ERIC RUSSERT KRAEMER

I N T E N S I O N A L C O N T E X T S A N D I N T E N S I O N A L E N T I T I E S

(Received 7 September 1978)

Howard Smokler argues (in 'Three grades of probabilistic involvement', this journal, August, 1977) that a correct account of probability statements requires an intensional framework. He also notes that "the notion of 'inten- sional' suffers from an apparent ambiguity" (p. 129). He claims, however, that "a unified account of the intensional can be given which renders the

ambiguity of its meaning harmless" (p. 129). What I wish to question here is the helpfulness of Smokler's account of the intensional.

Smokler makes the following proposal:

A notion is intensional/extensional iff statements employing it are committed to inten- sional/extensional entities. (p. 140)

His discussion ofintensional entities is limited to telling us that they are things

"such as possible worlds, necessarily existent individuals, and essential proper ties' (p. 140). But how do these remarks help to give us a 'unified'

account of intensionality? Smokler notes (in discussions of pr6bability statements) that the notion of 'intensional' has been construed as (1) refer-

ring to a non-truthfunctional operator 1 , (2) failing substitutivity of co- referential terms 2 and (3) being truth-value dependent on 'possible state-

descriptions 3 (p. 129). Why should not a similar ambiguity arise for the

notion of 'intensional enti ty ' . Is it an entity: (1 ' ) discussion of which requires

a non-truth-functional operator, or (2 ' ) which when discussed requires an

operator which fails substitutivity of co-referential terms, or (3 ' ) for which 'possible' state-descriptions are required for determining the truth-value of

statements concerning it? What sort of answer can be given to this question which is not open to one who wishes to resolve the initial ambiguity with respect to intensional contexts? In any event may we not suggest the following 'unified' account of 'intensional entity '?

An entity is intensional iff statements in which commitment to it is made employ intensional contexts.

Philosophical Studies 37 (1980) 65-66. 0031-8116/80/0371-0065500.20 Copyright �9 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

66 ERIC RUSSERT KRAEMER

In sum, it is not clear what sort of unity or clarity is to be gained from

Smokler's proposal. Whatever real problem there is for the notion of

' intensional' seems to have its counterpart for the notion of 'intensional

entity' .

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

NOTES

R.C. Jeffrey: 1967, Formal Logic: Its Scope and Limits (McGraw-Hill, New York), p. 56.

H. Smokler: 1967, 'The equivalence condition', American Philosophical Quarterly 4, pp. 300-307. 3 H.E. Kyburg, Jr.: 1974, 'Probabilities and propensities', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25, pp. 358-375.