The history of Indian philosophy since ancient times hasbeen characterized by its dialogic attitude. Discussionand debate, whether they were in a written form oractually conducted in public, were the hallmarks of anyschool of thought, because other views were first takeninto account before presenting its own so-called estab-lished position. The history of the emergence of each ofthe different schools was generally based on a funda-mental work which set forth its basic categories. Mostof these basic works were compiled in a very crypticand curt style, sometime in the four hundred years justbefore and after our common era. Commentatorselaborated the basic philosophy from within their owntradition in order to make the basic views understand-able to the uninitiated, whilst at the same time defendingthe tradition against attacks from opponents. This paperattempts to recall certain moments in the early devel-opment of Indian philosophy which directly or indi-rectly reflect an attitude to philosophizing relevant inan intercultural context. Two such interrelated momentswill be mentioned here: 1. the significance of debate andthe emergence of rules of debate which ultimately ledto a discussion of logical issues when discussing anargument; 2. the significance of epistemology for theview of the world, the objects to be known, and thesubject who knows. By way of an introduction andorientation to some of the issues in Indian philosophya few presuppositions will be considered in order toshow that the differences among the various schools aremore important than certain generalities which in somecases may be drawn.

1. Some presuppositions in Indian philosophy

A convenient classification of the different kinds ofIndian philosophy is a fourfold one, divided in termsof whether a particular school belongs to: 1. the general

category of Hindu philosophy (including within it theso-called six orthodox schools, and a philosophicalactivity which reflects the influence of Saivism,Vais.n. avism, or Saktism); 2. Buddhism, encompassingviews which belong generally not only to the Hınayanaand Mahayana schools, but also the Vajrayana school,especially with its Tibetan influence; 3. Jainism,whichmay divided into views characteristic of Digambaraand/or Svetambara schools; and 4. Materialism, eventhough it did not survive in exactly the same way asthe other schools, but whose influence is clearlyreflected by the fact that each school attacks its viewof the world and its emphasis on perception as the onlyreally valid means or instrument of knowledge. In thelight of this classification it is clear that even if onewanted to extract certain traits common to all schoolsof Indian philosophy, the term ‘Indian philosophy’ isin fact a misnomer, because one would have to talkabout the view of a particular thinker within a partic-ular tradition. The following presuppositions, then,apply

mutatis mutandis, with an emphasis on the nec-essary changes which have to be made when comparingdetails. The presuppositions are intended to facilitate theconsideration of the different areas of Indian philosophyand to indicate some of the concerns which occupiedthe Indian philosophies.

It may be noted that Buddhism traces all its doctrinesto the teachings of Buddha, Jainism to the teachings ofthe Jinas (the last two of twenty-four omniscient beingsare Parsva and Buddha’s contemporary, Mahavıra), theHindus to doctrines traceable in the Vedas, particularlyin their Aran.yakas (‘forest treatises’) and Upanis. ads(‘secret teachings’). In most cases it is impossibleto clearly trace the original source of ideas, argumentsor concepts. Many Indians seem to have drawn theirinspiration to deal with philosophical issues from acommon pool of ideas (e.g., life being characterizedby suffering, the role of karma as a binding factor)

Intercultural Relevance of Some Momentsin the History of Indian Philosophy Jayandra Soni

Topoi 17: 49–55, 1998. 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

which the following presuppositions are intended torepresent.1

1. All schools of Indian philosophy explicitly orimplicitly accept the clear distinction between thecategories of the ‘sentient’ and the ‘insentient’. Theformer refers to living beings which have consciousnessas their defining characteristic, the absence of whichmakes the object a dead thing, a corpse. In the case ofhuman beings consciousness refers to our essentialnature expressed through the medium of the body whichintrinsically is matter and, therefore, lifeless.

Implicit in this distinction is the problem that evenif consciousness is described, it cannot be treated as anobject, as something out there in the world; it is mani-fested in our descriptions of it. This point entails theproblem of how consciousness can speak of itself. If thisis at all possible, i.e., without the limiting influencesof the sense organs which supply the limited data, thena means of communication different from the one weuse when talking about the things of the world will haveto be assumed. Each school deals with the nature of con-sciousness in the light of its own metaphysical presup-positions and each deals with the question of theexperience and manifestation of consciousness in itsown way. This point is captured in the complex andcomplicated discussions of the basic problem of liber-ation (moks. a/nirvan. a), with Buddhism, Hinduism andJainism each offering its own unique interpretation.

2. Entailed in the above presupposition is the oneconcerning our limitedness, namely the limitedness con-cerning our knowledge of our own intrinsic nature andthe world. The Indians say that this limitedness is nota reflection of our innate nature, but one which comesas a result of one or more ‘external’ causes. It is saidthat consciousness is not limited in the same way inwhich the senses are. Each sense organ is limited to aspecific function which is fulfilled in accordance withthe capacity of the organ concerned. Consciousness, onthe other hand, is limited only by the limited capacityof the sense organs; when an insight into its intrinsicnature is obtained, namely when through discipline oneis freed from the bondage to sense organ experiences,then the unlimited nature of consciousness is realized.The ability to speak about the unlimited nature of con-sciousness is accredited to experience and to trustworthystatements about it contained in authoritative texts onthe subject and on the part of those who are regardedas liberated beings.

3. The question of our knowledge of our limitednessis associated with the assumption above. That we canat all grasp the idea of our limited existence, thatthe categories of our thinking make such an insightpossible, presupposes a category that is itself not solimited, namely consciousness itself. The nature of con-sciousness is revealed by contrasting its nature with thematerial nature of the things of the world. Hence, aknowledge of the nature of the world indirectly leadsto the question about the nature of the subject who canhave a knowledge of the world. This subject is said tobe essentially different from the nature of the world andis said to be characterized by what constitutes the natureof consciousness. Consciousness constitutes the intrinsicnature of the subject, the self.

4. All the three indigenous systems of Buddhism,Hinduism and Jainism presuppose the efficacy of karma(karman). The theory of karma was accepted as a factof existence so early in the history of Indian philosophy(it seems to have been pan-Indian during the time ofMahavıra and Buddha in the sixth century BCE) thatnone of the schools thought it necessary to give a philo-sophical justification of its acceptance. Put simply, thetheory of karma, as it has survived through the ages, isbased on the view that the present state of man in theworld derives from previous causes and that, conse-quently, what happens or is done now determines, con-ditions or influences future events and situations.According to the theory every deed or action, includingone’s attitudes, leaves behind traces (sam. skara) which,like seeds, ‘bear fruit’ at the appropriate time and place.The two senses in which the word karma is used hererefer not only to deeds or actions, but also to the accu-mulation in seminal form of their impressions – as aseminal principle karma is thus pregnant with conse-quences, i.e., it is generative of conditions which leadto the maturation or fruition of certain effects causedby, and as a consequence of, past actions.

With the unexplained assumption of the karma theoryseveral basic questions remain unanswered: in what wayexactly has karma been set into motion originally? Whatis the original cause which has incited the cycle ofkarma and all the existences associated with it? To say,as the adherents of the karma theory do, that ithas a beginningless (anadi) origin is not an answerthat can be accepted without further qualification. It isa euphemistic way of saying that it is beyond humancapacity to grasp the original cause, precisely because

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we are bound by karma. The argument sounds circular:I cannot know the origin of karma because of mylimitedness; my limitedness is due to the fetters ofkarma. The fact that we cannot really grasp the originof karma, however, should not hinder our reflections.Suffice it to say that all Indian philosophical schoolsshare the common view that we are limited beings,that this may be accepted as a basic fact, and that thislimitedness may be ascribed, directly or indirectly, tothe effect of karma.

5. All the adherents of the karma theory also pre-suppose the condition of the possibility of stepping outof the cycle of recurrent existences caused by karma. Itis understood that the karma theory does not have anontological status, namely that karma does not consti-tute a characteristic feature of being. Even though it maynot be known when and how exactly the karmas origi-nate, it is nonetheless assumed that all kinds of karma,the accumulated ones, those responsible for the presentexistence and those which will fructify in the future,all of these types of karma can be annihilated. It canbe said that it is the genius of the karma theory that thedestruction of the karmas is built into the theory itself:since karma has a cause and since it has an origin (albeitin ‘beginningless time’) the cause can be interferedwith and karma can be brought to an end, unlike the apriori ontological categories which are uncaused and bydefinition cannot be destroyed. As for the cause ofkarma some schools say that it is ‘passion’ (raga), or‘thirst’ (tr. s. n. a) which is responsible and which servesas the fuel which maintains its function.

The above presuppositions have to be understood inthe context in which they apply, namely, as a generalorientation towards Indian philosophy facilitated by aset of some basic ideas from which all major Indianthinkers drew. These have to be treated with caution aswell, because one school of Buddhist philosophy, forexample, does not accept any ontological category, withultimate reality being described as ‘empty or void’(sunya), despite accepting the notion of karma and theseries of existences for which it is responsible. Further,these presuppositions should not conceal the interestingand intricate debate among the schools over a varietyof philosophical issues like those in ontology, meta-physics, epistemology and even the philosophy oflanguage.

2. Philosophical debate in India

The emergence of philosophical debate in India, notonly in the commentary literature on the basic worksof each school, but also in the form of organized publiccontests, contributed greatly to a sharpening of thephilosophical tools and to the setting down of rules ofdebate which had to be strictly adhered to in the courtswhere the debates took place. The intercultural rele-vance of my paper rests on the significance of thismoment in the history of Indian philosophy. The indol-ogist Erich Frauwallner has summarized this moment inthe following way:

a person who wrote thought provoking works was not regardedas a great philosopher if he did not also know how to effectivelypresent his theory and to successfully defend it in a debate withopponent views. The result was that public discussions anddebates always had a significant role in the intellectual life ofIndia since ancient times. We hear of them even in the Vedicperiod and there are recurring reports throughout the centuries ofhow great masters successfully defended their theories in publicdisputations and defeated their opponents.2

It is necessary in both a single culture which evincesdivergent streams of thought (as in India) as well as inintercultural contexts to exchange ideas in the positiveatmosphere of dialogue and debate. Such an attitude pre-supposes an acquaintance with the other views. In ourcontext it seems to be appropriate to add that victoryover the other is not the aim, but rather through debateto seek clarification and understanding of the other view.Here too an earnest attempt to try and understand theother is implicit.

In an early work on Indian medicine (perhaps in thefirst century of our era) compiled by one Caraka andcalled Carakasam. hita the author (in CS 3, 8) advisesmedical practitioners to debate with others becausediscussion increases the zeal for knowledge, clarifiesknowledge, increases the power of speech, makes onefamous, removes doubt and establishes the knowledgealready gained. Moreover, one can learn new things ina discussion, especially when carried away with the zealof the discussions the other person discloses informa-tion which would otherwise be kept secret. In this veryearly period in the history of Indian debate it was alsorecognized that a discussion which forms the basis of adebate can be of different kinds, and Caraka distin-guishes two kinds, one that is “friendly” and one thatis “hostile”.3 A friendly discussion

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is held among wise and learned persons who frankly and sincerelydiscuss questions and give their views without any fear of beingdefeated or of the fallacies of their arguments being exposed. Forin such discussions, even though there may be the fallaciesdescribed, no one would try to take advantage of the other, noone is jubilant over the other’s defeat and no attempt is made tomisinterpret or misstate the other’s views.

In the basic work of the Nyaya school of Indian phi-losophy which was composed in its present formperhaps more than a century after Caraka’s work andclearly influenced by it, three kinds of dispute are dis-tinguished: vada, jalpa and vitan. d. a.

Vada means a discussion for the ascertainment of truth, jalpa adispute in which the main object is the overthrow of the opponentrightly or wrongly, and vitan. d. a a dispute in which attempts aremade to discover the faults of the opponents’s thesis without anyattempt to offer any alternative thesis. Vada is thus essentiallydifferent in its purpose . . . vada is an academical discussion withpupils, teachers, fellow-students and persons seeking truth solelyfor the purpose of arriving at right conclusions, and not for fameor gain. Jalpa, on the other hand, is that dispute which a mancarries on while knowing himself to be in the wrong or unable todefend himself properly from his opponents except by trickeryand other unfair methods of argument.4

Rules of argumentation and its validity emerged handin hand with the rules for debates. In other words, epis-temological issues concerning, for example, the meansof knowledge, the objects of knowledge and the contentof knowledge occupied Indian thinkers very early intheir philosophical activity. This was in fact thefavourite concern of the Nyaya school, especially inits later phase as Navya-Nyaya, when an attempt wasmade to clearly assess what constitutes a valid inferencein which the relations among the major, minor andmiddle terms became the chief occupation of theschool.5

It is interesting to note that matters relating to debateand what constitutes a good discourse are also dealt within the famous Indian epic called Mahabharata. Thereis a noteworthy debate between the nun Sulabha andthe king Janaka.6 The king was renowned for hiswisdom and the nun who heard of it doubted it, andwent to him to find out for herself. After the formali-ties of a polite welcome the king admonishes her, amongother things, for taking the liberty as a woman toquestion him and his authority. After his speech the nunbegan, with a beautiful smile, to enumerate the elementsof a good speech. She says it should contain the fol-lowing five elements: it should be subtle, distinctive or

distinguished, systematic, clear in its conclusion, and itshould have a motive. She then briefly defines eachof these terms and goes on to say (to paraphrase herspeech): further, I shall speak to you meaningfully,unequivocally, without circumlocution, unpleonastically,fluently, indubitably. Moreover, my talk will not becumbersome, not without cheer, it will be truthful,neither insulting nor deceptive; it will also be cultivated,not laconic, abstruse or unsystematic. Nothing in whatI say should be left unexplained, nothing merelymetaphorical, nothing unfounded nor unmotivated.

The nun Sulabha then says that she will not let herspeech be controlled by greed, anger, fear, etc., and goeson to briefly talk about the speaker, the listener andspeech itself. This example concerning discourse ismentioned here to show that even in epic literature theissues related to discourse were thematised, clearlyshowing that debate and argumentation were not onlyphilosophically treated, but that they applied to all walksof life since early times in India.

3. Indian epistemology

The theory of knowledge has consistently been afavourite field of investigation in India since ancienttimes. This is evident not only from a list of termsCaraka says a physician should know about, but alsoin the commentaries on the basic works of each wherethe first opportunity was taken to mention the meansof knowledge accepted by the school, together with acritique of the views of other schools in this context.Caraka’s list contains 44 items which the physicianshould have a command over before accepting an invi-tation to enter into a debate. Suffice it to mention afew terms out of this list for the point made here:7

perception, inference, comparison, thesis, statement ofthe proof for the thesis, the reason, the example, thedoubt. The list becomes more compact later and espe-cially when the Nyaya school includes them as a startingpoint for all the themes which it deals with in its basicwork. Sixteen terms are listed which are interesting tonote here to show their relation to the emergence ofphilosophical debate in India and for their specialemphasis on epistemological issues: 1. the instrumentsor means of knowledge, 2. the objects of knowledge,3. doubt, 4. purpose, 5. example, 6. tenet, 7. membersof the argument, 8. deliberation, 9. conclusion, 10.disputation, 11. debate, 12. wrangling, 13. fallacious

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reasons, 14. quibble, 15. false objections and 16. reasonsfor defeat.

Each school accepted a fixed number of instrumentsor means of cognition, each of which yields a partic-ular kind of knowledge, and for the major schools ofIndian philosophy the number ranges from one to six.So, for example, the materialist accepts only percep-tion as the most important and reliable means of knowl-edge, the Buddhists and the Vaises. ika school acceptinference as well, the Sam. khya school accepts verbaltestimony or scriptural authority in addition to percep-tion and inference, etc. There are certain implicit con-ditions on the basis of which the number of means ofcognition were accepted by each school. At least fourconditions need to be fulfilled: (a) the knowledge whichone means of cognition furnishes must be new and notattainable by any other means; (b) one means of cog-nition may aid another in making a particular knowl-edge possible but the means of cognition in questionshould not be reducible to another – so, e.g., when per-ception aids inference, as in inferring fire by seeing thesmoke in the distance, the knowledge gained cannotbe reduced to the knowledge obtained by perceptionalone; (c) the cognition obtained through one particularmeans of knowledge should not be contradicted byanother means of knowledge; (d) the accepted means ofcognition should appeal to reason and in the case ofverbal testimony or scriptural authority, for example,knowledge concerning the revealed truth must appearprobable and be made intelligible in terms of humanexperience, otherwise such a means of cognition willfail in its purpose.

One of the remarkable features in the history ofIndian epistemology, and one relevant for constructiveintercultural dialogue, is that when attacking the theoriesof the other schools this has to be done on the basis oftheir own presuppositions. So, for example, all theschools know that since the materialist accepts percep-tion as the only valid means of knowledge then it wouldbe ‘unfair’ to attack his theory using arguments basedon inference. Practically every school criticizes thematerialist standpoint, a point which in fact reveals thewidespread influence the materialists had. In any case,through their blatant rejection of non-materialist posi-tions the materialists contributed greatly to a sharpeningof the philosophical critique against them. Hence, theother schools tried to show that the materialist cannotdeny the validity of inference as a valid means ofknowledge because, it was contended, the arguments

in favour of perception as the only means of knowl-edge are based on inference. It is not uncommon in thecommentaries on the basic works to come across state-ments hypothetically granting the other view (‘if yousay this . . .’) and then criticising it (‘then it is inad-missible for the said reasons’). It is obvious that suchan attitude can be useful in intercultural philosophicaldialogue when employed constructively.

It is not often noticed that Indian thinkers dealingwith epistemology implicitly dealt with theories of erroras well, i.e., in accepting human fallibility, based on theassumption that we are limited beings, they sought toexplain the phenomenon of human error. Indeed thesuccess of a theory of valid cognition is commensuratewith the success in which error in our cognition is alsoexplained. In other words, granted that we can err in ourcognition a theory of cognition should also be able toexplain the source of this occurrence, or at least be ina position to account for it. A brief look at a few theoriesof error will not be out of place here in order toshow how they also belong to the field of epistemology.When explaining the fact of error some thinkers (e.g.,Ramanuja) say that error should be seen rather as a lackof knowledge. In other words, there is no error as suchand one should speak, instead, of a failure in cognitionto distinguish the positive features of an object from thenegative ones. The criterion which decides the problemof whether the cognition is erroneous or not is its applic-ability to practical life. Error is explained away bysaying that, for example, seeing a rope as a snake is aconfusion of two elements, the memory of a snake over-shadowing the perception of the rope which in somerespects resembles a snake.

Another theory of error (e.g., of the Saiva Siddhantaand Yoga Schools) is that error is the cognition of anobject as something ‘other than what it is’. A rope seenas a snake entails an affirmation of qualities for anobject which in fact can only be denied of it. Separatelyboth the rope and the snake are real objects, and therealization that ‘this is not a snake’ is for all intentsand purposes the same as saying ‘this is a rope’. Herethe object perceived is seen as something different fromwhat it is on the grounds of features ascribed to it whichshould be denied.

Some schools of Indian philosophy (notablyYogacara Buddhism) say that experience as such,including the cognition of an object, is in its objectivisedmode illusory and, by extension, the ‘error’ that occursin daily life is a ‘double error’. In other words, life is

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a kind of dream and is therefore unreal. An error in adream is an error to the second degree. It is only thesubjective consciousness which exists, without any cor-responding object outside. Just as the waking statereveals the unreality and error of the dream state so too,it is claimed, the errors and even unreality of the wakingstate will be revealed when a knowledge of ultimatereality is gained, in whatever way this may be definedtogether with the means to its realization.

Another theory of error states that error consists inthe cognition of what does not exist and is the view ofMadhyamika Buddhism. The theory is more radicalthan the above one in that all knowledge as such isquestioned. Since nothing really exists, the objects ofeveryday experience are as non-existent as those whichare erroneously cognised.

According to the adherents of this theory, if anythingexists then it is ‘nothingness’, and all issues are seenas ultimately pointless from this position.

One further theory has gained relevance in episte-mological discussions in India and this is the view thatthe object of error and how error really takes placecannot be adequately explained. This view is expressedby San

.kara (possibly eighth century). According to him

how a rope is seen as a snake cannot be determined. Inerror there is some kind of reality that exists as long asthe error obtains. Just as in a dream water can quenchthirst, and seeing a rope as a snake in the wakeful statecan cause fear, a relative truth has to be ascribed to theseexperiences. When the actual truth dawns on one, whenwaking up or when realising that the ‘snake’ is in facta rope, then the error disappears. How such an experi-ence occurs may be ascribed to ignorance, in so far aswe do not know the objects as they really are, but therole of ignorance has itself to be explained. Preciselyhere it is impossible, according to San

.kara, to account

for it, it is inexpressible.The reason for briefly mentioning the above views

is to show that in India there were significant differ-ences among the numerous schools of philosophy, andin one school there were even shades of differences.Philosophical debate in public must have been verylively judging from the numerous records of it, and itis even more evident in the philosophical literature. Itmust also be noted that when the view to be criticisedwas first presented then very often this was done in sucha way that the faults could be easily detected. In manycases other views were even ridiculed, as was ‘allowed’in some kinds of debate where the aim was sheer

victory. Hence, for example, the Jaina theory of mani-foldness, according to which existence, non-existenceand/or inexpressibility could be ascribed to one and thesame object of investigation depending on the stand-point from which the judgement was made, was oftenrejected outright as something impossible. The positiveattempt to try and find out what the other view is, isnonetheless implicit.

Conclusion

It cannot have been the case that debate in India wasalways in the ideal spirit of discussion. Indeed Caraka’sadvice is that one “should dismiss an opponent who isinsignificant and disliked, by confusing him, by notgiving him any say, by rebuking every incorrect wordof his, and by such similar means.”8 What is signifi-cant is that different kinds of debate were conducted andthat one knew what it meant to discuss issues in afriendly, collegial manner. Many of the ‘tricks’ of debatementioned by Caraka can apply even today. The sig-nificance of knowing about the development of debateslies in the fact that one can choose an attitude that isconstructive, and one which can further the cause ofintercultural relationship. Although epistemologicaltheories varied from school to school, there was stillthe possibility of discussing these. In an interculturalcontext such a positive rapport can only deepen mutualunderstanding, without in any way claiming superiorityfor one or the other point of view. In other words, debatein an intercultural context can be conducted analogouslyto the debate carried out among the Indian schools.

Notes

1 For a general introduction and orientation to Indian philosophythe following secondary sources may be useful: Potter, Karl H.:Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1963; Surendranath Dasgupta: A History of IndianPhilosophy, 5 vols. Cambridge: University Press, 1951–55; M.Hiriyanna: Outlines of Indian Philosophy, London: George Allen andUnwin, 1932.2 Erich Frauwallner’s Posthumous Essays, Delhi: Aditya Prakashan,p. 66, tr. from the German by J. Soni. German title: ErichFrauwallner: Nachgelassene Werke I: Aufsätze, Beiträge, Skizzen,Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1984, p. 66.3 For more interesting information about the kinds of assemblieswhich finally assess the outcome of the debate and declare the winner,and about the things one should take care of before accepting a

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contest, see Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy,vol. II, Cambridge: University Press, pp. 378–388, and ErichFrauwallner’s work mentioned in the previous note, pp. 68 ff. Thedescription of what the two kinds of discussion entail is quoted fromDasgupta, p. 378.4 Ibid., pp. 377–378.5 For a brief history of the Navya-Nyaya school see the work byFrauwallner mentioned in note 2 above, pp. 43–61.6 The debate occurs in Santiparvan. , Moks.adharmaparvan. , 12, 308,1–191. The Mahabharata is dated between 400 before and 400 after

our era, and contains a wide range of themes, some philosophical,some historical, embedded in a narrative record of a family conflictwhich leads to a great war. For my purposes here I am mentioningthe elements of a good discourse only, which the nun teaches theking.7 For the complete list see Frauwallner again, pp. 69–70.8 Frauwallner, p. 69.

University of Marburg

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