementation arrangements and financing plans. The Project as set in the revised design was considered relevant to Turkish national agricultural and rural development priorities, and it was consistent with IFAD's 2006 COSOP and in line with the national laws and regulations on agriculture and irrigation. However, SEDP was only partly relevant to the livelihood concerns of the primary target group as project's relevance to the poorer varied by component. On one hand, SEDP investments in rural infrastructure addressed effectively the poor villagers' needs and priorities, which had been identified through a series of participatory discussions at village level; this participatory process turned out to be highly effective. On the other hand, with concern to the farming support and agriculture marketing component, it seems that SEDP support to supply chain actors was relevant to middle size entrepreneurs in the project area, whereas it was biased against the poorer HHs which did not own significant farm assets. Nevertheless, selection of apiary and dairy value chains was made based on a sector study done by the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture (PDA) in 2009. At the time it was perceived that these were the value chains with the best chances of reaching to poor people. The lack of solid and continuous M&E support for the project, also due to the lack of an M&E responsible officer, has had a detrimental effect on project ability to record and analyse data, provide adequate indicators of performance, provide a useful tool for management in decision making, and learn from experience. A benchmark study of low quality was produced in 2009 and remained unused. No systematic data collection on indicators was carried out. The Logical Framework in the redesign document identified performance indicators but did not contain any quantitative target for these indicators. Likewise, the LF did not guide discussions about AWPBs. No baseline study was undertaken at the beginning of the project.

4

Effectiveness The project has been effective in achieving some of the foreseen development objectives. It has to be noted that during project implementation, the organization and management structure stipulated for the redesigned SEDP was not realized; the recruitment of contracted staff positions proved very problematic, as the incentive structure proved inadequate to attract well qualified and experienced staff to work in the remote and disadvantaged project area. When looking at the positive side, the project investments in village infrastructure reached a large number of inhabitants of the selected poor and isolated settlements. Small scale irrigation would benefit 8420 farmers, i.e. 1684 HHs; the investments in sewerage systems with natural treatments benefitted almost 10878 (2176 HHs), those

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of road upgrading benefited about 440 HHS, and other infrastructure covered 2000 HHS. Thanks to the irrigation investments, as a result of the conversion of the existing system to the closed pressure irrigation system, the evaporation's and the leakage losses are diminished significantly. As a result, irrigation efficiency has improved, water availability increased, leading to higher yields. With the conversion of on-farm irrigation to drip system, substantial benefits are likely to be accrued to farmers in terms of reduction in the irrigation costs, water savings allowing addition to the irrigated land, and shift to high value crops. In some cases, these have already been reflected in higher farm and HHs' income for some farmers and are likely to materialize at a wider scale in the project area. On the less positive side, the choice of the main supply chain supported by the project (dairy value chain), the technical package provided, eligibility criteria set by SEDP for recipient of its partial grant support and the choice of institutions within the supply chain to work with Cattle Breeder Associations (CBAs), meant that poorer producers have not benefitted as expected, as the bulk of the project support went to middle size milk producing HHs or enterprises. Trickle down of benefits to the primary target group (the poorer) through employment and/or income generation as expected at design was not evident. Local employment generation has been very modest and no visible effect on migration was noted, as few employment opportunities were created through the development of milk collection networks in both Sivas and Erzincan and in the dry bean processing facility in Erzincan. Another issues was the sequencing, as well as the little systematic synchronization of interventions between the two components at geographic or activities level.

Efficiency SEDP's effectiveness lag stood at 16.5 months. The project was extended by one year till September 2013. At completion, IFAD's disbursement stood at 99% and OFID was 100%. Due to a poor M&E system, insufficient data and information are available to allow a comprehensive assessment of project efficiency globally. With regard to the village infrastructure component, it seems that investments in the sewerage system have been efficient for the small mountain/forest villages with relatively poor resource endowment. The selected water treatment system has a very low energy consumption and does not require any special qualification for the maintenance. The investment in off-farm piped networks for irrigation is also supposed to contribute to a better efficiency, as the project has helped convert inefficient and costly existing irrigation techniques using flood irrigation and pumping underground water into a modernized system. The Project-initiated improvement in irrigation system has improved water availability and increased water use efficiency from an average of 40-50% before the project to an average of 80% after the project. Another indication of efficiency is that the costs per ha is comparable with similar irrigation network elsewhere in the Near East region. With concern to the farming support and agricultural marketing, all assistance for the dairy value chain supported by the project has been delivered timely and at acceptable cost to beneficiaries. It must be highlighted that SEDP support to the dairy value chain was by far the largest among the three selected value chains, absorbing about 85% of component costs. Moreover, the approach followed by the dairy SIP focused exclusively on dairy farmers (milk production) and milk collectors, carriers and haulers (delivery of raw milk) who constitute the first two essential links in the value chain. Therefore, the SEDP was directed to a partially integrated value chain without the downstream links of wholesalers and consumers. The training implemented by the PMU exceeded in scope and cost the design provision, as it went from an allocated USD 616 600 to just over USD 1.0 million and included farmer training in modern irrigation technologies. The number of trainees exceeded 15 000.

5


Partner Performance

IFAD Since 2007, IFAD has been in charge of project's direct supervision. Overall, IFAD performed its role satisfactorily as the main financier responsible for supervision and loan administration. Throughout implementation, IFAD systematically responded promptly to PMU's requests including approval and fund releases. It also provided adequate and timely advisory services. It approved one year extension and implementation support missions when needed. On the less positive side, IFAD has been responsible for the initial design which was proved non-implementable for the first 6 years. The two major project design features IFAD is responsible of are: i) implications of the value chain approach to rural poverty outreach and targeting; ii) inadequate staffing levels proposed (no provision for full time M&E officer and engineers). A project's redesign was done in the light of the realities of the Turkish rural development policies, and has been appreciated by the Turkish counterparts. However, the above issues could not be resolved during implementation despite the acknowledgement of supervision missions of their potential adverse implications on project performance. Although IFAD direct supervision has been very regular and a mission was mounted every year, some highly needed expertise in the socio-economic domains, e.g. targeting and gender specialists were never included. Supervision did not raise any issues regarding SEDP grant beneficiary selection criteria which excluded poorer HHs that are supposed to be the primary target group. Nor did IFAD supervision mission recommend the hiring of such expertise as short term technical assistance to ensure the poverty focus of the interventions. Finally, IFAD did not deal more forcefully with the issue of contract staff recruitment, especially the marketing and enterprise development specialists, who

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were crucial to the success of the value chain approach, and the M&E officer.

Cooperating Institution UNOPS was in charge of project's supervision until April 2007. No information is available in the PCR to assess UNOPS performance.

n.a

Government The GOT demonstrated a strong ownership of the project's goal and objectives and has met all its financial obligations. In the early stages of project implementation, MARA (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs) at the central level did not adhere closely to the structure for project organization and management, and it did not fulfil its obligation to install a management information system. Moreover, supervision missions reported some delays in the submission of agreed amendments to the IFAD and OFID loan agreements after the project redesign. MARA became MFAL (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock) in June 2011 and the reorganisation and personnel changes resulted in an adequate provision of timely and very relevant support and guidance to project implementation. The MFAL, in its role of implementing agency, had the overall responsibility of the SEDP finances. The compliance with the loan covenants is deemed as satisfactory. The main issues were related to the adequacy of staffing at regional level, as project staffing remained a critical issue until project completion. Despite prompting from both IFAD supervision missions and UNDP, MFAL did not see a need to improve contract staff's salaries to levels that were competitive with the private sector and sufficient to attract high calibre staff to work in the remote and disadvantaged project area provinces. The absence for long periods of time of contract staff in supply chain management, marketing and engineering and M&E detracted from the efficiency of the project and reduced the overall benefit level that could have otherwise been realised. The provincial Directorate of Agriculture (PDA) at the provisional level played an important and critical role in project implementation. PDAs cooperated very well with the project, provided information and advice to project staff and facilitated their access to provincial authorities and their interaction with project beneficiaries.

4

NGO/Other UNDP acted as the implementer of the project funds and as an implementation partner of MFAL in the domain of financial management and procurement, human resource management and services in respect of contract staff and technical assistance. It also financed part of the project technical assistance and training for a total of USD 0.2 million, which was almost fully disbursed. SEDP was the first IFAD investment in the country administered by UNDP. The provision of technical expertise by UNDP in the field of procurement, financial management and civil engineering was crucial for the successful implementation of the project. A clear detected deficiency in the accounting system is that it gives expenditure by loan category but not by project component. MFAL has also expressed concern regarding the timely discharge of UNDP functions and in particular on procurement which happened to be quite lengthy (between three months up to one year). Furthermore, problems were experienced in the recruitment of contract staff, especially engineers and financial management professionals highly demanded by Turkey's booming private sector firms for posting to the project area. There has been also a lack of clarity as to the allegiance and accountability of contract staff that is hired by UNDP but was working for a Government project.

4

Cofinancier(s) OFID as a co-financier has delegated to IFAD the responsibility for its loan administration and supervision and proved an excellent and understanding partner throughout. It responded promptly to IFAD and GOT requests.

5


Overall, it seems that it would have been desirable to have a better communication and collaboration between UNDP and MFAL.



Due to the project poor M&E system, very little quantitative data are available to assess project's impact on this domain. Based on the PCR, it seems that SEDP contributed to the creation of physical assets for the rural poor individually and at village level in the project area. The constructed assets have impacted on the lives of the rural poor and are likely to contribute significantly in achieving project overall goal. With concern to the investments on irrigation, for those farmers who installed on-farm irrigation infrastructure following the finalization of schemes construction, the benefits in terms of yield and income have been substantial. The irrigated land value, generally, is three to four times than the non-irrigated land. According to the PCR, the project has had a positive impact on improving rural HHs' access to financial resources for investment in starting or expanding their agricultural business. The availability of agricultural financing has improved for the project's secondary target group, both as a direct result of the project's grant programme, but also because the project is making the beneficiaries aware of all other financing possibilities including GOT grant programme, GOT interest free credit for acquisition of improved pure breed cows, WU-IPARD grant programme and interest free loans from the Agriculture Bank. Those farmers which participated to the dairy value chain in Erzincan and Sivas have achieved positive gains; farmers have benefitted from improved and stable terms of payment and increased farm-gate prices, as well as improved yields and produce quality, and increased their income. However, SEDP interventions have benefited mainly medium size enterprises, whereas limited evidence was found of indirect benefit through employment and income generation to the benefit of the poorer HHs. SEDP interventions have

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catered for some of the needs of poorer farmers, as SEDP's support to CBAs has led to increase in non-members' sales of milk to the collection centers and increased their access to AIs. However, overall the direct benefits to the poorer farmers have been limited in scope compared to their needs and their prevalence in the project area. As far as the SEDP support to bee-keeping, is seems that project's support packages which included honey and by product processing equipment was attractive enough to result in a significant leakage of support to less poor HHs.

Food Security Although the contribution to a higher agriculture productivity could lead to a better food security, no analysis is made in the PCR which allows to provide a definite assessment of project's impact on this domain.

n.a

Ag. Productivity Through provision of training to farmers, and dissemination of modern technologies, increased quantities and quality of produce were achieved (this was the case of farmers beneficiaries in milk production, honey value chain). Project's investments through the Village Infrastructure component are highly likely to have a positive impact on agriculture productivity. Project small scale irrigation interventions allowed the available irrigation water to cover an additional 1447 ha raising the total irrigation command area to 2871 hectares. Available studies and direct interviews with farmers using on-farm improved irrigation technology attested to a significant improvement in crop yields depending on location. The evaluation and impact studies provide ample evidence that yields under irrigation for the major crops, i.e. wheat, sugar beet, tomato, fruit trees can increase significantly under irrigation affecting positively farm income. The project led investments also contributed to reduce production costs for most crops as improved irrigation systems reduce both water delivery costs and labour requirement. However, the benefits for farmers are contingent upon: i) farmers completing the system improvement from the communal hydrant where the project stopped and into their own farm; and ii) the efficient operation and management of the irrigation system by the irrigation cooperative/water user associations entrusted with this task. The villagers reported their satisfaction with the upgrading of access roads that make their life safe and easier as well as enable them to perform better farming.

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The project constructed sewerage networks has resulted in positive impact on the environmental conditions in the village. The most visible change was the disappearance of the mud which is always a nuisance in rainy weather. Following the completion of the project, almost all of the houses were refurbished with hygienic toilettes and bathrooms. Improved sanitary conditions have had a noticeable impact on women's conditions. Work burden on women has been reduced as a result of a greater number of washing and dish washers in the houses. Previously, women were dumping the HH's wastewater into the immediate environment, causing health problems to poultry, inflicting damages on fruit bearing trees and triggering disputes with the neighbours.

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SEDP investments through the Village Infrastructure Component, including the rehabilitation of the existing drinking water system, have had a significant positive impact on living conditions in the poor villages. The sewerage systems installed in 30 villages have significantly improved health and sanitation (particularly for women and children) and village living conditions. Around 15000 farmers also became exposed to modern technical practices in modern irrigation and in agricultural production and marketing practices, through the provision of training activities in a number of agriculture and irrigation related skills and competencies (including crop and horticulture production, feed and fodder production, dairy farming skills, apiculture as well as modern irrigation technologies). Demonstrations of technologies on horticulture were linked with farmer visits to demonstration sites. Communities have also been empowered through the village planning process to determine and prioritise their needs and through training in O&M of sewerage system.

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Inst. & Policies Several farmer organizations (Associations and Cooperatives) were supported by SEDP. The support included material support with partial grants for equipment and transport vehicles for milk collection to Cattle Breeding Associations (CBAs) and to the dry beans processing facility as well as technical assistance and training to the Sivas Bee-Keepers Association and the seven irrigation cooperatives/ water users associations. However, it seems that the CBAs (which are institutions intended to serve the whole farming community but are inclined to focus on the more commercial minded middle and higher level producers) received stronger support from SEDP compared to the Cooperatives (which are truly institutions of the poor). However, it is not possible to attribute the CBAs expansion only to the project, as the CBAs have received large amounts of external support from donors during the project implementation period as well as from the GOT.

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Markets Project support to the four Strategic Investment Plans (SIPs) in 3 different value chains has resulted in improved farmers' (and their cooperatives and associations') access to markets. Roads and associated village infrastructure have also improved access to pastures, agricultural lands and markets. In general, marketing of commodities supported by SEDP vary from direct sales to family and neighbours (as in the case of bee-keeping) to more coordinated activities that include collection, cooling,

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transportation and sales through associations (in the case of diary). Involvement in primary level processing (value-addition) is not frequent within the associations and has not been supported by the project. No collective marketing efforts are evident in the dry bean or in the beekeeping chains. Marketing activities concerning the dry beans still seem to be varied in nature, with some producers selling the unsorted and ungraded produce to traders, and others selling the sorted, graded and packaged produce to middlemen. (Additional CPM comment: The significant increases in the values of sold milk and milk prices should be noted as a success.)

Project Impact 4

Overarching Factors

Innovation Improvement of irrigation systems through implementation of drip irrigation to rationalize the use of water and fertilizers represent an innovative approach in the context of Sivas and Erzincan to reduce production costs and maximize farmers' income. Another important innovation is the introduction of natural treatment of waste water plant using constructed wetland system. Besides, its maintenance does not require special qualification. The adoption of the supply chain management approach is an important innovation introduced by SEDP, and implemented in the Turkish rural and agricultural development sector and environment.

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SEDP has provided a successful low-cost irrigation with high potential for replication and scaling-up. The adoption of the drip irrigation technology can be replicated by farmers in other regions with similar possibilities of using a water intake located at a sufficient altitude with respect to the fields to be irrigated. The introduction of natural treatment plant is a low cost appropriate technology which has a potential to be replicated in the project area and elsewhere. This system can be easily replicated to cover the needs for sewerage networks in other villages of Turkey. The adoption of the supply chain management approach has the potential to be replicated in other geographic areas of Turkey and within other sub-sectors, while observing IFAD's required focus on the poorer inhabitants.

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With concern to the sustainability of village sewerage, it seems that the prospects for sustainability are reasonably satisfactory. By October 2013, the project has handed over sewerage systems and other village level infrastructure to the special Provincial Administration of Sivas and Erzincan (SPA) who will be responsible together with village Muhtar and the villagers' contribution for O&M. By that time, the project has also started the process of handing over the irrigation infrastructure to the Water Users Associations/farmers Cooperatives as per the existing by-laws and legal frameworks prevailing in Turkey. In order to take full advantage of irrigation rehabilitation, there is a need to provide additional support to the farmers through some accompanying measures aimed at making good value of the investment made in modernizing irrigation schemes and ensuring generalization of their benefits. The sound technical practices and the good produce collection and marketing arrangements introduced by SEDP are expected to contribute positively to the long term sustainability of the supply chain. However, given the high dependency of the supply chain on a host of grants and subsidies, concerns have been raised on whether, without these grants and subsidies, dairy production would be financially sustainable. The MFAL has started to implement an exit strategy and a set of follow-up activities to secure sustained impact and enhance wider uptake of the technologies introduced by the Project, and intends to allocate sufficient budgetary and staffing resources for this purpose. An important element of the exit strategy is also the support to existing cooperatives and associations to strengthen the implementation of a fee based systems to sustainably cover the O&M costs in the irrigation schemes.

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Targeting As per its design, the project was implemented in two provinces (Erzican and Anatolia), which are among Turkey's poorest. The project aimed at giving priority to the poorest counties/villages of the two project provinces. The target group comprised the poorest people in the project area, whose livelihood system is based on the exploitation of local natural resources; but also it included support to new or established rural businesses identified as sustainably profitable on the basis of supply chain analysis of the project area commodities/subsectors with a comparative advantage. Within the implementation of the Village Infrastructure Component, the project implemented successfully very clear and relevant targeting strategy and participatory approach which benefitted the poor. Priorization of the districts/villages for project support was based on State Planning Organization's (SPO) national poverty ranking of districts and the Agriculture Master Plans for Sivas and Erzincan. With regard to the farming support and agriculture marketing component, the project did not formulate any targeting strategy under this component, only eligibility criteria for grants users were established which overall did not favour the poorer rural groups. These eligibility criteria included that selected farmers: i) should possess minimum 5 cows with mixed-breed; ii) own or rent minimum 110 Decares (11 ha) of land; iii) own or rent plot with size of 600 m2 for construction of new barn. These requirements, although consistent with GOT support in preparation for EU accession, have deterred the relatively poorer HHs from applying a grant due to lack of access to such capital. (Additional note

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from CPM: It could be useful to underline that a minimum of five cows is a government/EU (accession) requirement for GAP registration, and for receiving advisory support by government advisory service. The reason is that less than 5 cows, in the competitive Turkish dairy sector, are not sustainable.)

Gender Although there was no specific attempt to target women during project implementation, women have somehow benefitted from various project interventions. The professional staff of the project did not include women and none of the seconded village development coordinators were women, as stipulated at appraisal. Women did participate in training activities and few received value chain investment grants, but their number was below the 50% share stipulated at appraisal. However, social infrastructure at village level (e.g. sewerage systems, bakeries and drinking water) and sanitation interventions have directly benefitted women and children health and have led to a significantly decreased workload, availing them of opportunities to socialize and cooperate. SEDP dairy chain investments by modernising dairy production have also lessened the work burden as they are usually entrusted with milking. On the other hand, there was no evidence that the SIPs have undertaken a thorough gender analysis nor did project activities under this component specifically target women producers.

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PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is mostly in line with the 2006 Guidelines for PCR preparation. However, some of the requested annexes were missing.

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Quality As stated in the same PCR, the absence of a good M&E system has severely hindered the analysis of project's results. No systematic data collection on indicators was carried out and consequently no analysis and reporting of results and outcomes could be made, without an effective M&E system in place. This has affected the ability to provide more rigorous indication on project effectiveness, efficiency, performance and impact. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that - despite this lack of data - an effort was made to provide a comprehensive analysis of the project's main results and shortcomings. The PCR was built on four evaluation studies commissioned by the Project's as well as an impact assessment study.

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Lessons The lessons learned are in line with the overall project's analysis and their focus is on the most critical aspects of SEDP.

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Candour The project's assessment has been conducted objectively, with a fair perspective on both the successful and less successful achievements.

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Yemen - Dhamar Participatory Rural Development Project


Country & Project Name Yemen - Dhamar Participatory Rural Development Project (DPRDP) Ratings

Loan No.: 594-YE

Project Id. 1195



Completion Date 31 December 2012 (Original completion: 20 September 2011)

Final Closing Date 30 June 2013 (Original closing: 31 December 2012)





Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI)

Principal Components Project investment will be organized around five principal components and their sub-components: (i) Land and water resources management: (a) drinking-water supply; (b) land- and water-management structures; (ii) Agriculture and livelihood development: (a) livestock and range management; (b) apiculture development; (c) crop production; (d) community-based microfinance facilities; and (e) non-farm employment; (iii) Community development: (a) capacity-building of communities and (b) strengthening women’s development capacity; (iv) Development initiatives facility; and (v) Institutional support and project management: (a) institutional support; and (b) project management.

Project Performance

Relevance The project was designed in 2001 as part of IFAD's 2000 COSOP cycle and was also consistent with the Government of Yemen's Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (2000-2005). The project approach was very much in line with the beneficiaries' needs, through the adoption of a set of interventions well suited to their livelihoods systems. The DPRDP has been the first project of its kind to penetrate a difficult and developmentally deprived governorate and develop a new flexible and participatory approach, making the beneficiaries the target and, at the same time, the means for development. The beneficiaries, through their social organizations, have been the decision makers regarding the type and size of project interventions. Project activities envisaged under each of the four components were valuable, and all the specific objectives of the components and subcomponents were and have remained relevant. The project was initially identified as a problem projects (2004-06). However, its design was well adjusted during implementation to adapt it to changing contexts. The 2009 MTR addressed emerging issues, including amendment of the Financing Agreement, reallocation of funds across financing categories and extension of the project completion date and loan closing. In addition, the project's logical framework was fine-tuned and relevant sections were added, deleted or amended accordingly.

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Effectiveness The project's notable achievements must be seen in the context of the extremely difficult socio-cultural situation of the Governorate of Dhamar. Despite the operational constraints during its inception (e.g. project staffing) and the socio political unrest in 2011 and 2012, the project successfully implemented the intended activities and significant progress has been achieved toward the attainment of the project's development objectives. Overall, the project reached 93% of the target beneficiaries (52,706 rural poor HHs) and assisted them in overcoming poverty. All project activities contributed to enhancing local community livelihoods through improvements in crop productivity and livestock production practices, provision of rural financial products as well as infrastructure and support services, rehabilitation of terraces and protection of wadi banks, among others. Notable results were achieved with regard to women. As per project's development objectives: i) communities were empowered to mobilize and organize themselves to participate in, and gain direct benefit from, development planning and project execution; ii) critical infrastructural and social constraints were removed to the benefit of higher productivity and enhancement; iii) farming HHs were equipped and supported to enhance output so as to secure basic food supply, produce marketable surpluses and to pursue income-raising opportunities.

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Efficiency The project was approved in 2002, but the loan did not become effective until 2004; 22 months after Board approval. This long delay in project start-up was partly due to the long recruitment process of project's director. Despite the initial hurdles, after a long dispute, it was selected a highly qualified woman. The project also faced delays due to failure of planned cofinancing (from WFP and the Dutch Government) to materialize. This led to a significant reduction in the scope and volume of the project activities under the community development component, particularly in the number of villages and HHs targeted, thereby reducing the overall flow of benefits. To cover this financial gap and complete the project's financial package, the project received an IFAD supplementary grant of USD 7.5 million (taking into account the inflation since 2002). At completion, disbursement of IFAD loan and grant stood at 99% and 92%, respectively. The project was also extended by one year. According to the PCR,

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the efficiency of project has been different across its interventions. An economic rate of return of 12% was obtained for the project at PCR for only quantifiable benefits (i.e. partial project benefits) and all investment costs (excluding taxes and duties) over the project life compared with 14.1% at appraisal. The net present value (NPV) at 10% was USD 2.98 million. However, it seems that if the benefits generated as a result of project interventions (e.g. improvements in drinking water supply, health services, capacity building, credit for investment in micro projects and animal production) were quantified and included in the economic analysis, the EIRR would improve significantly.


Partner Performance

IFAD In the early stage of project's implementation, IFAD support was not as strong as it could have been. With regard to the cofinancing arrangement, it seems that just a verbal gentleman's agreement with the IFAD CPM, instead of a signed agreement between MOPIC, WFP and the Dutch Government, was not the appropriate procedures to follow. Over time, IFAD was able to adjust project's design, when required, and to improve its implementation support through the provision of constant technical support to the project, in the form of national and international experts, regular implementation support missions and capacity-building. The prevailing security situation during the 2011-12 conflict period in Yemen required the adoption of an alternative approach to supervision and implementation support. This entailed frequent off-site meetings with project management in Sana'a, intermitted field visits by the IFAD Country Office to the project area, a mid-year desk-review in 2011 and a portfolio review workshop for the IFAD Yemen portfolio in 2012. IFAD was very supportive and flexible in approving the Government of Yemen’s (GoY's) request to reallocate funds among the project categories to enable the project to meet its needs and accomplish the revised targets.

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Cooperating Institution Supervision of the project was initially entrusted to UNOPS. It launched two supervision missions, one in 2005 and one in 2006 with different outcomes. UNOPS performance is considered as moderately satisfactory.

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Government The MOPIC (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation) was very cooperative and supportive of project's needs. The Project Steering Committee (PSC) was very constructive and supportive to the Project Management Office (PMO), especially on procurement issues and contracts with the service providers. The PSC met 17 times during the project's seven years of life, meeting regularly even during the period of unrest in Yemen (2010 and 2011). The Project Coordination Committees (PCCs) (one for each district) played an important role in facilitating the implementation of the project activities in their districts, and were particularly useful in resolving implementation constraints and community disputes. The PMO was well established with motivated and well-experienced financial, technical and managerial staff. It addressed most mission recommendations adequately and promptly. The project director proved to be hard worker, disciplined, transparent and a good decision-maker. The project staff continued to work in the field during the 2010-2011 unrest, despite the risk of being hijacked or having their vehicles seized. During this period, there were sharp divisions within the target communities as a result of political polarization, yet the project managed to work with the communities and resolve many of their problems. On the fiduciary aspects, the timeliness and quality of audit were fully satisfactory; the project was found to be to a large degree in compliance with the covenants of the Financing Agreement. Conversely, some issues were raised about the financial management, plus procurement procedures were not always adhered to.

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NGO/Other The performance of the service providers has not always been satisfactory. Some providers were not efficient enough in implementing the activities entrusted to them. There has been a need to revise contracts to make them more responsible and accountable for timely implementation of projects and utilization of available funds.

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Cofinancier(s) The foreseen cofinancing from the Dutch Government and WFP was not realized, resulting in a financial gap of USD6.6 million.

n.a


Through its participatory approach, the project has succeeded in building a strong working partnership with local government, services providers and local communities that has earned it a much respected position.



By comparing the 2006 and 2012 RIMS impact survey, it emerged an improved asset ownership by HHs (e.g. a 21% increase in electricity and a 22% increase in electrical appliances such as refrigerators, washing machines, televisions). Regarding the increment in HHs incomes derived from the project, there is general agreement that the project has contributed to HHs incomes, but precise measurement has not been possible. However, it can confidently be stated that the project helped local communities improve their livelihoods and increase their incomes through diversified agriculture production, animal production, beekeeping, rehabilitation of terraces and the protection of wadi banks. In addition, through the provision of technical capacity, women were enabled to find full or part-time work and to generate income. With regard to rural finance, the project successfully established 267 Saving and Credit (S&C) groups and one saving and credit associations with a total

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membership of 6124 and 534 women, respectively. The value of voluntary savings mobilised by the S&C groups/association amounted to USD 537,000, while the value of gross loan portfolio was US$306,000.

Food Security The project contributed to enhance HHs food security. The comparison between 2006 and 2012 impact surveys shows that there was a 41% decrease in HHs experiencing hunger during the hunger season. Moreover, the rate of acute child malnutrition was reduced by 6%. However, 62% of the children were found to have chronic malnutrition (stunting), a worsening of 2006 situation (57%). Although no reasons are provided to explain why this occurred, this could be related to the conflict spread in Yemen during 2011-12. On the other hand, 41% of the children were underweight, a clear improvement from the 54% observed in 2006.

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Ag. Productivity The project has contributed to increase agriculture productivity. This occurred thanks to the set of interventions: i) distribution of sorghum, maize and legume seeds as grants to the farmers; ii) supporting farmers in replacing sorghum with coffee by providing extension advice and coffee seedlings for new coffee farms; iii) holding demonstrations on farmers' fields of a new technology for planting new fruit and vegetable varieties. The project selected and trained 168 Village Extension Workers (VEW) for crop production; they provided agricultural extension services to an estimated 51.095 farmers. This resulted in 21.583 farmers reporting increases in crop productivity, which implies that the extension services were quite effective. The project sponsored the preparation and dissemination of extension messages on different production systems to encourage farmers to increase and diversify their incomes. As a result of the irrigation type of infrastructure (dams, tanks, cisterns, small channels, reservoirs for floodwater harvesting), 727 HHs benefitted from the irrigated land. It was observed a double cropping in areas receiving supplementary irrigation from the constructed dams. Over 25,000 smallholders have adopted new technologies, and 20,000 reported increased yields; farmers using improved seeds report 33% yield increase, and those using improved beehives report 300-600% yield increases. The improved sorghum seeds developed by the project in special field trials, resulted in a 38% increase in sorghum productivity when compared to traditional seeds. The project also introduced 31 agronomic techniques for income diversification alternatives for crop production. There were also established 781 coffee farms, which were supplied with 78539 seedlings in a total area of 70 hectares; and 339 fruit and vegetable fields planted with new, locally suitable varieties.

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The project had a positive environmental impact. The project selected and trained 161 men and villagers as environment and natural resource extension leaders. These extension leaders were very effective and played an important role in implementing the project's main NRM activities. A total of 452 hectares of agricultural land were rehabilitated. It also helped rehabilitate 280 sites of almost abandoned terraces covering 354 hectares. It completed the rehabilitation of 139 wadi bank protection sites protecting 581 hectares of agricultural land and benefiting 1399 HHs. It also rehabilitated 912 grazing sites, benefiting 1401 HHs. The project also funded the planting of trees in seven grazing sites covering 13.2 hectares using 4150 seedlings and shrubs and scattering 50 kilograms of herbs seeds in three sites within three target village communities, and benefiting 33 farms HHs. The project supported initiatives to increase the efficiency of groundwater use by promoting the installation of piped conveyance system in place of open channels. It also financed on-farm research on improved irrigation management practices. This is likely to have a positive environmental impact in the future on reducing groundwater depletion. Clean village campaigns were also conducted by the project, involving activities such as garbage collection, clean water for all and waste water disposal. The project also organized a competition for the cleanest villages. This encouraged communities to be more aware of and sensitive to environmental concerns. A further positive aspect is that the community accepted the need to be involved in environmental improvement works and going so gave them a sense of ownership. The one exception is the open water-harvesting reservoirs for drinking, which were liable to contamination, making the drinking water from these reservoirs unsafe.

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On human capital, project's impact has been notable through a set of interventions encompassing provision of literacy classes and life-skills trainings as well as infrastructures, which have given beneficiaries direct benefits in the form of safe drinking water, education, health and better transport. The beneficiaries have been pleased with the literacy classes and life-skills training. Some literacy class graduates have become teachers, saving and credit group managers and chairs of community organizations. In terms of social capital and empowerment, the beneficiaries believe that DPRDP is the only project that has ever reached them and made their voices heard and it has significantly contributed to the inclusion and empowerment of vulnerable groups (poor and women). The communities have been made aware of their rights and helped be organized in formal and informal organizations. This has enabled them to effectively assess their development problems and identify and prioritize their needs, and subsequently to participate in preparation and implementation

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of project and take over full management and O&M responsibility.

Inst. & Policies The project supported a decentralized administrative framework, while recognizing that capacity has first to be built at the governorate and districts levels, particularly in planning and financial management, in order to ensure an efficient and effective operational framework, transparency and accountability. To this end, the project provided for capacity building of the governorate and district councils, administrative departments and executive offices. A total of 83 governorate and district officials and all committee members in the 168 community groups received local training. Despite project's efforts, a proposal for restructuring the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank was not finalized. The project did, however, create an alternative mechanism to implement the rural finance programme through S&C groups and their revolving funds supported by the Women's Economic Associations for Rural Savings and Credit, an apex established by the project.

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Markets On one hand, the project contribution was positive, through the construction/rehabilitation of 4 rural roads, which meant for HHS a reduction of the travel time from their villages to markets and districts centres, as well as a lower cost of traveling by car to the markets. However, on the other hand, it seems that little progress has been achieved on this domain. Marketing activity was to have a commercial approach and be implemented by business management advisors and marketing consultants. The project was, however, not successful in recruiting international consultant of such calibre. As a result, despite its efforts, the project was not successful in addressing the marketing and value chain aspect seriously. The project established five value chain associations and 20 value chain groups. These associations, however, did not actually function. No intensive efforts were made to commercialize the production and distribution of improved seeds for rainfed farming.

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Project Impact 5

Overarching Factors

Innovation The project had several innovative features that could be considered for future wider-scale replication and scaling up: i) the use of community extension and animal workers; ii) the communities' contributions (in cash or in kind) to infrastructure development; iii) women's savings and credit groups; iv) the competition organized for the cleanest villages. These are all innovations that have been highly appreciated by the communities and could be replicated in the new Rural Growth Programme (RGP). The agricultural extension services, including animal and apiculture, which were absent in targeted remote areas before the project, have become available in a sustainable manner as they are delivered by the local village extension leaders/agents who sell their services and agricultural inputs and animal drugs after they have been selected by their communities and received extensive training by the project.

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The project's approaches and activities have been already scaled up with incremental resources of USD 7.5 million in Dec. 2009. However, the needs are still huge and there is a need for continuation and expansion of the activities initiated by the DPRDP in the same targeted and other remote areas within Yemen. The new Rural Growth Programme is the right vehicle for that. This new project will help to maintain the flow of services and benefits to the target group and ensure that knowledge and institutional capacity built during the lifetime of the project is not lost. It is interesting to note that there was a demand for the services of many Village Extension Workers (VEW) outside the project area, especially for those related to livestock and beekeeping, and a willingness to engage these extension workers on a fee-for service basis.

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According to the PCR, project's activities are overall likely to be sustainable socially and technically in the future. However, it seems that the PCR does not go too deep into analysing sustainability of project's interventions. The adoption of participatory approaches and the involvement of all stakeholders in the planning, priorization and formulation of community/village development plans built ownership and contributed to project sustainability. To ensure ownership and sustainable delivery of services, the beneficiaries have contributed to capital costs and pay for services delivered by village extension leaders/agents. In regard to rural financial services, there is good capacity and enthusiasm in SCGs which will contribute to their sustainability. At the project end, 219 S&C groups were still operational. However, more training and capacity-building would be required under the follow-up project. Moreover, the newly created SCA is still dependent upon technical and financial assistance from the project, which is not a good sign for its sustainability.

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Targeting The project envisaged some particular attention to remote and marginalized areas and focused its interventions on vulnerable and marginalized groups (women and poor) and given them top priority in targeting social and development interventions. Targeting criteria were established to ensure selection of the poorest areas and communities in the districts to be included in the project. The project had also a strong poverty focus. The project has been effective in reaching and providing services/benefits to targeted poor communities in remote districts which were previously excluded from similar support. Within the targeted communities, project interventions were principally

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directed to poor HHs, typically with around 0.5 ha of rain-fed terraces, or landless and sharecropper families.

Gender The Project's achievements on gender aspects in the conservative cultural environment of Dhamar governorate are impressive; the project has set a remarkable example for other projects in Yemen. The project has made a breakthrough in overcoming prevailing social constraints to empower traditionally marginalized women. The project adopted a gender-integrated approach, which was intended to ensure that women were brought into the mainstream of all the project activities at the community and district levels. In all, the project trained 7.527 women in life-skills. The comparison between 2006 and 2012 impact surveys shows a 23% increase in women's literacy in the project areas. Women have also become active members of all formal and informal community organizations. Their representation in CDCs reached 51%, which exceeded the expected target. There were established 267 women's savings and credit groups and one women's savings and credit association with a membership of 6124 and 534 women, respectively. Women expressed their satisfaction with the literacy classes and life-skills training sessions. Through the project's activities, women have achieved greater visibility and recognition at home and in the community as credit managers, village extension workers, demonstration farmers and contributors to family income. The project assisted promoted women's investments through micro projects, especially in livestock rearing and small businesses. For women, these initiatives were a practical way of ending their illiteracy and social isolation, improving their social status, becoming aware of their rights and becoming contributors to their family income through selling their extension services, agricultural produce and off-farm income generated from micro-enterprises financed by the SCGs.

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PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is fully in line with the 2006 PCR Guidelines. All the requested annexes have been provided. 6

Quality Overall, the PCR makes an in-depth analysis of project's performance and main achievements, by providing a great amount of information to substantiate the findings. On the other hand, two main shortcomings have emerged: i) the section on effectiveness was not addressed by looking at the achievement of project development objectives; ii) the section on impact was too scant and it did not cover all the impact domains. On the latter, this probably resulted from a too heavy reliance on the comparison between 2006 and 2012 RIMS surveys, so that the other impact domains not covered by the RIMS survey were not considered.

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Lessons It seems that the lessons learned could have benefitted more from the project's very notable achievements, also considering the very challenging context where the project was set in.

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Candour The PCR assessment has been overall honest and in line with the other available information sources. Some issues related to the procurement and fiduciary aspects did show somehow a too rosy tone.

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Benin - Rural Development Support Programme


Country & Project Name Benin - Rural Development Support Programme Ratings

Loan No.: 676-BJ

Project Id. 1250


Entry into Force 09 March 2007







Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries

Principal Components Four components will be carried out over a period of five years: (a) support to rural IGA groups and MBs; (b) access to rural microfinance; (c) support to village-level institutions; and (d) coordination and strategic partnerships. These components will be implemented as part of a framework programme incorporating the activities of PDRT and PADPPA and in partnership with other interventions wherever possible. Field work will be carried out by implementing agencies under contract. OPAs with the required expertise may be eligible (e.g. for training, access to information, marketing)

Project Performance

Relevance The programme was designed to consolidate the achievements of two predecessor projects, PAGER (income generation) and PROMIC (microfinance and marketing) by providing support to IGAs, rural microenterprises, FSAs and other rural entities entrusted with community development. By doing so, it responded to the most urgent needs of the rural poor (access to means of production, markets, job creation for women and the youth, support to the economic and social independence of women and the youth, income increase and diversification, literacy). It was fully aligned with Government’s second Action Plan (PAG 2), its PRSP, its sector policies (decentralization, gender, youth, education), its rural and agricultural development approaches and strategies, and all relevant IFAD strategies (COSOP, Regional Strategy, Gender, Microenterprise Development, Microfinance, etc.). It also takes into account the recommendations of the Country Portfolio Evaluation of 2005. Relevance of the programme’s goal and objective was confirmed by the MTR.

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Effectiveness Programme effectiveness reached mixed results. PADER’S performance was weaker than expected, making it necessary to reduce its physical targets, refocus interventions and concentrate efforts on the more performing elements among the beneficiaries in order to maximize the chances of success. Such drastic measures were necessary because the PCU was charged with the implementation of 3 additional activities, which were given priority over PADER activities (as mandated by the Government of Benin): (i) consolidate the achievements of PDRT (roots and tuber); (ii) facilitate the implementation of the food security emergency support programme (PUASA); and (iii) implement the certified rice seeds and cassava cuttings programme financed under the EU Food Facility. Objective A to support the further development of IGAs and micro-enterprises was weakly met (achievement rate of 43%). Support was provided to 429 IGA groups and 154 microenterprises but they lacked access to medium-term credit, which would have enabled them to make their respective businesses grow and develop. Technical training was insufficient too. Objective B to support the consolidation and expansion of the FSA network was partially met. Activities of the FSA could be revitalized (all indicators improved), but many FSA are still fragile and product diversification failed, in particular provision of medium-term credits. Objective C to build the capacities of village level institutions was partly met. The programme has contributed to the implementation of the decentralization strategy and to clarification of the relationship between villages/communities and municipalities. The Village development associations are recognized in their status, but 63% are still considered weak. Finally, Objective D to participate in policy dialogue and strategic partnerships was partly met. Coordination between IFAD interventions was weak. On the other hand, the programme established a large number of strategic partnerships, including PPPs. The objective of PUASA that was to boost the production of rice, maize and vegetables, was fully met, in particular in the case of rice. This was done by concentrating efforts on the production of improved seeds. Consolidation of the achievements of PDRT was not always satisfactory, in particular with regard to training of beneficiaries. The availability of quality cuttings enabled, however a quick start of the EU grant. The grant provided under the EU Food Facility, by contrast, was highly effective. The objective to improve the living conditions of smallholders by giving them access to improved seeds and cuttings was fully met. Physical targets were largely surpassed (186% for rice seeds and 191% for cassava cuttings). Finally, the relative success of PADER enabled it to become a framework programme for the implementation of all ongoing and future IFAD interventions in Benin. In 2010, it launched the implementation of the Economic Growth Programme.

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Efficiency The programme was completed with a disbursement rate of 91% but the achievement rate reached 59% only, for various reasons: (i) Resources were partly diverted towards the implementation of other activities (consolidation of PDRT activities, PUASA, EU grant); (ii) Inadequacy of its support to the development of IGA groups and microenterprise. The resources invested have not led to corresponding results. This concerns in particular the failure to provide access to medium–term credits to facilitate the purchase of necessary equipment; (iii) Implementation through operating partners turned out to be more costly and less efficient than expected (lack of expertise, payment delays, staff turnover, etc.); (iv) A cumbersome national budget approval process combined with delays in processing WAs an payments on IFAD’s side have led to repeated disruptions in the flow of funds. These have resulted in serious cash flow problems which have affected the implementation of activities and the credibility of the programme vis a vis its partners; and (v) The large number and multiplicity of the activities to be carried out by the programme while its implementation capacities and budget remained unchanged. In addition, funds were reallocated in order to meet the changing needs of the programme (Comp A and B decreased by 36 and 44%, while component D (coordination and partnerships) rose by 54%. The IRR of return reached only 12% compared to an appraisal target of 14.9%. Other factors that point at an average efficiency include: an effectiveness lag of 15 months was slightly higher than the national and regional average. This list of factors that have negatively impacted on programme efficiency is long, but the PCU can be praised for having successfully managed the implementation of 4 projects without increasing its staff. In that sense, PADER has been highly efficient as it produced a far larger output than expected with the same amount of resources.

4


Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD’s performance was satisfactory. Supervision frequency under the DS scheme was adequate (one 2-week mission every 6 months). IFAD produced good quality reports. Continuity in the use of consultants for the supervision missions was appreciated, but it appears that apart from the MTR, none of the missions benefited from the participation of a rural finance expert, which was critical for the advancement of the RF sub-component. IFAD’s performance has also slightly suffered from its lack of experience with the fiduciary aspects of loan administration. The implementation budget was underestimated. Finally, IFAD has been overambitious in adding the implementation of 3 more projects/activities to the responsibility of the PCU without increasing its staff. This caused the original activities of PADER to be neglected. It also resulted in cash flow problems and tensions between the PCU and implementation partners. On the other hand, PADER and IFAD in general gained visibility in particular through the implementation of PUASA and the EU food grant. IFAD has persistently and closely involved Government counterparts during its supervision missions. It has been responsive to Government’s requests to simplify the procurement procedures and introduce needed changes to the loan agreement (reallocation of funds, size of the special account) to facilitate a smooth implementation of the programme. Above all, it has responded positively to Government’s request for support during the food price crisis of 2008. IFAD has also been very supportive to the overall implementation of the country programme by hiring an interim country programme officer in 2011. On the more negative side, IFAD’s performance has slightly suffered during the last 3 years due to the frequent change of CPMs since 2009 (3 CPMs between 2009 and 2013).

5

Cooperating Institution

Government Government has actively participated in the design and start-up missions. It has also contributed to all supervision missions, with the exception of the MTR and the completion mission. It has respected the conditions of the loan agreement and has made an effort to implement the recommendations of the supervision missions in a timely manner. Regional steering committee meetings and national orientation meetings were held regularly and have helped giving directions to the programme. Government has further provided support to the implementation and sustainability of the operations through the adoption of the national rural finance policy. It has also strongly support the proposed arrangements to ensure sustainability and ownership of the infrastructure provided (workshop outcome). A very positive initiative has been the creation of a specialized procurement commission which has greatly facilitated the implementation of the AWP&B and which has accelerated programme disbursement. This experience could be replicated in future programmes. On the less positive side, it has been noted that Government released only 43% of its contribution. Project start-up and implementation have further suffered from slow administrative procedures (lengthy loan ratification process, cumbersome procurement procedures, slow implementation of the integrated public finance management system). The PCU (1 national and 3 light regional implementation units) was highly efficient and was commended for its dynamism, professionalism and dedication. Most of its staff was taken over from former IFAD projects. Nevertheless, it would have benefited from some training/up-grading of skills, which never occurred for lack of time and budget. Staff remained stable, despite tensions that arose due to budget constraints.

4

NGO/Other 14 multipurpose and 9 specialized implementation partners carried out the field operations (“faire-faire”). This modus operandi was highly appreciated by the beneficiaries. However, they did not

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always perform adequately, due to the lack of skills and delays in the payment of their services. These weaknesses were partially compensated through partnerships with the regional/municipal centers for ag. promotion and other capacity strengthening activities. Partnerships with MFIs other than FSA did not materialize. Partnerships with research institutions on seed production were very efficient. In contrast, constructions firms were somewhat slow in the delivery of their works.

Cofinancier(s)


Altogether, they collaborated well, despite some tensions between the PCU and the implementation partners of the programme, who did not get their payments on time due to budget constraints.



Through its own activities, PADER has not contributed significantly to the incomes of the target populations. However, in combination with the other activities under its responsibility, it has contributed to improving the living conditions of the households who mention: increased assets (50%); higher incomes (27%); diversification of economic activities (65%), increased area under cultivation (42%), increased livestock ownership (37%), stronger participation in mutual credit activities (tontines) (80%). Other aspects include improved access to health, education, consumer goods, means of transportation (from 16% to 75%), communication (from 24% to 38%), radio (70%) and motorbikes (59%). Housing conditions have improved too. It terms of financial assets, FSA revitalization and development has given the poor access to credit. However, it appears that the activities of the programme have had only a very limited impact on the economic situation of microenterprises and IGA groups. The lack of access to medium term credit, equipment and technical training has set limits to their possibilities to increase productivity and profitability of their activities. The profits generated by the IGA groups are too small to enable them to engage into a process of growth and expansion. The situation is different with regard to microenterprises. Their net margins could increase by 51% for vegetable production, 88% for grass cutter and 193% for rabbit rising. These increases were less significant for the processing of rice and cassava (only 3% and 5% respectively). Net margins were very high for the production of certified seeds (CFA 805 000/ha or CFA 220 000-515 000/beneficiary/ha/year for rainfed rice and up to CFA 1 million/beneficiary/ha /year for irrigated rice). However, it was pointed out that income increases are not always significant and not sustainable, due to the absence of appropriate downstream support (e.g. marketing for seed producers).

4

Food Security Impact on food security gives a mixed picture. Implementation of the programme was marked by the food price crisis of 2008. The PUASA and EU grant could be effectively used to boost food crop production, first by increasing the production of rice, maize and vegetables and then, by providing support to seed production. This has enhanced the availability of food crops and food security nation-wide. In 2012, 73% of the populations were satisfied with the number of daily meals compared to only 43% in 2008. 89% mention having at least 3 meals a day compared to only 71% in 2008. The impact on child malnutrition was the most significant. The percentage of households having an undernourished child has decreased from 44% in 2008 to 7% in 2012, but the percentage of undernourished children has increased from 14% at the beginning of the project to 22% in 2012. The latter could hint at an impoverishment of the poorest households following the food (price) crisis of 2008. Chronic malnutrition among children could be reduced from 44.7% in 2006 (national statistical data) to 25% in 2012. The proportion of children underweight has remained largely unchanged while acute malnutrition has slightly increased from 8.4% to 14.3%. This seems to indicate that despite an overall improvement of household living conditions, their resilience against external shock could not be improved. Also, despite these improvements, 55% of the households mention still experiencing a food shortage period of an average 3.7 months. The daily consumption of meat and fish has only very slightly increased. The same applies to the percentage of the households being able to stock up with food reserves.

4

Ag. Productivity Access to farm equipment and infrastructure (forages, wells, pumps, seed wheels, storage facilities, etc.), inputs (seeds, cuttings, fertilizers, pesticides), farming techniques and processing technologies have contributed to boosting the production of food crops, in particular rice, maize, cassava and vegetables. Productivity of certified seeds could be increased from 2.8 t/ha to 4 t/h for rainfed agriculture and 4t/h to 6/h in irrigated. Yields could be improved: from 2 to 4.5 t/ha for rice and from 1 to 2 t/ha for maize, but support will be needed to ensure continuous supply of certified seeds and cuttings. Training on production techniques has been somewhat weak. Support will also be needed to ensure operation and maintenance of the infrastructure and equipment provided. The programme has helped implement 6 processing chains and 2 microenterprises for cassava processing, contributing to a substantial quality improvement of the produce. The PUASA and the EU grant have been the main contributing mechanisms.

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The design document did not foresee any activities in view of improving NRM and protection. The programme had a neutral or positive impact on the environment. The promotion of IGAs and microenterprises aims at the diversification of incomes sources, and thus, at reducing the pressure on the environment through intensified agricultural production. It also promoted the use of improved ovens, reducing the use of firewood during processing activities (e.g. gari and chea butter production). Also, the construction of adequate irrigation infrastructure has improved water resource management while enabling farmers to expand the land under cultivation. On the other hand, the introduction of motor pumps has increased the risk of soil pollution. Particular attention still needs to be given to the adequate management and maintenance of the pumps. Soil fertility is maintained or improved through the promotion of fallow techniques. The programme has promoted a rational use of fertilizers and pesticides and the use of automatic tillers instead of tractors in order to reduce the impact on soil structure. Organic production and the use of natural pesticides have further been promoted. Nevertheless, 80% of the households still use fuel wood for cooking.

4


The contribution of the programme to the overall increase of the literacy rate was rather weak. Thanks to Government’s effort to boost the literacy rate with its initiative “education for all”, the literacy rate could be lifted from 1.18% in 2008 to 33.6% in 2012. However, PADER has provided literacy training to only 851 individuals. Technical capacity strengthening (production and processing) was weak as well, due to the lack of funds. It appears that the financial resources available were used to strengthen the capacities of partner operators, and to provide organizational support to village development associations and FSAs. The workload of women could be reduced with the construction of wells and the availability of small processing equipment. Increased incomes have usually been used to access health care, education (children) and to improve housing conditions. In 2012, 64% of the households live in a house with a concrete floor, 57% have more than 3 rooms and 73% have access to safe water (compared to only 51% in 2008), 89% have access to sanitation and 36% to toilets (compared to 8% in 2008). Altogether, the programme had a greater impact on social capital than on human capital.

4

Inst. & Policies The programme (PADER + PDRT + PUASA and EU grant) has had a significant impact on the reactivation of the seed sub-sector and hence, on agricultural production and food security in a situation of crisis. Moreover, the PCU has actively participated in the policy dialogue on decentralization, microfinance and seed production where it has established itself as a knowledgeable partner. It has played a critical role in advocating the needs and interests of the beneficiaries when dealing with Government partners. Their needs are now better understood and taken into consideration at national level. The programme has further contributed to the effective implementation of the national decentralization policy and poverty reduction strategy by providing support to the development of decentralized services through FSAs, the national FSA union, the village development associations, seed multipliers and local literacy trainers. The village development association model has been well received by Government, which has promoted the country-wide replication to offer a variety of services in support of the rural communities. A discussion about their role and legal status vis a vis the municipalities has been initiated by the programme (PCU). Furthermore, the programme has directly contributed to the design of the new national microfinance strategy. It has also initiated consultations at national level about the sustainable management of the infrastructure provided by the programme and the role of the village development associations in managing this infrastructure in the context of decentralization. Finally, PADER has contributed indirectly, together with other similar interventions, to the reform process of the Ministry of agriculture, livestock and fisheries by giving concrete responsibilities to the different departments and agencies, and thus by shaping their respective roles.

5

Markets The programme has had only a moderate impact on markets. On the positive side, is to be noted the successful collection and dissemination of prices of 23 agricultural products and the participation of beneficiaries in sub-regional fairs in Niger and Burkina Faso. On the less positive side, it is to be noted that the provision of marketing infrastructure, the number of market studies conducted and the support given to training and organization of beneficiaries to improve their marketing capacities has been insufficient. This also concerns seed producers who were not assisted in developing their outlets. The management of the marketing infrastructure has not always been given sufficient attention and has created conflicts between villages and municipalities over the use of funds (sharing of the benefits).

3

Project Impact An impact assessment carried out in 2012 compares results with the benchmark study of 2008. This assessment is not fully in line with the RIMS requirements, but provides a sufficient amount of data to assess changes after 5 years of implementation. Some results are however inconsistent and need to be considered with caution. For others, there is no reference figure to compare with. Despite positive impact results in the various areas, the PCR concludes that the programme has had only a modest impact on rural poverty alleviation. The beneficiaries are still vulnerable to external shocks and improvements can only be achieved with a more systematic and sustained strengthening of their production capacities, negotiating skills, ability to deal with outside partners and access to markets.

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Overarching Factors

Innovation PADER together with its subprojects has introduced several innovations such as: (i) modification of the FSA approach and creation of the National FSA Union; (ii) pilot training units; (iii) collective marketing of ag. products; (iv) reactivation of the seed production industry; (v) role of village development associations in rural development; (vi) creation of a special interministerial procurement commission to speed up loan disbursement. These innovations are more conceptual than practical, and would require further testing before being replicated or scaled up.

4


Some of the above mentioned innovations have a good potential for replication and scaling up, but need further testing.

4


4


Prospects for sustainability are mixed. Chances are high that activities carried out by partners such as research centers and universities will continue, provided their budget remains unchanged. By contrast, other activities may stop at programme closure, unless taken over by another donor. These include literacy training activities, operation of 5 pilot training units and production of cassava cuttings without visible marketing possibilities. For most activities, chances for sustainability are average: (i) certified rice seed production which still faces marketing constrains, (ii) continued participation of the village development associations in the rural development process; (iii) FSA development and diversification of services, which depends on the quality of its portfolio and the approval of the national FSA union; (iv) support provided by the regional and municipal centers for agricultural promotion, which operate with limited means; (v) operation and maintenance of the rural infrastructure provided by the programme; (vi) female-led IEC sessions to the benefit of the rural communities, which will need to operate without financial support. Finally, some infrastructure works that could not be completed will be transferred to the new PACER programme (Rural Economic Growth Programme)

4

Targeting The targeting strategy was based on the consolidation of the achievements of the two predecessor projects PAGER and PROMIC, which had established the first promising FSAs, IGAs, microenterprises and village development committees and associations. As such, the approach was mainly geographical. The required refinement of the approach, by analysing the needs of various target groups, did not take place.

4

Gender Gender aspects were not explicitly analysed in the PCR. The appraisal document assumes that the programme would automatically target women and the youth through the focus of its interventions (support to IGAs and microenterprise development, typically run by women and the youth). The PCR points out that a more specific approach would have been helpful to target the neediest amongst them (see targeting).

4



Of 56 000 initially targeted, only 22376 beneficiaries were reached (40%)

PCR Quality

Scope Guidelines were respected but most annexes are missing (draft document) 5

Quality Well written, good analysis substantiated with relevant data and yet succinct. Good cause effect analysis.

5

Lessons Relevant lessons for stronger impact, better sustainability and improved project performance, also from a financial and administrative point of view.

6

Candour Objective and analytical 5


97

Cameroon - Roots and Tubers market-Driven Development Programme


Country & Project Name Cameroon - Roots and Tubers market-Driven Development Programme Ratings

Loan No.: 606-CM

Project Id. 1238










Principal Components The programme will have four components: (a) support for capacity-building and for farmer organizations; (b) support for marketing and market development; (c) support for processing, postharvest and production and (d) programme coordination and management.

Project Performance

Relevance The programme was fully in line with the country’s Rural Sector Development Strategy, its Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (former PRSP) and various IFAD strategies including the IFAD COSOP of 1998-2002, IFAD’s regional poverty reduction strategy and IFAD’s cassava development strategy. Also, it was found highly relevant in its objectives to improve food security and incomes of the most vulnerable by developing the R&T value chains. This is justified by the fact that R&T are a main staple and an important income source of rural households in Cameroon. Women are key players in the value chain (production, processing, marketing). In addition, demand for R&T is on the rise firstly for demographic reasons but also because of the increasing demand in urban areas, emerging SMEs processing R&T products and an increasing demand for R&T products in neighbouring countries. Programme design was highly relevant in the sense that it targeted the vertical integration of all players in the development of the value chain. However, it was also very ambitious in its approaches, geographical coverage and physical targets. More importantly, budget estimates were not in line with the area to be covered. Important adjustments took place at MTR, in particular with regard to the physical targets, which were substantially reduced. The number of value-chains to be developed was reduced from 7 to 3 and later to 1 (cassava) and the number of villages from 6000 to 1000 and later to 250. The geographical coverage was however maintained. Important reallocations of funds took place to cover the high operating costs of the programme, resulting in an imbalance in the use of funds which were largely diverted away from the beneficiaries.

4

Effectiveness The overall goal of the programme was to improve food security and livelihoods of the rural populations, in particular women. This objective was partly achieved. While the programme largely benefited women, the PCR concluded that better results could have been reached in terms of food security, despite improved access and availability of R&T products and reduced child malnutrition. The specific objectives were achieved at varying degrees. The programme effectively contributed to an increase in R&T production and productivity (cassava in particular). Yields passed from 8-10 t/ha to 37 t/ha in some areas, compared to a national average of 13-14 t/ha in 2010-11. Also, the amount and quality of processed products could be markedly increased. Regarding improved market access and marketability of R&T products and sub-products, results are not conclusive. The amount of marketable products could be increased, but there was no noticeable change in the amount of produce being marketed. Also, the market information system as originally foreseen (Esoko platform) did not become operational and an alternative, simpler system was implemented. Support to the development of FOs was only partly effective. A non-negligible number of FOs was created but they would have needed further strengthening. Also, they did not graduate into regional or national apex organizations. Altogether, it appears that the programme failed to internalize and implement some of its key approaches and strategies. As such, it failed to properly implement the value-chain approach. Instead of aiming at the systematic development of partnerships between the various actors, its interventions were sporadic and uncoordinated, and focused on the production/processing side. Little attention was given to marketing issues. Also the proposed targeting strategy was disregarded. Interventions were poverty oriented, but the programme failed to develop a strategy to address the most vulnerable. Finally, the PCU adopted a top-down approach instead of promoting beneficiary ownership by taking over the implementation and management of micro-projects. Other factors which had a negative impact on programme effectiveness include: (i) ambitious design with unrealistic physical targets which called for a reduction and refocusing of activities; (ii) underestimation of programme costs; (iii) overestimation of implementation capacities; (iv) lack of synergy and communication within the PCU; (v) high staff turn-over within IFAD (4CPMs), UNOPS (3PMs) and MINADER (4ministers); (vi) no baseline and weak M&E.

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Efficiency The PNDRT was partly inefficient. The programme started with an effectiveness lag of 15.3 months, which is higher than the regional average. The processing of payments and WAs was slow (195 days on average), procurement procedures were even slower and the management of contracts often inadequate, leading to important delays in the payment of services providers. Important delays were also noted in the submission of the AWP&B. More importantly, operating costs were largely underestimated at appraisal. To counterbalance this problem, most physical targets were reduced, but the Government insisted in keeping the original geographical coverage. As a result, the implementation structure needed to be kept and was even strengthened with the PCU taking over the implementation and management of micro-projects on behalf of the beneficiaries. As a combined result of all of these factors, programme operating costs increased by a multiple, making it necessary to cut some costs (competitive research fund cut by 93%, risk fund cut by 90%, R&T development fund cut by 24%) and to reallocate funds in favour of programme coordination and management, as reflected in the disbursement rates by category: Capacity building of FOs (33%); Marketing and market development (21%); Processing, post-harvest and production (65%); and Coordination and management (261%). Operating costs by beneficiary were higher than investments costs (US$407 against US$546), corresponding to roughly US$0.75 investment cost for US$1 operating costs (against a ratio of 3:1 as estimated at appraisal). At the end of the implementation period, operating costs amounted to 57% of total costs.

3


Partner Performance

IFAD Implementation support provided by IFAD was appropriate, especially since 2009, when it took over the direct supervision of the programme. IFAD also provided specific support to improve financial management and procurement processes. These enabled the programme to make its financial management procedures more transparent and to speed up the resource mobilization process (direct payments, WAs). IFAD’s performance was further improved by opening a country office in Yaoundé in 2011. This has enabled a much closer follow-up of activities and implementation issues. IFAD can however be made responsible for having set the bar too high at appraisal and in particular for having underestimated the implementation capacities, the costs and the apparatus needed to coordinate, support and monitor the implementation of a value-chain programme of national coverage. Possibly also, the implementation support provided at the beginning of programme was too weak, compared to the needs of the programme and the complexity of the implementation structure (one national PCU and 5 regional coordination units).

4

Cooperating Institution The programme was supervised by UNOPS until 2009. The quality of its services was satisfactory, but supervision performance was affected by the frequent change of staff (3 CPMs in 4 years) and its limited time to address urgent needs. The PCU would have greatly benefited from a closer follow-up by the CI during the initial stage of project implementation. Important implementation delays could have been avoided. Also, management issues faced by the programme would have deserved a closer follow-up throughout implementation.

4

Government If IFAD was responsible for a too ambitious design, Government was responsible for having prevented the project from becoming more effective and efficient after the MTR, mainly by opposing itself to a reduction of the geographical coverage and by allowing the PCU to substitute itself to the implementation of beneficiary projects. Government contribution exceeded the amount expected at appraisal (140%). However, only 36.5% of the expected contribution under the HIPC initiative was mobilized. Terms and conditions of the loan agreement were broadly respected. Government actively participated in all supervision missions organized by IFAD and the CI. Technical performance of the PCU was no always satisfactory and could have been improved through adequate training and capacity strengthening in the course of implementation. The PCU failed to develop its own training programme. Financial management was weak and a permanent reason of concern. The lack of transparency remained an issue until 2009 when IFAD organized a specialized support mission. Nevertheless, the PCU was highly instrumental in making the project known at home and abroad. It has, however, suffered from lack of internal coordination and communication which has prevented it from internalizing and implementing some of the key approaches of the programme. Together with the lack of financial resources, these were the main factors which have contributed to lowering the impact of the programme.

3

NGO/Other The programme had contacts with a large range of partners performing in the R&T sector, incl. donor-financed projects and programmes, government institutions, NGOs, research institutions, universities, private sector, local level organizations, etc. Their performance as partners is not explicitly assessed, due to their large number, except for IITA, national research centers and the national network of yams and cassava seed multipliers. These partnerships were positive. Again, no detailed analysis is provided.

n.a

Cofinancier(s) no cofinanciers


99




There have been tensions between IFAD and the Government of Cameroon (GoC) who was not willing to follow and implement all recommendations made by the MTR, such as reducing the geographical coverage of the programme to enhance its effectiveness and impact.



Beneficiary interviews seem to indicate that the programme had a positive impact on the incomes of farmers involved in cassava production and processing. It also contributed to the creation of temporary employment in the local processing industry. Communes could increase their tax incomes through the lease of storage facilities and FOs through the sale of cassava cuttings. Higher yields have generally enabled farmers to reach higher gross margins, such as in the case of the CVC (Village Concertation Committee) of Minkoa involved in the production and sale of cassava tubers and stick. This CVC could increase its gross margin by 66%. Unfortunately, there is no figure reflecting the average income increase of all CVCs. Altogether, beneficiaries have indicated that higher incomes form sale have enabled them to improve their housing conditions and access health services and education. Some have also indicated that it has helped them start a small business. Altogether, the lack of data makes is difficult, however, to objectively assess the impact on household incomes and assets. The microfinance sub-component was not implemented. Neither was the risk fund, which was reduced by 90% in the course of implementation.

3

Food Security Improved food security was to be reached through production and income increases, and capacity strengthening of women, who are responsible for household nutrition and who are key actors in R&T production, processing and marketing. Cassava being the main staple in the target area, a production increase of 95% has positively impacted in household nutrition. The amount of cassava available for consumption has increased from 122 kg/person to 194 kg/person, per year. This corresponds to a 59% increase and is higher than anticipated at appraisal (30%). The PCR states that an estimated 30-40% of cassava production currently goes into consumption. The remaining 60-70% is being processed into a variety of cassava products such as leaves, flour, sticks, starch, gari, etc. This has contributed to diversifying household diets. Also, the quality of these products could be improved thanks to the technical support provided by the programme. Finally, a larger amount of produce is now being marketed, contributing to higher incomes, of women in particular, which in turn may be used to improve household consumption and nutrition. Programme impact in this area is however lessened by the fact that it focused almost exclusively on cassava while the original objective was to also develop taro, yams, sweet potato and potato. Nevertheless, the programme has contributed to improving child malnutrition. In 2011, acute malnutrition in the programme area accounted to 4.2% while it was 7.5% nation-wide.

5

Ag. Productivity The programme contributed to a substantial increase in cassava production and productivity. Yields have passed from 8-10 t/ha to 37 t/ha in some areas, compared to a national average of 13-14 t/ha in 2010-11. This has allowed production to almost double without any considerable increase in the surface being used. Collaboration with national research institutes and IITA have strengthened the availability of quality seeds. Seed multipliers now produce up to 15 million quality cassava cuttings per year, responding well to famer’s needs. FFS have been highly instrumental in the dissemination of high quality seeds and in the transfer of technologies in various areas (production system, quality control, reduction of post-harvest treatment, processing and diversification of sub-products, etc.). This has contributed to a considerable increase in the availability of R&T products both for consumption and sale. The competitive R&D fund was never really implemented due to the lack of sensitization and information dissemination.

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5


The programme has contributed to NRM and conservation by promoting environmentally friendly production and protection techniques, such as IPM. It has also promoted natural soil restoration techniques and the use of environmentally friendly processing equipment. Farmers have been trained in the use of R&T peelings as a source of energy or fertilizer. There is no further information or figures available.

4


The impact on human capacities and empowerment was partly weak compared to the targets set and to the fact that capacity building was the starting point to developing R&T value chains. The establishment of 249 Village Concertation Committees (CVC) and of R&T Village Development Plans were the key tools to identifying the needs and developing appropriate activities in response. These instruments were, however, not sufficiently strengthened, due to the unstructured approach adopted by the project and the fact that the PCU has substituted itself to the implementation of many activities. Various financial mechanisms were not implemented as originally planned, such as the roots and tuber development fund. Originally, it was to be managed by the CVCs. In reality, it was kept by the PCU, depriving the beneficiaries from an important aspect of their capacity building process. A major shortcoming of the programme was the failure to systematically strengthen the capacities of all actors of the value-chain(s). This fundamental concept was not internalized. Capacity

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building activities remained disconnected and uncoordinated and needed partnerships between actors were not established. Nevertheless, the programme succeeded in strengthening the capacities of producers and processors. Also, about 220 POs were structured and trained in production and processing. Some POs opened an account with a microfinance institution. Regional and national federations of R&T POs did, however, not materialize and the programme failed to establish an R&T council, which was supposed to provide continuous support to value-chain development. The PCR further mentions that these POs are not yet in a position to compete with well-established bayam-sallam and other commercial actors in the wholesale or export market of cassava. The main reasons are the lack of organization and their limited financial capacity. It is obvious that the organizations, which have emerged with the help of the programme, still need further support to become competitive.

Inst. & Policies The programme had no impact on policies and institutions. n.a

Markets Impact on markets was rather weak, given the difficulties of the programme in translating the value-chain approach into practice, and hence its failure in establishing lasting partnerships between the various (vertical integration). The PSR states that access to markets was basically left to the initiative of the farmers. In addition, the Esoko market information system, which was supposed to provide key information about the existing demand and market trends, did not become operational. The PCR states that there is no evidence for an increase in economic transactions between the production areas and the markets/sales points. Nevertheless, a series of activities were implemented which may have contributed to the development of markets, even if only locally: (i) the programme provided support to the development of various products of good quality standards and market value (cassava leaves, flour, sticks, etc.); (ii) market access was facilitated through the construction of 130 km of feeder road and the provision of 13 small road infrastructure works; (iii) market access was also facilitated through the provision of small market infrastructure such as storage facilities (24), which have become the sales points of some FOs; (iv) support was given to the organization of fairs and exhibitions; (v) a map identifying the location of 60 local markets was developed; (vi) effort were made to make R&T products known at national and international level through radio, internet and newspaper contributions; (vii) 27 FO members were trained in group sale; (viii) contacts were established between producers/processors and large agroindustries (national and international).

4

Project Impact The programme failed to conduct a final impact evaluation. The figures available stem from various sources, incl. studies (RIMS, IITA, etc.) and beneficiary interviews. National statistical data are used to compare programme results with. The programme had an impact on rural poverty, but its results need to be put in perspective. Initial targets were considerably reduced and the programme failed to internalize the key underlying approach to value-chain development (vertical integration of all acors). Its results could have been more significant and its impact stronger had it succeeded in implementing the recommended approaches.

4

Overarching Factors

Innovation The PNDRT was innovative in itself in the sense that it was one of the first value-chain programmes targeting the development of food crops (as opposed to cash crops), with the objective to improve the livelihoods and the food security situation of the rural poor. In terms of technical innovations, the programme has supported the development of the award winning Djilemo oven, used for the preservation of agricultural products through drying. According to the PCR, the technique needs some refinement to increase its economic efficiency before dissemination at a larger scale. The PCR does not mention any other technical innovation.

4


Despite its weaknesses and shortcoming, the PNDRT was perceived as a valid programme, worth being improved, further developed and scaled-up. This will be done by MINADER with the support of the World Bank and other development partners (PIDMA).

4


4


Political and institutional sustainability is ensured through Government’s strong and sustained support to R&T development, in particular cassava. GoC developed its own cassava development strategy in 2006. It was revised in 2010 and gives cassava the role of engine of growth in the rural sector, while being a main tool in the fight against poverty and food insecurity. Several initiatives have been taken at national level to implement this strategy. One of them is the WB supported PIDMA project, which further develops, improves and consolidates the achievements of the PNDRT. To support implementation of the programme, technical staff at local level has been trained to train FOs in integrated plant production & protection, using the FFS approach. Also, the market information system piloted by the PNDRT, based on dissemination by radio and newspaper, has been handed over to MINADER is currently being further developed. Sustainability of the infrastructure provided is not yet ensured. Future operation and maintenance have yet to be clarified. Despite the various weaknesses noted during the implementation of the programme, the different actors involved have widely adhered to the objectives and initiatives of the programme,

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ensuring its social sustainability. The National Cassava and Yams Seed Multiplication Network, created with the support of the programme, seem to be sustainable and viable. Various partners are increasingly asking its services. The FOs created at village and area level are fragile and will need further strengthening to ensure their sustainability. Only 27% are estimated being economically viable. Capacity strengthening in governance and management was given to about 250 members (around one member out of each PO), but this came late and is not enough to ensure long terms sustainability of the structures. Institutional sustainability is only partly ensured. Contacts established with support services (technical services, NGOs and other services providers) will continue to strengthen the POs.

Targeting The programme failed to develop a strategy to identify and target the most vulnerable among the poor, in particular the poorest and the food insecure. Apparently, it was assumed that poverty is generalized, while the appraisal report mentions that only 57% of the rural population can be considered poor. Also, a study conducted by IITA in 2011 seems to indicate that only 25% of the programme beneficiaries were poor. Since no baseline study was conducted, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the programme has targeted the right people.

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Gender A gender impact assessment conducted a year before project completion has concluded that the programme has had a positive impact on capacity building and empowerment of women. The status of women within the family and village has markedly improved. Women representation however varies. Their representation if high in CVCs and they make 67% of the members of Farmer’s Organizations. In appears however that their representation is still insufficient in other decision-making bodies at community and municipal level. The PCR does not provide any further data.

4

Overall Performance Overall performance is mixed. It cannot be argued that the project performed satisfactorily since it did not succeed in developing sustainable R&T value-chains and its support to key partners (POs, CVC, area committees etc.) was weak. Nevertheless, it provided sufficient support on the production and processing side to raise interest in the approach adopted which will be further developed under the WB financed PIDMA project (Agricultural Market Investment and Development Programme).

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An estimated 18000 households have benefited, which corresponds to 108000 individuals of which, 62.5% were women.

PCR Quality

Scope Guidelines have been respected, but some annexes are missing: physical progress, financial and economic analysis, environmental impact.

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Quality Makes a real effort to provide a good picture of the programme. However, more efforts could have been put into developing the impact section a little further. This section is very short, despite the fact that the information to assess all areas would have been available and largely found under the effectiveness section.

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Lessons Summarizes the main obstacles the programme had to face during implementation. Identifies good recommendations for the future implementation of similar projects.

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Candour Provides an objective assessment of the performance and impact of the programme. 5


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Democratic Republic of Congo - Agricultural Revival Programme in Equateur Province


Country & Project Name Democratic Republic of Congo - Agricultural Revival Programme in Equateur Province Ratings

Loan No.: 632-ZR

Project Id. 1244






IFAD loan& Grant US$(M) Loan US$14 762

Cofinanciers (if any) Belgium/BSF US$6 009; Government US$1 415; Beneficiaries US$414

Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Livestock

Principal Components The programme has four components, namely: (i) support to the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector; (ii) support to the rehabilitation of the fisheries sector; (iii) rehabilitation of social services; and (iv) programme management unit (PMU).

Project Performance

Relevance The programme is fully aligned with the objectives of the 2003 agricultural master plan and the objectives of the IFAD COSOP of 2003. Both are centred on poverty reduction and food security. In addition, the IFAD COSOP emphasizes the need to take into account the post-crisis and recovery situation of the country and to help it shift from humanitarian aid to development assistance. As such, and in line with the most urgent needs faced by the rural populations at that time, whose livelihoods were strongly affected by a prolonged period of war, poor governance, lack of development assistance and investments, the programme aimed to (i) restore and improve agricultural productive assets; (ii) restore and improve the productive assets of the fisheries sector; and (iii) restore and improve the access to basic social services, including health, education, water and information. In its design, the programme was however too ambitious. Costs were underestimated given the size of the area of intervention and the needs of the populations. Also, the implementation capacities of local partners, both private and public, were overestimated (see effectiveness). The programme was refocused during the MTR, its targets were revised downwards and funds were reallocated. Its strategies and approaches were found relevant, but difficulties were faced during their implementation, given the quasi absence and weak capacities of implementation partners. The programme was formulated in a participatory manner and beneficiaries were involved at all stages of programme design.

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Effectiveness The project was considered moderately effective in the implementation of its technical components, which reached between 83% and 54% of their targets. Project management and coordination was considered ineffective, due to high staff turnover, weak financial management (cash flow problems) and issues inherent to the nature of the programme. Overall, the programme suffered from various implementation issues, which were partly addressed at MTR. Programme objectives and outputs were refocused and costs were reallocated to enable it to reach visible results by the end of its implementation period. At project completion, 70% of the (new) targets could be achieved. Its most salient results include: (i) creation of producer organizations at 3 different levels, in both the agricultural and the fisheries sector; (ii) direct distribution of seeds and small equipment to about 20 000 households; (iii) revival of the local radio; (iv) opening up of the production zones with the construction of 206 km of rural road; (v) general boost of the economy due to a higher number of economic transactions; (vi) construction and rehabilitation of hospitals and health centers; (vii) construction and rehabilitation of local schools; and (viii) improved access to safe water. The following issues have negatively impacted on its effectiveness: (i) underestimation of costs related to infrastructure development at appraisal (roads and wells) (ii) remoteness of the project area and inadequacy of the implementation set-up (staffing, equipment); (iii) absence of services providers and skilled workers to undertake planned infrastructure works; (iv) quasi non-existence and weaknesses of technical services; (v) “competition” between relief efforts and development work; and (vi) frequent change of CPMs (6 since EB approval, 9 since inception).

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Efficiency The programme is rated partly inefficient. The overall disbursement rate is satisfactory (85% at the time the PCR was prepared) with a strong imbalance between components, however. The component “rehabilitation of the agricultural sector” reached a disbursement rate of 98% due to the high costs involved in the construction and rehabilitation of roads. The fisheries sector and social infrastructure rehabilitation component reached a disbursement rate of only 36% and 65%, respectively, while the management and coordination component was over disbursed (101%), despite an increase of fund allocation at MTR. At the end of the programme, project coordination and management costs had risen from 15% to 26% of total project costs. This is mainly due to important fuel costs increases (and even higher black market prices) and the need to align staff salaries with those of other UN projects. As a result, large part of the funds went into programme coordination and road infrastructure, while

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too little was spent on the development of farmers’ organizations, fisheries and social infrastructure. Programme implementation as further considered inefficient because of the permanent cash flow problems faced by the programme, lack of technical expertise and material to perform specific works, cumbersome procurement procedures and in light of all these difficulties, a too short implementation period. The completion date was extended by 2 years, from Dec 2010 to Dec 2012 (2 years) to enable important activities initiated after MTR (10/2009) to be completed. The final prices were much higher than estimated at appraisal, but in line with the MTR estimates. Altogether, the programme was partially efficient against MTR targets, not efficient against its appraisal targets.


Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD’s performance is mixed. Its performance was particularly affected by the frequent changes of CPMs (9 since inception). IFAD can also be made responsible for having overestimated the implementation capacities prevailing in the country, and hence, for a too ambitious design. Some cost factors were largely underestimated. On the other hand, IFAD has provided ample support during implementation (implementation support missions, training workshops, etc.), in particular since opening a country office in Kinshasa and taking over the direct supervision of the programme in 2010.

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Cooperating Institution Until 2009, the programme was supervised by UNOPS, which organized 9 supervision missions in 6 years. UNOPS supervision arrangements suffered from various weaknesses: (i) supervision through UNOPS Nairobi and Dakar, instead of UNOPS Kinshasa, because of the framework agreement with IFAD; (ii) most missions only met with the PCU in Kinshasa, due to travel restrictions to the project area, which substantially limited their understanding of the various implementation constraints faced by the programme; and (iii) frequent changes of responsibilities within UNOPS (6 CPMs in 4 years). Technical supervision was found satisfactory, although it can be criticized that UNOPS did not press for a readjustment of the programme early on. The quality of loan administration is not assessed in the PCR.

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Government Government regularly participated in supervision missions and fulfilled its duties in terms of organizing steering committee meetings, processing WAs and payment requests, etc. Altogether, its attitude was however rather passive. It failed to suggest needed adjustments to the programme and did not make the necessary effort to preserve its assets. Counterpart funds were provided, but with delays. The PCU was not given the means to operate properly, which would have been difficult, however, in the given context

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NGO/Other An important partnership was established with INADES Congo to support the creation and capacity strengthening of farmers’ organizations. While the support provide by INADES was essential for the creation of grassroots organizations, it was criticized at the beginning for giving out biased messages about the objectives of the programme. This led, later on, to the demotivation of the beneficiaries and their withdrawal from some activities. As regards private services providers, most faced delays in the delivery of their services due to the remoteness of the programme area, their lack of expertise, difficulties of the beneficiaries to provide their expected contribution and management problems of the PCU.

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Cofinancier(s) The programme was co-financed by the Belgian Survival Fund (BSF). BSF financing was earmarked for the rehabilitation and construction of schools and health care infrastructure. Delays were experienced in the release of funds. BSF disbursement rate reached only 40%. (In 2011 in the wake of a joint IFAD/ BSF/ Gvt supervision mission, BSF decided to withdraw funding from the rehabilitation/ construction of medical facilities and their equipment. This also had an impact on the disbursement rate of BSF funds.)

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The PCR contains little information about collaboration between partners, making it difficult to judge. Though probably positive (no major issues mentioned in the PCR) it can be assumed that collaboration was rendered difficult by the frequent changes of responsibilities on the side of both IFAD and UNOPS.



There is clear evidence of the increase in household ownership of assets across the two areas where RIMS surveys were conducted. Access to electricity, ownership of radios, TVs, refrigerators, bicycles, motorbikes and vehicles all increased across Bumba and Mbandaka. Increased agricultural production has led to higher incomes in 55% of the cases. These incomes have partly been reinvested into household assets (radio, bicycle, motorbikes). Many people involved in the value chains (production, processing, marketing, and transportation) could increase and diversify their incomes thanks to new business opportunities arising. Sustainability of market access is however questionable as maintenance of these roads is presently not guaranteed.

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Food Security During the socio-nutritional survey conducted in 2012, 34% of the households stated having had access to improved seeds of which 90% mentioned still using these seeds at the end of the project period. Most likely, this has contributed to improving household food security. The results of this survey however also show that child malnutrition could not be significantly reduced. In Bumba,

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chronic malnutrition has decreased slightly from 38% to 36% between 2006 and 2012 and the percentage of underweight births has decreased from 17% to 7.6%. By contrast, acute malnutrition among children under 5 has increased from 14% to 19.4%. This seems to confirm observations made elsewhere that income increases are used for the purchase of household assets (radio, bicycle, motorbikes) rather than for improving household diets. Protein deficiency is still widespread and the programme did not help improve the situation.

Ag. Productivity The programme was focused on the recapitalization and the revival of agricultural production and fisheries, in particular on increasing total production and productivity. In terms of agricultural production, the impact is visible. The programme gave direct access to seeds to 19 000 households, indirectly to 30 000. Better seeds together with improved production and storage techniques have led to significant yield increases: rice (+100%), maize (+80%), groundnuts (+24%) cassava (+40%). Farmer’s field schools played in important role in the dissemination of improved techniques. 288 famers were trained in seed multiplication technique. Also, 31% of the households were able to purchase a tool kit through the project and 75% were satisfied with the quality of the tools provided. 73% stated that these tool kits were affordable. Altogether, about 60% of the planned tool kits were distributed. The opening up of the production zones has further stimulated production and processing (rice threshing etc.). Nevertheless, only 51% of the households stated that the programme has helped them increase their agricultural production. Regarding fisheries production, the impact of the programme is less pronounced. 2460 fishing kits & 800 processing kits were sold to a total of 3264 households. In Bumba, about 90% of the fishing households stated having reconstructed their production capital, which has allowed 29% to increase their production and 23% to increase their incomes. Access to credit, through the programme, has enabled some fishing organizations to purchase equipment such as nets and motorized canoes. The programme has also enabled them to rehabilitate their offices and storage facilities, or to start activities outside the fisheries sector to increase and diversify their income sources (community fields, pig and chicken farms, etc.). Some investments requested by the communities, could however not be undertaken due to changing priority setting of the programme. These include the fishing lodge, which would have helped the fishing community organize group sales and other activities, and the wider dissemination of fish smoking facility, much appreciated by women’s groups.

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The programme did not aim to protect or rehabilitate the natural resource base. This was a problematic area as the road works did not take into consideration negative environmental effects: no environmental impact study was conducted; no mitigation plan was put in place and no measures were reflected in the contract for road works. Further, agricultural intensification and road works increased deforestation. However, the programme contributed to raising awareness among fishermen about the causes and effects of overfishing. In the village of Mbandaka, fishing communities now respect the rules which have been established with the help of the programme.

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The programme has focused on 2 aspects: reconstruction and improvement of the social capital and provision of basic social services (health, education, water). According to the 2012 survey, the programme has helped about two thirds of the households to re-establish their social capital. 46% have mentioned having improved their social capital. One of the key activities of the programme was the creation and consolidation of organizational structures in the agricultural and fisheries sector. Such organizations were created at 3 levels (agriculture: 578 farmers’ organizations, 55 unions and 1 federation with a total of 80 000 members; fisheries: 135 producer organizations, 12 unions, 2 federations with a total of 9428 members), but time was too short to enable them to consolidate. Most of these structures will need further support to operate on a sustainable basis. At completion, only 188 farmer’s organization, 28 unions and 1 federation were considered operational. This corresponds roughly to half of the structures created. In the fisheries sector, the percentage is 60%. In terms of social infrastructure, the programme helped the rehabilitation of 15 schools, 5 health care centers/hospitals, 25 fountains and the construction of 30 wells. As a result, the number of children going to school has more than doubled, the utilization rate of hospitals and health care centers went up from 9% to 46% and more than 10700 households were given access to drinking water. However, despite what seems a positive result, the impact of these interventions remains almost unfelt since the actual needs of the population exceed by far what could be delivered by the programme. One such example is access to drinking water. While 10700 households were given access to drinking water (30% of the target at MTR), only 0.6% of the population in the project area have gained access to “safe” water. Finally, a total of 228 community organizations were created for the management of these infrastructure works, but only 111 remained operational at the end of the programme, together with the infrastructure created.

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Inst. & Policies The programme did not aim to influence public institutions or policies for the poor. NA

Markets The programme aimed to implement a market-oriented approach by improving market access and investing into the development of high value crops such as rice, maize, groundnuts and cassava.

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Positive results could be reached in both areas. The yields of some important crops could be increased and hence, the amount and the quality of the produce sold. Also, processing could be developed. More importantly, the programme invested into the construction of two essential roads, which gave a boost to the development of entire value chains (production, processing, storage, transportation, marketing). Economic transactions in the programme area have increased, production has diversified, processing units and storage facilities have been established in villages along the newly constructed roads and transportation costs could be reduced. Also, a market information system was established in the region of Bumba, covering 54 markets. Sustainability of these achievements is however subject to future maintenance of these roads (see sustainability). Operational weaknesses within the FOs’ created is also perceived as an additional hindrance to the further development of markets (i.e. difficulties to organize group purchases and sales)

Project Impact Despite some important achievements in all areas, the impact of the programme is considered fragile, due mainly to the short actual implementation period combined with the many implementation difficulties faced by the programme (see effectiveness). A key factor which has negatively affected the overall impact of the programme was the fact that it was “competing” with other relief programmes which were providing support for free while the present programme tried to foster beneficiary ownership by requesting their contribution in kind or providing goods and services against a fee (seeds, health care services against payment).

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Overarching Factors

Innovation The programme led to a number of technical, institutional and social innovations. The programme has brought about 3 innovations in the area of Integrated Pest Management which helped to: (i) reduce the use and expenditures for pesticides; (ii) increase yields and hence, farmer’s incomes and (iii) improve food safety. With the help of INADES Congo the programme has also introduced a new organizational structure for CBOs (agriculture and fisheries). Finally, the fishmonger organization is another successful creation of the programme which has not only contributed to strengthening the professional organization of women fishmongers but has also contributed to improving their overall level of activity (organization of tontines, IGAs etc.) and hence, their social status. A total of 21 have been established so far.

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Several of the above mentioned innovations have a good potential for replication and scaling up. Some of the technical innovations have already been replicated within the programme and have a good potential for scaling up beyond the programme area. All other innovations need to be further deepened in order to learn more before replicating or scaling up. The approach community-based approach adopted by the programme has been replicated in the PARRSA and other interventions in the area.

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Sustainability of the programme is affected by several endogenous and exogenous factors: (i) conflicts and political instability in the programme area which prevents development efforts to set root; (ii) physical and institutional remoteness of the area which limits the impact of private and public development efforts; (iii) weakness of the local structures (community organizations and others village-level organizations) who used to be strong but are no longer in a position to ensure maintenance and sustainability of the physical achievements; (iv) organizational and financial weakness of Government structures at national, provincial and local level, which will not be able to ensure continuity of the activities and processes initiated by the programme. In order to fill some of these gaps, efforts have been made to support the development and consolidation of community organizations. It appears however that: (i) INADES Congo failed to strengthen the capacities of existing organizations; instead, new ones were created which are not yet strong enough to ensure sustainability of the achievements such as maintenance of the infrastructure; and (ii) it was difficult for the programme to build a sense of responsibility and ownership among the beneficiaries in a context where FAO gave seeds for free, UNICEF provided school infrastructure and equipment for free, etc. while the IFAD programme requested a contribution from the beneficiaries in cash or in kind (e.g. seeds and tool kits were sold cash or on a credit basis through the FOs, ). Sustainability, even short-term, will be ensured only if all stakeholders, incl. government structures and other projects operating in the region meet and seek to establish partnerships to consolidate and ensure continuity of the achievements. INADES, UNICEF and some public structures can play an important role. Particularly worrying is the fact that road maintenance is not ensured. A team of roadmen have been trained but they have neither the budget nor the material to operate. The long-term sustainability of the two connecting roads (206 km in total) is, however, a pre-condition for preserving the achievements of the programme, in particular the processes it has initiated (development of production, transportation, marketing, access to social services, etc.).

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Targeting Initially, the programme targeted smallholder farmers in Bumba, small fishermen in Bumba and in the Hinterland of Mbandaka, and the most vulnerable (landless, pygmies and refugees in the Hinterland

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of Mbadaka). At MTR, targeting was streamlined leaving out the landless and the refugees. The programme undertook targeted activities to support the integration of the pygmies into the development mainstream by giving them access to schooling and health care.

Gender Not directly assessed in the PCR. Women representation in the various grassroots organization is however low (20-30% or less).

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PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is in line with the 2006 guidelines. Most annexes, but not all, are included. It is not clear if a stakeholder workshop as organized.

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Quality Good and well-written, but not always very detailed. For the external reader, it is not always easy to understand the many acronyms that are not explained.

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Lessons This section is very general and largely a repetition of the main factors that have affected programme implementation. Possibly, more detailed lessons could have been extracted for the design of future interventions.

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Candour Honest assessment of performance and impact. Positive achievements and shortcomings are highlighted.

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Ghana - Rural Enterprise Project - Phase II


Country & Project Name Ghana - Rural Enterprise Project - Phase II Ratings

Loan No.: 588-GH

Project Id. 1187







Cofinanciers (if any) African Development Fund US$10 011; Government (Local) US$1 761; Government (National) US$3 687; Beneficiaries US$2 389; Domestic Financial Institution US$181

Implementing Agency Ministry of Trade, Industry, Private Sector

Principal Components The project will have five components: business development services; technology promotion and transfer; rural financial services; support to rural Micro and Small Enterprises (MSE) organizations and partnership-building; and project management. It will have two district-based delivery mechanisms: Business Advisory Centers (BACs), which will identify opportunities for MSE promotion and furnish relevant support services by contracting specialized providers; and rural technology facilities (RTFs), which will focus on technology promotion and support to apprenticeship.

Project Performance

Relevance The design of REP II has been noted as being straightforward, appropriate and somewhat ambitious compared to REP I. It strongly benefitted from the experience of REP I. The project design comprehensively identified the main constraints to MSE sector development in the rural areas at that time and devised strategies and approaches that were appropriate within the context of the country. REP II has been considered as highly relevant to the national poverty reduction agenda of Ghana, to IFAD's Strategic Framework (2007), to IFAD's Country Strategy for Ghana and to the needs of the rural poor. The goal and objectives of REP II were consistent with the Government of Ghana’s (GoG's) development objectives as stated in GPRS I and II. Thus, the project was the major thrust of the Government in relation to MSE sector development and has achieved significant nationwide recognition with MSE potential for poverty reduction and economic development in rural areas. REP II design also supported GPRS II's emphasis on developing a market-driven agricultural sector and a vibrant private sector. The project design took into account the need for synergy with other programs and projects in the country. At the local level, the project's objectives were also consistent with the national decentralisation agenda that aimed to strengthen the capacity of local governance through encouraging District Assemblies (DAs) to take responsibility for local development and in generating resources through local taxes and fees. The REP II was implemented in sixty-six districts (53 new and 13 from REP I) in the ten regions of Ghana. The project intervention targeted the entrepreneurial poor through a demand-driven approach. The institutional structure of the project through the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI), the National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI), Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology and Industrial Services (GRATIS), Association of Rural Banks (ARB) Apex Bank and the DAs were coherent for project implementation and were important for future MSE sector development. The Project experiences some changes over its implementation. The MTR of the project in late 2007 and early 2008 revised the physical targets set at Appraisal and this has contributed to the enhanced performance results of the project. This revision was informed by the experiences from implementation, particularly with regard to the RFS component. The Participating Financial Institutions’ uptake of Project services was lower than expected. This they mostly attributed to bad experiences with other government supported Projects where they incurred bad debts. At the same time, new initiatives were introduced such as the Initiative for Rural Enterprise Growth and Employment Creation (IREGE).

6

Effectiveness The Programme has continued to make significant progress in disbursement, implementation and achievement of development outcomes for its beneficiaries, exceeding most of the targets, especially for Initiative for Rural Enterprises Growth and Employment Creation (IREGE). The project was successful in reaching and exceeding the targeted coverage in terms of number of districts. The number of new MSEs established has reached 101% of the target (25 000) and 203% of the target number (6 250) of clients have been linked to larger commercial operations. Despite some initial delays, training activities have exceeded targets for clients trained at 170% of the target (81000). On the other hand, some challenges were faced for the MSEs in achieving the targeted results, as only 57% of them accessed the available loan funds. The bottlenecks in accessing credit have also contributed to lower than expected number of wage jobs created at 71% and adoption rates from training 49% of those trained in community-based skills. The operations of the RTFs were also below expectation and engaged the attention of all stakeholders for improvements into the future. The BACs were supported actively to overcome barriers to credit access and increase conversion of training into

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business start-up, survival and employment generation. In relation to the achievement of project's specific objectives, the BAC network created a more enabling environment for MSEs and effectively stimulated the establishment and expansion of MSEs. BAC clients achieved greater access to services and to the market. The quality, design and packaging of products improved, particularly through the increase in private sector technical support. Client organizations and trade associations became stronger in some areas. The access to working capital and investments funds was less effective but the project sought innovative pathways for business growth for clients that demonstrated capability. From 4.639 MSEs accessing funding from PFIs as at September 2010, the number increased to 8.529 as at December 2012. This increased access was achieved by improving the working relations between the BACs and the PFIs and the introduction of basic pre-appraisal documentation for loan applications from clients to the banks. The BACs supported the clients to complete business plan and cash flow templates for submission to the banks.

Efficiency REP II commenced slowly, due to reasons beyond the management control (several changes within the executing agency, as well as issues and challenges pertaining to recruitment and procurement). However, since the mid-term review in 2007, results have shown an improving trend. As at 31st December 2012, the project expenditure was 100% for IFAD-financed activities and 99.8% for AfDB, representing full utilisation of the REP II loan funds. The project was extended by one year in order to allow for a smooth transition from REP II to the successor Rural Enterprise Programme (REP III). REP II was managed efficiently although it is acknowledged that there were delays in RTF establishment, difficulties with the AfDB procurement processes and weak financial performance of the RTFs that were established. BACs were found to be efficient in their operations. It was not the same for the RTF activities, whose efficiency was constrained primarily due to the delays in the physical establishment of these facilities. RTFs were also not efficient in their internal control processes and in balancing their priorities. The financial allocation to project management was considered to be relatively high at 18%. It would appear that the two zonal offices of REP II contributed significantly to the higher than expected Project Management costs. On the basis of this, it was decided to absorb the PCMU zonal functions into the main project office in 2011 to reduce overhead costs. On the other hand, the project complied with the annual work plan, as well as the budgeting and financial management requirements. There was a substantial shift in funds from the business development services allocation to the technology promotion allocation. This was mainly due to the agreement between the GoG and the AfDB to realign funds to support facilities and equipment upgrade of the rural technology facilities. The overall funds available to the project increased above the initial base costs due to the currency movement and redenomination.

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Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD’s performance with respective to REP II was satisfactory. It provided adequate supervision and implementation support for the project. Withdrawal applications from the project were paid on a timely basis resulting in a 100% level of disbursement as at 31 December 2012. The strategic work of IFAD through the COSOPs provided a solid operating framework for the project. The gap in project performance however, was the unrealised expectation that the rural finance sector would be able to service the REP II clients more effectively. In this respect, IFAD probably underestimated the extent to which its other activities would bolster project activities. In all other respects, the performance of IFAD was very positive. Project orientation was projected and communication was effective. Supervision missions were fielded regularly. There was a short period where difficulties were experienced when the supervision modality changed from UNOPS to direct supervision by IFAD in 2007. Communications were delayed and the required approval processes were lengthier than previously. However, these were considered to be problems just affecting the project's early stages. The Project and government were satisfied with the direct supervision by IFAD. The performance of IFAD was further boosted with the establishment of the IFAD Country Office in 2010 which improved the delivery and overall success of REP II.

5

Cooperating Institution UNOPS was the cooperating institution during supervision for the first four years of the project. In general, the UNOPS performance was satisfactory. The supervision missions provided a useful mechanism for reviewing progress and for addressing design and implementation issues. The supervision missions were also a time when adaptations and innovations were discussed and budget adjustments made accordingly. Such processes helped the project to be more responsive to the needs of the clients. Nevertheless, there was a greater time lag and more distant relationship with UNOPS as compared to the later arrangements with IFAD direct supervision.

5

Government The performance of the Government of Ghana with respect to REP II was satisfactory in that it consistently met its financial obligations to the project with actual government support in financial terms exceeding the expected amounts. MOTI also provided a high level of support for the implementation of the project including its oversight responsibility. The fact that the project steering Committee (PSC) was chaired by the Chief Director of the Ministry was a clear manifestation of the Ministry’s interest in the project and the importance it attached to it. The PSC was also very effective

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in providing policy and technical direction to the project. It met every six months as required and reviewed and approved work plans and budgets and progress reports. The project also benefitted from a Project Coordination and Management Unit (PCMU) which ensured that the various components of the project were implemented in a timely, co-ordinated and coherent manner in order that the stated objectives of the project could be met efficiently and effectively. The PCMU contributed significantly to the positive performance of REP II. It was effective in mobilising the DAs, recruiting, appointing, training and supervising staff. The autonomous nature of the office was a huge advantage for REP II in that it enabled the project to cope with the intense work load required for establishing a nationwide program. However, some challenges noted in the design quality assurance process persisted. One major consideration was the incomplete institutional integration within the government decentralisation process for BAC and RTF support. The project also experienced some human resource problems such as high staff turnover, particularly at the district level, due to uncompetitive remuneration and delayed salary payment for some of the staff. Overall, the PCMU made substantial contribution to the achievement of the overall project objectives in building the MSE sector at national and district levels.

NGO/Other The key project implementing agencies for REP II were the DAs, NBSSI, GRATIS Foundation, the ARB Apex Bank Ltd. and some NGOs. The performance of NBSSI was satisfactory in the face of its resource constraints. It provided backstopping to the BACs through its regional offices. The performance of GRATIS was moderately satisfactory since it was not able to play its monitoring and supervisory role for the RTFs effectively. Delays in the release of funds by the project sometimes impacted negatively on the effectiveness of GRATIS since its own resources were not adequate and payment of the salaries of the RTF staff was delayed. This resulted in high staff attrition rates and slow project implementation. The technical backstopping was of assistance to the RTFs but it was not always as prompt and effective as expected. In addition to the formal arrangements entered into by PCMU with some private sector organizations, the assessment found that there was other private sector involvement in the activities of the Project at the district level that had not been formalised. The activities of the private sector were found to be helpful in achieving the set objectives. The Project also engaged private service providers in delivering training services to beneficiaries.

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Cofinancier(s) The AfDB was a co-financier of REP II with a US$11.24 million loan of the total Project cost of US$29.27 million. The AfDB funds covered all the activities of the RTFs (with substantial infrastructure) and part of the Business Development Services activities in 15 districts in 4 regions. There were substantial issues in aligning financial management and procurement processes at the commencement of the project. The reasons for slow disbursement of AfDB funds were that: the REP II financial procedures had been established under REP I in line with IFAD requirements and were not aligned to AfDB requirements; and, there was no AfDB country office resulting in substantial communication delays and difficulties. The delays severely affected project activities in the early years of the project. These issues were largely resolved in terms of funds flow by the third year of implementation. AfDB recognised the issues (these were also being experienced by other projects in Ghana), and responded by establishing a country office. Thereafter, the issues were steadily addressed and the project recovered from the early delays to achieve a 100% disbursement at completion. Nevertheless, the delays affected the overall efficiency of project implementation.

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No major issues have been detected on the partnership between the different stakeholders.



REP II had a significant impact on the incomes of its clients. Many of the clients met during the IFAD's independent evaluation (IE) indicated significant improvements in their incomes and standard of living. These were clearly linked to the improvement in MSE activities rather than as a result of broader economic growth. Increases reported ranged from 50% to 500% and were substantiated by reports of supporting family members through education, through purchase of business and personal assets and by improvements in housing. According to the 2012 BIRD Impact Evaluation study, out of the 340 Project clients who took part in the field survey, 280 (92%) mentioned that the Project has improved their income levels. Clients’ average income before enrolling on the REP II was GH¢455.00. After receiving support from REP II, clients’ incomes have now increased to GH¢755.00 representing about 40% increase in their previous monthly income. The clients partly attributed the increased income to the expansion of their businesses as well as improved managerial skills and other support services received from the Project. However, they acknowledged that there were some extraneous factors that also accounted for their enhanced incomes. Therefore, it was difficult to attribute the enhanced clients’ income solely to the Project. It was recognised that majority of the clients were engaged in other income generating activities especially agriculture which was a primary occupation. The increase in income helped some beneficiaries to acquire business assets (lands, connect electricity to shops and purchased new equipment), household assets (put up houses, bought radios and vehicles, etc.) and invested in their children’s education. Many clients did not have bank accounts before REP II’s intervention, but after the training they opened bank accounts and started saving.

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Some of the reasons cited by the clients for opening banks accounts include: savings (57%), access to credit (33%) and for security (20%). Thus, though REP II fell short on the provision of financial services, particularly access to credit, the impact of the 57% delivered was very significant. Clients linked to the PFIs developed their capacity to engage them and have improved their confidence over time. The clients in most PFIs sustained a relationship with the PFIs that allowed continued, and often increased, access to finance.

Food Security REP II did not directly influence agricultural productivity and therefore had little connection to primary food production. However, the fact that direct production from clients’ enterprises was a contribution to the rural economy could be linked to improving food security through generation of income. In food deficient households, food security was improved through increased income sources for the household. As a result clients are now able to give their families three square meals a day, something that was difficult to do in the past and which affected the health of the family members, particularly the children. (BIRD – KNUST, 2012 [REP II Impact Evaluation Study).

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Ag. Productivity On this domain the project's impact was found to be only moderate, partly due to the nature of the project design. However, some agro-processing MSEs were supported, as a link was established between primary production and agro processing such as palm oil processing, soap making, gari processing which used agricultural raw materials in which many of REP II clients were engaged. The BIRD study found that in some of the districts visited cassava farmers were supplying their products to gari-processors who had received training from the BACs. However, these examples were limited to a few locations and linkage between local agricultural production and SME development was not a core approach for the BACs.

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Regarding the environment, REP II provided off-farm employment opportunities to the rural poor through rural MSE development which helped to reduce the farming pressure on the land in some areas in Ghana. At the same time the project disseminated and promoted environmentally-friendly production techniques and improved equipment to replace the traditional practices considered to be harmful to the environment (such as illegal mining and illegal timber). The project took steps to improve the occupational safety and health conditions in rural MSEs through training and field demonstrations.

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REP II has contributed significantly to human resource development in Ghana through the various types of training programmes provided to some 133,570 poor rural people. Generally, the clients believed that the training received had empowered them and that they could stand on their feet after the project ends. The organization of trade shows for clients and the counselling services provided by the BACs benefited clients in terms of providing exposure and contacts to promote their businesses. Most REP II clients running businesses mentioned that they were able to look after their children and support the home. The ability to afford to pay children’s school fees is often cited as a major benefit demonstrating that education is valued. A respectable group of REP II clients have matured into service providers and supported REP II activities as well as others through private arrangements. In many REP II districts, training was provided to clients in group leadership, record keeping, group dynamics and setting up trade tests (NVTI examinations) to MSE associations. This ensured the cohesiveness and stability of the associations. REP II worked closely with local trade associations as well as informal groups of MSEs in a number of specific technical areas to strengthen their capacity to participate more actively in advocacy and policy consultations at both local and national level. Across Ghana many DAs can no longer ignore the Local Business Associations (LBAs) in making decisions (e.g. rate/fee fixing) that affect MSEs. Such an empowerment of MSE representative organizations has contributed towards the sustainability of the support services initiated by the project. In some instances these associations had influenced local government policy.

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Inst. & Policies To maximize the impact of the project interventions, the project undertook a number of policy dialogue activities towards the elaboration of a more conducive policy framework for the efficient and effective promotion of rural micro-enterprise development, building upon the experiences and best practices from REP I and similar programmes and projects. As a result, the project affected significant policy changes in support of the MSE sector and implementation of major national policies related to MSEs in the rural areas. The project facilitated the introduction of two policy initiatives in the local government system through the MOTI and Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD). First is the establishment of the MSE Sub-Committee and second is the Legislative Instrument (LI) 1961 (2009). The creation of the MSE sub-committees mainstreamed MSE promotion within the DA system to facilitate the establishment of small businesses in the districts and thus enhance the revenue generation potential of the DAs, promote local economic development and job creation and reduce poverty. The passing of LI 1961 which has authorized the establishment of DA departments including a new department of Trade and Industry will facilitate the development and promotion of small scale industries in the districts. At the national level, the project had also a notable impact on NBSSI, GRATIS and ARB Apex Bank in their capacity and approach to supporting rural MSE

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promotion and development.

Markets There is not a specific assessment of project's impact on this domain. The Institutional Support to MSEs has resulted in partnerships between the project and various key implementing actors. This has led to positive accomplishments in a number of different project initiatives, particularly in improving market opportunities for MSEs. The BAC network has created a more enabling environment for MSEs and has effectively stimulated the establishment and expansion of MSEs. Beneficiaries are experiencing greater access to services and to the market and trade associations are stronger in some areas. The BACs worked closely with potential and actual clients to identify viable market opportunities and ensure that the clients were prepared to supply market demand. In this regard, the business counselling and support to associations has been invaluable in assisting clients to prepare their products for the available markets. The success rate of business establishment demonstrates the effectiveness of the marketing approach. However, the extent of business growth has to date been limited. Building marketing capacity for business growth is an increasing focus of the project. The IREGE initiative is showing positive signs of clients that are most interested in business growth are being supported in market development. The project has been effective in stimulating markets for rural SMEs through the project and other trade shows, through linking clients through other players in the value chain and has started assisting clients with improved packaging through the Ghana Institute of Packaging. project/District Assembly sponsored Clients’ Exhibition and Trade Shows and support for clients to participate in Ghana International Trade Fairs had significant and positive impact on beneficiaries as they resulted in market opportunities for many rural MSEs leading to business growth and increased employment and income opportunities. The range of MSEs assisted as shown in table 4 arose from a consideration of local markets. The BACs worked closely with potential and actual clients to identify viable market opportunities and ensured that the clients were prepared to supply to meet market demand. In this regard, the business counselling and support to associations was invaluable in assisting clients to prepare their products for the available markets. The success rate of business establishment demonstrated the effectiveness of the marketing approach. However, the extent of business growth was limited. The IREGE initiative started in 2010 demonstrated positive signs of clients businesses graduating through the different growth stages. REP II was also effective in stimulating markets for rural SMEs through the project and other trade shows, assisting clients with improved packaging with the support of the Ghana Institute of Packaging.

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Project Impact 5

Overarching Factors

Innovation There were a range of innovations in the project, from business level improvements to improved DA systems. The Mid-Term Review (MTR) of REP II made a number of recommendations necessitating innovations in Project implementation strategy: i) The form, delivery and administration processes of the credit facility of the Project (Rural Enterprises Development Fund) were reviewed and modified to ease access, expand outreach and accelerate business development and growth at the district level; ii) more emphasis was placed on supporting new business started as a result of Project intervention as well as existing businesses; iii) Training in Small Business Management for existing enterprises was given priority over new skills training; iv) REP II was to work with the District Assemblies towards the mainstreaming of the BACs and RTFs into their structures. This began with the setting up of the sub-committees on MSE development by the DAs and initiating the process to take over full responsibility for the staff of these units through the mechanisms of the Local Government Service Act. Other innovations concerned: the rotational districts trade shows; the development of industrial estates; the use of capable clients as local service providers. These were major national level innovations that proved their worth in terms of better and more cost-effective operations, and in overcoming chronic barriers within the MSE sector in Ghana.

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The Programme has developed models that have been replicated even in districts not served by the Programme. The innovations that emerged, were further replicated and scaled-up nationwide. This required a change in direction in investments within the MSE sector e.g. in strengthening national and regional MSE support institutions, greater focus on value chain development and restructuring of the RTF model. Based on the visible benefits of Project's led institutions, especially the BACs, non-REP 14 districts decided to establish their own BACs and support them to function from their own resources. The total success of REP II that built on REP I itself has been scaled up into a national Programme (Rural Enterprises Programme III) that now seeks to build capacity within identified institutions at the national, regional and district levels to sustain the momentum of MSE development across the country. The preparation of the follow up Programme (REP III) has fine-tuned the models and concepts and prepared packages that be replicated and upscaled to national level coverage, with accompanying support for the necessary institutional development to bring the programme to national scale.

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The design of REP II had strong in-built mechanisms for sustainability by mainstreaming its institutional and delivery processes within the decentralized government entities while involving the private sector whenever relevant and feasible. Prospects for sustainability have been enhanced by strengthening the institutional framework for supporting rural enterprises through better coordination amongst Participating Financial Institutions (PFIs), BACs and Rural Technology Facility (RTFs); and continued mainstreaming of support for micro and small enterprises (MSEs) into the operations of District Assemblies (DAs). The district-based support mechanisms used by the Project were aimed at enduring sustainability of REP II interventions at both the institutional and enterprise levels. The project was the main catalyst in the re-orientation of the participating districts to pay more attention to local economic development through the MSE Sub-committees and the LI 1961 (2009). Based on the visible benefits of these institutions, especially the BACs, non-REP 14 districts decided to establish their own BACs and support them to function from their own resources. At the national level, REP II had a tremendous impact on NBSSI, GRATIS and ARB Apex Bank in their capacity and approach to supporting rural MSE promotion and development. Measures are in place to maintain momentum in preparation for a smooth transition to REP III. The RTF model is less viable. The current mechanism is not financially viable and requires review to define the future strategy for ensuring that operational costs will be covered and for the RTFs to remain relevant to the needs of the districts.

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Targeting The project targeting was adequate. The clients of the Project were mainly rural poor farmers who wanted additional sources of income or rural poor already into some generating activities but desiring more technical and/or entrepreneurial and business management skills. The Project interventions were primarily targeted at the "entrepreneurial poor" as well as rural micro and small enterprise support institutions at both the national and district levels. The project was implemented on a demand driven basis starting with a competitive enrolment process for the participating districts and the delivery of project services within the participating districts with emphasis on self-targeting of potential clients who were interested in participating to those services. However, efforts were also made to include vulnerable groups such as disadvantaged women, unemployed youth and graduate apprentices who lacked the capital or acumen to start their own businesses.

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Gender Majority of rural micro-entrepreneurs were women. REP II responded adequately to this target group through its design and implementation was focused on female-headed MSEs. Overall, about 62% of Project clients were women, while about 44% were the youth. The experience of REP II has confirmed that women are better in loans and credit repayment, work easier in groups and consciously search for regular and stable incomes for their businesses. Women, in general, more than men, use self-employment incomes for improving the living conditions of the household and especially for extra expenditures on education and health.

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PCR Quality

Scope The PCR is line with the 2006 Guidelines for Completion Report. 6

Quality The overall quality of the PCR is satisfactory. The report benefitted both from the results of the Interim Evaluation conducted by IFAD's Office of Evaluation in 2010 as well as Impact Evaluation Study of REP II conducted in 2012 by the Bureau of Integrated Rural Development (BIRD) of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science Technology (KNUST).

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Lessons This section could have benefitted more from the well-articulated analysis of project's successes and weaknesses.

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Candour The PCR has conducted a fair assessment of the project's main results, highlighting both its positive achievements and shortcomings.

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Guinea Bissau - Rural Rehabilitation and Community Development Project


Country & Project Name Guinea Bissau - Rural Rehabilitation and Community Development Project Ratings

Loan No.: DSF 8007-GW

Project Id. 1278


Entry into Force 30 April 2008




IFAD loan& Grant US$(M) Grant: DSF 4 682

Cofinanciers (if any) Swedish Complementarity: US$1 050; Government: US$0.803; Beneficiaries: US$0.092


Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Principal Components The project is structured around four components: (i) rehabilitation of infrastructure and basic social services; (ii) capacity-building of grass-roots organizations; (iii) reactivation and development of the rural economy; and (iv) project management.

Project Performance

Relevance The project was fully aligned with Government’s poverty reduction strategies (Document de stratégie nationale de réduction de la pauvreté) DENRAP I (2006-08) and DENRAP II (2011-2013) by responding to 3 out of its 5 main objectives, namely: (i) poverty reduction; (ii) reduction of food insecurity; and (ii) elimination of inequalities between men and women. The project was further aligned with Government’s Agricultural Development Policy of 2007 and the Water Management Master Plan. As such, the project provided direct support to the implementation of important development strategies of the country. The project integrated the lessons learned through previous IFAD interventions in the country and was aligned with relevant IFAD strategies and approaches, including the IFAD COSOP for Guinea Bissau of 2003 and IFAD’s Policy for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. It was based on a geographically integrated development approach and took into account the most urgent needs identified by the rural populations through appropriate interventions in the areas of road infrastructure development, education, access to water, agriculture & livestock development, and provision of IGAs, while at the same time strengthening the social capital, the position of women within the society and social cohesion altogether. The project was designed to address 3 major development challenges: (i) rehabilitation of social infrastructure and capacity strengthening of rural organizations; (ii) reduction of rural poverty through the development of the rural economy; and (iii) social capacity strengthening to prevent social unrest and crisis. This was done by focusing on the development of essential rural infrastructure, capacity strengthening at local level and support to the development of local initiatives, while maintaining a highly flexible approach, enabling the project to respond to a changing field realty and to emerging beneficiary demands, especially from women. As such, the project proved highly relevant to the specific context of the country. Project design was appropriate and realistic.

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Effectiveness The project reached some positive results, but its effectiveness was affected by several factors which have prevented it from reaching a steady momentum and thus, from reaching its development objectives. This is reflected in the low level of achievement of its technical components. Regarding implementation of Component 1 “Infrastructure and basic social services”, the project was partly efficient. The rehabilitation/construction of 65 km of rural road was not performed, which resulted in a major setback for the project, especially with regard to its sustainability prospects. Only 27.5% km of feeder roads were rehabilitated under the FIDL. The project achieved better results with respect to access to water (74% achieved). It also facilitated the construction of 14 community school and 14 health care centers. As for Component 2 “Capacity strengthening of grassroots organizations”, the project was partly efficient with the implementation of the Local Initiatives Development Fund (FIDL) which reached an achievement rate of 86%. The latter turned out to be the project’s most successful activity, with 777 community projects submitted for approval and 319 implemented. The FIDL was considered particularly successful as per the diversity of the projects implemented and of the beneficiaries involved. Regarding capacity strengthening, most physical targets could be surpassed: 164 villages were reached, 159 IOR created (incl. 61 CIDT), and 2965 CIDT managers trained. Nevertheless, it was also pointed out that the majority of these organizations were created late in the life of the project. They are still weak in terms of management and governance. Regarding Component 3 “Reactivation and development of the rural economy”, the project was partly inefficient. Activities under this component could not be completed due a decision of the March 2013 Supervision Mission to stop all activities under this component. Nevertheless, the project achieved some good though isolated results. It helped develop 305 ha of irrigated land (62% of the target) and provided support to livestock development, vegetable production, fruit tree production and natural resource management. Research stations were rehabilitated with the support of the project and the capacities of technical services were strengthened. - Overall, the project was appreciated by the beneficiaries, technical ministries and institutions involved.

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Also, this project was the first and only IFAD intervention in Guinea Bissau that was not closed prematurely, but was implemented fairly satisfactorily in a difficult socio-economic and political environment. Its design followed the right objectives, the right approaches and achieved some positive results. During implementation, it was however penalized by a late effective start-up, political instability, uneven support provided by IFAD and frequent changes of responsibilities within the implementing ministry and IFAD (4 ministers and 4 CPMs in 6 years).

Efficiency Project efficiency was affected by several factors: (i) late effective start-up due to delays in finding an adequate office space in Buba (it took 15 months for the coordinator to be in place and for the PCU to become operational); (ii) first NGO contracts wrongly financed under “salaries”; (iii) suspension of loan disbursements by IFAD following the military coup of April 2012; (iv) failure to carry out the rehabilitation/construction of the local road network, essential for opening up remote but densely populated areas; and (v) cancellation of important activities following the IFAD supervision mission of March 2013. This has resulted in an overall low disbursement rate of 60% (68% for the main IFAD grant), with strong imbalances between components and categories. Disbursement rates of the technical components were low (“Infrastructure and basic social services”=23%; “Capacity strengthening of grass roots organization”=45%; “Reactivation and development of the rural economy”=33%). By contrast, Project management reached a disbursement rate of 109%. This resulted in a cost-benefit ratio (operating costs/investments) of 56.8%, which is much higher than the estimated 23% at appraisal, meaning that an input of 568 CFA was needed to produce an output of 1000 CFA (against a target of 230 to 1000 CFA). Despite this low level of disbursements, achievements and apparent inefficiency, the PCR points out that the project has produce good quality results. It has contributed to changing the mind-sets of the populations and has initiated a positive economic development process at local level, through the implementation of the well-received Local Initiatives Development Fund (FIDL) and accompanying capacity strengthening measures at different levels. The project has also been quite successful in strengthening the capacities and changing the image of women. It benefited from an additional grant from the Swedish Government in 2010 and was extended by one year.

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Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD performance has varied over the years, due to frequent changes in responsibilities (4 CPMs in 6 years, responsible respectively over a period of 3 years, 6 months, 18 month and 6 months). These changes, which mainly took place during the second half of the project life, have proven highly disruptive. Also, they happened during a period of political instability, when a closer and continuous follow-up by IFAD would have been desirable. As a result, the frequency of supervision was inadequate (only 4 supervision and 2 follow-up missions in 6 years, no mission in 2012). Also, composition of the missions was not always adapted to the needs of the project and fiduciary aspects were not adequately addressed. The PCR points out that IFAD was often slow in providing non-objections. In the particular case of the rehabilitation/construction of 65 km of rural roads, essential for a sound completion of the project, IFAD ensured that all preliminary studies were done. However, following a change in CPM responsibilities, IFAD did not follow-up by providing its non-objection for the actual construction works, based on the ground that the department of Public Works, who would have been in charge, did not have sufficient capacities to undertake these works. In 2012, following the coup, IFAD disbursements were suspended and resumed in 2013 only. The March 2013 Supervision Report mentions that a new WB financed project, with a strong focus on rural infrastructure, was interested in completing these works and recommendation was given to Government to follow-up on this possibility. It is not fully understandable why IFAD did not push for the road construction project to be completed using the IFAD funds. IFAD can however be commended for a sound and highly relevant project design, well adapted to the needs of the rural populations and fully in line with Government’s development priorities.

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Cooperating Institution

Government The project was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR). MADR globally fulfilled the conditions of the loan agreement. However, delays were experienced in hiring project staff, purchasing project equipment and finding appropriate offices, which led to a late effective start-up of project activities. MADR respected the majority of the loan covenants, but released only 25% of its counterpart funds. This was partly due to the failure to implement some activities, such as the construction of 65 km of rural roads. Partly, counterpart funds were included in the budget but not paid. The MADR also chaired the project Steering Committee, and the Policy Forum. Their performance is not assessed in the PCR. The Steering Committee was responsible for oversight, policy orientation, AWP&B approval and FIDL implementation. It included 9 representatives of the rural populations. The Policy Forum played an advisory role in terms of approaches, analysis and M&E. Beneficiaries were represented through village representatives, regional IOR representatives and 62 CIDT members. Project activities were coordinated by an autonomous PCU, which used NGOs, technical ministries and other partners for the implementation of field activities. PCU performance was satisfactory, but not proactive. Also, it lacked experience in planning, coordination, evaluation and reorientation.

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NGO/Other A major partner in project implementation was INDE (Inter-coopération pour le développement). INDE was to provide a permanent TA to assist project implementation and participate in supervision missions over a period of 16 months. Due to incompatibility of the TOR of the TA with the supervision missions, the contract with INDE was terminated but the TA continued to provide assistance to the project, on a freelance basis. Further support was provided to the project through an administrative and financial TA. However, the person was not hired on a competitive basis, which created a climate of mistrust with the PCU staff, all hired on a competitive basis. In addition, a large number of NGOs and CBOs were involved in the implementation of the project, but their performance was not assessed in the PCR. Main partners of the project were the CDIT, technical ministries and research institutes. Only very few NGOs (NIMBA) could perform as expected because many of them either did not have a good understanding of their assignment or did not have the required capacities and expertise.

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Cofinancier(s) The project benefited from a Swedish Grant of USD 1.05 million approved in 2010. This grant represented a top-up to the IFAD grant and was used to increase investments under the FIDL. It reached a disbursement rate of 44%. The grant was supervised by IFAD. Performance of the Swedish Government as co-financiers is therefore not assessed.

n.a


Collaboration between partners was altogether positive, but affected by the country’s political instability in 2012 and the frequent changes of responsibilities on both, Government’s and IFAD’s side.



Through the implementation of the FIDL, the project has provided support to the development of various microenterprises and micro projects, which have contributed to increasing and diversifying household incomes. These mainly include rural bakeries, convenience stores, tree nurseries, phone shops, recreation rooms, etc. Most of these initiatives have benefited both, the initiator and the beneficiary, but results widely varied. Women could improve their incomes by increasing and diversifying vegetable production. Vegetables are usually not sold on markets given their perishability and the high costs of transportation. However, they are bartered against cashew nuts, which is the country’s main cash crop sold on markets. The RIMS survey conducted in 2013 concluded that the living conditions of the populations have improved. This mainly concerns HH access to water (from 32% in 2009 to 49% in 2013) and use of latrines (from 65% of the HH in 2009 to 78% in 2013). Livestock ownership has increased too: 47% raise goats (compared to 35% in 2009), 32% raise pigs (compared to 28% in 2009) and 18% raise cows (compared to 11% in 2009). Higher incomes have also enabled the populations to improve their means of transportation. The ownership of motorbikes and dugout canoes has increased from respectively 5% to 8% and 13% to 14%. Household ownership of television and refrigerator has increased too, but less significantly. These effects are not all attributable to the project, but it has certainly contributed to improving the living conditions of the population in the project area. Regarding water the project has provided access to drinking water to 34 villages (or 11 108 individuals). Women (5419) have particularly benefited as it has helped reduce the burden of collecting water. Rehabilitation activities financed under the FIDL have provided access to health care to a total of 7 villages with 3000 inhabitants. Access to education was improved with the construction/rehabilitation of 14 community schools, benefiting mainly women. However, these activities did not achieve any substantial impact since the literacy rate has even dropped between 2009 and 2013. Finally, access to markets only marginally improved, thanks to the rehabilitation of 27.5 km of feeder road.

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Food Security Food security was improved. The percentage of households affected by 2 food shortage periods (of 2-3 months) has decreased from 98% in 2009 to 71% in 2013 and from 26% to 5% for 3 food shortage periods. The situation is still serious, but has markedly improved since 2009. Child malnutrition has improved too. Chronic malnutrition among children blow the age of 5 has decreased from 30% in 2009 to 24% in 2013 and acute malnutrition from 5% to 4%. Finally, availability and diversity of food could be improved thanks to a higher and more diversified agricultural production. The PCR points out that women have learned to improve and diversify their vegetable production. Figures are not available but it can be assumed that this has contributed to the improvement and diversification of the household diets. Altogether, the project’s impact on agricultural, livestock and fisheries production has contributed to improving household food security (see agriculture).

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Ag. Productivity Agricultural development was perceived as a mean to develop the rural economy in the region and thus to contribute to rural poverty alleviation. Despite a weak overall impact on agricultural production and productivity, the project has initiated dynamic processes, which are likely to have a sustainable effect on agricultural production, food security and incomes in the region: Results include: (i) increased yields for mangrove and low land rice cultivation from 1.5t/ha to 2.5 t/ha (4t/ha in some cases). Beneficiaries could increase their production by up to 67%; (ii) increased and diversified vegetable production with the introduction of non-traditional vegetables; (iii) development of traditional fisheries with the distribution of start-up kits in 24 villages. This has enabled many artisanal fishermen who had abandoned their activity, due to lack of equipment, to re-start their activities. Others could substantially increase and even double their catch; (iv) increased livestock production through sensitization, distribution of breeding flocks and veterinary equipment. Project activities have raised interest among the beneficiaries in the production of small livestock, both as a source of income and as an investment

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opportunity. Livestock production is not widespread in the project area; and (v) support to agricultural processing with the introduction of small processing units for rice (hullers) and palm oil production. 336 individuals in 27 villages have benefited. Support to agricultural production and productivity was also given indirectly through the rehabilitation of the research stations, but there are no details available.


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Project design did not include safeguards as it was not expected to have any major impact on the environment. This was confirmed by the PCR. On the positive side, the project provided support to the implementation of the community management system for the Cantanhez Forest National Parc with the objective to promote the sustainable use of forest resources. The project’s impact on natural resources and the environment was limited but positive

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With 134 IOR, the regions of Quinara and Tombali had only few rural organizations (about 10% of the country’s IOR), which denotes the lack of support given to these regions. With the creation of 61 CIDTs, the project has substantially increased the number of rural organizations in these two regions. Since the CIDTs have a broader mandate, they have substantially contributed to the empowerment of the populations in the two regions. These rural organizations are associations dealing with a wide range of activities such as agriculture, IGAs or services (to producers or to the community). Others are youth associations, parent’s associations, water user associations, road maintenance associations, low-land user committees, natural resource management committees, etc. The project further aimed to create producer organizations centred on a specific value chain, but this did not materialize. A major innovation of the CDIT has been the role of the beneficiaries who are at the same time the main actors of the CDIT. This has substantially contributed to their empowerment and has led to: (i) more transparency; (ii) improved gender representation; (iii) emergence of young leaders; (iv) improved social cohesion. CDITs have brought about many initiatives, financed under the FIDL. The CIDT played an important role in fostering social cohesion and preventing conflicts, by promoting exchange and dialogue at village level. Participation of all professions and villagers of all ages was encouraged, giving thereby the possibility of exchange across generations, social classes and occupations. The thematic focal points became a particularly important feature of the CIDT as they gave the CIDT a more important and “modern” role than the traditional village organization and enabled it to deal with development aspects (health, education, water, etc.) at local level, strengthening thus the sense of unity and strive for a common goal within the village society. The project had only a limited impact on the emergence of public and private support services. The following services were developed by the villages with the help of the FIDL, and reinforced with capacity strengthening measures: vehicle repair, pump construction and repair, masonry, rice processing, bakery, oil and gasoline shop, village eatery, portable charging units, agricultural technical support.

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Inst. & Policies Due to its nature, the project did not have any impact on institutions and policies. n.a

Markets The project’s impact on markets was affected by the failure to carry out the 65km of road construction/rehabilitation, which would have opened up an important and densely populated production area. As such, the project failed to undertake an important activity which would have contributed to the development of the rural economy and thus, to the alleviation of rural poverty in the region. Accessibility of key production areas is as limited as it was before the project, especially during the rainy season, thus affecting the development of markets and trade. Also, transportation costs are high. Some beneficiaries, who could increase their incomes through the project, have found a way to circumvent this problem by purchasing cheaper means of transportation. As a result, the availability of motorbikes and dugout canoes has slightly increased between 2009 (benchmark) and 2013 (RIMS assessment) from 5% to 8% and 13% to 14% respectively. In one CIDT, beneficiaries have initiated the rehabilitation of 27.5 km of feeder roads and 2 bridges under the FIDL, which has partly helped ease the transport situation. However, these are only tertiary roads and their maintenance is not ensued by public services, as they were not involved in the planning and undertaking of the works. Nevertheless, this has reduced the isolation of 16 villages with an estimated population of 5670 inhabitants.

3

Project Impact The assessment of project impact was affected by the absence of a final project evaluation. RIMS data and project M&E data did not provide any information on the project’s direct impact, in particular with respect to the FIDL financed micro-projects. The impact assessment provided in the PCR was therefore based on various sources of information. Altogether, project impact was limited, due to the various external factors, which have affected its implementation and the short actual implementation period of 4 years only (2009-13). Nevertheless, the project did achieve some positive results, in particular through implementation of the FIDL.

4

Overarching Factors

Innovation The project was highly innovative in Guinea Bissau as per its strategy of intervention and implementation mechanisms: local development approach, identification and implementation of the micro projects by the communities themselves (participation), a multidimensional partnership approach and competitive selection of implementation partners. More specifically, the project brought about 3

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major innovations: (i) the call for proposals as a way to identify and cooperate with performing NGOs; (ii) the Integrated Tabanca (village) Development Committee (CIDT) which provided an appropriate framework for local partners to meet and agree on various issues of concern to the “terroir” and to identify development activities responding to the economic or needs of the populations. This has enabled the identification and implementation of a large number of relevant initiatives submitted to the FIDL; and (iii) the FIDL, whose innovative features lie in the liberty of choice of the activities to be financed, the diversity of the initiators, the financing mechanism, the implementation mechanism (directly through the initiator) and implementation follow-up by the CDIT on behalf of the community.


Replicability is not assessed in the PCR, but it can be concluded that the positive experience of the CDIT and the FIDL are worth being replicated and scaled up. Possibly, however, more time would have been needed to properly experiment with these instruments, draw lessons and improve them before replication and scaling up.

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The project was highly innovative and has initiated some positive results. Chances for sustainability are however compromised in particular by several external factors that have negatively affected project implementation and thus, hindered the consolidation of achievements. The failure to construct and rehabilitate 65 km of main road, a necessary pre-condition for strengthening market structures and trade, has substantially reduced the chances for sustainability of all other project interventions. However, if taken on by a future WB project, chances are much higher. The PCR states that new interventions financed by other donors will not intervene neither in the same villages nor will they help complete those activities that were left pending by the present project. It does however not discuss the future WB project. Regarding the public (technical) services at local level, they lack both human and financial resources to follow-up on the project after its closure. By contrast, the various NGOs strengthened by the project will most likely be able to continue offering their services to the rural organizations, the IOR and CDITs in particular. It is not sure, however, whether they will recognize the CDIT as main interface between the village and themselves. The CIDTs are not yet recognized as an institution representative of the beneficiaries and their legal status still needs to be clarified. So far the CIDTs are still linked to the implementation of FIDL projects. Further support is still needed to clarify and strengthen their status.

4

Targeting The project’s targeting strategy was effective. Targeting was based on the two regions with the highest poverty incidence (Tomabali & Quinara), covering altogether 626 villages. Its target population encompassed an estimated 13 000 households or 100 000 individuals corresponding to 70% of the total population in the two regions. Beneficiaries included: women, young men, young families/households, poor families and large families. However, the project failed to develop a specific mechanism to reach out to its privileged beneficiaries. Gender aspects were to be mainstreamed across project interventions. In reality, the project reached 164 villages (compared to a target of 100). These villages were selected based on their vulnerability and accessibility, and based on the developmental and organizational issues they are facing. The targeting strategy was modified and adapted to each specific intervention, making the project’s targeting methodology altogether highly effective.

4

Gender The project had a felt impact on women and the youth by opening up economic, social and cultural development opportunities. Of the 22 550 individuals who have benefited from the project’s services, 57.6% were women. The principles of gender equity were respected across components and activities. Results in terms of women representation were very positive: beneficiaries of the FIDL (52.1%), trainees in community management (51.5%), members of IOR (56.7%) and management positions within the IOR (69.9%). By contrast, only 25% of the IORs are led by women, mainly due to the fact that the literacy rate among women is still very low. For the same reasons, women were weakly represented within the project management and oversight structures, and among the partners of the project. Despite the lack of data, it can be stated that the project had a strong impact on the youth who represent about one third of the country’s population. The youth have largely benefited from the FIDL and were well represented within the CIDT, both as members and within their governing bodies. The project has adequately approached the youth who have understood how they could draw long-lasting benefit from the project. They were strongly involved in all economic and socio-cultural activities.

5

Overall Performance The project was considered innovative but results were compromised by the socio-economic instability of the country and the underperformance of some actors during implementation. Nevertheless, important investments took place, a local dynamic was initiated at social, economic and cultural level, the socio-economic position of women and the youth was improved and local support services have started emerging in some villages.

4


The project has directly benefited 79 500 individuals, of which 51% were women.

PCR Quality

Scope The outline was respected but most annexes are missing. 4


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Quality The PCR makes an excellent analysis of a well-designed project that encountered major implementation difficulties. Despite the lack of a final impact assessment, the PCR provides a large amount of data (mainly output figures) to substantiate its findings and conclusions. It makes a true effort to outline the positive achievements of the project at local level (beneficiaries and their organizations) despite weak physical achievements rates.

6

Lessons A good analysis of what worked and what did not work, with advice for future projects. Good conclusions and recommendations, also for the Government of Guinea Bissau (GoGB) in order to maintain achievements and assets of the project.

5

Candour Objective and well intentioned, with a tendency to be on the side of the Government and biased against IFAD.

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Mali - Sahelian Areas Development Fund Programme


Country & Project Name Mali - Sahelian Areas Development Fund Programme (SADeF) Ratings

Loan No.: 488-ML

Project Id. 1089



Completion Date 31 July 2013 (Original: 31 March 2009)

Final Closing Date 31 January 2013 (Original: 30 September 2009)


IFAD loan& Grant US$(M) 21.95 Loan

Cofinanciers (if any) GEF: US$6.00; Government: US$6.38; Beneficiaries: US$3.50

Cooperating Institution IFAD Pilot (direct supervision)

Implementing Agency Ministry of Rural Development and Water

Principal Components The programme offered its participation to rural communities in carrying out their own initiatives through a number of services and funding arrangements falling within the remit of IFAD’s mandate. The activities to be supported have been divided into three broad menus: (i) Village Development Support with two sub-components: (a) Training and support services; (b) Village investment fund; (ii) Decentralized Financial Services; (iii) Programme Management.

Project Performance

Relevance The Sahelian Areas Development Fund (SADeF) Programme was designed under the Flexible Lending Mechanism (FLM). The PCR is focused on assessing programme performance during the third phase, incl. consolidation of the achievements of the first 2 phases. The third phase was found in line with relevant government policies and strategies, in particular with the strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction 2007-2011, which identifies agricultural intensification and social development as the main tools for rural poverty alleviation. It is also in line with the National Environmental Action Plan, the National Programme to Combat Desertification and the national policy on wetlands. It has contributed to the implementation of the Agricultural Development Master Plan, the Framework Law on Agriculture and the livestock recovery strategy. It was also designed in support of the decentralization policy. The programme was aligned with the IFAD COSOP of 2007-2011 and responded well to the needs of the beneficiaries in the Inner Niger Delta, by combining rural development with natural resource management and ecosystem / biodiversity restoration. This was confirmed by the stakeholder workshop held as part of the completion mission. The choice of the area of intervention was found highly relevant too, in particular the choice of the 19 rural communities, which are among the poorest in Mali and cover protected ecosystems of the Inner Delta Region (wetlands of international importance recognized by the Ramsar convention). By contrast, the demand-driven approach of the programme, whereby all interventions had to be initiated by the beneficiaries themselves did not enable the programme to: (i) move into a value-chain approach and achieve greater results by providing coordinated and structured support to all elements of the chain; and (ii) widen its rehabilitation and restoration measures to the entire Inner Niger Delta based on an ecosystems approach. In other words, the programme could have reached more by combining its demand-driven approach with structured investments in support of the needs expressed by the beneficiaries.

5

Effectiveness Measurement of programme impact was hampered by a weak Logframe and the demand-driven approach of the programme, which made it difficult to pre-define impact measurement indicators. Beneficiary interviews, workshops and meetings held during the completion mission have led to conclude that: (i) the programme has satisfactorily contributed to improving the living conditions of the populations in the programme area (SO 1) by securing their incomes, access to basic social services and reducing conflicts over the use of natural resources; (ii) the programme has only partly succeeded in strengthening the capacities and participation of farmer’s organizations in local development processes (SO2). While this SO was reached with regard to local farmers’ organizations, the programme widely failed to establish regional apex associations providing adequate and cost effective services to their members. By contrast, local authorities were strengthened through local development plans and communal environmental action plan; and (iii) the programme significantly contributed to improving NRM and ecosystem conservation & rehabilitation in the Inner Niger Delta Region over an estimated area of 10 334 ha of wetlands, by establishing rehabilitation plans for 6 protected areas of local, national and international interest.

4

Efficiency The IFAD disbursement rate reached 96% (PSR), which can be considered highly satisfactory, given the difficult conditions under which the project has operated since 2011. The GEF disbursement rate reached 79%. Efficiency was however affected by: (i) a strong imbalance between disbursements by component and by category. The capacity strengthening component reached 136% of the original allocation, management & coordination reached 150% while support to local development and NRM reached only 50%. Overruns were also noted for the GEF categories “salaries” and “operating costs”

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(51% and 112% respectively) and the IFAD category “TA” and “salaries” (171% and 61% respectively); (ii) high programme management and coordination costs (see costs overruns for related categories); and (iii) high beneficiary and household unit costs (165 USD and 997 USD respectively compared to 69 USD and 484 USD for a comparable project). The main causes were: the political crisis, remoteness of the programme area (which required the hiring of additional staff and increased travel costs), and strong emphasis on beneficiary sensitization at the beginning of implementation. The latter caused the bulk of investments to take place towards the end of the implementation period (29% of the funds earmarked for the third phase (IFAD & GEF) were disbursed in 2013 and 43% of the funds allocated to the component “local development and natural resource management” were spent in 2013). - Aspects which have positively contributed to programme efficiency include: (i) adequate AWP&B implementation; (ii) satisfactory overall disbursement rate (87%); (iii) high profitability of the investments (between 24% and 100%); (iv) unforeseen results with high profitability, such as fish and milk production; and (v) unit costs lower than those of other comparable interventions in the region. Finally, with 39% the IRR is much higher than estimated at appraisal/3

rd phase design (12%). This is

mainly due to the fact that the two IRR were not based on the same activities. Also, the final IRR has strongly benefited from various new activities (fish, milk and vegetable production) especially from “bourgou” production, without which, the IRR would be of 8% only.


Partner Performance

IFAD The project was directly supervised by IFAD from the beginning, as a pilot. IFAD performed a very close follow-up of the project throughout, but could have made a better use of the FLM. This concerns in particular the inter-phase review missions, which were rather weak considering that they had to draw lessons from the phase that was being concluded and feed the results into the formulation of the next phase It appears that the conditions (triggers) for moving from one phase to the next were not analysed closely enough. Also, given the rather complex institutional set-up of the programme, these missions failed to recommend necessary adjustments in due course, such as the revision of the implementation manual, the clarification of the respective roles of the regional/national associations and the programme implementation agencies and the legal status of the regional/national associations to enable them to become independent entities representative of the rural populations. Supervision performance and timing were adequate. The missions provided important recommendations to improve the performance of the programme which were, however, not always followed by appropriate actions on the side of the programme. Some weaknesses that were not followed up included: (i) strengthen the Logframe and the M&E system; (ii) accelerate project investments; (iii) scale down sensitization and animation of beneficiaries, and (iv) provide clear directions for the support of producer organizations. It should be noted, however, that through the SADeF programme, IFAD pioneered both, the FLM approach and the direct supervision. IFAD performance has markedly improved with the opening of a country office in Bamako in 2011. IFAD closely followed the disengagement of the programme and the gradual transfer of responsibilities to the various partners and actors involved. The early transfer of all rural finance activities to the new IFAD project was a particularly wise decision, given the absence of adequate skills within the SADeF/Mopti.

4

Cooperating Institution This project was directly supervised by IFAD from the beginning.

Government Government support was partly satisfactory. Government performed better at national than at regional level. Counterpart funds were released on time and reached 119% of the estimated amount at appraisal. By contrast, Government contribution in total reached only 77%. WAs were prepared in a timely manner. Delays were however noted in the transfer of funds from the central ministry to the technical departments at regional level, which led to delays in programme implementation. Through the steering committee Government strongly contributed to overall guidance and follow-up. It also facilitated the participation of other ministerial departments, the civil society and deconcentrated technical services. Its participation in supervision and inter-phase review missions was, however, found insufficient. Local authorities have strongly supported the implementation of the programme through the development and implementation of the socio-economic and cultural development plans and the environmental action plans. Their contribution was greatly appreciated by all stakeholders. According to the beneficiaries, support provided by the technical services was significant, but the PCR does not provide details supporting this statement. Project management was entrusted to the National Management and Coordination Unit and the Regional Implementation and Management Unit of Mopti. The latter was responsible for the day-to-day management of the programme. AWP&B implementation was adequate. Financial management was, however, weak and the main cause for liquidity problems and a slow disbursement rate at the beginning of the phase. IFAD’s recommendation to change the finance and accounting staff were delayed and did not achieve the expected improvements.

4

NGO/Other The programme’s main partners were the National Association for the Development of the Sahelian Areas (ANDES) and the Regional Association of Mopti (ARM), established under the programme. The fact that their legal status was never clarified has hindered them to fully play their role as

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representatives of the communities and farmer’s organizations at national and regional level. This has substantially weakened them in their interactions with their members (and other partners of the programme) and has put their sustainability at risk. - A very positive partnership was established with ICRAF and the Institute for Rural Economy in 2 villages in the Mopti Region (and 9 in the region of Ségou) for the production and distribution of local tree seeds. ICRAF has also provided support for the integration of fruit trees and vegetable production. This has greatly contributed to improving the income of women and improving/diversifying household food security. ICRAF has also provided support to community reforestation in the Mopti region which has resulted in an innovative agro-forestry system developed specifically for the region and for the production of fuel wood. However, ICRAF’s capacities of intervention were very limited so that some remote districts could not be covered.

Cofinancier(s) The programme was co-financed in its 3rd

phase by the GEF. Implementation and supervision responsibility of GEF funded activities rested with IFAD as executing agency of the GEF.

n.a


No major issues mentioned. Cooperation was good, but rendered difficult by lack of clarity of roles of the regional/national associations and the programme’s implementation agencies (national and regional).



Incomes could be increased through: (i) the development of vegetable, livestock and milk production, fish farming and community “bourgou” fields; (ii) improved production technologies; (iii) better use of flood field; (iv) access to organized community fields which helps keep the livestock within the grazing areas and has reduced conflicts; and (v) the drilling of boreholes, which has reduced the workload of women and the incidence of water-borne diseases among the population. Women have particularly benefited through (i) the intensification of vegetable production which enables 3 growing seasons a year, (ii) the introduction of new fruit and vegetables (integration of fruit farming with vegetable production); and (iii) the improvement of drying techniques which enables them to sell dried vegetables and leaves throughout the year. The additional income generated by the women from the production of fruits and vegetables corresponds to the national average income in 2007. Women fish smokers (80 in total) have, in addition, benefited from the introduction of the chorkor oven, which has brought about important productivity increases. These women could reach an annual income 7 times as high as the average annual income in Mali. The development of bourgou fields has enabled livestock producers to increase productivity, enabling them to earn higher incomes and improve their living conditions. Finally, the development of bourgou fields has enabled the communities to engage into the sale of stacks of bourgou. The PCR does not provide any figures about the extent of these income increases, but they are assumed to be significant. – Regarding assets, households could reportedly increase their access to safe water, latrines, telephones, electricity, radio and livestock (chicken, sheep, goats).

5

Food Security The programme has contributed to improving household food security and child malnutrition. The percentage share of households affected by a food shortage period could be reduced from 65% in 2008 to 52% in 2013 and child malnutrition could be reduced from 36% to 23% (RIMS data). According to the PCR, increased fruit and vegetable production by women has improved and diversified household food security and nutrition, especially during the lean season with the availability of dried vegetables (onion, okra) and tree leaves (baobab). The development of bourgou production has had various indirect effects on food security and nutrition as it has enabled the development of livestock and milk production, through the availability of fodder and grazing areas. It has also enabled the rehabilitation of fisheries resources. The PCR does not provide any data, but it can be assumed that the increased production of livestock and fish has increased the beneficiaries’ protein and milk intake.

4

Ag. Productivity The programme had a visible impact on agricultural productivity. Vegetable production yields could be increased for many varieties, such as gombo and chili. A total of 1450 individuals, mainly women, have benefited. Bourgou production has helped develop livestock production and productivity, due to the increased availability of fodder all year round. As a result, milk production could be increased by 1-3 litres per cow, over a period of 6 months. The development of Bourgou production has also helped develop artisanal fisheries in the Mopti region. Beneficiaries have stated that larger fields of bourgou have enabled them to increase and further develop their catch. Unfortunately, the PCR provides no figures.

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The programme met expectation with regard to its impact on natural resource management and biodiversity conservation/restoration. It has successfully piloted different forms of conservation and restoration measures on 2000 ha of bourgou fields and 7300 ha of forests and forest floodplains, while at the same time promoting the sustainable use of natural resources by the beneficiaries (fodder production, livestock production, fisheries development, bourgou seed production, fruit tree plantation, etc.). By doing so, it has contributed to the rehabilitation of their main source of

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livelihoods. It has also had a major impact on biodiversity conservation and rehabilitation (fauna and flora). Several endangered animal species have reappeared thanks to the restoration of their habitat, such as migratory birds and local fish species (much appreciated by the local population for the nutritious value), but also insects and amphibians. Manatees were spotted and 32 hippopotamus registered. The programme also contributed to the recovery of traditional fruit trees (jujube, tamarind) and shrubs. Sensitization measures helped the populations understand the complex functioning of their ecosystem and agreements with the local populations led the ground for a sustainable use of natural resources over the year. Altogether, their resilience against the negative effects of climate change could be improved. The programme has also initiated the creation of an environmental information management system for the Inner Niger Delta region.


The programme has strengthened the capacities of a large range of beneficiaries. They were trained in the areas of vegetable production, fish production, bourgou regeneration and development, soil protection and restoration, degraded sites restoration, etc. Women have particularly benefitted. The programme has helped them develop their capacities in different areas related to vegetable production fruit tree plantation and small livestock production. They have gained access to productive resources, which has enabled them to substantially increase their incomes and thus, their socio-economic status within the villages and the families. The programme reached good result in terms of women empowerment, but its impact was limited by the small absolute. It can be assumed that improved food security and access to safe water has improved overall health of the population in the programme area.

4

Inst. & Policies The programme had a major impact on local institutions and policies. It has strengthened the capacities of technical departments at local level, in particular the regional departments of agriculture and forestry in Mopti which are now in a better position to support development interventions in the region. It has also strengthened the capacities of the municipalities through its support to the development and implementation of Social, Economic and Cultural Development Plans and Environmental Action Plans. Both tools have been mainstreamed into the work process of the rural communities and municipalities, and have become a major tool for the management of local development and natural resource management. Mayors and other communal staff have been trained in procurement. The programme has further piloted agreements with local communities over the use of natural resources, in particular the forest floodplains and bourgou fields. This has contributed to reducing tensions and conflicts over the use of these resources. SADeF was recognized as a programme which has contributed to the implementation of the Master Plan for Agricultural Development, the Framework Law on Agriculture, the livestock recovery strategy and the national policy on wetlands. The programme also provided strong support to the development of farmer’s organizations. Associations were established at national and regional level with the objective to create an apex structure for farmer’s organizations. However, these structures were weak and their legal status never clarified so that they remained financially and organizationally fully dependent on the programme. As a result, they were unable to play their role as representatives of farmer’s organizations and could not be considered sustainable at completion. They failed to contribute to the expected empowerment of the beneficiaries.

5

Markets The programme did not have any direct impact on the development of markets. It was stated, however, that the production of bourgou has increased the sale of bourgou seeds within the region, and across the border. There are no figures to substantiate these findings. The programme also introduced the use of stack binders for bourgou, enabling the beneficiaries to sell stacks on the markets.

n.a

Project Impact Given the weakness of the Logframe and of the M&E system (no appropriate impact indicators), few impact data are available. Impact has been assessed using a combination of RIMS assessment results, beneficiary interviews and observations, discussions and meetings held by the completion mission, incl. the stakeholder workshop. Altogether, the programme has reached good results in several areas. Its impact has however been lessened by the limited outreach of its interventions (low absolute numbers).

4

Overarching Factors

Innovation The programme’s main innovation was its implementation set-up whereby programme activities were led by the national and regional associations, representative of the beneficiaries, while day-to-day implementation was managed and coordinated by national and regional agencies. This set-up however, showed some major weaknesses (see institutions). By contrast, the SADeF programme has brought about a large number of activities, which were new to the region and greatly appreciated by the beneficiaries. These innovations were documented in 11 technical data sheets dealing with the development of bourgou production, strengthening the resilience of livestock farmers, developing local forests and village groves, integration of the environmental dimension into the local development planning process and the use of the chorkor oven. All of these innovations had a significant impact on incomes and well-being of the populations in the region.

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Above-mentioned technical innovations hold a strong potential for replication and scaling up. The bourgou development techniques are sufficiently consolidated to be replicated and scaled up across the inner delta region. The potential for scaling up is high. Not only does it contribute to household incomes and food security (livestock and milk production, sale of bourgou stacks). It also reduces transhumance, reduces conflicts between livestock farmers and pastoralists and lessens the pressure on the natural resource base. Given the high demand for the expansion of bourgou fields and the availability of the right approaches and techniques, it is assumed that this activity will be replicated and scaled up. The PCR however indicates that some further studies will be necessary to enable the sound development and management of bourgou production at a larger scale, incl. the analysis of production models. Some institutional and policy support will also be needed. Vegetable production and fish farming are other areas that hold a strong potential for replication and scaling up. However, their development at a larger scale will require additional studies and support. Vegetable production requires access to water all year round and a larger plot sizes to enable economies of scale. It also needs to be integrated in a value-chain approach. Fish farming requires further analysis to identify the best production mode (individual or community-based) and financing mechanism. Several decades ago and before droughts, climate change and overfishing have reduced the fish stock, fish production in the area was strong enough to enable “exports” towards the cities and neighbouring countries. Possibilities should be studied to restore the fisheries resources and to develop the fisheries sector in the delta region, following the example of similar ecosystems development (such as Nigeria).

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Beneficiaries have gained a good level of ownership of the programme as shown by their strong participation in the identification, planning and implementation of activities (environmental and productive micro projects) combining improved knowledge with the use of locally available resources. Bourgou development has reached a sustainable level, which can be further developed by the beneficiaries themselves who have learned to manage these resources independently. Additional support could however speed up the further regeneration. The same applies to soil & water conservation and soil protection & restoration measures. Activities that still need further support include: fish farming, bank protection vetiver and restoration of forest/tree resources. Vegetable production will continue to benefit women, but support will be needed for the further development and expansion. While the programme had a strong positive impact on the environment and natural resource management in the Mopti region, sustainability is threatened by the absence of a global environmental management and governance system for the Inner Delta Region. So far, activities have not gone beyond the micro project level, but a master plan approach is needed to protect and sustainably manage the resources within such a vast and complex ecosystem. Regarding the Environmental Information Management System for the Inner Niger Delta, the system has been established but is not yet operational. The Government-led Project for the Sustainable Development of the Inner Niger Delta Region will provide the necessary capacity strengthening to the regional department of agriculture and forestry in Mopti. Of major concern is the future of the National Association for the Development of Sahelian Areas and of the Regional Association of Mopti (ARM) in particular. So far, the ARM depends entirely on the financial and operational support of the SADeF programme. It is likely to stop, as did the regional associations in Ségou and Koulikoro. This lies in the fact that their members come from different organizations, with different objectives and have come together only for the purpose of the implementation of the programme. They have not been established to provide support to the populations on a sustainable basis. Also, they have no mechanism enabling them to cover their operating costs, currently financed from the SADeF Programme. On the positive side, some POs have succeeded to mobilize external resources through their apex organization. Some POs are showing signs of autonomy.

4

Targeting The SADeF Programme applied a geographical targeting (poorest and most vulnerable regions). Beneficiary households were selected based on a participatory analysis. The demand-driven approach of the programme made it participatory by definition. It is not clear, however, what mechanisms were used to reach the most vulnerable and if the programme succeeded to do so.

4

Gender The PCR provides only few facts and data about the impact on women. Women were the main beneficiaries of all activities directed at improving vegetable and fruit production (94%). During beneficiary interviews they stated that this has helped them improve their socio-economic status as they have become financially more independent. The RIMS survey has shown that women’s conditions could altogether be improved with 36% of women headed households situated in the top 2 income quintiles (compared to 19% in 2008).

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Estimated at 57 000 in total with an estimated 49% women.


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PCR Quality

Scope The guidelines were respected. 5

Quality The PCR was prepared by FAO/TCIA. The report reviews the 3rd

phase of this 10 years (actually 14 years) project designed under the FLM. There is no PCR for the entire programme, but the team was asked to write the PCR for the last phase considering the conclusions of the reports written for the previous phases. The main report is well written and structured, but could have gone a bit further. Analysis could have been more in-depth, but that was also difficult given the difficult context, including a complex and long project and the political crisis.

4

Lessons One could have expected a more in depth analysis of lessons after such a long implementation period. 4

Candour The PCR is very objective. 5


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Niger - Project for the Promotion of Local Initiative for Development in Aguié


Country & Project Name Niger - Project for the Promotion of Local Initiative for Development in Aguié Ratings

Loan No.: 597-NE

Project Id. 1221


Entry into Force 05 May 2005





Cofinanciers (if any) Belgium (BSF): US$3 775; Government: US$2 555; Beneficiaries: US$1 227


Implementing Agency Ministry of Agricultural Development

Principal Components The project has five components over eight years: (i) support to local innovation; (ii) capacity-building of REOs and other partners; (iii) establishment of a local innovation and initiatives support fund (FAIIL); (iv) strengthening of local service-delivery capacity; and (v) project management.

Project Performance

Relevance The project was well integrated with the country’s existing policies and strategies, incl. the PRSP and the decentralization policy. It also fits with the Initiative 3N approved in 2011, which supersedes the former rural development policy. It was aligned with the IFAD COSOP of 1999 and remained coherent with other policies and strategies adopted at a later stage, such as the IFAD SF (2007-2010 and 2011-2015), IFAD’s corporate gender strategy, and its targeting and innovation policies. The PCR states that project design responded well to the expectations of the beneficiaries and took into account the experience and lessons learned from past IFAD-financed interventions. Particular attention was given to IFAD’s experience in the region of Aguié in the identification and support to locally initiated agricultural development approaches and sustainable natural resource management methods. Project design was sound and did not need major adjustments in the course of project implementation. Also, it was sufficiently flexible to allow integration of complementary activities (GEF financing, WFP contribution, emergency response to the droughts of 2005 and 2009, testing of new land tenure arrangements, support to farmer’s organizations, introduction of improved housing constructions, etc.).

5

Effectiveness Despite initial implementation difficulties due to the size of the project area, the weakness of local partners and the many capacities that needed to be developed, the project successfully reached all major outcomes. The project also demonstrated great flexibility by adapting to changing circumstances such as the food crisis of 2005 and 2009 (droughts, locust attack). A critical factor in the project’s success has been the direct involvement of beneficiaries in the identification, development and dissemination of innovations (“name targeting”) as well as in the monitoring of project achievements. Most physical targets were reached or even surpassed (Comp 1=126%, Comp 2= 119%). In the rare cases when physical targets could not be reached (mostly Comp. 3), this was because the activities had not been requested by the beneficiaries, did not show any development potential or because the PCU intentionally slowed down the implementation pace for greater sustainability. The project had a visible impact on food security and poverty alleviation among the poorest households in the project area and also in terms of social and technical assets, agricultural intensification, regeneration of the vegetative coverage and income diversification. The project had a sound gender strategy and contributed to improving the living conditions of women. On the administrative side, the project suffered from the fluctuation of its staff (4 administrative & financial directors and 4 accountants in 8 years), which led to temporary cash flow problems. Implementation was also affected by the limit set to the special account, which was lifted in 2012 only. Soaring prices of construction material have negatively impacted on the project’s capacity to reach its physical targets in terms of community infrastructures (schools, health care centers).

5

Efficiency Following a slow start-up combined with a low disbursement rate during the first 2-3 years, the implementation pace eventually gained momentum allowing the IFAD loan to be fully disbursed by the end of the original implementation period (99% for the IFAD loan and 100% of the BSF grant disbursed at completion). The project was completed on time. A reallocation of funds from “unallocated” to other disbursement categories allowed the loan to be fully disbursed. It also allowed the project to respond to the price increase of construction material and to the deterioration of the exchange rate. The average cost per beneficiary was estimated at 484 US$ which is lower than the estimated at appraisal. The shift from CI supervision to direct supervision by IFAD has eased project implementation and hence, increased its efficiency. As such, the project is considered efficient.

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Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD’s performance is considered satisfactory, especially since introduction of the direct supervision. 5


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This move has had a very positive impact on the overall performance and implementation pace of the project. The flexibility of IFAD’s approach and its responsiveness to changing circumstances was highly appreciated.

Cooperating Institution UNOPS’ support was only moderate. The workload did not enable its staff to follow closely enough project implementation. Delays in the processing of WAs was another hindrance to the CI’s performance.

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Government Despite some flaws, Government’s performance is considered moderately satisfactory. This can be seen as a major achievement since historically, its performance has been inadequate. In this specific case, Government actively participated in all supervision missions. Also, the Ministry of Agriculture organized its own follow-up missions, which proved to be beneficial to the project. At local level, the project involved various technical services (agriculture, livestock, water, health, education and environment). Their performance was variable. Support provided by the department of agriculture was satisfactory. It took over a large range of responsibilities, involving staffs at various levels, which has helped the project reach considerable results. Support provided by the other ministries was less effective. They largely failed to internalize the approach of the project. While they provided the necessary technical support, they did not adequately support the empowerment approach advocated by the project. Difficulties were encountered in trying to change their attitude to become more service oriented and respond to the needs and requests expressed by the beneficiaries as opposed to implementing a pre-determined set of activities. A major obstacle in trying to change behaviours was the frequent change of staff within the services. Another problem was the difficulties faced by most services in keeping track and monitoring results as opposed to keeping record of output figures. Government’s financial contribution was limited. It actual terms, it surpassed the amount set at appraisal. In USD terms its contribution was only 32%, due to changes in the exchange rate.

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NGO/Other Cooperation with CBO established under the project was mostly satisfactory. The Apex organizations established in the course of project implementation have a top-down approach. Interaction with them was found rather difficult. Performance of services providers other than Government was variable. Some performed satisfactorily while other have seen their contracts discontinued (mainly construction firms).

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Cofinancier(s) The project received additional financial resources from the BSF (pari passu financing with IFAD and parallel financing of health related activities). BSF performance is considered highly satisfactory. No issues mentioned. The grant was fully disbursed.

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No issues mentioned.



The project has had a positive impact on household incomes and assets through: (i) improved agricultural production and productivity which has improved access to cereals and reduced food expenditures; (ii) fuel wood production and sale (natural regeneration); (iii) seed multiplication and sale; (iv) support to small livestock development; (v) promotion of IGAs such as sewing, knitting, carpentry, and masonry; and (vi) sale of medicinal and forage plants. These activities have however not benefited all beneficiaries equally. The better offs have benefited more than the most vulnerable, given the weaker capacities of the latter to leverage the effects of the project. Also, adverse external conditions have altogether lessened the project’s impact on incomes and assets. The food crises of 2005 and 2009 have depleted household incomes. Other factors that have negatively affected household incomes are expenditures for festivals and ceremonies (weddings, wedding gifts, dowries, baptisms, funerals, etc.). These represent a heavy and uncontrollable financial burden to the households, and undermine the effort made through their participation in the project’s activities. It was estimated that about 25-34% of the income from the sale of livestock was spent on ceremonies.

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Food Security Given the particularly harsh conditions prevailing in large parts of the country, food security was at the core of the project’s interventions. The project successfully improved food availability, access and diet, as shown by several indicators. Among the beneficiaries interviewed in 2008, 54% stated that the project had contributed to the diversification of their diet, 75% have indicated being able to eat 2 meals a day compared to only 30% before the project and 86% have mentioned having enough to eat during the lean period. Child nutrition has improved too, according to an impact survey conducted in 2013. In 65% of the households, infants below 6 months are exclusively breastfed. 87% of the children below the age of 6 receive 3 meals a day, 90% of the households mention feeding their children fruits and 64% make sure pregnant women get a balanced diet. There are no figures to compare with, but all households mentioned this as a considerable improvement compared to the situation before the project. Factors that have contributed to a positive impact include: (i) increased production and productivity (food availability); (ii) grain banks (availability and access); (iii) investment into small livestock (safety); and (iv) increased incomes (purchasing power). The various interventions have had interrelated effects. For example, the introduction of grain banks has improved the food security situation during the lean period. This in turn has reduced the dependence

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on agricultural wages, providing more time for farming activities and hence, improving production and productivity, which has further contributed to improving global food security. The project’s main merit was to improve the beneficiaries’ resilience against food shortage during the lean period and periods of drought.

Ag. Productivity The project has significantly contributed to improving agricultural production, productivity and livestock production through its focus on the identification and implementation of innovative technical solutions and their large-scale dissemination by local level organizations. Most of the activities concerned agricultural intensification (introduction of improved seeds (millet, sorghum, niebe), field trials and tests, support to farmer’s initiatives, diversification, extension, small livestock improvement, collection of organic fertilizer, fodder storage, etc.) .The PCR states that the project induced a genuine transformation of production systems in the region through soil improvement techniques, conservation agriculture and assisted natural regeneration. The intensification of agro-sylvo-pastoral production systems has allowed to diversify agricultural production while maintaining soil fertility and reducing vulnerability to the negative effects of climate change. Yields by hectare could be increased by 40-65%, depending on the crop. This is considerable given that soils are poor and depleted. Technical capacities of about 3500 households (or 10500 individuals) could be improved. Harsh climatic conditions, droughts, poor harvests and pests (locust attack) have limited the results and impact of the project in this area. Nevertheless, and despite these limitations, the project’s impact on agricultural production and productivity is considered satisfactory. The project further contributed to developing a local extension service run by the farmers themselves to help the most vulnerable. This is one of several small but successful innovations identified and implemented by the beneficiaries themselves.

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The project has strongly promoted assisted natural regeneration of the vegetative coverage. A total of 65 villages were reached between 2006 and 2010, and an estimated 13000 ha have been regenerated. Monitoring and oversight committees have been established in all 65 villages. All of them are operational. During the first year, most villages have reached a density of 35-100 trees/hectare. In some of the first villages that have been targeted, the density reaches 100-150, sometimes even 300 trees/hectare. The positive effects of this technique include: (i) reversing the desertification trend in the Aguié Province; (ii) reducing the number of sowings from 3-5 to 1-2, and thus reducing the amount of seeds needed and minimizing seed losses; (iii) higher yields (30-220 kg/ha for millet, depending on the area); (iv) improving the amount of fodder and fuel wood; (v) increasing household incomes through the improved production and sale of wood and wood-related products. Regeneration of degraded soils has contributed to improving fodder production for livestock rearing and sale. These activities have contributed to diversifying the beneficiaries’ income basis and thus to strengthening their resilience against external shocks (droughts, food (price) crisis) by helping them to build up their capital to face future crises or to compensate for losses incurred in previous years.

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Capacity strengthening is a major development thrust of IFAD in Niger. An entire component of the project was therefore dedicated to strengthening the capacities of rural organizations and individuals in various areas: local administration, (FOs, local authorities), agriculture (water points, inputs store), food security (diversification, cereal bank, grain banks), NRM (tree nursery, land tenure, fuel wood market, land rehabilitation, herd passage development (pastoral corridors), health and nutrition (training of midwives, village nutrition advisors, development, distribution of mosquito net, development of village health care centers and health care capacities), small livestock rearing, gender aspects, infrastructure maintenance and management capacities of local committees. Training and sensitization activities definitely contributed to strengthening overall capacities in a region with weak human capital. It is worth mentioning that a total of 1080 rural organization (ROs) benefited from some sort of capacity strengthening compared to 493 originally envisaged, surpassing by far the physical target set. 32% deal with local development, 31% with food security, 24% with livestock development, 6% with agricultural intensification and 7% with NRM. Also, between 40-50% of the beneficiaries in the target villages have joined a local rural organization compared to only 20% in non-target villages. The project has also provided support to the emergence and strengthening of agricultural services support groups or FAROL (Special Fund to Support the Local Supply of Services) which now provide support to the municipality, NGOs and other projects. Women have particularly benefited from capacity strengthening. Access to water could be improved too. The projects also had an impact on access to health and education with the construction of several school (30) and health care centers. Nevertheless, management capacities in the area remain very low and deserve further support, despite the positive results achieved.

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Inst. & Policies The project’s overall approach was based on strategic partnerships with technical support services. As such, it has directly and indirectly provided support to various institutions and policies dealing with agriculture, livestock, local development, health and education. The experience and lessons of the

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PPILDA have been widely discussed at national level during preparation of the “Initiative 3N”. Its good practices in the area of agricultural intensification, food security and improving resilience against external shocks have been incorporated into this strategy. The project has further contributed to the institutional strengthening of many of its partners: rural organizations, technical services and municipalities. Its most visible impact has been the creation, strengthening and consolidation of several rural organizations, of which some have evolved into recognized development partners at local level. The project has had a noticeable impact on local governance through its support to the preparation and implementation of communal development plans, and the training of elected members and municipal agents. These activities reached unequal achievement rates (fewer CD plans implemented, more people trained), but altogether, their impact was positive. The project also worked with 6 rural communities and 10 land development commissions at departmental, communal and local level with the aim to support the implementation of the rural code, to facilitate land titling procedures and to secure pastoral corridors.

Markets The development of markets was not part of the project’s objectives. The project contributed to the development of markets through its support to IGAs and the construction of 34 km of feeder roads.

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Project Impact The project was approved in 2002. No baseline study was carried out. Instead, the M&E system used statistical data as key reference. Efforts were made in due course to fill the gaps, in particular with regard to the 1st and 2nd level RIMS indicators. This was more difficult with regard to the 3rd level indicators. As a result, the impact assessment carried out at the end of the project relied heavily on various, non-comparable survey data and beneficiary interviews. Furthermore, the PCU failed to analyze the data collected from the 21704 households, which benefited from name targeting. These data could have provided useful insights into the actual impact of project operations on the beneficiaries. Nevertheless, rural poverty impact is considered satisfactory, since the project has induced notable changes in an adverse environment, in particular in the areas of agricultural production and intensification, food security, capacity strengthening and NRM. Also, it has positively influenced national strategies and policies.

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Overarching Factors

Innovation The project’s main innovation was its targeting approach. The “name targeting” (“ciblage nominatif”) was developed specifically for this project, in direct partnership with the beneficiaries themselves. It aims to strengthen their capacities in identifying the most vulnerable amongst them and to jointly develop, implement and assess activities that would help them reduce their vulnerability, improve their food security and ultimately, their livelihoods. Most of these activities and approaches were developed for a specific target group and were thus considered innovative as well. Altogether, the project identified 30 replicable innovations in the area of agriculture, decentralized NRM, food security, IGA development, and social & institutional development.

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The PPILDA was designed to replicate and scale up the technical, economical and organizational promising innovations developed and tested by the former PAIIP. Furthermore, its targeting mechanism enabled the participatory identification and implementation of activities adapted to the needs and financial capacities of the poor and the most vulnerable. Recommendations were formulated for 5 key areas: (i) self-targeting (name targeting); (ii) agricultural intensification; (iii) support to rural organizations; (iv) opening up of remote areas through appropriate infrastructure development; and (v) M&E for capitalization and scaling up. These recommendations and best practices have been taken into account in the preparation of the COSOPs 2006-11 and 2013-18, while the new PASADEM project financed by IFAD, has been specifically designed to (i) scale up several good practices of the PPILDA and (ii) implement 4 out of 5 development thrusts of the Initiative 3N. Finally, the innovation-based local development approach of PPILDA has been replicated in other IFAD projects in the region (e.g. Benin, Chad, Mali).

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Important efforts were made to maximize sustainability of the project’s achievements and of the processes initiated. The exit strategy was prepared well in advance (2008), enabling necessary measures to be taken on time. Supervision missions have always given due consideration to the question of sustainability and a separate evaluation of rural organizations was conducted in 2013. Social sustainability is high since the project has strongly emphasized beneficiary participation and hence, ownership of activities and processes. Economic sustainability is assessed as satisfactory. Agricultural activities are considered sustainable since the innovations supported by the project have been identified in close participation with the beneficiaries. Most of these innovations use locally available inputs and need little financial means. Sustainability of small enterprises could be threatened by the lack of training e.g. in basic management and the absence of a real demand, enabling these businesses to grow and develop. Technical sustainability is satisfactory. All infrastructure works were officially handed over to the rural communities and municipalities. Agreements were signed with the municipalities to ensure their maintenance until this is included in

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the regular budget. In terms of institutional sustainability, some RO are now fully recognized as partners in the local institutional landscape, such as the seed union of Maradi. Others have not been developed with the aim to last beyond the project. Most private structures are sustainable as they have emerged from a real demand. Some structures such as the grain banks, the retail shops for farm inputs and WUAs seem more fragile, due to the direct involvement of funds. Their long-term sustainability is not given at this point in time. They need to be linked up with existing and sustainable institutions. Environmental sustainability is high since the techniques supported by the project are based on local knowledge. They directly address aspects of climate change.

Targeting The importance to directly involve the beneficiaries in the targeting process is one of the key lessons learned from the project. The targeting approach was developed jointly with the beneficiaries and aimed to ensure the project would benefit the most vulnerable. The poor were divided into 4 groups of vulnerable, by the beneficiaries themselves (extreme, high, medium, slight). This enabled a large number of households to be reached and to tailor the activities to the needs of each specific sub-group, incl. women and the youth. Since the beneficiaries, including the poorest were directly involved in the targeting process, they also participated in the ex-post evaluation of the targeting methodology, the relevance and quality of the support provided for each sub-group, and the identification of the next target households (ex-ante evaluation). As such, the targeting mechanism was perceived as highly satisfactory. Nevertheless, the mechanism showed some flaws. While it enabled to reach the most vulnerable, the latter benefited less than the better-offs, given the low level they are starting from, including the weak capacities they dispose of.

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Gender Gender aspects were given due attention and benefited from additional financing through a TAG (2003-05). In terms of gender aspects, the project has mainly targeted women representation and their active role in village level decision-making bodies. A survey conducted in 2013 concluded that more women than men were part of local management committee (60% against 40%). Women were involved in many different activities such as small livestock rearing, grain banks, professional training, food crop production, etc. Women have become socially and financially more independent and self-confident. Interviews have shown that women appreciate the social recognition they have gained within their households and the village society. As such, the project has successfully induced in change in their status, which is remarkable in a context where the status of women has remained unchanged or has worsened in terms of access to education, land, means of production, markets and freedom of decision. Capacity strengthening in the areas of health, nutrition and education (literacy), which the project has strongly supported, has mainly benefited women. As a result, health care services (prevention of malnutrition, midwife services, nutritional services, malaria treatment) have increased with the training and implementation of female village focal points, health committees, health workers, etc. Women represent 61% of the direct beneficiaries of the project. All of them have had access to the grain banks. Some 40% have benefited from technical training and 35% of the trainees on demonstration plots were women. Professional training has benefited more young women (70%) than men (30%). 117 female nutritional focal points have been trained, and 100 matrons/midwifes have been equipped. The project also administered 524 training sessions in nutrition.

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39 896 households or 139 635 individuals have directly benefited from the project. Considering that the average households size counts 7 individuals (children included), it can be concluded that the number of actual direct beneficiaries is 279 272.

PCR Quality

Scope The guidelines are fully respected. 6

Quality Very well written and analytical, despite limited availability of figures to sustain the findings and conclusions. Very well structured too. Few repetitions, despite its length. Very informative.

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Lessons Very good analysis of lessons learned (activities and approaches) and recommendations 6

Candour No issues to rise. Very objective, slightly too positive compared to other reports. 5


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Nigeria - Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme


Country & Project Name Nigeria - Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme Ratings

Loan No.: 564-NG

Project Id. 1196






IFAD loan& Grant US$(M) Total of US$42 000 (Loan: US$29 000; Suppl. Loan: US$13 000)

Cofinanciers (if any) Government: Local US$63 393; National US$3 270; Beneficiaries: US$3 838


Implementing Agency Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Principal Components The programme will have two main components: (i) awareness and capacity building; and (ii) community development. The first will be process-oriented and contribute to raising awareness on new ways of working with rural communities, developing the enabling institutional, financing and policy framework, and strengthening the capacities of the government and private sectors for community-based agriculture and rural development. The second component will be activity-based and support interventions requested by the rural poor, especially women and other vulnerable groups.

Project Performance

Relevance Building on the experience of the past community-driven development (CDD) projects funded and jointly implemented by the Federal Government of Nigeria and IFAD during 1992 to 2000, CBARDP was designed at a time when decentralisation was being introduced and community driven development (CDD) was a fundamental objective of the programme. The project promoted the CDD approach as a tool for programme management and spawned a whole range of institutions to pursue this approach and meet its programme management needs at Federal, State, Local Government and Village levels. The programme's goal of improving the livelihoods and living conditions of rural communities, with emphasis on women and other vulnerable groups converged with the overarching objective of IFAD and the Government. The project was designed with an implicit phased approach that emphasized sensitization and capacity building. It was also both process oriented and activity based. Since CBARDP was designed, policy has been guided by the ATA (Federal Government's Agricultural Transformation Agenda) and Vision 20:20. In the extension period, since 2010, alignment of project's activities with ATA has been strengthened, giving the programme a window to channel its lessons into policy. While the overall interventions were highly relevant, there were two major inadequacies in programme design that had a bearing on programme implementation. Firstly, was the issue of funding mechanism for the Community Development Fund (CDF) interventions that contributed to delays particularly prior to the period before the extension. The requirement for 50% of funding from Government resources prior to the release of IFAD funds, given the known erratic nature of release of Government funding in Nigeria, acted as a major constraint in programme implementation. This was apart from the issue of share of financing between federal, state and local governments which was another source of delay. Secondly, CDD operated as a virtual carte blanche in the range of investments prioritised by the village groups supported by the programme. The result was that CBARDP supported a very wide range of sub-activities, overstretching the competencies of the programme support team. The restructured programme which included funding 100% of CDF funds by IFAD was able to ease the funding mechanisms to make it operational and without bottlenecks. Furthermore, after restructuring, CBARDP refocused its approach and concentrated on elements directly linked to productive agriculture. Nevertheless, the number of activities supported was still far beyond the technical capacity of the Community Development Associations (CDAs) or Local Government Areas (LGAs).

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Effectiveness CBARDP has made huge efforts in achieving its objectives to improve the livelihoods and living conditions of the rural poor, specifically for women and other vulnerable groups. It has supported the institutionalisation of policies and processes of public sector service providers to become more relevant and responsive to the rural poor. It has also made a beginning by empowering poor rural women and men to improve their livelihoods, by supporting sustainable social, agricultural and economic development interventions. Programme's final outreach amounted to about 43% of the planned estimate of 400,000 households. However, if beneficiaries from the capacity building and indirect beneficiaries were to be included, the count of beneficiaries would be higher. There is clear evidence that the Programme has empowered the rural poor by improving their access to resources and services and their right to determine its utilisation. Through its strategic partnership with research institutes, Songhai and other service providers, CBARDP has facilitated job creation. These partnership have capacitated women and youths in various enterprises of high economic value like poultry production, bee-keeping, crops like sesame, processing and packaging of agro-products, high value/cash soya bean, rice and millet using improved varieties. An effort was also made to promote

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financial linkage support services and promotion of other financial services at community levels, e.g. introduction of savings and credit groups through the formation of Financial Service Associations (FSAs) in the village areas. There has been variation in the operation of FSAs across the VAs, especially in respect of interest rate (while in some communities Islamic concept of profit-loss sharing was adopted, in others 10% flat interest was being charged). In general, the Programme's implementation performance has been highly variable in different states, largely determined by the commitment and ownership of CBARDP activities by the State Governments. On the less positive side, within the specific components, there has been a wide support to many activities which has resulted in a general lack of standardisation in agricultural and enterprise activities and infrastructural schemes, further resulting in a variability of the quality of activities from state to state. The existence of a weak extension system in the country resulted in the fact that often site selection for many demonstrations was not appropriate in terms of visibility, choice of commodity and soil quality.

Efficiency The project had an effectiveness lag of 16.9 months. A MTR was conducted in December 2006. While the original project completion date was 31 March 2010, towards the end of its initial closing period the programme was restructured and CBARDP was given an extension of 3 years up to 31 March 2013. An additional USD 13 million was allocated to the programme, thus bringing the total IFAD loan to USD 42.9 million and making the total programme USD 81.5 million. The rationale for this extension was to consolidate and deepen successes recorded, scale-up results and ensure sustainability of programme initiatives. At completion, the Programme achieved an enviable record of spending 99% of IFAD funding - a feat that was not attained by previous IFAD programmes in Nigeria. Total Programme expenditures amounted to USD 99.68 million or about 17% higher than the planned allocation due to an over-commitment on the part of the Government. The actual total costs per beneficiary (inclusive of both capacity building and CDF components) reached a total of USD 89.0 per beneficiary or USD 534 per household (against that estimated at appraisal amounting to USD 36.0 per beneficiary and USD 216.0 per household). This was due to the increased allocations and the reduced number of beneficiaries plus inflation increase witnessed in Nigeria since effectiveness. The PCR did not attempt to undertake a financial or economic analysis of the programme on the grounds that no such analysis was undertaken at appraisal due to the demand-driven nature of the programme making the ex-ante programme estimation of outputs and benefits difficult. About 20% of the total support under CDF was in directly productive investments in sustainable agricultural development for which no systematic data on production or costs on the profitability of the investments were collected. However, sample financial analysis was undertaken on a range of commodity activities (rice, maize, groundnut, sorghum, millet). In all, there is evidence of positive return on investment for agricultural commodities supported by the programme. Income generation from the provision of processing services also indicate high returns ranging for rice milling, oil extraction and aluminium pot making.

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Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD's performance was reasonably satisfactory, although it may be deemed responsible for taking almost the entire initial project period before addressing the initial faulty design of conditionality for the release of IFAD funds. However, on the positive side, it is to be complimented for pioneering the CDD approach in the country. As supervision was taken up directly by IFAD, it restructured the programme with an additional infusion of funds and taking appropriate measures to resolve the bottleneck that was holding up programme implementation. The release of funds after programme restructuring during which IFAD undertook direct programme implementation was commendable allowing the programme to achieve an almost complete utilisation of programme finances.

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Cooperating Institution The Programme was under the World Bank supervision until June 2009, when IFAD assumed direct supervision of the Programme. There is no information available to assess WB's performance.

n.a

Government The performance of FMF (Federal Ministry of Finance) was moderately unsatisfactory. The programme took a little over one year before it could be declared effective, a repetitive aspect of IFAD programmes in Nigeria. In addition, the programme faced frustrating delays in the release of counterpart funds which were conditional for the release of IFAD funds resulting in a disbursement of less than 60% of IFAD funds by the end of the initial programme period. The lack of counterpart/operational funds in some states (specifically Katsina and Zamfara) hampered implementation progress. FMARD's (Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Federal Government) performance as the lead agency for implementation was moderately unsatisfactory. It can be faulted for weak oversight of commitments, which led to over-commitment in the AWPB, and a weak monitoring and evaluation. The performance of the PSO (Programme Support Office) and SSOs (State Support Offices) is rated as satisfactory. The delivery on the capacity building component was good and delivery on the CDF funded component picked up during implementation. However, the implementation performance has been highly variable in different states, largely determined by the commitment and ownership of CBARDP activities by the State Governments. Moreover, there should have been more judicious use of service providers. While information and reporting on financial data was good, monitoring information of the impact or performance of activities funded under the

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programme was very weak. There were few attempts to undertake/evaluate the impact of some of the interventions and no thematic studies were undertaken. On fiduciary aspects, some issues were raised concerning financial management due to: i) budgetary control weaknesses; ii) deficient financial accounting and reporting arrangements; iii) absence of audit oversight of expenditures and activities at community level. Financial reporting has not been strengthened in spite of heavy investments made.

NGO/Other CBARDP has strengthened implementation at the field level through a wide range of partnerships with research institutes, input dealers, extension providers and specialized firms in renewable energy. The outcomes of these partnerships have had varying degrees of success, largely due to absence of effective coordination between the PSO and the SSO in part, but mostly due to weak extension delivery system and lack of adequate knowledge in the States to mobilise partnerships. The CDAs/Apex Organizations' performance varied a great deal in terms of management capacity, record keeping and understanding of roles and responsibilities in various states.

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Cofinancier(s)


Coordination between PEU, SSO and PSO was crucial to facilitate, supervise and monitor project's implementation but it has not always been smooth.



Positive impact has been achieved by CBARDP in terms of higher incomes both for those engaged in agriculture as well as those running microenterprises. As a result of higher productivity, farmers' income is estimated to have increased by 55%. Moreover, as a consequence of the income increase, there has been an appreciable accumulation of assets by beneficiaries such as motorcycles, bicycles, TVs, radios, zinc-roofed houses, livestock, farmland, etc. Financial assets have been brought about with the introduction of savings and credit groups through the formation of FSAs in the village areas. The CBARDP collaboration with the Bank of Agriculture (BoA) and Development Exchange (financial NGO) has facilitated access to micro credit by farmers. From the two partnerships, farmers were able to obtain Naira 88.3 million as credit in the 2011/12 farming season. The farmers have since repaid up to 95% of the credit and interaction with some of the beneficiaries showed that they made up to 30% profit within the 3 months loan period. Farmers also gained increased earnings from the use of the improved varieties and fertilizers as well as through various vocational skills induced by the Programme.

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Food Security The PCR does not provide any quantitative information on the magnitude of how food security has effectively been enhanced through project's intervention. Nevertheless, according to the available information, the use of high yielding seeds of sorghum, millet, maize, cowpea and soybean by farmers has contributed to higher food production in the communities in the programme area, thus enhancing household food security and increased volume of these commodities being traded by farmers. A positive contribution was also given by the support to small scale irrigation which led to higher year-round food availability. Moreover, support for storage facilities also led to a reduction of crop loss and thus to an improved food security (in terms of longer period of availability of food to families).

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Ag. Productivity Agricultural productivity enhancement was achieved through an improved extension support (329 Farmer Field School - FSS), as well as through the introduction and distribution of seeds of improved crop varieties (rice, sorghum, millet, maize, cowpea and soya beans) and fertilizers. The Programme recorded an increased productivity and production of key commodities such as millet (48%), sorghum (18%), groundnut (41%), cowpea (37%), maize, rice (38%) and cotton. Nevertheless, according to the PCR, productivity increases for all the commodities is still marginal as in spite of the increase in productivity, the yields obtained in some locations are still below the optimum compared to yield attainable in similar agro-ecologies in West Africa. Much still needs to be done in the areas of extension and access to inputs and services. On the other hand, the strengthening and scaling up of dry-season farming with irrigation has also increased farmers' opportunity to have more than one crop per year with attendant increase in volume of produce and additional income generated from high value crop. Similarly, support for storage facilities resulted in a reported reduction of crop loss by about 20% and enhanced income from this reduction by 25%. In the case of livestock production, the introduction of improved breeds for poultry and small ruminant as well as cattle fattening and community poultry has created a positive impact. The project also provided animal traction and labour-saving equipment, which has resulted in expansion of land cultivated by farmers.

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The project's main impact has concerned the environmental sanitation activities, as well as land management environmental activities including gully rehabilitation, contour bonding, etc. Many of the project's interventions have contributed to environmental sustainability. These include: introduction of solar power for water supply, rehabilitation of degraded land areas, introduction of VIP latrines, incinerators, construction/upgrading of abattoirs, community and household tree planting, etc.

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In terms of human capital, the most important benefits have been achieved through project's interventions in reducing water-borne diseases, improving healthcare services and increasing literacy

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among community members as well as increased business activities in the CBARDP communities. The all-weather roads and drinking water supply had a great importance for the overall development of communities. The villages with reliable reticulated water supply have greatly lessened the burden of women and also reduced the incidence of diseases. On social capital, a significant project's impact was achieved through the awareness and capacity building activities, which were conducted at all levels from Federal down to beneficiary communities for CDD. The bottom-up CDD approach has promoted a culture of transparency and participatory decision making as opposed to previous top-down approach to local development with communities as passive recipients. This has empowered the ordinary members of village communities to seek answers and contribute their opinions for collective well-being. Through CDD, active engagement of poor HHs has been promoted in village planning, articulation of needs, self-implementation, oversight of contractors and management of accounts and has built local capacities and a spirit of self-reliance and confidence in their abilities to make a change for the better. The localised and participatory approach of the CDAs has resulted in greater ownership development actions by the people and provided an element of social cohesion by being inclusive in development decisions.

Inst. & Policies The most important impact of the Programme has been the institutional impact. The formation of the CDAs at the village level represents a fundamental change, adding a fourth tier in development administration and thus increasing the outreach of services for rural people. Despite a variation in the performance and abilities of the CDAs with some of them reaching a level of independence while others still requiring support to encourage in marketing activities and attain independence, they could be viewed as perhaps the most significant contribution of the CBARDP and one that could have far reaching positive consequences for rural development efforts for the whole country in the future. With concern to the LGA, the village areas, which were spread over a large area and often remote from the people, they provided an additional institutional mechanism by which the people could be accessed. Emphasis on aspects of decentralisation and participation implicit in the approach adopted has resulted in better service delivery to the people by Government. The substantial trainings and capacity building measures that have been given to service providers at the local, state and federal government levels have had their impact in improving the coordination of development activities. CBARD could have a considerable policy impact in light of its relevance within the ATA, as a model for productivity increase, income increase, job creation and improved living standards. Some local government councils have pledged to build on this model to reduce youth unemployment. Furthermore, CBARD has catalysed the creation of FSAs, which are rural microfinance institutions (RMFIs). The FSA model has created an avenue for channelling idle money in rural communities into productive use. Unlike for formal institutions, some of the FSAs recorded extraordinarily high repayment rates due to built-in community-based social sanctions. However, while FSA has proven a good model for financial services delivery in the rural areas, their governance structure, quality and strength of business operations (including loan size, interest rate, repayment schedule, etc.) need improvement. Finally, the project-implemented rural farm input supply shops (RUFIS), have created a good distribution network for fertilizers, agro-chemicals and livestock feed to rural farmers and has lessened the traveling distance by farmers to access inputs. While a beginning has been made in improving access to quality inputs they will require further consolidation of their operations.

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Markets On this domain, the combined impact of the rehabilitation of rural markets and feeder roads facilitated market access to farmers resulting in increased sales as well as reduction in transport costs. The impact study recorded an average increase of sales of farmers produce from the baseline figure of less than 40% to 50% - a situation that still needs improvement.

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Project Impact The assessment of project's impact has been considerably hindered by the very weak M&E system. The major focus on monitoring was on financial aspect and no periodic assessments of impact or thematic studies were undertaken.

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Overarching Factors

Innovation The project introduced several innovations such as: i) renewable energy using windmills, solar and biogas; ii) cockerel exchange using the sturdy 'black haco' breed; iii) paravet clinics; iv) Financial Services Associations (FSAs). Above all, the programme successfully introduced some very innovative and successful approaches to train and engage unemployed youth in various vocations and promote joint ventures during dry season to provide them gainful employment. A workable model has been developed which communities can replicate through available revolving funds and government can further build in. Within CBARDP, the programme introduced a number of other innovative concepts aimed at facilitating agricultural growth. These included the introduction of RUFIS to facilitate access to inputs for farmers and the provision of paravet services for providing basic animal health services (drugs and vaccinations etc.) for livestock, particularly small ruminants. Two other innovative interventions in nutrition and health which had a significant impact were the provision of trained birth attendants (TBAs) and complimentary nutritious food supplements for children, pregnant women and nursing mothers.

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Replicability and Scaling- The success of the CDA approach has been recognised by the Government of three States (Kebbi, 5


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up Sokoto and Zamfara) which have, on their own, replicated it to extend its coverage to all the villages in the three states. Jigawa also has extended it to some LGAs and Village areas, while Katsina has adopted the CDD in its rural development planning covering the whole LGAs. In the rest of the states, the future of this approach greatly depends on the full adoption by all the participating states to safeguard its continuity. This approach has been scaled-up by other donors including the African Development Bank and the World Bank. On FSAs, there is recognition that they can provide the underpinning of a rural finance services system that could be critical for the future development of agriculture. The main pathway to scale-up FSA will be through: (a) building membership and incorporating more members and building capacity; (b) linkages and partnerships with formal financial institutions and strengthening of financial service providers, and (c) policy advocacy at the government level to support the activities of FSA as well as to influence microfinance investment climate. The interventions aimed at facilitating agricultural growth, have amply demonstrated their success and are in the process of wider replication and up-scaling. Finally, while the replication of TBAs to establish a wider coverage is likely to be undertaken soon, the up scaling of nutritious food supplements for children and women is likely to require some time as quantity and standardization need to be improved and upgraded.


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Where there is buy-in from the state authorities, potential for sustainability of CBARDP initiatives is high, as the states are providing funding support to the communities. The change that the Programme has brought about has already gathered momentum and a growing evidence of the benefits of the CDD approach, implicit through its adoption for the state as a whole in three states, is a resounding statement of sustainability of the approach. The CDAs need regular support and mentoring for sustainable existence and this is only possible if such institutions are institutionalised into regular government development framework. However, CDA currently has no still legal recognition in the existing local government system. On the FSAs, as these are an emerging rural financial delivery model, their governance structure, quality and strength of business operations (including issues of capitalisation, loan size, interest rate, repayment schedule, etc.) need improvement. They would need considerable handholding and capacity building (clearer arrangements in terms of regulations, fees and interest rates, linkage to outside micro-finance organizations, record keeping, etc.) for the next years to become self-sustaining and responsible Associations. For the community infrastructure, maintaining the health and education infrastructure is beyond community capacity and should be formally transferred to concerned government departments for maintenance. There are good prospects for the socio-economic and income generating activities. On the interest groups/micro-enterprises, some of them have grown to get actively involved with external markets and are doing quite well. Livestock production, particularly those of goats, is likely to remain sustainable given the market demand. Poultry production activity is also likely to be sustainable given the prevailing excess demand by emerging fast food market. On the other hand, economic returns from a rapid growth in crop production are likely to be constrained by the availability of quality seed, unless community based seed production activities in Yobe State (one of the benefiting states) keep pace with demand. Expansion in fishery is also likely to be constrained by availability of funds for pond excavation and limited water supply in some states. Sustainability of most of activities under gender and vulnerable group development will remain dependent on Programme/government support.

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Targeting The programme was successful in its adoption of geographic targeting as a rationale for selecting the specific programme areas. CBARDP has been implemented in 207 village areas (VAs), hitherto mostly isolated with little or no social facilities such as roads, potable water, electricity, health facilities, schools, in 69 LGAs (Local Government Areas) of seven northern states of Nigeria. The project's targeting primarily revolved around two main planks: i) targeting of the poorest LGAs and targeting of the poorest and remotest village areas within each Local Government; ii) designing of interventions suited to the needs and capacities of the poor and the vulnerable and of little attraction to the better-off HHs. These two features have served the programme well in most places in terms of targeting the poor and the vulnerable in each of the components and sub-components. With its community based focus, the provision of community infrastructure resulted largely in the development of common property assets which aligned easily with the geographic dimension. Within each farmer group and within each CDA, efforts were made to ensure that the voice of the poorer section of the population and specifically those of women would be heard. Moreover, one sub-component, i.e. Support to Vulnerable Groups was very clearly targeted at the poorest, physically challenged and vulnerable. The focus on women was pursued such that their participation was ensured both in matters of decision making as well as in matters of benefitting from the interventions.

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Gender A major aspect of the Programme has been in its gender impact. The programme has been successful in reaching women, widows, youths as well as the physically challenged. Out of a total of 1,328,121 beneficiaries directly or indirectly reached by the Programme, 550,580 (41.5%) are females. Before programme intervention, the baseline survey shows that women participation in community activities,

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meetings, etc. was below 3%. Women participation in social and economic activities under the Programme is estimated to have increased to about 40%. The programme mainstreamed women and other vulnerable groups into development agenda through sensitization of traditional institutions both at the PSO, SSO, LG and the community levels. A range of activities including income generation activities (small ruminants, micro-credit, micro-enterprises, groups, vocational training, membership of CDA and management committees, TBA training, labour saving devices, adult literacy and provision of clean drinking water) has led to women's empowerment in a largely conservative male dominated society. The series of awareness creation, sensitization and capacity building activities embarked upon by CBARDP has brought about improved gender sensitivity and female education up to secondary school and above in the communities. There is improved social integration and gender equity in access to financial credit, income earning opportunities, health, social functions and even political positions. One dimension of the impact is reflected in the increasing number of school enrolment annually by girls and boys as well as improving record keeping by men and women who benefited from adult education class. Similarly, the impact of the provision of TBAs (trained birth attendants) is reflected in the reduction of infant and maternal deaths in programme villages. On the other hand, there is still room for women to make a greater contribution to decision making in the communities as there is considerable variation in gender sensitization in the states due to socio-cultural and religious proclivities.



PCR Quality

Scope The report is fully in line with the 2006 Guidelines for PCR. 5

Quality Overall, the PCR well presented the Project's main achievements and shortcomings. Nevertheless, a main shortfall concerned the lack of relevant data, due to a very weak M&E system, especially at impact level. Because of this, a comprehensive impact study was carried out by a team of national consultants in May/June 2013. However, as stated in the same PCR, there was heterogeneity in the findings from the data obtained, which has made reconciliation of the data challenging. As a result, a sound analysis could not be derived.

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Lessons The PCR made a good effort in tackling the lessons learned. In their first section, the lessons learned focus on the most critical aspects of the Project's implementation. In the second part, the PCR shows how the lessons learned have been incorporated in the newly-designed Programme, CASP (Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme).

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Candour The PCR is objective and presents both the positive and less successful aspects of Project's implementation in a critical way.

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Senegal - Promotion of Rural Entrepreneurship Project - Phase II


Country Senegal - Promotion of Rural Entrepreneurship Project - Phase II Ratings

Loan No.: 658-SN

Project Id. 1308



Completion Date 31 March 2013




Cofinanciers (if any) West African Development Bank (BOAD): US$2.03; Government: US$2 194; beneficiaries: US$1 448


Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources

Principal Components The components of the proposed project are: (i) access to non-financial business development services; (ii) promotion of rural financial services; (iii) strengthening of professional organizations and political, legal and institutional environments; (iv) development of business information services; and (v) coordination and management.

Project Performance

Relevance The overall objective of the project is to promote the diversification of rural incomes and livelihoods in a gender sensitive way by developing local entrepreneurship in areas with a strong economic potential. As such, it is in line with, and directly contributes to the objectives of the country’s PRSP, which identifies poverty alleviation, reduction of youth unemployment and rural outmigration, and the integration of women into the local economy as key development objectives. The project is also in line with the Accelerated Growth Strategy, which identifies agriculture and agro-industries as the main engines of growth and development of the country. On IFAD’s side, the justification for a second phase of PROMER I (completed in 2004) is provided through the Country Portfolio Evaluation of 2003, the COSOP design process of 2003 and the Interim Evaluation of PROMER I conducted in 2004. A second phase of the PROMER I was considered crucial to ensure consolidation and scaling up of the positive achievements of the first phase. In addition, the results of the various evaluations contributed directly to the design of IFAD’s rural enterprise development strategy (2004). A follow-up phase of PROMER I was seen as a major vehicle for the implementation of the new strategy. As such, project objectives were considered highly relevant at the time of project design. Project design took into account the recommendations made by the various evaluation missions and was built on the results of various thematic studies conducted before hand. As a result, it was sound and inclusive, but turned out to be too ambitious. All physical targets needed to be reduced at MTR, including the geographical coverage (from 10 regions to 7), the number of focus value chains (from 13 to 8) and the project’s total outreach (from 3000 SMEs to 1330).

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Effectiveness The project has largely contributed to the alleviation of rural poverty among women and the youth and to the reduction of youth outmigration in the project area. It has reached a total achievement rate of 80%, which is considered satisfactory. The achievement rates of most technical components are high (Comp 1 = 92%; Comp. 3 = 96%; Comp. 4 = 145%), except for the Rural Finance Component (Comp 2) which reached an achievement rate of 53% only. In some areas, physical targets could be surpassed, compared to the MTR targets. The project has contributed to the creation of 1459 Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) (110% achieved) and to around 4000 new jobs (105%), of which more than half have benefited the youth. In addition, 1450 individuals have benefited from technical and managerial training, which has enabled them to move from being mere “producers” to becoming “entrepreneurs”. The political, legal and institutional environment for MSEs could be improved which has enabled the creation and development of a large number of new initiatives. 821 loans for a total amount of FCFA 686 million could be given to 813 beneficiary MSEs. The project’s main results consist of: (i) gradually instilling a sense of entrepreneurship among the beneficiaries who aim at objectives beyond just making a living; (ii) establishing a sustainable network of services and services providers enabling the MSEs created under the project to continuously evolve and new ones to emerge, and (iii) providing an institutional framework conducive to the further development of this new profession, including adequate support to professional organizations at regional level, capable to link up with national POs and the implementation of a knowledge management and exchange system. However, implementation of the project faced considerable difficulties during its initial phase, mainly due to an overambitious design, but also due to the inherent challenges which the project had to address: low quality of the produce, limited access to microfinance, limited self-financing capacities of the MSEs, limited access to inputs, markets and market information, and low competitiveness of rural MSEs compared to urban ones. In addition, the implementation environment was altogether not conducive, from an institutional and a legal point of view. Profitability of MSE activities was further affected by the lack of access to electricity and the need to further improve production, processing and marketing

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techniques. On the more positive side, the project has benefited from the availability of labour, local knowledge and raw material, a strong domestic demand for rural support services and the emergence of producer organizations and of new export opportunities (organic, fair trade and ethnic products). Efforts were made to ensure sustainability of the achievements and continuity of support where needed.

Efficiency Efficiency of the components was assessed by comparing their physical achievement rating with their relative share in the project’s total costs (rating between 1 and 6). Based on this, Comp. 3 “Strengthening of professional organizations and of the policy, legal and institutional environment” was the most efficient, while Comp 5 "Project management and coordination" was the most inefficient, which is not surprising given the large area being covered by the project. The project was particularly inefficient before the MTR as reflected in the strong imbalance between the disbursement rates of the technical components (18-25%) and project management and coordination (60%). Deterioration of the exchange rate combined with the large size of the project area have negatively impacted on the implementation of physical activities while at the same time driving up project coordination and management costs. After the MTR, the situation could be reversed and the AWP&B was properly executed, with few exceptions (allocation for the implementation of SITEC insufficient; delay in the implementation of the agreement with ILO). Throughout, the project has faced cash flow problems. Another issue which could never be solved was the question of the beneficiary contribution which remained low and was perceived as a "cultural problem" prevailing in both, rural and urban areas, and a delaying factor in project implementation. For most MSEs, the financial rate of return could not yet be established, as the investments were either not yet finalized or not yet operational (construction works). There is no IRR available for the project, but it is assumed to be positive, given the positive impact of the project on household incomes and well-being. The project was completed on time with a disbursement rate of 99%.

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Project Performance

Partner Performance

IFAD IFAD performance is considered satisfactory. IFAD has provided adequate support throughout project implementation, especially since it took over the direct supervision of the project in 2008. Technical support and supervision were adequate. IFADs positive and constructive attitude was particularly appreciated. WAs and payment requests were processed with due diligence and on time. IFAD can be made responsible, however, for an overambitious project design.

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Cooperating Institution BOAD’s performance was found moderate. Its performance was particularly weak until the MTR, after which the credit line (its main contribution to the project) was implemented. Altogether, only 56% of the funds were disbursed. BOAD participation in IFAD-led supervision missions was irregular.

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Government Government took full ownership and responsibility of the project. It participated actively in all supervision missions and substantially contributed to the refocusing of activities during the MTR. Counterpart funds were provided in line with the loan agreement.

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NGO/Other n.a

Cofinancier(s) BOAD’s performance as co-financer is not assessed. BOAD provided financing for a long-term credit line to cover medium- to long-term financing needs of MSEs. This credit line was made available only after the MTR, due to delays in establishing all necessary conditions.

n.a


Appears altogether positive and constructive. Partnership with ILO for training of MSEs services providers was pointed out as particularly successful.



The project has considerably contributed to the creation of employment opportunities for women and the youth, the diversification of income sources, regular incomes flows and higher income levels. Not only has the project brought new incomes sources, but it has inculcated a sense of entrepreneurship among the beneficiaries, which has enabled many of them to offer unique products, establish contacts to professional traders and engage into a process of financial growth. This, in turn, has enabled them to substantially increase their incomes and assets. In addition, new jobs have arisen with the development of a wide range of support services and the training of peers in technical areas (10 peers MSEs have trained more than 10 000 individuals for more than FCFA 50 million). The project has also facilitated access to rural financial services, but to a lesser extent than originally foreseen. Implementation of SAFIR (Rural Financial Support Service) and mobilization of the credit line were delayed, due to instability within the structure (staff fluctuation, insufficient implementation support). Altogether, 821 loans were provided for a total amount of FCFA 686 million, which corresponds to 53% of the initial target. The extent to which incomes and assets have increased over the implementation period of the project is not assessed in the PCR. According to the final RIMS impact survey, 83% of men and 82% of women mentioned that the project had directly contributed to increasing their incomes. Increased incomes were primarily used to purchase food and improve nutrition. Health care came second, education third and then clothing and housing. The impact survey also showed that 97% of women and 91% of men felt that the project had directly contributed

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to improving their living conditions by giving them access to land, enabling them to purchase furniture for their home, to build a new and better home or to improve an existing one with a concrete floor or a tin roof. Women also mentioned that higher incomes gave them the opportunity to participate in tontines or other group credit activities.

Food Security The project had a positive impact on food security in the region. The RIMS survey indicates that the percentage of households experiencing a hungry season has declined from 81% in 2008 to 55% in 2012. According to the same survey, 18% of the households have mentioned that the project has directly contributed to improving their food security situation. Higher incomes from MSE activities were primarily used to improve household food security and diets. Beneficiaries mentioned having diversified their diets and increased the consumption of meat and fish. Child malnutrition, however, remains an issue with no clear declining trend. The percentage of children underweight (weight/age) was 21% before the project, 16% at MTR and 18.5% at the end of the project. This corresponds to the national figures, which is 18% for the whole country and 21% in rural area. This percentage is considered high.

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Ag. Productivity Not assessed. Agricultural production and productivity were not at the core of the project’s interventions. The PCR, however, states that MSE development has boosted agricultural production of groundnuts, millet, sorghum and maize.

n.a


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The project was classified as belonging to category B (weak impact) and thus, no environmental impact assessment was needed. The PCR mentions that nevertheless, environmental considerations were applied by the project, which recommended the use of renewable energy and energy saving techniques.

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The project achieved an important impact in the area of capacity strengthening, including technical and managerial training of MSEs, which were key factors to the project’s success. A main contributing factor to human capacity development was the creation of employments in areas such as construction, masonry, carpentry and bakery for men with important growth rates of 292%, 200%, 114% and 62% respectively, and vegetable & fruit processing and petty trade for women. The highest employment growth rate was found in textile production with 500% for men and 400% for women. These new jobs have not only contributed to a substantial increase of households incomes, but also to initiate private sector development in rural areas, around these particular value-chains. This was further enhanced by the project's support to the emergence and training of support services providers. In collaboration with ILO, the project helped adapt a highly performing management training programme (GERME- gérer mieux son entreprise) to the needs and specificities of the rural sector. This tool is now successfully used for training MSEs, services providers and professional organizations. - The project also had a positive indirect impact on basic education, the third most important area in which incomes are being invested (see section on incomes). The literacy rates of both men and women could be improved from respectively 72.8% to 76% for men and 23% to 45% for women (2008-2013). The literacy rates of young people aged 15 to 24 could be improved by 15 percentage points for girls and 36 percentage points for boys. Access to safe water could be improved as well, from 49% of the population before the project to 63% at completion. This corresponds to a 28% improvement. Finally, the project had a positive impact on access to communication. At the end of the project, 85% of the beneficiaries mentioned having access to a mobile phone compared to only 3% in 2008.

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Inst. & Policies The project had a considerable impact in this area. As a pioneer in providing support to MSEs development in Senegal, the project has contributed to the sectoral policy framework for MSEs, which has become an integral part of the country’s poverty alleviation strategy. It has helped recognize that MSEs can be a strong contributing factor to the development of the economy and to poverty alleviation in rural areas through its complementarity with farm and non-farm activities. Institutional strengthening of MSEs and their organizations were key elements of success of the project. About 70% of the targeted MSEs could be provided with a legal status, thanks to sensitization and training about relevant aspects and procedures. The PCR concludes that institutional strengthening has enabled them to be recognized as development partners and economic actors at local level.

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Markets Given the nature of the project, market access was crucial for its success. Access to markets could be directly improved through a wide range of activities including: (i) providing vendor authorizations; (ii) facilitating the participation in regional and national fairs (FIARA International Ag and Livestock Fair 2007-2013); (iii) facilitating the contact to traders and intermediaries; and (iv) support to product marketing through videos, broadcastings, leaflets, business cards, etc. Participation in fairs was particularly important for the MSEs to increase their visibility, establish contacts to buyers and traders and receive feedback on their products. Market access could also be improved indirectly through the creation of a network of services providers, essential to develop and maintain product quality (technical, packaging and labelling etc.). All of these activities contributed to increasing and improving

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market integration of MSEs.

Project Impact Despite initial difficulties the project has achieved its overall objective and has contributed to the reduction of absolute poverty in the project area. The percentage shares of the two lowest quintiles could be reduced from 54% in 2008 to 19% in 2012 while the percentage share of the richest has increased from 14.5% to 20% during the same period. Though this cannot be attributed solely to the PROMER, there is no doubt that the project has contributed to the creation of more than 1400 MSEs and further employments in related field, mainly to the benefit of women and the youth. More importantly, the project has introduced the concept of entrepreneurship and has contributed to changing people’s mind-set. It has also contributed to the creation of a conducive technical, financial and institutional environment to support the sustainable development of MSEs.

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Overarching Factors

Innovation The project was an innovation in itself since it successfully introduced approaches to rural enterprise development in Senegal. It has brought about at least 6 key innovations: (i) adapted technologies for néré processing; (ii) introduction of improved oven for bread baking; (iii) introduction of cashew nut processing units based on a model from Sri Lanka; (iv) introduction of shea butter processing units based on a model from Burkina Faso and now locally produced at the technical high school of Kedougou,; (v) system of group warranty and risk sharing to facilitate access to loans; and (vi) adaptation of the GERME training module (ILO) to the needs of MSEs.

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Chances for replicability and scaling up are very high. The project has brought about many innovative approaches, which were documented and shared with other IFAD projects in Senegal and in the region, as well as with interventions led by other development partners. Many lessons are already being shared through various knowledge networks, FAO and by providing direct advice to projects in neighbouring countries. At the time the PCR was written, the project was in the process of preparing a guide for rural enterprise development to capitalize the knowledge gained during the implementation of PROMER I and II and to make it available at a larger scale (Governments, donors, NGOs, private sector, CBOs, services providers, and other development partners). The project’s communication strategy and the knowledge and information sharing service (SITEC) created under the project and passed on to the Regional Development Agencies, have been very helpful to ensure continuation of the processes initiated. In 2011, PROMER II was declared champion in knowledge sharing and capitalization at the IFAD Knowledge Management Forum in Libreville.

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Chances for sustainability were improved by seeking actively solutions to all major challenges the project was facing: (i) the initially low marketability of the products offered by the MSEs was improved through technical training, adequate support and participation in local fairs; (ii) contacts were established between MSEs and traders/intermediaries in urban areas; (iii) support was provided to the consolidation of MSEs to make them institutionally, financially and economically viable; (iv) effort were made to create a pool of peers trainers and support services providers which will continue to offer their services beyond the life of the project. The creation of consolidated “elite” MSEs is a strong factor ensuring sustainability of the processes initiated as they will continue to provide support to rural enterprise development beyond the life of the project. Activities not yet considered sustainable will be transferred to other IFAD operations. Credit activities initiated with SAFIR will continue under PAFA. The knowledge exchange platform SITEC has been transferred to the regional development agencies. SITEC provides information about the project, its achievement, good practices, innovations, lessons learned, support services, etc. and will be a major tool to ensure sustainability and continuation of the MSE development in Senegal.

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Targeting The targeting strategy took into account the conclusions and recommendations of the first phase. Based on this, beneficiaries were divided into four groups, based on the size and type of enterprise. The targeting strategy as such was not discussed in the documentation available (PCR, SR), but appears appropriate. The rating provided is based on the PSR.

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Gender Gender aspects were at the center of the project’s considerations and hence, more than half of the MSEs are led by women or women groups. Of the 350 MSEs considered as autonomous, 58% are led by women, which exceed the appraisal target of 50%. Out of the 80 marketing groups created, 31 are led by women and of the 676 MSEs that were given IGA training, 46% were women-headed. 55% of the SMEs which were given training in entrepreneurship are led by women and 48% of those having had access to financial services were women. It can be concluded that good results were achieved in reaching out to women, despite adverse socio-cultural still prevailing in the areas covered by the project. This has also contributed to improving their status within the family and the society as pointed out in the PCR. A beneficiary survey has shown that their voice is now heard and better respected by men than before the project. Good results could be reached in terms of literacy training of women. Women reached a literacy rate of 45% compared to only 23% at the beginning of the project. This improvement of 17 percentage points is considerable. Nevertheless, the discrepancy in

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the literacy rate of women compared to men is still high (45% for women compared to 76% for men). The PCR concludes that efforts still need to be done to improve female literacy and to provide training in health care and nutrition, as shown by the lack of progress made in reducing child malnutrition (see food security). Of the 350 MSEs rural enterprises considered autonomous at the end of the project, 46% were led by young people who, in turn, have contributed to the creation of 280 new employment opportunities in the project areas. The youth have also benefited from literacy training and other capacity strengthening or support activities. As such, the project has effectively contributed to reducing youth unemployment and outmigration.



PCR Quality

Scope The main report conforms to the guidelines, but none of the required annexes is included. 4

Quality Short and to the point with enough figures to substantiate the statements made. 5

Lessons The PCR draws some useful lessons for rural enterprise development projects, both from a technical and from a design/implementation point of view.

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Candour Some areas sound overly positive. Critical assessments tend to be avoided. 3

Documents

International Fund for Agricultural Development