Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space a Methodology for Homeland Security Intelligence Analysis

8/4/2019 Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space a Methodology for Homeland Security Intelligence Analysis

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75A Methodologyfor hoMelAnd Securityintelligence AnAlySiSSAIS Reviewvol. XXVIII no. 1 (WinterSpring 2008)

75 2008 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

Intelligence Preparation of the

Battlespace: A Methodology for

Homeland Security IntelligenceAnalysis

Jin Kim and William M. (Bill) Allard

O the many challenges aced by the Department o Homeland Security and its intelligenceenterprise, developing a common culture remains one o the most daunting tasks. Intelli-

gence Preparation o the Battlespace (IPB) provides an analytical methodology that couldcultivate a common analytical culture in the homeland security intelligence community,which is key to the communitys eectiveness in thwarting a terrorist attack against theUnited States.

At hearings beore the Select Committee on Intelligence o the U.S. Senatein 1992, General Paul Gorman, U.S. Army (Retired), stated that intelli-gence remains inormation, no matter how adroitly collected, and no matterhow well analyzed, until it is lodged between the ears o a decision maker.1Intelligence with a purpose drives decision making. This intelligence enablespolicymakers to ocus on tactics, strategies, and policies to prevent, respondto, and recover rom terrorist attacks on the United States. Intelligence thatdrives decision making is a orm o structured argumentation in which onemakes a case or or against a tactic or policy in the context o a rameworkthat makes assumptions, reasoning, rationale, and evidence explicit andtransparent.2 Intelligence Preparation o the Battlespace (IPB) is an ana-

Jin Kim is a Principal Analyst or CENTRA Technology, Inc, and currently supportsstrategic risk methodology and analysis or the U.S. Department o Homeland Security.Mr. Kim has worked in the intelligence community or over ten yearsrom tactical

Army assignments to strategic assignments supporting the Department o Deense.He has a B.S. in General Engineering rom the United States Military Academy andan M.A. in Security Studies rom Georgetown Universitys School o Foreign Service.

William M. (Bill) Allard is a Senior Analyst or CENTRA Technology, Inc. currentlyproviding intelligence analytical support to U.S. Government client agencies. Mr. Allardis retired rom the U.S. Marine Corps, has been a member o the National IntelligenceCommunity or 27 years and is the ormer Open Source Intelligence Chie or the DHS-Intelligence and Analysis Directorate. He contributed to the development o DHSsOpen Source Intelligence Strategy and contributed to the ormulation o the NationalOpen Source Enterprise.


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76 SAIS Review WinterSpring 2008

lytical methodology utilized by the U.S. Army and military proessionals toreduce uncertainty about the adversary or threat.

Through methodical analysis and the aggregation o componentsteps, IPB provides a ramework or intelligence proessionals to continu-ally update their situational awareness o the adversary or threat and build

upon layers and layers o inormation. IPB provides a general rameworkor managing inormation, knowledge, and analysis to provide purpose-ul intelligence or planners and decision makers. In the military, the IPBramework allows the intelligence proessional to reduce uncertainty aboutthe threat, its capability, and its intentions, so that the commander canmake decisions and apply plans (tactics, resources, communications, etc.)to achieve the missions purpose. Applying IPB helps reduce policy riskby providing better situational understanding o the threat. In the og opartial inormation and uncertainty, IPB provides a methodology to help

extrapolate hypotheses.Ater the attacks o September 11th and the creation o the Depart-

ment o Homeland Security (DHS), the deciency in homeland securityintelligence (HSINT) has been clear and prominent. The National Com-mission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (commonly known asthe 9/11 Commission) highlighted the need or the United States to bridgethe divide between oreign and domestic intelligence.3 Breaking down thebarrier between oreign and domestic intelligence is a critical mission orDHSa mission that has additional hurdles beyond the normal og o

partial inormation, including structural and unctional barriers rom long-standing practices o not sharing inormation. Due to the added dicultiesin HSINT, a common analytical methodology is needed. By applying theprinciples o Intelligence Preparation o the Battlespace, DHS can createintelligence with a purpose, ocused on managing and mitigating risks tothe U.S. homeland.

This paper will dene IPB and the domain o risk analysis and riskmitigation within homeland security. It will also discuss the applicationo IPB to homeland security and intelligence. Additionally, this paper willdiscuss the importance o open source inormation and describe how open

source inormation can help create a culture o homeland security intel-ligence analysis.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

I you know the enemy and yoursel, you need not ear the result o a hun-dred battles. I you know yoursel and not the enemy, or every victory gainedyou will also suer a deeat. I you know neither yoursel nor the enemy, youwill succumb in every battle.

Sun Tzu - Art o War, c. 400 BC4

Intelligence Preparation o the Battlespace (IPB), previously known asIntelligence Preparation o the Battleeld, is a systematic and continuousmethodology to conduct intelligence analysis with the purpose o providing


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77A Methodologyfor hoMelAnd Securityintelligence AnAlySiS

inormation about the threat or adversary in order to drive decision making.Derived rom the Army and its Field Manual (FM 34130,Intelligence Prepara-tion o the Battlefeld) and the Joint Publication or IPB (JP 2-01.3,Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures or Joint Intelligence Preparation o the Battlespace),IPB is a methodology practiced at all echelons o the armed orces. The

Army incorporated IPB as its systematic process or reducing uncertaintyin adversary analysis with the publication o its Army Field Manual 34130, Intelligence Preparation o the Battlefeld in 1994.5 As other services adoptedIPB, the term battlespace replaced battlefeld to better represent all aspects othe environment.6 The Joint Stas o the United States released the JointPublication or IPB in 2000 with the new term, battlespace.7 Decomposed,IPB is a our step continuous process that builds on layers o analysis witheach subsequent step: Dene the Battlespace Environment, Describe theBattlespace Eects, Evaluate the Threat, and Determine Threat Courses o

Action.IPB, oten misconstrued as merely terrain analysis, is an analytical

methodology that is applicable to all environments. This inaccurate associa-tion likely stems rom the act that the terrain is the basis or all analysis inthe domain o conventional warare in the Army. Dening the environmentreers to not only the land terrain, but also the sea, air and other physicaldimensions, plus political, social, economic, and other human actors o theenvironment.8 This step requires rigor, as analysts must identiy the compo-nents o the environment or urther analysis. In the second step, describing

the eects o the environment, analysts examine the impacts and eectso the environmentincluding riendly actions and activitieson genericthreat capabilities. The third step o IPB, evaluating the threat, encompassesall the traditional processes o intelligence analysis, thus creating the knowl-edge base o threat capabilities and intentions. Adding the third layer tothe analysis adjusts the model o the threat based upon the constraints othe environment. This leads to the ourth and nal step, determining theadversarys courses o action or developing competing hypotheses. Basedupon threat capabilities, intentions, and the constraints o the environment,analysts can develop hypotheses or what the adversary will do. In this step,

adding evaluation measures such as easibility, diculty, or consequencewill add more sophistication to the outcome. The basic methodology oIPB, i properly applied and tailored, can add a baseline methodologicalramework or analysis throughout the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.

Risk and the Department of Homeland Security

Risk-based decision making and risk-based approaches in decision makingare terms requently used to indicate that some systematic process that deals

with uncertainties is being used to ormulate policy options and assess theirvarious distributional impacts and ramications. Today an ever-increas-ing number o proessionals and managers in industry, government, andacademia are devoting a large portion o their time and resources to thetask o improving their understanding and approach to risk-based decisionmaking.9


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DHS, with its mission to protect the United States rom terrorist acts, isimplementing a concerted eort to insert risk into its decision makingprocess to reduce uncertainty and optimize investment o its resources toprotect the nation.10 DHS evaluates risk based upon three components:threat, vulnerability, and consequence, where threat is the probability o

attack, vulnerability is the probability o that attacks success, and conse-quence is the magnitude o the damage given. Understanding consequenceis knowing yoursel, whereas understanding threat and vulnerability isknowing your enemy. Currently at DHS, the consequence component isthe predominant understanding o risk; understandings o threat and vul-nerability are less prevalent and not as mature. This gap in the developmento risk components stems in part rom the short history o the DHS itselahistory that initially did not have a true intelligence component.

Although bridging the gap between oreign and domestic intelligence

was a main deciency ound by the 9/11 Commission and one o the mainreasons or the creation o the department, DHS has only recently organizedits own intelligence analysis capability, with the designation o a Chie Intel-ligence Ocer in 2005.11 Within the Oce o Intelligence and Analysis, DHSis undergoing changes to adequately ulll the roles and responsibilities orhomeland security intelligence assigned to it by the National Strategy orHomeland Security, July 2002, ocusing on threat and vulnerability.12

Interconnected with any structural reorm o intelligence operations isthe need or accompanying reorm o the DHSs analytic culture. Currently

this culture is a mix o the numerous intelligence and law enorcementcultures rom which the analysts predominantly learned their crat. As RobJohnston ound in his ethnographic study,Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intel-ligence Community, the methods and techniques o analysis are inormal,idiosyncratic, unveriable, and perhaps even unexplainable.13 Within DHS,what the analysts have brought with them are the practices and techniqueso their ormer organizations. Applying IPB as a methodology or intelli-gence analysis at DHS will provide a general ramework or rigorous analysiso threat and vulnerability that will urther develop an integrated homelandsecurity analytic culture that is inherently risk-based.

IPB Applications to Homeland Security

Homeland security involves the government and law enorcement at theederal, state, and local levels, as well as the private sector. Intelligence analy-sis in this collection o organizations goes against the grain o customaryoreign intelligence analysis in the intelligence community. State and locallaw enorcement practice a bottom-up approach o gathering evidence inorder to prosecute criminals, whereas the ederal authorities use a top-down

model.14

This disparity is evident within DHS alone. Headquarters and itsOce o Intelligence and Analysis possess traditional intelligence analysiscapabilities that are tied to the U.S. Intelligence Community, whereas otherDHS components including Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immi-gration and Customs Enorcement, Transportation Security Administra-


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tion, and the Coast Guard, all have unique intelligence organizations andmethods.15 Add state and local governments and law enorcement to themix, and the homeland security intelligence community becomes diversein background, as well as in tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Although the organizational growing pains within DHS and thebroader intelligence community will continue as inormation stovepipes

break and collaboration between entities increases, the opportunity to le-verage the expertise and practices o state and local law enorcement alongwith the traditional oreign intelligence expertise o the ederal agenciesoutweighs any hassles o reorganization. The demand or domestic intelli-gence capabilities has increased because countering terrorism has increasedthe need to collect domestic intelligence, but threats to domestic securitywill increase even more in the uture due to growth in technological ca-pacities.16 However, because there will be chaos in creating an increaseddomestic intelligence capability, there needs to be a standard analytical

methodology to provide ramework, guidance, and direction.For the purposes o this paper, we divide homeland security intelli-

gence analysis into three amiliar levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.Strategic intelligence analysis supports national-level requirements andpolicies. The DHS headquarters Oce o Intelligence and Analysis, with itsnational intelligence reach capabilities, is an oce that operates within thescope o the strategic level o analysis. Operational intelligence analysis sup-ports those organizations that have sub-domains o the homeland securitymission, such as Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security

Administration, and Immigration and Customs Enorcement. Tactical intel-ligence analysis covers state and local law enorcement.

Step One: Defne the Battlespace EnvironmentIPBs rst step, dening the battlespace environment, includes both geo-graphic and non-geographic inormation and serves as the base layer or

Roles & Responsibilities of Homeland Security Intelligence and Information Analysis


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analyzing the threat. This essential rst step incorporates the mission othe intended decision maker or customer and provides boundaries or theanalysis. The vision o the Department o Homeland Security IntelligenceEnterprise is to provide a decisive inormation advantage to the guard-ians o our homeland security.17 At every level o the Homeland Security

Intelligence Enterprise, intelligence analysts can dene their battlespaceenvironment based upon the mission o their own organization. One othe critical objectives o this step is to identiy current intelligence gaps inorder to dene assumptions, constraints, and limitations or analysis andto ocus the collection o inormation.

At the strategic level, homeland security intelligence analysis ocuseson terrorist threats to the entire United States; thereore coordination withand leveraging o the US Intelligence Community is vital. Dening thebattlespace environment at the operational level would be the task o such

agencies as the Transportation Security Administration, which would becharged with identiying systems, networks, and environmental variables

that shape transportation security. Tactically,the analysis or step one would ocus morenarrowly on state and local inormation,such as detailed geographic inormation oncities and neighborhoods, demographicson criminal activity, or income levels. At alllevels, the rst step o IPB involves data col-

lection and coordination with specialists totake into account all environmental variablesthat may aect terrorist operations.

Step Two: Describe the Battlespace EectsDescribing the battlespace eects builds on the characterization o the bat-tlespace in step one and explains how it infuences the threat entities in theirbehavior, tactics, and operations. This step also explains the eects upon theguardians o homeland security. By ocusing on the general capabilities othe threat and the vulnerabilities o homeland security, this step helps theanalyst identiy the limitations and opportunities the battlespace environ-mental variables present to the potential threat and homeland security op-erations.18 The vulnerability analysis in this step is critical or developmento the threats potential courses o action because it allows the analyst tostep into the mind o the threat to homeland security. Thereore, this stepin IPB requires coordination between intelligence analysts and operationsanalysts or planners. In DHS, this rapport is between inrastructure analystsand intelligence analysts; at CBP, the link is between customs and borderprotection agents and planners and the intelligence analysts; at the state

and local level, the relationship is between law enorcement ocers and theanalysts. Building on the rst step o IPB, describing the battlespace eectsocuses the analyst on vulnerabilities and opportunities o both the threatand homeland security guardians.

[H]omeland security

intelligence analysis

focuses on terrorist

threats to the entire

United States . . .


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Step Three: Evaluate the ThreatThis step o IPB begins the classical process o intelligence analysis: search-ing and developing databases o inormation and applying historical modelso the threat.19 For homeland security, it involves developing inormationfow in all directions to break down barriers to inormation sharing. Evalu-

ating the threat is about managing inormation and knowledge to beginto connect the dots. Connecting the dots, however, begins with being ableto manipulate the data and apply models or templates to iner gaps in thedata. Doctrinal templates are models o the threat based upon ideal condi-tions or the threat to operate, incorporating historical data about how thethreat has carried out past operations. Situation templates are an applica-tion o the doctrinal template to the current operating environment denedin steps one and two.

Step Four: Determine Threat Courses o ActionThe nal step o IPB is where the pieces o the puzzle come together, as ana-lysts connect the dots and develop hypotheses o what the threat is going todo. Integrating the previous three steps o IPB, step our asks, given whatthe threat normally preers to do, and the eects o the specic environ-ment in which he is operating now, what are his likely objectives and thecourses o action available to him?20 Determining threat courses o actionis where the art o intelligence analysis meets the science o the IPB meth-odology. Through corporate knowledge, each level o homeland security

intelligence analysis brings a unique perspective. Organizational standards,processes, and knowledge only provide a baseline or this step; the creativityand critical thinking needed or intelligence analysis comes rom the powero thinking analytically, a crat in its own right that demands practice andtraining.21 In this nal step o IPB, homeland security intelligence can realizethe ull potential o analytic power by creating a unique homeland securityintelligence culture that rom the bottom up eliminates the traditionalstovepipe and bureaucracy problem.

IPB and Mitigating RiskFor homeland security, risk is the product o threat, vulnerability, andconsequence; dierent organizations use dierent variations o this intheir risk methodology, but the general ramework is consistent. IPB is amethodology that helps analysts reduce uncertainty about the threat andpoint out vulnerabilities in homeland security. Ultimately this methodol-ogy helps decision makers develop plans and allocate resources to preventand protect the nation rom terrorist attacks.22 As decision makers imple-ment measures to prevent and protect, the continuous cycle o IPB enablesanalysts to update assessments and threat courses o action based upon the

risk-reduction measures.


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Open SourceTapping into the Well

Because o the complex composition o homeland security, encompassingederal, state, and local governments, tribes and the private sector, sharinginormation poses many challenges. However, open source inormation is

the common denominator among homeland security organizations at alllevels. Homeland security intelligences use o open source inormation isthereore vital to its culture and mission.

A strategy is a statement o undamental values, highest priorities, and ori-entation toward the uture, but it is an action document as well. For U.S.national intelligence, the time or change is now. There are no easy answersto the risks contemplated here, or the risks that might emerge. This strategythereore accepts risk as intelligences natural and permanent eld o actionand is based on the proposition that to preserve our security in a dangerous

century, vigilance is not enough. U.S. national intelligence must do more.23

When Ambassador Negroponte penned these words in the NationalIntelligence Strategy o the United States published in October 2005, almostcertainly one o the areas where he intended change to be made was in theexpanded use o a virtually untapped well o inormation, open source inor-mation. Open source inormation and subsequently open source intelligence(OSINT) has been a recognized resource or decades, and has requentlymade signicant contributions to the eorts o the United States Intel-ligence Community. Open source inormation diers rom OSINT in thatOSINT is the culmination o directed open source inormation gatheringand ocused analytical scrutiny. In broader terms, OSINT is no dierentthan SIGINT, HUMINT or any other INT, in that OSINT is inormationthat has been deliberately discovered, discriminated, distilled, and dissemi-nated to a select audience in order to address a specic question.24

Open source inormation, however, has oten been an aterthought inthe minds o trained all-source intelligence analysts, their leaders, and theirmanagers, particularly when aced with siting through mounds o otherintelligence-discipline material. In implementing a new strategy, the U.S. In-

telligence Community has perhaps discovered the intrinsic value that opensource inormation can play in the modern era, especially at a time when itnds itsel squarely at odds with the undamentally asymmetric problem oterrorism around the world and at home. Open source inormation venues,including traditional media sources, commercial or premium (pay) content,commercial geospatial data, proessional and academic journals, and greyliterature, must be viewed as an entirely separate dimension in deningthe contemporary battlespace. Grey literature is that inormation that isboth legally and ethically available, but only rom specialized channels or

through direct local access. Generally, grey literature is considered inorma-tion whose distribution is not controlled by commercial publishers, and/orthat inormation that is not published, distributed, catalogued or acquiredthrough commercial booksellers and subscription agencies. Grey literatureincludes working papers, pre-prints, technical reports and technical stan-


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dards documents, dissertations and other academic papers, data sets, andcommercial imagery.25

Understanding the permissive environment wherein the adversaryconducts his business is essential to understanding and validating potentialthreat inormation. In terms o

terrorist pre-operational activ-itythat is, what terrorists dobeore they strikewe know thatthey and their supporters com-municate in open orums on theInternet.26 We know they elicitsupport, proselytize, recruit, andmine or data, and there is nodoubt some o that data is intended as targeting inormation or their own

operations. Overlaying open source inormation in an Event Template sce-nario, trained open source analysts are able to understand what an adversaryis capable o, what they have done, and possibly what they are currently do-ing. Based on validated open source inormation, analysts are then able toassess potential courses o action that the adversary may choose rom or bein avor o. However, the accuracy o any open source assessment is based ontwo actors: the veracity o the data or source, and the ability o the analyst,which includes the ability to recognize and assess source credibility, discernactual data rom opinion, understand the political light inormation is be-

ing cast in, i any, and assemble disparate pieces o inormation into cogentand concise ormat or immediate consumption.The prousion o publicly available open source inormation today

is abundant to the point o being inexhaustible. In terms o battlespacedepth, identiying and exploiting specic targets in the sheer expanse othe Internet alone demands substantial investment in both human capitaland nancial resources. While ederal, state, local, and tribal governmentadministrations ace the constant struggle to balance nancial investment,trained OSINT exploitation and analysis assets are in short supply and willtake years to cultivate.27 For DHS, State Oces o Homeland Security, and

the relatively new State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFC), the challenge isin balancing the targeting and collection o publicly available open sourceinormation pursuant to their respective missions without unlawully in-truding on civil liberties. Moreover, legal authorities or the collection oopen source material may vary rom state-to-state, county-to-county, andeven jurisdiction-to jurisdiction.

DHS and the Department o Justice (DOJ) both recognize the valueo open source inormation. The daunting tasks beore them are to utilizeopen source inormation as eciently as possible and to train SLFC mem-

bers in how inormation becomes intelligence. For instance, in deningCollection [o inormation] in the Intelligence Process , the DOJ states:

Collection is the gathering o the raw data needed to produce intelligenceproducts. Data may be collected rom many sources, including but not lim-ited to public records, the Internet, condential sources, incident reports,and periodicals.28

Homeland security intelligences

use of open source information

is . . . vital to its culture and

mission.


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The components o raw inormation contained in this Justice Departmentdenition are almost exclusively based on open source resources. Compe-tent open source exploitation and analytical resources remain decient inthe national intelligence apparatus. Unortunately, despite the recognizedimportance o open source inormation, open source research habitually

remains a unction o less-experienced or lower-grade intelligence personnel.Too requently, all-source analysts are tasked with perorming their ownopen source research that oten results in nothing more than Googlesearches.

In an age where there is simply too much inormation, haphazardlysurng the Internet in hopes o bumping into a credible source based on akeyword search undermines the purposes or establishment o SLFCs in therst place. SLFCs are on the oreront o inormation availability or boththe intelligence and law enorcement communities, as they are embedded

in key locations throughout the United States and have their nger on thepulse o America. Having trained open source proessionals working inthese SLFCs is not only prudent, but crucial to the success o inormationcollection and analysis.

While open source inormation and OSINT can uncover golden nug-gets in an analysts search, these tools are o ar more utility as a acilitatoror other aspects o inormation and intelligence gathering. A truism spokenby Mr. Eliot Jardines, the rst and current Assistant Deputy Director oNational Intelligence or Open Source, (ADDNI-OS), is that open source

should be considered as a rst resource, rather than the last resort. Opensource provides a ramework or more ocused examination. When properlyused, open source inormation can provide responses to many questionsbeore it becomes necessary to employ more expensive or more intrusivemethods o inormation collection. Open source inormation exploitationis an essential aspect o the IPB process or identiying, monitoring, inves-tigating, and mitigating threats to the homeland.

Conclusion

The benets o IPB as a common analytic methodology are its applicabilityto the analysis o all categories o threats, and its simplicity. The stepwiseprocess or IPB provides a ramework that serves both junior and senioranalysts. IPB provides a systematic process or disaggregating the problemand building solutions through a layered approach. IPB is not only or theU.S. Army or the Armed Services, but is a methodology that provides corepillars that DHS can customize to meet its needs. IPB is a proven methodol-ogy o the U.S. Armed Services because it is not exclusive only to intelligenceproessionals; it is a methodology applied at all echelonsrom strategic and

operational to troop leadingand in all unctional areasrom operationsto logistics. The Army teaches IPB to soldiers, non-commissioned ocers,and ocers at all specialty schools, including: inantry, armor, signal, trans-portation, nance, and chemical. Permeating the IPB methodology to thoseoutside the intelligence proession at DHS will build common expectationsand an analytic culture that crosses unctional boundaries.


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IPB provides a core ramework and approach that is compatiblewith other more ocused analytical approaches. Analysts can utilize othermethodologies under the IPB ramework. Currently, DHS is developing amethodology or a new radicalization project that phases analysis and as-sessments by state or region through the State and Local Fusion Centers by:

assessing national level intelligence and open sources, collaborating withthe FBI and other Federal partners, and collaborating with state and locallaw enorcement.29 Through this process, i DHS uses IPB as the commonmethodology, it would provide common expectations or assessment. Utiliz-ing IPB with the radicalization project would produce multiple hypotheses,create a ocus or collection, and provide a purpose or decision makers andplanners to counter the threat. DHS is moving in the direction o developinga common culture; implementing an analytic methodology like IPB wouldprovide both the top-down and bottom-up approach necessary.

IPB will help to dene and develop the homeland security intelligenceanalysis culture, an aspect vital to shaping the nations eorts to protectit rom terrorist attacks. The strength o the IPB methodology is that itonly provides a ramework, while also allowing analysts the reedom to becreative and innovative. IPB also helps decision makers take ownership ointelligence and helps them to ocus intelligence to support the mission. Inthis sense, IPB is more about developing a common understanding or situ-ational awareness between the intelligence analyst and the operator. Home-land security intelligence eatures many challenges because o the inherent

diculties in coordination and collaboration in the mission among manyentities at all levels o government. Many top down policies are currentlybeing implemented within homeland security intelligence to dene a newculture. However, culture is about people. IPB will help develop a culture ohomeland security intelligence analysts rom the bottom up in conjunctionwith the denitions coming rom the top down. The immense potential inhomeland security intelligence comes rom the diversity o its peopleop-erators and analyststhat represent the breadth and depth o governmentat all levels, the private sector, and academia. The collaborative potential,i properly harnessed, will provide the ultimate support to the mission o

homeland security.

Notes

1 Statement o General Paul Goring. Hearings Beore Select Committee on Intelligence othe U.S. Senate, S. 2198 and S. 421 (Washington: 1992), 262.2Jermano, Jill. Introduction to Structured Argumentation. Genoa Technical Note. VeridianCorp: Arlington, VA, May 2002. [Genoa was a Deense Advanced Research Projects Agency(DARPA) unded program.]3 The Final Report o the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States . Wash-

ington: U.S. Government Printing Oce, 2004. 399428, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pd/ullreport.pd.4 Sun Tzu. Part III: Attack by Stratagem, Verse 18. In The Art o War, translation and criticalnotes by Lionel Giles, 32. London: British Museum, 1910.5 Field Manual 34130, Intelligence Preparation o the Battlefeld . Headquarters, Department o


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the Army: Washington, DC, July 8, 1994, https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/11681-1/m/34-130/toc.htm.6Department o Deense Dictionary o Military Terms, April 12, 2001, http://www.dtic.mil/doc-trine/jel/doddict/data/b/00691.html.7Joint Tatics, Techniques, and Procedures or Joint Intelligence Preparation o the Battlespace. JointChies o Sta: Washington, DC, 2000, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_01_3.pd.8 Satterly, Lt. Col. Mark T., USAF, et. al. Intelligence Preparation o the Battlespace An

Airmans Introduction. Air and Space Power Journal, 26 July 1999, http://www.airpower.maxwell.a.mil/airchronicles/cc/Satterly.html.9 Haimes, Yacov Y. Risk Modeling, Assessment, and Management. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: New

Jersey, 2004, 3.10 Cherto, Michael. Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Cherto to theSacramento Metro Chamber o Commerce, April 23, 2007. DHS Press Release. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1177426083887.shtm.11 Mass, Todd. Homeland Security Intelligence: Preceptions, Statutory Denitions, and Ap-proaches. CRS Report or Congress. Congressional Research Service: The Library o Congress,

August 18, 2006, 8.12 The National Security or Homeland Security. Homeland Security Council: Washington, DC,

July 2002, p. 16, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pd.13 Johnston, Rob.Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community. Center or the Study oIntelligence: Washington, DC, 2005, 18.14 Mass, 4.15 Department o Homeland Security Organizational Chart, April 2007. Department oHomeland Security Website. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS_OrgChart.pd.16 Marrin, Stephen. Homeland Security Intelligence: Just the Beginning. Homeland Se-curity Institute Website. November 2003, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Ar-ticles/marrin.html.17DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan. Department o Homeland Security: Washington,DC, January 3, 2006. http://www.as.org/irp/agency/dhs/stratplan.pd.18 Field Manual 34130, Intelligence Preparation o the Battlefeld. Headquarters, Departmento the Army: Washington, DC, July 81994, 12.19 Ibid, 13.20 Ibid, 13.21 Heuer, Jr., Richards J.Psychology o Intelligence Analysis . Center or the Study o Intelligence:Central Intelligence Agency, 1999, 2.22 Cherto, Michael. DHS Secretary Michael Cherto, Prepared Remarks at George Wash-ington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (Mar. 16, 2005). DHS Press Release.http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0245.shtm.23National Intelligence Strategy o the United States o America. October 2005. Federation o

American Scientists Website. http://www.as.org/irp/odocs/nis.pd. 2.24NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook, November 2001. Open Source Solutions Website.http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/le_archive/030201/ca5b66734540bb486e759b258c/NATO%20OSINT%20Handbook%20v1.2%20-%20Jan%202002.pd. 2-3.25 Ibid, 89.26 www.terror.net,How the Modern Terrorist Uses the Internet.United States Institute o PeaceWebsite, March 2004. http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.pd. 5.27 Generally, DHS acknowledges Native American tribal governments as integral partici-pants in a variety o homeland security issues including law enorcement, border security,immigration, and counternarcotics, among others. In act, U.S. Territorial governments,

(Guam, Puerto Rico, etc.), are also generally included in Homeland Security decision mak-ing processes.28Fusion Center Guidelines-Developing and Sharing Inormation in a New Era , August 2006. De-partment o Justice, Oce o Justice Programs, Inormation Technology Initiatives Website.http://it.ojp.gov/documents/usion_center_guidelines_law_enorcement.pd. 20.29Allen, Charles E. Statement o Assistant Secretary Charles E. Allen Beore the Subcom-


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mittee on Intelligence, Inormation Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment o the HouseHomeland Security Committee (March 14, 2007), 5, http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocu-ments/20070314172258-47553.pd.

Documents

Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space a Methodology for Homeland Security Intelligence Analysis