NORBERG-SCHULZ, Christian. Intentions in architecture. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1965.

The present situation of architecture is confused and puzzling. From the client we hear constant complaints about the architects lack of ability to satisfy him, from a practical as well as from an aesthetical and economical point of view.1 The authorities give us to understand that it is often doubtful whether the architects are qualified to solve the problems which society poses.2 And the architects themselves disagree on issues so fundamental that their discussion must be interpreted as an expression of groping uncertainty. The disagreement does not only concern the so-called aesthetic problems, but also the fundamental questions of how man should live and work in buildings and cities.3 It is also characteristic that architectural education has been under revision for a long time. New didactical principles are wanted, but the ends and means are in dispute.4 All these symptoms unite to indicate a confusion in our environment which we do not agree about how to unravel. The unified character we know from the cities and architectural lay-outs of the past is becoming a dying memory.5The result of this situation is that the architect is hardly accorded the same recognition as other specialists with an equally high education. Many look upon him as a necessary evil, with the sole task of trimming the ideas of the client. And in writing and speech he is pointed out as responsible for the inconveniences and monotonous confusion of our present-day environment. Many architects, on the other hand, pay scanty respect to the taste and wishes of the client, and maintain that he has to be educated.6The situation is very unfortunate. The absence of mutual confidence between the parties and the lack of opportunity to co-operate on a common basis will of course reduce the chances that new buildings and lay-outsmay fulfil their purposes in a satisfactory way. For the architects themselves it is depressing to have to work without any objective criticism and self-criticism. Let us consider the single points in more detail.The clientWhen the client criticises, words like unpractical, ugly, and expensive* are frequent.The practical or functional criticism is due to a lack of correspondence between the current way of life and the existing architectural frame. This lack of correspondence may of course stem from shortcomings in the architectural frame, inasmuch as it does not allow certain functions to be carried out. But it also often happens that man prefers an antiquated way of life, although he thereby comes into conflict with the environment and misses new values.7 And we know that particular environmental needs may induce man to accept highly impractical* living conditions.8 This suggests that the architect should not as a matter of course satisfy the functional or environmental wishes of the client.The aesthetic criticism is also directed against deviations from the habitual. Without further justifications most new solutions are deprecated and labeled as architects fancies. Or the critics go to the other extreme and talk about greyness and monotony.9 The layman thus asks for an architecture which is at the same time normal* and unusual. In any case he surely does not find satisfaction in the so-called modern architecture*. But at the same time it is rather obscure what he sees in the beloved architecture of the past.10 His point of view hardly coincides with that of the art historian, but shows itself on closer scrutiny to be based upon a few characteristic attributes with which he associates particular meanings.11 These meanings will generally appear superficial and primitive to the architect, and it is a fact that both architects and artists react against following the ruling taste*.12 The problem, however, is not made more simple by saying that the aesthetic criticism of the client is due to prejudices.The economical criticism is connected with what one gets for one's money. We are willing to pay more if we obtain satisfaction of our subjective environmental needs.13 The economical conditions, therefore,

*3are relative, rather than absolute (within certain limits). Thus even economy does not give us any clear directions how to build. And in most cases we can also choose between many different solutions which cost the same.Although the clients criticism of the architects and their products is imprecise and subjective, we should not call it irrelevant. It has sprung from concrete situations, and shows better than any other symptom that our present-day architecture does not participate naturally in a unified and ordered environment. But we may assert that the criticism in most cases has a certain narrowness of view. Generally the client will criticise on the basis of his personal needs without recognizing that his project in many ways forms a part of a larger whole. He is therefore not conscious of and amenable to the new possibilities the architect can offer him, possibilities which may only become manifest after a long period of getting accustomed to the finished product. Man has a conservative character,14 and we experience today a communication-gap between the larger part of the public and those architects who go, if only very slightly, beyond the most conventional solutions. At the same time it is a fact that an ever-increasing number of architects are forced to find new solutions on technical and economical grounds.15The relationship between the client and the architect will of course differ from place to place, and depends upon the role-distribution within the society concerned. Generally, however, we may assume that the architect should not only fulfil the needs of which the individual client is conscious.The societyThe criticism of the society or of the authorities differs from that of the client, although it is also offered by individuals. The authorities may to a certain degree free themselves from purely personal interests, mainly by pointing out a lacking fulfilment of common needs, such as an inadequate number of dwellings. The authorities can, for instance, give their opinion on solutions they do not know from direct experience, but which they recognize as unsuccessful on the grounds of practical and economical information. Their criticism is therefore more objective, as it takes into consideration factors concerning many individuals with different attitudes,

and as it aims at common measures. We should remember, however, that this criticism necessarily reflects prevailing political and economic theories, and therefore also particular interpretations (conscious or unconscious) of what suits society better.16 The subjective environmental needs of the public may also influence these theories in such a way that the common measures reveal themselves through a closer scrutiny as a mere satisfaction of habitual wishes.17 The authorities thus rarely realize that common needs frequently have to be satisfied in unconventional ways in order to make the solution effective.We often hear that present-day society is chaotic, and that this fact must lead to architectural disorder. The argument is superficial. Any society necessarily has a particular structure which should find a corresponding physical frame. Its chaotic aspects are often due to the lack of this correspondence.18In general we may say that society makes demands which transcend the understanding and wishes of the individual; but these demands are usually badly formulated and not distinguished from the ruling taste. This also holds true for those building tasks where society confronts the architect with aesthetic and environmental problems.19The architectsIt is no excuse for the architect that the client and the society confront him with imprecise and one-sided problems, because it is one of his main tasks to formulate the problems on the basis of the various and often contradictory needs which are brought forth. Very few present-day architects have a secure grip on this task. Most of them dispute the functional problems because they disagree on what is a desirable way of life, or because they fail to understand how a * way of life may be formulated or f translated into an architectural frame.20We all know that buildings and architectural lay-outs serve practical purposes, and we may recognize that much has been done to satisfy different interpretations of these functional needs. It is natural that this aspect came to the fore under the pressure of the modern idea of efficiency. The functionalism of the twenties and thirties took this as its point of

16

17departure, and gave us the first systematic attempt at an examination of the actual building tasks. Its investigations usually aimed at finding the correct minimum measures (sizes), on the assumption that architecture above all means efficiency and economy.21As time passed, however, many architects recognized that the classical functionalism was based upon too narrow a definition of the building task. They understood that it is not enough to adopt the most economical solution, and lately another problem has come steadily to the fore. It has presented itself in many different ways, but in general we may say that interest has begun to grow in the milieu-creating function of architecture. Environment influences human beings, and this implies that the purpose of architecture transcends the definition given by early functionalism.22 For the present, however, we know very little about how this influence works, and the new point of view is therefore subject to disagreement and misunderstanding.23The question whether we need a new monumentality has also been considered. Through giving a visual expression to the constitutive ideas of a community or to the social structure, architecture becomes symbolic or monumental.24 In other words, one tries to make manifest a common basis which may counteract the lonelines of modern man and the separation of the artist from the public.25 The misunderstandings created by this problem are closely related to the confusion within the aesthetic dimension of architecture. The styles and formal ideals of the past have been exposed to increasingly strong attacks, on the grounds that new problems demand fundamentally new solutions. Schinkel, deeply impressed by the new industrial buildings he saw in England in 1826, exclaimed: Should we not try to find our own style? ,26 Afterwards, however, he went on building both in the neo-classical and the Gothic styles.27 The style had become a mask covering the real structure of the edifice.28 During the great epochs of the past certain forms had always been reserved for certain tasks. The classical orders were used with caution outside churches and palaces, and the dome, for instance, had a very particular function as a symbol of heaven.29 In the nineteenth century these forms were transferred to completely new types of buildings, and a devaluation of the forms resulted.30 The reaction against this confusion of styles happened in two different ways. In some places an attempt was made to establish a new contact with the past, in the belief that this would bring architecture closer to life.31 Elsewhere, what is fundamentally new in the problems of our day was stressed, all kinds of historicism was eschewed, and neue Sachlichkeit propagated instead.32 This movement found its inspiration in abstract art, and in the possibilities offered by new building materials, such as iron, concrete, and glass.33 Little by little new characteristic forms developed, displacing the devaluated clichs of historicism. But the public remained without understanding of this radical new orientation, which also created a split among the architects themselves.Since the second world war, architecture has obviously entered a new phase. Instead of seeing historicism as an alternative, many want to make modern architecture human by softening or enriching its naked elementary forms. The enrichment, so far, has mostly had the character of fancies, degenerating into an ever more forced play with strange forms and effects.34We are here faced with basic problems which involve a revision of the aesthetic dimension of architecture. How can architecture again become a sensitive medium, able to register relevant variations in the building tasks, and at the same time maintain a certain visual order ? A new aesthetic orientation transcending the arbitrary play with forms is surely needed, although it is not claimed that the result should resemble the styles of the past. Undoubtedly we need a formal differentiation of the buildings corresponding to the functional differences of the building tasks.35 But so far we have not found any answer to the question whether the differentiation should also acquire a symbolizing aspect by the assignment of particular forms to particular functions with the purpose of representing a cultural structure. So far modern architecture has had the character of a belief, rather than a worked-out method based upon a clear analysis of functional, sociological, and cultural problems.The lack of agreement among the architects has deprived architectural education of its stability. It has undergone transformations which correspond to the phases of the aesthetic debate.36 After the teaching of styles in the academies came the Bauhaus, and a complete break with all historicism. The history of art and architecture was dropped from the curriculum. Instead, a free experimenting with materials and forms was introduced: everything should be invented anew.37 The purpose was not to create a new style, but to establish a free approach to the tasks. It was said that this implied a new contact with reality.38 Today we may say that the Bauhaus initiated a cleaning process which freed us from the blind copying of obsolete forms. But we also realize that the Bauhaus method ought to be supplemented and developed on the basis of a better understanding of psychological and sociological factors.39 Education in this field should above all be founded upon an understanding of the nature of the architectural totality, and it may be doubted if the free experiments and artistic activities of the Bauhaus will retain their importance in future. It is also interesting to notice that generally the history of art and architecture has again been introduced into the curriculum, not for the purpose of copying, but because it seems somewhat imprudent to throw the experiences of several thousand years overboard.40These reflections show us that the debate among the architects is related to and yet differs from the criticisms of the client and the authorities. The architects often react too, of course, because of habits and prejudices, and may with more or less justification accuse each other of building ugly or unpractical houses. But they also discuss problems on a higher level, at which the layman would hardly be able to participate. The public does not easily understand that issues such as the relations between technics and form, or form and function, really are important. As long as the house looks like a beloved prototype and does not cost too much, the problem of the layman is solved. Any closer scrutiny of the ideas of the last hundred years, however, shows that the new architecture is not a result of the wish for lArt pour I'Art, but has sprung from the strivings of idealistic individuals to make mans environment better.41 Hence the architects seem to believe that the satisfaction obtained when fulfilling the wishes of the individual is only apparent.Another reason for the existing difficulties in bridging the gaps between the architect and the layman and between the architects themselves, is the lack of a precise terminology. Our confused debate on architectural matters is a demonstration of imprecise use of language and meaningless formulations. 42 This loose terminology adds to the disorder, and makes sound discussion difficult even among the architects themselves.

The situationIn spite of all the confusion there seems to be one point of agreement: the situation is impossible. Who would defend the chaos of the modern metropolis, the destruction of the landscape through characterless building, or the split in conflicting opinions on basic architectural problems? But the disagreement becomes deep and fundamental as soon as we question whether the modern movement in architecture and planning really shows the way out of our muddle. On the one hand, the view is advanced that modern architecture regains basic human values and opens up a new phase of sound creative activity. Design for life has become the slogan of this movement. On the other hand, it is said that modern art and architecture are debasing humanity and killing the real artistic values.43 Although the public shows a tendency to support the latter view, we may point to the fact that no alternative to modern art and architecture has so far been offered.In any case we should take both views seriously. Let us hope that modem architecture has contributed to solve essential human problems. The actual situation, however, makes us understand that the solutions are still rather defective, not least because of the omission of fundamental environmental and symbolical factors. We must realize that the main responsibility for this state of affairs is the architects own. Our highly complicated new world demands new professional methods, but while the engineer and the scientist have adapted their activities to the changes in the social structure, the architect has isolated himself and clung to obsolete ideas and methods. Often he still supports the romantic nineteenth- century idea that the artist should only express his autonomous personality.44 This point of view really makes art become a luxury without direct contact with or purpose in society, and architecture, being both a practical tool and an art, becomes involved in a grave internal dissension. While the planning is governed by practical and economical considerations, the buildings are decorated afterwards to give them the status of works of art. The lack of a common basis has made it possible for the architects to take all kinds of liberties. We might not always agree with the common criticism of art and literature, but at least we must acknowledge that it undoubtedly has created an increased respect for these fields. For architecture we hardly find any respect whatsoever, either from the public or from the architects. In discussing architectural matters we rarely achieve anything but a quarrel about what you like and what I like. As soon as the problems go beyond the purely physical functions, the architects are completely lost and fall back upon haphazard improvisations. But the concrete problems they are facing cannot be solved in this way. In the long run it also becomes highly unsatisfactory that the formal language of architecture is not differentiated in relation to the different building tasks. Today it is often impossible to distinguish visually between a cinema and a church. One of the reasons why the public reacts against modern architecture, is simply that it does not offer any new visual order as a substitute for the devaluated styles of the past. It has certainly created a new vocabulary, but so far no hierarchy of meaningful signs which may serve the purpose of expressing the way of life of the society.45On this background we may sketch the programme of the present study.The problemWhat we need is a conscious clarification of our problems, that is, the definition of our building tasks and the means to their solution.The architect does not work in a vacuum. His products are solutions to problems coming from the environment, and the solutions also have a retroactive effect.46 We therefore have to inquire what the environment asks from the architect, or rather, what it ought to ask from him, and also how a good solution is defined. The architect works in situations which are composed in particular ways and which explicitly or implicitly pose particular questions. The situations are for instance made up of economical, political and social conditions, of cultural traditions, of physical conditions such as climate and topography, and not least of human beings who see the environment in very different ways.47 The situations are not static, but always changing: the political organization of the society changes, the economical conjunctures oscillate, and the climate hardly offers constant conditions. These fluctuations are always more submitted

20

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21to human predictions and control, and the architect has to participate in the planning which should secure stability through the changes.In general we may say that architecture is a human product which should order and improve our relations with the environment. It is therefore necessary to investigate how human products are brought forth. Hence we should ask: What purpose has architecture as a human product? The functional-practical, the milieu-creating and the symbolizing aspects constitute three possible answers to the question, all of which have to be investigated more closely, and which should, if necessary, be supplemented with other factors.48If we return to the layman, we may assert that architecture undoubtedly concerns him in many different ways. Our life consists of changing activities which demand changing surroundings. This implies that the environment will look different according to our immediate state or role.49 To take into consideration this relative and variable relation between man and his environment, it is necessary to stress the question: How does architecture (the environment) influence us? It is a truism to say that the environment influences us and determines our mood. That architecture is a part of our environment is just as evident. If we take this point of departure, architecture has not only an instrumental purpose, but also a psychological function. The question could also be put in this way: In what outer circumstances do we have this or that particular experience ?50 And further we shall ask: Do we always have the same experiences in similar outer circumstances? From everyday experience we know that the last question has to be answered in the negative. We do know that we might have very different experiences although the surroundings remain the same. A known object may suddenly appear completely different, and we may say that we have become alive to another of its aspects. Does this relativism mean that architecture only plays a minor role as a background for our daily activities, and at the most, may induce certain sentiments? And if this is the case, does it necessarily have to be like this? Anyway it is evident that the relationship between man and his environment is not as simple as it may seem at first sight. We therefore have to investigate more closely how we really perceive the world around us.51 A better understanding of this process may also help us to grasp what it means to experience architecture in the changing situations of daily life. It is possible to learn to experience architecture, and the architects need such a training. That the public * learns to see is also necessary if we want to increase the respect for architecture and to bridge the gap between the professional man and his client.To give the questions about the purpose and effects of architecture a basis, it is necessary to inquire whether particular forms ought to be correlated with particular tasks. We thus have to ask: Why has a building from a particular period a particular form ?52 This is the central problem in architectural history as well as in architectural theory.53 We do not intend that the study of history should lead to a new historicism based on a copying of the forms of the past. The information given by history should above all illustrate the relations between problems and solutions, and thus furnish an empirical basis for further work. If we take our way of putting the problem as a point of departure for an investigation of architectures (changing) role in society, a new and rich field of study is laid open.54 Today the so-called analytical explanations of works of architecture are usually rather dubious.55To render an account of why a building looks as it does, we should first have to describe it in an accurate and illuminating way. We here again return to the demand for a well-defined and coherent terminology. This terminology should not only have a logical structure; it should also be empirically founded to enable us to order our subject-matter in a convenient way.56 We thus have to develop a conceptual scheme which makes it possible to answer the question: What does *architectural form mean? This is logically related to the preceding question. In both cases we have to study the relations between corresponding structures in different fields. Firstly we should translate a practical-psychological-social-cultural situation into architecture, and subsequently the architecture into descriptive terms.57 In doing this, were are treating the relation between building task and architectural solution, which is the core of our problem.On a purely theoretical level we gain knowledge about the relation between task and solution. But this knowledge may also be incorporated into a method which helps us in solving concrete problems, and which might facilitate the historical analysis going from the solution back to the task. The historical analysis orders our experiences and makes the judgment of solutions possible. All in all, we arrive at a theory treating architectural problems. That does not mean that architecture is reduced to this theory. Architectural solutions are not brought forth by intellectual analysis alone. On the other hand it is not possible for responsible architects to base their solutions on the arbitrary tastes and wishes of the public. We may actually claim that the visual chaos of our day stems above all from the architects attempts to satisfy isolated or misunderstood needs. The responsibility of the architect as the one who more than anybody else gives form to our environment, can only be based upon a clarification of the purpose and means of architecture.The questions we have taken as a point of departure for the present study belong to three different categories. Firstly we have the questions concerning the relationship between buildings and those who use them, that is, the prerequisites and effects of architecture. Subsequently follows the question about the organization of the means, seen independently of their effects. Finally we question whether particular means correspond to particular prerequisites and effects. Taken together the questions cover all aspects of architecture as a human product.58 The theory thus becomes complete, if we succeed in answering these questions.The nature of architecture* is not something which has to be added to our questions. The nature of architecture* can only be characterized by combining the answers to the three kinds of questions we have indicated, and does not consist in any unknown metaphysical factor. The term is, by the way, a characteristic symptom of the lack of clear thinking still common in architectural aesthetics. We should stop freezing architecture into abstract dimensions which only rarely have any contact with actual reality.The logical skeleton of our architectural theory will always remain valid because it is purely analytical. This does not mean that architecture is always the same, only that the theory is capable of covering all possible historical contents. Hence we do not want to present a textbook, but to establish a convenient method of architectural analysis. At the centre of our investigation we put the work of architecture, and we understand this as a human product, that is, we study the conditions under which it appears.

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23II Background

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27l. PerceptionPhenomena and objectsOur immediate awareness of the phenomenal world is given through perception. We are highly dependent upon seeing our surroundings in a satisfactory manner. Not only do we have to find our way through the multitude of things, but we should also understand or judge the things to make them serviceable to us. The judgment is just as important when we drive a car as when we search for a partner for life, because it enables us to make decisions and act appropriately. In daily life we generally act on the basis of our spontaneous perceptions, without trying to classify or analyze our impressions. Nevertheless we manage surprisingly well, due to the fact that the phenomena appear (are perceived) with form. But it also happens that we err. The small problems of daily life we usually manage without much trouble, but when the problems become less transparent, we often run the risk of being fooled. It may for instance happen that we judge (perceive) another person wrongly. We may believe that he is better than he is, and be disillusioned. That is, we had expected a different behaviour from him in certain situations. Particularly often our expectations fail when the conditions are unusual. It is difficult to recognize a Chinese among other Chinese, and to judge his character is still more difficult, even after a closer acquaintance. We may say that we do not attain the real object of our perception. It may also happen that a situation makes us feel completely lost. A common case is an exhibition of modern abstract art. Many do not see anything but a confusing array of coloured spots, although knowing that something more has been intended, that a better performance is requested from perception. But mostly we have to take our position and act on the basis of such insufficient perceptions. Brunswik says strikingly that the motto of perception ought to be: Besser unsicher als gar nicht1 In general we may say that the purpose of perception is to give us information which enables us to act in an appropriate way, but we already understand that perception is an unreliable companion who does not mediate an objective and simple world.Spontaneously, the world consists of the phenomena, or our experiences.2 We define according to Jorgensen: The word phenomenon designates every something which may be experienced, and its contrary nothing does not designate anything, but expresses that I do not experience anything, that is, that nothing is present to me.3 But it would hardly be satisfactory to consider the world as an aggregate of accidental phenomena. We know from daily experience that the phenomena are united in particular ways, we talk about causes and effects, meaning and order. Les us look at an example.We meet a girl. This girl has certain properties of which we spontaneously become aware. She may seem very beautiful because she corresponds to our idea of how a beautiful girl should look. Being asked after the first meeting if we know the girl, we should have to answer both yes and no. We do know some of her properties, but some thought tells us that she certainly has other qualities which are hidden to us. For the present, her beauty represents her to us. We say that her beauty is one of her manifestations. Through a closer acquaintance we may discover other manifestations of the girl, and we say that we know her better. Perhaps the first property we recognized recedes, becoming less important and convincing. Generally we may say that any object is represented by its manifestations, that is, by mediating phenomena or lower objects. We may also call these phenomena properties because they are not a tiling, but belong to the thing in such a way that they directly represent or symbolize the thing for us; and we cannot be sure that some day we may not discover (i.e. will experience) new phenomena which have the character of being properties of the same thing. What we call the thing, is thus not only the collection of its known properties, but the collection of its known and unknown properties.4 From this it follows that a phenomenon is present (appears), while an object exists.^ The phenomena do not exist, as they are characterized by a lack of permanence. That the objects exist, means only that they are constituted as the most permanentrelations between phenomena. Thus they have no independent existenceand it is meaningless to talk about das Ding an sich.6 Whenwe saythat an object has unknown properties, this does not meanthat it hasan independent existence, only that our conception of the object isinsuffi-cient and has to be revised through future experiences.We use the word object* in the widest possible way in accordancewith Carnap, who defines the object as alles worber eine Aussagegemacht werden kann.7 Both the things of our daily life and the less intelligible concepts of science, such as atom, are objects. Works of r* is I art, social groups, political parties, and even the State itself,are objects,although they are not physical things.Object levelsGenerally we judge and act on the basis of a few representing phenomena, that is, we have an incomplete and superficial idea of the world ofobjects.This may, of course, be dangerous, and may lead to unfortunateactions.If we marry the girl because of her beauty, it may bring along unpleasant surprises. If we experience or judge a work of art on the basis of an accidental but conspicuous property, we are guilty of an injustice, disregarding the more essential properties of the object. Generally the objects are represented by diffuse totality-phenomena or by particularly pronounced properties. It may of course happen that this gives a satisfactory basis for our behaviour, but in front of works of art this is hardly the case. Works of art are generally very complex objects and therefore not easily accessible. Thus we generally do not advance beyond the perceiving of secondary properties. It is a fundamental misunderstanding to believe that a good* work of art is characterized by being easily perceived. We show the tendency to abstract single properties and regard them as if they were the whole object.8

e>i.It is also important to underline that the phenomena receive their representative function through ourselves. Thus we have to learn that a certain phenomenon is mediating a particular object, and through experience we have to discover the relations between the phenomena, and build up a world of objects. We have to learn a foreign language, just as we

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31have to learn that the sight of a pencil indicates something we can pick up for writing.9Obviously the representing phenomena do not have the same importance for the object. This holds true both in spontaneous perception and when we have made a closer acquaintance with the object. Objects are built up through generalizations and ordering of experiences, and we have already suggested how the hierarchy of phenomena may change through further experiences. The nature* of the object is defined as the properties appearing more frequently, and forming the simplest relationships. Properties characterized by irregularity are generally of minor importance. While the visual phenomena are highly dependent upon the conditions of observation (illumination etc.), touch is more invariant. Therefore palpableness is the most primitive and common criterion of reality.10 It follows that the object which is represented seems to be more remote than those representing it. According to Jorgensen we may talk about object levels. A cultural object is thus on a higher level than a physical one. From what has been said above, we understand that the lower phenomena do not as a rule appear first, mostly they are only accessible through a certain analytical attitude. Generally perception grasps an intermediate level, and only through a change of our attitude can we reach the lower or higher objects.11AttitudePerception is not only problematical because we may judge the situation unsatisfactorily. It is a paradoxical but common experience that different persons at the same time have a similar and different experience of the same environment. That we do manage to participate in the activities of daily life, proves that we have a common world. We do all see a house in front of us, we may walk by it, look through the windows, knock at the door and enter. Obviously we have all seen the house, nothing indicates that somebody believed he was standing in front of a tree. But we may also with justification say that we all have different worlds. When we judge the house in front of us, it often seems as if we were looking at completely different objects. The same holds true for the judgment of persons, and not least, works of art. Fortunately it often happens that we agree, but the idea that taste should not be discussed is well established. How has- this to be understood ? So far we may say that the classifications upon which we agree are generally rather superficial, and that the agreement usually finishes when we have to see the things of everyday life as manifestations of higher objects.This implies that we have a different attitude (orientation) to the same things. We have all experienced how the same thing may change according to our attitude. If we are in a bad mood even known and dear things may seem repulsive. The psychologists have studied this aspect of perception and have found that the attitude plays a much more important role than we generally believe. Thus Brunswik has shown that we have a tendency to overestimate the size of things we consider valuable, as for instance coins,12 and another experiment shows that the same coins appear larger (relative to a neutral scale of comparison) to poor than to rich children.13 Hence we have to realize that our attitude does not only mean a more or less friendly outlook on things, but that the attitude directly determines the phenomena. We may even say that it is nonsense to talk about phenomena independently of an attitude.14 Naive realism, therefore, is the victim of a fundamental misunderstanding, in believing that a similar world is given, a priori, to all of us.The attitude is often dictated by the situation. When we read, the letters are given with form, as well as size and colour. But the task demands that we direct our attitude towards the form, whereas the size and the colour are irrelevant, or even disturbing, if they are not omitted in the perception.15Perception, therefore, is anything but a passive reception of impressions. We may change the phenomena by changing our attitude. Brunswik used the word intention instead of attitude, to underline the active character of the act of perceiving. We have suggested that our common everyday intentions are simple classifications (such as fish, flesh, or fowl) which enable us to master the situations of daily life.16 When a more unusual attitude is requested, a greater intentional depth is needed, or let us say, when we have to study the thing more closely and judge it more actively, our everyday classifications fail, and we do not fully grasp the situation.This expresses itself through disagreements, or through our falling back upon the superficial, everyday concord. That we nevertheless use the same names for the things shows that language in general serves to describe our everyday world. One could very well ask if we should not be content with this simple world, and avoid complicating things unnecessarily. But we know that everything we consider particularly valuable, like nature, art, social solidarity, scientific insight, and religious belief, is characterized by going beyond the level of everyday life.We have to conclude that it is of the greatest importance to investigate how and to what degree we attain the higher objects.Intermediary objects

Egon Brunswik was the first to formulate a psychology which integrates the organism with its environment.17 His work, however, has gained too little attention, both because of its forbidding degree of complexity, and because psychologists often suffer from the prejudice that psychology has to be studied by peeping into the organism.18 Brunswiks point of departure is the question to what degree and by means of what mechanisms we are able to perceive the objects which constitute our relevant environment. 19 We quote one of his examples: Let us suppose that a spider only reacts to movements in the visual field. Flies are biologically important objects to the spider, but it is only able to perceive the object fly by assuming that all movements in the visual field represent (are manifestations of) flies. We may take it for granted that the spider often erres, and that it only in a very unsatisfactory way attains this vital object. Another animal, for instance a fish, may also react to the form and colour of the fly, and thus attains a more satisfactory perception (it does not err as often as the spider). But the fish does not perceive the fly perfectly either, and is easily fooled by an imitation which has certain properties in common with the fly.20 This example shows that it is not at all certain that perception reaches its real goal. The biologically important objects usually lie deeper than those perceived. Rather than grasping the thing directly we perceive a situation where the thing is included as a possible component.21

3*

3*One may object that the impertect perception of animals does not proveanything about human beings. But we have already mentioned the suitorwho chooses his bride because of her beauty, and we understand thatobject-world of man is also known through its more or less reliable mani-festations. When the bride is chosen because of financial considerations,the whole thing becomes still more complicated. The suitors love, so tosay, is a function of the girls money, in other words, his attitude is notonly directed towards her personal properties, but also towards herand the rich bride therefore seems more interesting, better, and morebeautiful than a corresponding poor girl. The suitor thus sees a girlwho is conditioned by something extraneous, her personality is by her money.22 If this perception is beneficial remains to be seen, butwe may at least say that the suitor does not attain the pure object,is represented by an objective description of the girls personality. Thesuitor only perceives an 'intermediary object between some of the girlsproperties and her fortune. His perception could even be con-ditioned by the weather on the day he met her.23 We have all experiencedthat similar intermediary objects are easily formed between a person andhis nationality, social position, title, or family name. The formation ofintermediary objects is characterized by our believing that we perceivepure objects, without, however, attaining them. We may, for instance,say that the suitor tried to judge his bride to the best of his ability, thejudgement, however, becoming defective because of the unavoidable ;.disturbing factor of the money.The formation of intermediary objects also holds true for the perceptionof simple physical situations.24 If we try to estimate the real length of a small stick appearing at a certain distance by comparison with a series of sticks near at hand, we will exhibit a tendency to underestimate it. This is called imperfect size-constancy. At the same time it is evidentthat the projection on the retina of the distant stick is much smaller thanthe projection of a similar stick near at hand. But the relative difference between the projective lengths (which is proportional with the distance) is always much larger than the relative difference between estimated and real length (approximative size-constancy). If we instead intend the projective length of the distant stick on a stick at hand, we will generally

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35overestimate it. We see that the perception in both cases is an intermediary object: the length is found between the two possible extremes, the real length and the projective value. If we intend the real length, the intermediary object will approach this; if we instead intend the projective length, the intermediary object will move in this direction. In both cases the intermediary object is a product of the two possible intentions, with the intended one dominating.25The objects which constitute the intentional possibilities we call, in accordance with Brunswik, * intentional poles*.26 All the poles may be of importance to the attained intermediary object, but the intended one is primary. One may also say that we simultaneously intend different poles, but with varying intensity. The perception of ambiguous figures clearly shows that our experiences are conditioned by the pole-objects, and may not be derived univocally from the stimulus-situation. When the aspect* of an ambiguous figure shifts, the stimulus remains the same. And still the figure looks completely different. We may say that the aspects are possible interpretations of the situation. To perceive is to interpret, that is, to choose between the intentional possibilities.27What is said above illustrates the thesis of Gestalt psychology that the parts are conditioned by the whole M, only formulated more precisely by taking the attitude into consideration. Brunswik expresses this when he says that the poles influencing a particular perception form a * coherence- system9 29. It is not said that all the possible poles which may be connected with the stimulus-situation really contribute to the intermediary object. A variation of poles not belonging to the coherence-system does not influence the experience.30 The coherence-system is a more precise designation of the relevant aspects of the situation and expresses, as suggested, that we do not perceive isolated (discrete) absolute objects, but relativistic totalities, such as a 6 cm long stick at 5 m distance, and not a *6 cm long stick31 The coherence-system defines under which conditions we (imperfectly) attain an object. The less extensive and the simpler the coherence-system is, the greater is the chance that we may attain an approximately correct perception of a single object. In most cases the intermediary object lies close to one of the poles. This effect is so strikingthat we generally have the illusion of perceiving pure objects. It is also normal that the contribution of the poles to the perceptionisunequal;33 Bthe intermediary object indicates the share of each.3234 TWe have mentioned that Brunswik has introduced the term inten- tional depth to express that the intentional poles may He on differentlevels, and represent each other.33 Difference in intentional depth is not the same as what we called object levels, as it is not certain that thelowest object is more easily perceptible. The situation at the moment will determine if a near or distant pole is the right goal for the perception,Thus it would be to intend a dangerously distant object if WC Start tophilosophize about the transformations of our visual world while drivinga car; and it would be just as dangerous to intend too near an object, such as a minor detail of the visual field.The lower objects which mediate the relevant object also offer problems.It is characteristic that many representing objects do not clearly mediateone particular object, while an object on the other hand may be represented in many different ways. Brunswik says that the mechanism of perception is characterized by Mehrdeutigkeit or vicarious mediation. Thus any shape within the projectional pattern on the retina may be caused either by a distant but large object, or by a small object close by.34 Any hypothesis about reality therefore has to be based upon at least two mediating objects to be fairly safe.35 In spontaneous experience the mediating objects (for instance the projectional pattern on the retina) are swallowed by the process of perception, and a particular attitude is needed to make us aware of the mediation. In the same way the physical manifestations of a work of art may be swallowed in certain types of art experience.36 The State, on the contrary, is an object which we can hardly perceive, but have to imagine through its manifestations.37 It is very common that a higher object forms an intermediate object with its own mediation. The perceived quality of a work of art will thus often be influenced by the fineness of the materials employed. Intentionally distant objects are usually difficult to attain (especially when we lack special training in perceiving them), because the mediation always becomes more complicated.38In daily life our imperfect perceptions are usually adequate, and we also rarely have time to control the perceptions on which we base ouractions. It may even be convenient that perception spontaneously counterbalances several factors and makes a compromise.When we partly or completely attain an object, our conduct may be described by means of this object. We have suggested that any objective description has to be done in terms of objects because the objects are constructed with objectivity as a criterion. This is the basis of Brunswiks programme: Psychologie vom Gegenstand her* or psychology in terms of objects.39 The objects themselves may be understood as descriptions of an ideal conduct, or as perceptions under ideal conditions (measurement). Such a conduct is only suitable when facing certain tasks, but gives a standard for action in general.We understand that the immediately given, the phenomena, are intermediary objects. The term intermediary object has been introduced in such a way that the phenomena are explained. We repeat that to render an account of an intermediary object, one has to indicate the poles which have contributed to its formation, in other words, to investigate under which conditions, in which phenomenal context a phenomenon appears (is given).40 It may seem confusing to say that we are able to experience something which is an intermediate between a length and an area, or between a size and a value; in general that the nature of the perceptions is such that language remains without words. But we have just seen that the words denote objects which are abstractions (generalizations) from the immediately given phenomena. Spontaneously we escape confusion by assuming that we experience pure objects, without realizing that the perception is diffusely mixed* with the perception of other objects.41 We understand the importance of the object-constructions as the basis of an ordered world, but we also understand that they make us miss the finer shades. The concept intermediary object deprives the world of the last rest of immanent static or absolute form, and presents instead an interaction of self-changing energies.42Above we have given an account of the process of perception, but we have not explained how intentions are attained, how we learn that particular phenomena represent particular objects. Nor is it explained how we win the vicariousness of mediation.SocializationIn trying to establish the connection between the organism and its environment, we are inquiring how the adjustment of the organism takes place.The childs adaptation to the environment is generally labeled as ap,socialization-process.43 This term indicates that the child is admitted to*a society and only gradually learns to apprehend what the society expects from it, and what the child itself may expect to attain. This adaptation not only consists in adjusting to social objects (other persons and collec-tivities), but also in adjusting to the physical things with which the child comes in contact. The child, so to say, has to learn how the things behave* if they are treated in a particular way, that the things may be grasped or lifted with more or less effort, that they are hard or soft. Through experiences with the things one may adjust ones own conduct, and perception becomes a recognition of the things which are known. It might be objected that the word socialization* does not fit the adjustment to the physical things, as an interminable amount of elementary experiences has to be common to all cultures to enable man to find his way in the physical surroundings. But at the same time the physical objects differ in the various societies, and above all, they participate in different human actions. Children growing up in a metropolis and peasant children thus have different experiences with physical things. Generally perception is very unsatisfactory in front of things we do not know.44 As grown-up persons we usually have to undergo particular experiences to be able to carry out a particular profession. This means that perception is dependent upon our conceptions; we perceive the sum of our own experiences.45 And these experiences are in the highest degree a result of the demands made by our society. We may also put it this way: the formation of intermediary objects is dependent upon intentional poles which have to be understood as generalized, socially conditioned experiences. The intentions we attain are a result of the socialization-process. Tautologically expressed the given world consists of the objects we know.46Very soon the parents start to expect a certain behaviour from the child.At the gatnt time they adjust themselves to the childs actions and try to understand their meaning, that is, what the child seems to expect from the environment. Parents and child thus influence each other mutually, a state of affairs which is generally called interaction .47 The interaction is conditioned by mutual expectations. Scientific work is also based upon expectations, in the form of appropriate predictions. Human interaction is more complicated because it is not enough to understand the behaviour of physical objects, but one has also to consider the reactions of Alter to ones own actions. This is a fundamental characteristic of human interaction. From childhood on, we behave in certain ways to obtain the reactions we want from Alter, or to escape undesired reactions. Those objects which may enter into a relationship of mutual expectations, we have called social objects. Social objects may be single personalities, groups or collectivities. For the child, the mother is primarily an important social object, soon also the whole family and only later other collectivities.Evidently the social expectations are also generalized experiences. One attains in correspondence with ones own actions. The baby cries when it wants something, and because its needs are relatively few, this is usually adequate. When the needs become more differentiated, the childs actions become correspondingly articulated and it starts to make use of 1 signs* to attain gratification of its expectations. In this way it takes advantage of the fact that objects may represent each other. We thus see that the signs we employ denote generalized experiences, objects we want to attain, escape or describe. The generalized experiences are abstracted inter-situational similarities. The sign is of fundamental importance because it overlooks minor differences, and through its stable meaning makes that communication possible which is a prerequisite of any differentiated interaction.48 The signs are characterized by being common and ready for use; they are not invented anew within the individual interaction.49 Socialization therefore primarily consists in an adjustment to that part of tradition which comprises all sign-complexes or symbol-systems .50 It is impossible to get direct individual knowledge of all the objects in our environment, but we take over instead the experiences of others through the symbol-systems. Although these experiences often are communicated and used in a superficial way, they make us grasp objects far beyond our individual potentialities. The process of socialization is therefore both necessary and dangerous. It is needed to integrate the individual in the common world and to give

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37him a feeling of security. It becomes dangerous when the adjustment to the accepted standards is exaggerated and brings forth prejudices and rejections of everything different. In a fascinating study, G. Allport has shown how socialization generally leads to pronounced conflict-creating prejudices.51 The * standard-meanings also are often employed by opportunists or * success-hunters who try to win a large public by serving up the most vulgar generalities.52We understand that the characteristic expectations which determine a personality may not be interpreted as organical needs. The personality as well as the collectivity and the symbol-systems are created through interaction. We also understand that all these objects are mutually interdependent.53 Our inborn faculties cannot be considered anything but dispositions which have to receive concrete empirical material within the limits established by the interaction-process.The socialization primarily takes place through imitation and identification. Imitation consists in taking over cultural elements like knowledge, beliefs, and symbols, while identification means that we come to understand and accept the mediated values, i. e., that the expectations and objects the signs designate are of different importance. The result is a common standard which gives meaning to the interaction- process. 54 The values thic are not absolute either, but must be understood as more or less invariant social products. They are given a priori neither in personality nor in nature, but are handed down as a part of the cultural tradition, and are integrated in the personality through interaction.55We have mentioned that socialization continuously demands that obsolete expectations are substituted with new ones. This is particularly important during childhood and adolescence, but the process necessarily continues throughout our whole life as we always have to face new situations, and because society undergoes continuous changes. The substitution can only be carried out by forwarding demands which initially give the interaction a certain lack of balance. Immediate gratification of these demands is impossible, at the same time as our expectations become wrong: something else is asked for other than we expected. It is of decisive importance that the ego does not respond with defense-mechanisms which hinder the socialization-process, but accepts the disappointment and adjustsitself to the new expectations. Security thus means the ability to bear a certain amount of disappointments, and these disappointments or renouncements are basic to the development of personality.Socialization therefore implies that we learn to behave in particular 'i ways towards particular things, in other words, that particular phenomena $ have become connected with particular objects. This relationship varies according to which interactions the single individual has established. The sociologists express this by saying that we play different * roles* in society. II The word role thus denotes an ordered behaviour determined by parti- cular intentional poles.56 The word has been chosen to illustrate that our ^ behaviour is neither accidental nor understandable through an isolated | study of the single individual. It also expresses that we have different roles in interaction, which are mutually interdependent. A society is an ordered system of roles defined through institutions. Marriage is such an institution. The personality may also be understood as a system of roles determined by the individuals participation in different interactions. The same role, therefore, is different to different individuals in so far as it always belongs to another role-system. The roles of the single individual \ change during the course of life, especially during childhood and adolescence. Particularly important is the transition to the professional world of the grown-up person. Parsons considers this a new phase in the socialization-process. While the first phase was universal, the second is more specialized. In great part it consists in the acquisition of that specialized knowledge which is necessary in the situations of a grown-up role. What has to be learned is generally so complex that the only efficient method is imitation.57 The roles also change later in life. Marriage thus asks for always new role-contents as one gets one or more children, and as the children grow up and leave the home. Even society itself may change in such a way that the roles assume a different character.58 In general, however, we may regard the roles and their changes as determined within the social system. We may also say that a particular cultural pattern is expressed through the roles.Every role implies a particular orientation to the environment, and it is therefore a matter of course that the roles are reflected in perception. We have already mentioned the specialized * perception of the car-driver,

4

4and understand that all specialists necessarily have to develop their characteristic intentional poles. The artist is no exception. Most special* intentions are developed during the second phase of socialization. The mechanism of perception, however, is built upon a foundation of general, everyday intentions. This is due to the first phase of the socialization-process, which may be called universal* because it changes less in space and time. Childrens drawings are fairly similar in all parts of the world, while the arts reflect a later adaptation to different roles and cultural objects.SCHEMATIZATIONWe define a schema as a typical (stereotyped) reaction to a situation, that is, as a typical attitude or a characteristic coherence-system of intentional poles. We understand that the schemata are formed during socialization,59 and their importance is so great that we may almost put a sign of equality between schema and perception.60 Thus we generally ascribe to a man who speaks Swedish all the properties which make up our schema Swede9; in fact we perceive properties which may not be present, and discover perhaps that our schema only partly fits. Or rather, we discover that our perception is wrong, as we usually are not conscious of our schemata. When we discover that our reaction is unsatisfactory, that the schema does not allow a sufficient intentional depth, we are forced to revise it. The schematization therefore is a process which never comes to a close. But it is a well-known fact that our prejudices may be so strong that we refuse to revise, and if we say that a person is fossilized, it signifies that his schematization has stopped. He has acquired a collection of more or less primitive schemata, and has at any price to force reality into them. Rather than letting the schemata go, he accepts a distorted view of reality. We cling to the schemata and are afraid of the insecurity which would result if the world should lose its schema-bound stability. Brunswik thus says that a certain Unbelehrbarkeit characterizes perception.61 Piaget reports an experiment where 5-year-old children have to predict how the surface of the water inside a bottle moves when the bottle is tipped. Although the children look at the bottle when it is tipped, they are unable to perceive that the surface of the water remains horizontal.Piaget concludes that the experiment *... shows how poorly commonly perceived events are recorded in the absence of a schema within which they may be organized.62 Any new situation demands a certain revision of our schemata, and an active relation to the environment presupposes such a flexibility. One of the most beautiful experiences is to meet an j elderly person who is still willing to receive impressions, and who does not reject everything that does not not fit in with the essence of his or her previous experience.To learn to see*, above all means to acquire schemata which allow an adequate intentional depth. This is apparent, for example, when one is learning a foreign language: it is essential to learn to intend spontaneously the meaning of the words. A language we do not know well demands effort, because the intention of the meaning does not come without translation. It is of course neither possible nor necessary to build up all schemata individually. While the simplest perceptual schemata are a result of senso-motoric activity, the higher schemata are, as suggested, based upon communication of experiences and cultural traditions. If this were not the case, our culture would never reach beyond a very primitive* stage. We assimilate experiences through the schemata, and these come to life when we have an experience which fits . Every historical period brings forth its characteristic schematizations.The great Swiss child-psychologist Jean Piaget has given us a basic understanding of schematization. He stresses that the first schemata are a result of the childs concrete operations, and not an intellectual abstraction 4 of the properties of things. Wittgenstein expresses this state of affairs when he says: It is only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such and such, that it makes sense to say that he has had this experience. Thus Piaget shows that our primal schematizations are the result of operations such as putting things close to each other, into each other or after each other.64 When the child draws a rounding and lets it represent a thing in general, this signifies that it assimilates the things to its schema for thingness. For the child a thing is primarily something enclosed and compact, and the rounding perfectly represents these qualities.65In general the schemata are based upon similarity between phenomena. While the objects of science are constructed through approximately objective abstractions, the schemata result from the experience of equivalent situations and have to be understood as relatively impure objects.66 In the following we shall take a look at the schemata which mediate our physical world of everyday life.The first schema to be acquired is, according to Piaget, proximity*. Later follow among others, enclosure and continuity. Size-constancy is a schema which results from the operational experience that things maintain their size when moved. Simple gestalt qualities like elementary geometrical figures are obviously based upon the schemata enclosure and continuity, while the perception of more complicated wholes, like works of art, presuppose schemata which may only be acquired through special training. We easily perceive a melody as a totality because it belongs to a key, whereby the single tones of the melody are experienced in their relation to the key-schema. Atonal music is generally criticized for being without melody, because the key-schemata not only have lost their organizing role, but work directly to create prejudices and hinder perception. Through instruction and through becoming accustomed, we may acquire an adequate new schema which opens up the intended meaning.67 When we say that the schemata mediate the intended meaning, we underline the fundamental importance of schematization. The schemata are, as mentioned, to be considered as characteristic coherence-systems of intentional poles, and thus correspond to the objects which constitute our personal world. The world is common in so far as the schemata are common. The schemata give form to the world, because they organize the phenomena as manifestations of objects.68 The constancy-phenomena, for instance, imply that we have learned to perceive changing phenomena as representing the same object.The first schemata start to develop on a senso-motoric basis from birth on.69 In a child of 7-8 months, the visual and tactile experiences of the permanency of things are not yet co-ordinated. Although a child of 5-6 weeks thus does not experience the things as permanent, it starts to recognize.70 As the experience of form- and size-constancy is lacking, the recognition can only result from the childs ability to grasp topological

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transformations. Topology docs not deal with permanent distances, angles or areas, but is based upon relations such as proximity, separation, succession, closure (inside, outside), and continuity.71 We may notice that the child in this early period experiences the transformations as changes of the thing itself, and not as apparent changes due to variations in the relation between the thing and the child. The topological schemata thus are characterized by being tied to the thing, not grasping the mutual relations between a number of things. In this way they mediate a visual world consisting of isolated elements, and do not allow for the co-ordination of these elements into a unified whole. The only kind of order which may be attained is based upon the proximity-relation, and consists in a succession of separate things. This kind of order (collection) later develops into the continuity-schema, when the child realizes that the proximity-operation itself is a process which can be repeated ad infinitum. In this way the operation is abstracted from the concrete physical things which gave birth to it. As soon as continuity is acquired, only a small step lacks for the formation of schemata which determine the relations between things. The straight line has an important function in the development of such comprehensive schemata. Topology does not know the straight line, but it forms a part of the projective and Euclidean systems. The straight line thus is not given to the child a priori, nor is the tri-dimensional or Euclidean; space, which most people consider self-evident.72 * Vertical-horizontal* is another schematization. Piaget opposes the general view that this relation is a necessary result of our standing and walking upright. His experiments show that the vertical-horizontal schema has to be built up through operations with things.73The projective or perspective relations are neither properties of the things nor an a priori relationship between the things and ourselves, but schematizations on the basis that certain properties remain constant when the viewpoint is shifted. The only property which is added to the topological ones is that the straight lines are preserved during the transformational Angles and distances (proportions), however, are variable. Proportions seem related to the interdependence of the parts of the Gestalt theory.74 The Gestalt psychologists have clearly shown that the phenomenal relation between the parts are a function of the whole, that is, the perception ofsingle proportions varies according to the context. Piaget also shows that75 pthe perception of proportions is very unsteady and defective. Strong 676 *Gestalten such as discrete, simple geometrical figures, are the only ex- ceptions.75 The experience of pregnancy and Gestalt quality is thereforeprimarily due to other factors than the proportions, and we have alreadysuggested that the basis is topological, with straight lines and definedlangles as later supplements.76From what has been said above, we understand that the Gestalt laws '* are relatively simple schematizations, mainly based upon the topological schemata described by Piaget. It should also be* stressed that they are not general laws* we have to obey. We can very well direct our attitude differently than prescribed by the Gestalt schemata. And the thesis of Gestalt psychology, that we always prefer the simplest solution, is explained by the fact that we know that a clear order is convenient. But the need for a simple order is not absolute, it is a well-known phenomenon that perception often tends to oversimplify the situation. The experiences of a characteristic property, as well as a diffuse totality or an articulated form, are the result of schematizations. To perceive implies that we attain a certain order, and the chaotic is defined by shunning a satisfactory perception.The so-called constancy-phenomena also have to be mentioned in more detail. When we perceive a circular table, it is almost always seen obliquely, and the projective pattern on the retina is oval. In spite of this we experience a circular table and not an oval one. This is called * form- constancy, and implies that we may perceive the sameness of a thing although its projective pattern changes. There are of course limits to the recognition of complicated forms. J. J. Gibson maintains that the projectional pattern must keep a kind of identity through the changes.77 The projectional pattern is distorted, but certain determining structural qualities are retained during the distortion. We may say that the form is stretched without bursting. As already mentioned, Piaget has shown that we learn to perceive the sameness of things because .of their topological properties.We therefore do not have to consider the projective pattern in this context, but a careful investigation of the limits of thing-constancy is anyway very desirable.78 Thing-constancy may of course also result when two (or more)

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49forms are mediated by the same non-topological (or mixed) schema. If we want to describe a square, for instance, it is not enough to say that it has four equal sides which are joined at right angles. Among other characteristics the square also has a centre which, although invisible, may play an important role in perception. We see that a point which is placed in this centre acquires a completely different character from a point placed somewhere else within the square. We may conclude that the area of the square has not a uniform character, but is structured by a skeleton of lines and points. Consequently we also understand that the form of a figure is not only determined by its contours. The structural skeleton has to be understood as a system of simple topological and Euclidean schemata, which in the above-mentioned case art unified in the * square- 1 schema*.79 Usually we perceive a Gestalt by means of several schemata, and the structural skeleton is made up of the poles these schemata encompass. In general we realize that the constancy-phenomena are of the greatest importance, because they determine those basic principles of composition we call repetition and variation*.One of the problems which has given the psychologists most trouble is the so-called space-perception*. As long as the eye was considered a kind of photographic apparatus, it seemed incomprehensible that the flat* projectional pattern on the retina could mediate the perception of depth. But we have seen that perception is not a slave of the projectional pattern. Perception aims at valid assumptions about the nature of the environment, and it is evident that a hypothesis which organizes the situation into a two-dimensional surface would usually lead to catastrophical actions. It is highly necessary that the organism acquires schemata which directly mediate a tri-dimensional world. Piaget shows that our space- consciousness * is based upon operational schemata, that is, experiences with things. The space-schemata may be of very different kinds, and the same individual normally possesses more than one schema, to allow him a satisfactory perception of diverse situations or tasks*. The schemata, moreover, are culturally determined. It is thus a naive simplification to believe that the space-perceptions correspond to the objective physical space of science.80 In daily life we usually act on the basis of direction, size and distance, and only a particular attitude enables us to combine these phenomena into a superior space-conception. Such a space-schema in a developed form, is capable of defining the relations between things by indications like right and left, behind and before, over and Under, and alsothrough considering the relative sizes. The Euclidean space-schema organizes such indications into a system extending in all three dimensions.81The investigations of Piaget have shown that Euclidean space is a relatively late schematization, which only has an unconscious behavioural character.The experience of depth, which is the point of departure for the Euclideanschema, stems from the topological relation that things are between each other. Also, the perception of depth is very inaccurate and demonstrates that phenomenal space has a non-Euclidean character.82 Nor does Euclidean space correspond to the gravitational space which 4 radiates from the globe. The straight lines we imagine parallel to the surface of the earth are far from straight, and we understand that Euclidean space is not derived from the physical properties of the globe.Piagets experiment with the water-bottle shows that the younger children only perceive that the water is inside, without being able to render an account of the relation between the water and the bottle. The bigger children also perceive the surface of the water, but imagine its relation to the bottle as unchanged when the bottle is tipped. The water is hence assimilated to the directions of the bottle as a schema, and although the children see that the water-surface remains horizontal when the bottle is tipped, they are unable to represent in a drawing this state of affairs!Only still older children are able to assimilate the water to an imagined schema outside the bottle, i. e., the vertical-horizontal schema.Piaget sums up his investigations with these words: It is quite obvious that the perception of space involves a gradual construction and certainly does not exist ready made at the outset of mental development.83 The intuition of space is not a reading or apprehension of the properties of objects, but from the very beginning, an action performed on them.84 Hence we understand that the word space may denote very different objects which may be more or less intentionally distant. In certain older cultures, for instance, the space-conception was also determined by different qualities assigned to the directions north, south, west and east. These qualities were intermediary objects with religious ideas as contributingpoles, and the space-schema thus has to be described as non-homogeneous or even discontinuous. Such * space-conceptions * are not as unintelligible as they may seem; we should only remember that our own more or less developed Euclidean schema is also a schema, an empirically constructed contribution to the intentional poles of perception, and not something immediately given in the stimulus-situation.85 Those phenomena which are manifestations of a * space may be indications like * from here to there , or an experience of narrowness, openness, enclosure etc., discrete indications with ourselves functioning as a centre. We may move the * space-centre by concentrating our attention on a far object ( I put myself in your place ), or even by moving it into an imagination. But a more developed space- schema is usually an object on such a high level that it escapes elucidation.If we really try to imagine Euclidean space as uniform extension in all directions, we discover that this is impossible. Even to imagine an infinitely long straight line is an impossibility. We may perhaps conceive such things, but we cannot perceive them. Thus we have to repeat that they are human constructions and not given a priori. Our perception of space, therefore, can be described as always changing intermediary objects where our own space-schemata function as intentional poles.86Schema variantsThe elementary perceptional schemata which have been outlined above, mediate a world of simple physical things. In different cultures these schemata are mixed* with more particular intentional poles with colour* perception in characteristic ways. In our western culture we distinguish ^ strictly between living and inanimate objects, and we pursue intentions where the invariant physical properties of things are the main goals. We usually try to understand the situation, and our perception becomes diffuse and unsatisfactory if the stimulus does not fit our simple categories.*7 Primitive man behaves in a completely different way. All things are spontaneously experienced as animated and living. Such a physiognomic or magic* perception intends the expression of things. In our culture we only experience other persons in this way.88 Anthropomorphism is a particular type of physiognomic perception, where human characteristics arc read into everything. Schematizations resulting from experiences with other human beings are employed as more general intentional poles. Another kind of intermediary object which still is very important, and in primitive man basic, results from the confusion of different sense- modalities. A well-known case of this synaesthesia is the seeing of colours on hearing music. In the old Chinese culture the colours were attached to different realms of objects and properties, and the Zuni-Indians assign a colour to each of the main directions.89 Child-psychology shows that early experiences usually have a synaesthetic character, and when we as grown-ups say that a thing looks heavy and soft, we still perceive synaesthetic phenomena.The intention of the expression means that the feelings come to dominate perception. The feelings, however, are not mystical qualities which exist independently of the objects. They also have to be described in terms of objects, and are to be understood as a particular kind of intermediary object where values (or cultural objects in general) colour the situation.90 No perception is in reality completely free from an emotional content; it is only in the laboratory of the psychologist that we can isolate those pure schematizations which have been mentioned above. In our culture, though, it is typical that we consider the pure objects as our ideal goals.91 Primitive man, instead, structures the world according to the emotional relationships to things.92 He does not, as we do, intend the more invariant properties of things, and his world becomes unstable and variable. The same things have a different character according to the context where they appear.93 In spite of the changeable environment of primitive man, his culture may be labeled revolution-free.94 To survive he is dependent upon an immutable society of which he forms an integral part.95 Children, too, from an early stage of development, show the same need for fixed rules.96 In both cases the concept of order expresses itself as the determining condition for all human behaviour, and at the same time we recognize the need to cling to any acquired order. This can give perception the character of defense rather than the collection of information. The perceptive variants outlined above are not accidental, but result from concrete experiences. They represent possible organizations of reality, and their development in the individual is determined by cultural, social, and personal factors.97 On the other hand, we can within any culture recognize characteristic errors of perception. These may follow from an insufficient organization of the situation due to the lack of appropriate schemata, or from the employment of wrong schemata. The last case often presents itself as trompe-Voeil or as a confusion of Sein und Schein (we marry the girl because of her beauty).The organism in the environmentThe psychology of perception teaches us to refuse nave realism. The world is not as it immediately appears to each of us. We always have to take into consideration that our perceptions may be superficial or even wrong. Any situation in which we have to participate is perceived in relation to our previous experiences. This means that we organize the situation according to our perceptual schemata. And we have seen that the schemata are only common on a fairly low, everyday level. If we put a modern sportsman in front of one of Michelangelos slaves, he integrates it in his world by saying: a man of stone. We become what we do, and we do what we are.98Our perceptions are, as we have seen, intermediary objects. The stimulus- situation usually offers many possibilities for the choice of intentional poles, and often we ourselves contribute decisive poles which are not to be found in the external situation. This happens for instance when a bank-note looks larger than a piece of paper of the same size. For every one of us particular stimuli will be connected with particular coherence-systems (schemata) during the process of perception. We can also express this by saying that a particular stimulus produces particular expectations. In most cases the same stimulus will give rise to several different expectations, among which one is of particular intensity. If a man talks Swedish, we expect that he is a Swede, although we might also believe with a certain degree of probability that he is a compatriot who wants to fool us. Thus we spontaneously perceive a Swede when he opens his mouth. We see and hear what we expect, and in this way the given stimulus becomes meaningful. We perceive the stimulus as a manifestation of an intermediary object, in our example the schema Swede, and everything this implies of positive and negative properties. Every time our perception is unsatisfactory, we should have to revise our expectations and make new schematizations. We can only enlarge our world in this way.99 The objects thus represent and mediate each other, at the same time as they form totalities which are something more than the sum of their components. An object is defined through certain objective properties. But we rarely react to these. We do not react to the weight or shape of a cushion, but perceive it as something to sit upon. We thus react to relations between objects, to changing phenomenal conditions.The schemata, as we have understood, are habits of perception which have become established in such a way that they acquire the character of quasi-objects. They possess a lower degree of objectivity (stability) than the concepts of science, but may in spite of this be common to a more or less extensive collectivity. A way of life is rather characterized by such common quasi-objects than by contemporary scientific theories. The world mediated by a more or less public perception therefore diverges from the system of pure objects of science. It is characterized by floating transitions and an infinity of shades. A descriptive analysis of this phenomenal world, however, can only be carried through in terms of the pure objects. Our environment can only be described vom Gegenstand her, and the organism is characterized by the objects which are accessible to it.100 We should be careful, however, not to form a belief that perception and science mediate two (or more) different worlds. What is said above only refers to different representations of the same world. Science is based upon the criterion of objectivity, and therefore offers us common standards. The only possible type of description is the scientific one, but we have not done with the world in having described it.101

52. SymbolizationObject and descriptionOur actions presuppose an organization of the environment. This organization consists, as we have seen, in abstracting objects from the immediately given phenomena.1 The objects, or the form we assign to the world, arc expressed in our behaviour. But we have also suggested that for many n purposes it is necessary to fix the objects by means of signs, so that they may be talked about, described and ordered into systems.2 The more complex and differentiated the environment becomes, the more we shall need a large number of symbol-systems which allow for co-operation and fellowship. We can only describe order, because every description aims at the demonstration of similarities. The objects are the order or form of reality.The phenomena are immediately given with form, as manifestations of objects, and this form is their meaning. This does not imply that the objects cause the phenomena. The phenomena have no causes, but appear (present themselves) in a certain order. The meaning of the phenomenon is the context in which it appears. We thus understand that phenomenon* and object are two aspects of the same matter. We abstract the most invariant properties of the phenomena and call them objects.We can only describe the phenomena in terms of objects because we can only describe similarities (relations) between phenomena, or structure.3 Any description, any science, therefore, has to be *vom Gegenstand her'.4 A phenomenological* description is an illusion, as it necessarily has to classify the phenomena, that is, it has to be carried out in terms of objects.It is not as a matter of fact evident how the phenomena should be classified, as the phenomena may have several properties in common. We could, for instance, classify according to colour, and give the same designation to

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53a Chinese and a yellow cheese. Although this example seems exaggerated, it often happens that we classify according to conspicuous, but superficial similarities. Under the pressure of new experiences, however, we will have to discard inconvenient classifications. Thus we no longer divide the material things into the substances (objects) earth, air, fire and water, but order them according to atomic numbers.5 The demand for efficient classifications means that we are trying to obtain an order of a certain durability (invariance), which is objective and common.6 In describing, it is of fundamental importance to choose the most suitable objects of comparison, or dimensions (Vergleichsdimensionen).7 The objects, thus, are neither accidental nor given a priori, but constructed to serve particular purposes. We say that our world of objects is false if it does not coincide with our ex