Intelligence Bulletin ~ Nov 1944

8/9/2019 Intelligence Bulletin ~ Nov 1944

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VOL.Ill NO. 3 NOVEMBER 1944INTELLIGENCEB

l l M mam ^ F 0 R USE OF MILITARYKg |^a PERSONNEL ONLY.. NOTT O B E^ F mm mm mm m^% PUBLISHED

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M I L I T A R Y I N T E L L I G E N C E D I V I S I O NW AR D E P A R T M E N T W A S H I N G T O N , D. C.


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S%aie HfoTo ensure the widest possible use of the Intelligence Bulletin, which

is designed primarily for the use of junior officers and enlisted men,each copy should be shared by a nu m be r of re ad ers. After you haveread this copy, please pass it on.

Th e repr in tin g of th is m ate rial w ithin th e service is encouraged.However, the restriction FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL ONLYNOTTO BE PUBLISHED should be maintained, and a copy of the publication in which the material is reproduced should be sent to the MilitaryIntelligence Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

Read ers a re invited to co mm ent on the use that they are m aking ofthe Intelligence Bulletin and to forward suggestions for future issues.Such correspondence may be addressed directly to the Military Intelligence Division, W ar D epa rtme nt, W ashington 25, D . C. Requests foradditional copies should be forwarded through channels.


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FOR USE OF MILITARY PER SON NEL ONLY NOT TO BE PUB LISHE D

VOL. Il l N O. 3 NO VEM BER 1944

INTELLIGENCEBULLETIN

M I L I T A R Y I N T E L L I G E N C E D I V I S I O NWAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D . C .


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TABLE OF CONTENTSJ A P A N

PageAMBUSH WORKS BOTH WAYS 1

Ambush by the Japanese 1Ambush by the British 5

How W E FIGHT MIX ED JAP OPINIONS 9Customary Tactics 10Assets and Weaknesses 10Problems in Jungle Fighting 11Fire in the Jungle 12Notes on Positions , 14Estimating U. S. Capabilities 16

Ho w THE JAP S CONCEA LED BAR GE-UN LOA DING PO INT S , 17I N THE ADM IRALTIES Fanatic Jap Rushes Withered by Steady

U. S. Defense 2iInitial Infiltrations 21All-out Counterattack 23Th e In d i v i d u a l S o l d i e r 24A t t e m p t e d R u s e s 25Las t -d i t ch F i g h t O rd e red 26

JAPANESE CAVE DE FEN SES ON BIAK ISLAND 28Beach Caves 29G al l e r i e s 31S u m p s 31V a r i a t i o n s 35For t i f i ca t ion of the M o k m e r P o c k e t 36

"HOME-MADE" OFF SHOR E OBSTACLES 38DIVERSIONARY U N I T S 44

Plans and Equipment 44Tactics 45

IN BRIEF 48Night Attacks 48Ground Tactics, New Georgia 49"Flying Pig" Mine 50All-around Defense of a Hill 51Japanese 105-mm Ammunition 52

II


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TABLE OF CONTENTS III

PageGERMANY

G E R M A N A N T I T A N K W E A P O N S 58FOUGASSE FLA ME TH RO WE RS 80TACTICS OF PER S O NN EL CARRIERS M O UN TING FLAM E THRO WER S . . 86W I T H D R A W A L T A C T I C S I N I T A L Y 89

PatrolsEngineers RusesMachine-gun TacticsCombat in Hilly TerrainMore on Target Designation. -.Cover Trap

.,

899091929393

I N B R I E FMore Notes on Machine-gun Tactics.Engineer Assault SquadS-mines in Grainfields

, 94949598


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"As the head of the main body reached Y, the tail was approachingX. At this moment the four Japanese machine guns opened fire."


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JAPANAMBUSH WORKS BOTH WAYS

There has been a growing tendency on the part of U. S. troopsto use the word "ambush" loosely. Many contacts with hostilepatrols and outposts have erroneously been reported and treatedas ambushes. As an aid in clarifying the matter, the Intelli-gence Bulletin presents two instances of true ambushes that theJapanese prepared against the British in Burma, and also dis-cusses the reaction of Japanese troops when ambushed by Brit-ish forces.A M B U SH BY TH E JAPANESE

A British company was pursuing a Japanese force along atrail, moving in the direction indicated by the arrow in Figure 1.The company had an advance guard for its own protection.

Between X and Y the trail ran comparatively straight forabout 150 yards. It followed an old stream bed, which formeda clearing about 60 feet wide. The advance guard examinedthe edges of the clearing for signs of a Japanese ambush, and,finding none, notified the main body and moved forward.

What the advance guard failed to discover was that the Japa-nese had built platforms in the trees at X and Y, and had placedtwo light machine guns in each tree. The platforms had beenconcealed with great care, and were barely visible from theground. The advance guard failed to reconnoiter the variousminor game trails which led away from the clearing, and which

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Figure 1. Japanese Ambush at a Jungle Clearing.converged at points A and B, where the Japanese had postedambush parties.

As soon as the advance guard had passed point Y, the Japa-nese parties at A and B quickly moved in, and stationed themselves along the edges of the clearing.

As the head of the main body reached Y, the tai l was approach-ing X . At this mom ent, the four Japanese m achine guns openedfire. Taken by surprise, the British troops immediately headedfor the cover of the jungle, but here they were met by the Japa-nese ambush party, armed with knives. Many of the Britishsuffered severe slashes on the arms and shoulders. The total


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JAPANAMBUSH WOT*KS BOTH WAYS

Direction ofBritish attack

Figure 2. Japanese Ambush at a Small Paddy Field.casualties numbered about 40 percent of the company, and in-cluded the com pany com m and er. In the confusion wh ich fol-lowed, the Japanese succeeded in escaping.

British Army comment: If security troops work well and are reallyalert, they can prevent a column from being ambushed. As a rule,there will be some little sign which will give a useful warning. It maybe only a footprint or the distant crackle of a twig, but either shouldbe sufficient to arouse the suspicions of well trained men and causethem to take additional precautions in that particular area.Clearings always have been dangerous places for the inhabitants ofjungles. Sometimes a hunter sits silent and concealed, with a rifleready, hoping that a tiger or a panther will cross a jungle clearing.


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4 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Very often the hu nt er 's pla ce of concea lment is a tree, whe re he hopesto remain unseen, inasmuch as an animal is unlikely to look upward.Warfare in the jungle is hunting of an extremely serious kind, and asoldier must be trained to look upward.

At any time the Japanese may ambush an attacking force.On one occasion the enemy had taken up a position in the smallp ad d y field, ma rk ed X in Fi gu re 2. Th e only trai l leading tothe nearby river ran directly through the paddy field. TheJapanese position was exceptionally important, for it controlledthe only ford in that gen era l ar ea . (N eith er the Japa nes e northe Bri t ish had bridge-building equipment avai lable.)

Th e British pla nn ed a two-platoon attac k. One platoon wasto make a holding attack in front of point D, and the otherplatoon was to break through between B and C, as indicated bythe arrow.

Th e attack was laun ch ed as planned'. But the Jap an ese, anticipating the time and direction of the attack, withdrew in frontof it as the attackin g troo ps wen t in. Enc ou nte rin g no opposition, the attacking platoon burst into the clearing, and headedfor the opposite side to eng age the Jap an es e at D . When theBritish soldiers were well into the clearing, enemy machine gunssituated in tree s at A, B , C, an d D open ed up an d caught theatta ck ers in a de ad ly cross fire. On ly 14 m en esca ped . Theother 16, including the platoon commander, were killed.

British Army comment: British troops must be taught that if theJa p j um ps out of h is foxhole, t ren ch , dugojjj;, or pi llb ox , and rurtsaw ay, this does not necessarily mean tha t he is beaten. The chancesoften are that the Jap is trying to make them forget the elementaryprinciples regarding the use of terrain and the need for covering fire.


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5APAN AMBUSH WORKS BOTH WAYS

AMBUSH BY THE BRITISHBecause of his habit of advancing rapidly along jungle trails,

often without adequate protection, the Japanese soldier is especially susceptible to ambushes. His behavior when he is ambushed usually follows certain patterns. For this reason, therecords of past experience are a useful guide to what his reaction is likely to be. The British Army offers a number of valuablecomments on this subject.No one ambush will ever be exactly like ano ther. A leade r pre

paring an ambush first satisfies himself that the move will be a profitable one; he then considers every possible factor, and makes his plan.An important thing to remember is that an ambush relies for its success entirely upon s urp rise. Also, an ambush must have a reserve, totake advantage of favorable oppo rtun ities an d to deal with the unexpected.

Japanese reaction to ambush is remarkably predictable:1. The enemy gets his leading elemen ts off the path , and trie s

an outflanking movement.2. He brings his mortar into action (he nearly always has a

m ort ar with him) with the least possible delay, and attacksastride the trail and general area in which the ambush has beenpre pa red . Th is sometimes takes place after a lapse of no more than5 minutes.

It follows that, unless arrangements have been made to the contrary,the Japanese will be left in possession of the battlefield and will beable to dispose of our wounded, collect their own, and prevent us fromgetting identifications. Th is often ha s hap pen ed in the past. Therefore, any plan for laying an ambush may well provide for our men toremain in at least temporary possession of the battlefield.

When an ambush takes place and a fight follows, there is bound tobe a certain degree of confusion; for this reason, a rendezvous for theam bushing pa rty is essential. It may take some hours before the entire


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6 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINam bush ing party can assemble at the rendezvous. Therefore, if we areto take adv an tag e of the situa tion du rin g the pe riod of confusion, it isclear that the reserve should be brought into action and boldly handled.

The relativ e stre ng ths of the ambu sh ing p ar ty and its reserve dependla rgely on the miss ion. If the mission is mere ly to cause confusion,and then to pe rm it the reserve to und ertake the main fighting, theactu al am bushin g p arty m ay be very sm all indeed , possibly just aleader and two m en. On the other hand , if it is known tha t a largenu m be r of Jap anese are a bou t to be am bushed m ore , in fact, thancould be dealt with by a very small ambush partythe ambushpa rty will have to be pr op or tiona tely stron ger , an d be subdivided intotwo, three , or more gr ou ps . A method which has been employed inthe Chin H ill s is an exam ple of the type of job the reserve may undertak e. After an am bu sh has been car ried out, the reserve moves forward in the same direction from which the Japanese have advanced,an d destroys the Jap an ese m orta r w hich alw ays com es into action,generally about 1,000 yards back.

A series of factors regarding Japanese reaction to our ambushmethods should be borne in mind:

1. W hen am bus hed , Jap anese soldie rs have been known to dropdow n an d feign dea th, lying still for lon g pe rio ds . It has been found

The British are well aware that Japanese so ldiers may be feigning


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7APA N AMBUSH WORKS BOTH WAYSadvisable to ensure that they really are deadeither by firing bulletsor using the bayonet, or by doing both.

2. The use of bamboo spike jungle traps, or "panjis," has beenproved most effective against the Japanese.1 Panjis are placed justoff a trail, and parallel with it, so that Japanese soldiers who leavethe trail to scatter into the jun gle are im paled on the sha rp spikes.

3. Japanese curiosity is not always proof against the temptation toexamine "ba it." In one am bush an old Japane se helmet was left inthe midd le of a trail. The Japanese stopped and collected arou ndthis helm et, exam ining it and asking questions. This gave our men

"The Japanese stopped and collected around the helmet, examining itand asking questions. This gave our men a concentrated target at shortrange."a concentrated target at short range, which almost would have justifiedthe employment of automatic fire.

4. A British ambush party may be on one side of a trail or on bothsides. If it is one one side only, it must be expected tha t the Ja panes ewill plunge into the jun gle on the other side. (In such instances,

1 For discussion of panjis, with illustrations, see Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. Ill,No. 2, pp. 88-92.


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pa nji s pre pa red on the far side should prove effective.) If the ambush party is on both sides of a trail, there is always a danger thatthe subd ivided elem ents will fire on each othe r. Stag gering the elements on both sides of the track furnishes the most prac tical solution,it has been found. As a rul e, the terr ain w ill dictate the answer tothis problem.

5. W hen an a mbush is pre pa red on a hills ide , there m ay be a question as to whether the Japanese should be trapped on higher or lowergrou nd than that em ployed by the ambu sh p arty , or whether the ambush party should employ both high and low ground so as to sandwich the Jap ane se. High g roun d pu ts the am bush pa rty in a moreadvantageous position; however, the enemy will disappear more rapidly when he is fleeing dow nhill. It may be found tha t snip ers, suitably dispersed, can handle this aspect of the situation.

6. The problem of pr ep ari ng an amb ush along a dusty trail withoutleaving footprints, or any other evidence that we have been there,deserves very careful c onsider ation . Often it w ill be found advisableto approach the ambush position by cutting an approach for somedistance thro ug h the jun gle . As an alte rna tive , it sometimes is possible to ap pro ach barefoo ted. M any other methods may be improvised, but the danger of leaving footprints is something which alwaysmust be given first co nside rat ion . Neglect of thi s sing le factor mayresult in the entire ambush proving a costly failure.

7. The command to open fire must be given only by the comm and er of the am bush par ty . Therefo re, his position usua lly shouldbe in a place from which he can observe how many rats have enteredthe trap before he gives the command.


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SwXED/a/? OPINIONS

Although Japanese appraisals of U. S. combat methods arenot always accuratecolored, as they so often are, by an imperfect understanding of the American fighting man and by a fondness for putting the Japanese Army in as favorable a light aspossible it is worthwhile for us to know just what the enemysoldier is being taught about our combat techniques. It longhas been a Japanese boast that the "crass materialism" of theUnited States eventually must bow to the "spirit of Bushido".in other words, to Japan's "sp iritual strength." While theenemy still repeats this boast on occasion, he places less emphasis on it than formerly. The enemy now tends to admit thatthe industrial might of the United States is formidable enoughto warrant respect. And even though Japanese comm anders liketo tell their men that our successes have depended entirely onour barbaric aptitude for things mechanical, there now seemsto be a tendency for unit leaders to admit that our tactics, too,can be skillful. The Japanese , who like to believe that theyhave a monopoly on ingenuity, still find it hard to concede thatAmericans can be imaginative.

The opinions of commanders of large and small enemy units,as well as views enunciated by Imperial Army Headquarters,are represented here. 9


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1 0 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Customary TacticsThe basis of the tactics of the U. S. Army may be said to be a belief

in the alm ighty pow er of m ate rialis tic fighting stre ng th. Althoughthe Americans are not adept at military deception and subterfuge, theirleadership is extremely reliable and their spirit in the offensive shouldnot be trea ted lightly. In an offensive the customary tac tics of theU. S. Army are to cut supply lines, isolate strategic key points, and, byconcentrating air and ground strength, exhaust and eventually capturethese points.

In daylight attacks against U. S. troops deployed in prepared position s, it is best to effect a bre ak th roug h in the en em y's lines at oneblow by neutralizing his fire power with well-prepared artillery fire.Even when we can take advantage of jungles in assaulting the enemy,neutra liza tion of h is fire po we r m ust not be neglec ted. It is also important for us to devise plans which will tempt the enemy to scatterand waste his fire. In th is connection , it shou ld be noted tha t feintsare useful.

Night attacks against U. S. forces must be continued.

Assets and WeaknessesThe enemy un dersta nd s m achine ry, a nd is adr oit at handling it.

Speed c harac terizes h is construction of a irfields, mo tor roads, andcommunication networks, and also his strengthening of positions. Hisstrong air forces execute day and night attacks.It has been establish ed that the enem y is cap ab le of altering histactics quickly. [Ed. Note: Thi s rep rese nts qu ite a concession on thepart of the Japanese.]

Against these admitted military assets, we must set down the decidedweaknesses of the American soldie r. He d epends too much on hism ate rial pow er, and is deficient in spi ritu al streng th. He is very susceptible to our artillery bombardments, and becomes passive when westrike at him in this m anne r. In the U. S. Arm y, the men 's sense of


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1 1OW WE FIG HT MIXED JA P OPINIONS

personal responsibility is not consistently high, and there are manyflaws in their security measures.

Problems in Jungle FightingThe U. S. forces, who place all faith in fire power, are weak in

hand-to-hand combat. In this respect they certainly are not to befeared. W e must guard again st m aking hea dlon g and reckless advances, however, even when we are achieving success in hand-to-handcom bat. It is foolish to make gains and then run a risk of losingthem.In jungle areas such as this [New Guinea], our mortars are highlyeffective. Autom atic rifles and light machine guns also have prove dmost valuable.

In the past the humidity has caused a large number of duds in theam mu nition for o ur 70-mm infantry guns, trench m ortars, and grenadedisch arge rs, as well as in our han d gren ades. Recently we have beensupplied with ammunition protected against humidity. This ammunitionis proving most successful.

We must become much more skillful at using hand grenades.Our artillerym en a re doing good work. Even so, they must become

more adept at target recognition, and must realize the importance ofmaking every round count.

Although the positions constructed by our engineer units are strongand can be held for a long time, many of the positions constructed byother branches of the service have been destroyed shortly after completion.

There are times when the jungle is transformed into an open fieldby bom bing and art ille ry fire. Conseq uently, when we construct positions, we must take into account the possibility that, for an indefiniteperiod, we may not be able to find cover. W e must be pre pare d todeploy laterally and in depth.

Infiltration into U. S. lines by patrols and platoons is generally possible, and can produce excellent results.


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Althou gh the battle charge and h and-to-hand combat should be encouraged, heavy losses will be sustained if the charge is made frontal ly into hostile fire. W hen cond itions perm it, it is advisable forplatoons to infiltrate patiently to the enemy's rear and to launch surprise attac ks. In gene ral, the best method is to attack with han d grenades and then to switch promptly to hand-to-hand combat.

In facing a U. S. force e ntrenche d on a slope, it usua lly is best totake up positions 20 to 30 yards below the crest or on the reverseslope.

Because of the frequency with which the various U. S. artilleryshells explode in tree tops, we must pay strict attention to the situationof ou r shelters. It is advisable eithe r to cut down the trees or toselect the bases of tall trees.

The gaps between U. S. positions are relatively large70 to 100ya rds an d often no security prec autio ns have been taken. (This ispa rtic ula rly true in the rear areas.) Con sequently, infiltration is easilyaccomplished.

Daw n and dusk are the best times for a ttack. It is especially easyto approach U. S. positions and launch an attack when it is raining,inasmuch as the U. S. soldiers lie low in their trenches and try to stayunder the cover of ponchos.

Since U. S. soldiers direct their fire at sounds even when they cannot see a target, and are likely to fire their rifles blindly from theirtrenches, it is comparatively easy to infiltrate and surround their positions if one acts with coolness and d elib era tion . (U . S. soldiers dono t show the ir heads when they fire.) Most of our casualties are-caused by hand-grenade fragments, rather than by firearms.

Fire in the JungleIn the attack, groups of from three to eight Americans creep through

tall grass or jungle growth [Wau area, New Guinea], and open upwith auto m atic rifles, fired from the hip at rang es of from 10 to 50yar ds. As soon as we retu rn the fire, they attack with concentrated


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1 3OW WE FIG HT MIXED JA P OPINIONS

fire from grenade rifles or light trench mortars, followed by concentrated fire from heavy trench mo rtars from the ir rear. Am ericans areskillful at using automatic rifles, grenade rifles and trench mortars;this accounts for the majority of our losses. [Ed. Note: The readerwill observe that this contradicts another unit commander's statement,in the previous paragraph.]

The Am erican s do not specialize in cha rges. Very few carry riflesor bayonets.

In the defense, the American s do not construct trenc hes. As a rule ,they shift their po sitions skillfully and make use of ro ving fire.

When the enemy abandons his weapons and flees, it is important forus not to linger in the immediate area vacated by the enemy; this areais sure to receive sudden and concentrated fire from grenade rifle's andtrench mortars.

U. S. expenditure of ammunition for guns and automatic firearmsis eno rm ous. W hen a force of abou t 100 men sets out to attack, thesound of their firing is almost continuous, and gives the impressionthat a much larg er force is bein g em ployed. At first, this is likely tohave a disheartening effect on our morale.U. S. observation of only one or two Japanese soldiers may resultin sudden and concen trated trench-m ortar fire. This happ ened to ourregimental commander and myself when we were in a place wherethe grasses were above our ohests. As I took out my glasses to observethe situation , we received a trench-m ortar shelling 7 to 8 yard s aw ay.

Prior to U. S. artillery shelling of the area our unit occupied, theenemy dispatched a number of small patrols armed with automaticrifles and rifle grenade throwers to perform reconnaissance. Weconcluded that liaison was accomplished by means of radio. I mustpoint out that U. S. com mu nications and liaison are excellent. Although our withdrawal was carried out during the night, the enemysheUed us all along the route. W hile the main streng th of our regiment was being withdrawn, several other men and I fortunately discovered the enem y's telephon e lines and cut them . Th is enabled usto escape without further interference.


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U. S. artillery fire in the Buna area [New Guinea] was expertlydelivered. All guns seemed to have an ab un da nt am mu nition reserve,an d fired contin ua lly, nigh t and day. In supp ort of front line advan ces, they often placed heavy cu rtain s of fire over wide areas. However, these curtains of fire, although heavy at the front, tend to thinout at the flanks. Our covered positions constructed of coconut logsstood up against fire from mortars and Browning automatics, but weredestroyed by concentrated fire of delayed-fuze projectiles and rapid-fire guns.

The U. S. infantry is not aggressive, and does not attack with any-think like enthusiasm unless it is capable of main tain ing terrific firepower.

U. S. artillerymen are comparatively brave, and are good at infiltrating . The inf an try 's snipin g is very effective. Th e art ille ry and infan try are skillful at join t action . Th ey com municate successfully bymeans of pyrotechnics and tracers.

For some reason the Am ericans do not exploit their battle successesprom ptly. After winning a battle, they are likely to remain static fora considerable time. Night operations are not numerous, but are notconducted briskly.

Notes on PositionsAmerican soldiers are terrified by our night attacks [Bougainville],

an d fire blindly when they are assaulted in this m an ner . Althoughthey expend the light-mortar and automatic-weapon ammunition ingreat quantities, the projectiles tend to travel too high because of theblind firing.

U. S. troops are noisy, and a security-conscious soldier is the exception, rather than the rule.

Since U. S. troops lack ability in the assault, their usual method isto penetrate positions where they do not expect to encounter Japaneseforces. Am ericans always advance over low terrain , and make extensive use of valleys.


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HOW WE FIGH T MIXED JA P OPINIONS 15The Americans prepare fields of fire in front of their positions, and

establish four or five rows of barbed wire entanglements in this sameWhen advancing Japanese units destroy these entanglementsarea.

and app roac h the positions, the Am ericans try to halt o ur attack w ithsudden artillery, light-mortar, and machine-gun fire at minimum range.In jungle areas they place fallen trees in front of their positions,

and snipe at our men who are obliged to clamber over these trees,often s tum bling in the process. Fo r this pu rpo se, U. S. snip ers oftentake up positions in standing trees nearby.

"In jungle areas, U. S. soldiers place fallen trees in front of their positions, and snipe at our men who are obliged to clamber over thesetrees."

Do uble-apron barbed-w ire entanglem ents are widely used. Sometimes a microphone is installed very near the front of an entanglement, and a triangular piece of red cloth is attached to serve as a basepoint for the direction of fire power.

A rtillery b elts of fire are a ppro xim ately 200 to 300 yard s wide and500 yards deep.


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The Am erican s have been known to attach ba rbe d wire to the rearof their tanks, so that our tank hunters cannot stage a close-in attackfrom that direction.

Estimating U. S. CapabilitiesWe are now at the front line [Cap e D inga, New G uin ea ], on an

im po rtan t mission, not an exercise. Day and nigh t we face an enemywho h as air sup eriority and who is threaten ing to advance by sea, air,and land.To perceive the enemy's situation and plans may seem difficult, butgood estimates of enemy plans and movements may be made as soonas the fighting be gins, by a close study of its pro gre ss. Ou r estimateswill be more nearly accurate if we deduce from past experience andknown statistics, maintain thorough observation and liaison, and carryou t each reconnaissanc e m ission w ith a definite aim an mind, an d at themost ap pro pri ate tim e. How ever, we mu st be accu rate in estimatingou r own situation and fighting s treng th, and m ust give full consideration to the difficulties which are to be overcome before we can subduea stubbo rn enemy. In other word s, we have a tendency to judge anysituation from our own point of view exclusively and to let externalappea rances deoeive us. Th is can work in two different w ays. If weoverestimate ourselves, excessive self-confidence will lead to beingcaug ht off gua rd . On the other ha nd , if we note certain disadvantageson our side, we are likely to feel that we are considerably inferior tothe enemy, and our proper confidence in our own great fighting spiritwill dim inish. Extreme optimism and extreme pessimism are equallydan gero us, and jeopa rdize our opportu nities for victory. We shouldknow the enemy well, and, at the same time, analyze our own capabilities rea listically . When we detect ou r weak po ints, we must strengthenthem. We must be open to new ideas and be willing to put them intoeffect, so that we can gain the upper hand ove'r the Americans and,with the help of Pro vidence , achieve certa in victQry.


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HOW THE JAPS CONCEALEDBARGE-UNLOADING POINTS

The Japanese barge-unloading points at Nambariwa, NewGuinea, which supplied all the enemy troops in the southernpart of the Huon Peninsula during the Lae, Salamaua, and Bunacampaigns, were so unusual and exploited the terrain so successfully that the part they played in these operations deservescomment.

The use of semicircular river-bank canals, masterfully camouflaged with tropical growth, is especially worth noting.

When Allied air observers began to sight an increasing number of barges in the vicinity of Nambariwa, it became evidentthat there were sizable facilities for unloading in that area.However, neither reconnaissance from aircraft nor a study ofair photos revealed anything except the usual luxuriant junglegrowth. Soon, however, intelligence was obtained which provedconclusively that an important barge-unloading and supply baseexisted at Nam bariwa. On the basis of this intelligence, andbecause of the cumulative sightings in this vicinity, our planesbombed and strafed the area . After the first bombing, the re turning crew members reported that they had observed nothingout of the ord inary. However, strike photqs revealed largechunks of debris which were easily recognized as barge plankings.

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the Japanese barge-unloading andconcealment points at Nambariwa, and show the great skill andcare that the enemy devoted to these installations . By means

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rame to supportvegetation.

Figure 3. A Typical Barge-unloadingPoint at Nambariwa.


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HOW THE JAPS CONCEALED BARGE-UNLOADING POINTS 1 9

Barge entrance-either e\

Figure 4. Another TypicalBarge-unloading Point at INambariwa.


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of vines and bamhoo trellises, the Japanese created a false riverbank. To enlarge their unloading facilities, they dug semicircu lar canals into the river bank, camouflaged them with garnished trellises, and used them as slips.In nearly all instances, each hideout was garrisoned by a detachment of shipping engineers, which handled the traffic running in and out of its particular unloading point, and by anotherdetachment of rear-echelon troops, which attended to the needsof transient troops and maintained the supply point generally,All evidence of the presence of Japanese troops was concealedwith the same care used in hiding the barges. Supply dumpsand huts for personnel were completely camouflaged by thenatural jungle growth, and, wherever necessary, additional garnished trellises were constructed.

After these hideouts were discovered, they were bombedalmost daily. Intelligence later revealed that the success ofAllied operations on the Huon Peninsula definitely was furthered by these systematic bombings, which kept the barge-unloading points in a state of continual disrepair, and preventedall but a trickle of vitally needed food and materiel from reaching the hard-pressed Japanese forces to the south.


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IN THE ADMIRALTIESFanatic jap RushesWithered by Steady U. S.

Defense

Although Los Negros and other islands in the Admiraltygroup were garrisoned with good, well-equipped Japanesetroops, the enemy resorted to wild counterattacks which failedto break the steady defense put up by U. S. troops. Logicalavenues of approach were well protected, but skimpy roadbuilding hampered enemy mobility. The Japanese were unableto move troops and materiel quickly to defend areas where theyhad failed to anticipate landings by U. S. forces.

Japanese soldiers fighting individually or in small groupswere wary, cunning, and intent on making every round count.But when they fought in large groups, they seemed unable todevelop, or to follow, a well-conceived plan. Headlong "suicide" rushes were the rule. Fanatical and shrieking, the largergroups charged without taking cover, and were mowed down.In the words of one observer, they were "stupid ly inefficient."INITIAL INFILTRATIONS

On the first night after the U. S. landing, the Japanese organized several patrols which infiltrated Allied positions for thepurpose of locating and attacking command posts, and execut

21


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ing ge ne ral ha ra ssin g ope ratio ns . At abo ut 0 4 3 0 one of thepa tro ls, nu m be rin g 18 or 2 0 me n, stealthily penetrated thepe rim ete r. Th is p atr o l wa s kno cked out, but not un til it hadsucceed ed in reach ing a point only abo ut 10 0 ya rd s from ahigh ly impor tant com m an d po st. Ja pan es e officers in this patrolused sw ord s unsu cce ssfu lly, except in one in stan ce, when theyen co un tere d a U . S. officer s leep ing in a ham m oc k. For them ost p ar t, the infiltrating Ja p s used han d gre na de s. They alsosucceeded in setting up two light machine guns within a squadron com m and-p ost are a be fore they we re killed or driven out.Some of the enemy then crawled back into their old, abandonedpillb ox es a long the be ach , and hid un til m orn ing , when theyemerged and tried to cause as many casualties as possible in theLeach ar ea . Thece enemy sold iers, too, were liqu idate d.

On the following day, 1 March, a Japanese suicide patrolinfiltrated the U . S. pe rim ete r in br oa d d ay ligh t. Th is patrolconsiste d of a bo ut 14 officers an d m en , and w as led by the battalion commander of a unit which had been assigned to defendthe Mom ote ai rs tri p . Th e en tire pa tro l wa s wip ed out after ith ad pe netr ated to w ithin 10 0 y ar d s of a most imp ortant command post .

It was estim ated that, as a res ul t of these infiltrations, 93Japanese were killed, as opposed to only a few Allied casualties.The intelligence officer of the task force stated: "The tactics ofthe enem y altho ug h ha rassin g, an noy ing, a nd dangerous tothe in d iv id ua l ap p ea r to be stu pid ly inefficient. Few of theinfiltrating J ap an es e cou ld ha ve escape d. M an y of them werecas ua lties. A long one un it 's pe rim ete r, enemy bod ies literallyw ere m assed in bu nches of 5, 7, an d 14 . The estim ated resultof this attempt by the Japs is better than 10 to 1 in our favor.'


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EN TH E ADMIRALTIES 2 3

ALL-OUT COUNTERATTACKOn the nights of 3 and 4 March, the Japanese garrison

launched its all-out counterattacks against our perimeter. TheU. S. task force intelligence officer made the following comments on these actions:"Jap operations on the night of 3 March are reported to haveoriginated from the west, where the Japs landed from bargesat their landing jetty at Porlaka. These reinforcements undoubtedly had been sent from Lorengau. Jap assault parties

attacked our perimeter during the night, and suffered manycasualties. An hour and a half after daylight, about 50 Japsmade what proved to be a suicidal charge against our emplacements. These Japs murt have been 'doped up.' When theycame in on the attack, they were yelling and singing 'Deep inthe Heart of Texas.' The entire party was annihilated by ourantipersonnel mines and by devastating small-arms fire fromevery weapon in our emplacements. On the morning of 4March, a total of 168 Jap dead were piled up in front ofTroop's perimeter.

"On the night of 4 March, enemy operation^ took the formof attacks on our positions by officer-led patrols, each consistingof from 10 to 15 men. Seventy-nine Japs later were foundpiled up on the western edge of the perimeter held by the Squadron, Cavalry.""In an open field fight," another officer reported, "it wassimply slaughter. The Japs came out hollering and yelling,rushing forward foolishly without taking advantage of coverand without giving a thought to flank protection. Many lackedhelm ets; many wore white gloves. Acting like drunken m en,they fired with fixed bayonets and sometimes closed with fixed


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bayonets when they should have fired. We took advantage ofcover, established ourselves in our firing positions, waited untilthe Japs were within range, and then let go with everythingwe had."THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

The Japanese soldiers in the Adm iralties were at their bestas snipers operating along jungle trails, singly or in smallgroups. They maintained excellent camouflage, and were adequately supplied with food and ammunition. They were cautious about expending ammunition, and ridiculed what theyconsidered the "waste of amm unition" by U. S. troops. (A Japanese comment: "Americans are ready to fire at anything; theymust get bonuses for the num ber of rounds fired.") The enemysoldiers carefully selected what they considered the best targets,and did not necessarily fire on our forward elements. Also, toavoid disclosing their positions, the Japanese usually held theirfire until a period when U. S. troops were firing. Although theJapanese soldiers sometimes changed positions, they stayed inthe fight until they were killed, or until they were able to departbecause our troops had abandoned the area. The Japanese didnot snipe from trees exclusively; they frequently used undergrowth, the bases of trees, or other natural cover."The Japanese soldiers in the Admiralties were cagey andtreacherous," an observer reported. "Occasionally a Jap wouldcome in with his hands up, offering to surrender; but when hewas close enough, he would hit his helmet with a grenade hehad tied to his wrist and had kept concealed in his hand. Hisobject, of course, was to injure as many of use as possible whilehe was killing himself."


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25N THE ADMIRALTIESSeveral instances of Japanese fanaticism have been reported.An enemy officer stood in a clearing about 30 yards in front ofpositions which had been established by a lieutenant and hisplatoon. The Japanese waved his saber, to which he had attached a flag, and yelled that he alone would kill the "American

dogs." He was shot down immediately.Labor troops were identified among the enemy dead. Theyhad attacked with bayonets fixed to long poles. The Japanesesoldiers in this paticular area had an ample supply of hand

grenades, but were short of other types of ammunition.

"Labor troops . . . attacked with bayonets fixed to long poles."ATTEMPTED RUSES

One of the attempted enemy ruses involved sending an individual Jap to move about in front of our defensive perimeter,so as to draw the fire of our autom atic weapons. Next, two orthree enemy riflemen would fire tracer at the automatic weapons.


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Japanese mortars then would direct their fire on the weaponemplacements.

The Japanese called out to the men in Troop, whichwas commanded by a Captain Frank , "The regiment's falling back. Retreat, F ra nk!" and used similar colloquial phrases*However, the U. S. soldiers did not leave their positions. Inmany instances, the Japanese yelled, "Move over, Joe! I'mcoming in!"

Such enemy ruses are of long standing. In every campaignsince Guadalcanal, the Japanese have tried methods like thesein an attempt to create confusion. Nor is the use of bayonetson long poles unprecedented. Austra lian forces reported encountering the same type of improvised weapon during theFinschhafen campaign on New Guinea.

LAST-DITCH FIGHT ORDEREDAfter the captu re of the Momote a irs trip on Los Negros, itwas learned that, following our landings, the garrison commander had issued forceful orders calling for last-ditch resistance on the part of his troops. Such orders are issued in equalprofusion by German and Japanese commanders, but, in thecase of the Japanese, there always is far greater likelihood thatthey will be obeyed. The Japanese colonel on Los Negrosordered:

"This is not a delaying-action type of warfare. Counterattack!"No reinforcements are expected."The battalion has no personnel in reserve."We must carry out our mission with our present strength.


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IN THE ADMIRALTIES

"Do not withdraw unless you have been ordered to do so."Be resolved to commit suicide."The effect of these pessimistic instructions upon the moraleof the garrison can read ily be imagined. A hint as to what thesoldiers thought may be obtained from the way an individualJapanese soldier expressed himself on 1 March: "Yesterday anenemy task force of cruisers and destroyers bombarded us. Theenemy began landing operations at 1000. Our radio was temporarily out of commission, but has been restored. We have

been given no reinforcements. If only one Japanese plane orship would appear! We are isolated and cannot expect anyaid. The day of defeat draws near. So it must be, and thepeople at home will have to realize this!"Although the feeling of hopelessness must have been fairlywidespread, it should be noted that the enemy soldiers, in lit

erally obeying the commander's injunction to commit mass suicide by hurling themselves in desperate and futile counterattacksagainst our forces, reacted in characteristic Japanese fashion.Obviously, the resulting enemy casualties in killed and woundedwere out of all proportion to the results obtained.


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JAPANESE CAVE DEFENSESON BIAK ISLAND

Japanese cave defenses on Biak Island, off northwestern NewGuinea, which were made possible by a number of unusualvolcanic and coral formations, have been described by an Alliedmilitary observer as "one of the most amazing defensive installations observed in the Southwest Pacific." These fortified cavesperm itted the enemy to conduct a type of warfare which, in thefuture, may be encountered elsewherealthough probably withcertain variations. While the Biak caves are in some respectspeculiar to Biak Island, the lessons learned there are adaptableto other lava-and-coral terrain found in the Southwest Pacific.Biak Island, one of a group that the Dutch call the SchoutenIslands, lies in the mouth of Geelvink Bay. After a volcaniceruption had created the initial land mass, a fringing coral reefwas formed around this eruption. Evidently successive eruptions raised the mass from time to time, and, in the intervalsbetween these thrusts, additional coral reefs were formed atsea level. These must have been raised with the land mass inlater upheavals, forming, above sea level, an irregular series ofbroken cliffs, rises, and ridges, each from 8 to 200 feet high.Erosion, faults, fissures, and the action of sea water during the"subm arine lif e" of these formations resulted in a network ofcaves and underground passages.

No two caves on Biak Island are exactly alike. However,each cave may be classified as being of a certain type.28


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29APANESE CAVE DEFENSES ON BIAK ISLANDft. hit

PLAN VIEWFigure 5. Tunnel-type Cave with an Embrasure Added.

BEACH CAVESFortified caves facing the beaches were of two varieties: the

cavity type and the tunnel type.


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PLAN VIEWFigu re 6. Terr ain Variation a Natural Alley, Fortified by the Japanese.

The cavity type usually is a cavern from 3 to 50 feet deep.Occasionally a transverse tunnel, 10 to 50 yards long and running parallel with the face of the cliff, gives access to another


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JAPA NES E CAVE DEFEN SES ON BIAK ISLAND 3 1

cavern. The Japanese used beach caves of this type as machine-gun positions and as food and ammunition dumps.Caves of the tunnel type traverse the base of a narrow coastalridge 20 to 30 feet high, and have a forward opening, 6 to 12feet high, commanding the sea. Usually the Japanese improvedan opening of this kind by preparing a concrete machine-gunembrasure* and by knocking out an opening at the landward endof the tunnel, near a road suitable for motor transport (see fig.5 ) . The dimensions of tunnel-type caves are of course irregular; as a rule, such caves are 15 to 25 feet long, 8 to 15 feetwide, and 3 to 6 feet high. The Japanese used the rear opening only when bringing in personnel, ammunition, and food.(Containers attached to coral teats in the roofs of the cavescaught a ample supply of fresh, cool water, which drippeddown slowly from the earth overhead.) Although the field offire from each embrasure generally was more or less frontal,a terrain variation like the one illustrated in Figure 6 permittedeffective oblique fire. Such a variation occurs when the seaward opening is masked by an apron consisting of a portionof cliff broken away from the main face or separated from itby the action of the sea. This results in a narrow alley betweenthe apron and the face of the cliff. The Japanese sealed theends of at least one such alley with concrete, but provided embrasures for observation and firing.GALLERIES

Galleries may occur at any elevation. One series was about200 yards back from a beach and 80 feet above the coastal road(see fig. 7 ) . These galleries, which were reached by a 75-degree


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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

! Mortars In wooded are; [Machine guns along edge of cli

Cliff edge 160 ft. above road- H b l

Organized gallery 80 ft. above road. '

Rotten coral slope y75 degrees

Figure 7. Cliff Galleries on Biak Island.slope of crumbled coral, consisted of a level series of irregu-larly connected cavities, 4 to 8 feet high and 3 to 6 feet deep.Merging stalactites and stalagmites and hard limestone forma-tions sometimes prevented continuous passage; in several in-stances, tunnels arched over, or bypassed, these obstructions.Wood flooring, blankets, and food were found in some of theinner rooms.


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33APANESE CAVE DEFENSES ON BIAK ISLAND

The face of the cliff rose another 80 feet above the galleries,and was pockmarked with additional caves at one or morelevels, depending on the locality. The Japanese did not utilizethese higher caves. Instead, they placed machine guns alongthe cliff's edge, and sited mortars in the wooded area whichextended back from the top of the cliff.SUMPS

On the ridges north of the coastal plain, holes or faults arefound. (Possibly they were formed when the roofs of subter-ranean chambers collapsed.) They are more or less circular,and have sheer or abruptly sloping sides. In general, the holes

Figure 8. "One or more caves open at the base of the sides, or fromsmall pits in the bottom of the sump."


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JAPANESE CAVE DEFENSES ON BIAK ISLAND 3 5

are from 30 to 75 yards in diameter, and from 15 to 75 feetdeep. One or more caves open at the base of the sides (seefig. 8 ) , or from small pits in the bottom of the sump. Thecaves may be nothing more than cavities from 5 to 30 feet deep.On the other hand, they may be entrances to a series of chambers and connecting galleries, some as high as 40 feet (seefig. 9 ) . Three different sumps, 35 to 100 yards apart, mayhave entrances to such a network. The "West Caves" on BiakIsland could have accommodated about 900 men, were lightedby electricity, and were equipped for radio communication.VARIATIONS

While most of the caves on Biak Island fall within one ofthe classifications already discussed, it has been observed thatsome caves combine the outstanding features of two or moretypes. An important characteristic of many caves is a screenof natural foliage which makes the entrances or embrasuresvery hard to detect, even when the observer is standing only afew feet away. In "sum p" caves, the screening sometimes consists of stalactites and stalagmites, which do not conceal themouth of the cave, but which stop or deflect a considerable portion of the attacker's fire, regardless of caliber. Further screening may be afforded by coral formations in front of the mouth.When a cave opens from a pit in the sump floor, still furthernatural concealment is provided, because of the angle of observation from the rim of the sump.

An example of the screening coral wall occurred in the mainsump employed by the Japanese . The sump was about 75 feetdeep. In the landward or north wall, and level with the sump


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floor, was a cave. A na tural coral wall ran d irectly across theentrance. Mortars placed in the cave had a limited but effective field of fire seaward. The trajectory barely cleared theforward edge of the cave's roof, the top of the coral wall, andthe rim of the sum p. The emplacement was virtually bombproof and shellproof.FORTIFICATION OF THE MOKMER POCKET

The fa ll of the so-called "Mokm er pocket" area on BiakIsland permitted examination of a Japanese position which hadwithstood two aerial bombings and strafings, naval gun fire,heavy mortar and artillery concentrations, and almost dailypoundings by tank guns.

The coral reef which parallels the coast rises to a height ofmore than 240 feet behind the village of Mokmer. The cliffat this point is not so sheer as in the vicinity of Parai, but it isvery steep and cannot be ascended without the use of hands.About three-fourths of the way to the top, there is a relativelyflat ledge with two large , perpendicular depressions like thoseof the "W est Caves." Caves in these depressions lead to ahoneycomb of tunnels and passages, at least one of which leadsto an opening in the face of the cliff. Forward of the caves,Japanese had built two observation shelters on the ledge. Behind the caves, and on the steep slope that led to the top ofthe reef, the enemy had constructed five pillboxes. In the caveswere a total of five 81-mm mortars in position, an extra mortartube, five 20-mm antiaircraft guns, two heavy machine guns,and about 1400 rounds of 81-mm mortar ammunition. Excellent cover and concealment for snipers and automatic weapons


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JAPAN ESE CAVE DEFENSES ON BIAK ISLAND 3 7

was available in the area surrounding the caves.. The observation posts permitted unobstructed observation of the wholecoastal plain, from the Parai jetty to the east end of the Mokmer airdrome. Machine-gun and mortar fire could be placedon most of this vita l area. The cave in the face of the clifforiginally had only a small opening, but this had been considerably "enlarged" by naval and tank gun-fire.

A destroyed heavy machine gun in the entrance indicatedthat an emplacement had existed there. Ingenious, but gruesome, was thes Japanese use of one of their dead as a decoy todraw hostile fire. A body was lashed to a pole and placed upright on the ledge, its back resting against the face of the cliff.Tents had been erected on wooden platforms in the two largercaves, and quantities of food and clothing had been hidden inthe tunnels.

It is believed that the position was manned by fewer than 100men, although it probably provided shelter for a great manymore.


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''H O M E -M A D E " OFFSHORE OBSTACLES

With Japanese shipping becoming more and more hard-pressed, enemy use of "home-made" offshore obstacles requiring little or no imported material is certain to become increasingly widespread. Concrete, cement, and angle-iron obstaclesstill will be encountered, but many beaches in outlying Japanese-held territory cannot be supplied with these luxury items. Instead, obstacles requ iring either no imported material at all,or little more than barbed wire and nails, will be employed inthe preparation of outlying beach and offshore defenses. Thefollowing sketches, based on U. S. Navy analyses of low obliquephotographs, show the princip al types which will be encountered.

Figure 10. Rock Mounds.

These mounds, approximately 3 feet high and 10 to 12 feetsquare, are staggered at 10 to 15 feet intervals on the outeredges of reefs. Such mounds may contain mines.38


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39OME-MADE OFFSHOR E OBSTACLES

F i g u r e 1 1 . W i r e F e n c e s .

Fences of this type consist of barbed wire strung on a seriesof upright posts, often interspersed with "spiders" and lightchevaux-de-frise.

Figure 12. Fish Weirs.Constructed by natives and not intended primarily for defense,

these coral-rock fish weirs are arrow-shaped. The arrow averages 200 yards in width at the base of its head, while the length


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of. the shaft may be as much as 500 yard s. The weirs,usually point seaward, may be employed on reef flats off anytype of shore line, and anywhere from close inshore to the extreme outer edge of a flat. A variation, termed a "turtle trap,"occurs in a saw-tooth arrangement along the outer edge of a reef.

Figure 13. Post Lines.Two genera ! types of posts have been observed: sharVstout

vertical logs spaced at intervals of .approximately 5 feet alongthe shore; and taller postssimilarly spaced, but of lighter construction and inclined seaward usually situated further offshore.

Figure 14. Rock-filled Cribs. 1


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41OME-MADE OFF SHO RE OBSTACLESLog cribs, approximately 10 feet long and 4 feet wide, have

been filled with coral rocks, and spaced at intervals of about5 feet.

Figure 15. Tetrahedra.Most of the examples of th is, type appear to be made ofwood, although some may be made of steel. They often arepartly, or completely,'filled with rocks.

Figure 16. "Spiders."A variation of a tetrahedron, a "spider" is constructed of logs

or poles, either braced by cross members at the base andweighted with rocks, or anchored with its ends buried in thesand. "S pider s" are spaced at intervals of from 15 to 30 feet,and often are incorporated in wire fences.


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Figure 17. Rock-filled Pillars.These forms are connected by barbed wire, and may abo

connected by a cable.

Figure 18. Log Barricades.

Barricades are constructed of logs or poles, and sometimesare strung with barbed w ire. Spaced at intervals of 6 to 10 feet,they usually occur just offshore.


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43OME-MADE OFF SHO RE OBSTACLES

mFigure 19. Rock Walls.

Rock walls, approximately 4 feet high and from 3 to 4 feetwide, have been observed in sections as well as in continuouslines. In some instances they may be topped with wire.

Figure 20. Rock-filled Mesh Wire.The Japanese fill rolls of mesh wire with rocks, and arrangethem in a line along the outer edge of a reef. (Obstacles of this

type were encountered at Guam.)


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DIVERSIONARY

Japanese Army elements known as "Diversionary Units" areorganized for the purpose of penetrating deep into hostile terri-,tory and executing surprise attacks on hostile headquarters, airfields, supply lines, and other military installations. The chiefenemy intention, in launching these diversionary attacks is todisorganize the opposition's rear and to facilitate operations byother Japanese Army forces.

Early in 1944 the Japanese General Staff issued combat instructions to be used by Diversionary Units. The following extracts from the combat instructions indicate how such enemyunits may be expected to operate.PLANS AND EQUIPMENT

1. The success of a D ivers ionary Unit dep end s on the degree ofsur prise tha t it is able to achieve . Th is m eans tha t all preparationsmust be extremely thorou gh . W hen the Un it reaches hostile territory,the secret of its success lies in its ability to conceal its plans and moveme nts. Con centration and dispersion of Japan ese strength must remain a mystery to Allied commanders, so as not to prevent themfrom retaliating with a clever maneuver or a decisive attack.

2. When diversionary tactics are being undertaken, the natives mustbe won over and put to practical use.

3. A Diversionary Unit can not expect a smooth flow of supplies.Although all Japanese troops must know how to live off the land,mem bers of a Diversionary U nit must be espec ially skillful in thisrespect.

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4 5IVERSIONARY UNITS

4. A great deal of intelligence must be gathered before the infiltration takes place. Ae rial ph otog rap hs are especially useful.

5. The following equipment will be needed:a. Necessary e qu ipm en t for scaling cliffs, crossing rivers andswamps, and penetrating jungles.b. Weapons to be used against the enemy; equipment for self-

protection; demolition equipment.c. Signal instruments and equipment for communicating with planes.d. Bivouac equipm ent, rations, m edical su pplies an d sanitation

equipment.e. Trinkets for winning over the natives.L Camouflage equipment; clothing to serve as disguises.

TACTICS1. The re are three ways to infiltrate into hostile te rri to ry : by air, by

sea routes, and by land routes.2. Infiltration by sea routes frequently offers the distinct advantage

of an advance well back into the enemy's rear, and an opportunity totransport a large quantity of material. Submarines, as well as surfaceCraft, may be utilized. Night is the ideal time for movement; how-fever, landings must be made before dawn.

3. The method and route of infiltration by land should be governed not nly by the tactical situation but by the terrain. Infiltrationshould be made th rou gh gaps between dispositions of hostile elementsand in places where an intelligence net is not m aintained . Greatadvantages are afforded by darkness and bad weather. Radio may beused only with the greatest caution. It is extremely important to keepall personnel from making telltale tracks on roads. Also, enemydogs are a threat to security. When a small hostile force is encountered, it should be annihilated in a surprise attack so that the infiltration can proceed with the strength and dispositions of the Diversionary Unit still unknown to Allied commanders.

4. One or more key points from which the actual assault should beestablished n ear the objectives. The following objectives are all pri


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mary: enemy headquarters (including its signal and liaison installations) ; airfields; vital arm am ent (airp lan es, tank s, motor transport,heavy and light weapons) ; such essential combat materiel as ammunition, fuel, river-crossing equipment, and so on; rear supply ware-,houses, dum ps an d tra ns po rt systems. As always, it is essential toki ll comm andin g an d staff officers so tha t the ir su bo rd ina tes will become demoralized.

5. The following points will be observed in attacks against staticobjectives:

a. In attacking enemy he ad qu arte rs, kill the com m ander and staffofficers, capture or destroy every document, and destroy the actualbuildings and communication installations. As a rule, it is hazardousto recon noiter enemy head qu arte rs. Try to gain inform ation in advance from the natives or from cap tured he ad qu arte rs personnel. It isbest to kill commanding and staff officers in their quarters, whichusually are not too well guarded, or while they are riding in theirstaff cars.

b. In attacking airfields, destroy the headquarters, ammunition andfuel dumps, signal towers, and all planes on the field and in thehangars. It is very important to kill Allied pilots. When a Diversionary Unit is cooperating with friendly planes, ground targets should beindicated by prearranged signals.

c. Exp losives and incen dia ries will be used to destroy firearms ofall types, including the armament of airplanes and tanks. If circumstances do not permit complete destruction of all enemy equipmentwhen attacking warehouses and dumps, it may be advantageous toconcentrate on destroying the most vital types of combat materiel.

d. In attack ing sh ips, destroy the ir sources of pow er by blasting orburning. Destroy navigation markers; water, coal, and oil supplyinstallations, and signal installations in, and overlooking, harbors.This type of work may well call for imaginative trickery and indirection.

If feasible, it is best to return by the same route that was used forthe approach.


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DIVERSIONARY UNITS 4 7

6. In attacking high headquarters, especially those of armoredunits, artillery, engineers, and the vital combat materiel of such forceseither employ a direct attack in force, or ambush the enemy andinflict all possible damage.a. In a direct attack against mo ving objectives, swiftly assau lt themost vulnerable vehicles, and seize them. Effect the maximum amountof damage with all possible speed, and then withdraw.

b. There are direct and indirect methods of executing an ambushattack against a moving target. The direct method is to attach timebombs directly to the vehicle, so as to kill personnel and destroyvehicle after the lapse of a predeterm ined interva l. An indirect methodis to lay mines at tactically advantageous points along the road, todestroy the target as it passes.


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IN BRIEF

NIGHT ATTACKSJap an ese night-attack doctrine has been sum m arized in the

fol lowing manner by an enemy source:All officers who will be engaged in the operation take part inreconnaissance during the afternoon before the night when the attackis to be launched. A thorough terrain study is made from commandingground or the edge of a woods, and the plan of attack is laid out.The attack is ordered to follow well-defined terrain features; this permits easy control and maintenance of direction as the force approacheshostile positions.After dark a reconnaissance patrol, which consists of three to fivemen led by an officer or a very able noncom, is sent out to reconnoiter the routes of advance, mark the turns with strips of paper orwhite cloth, and secure last-minute information regarding the dispositions of the hostile force. This reconnaissance is carried out as stealthily as possihle, to m aintain surprise. W hile the reconnaissance is inprogress, the units designated for the attack are moved up ahead ofthe Japanese main line and into a forward position, from which theprearranged routes of advance can be recognized easily. As a rule,machine guns are not carried. Firing is avoided, and reliance is placedupon the bayonet.Initially, a night attack aims at hitting both flanks of a position atthe same time. After the flanks have been rolled back, the two attacking prongs continue to advance, moving beyond and behind the opposition's front lines, where they meet at a prearranged rendezvous. Thedirection of attack of these two elements of the attacking force isgenerally at an angle to the opposition's front line, to facilitate thismeeting. After effecting a rendezvous, the attacking forces reorganize,;and another attack is launched against the center of the opposition'slinestriking from the reart

48


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IN ^rtlEF 4 9

If the attacking t'orce is to seize and to hold the defender's position,the former digs in arid awaits any counterattack.

If the unit w hic^ sends out an atta ck ing force is on the defensive,the attacking force retires to its "\vn lines after inflicting as muchdamage as possibi-1 upon the enemy.

Squads move ir one or two columns, with each man close behindthe man ahead . Ail elem ents of the attackin g force try to m aintainvisual contact with neighboring units. Security to the front, rear, andthe flanks is provHed. The security elements also maintain visualcontact with the m a ' i body . Security elemen ts to the front of a platoon normally consi"* of an officer and two or three men. Individualsoldiers provide flank nd rear security.

In this description o*' a Japane se nigh t attack , the m ost significantpoint is the dispatching *f a reconnaissance party prior to the attack,to reconnoiter and mark the routes of advance, and to locate the flanksand the general disposition of the defending forces.GROUND TACTICS, N5W GEORGIA

In New Georgia the Japanese defended effectively both onlow and high ground, according to a U.S. infantry division'ssummary of the opposition it met during this campaign.

A high proportion of automatic weapons was encountered.These were mutually supporting, and were protected by riflemen.

Both protective and tactical wire was encountered. In oneinstance, a double-band obstacle, constructed of stakes andvines, enclosed a strong, well-knit center of resistance.

Well dug-in outpost positions were found considerably forward of main positions. Apparently mortars had been registered on these outpost positions.

The action of the Japanese was defensive, terminating in acovered withdrawal. The enemy showed his customary determination when fighting on the defensive, but seemed less in


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5 0 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINdined to hang on and die in h is positions than he was onGuadalcanal, for example. The Japanese took advantage of ourfailure to maintain contact at night, and withdrew under coverof darkness.

Five Japanese counterattacks were experienced, one of whichtook place at night. The night attack was launched chiefly withgrenades possibly from grenade dischargers held in a horizontal position. The daylight attacks were characterized by intense, sustained automatic fire, waist high. In one attack, whenthe Japanese failed to locate any of our flanks, because of ourall-around defense, they employed grenades and machine gunsin an effort to clear the undergrowth and thus reveal our positions.

Japanese troops were under orders to move forward underU.S. artillery fire, so as to be in a better position to deal withthe U.S. attack which was expected to follow.

A large number of U.S. weaponsgrenades, especiallywasemployed by the enemy.

There were no authenticated instances of Japanese snipersconcealed in trees, and no enemy booby traps were reported."FLYING PIG" MINE

In addition to the Japanese antivehicle mine known as the"Yardstick,"1 a second type of Japanese mine also was encountered for the first time during the operations in the AdmiraltyIslands. This second mine, which has been dubbed the "FlyingPig," was installed as a remote-controlled mine, in connectionwith double-apron barbed-wire fences at Lorengau Harbor,Manus Island. While the re have been conflicting statements as

* See Intelligence BuMetin, Vol. II, No. 11, pp. 55-59.


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IN BRIEF 5 1to the use of this mine, the best information indicates that itwas used only on the beach, where it had been laid at 50-footintervals, under the barbed-wire fences.

Basically, the "Flying Pig" consists of a sheet-steel cylinder,about 10 inches long and 8 inches in diameter, with domed ends.(The sheet steel is approximately ^ - in c h thick.) At each endthere is a sheet-metal yoke with an eye, to which a towing cablemay be attached. Near the ends of the cylindrical sides are two,pairs of bar-steel arms, about 7 inches long, which project fromthe body of the mine at angles of about 20 degrees. The totalweight of the mine is about 30 pounds, including ai)lack crystalline explosive charge weighing about 19 pounds. The mine is.fired electrically by means of a detonator inserted into the sideof the cylinder and connected to a suitable length of heavilyinsulated double-conductor cable.

The use of the "Flying Pig" as a remote-controlled mine inconnection with wire obstacles on Manus apparently was moreor less of an improvisation. Reports indicate that the mine wasdesigned to be used in destroying submarine mines. Evidentlythe "Flying Pig" may be towed from a minesweeper by a lengthof cable attached to the towing eyes. The projecting arms a reintended to engage the anchor cable of a submarine mine, thereby permitting the "Flying Pig" to be drawn into contact withit. After this, it would be possible to fire the "F lying P ig " electrically from the minesweeper.ALL-AROUND DEFENSE OF A HILL

An interesting Japanese defensive position in the Burma-Indiaborder area has been described by British observers.


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In this area, terrain feature 124 is a horseshoe-shaped hill,with point 124 at the northwest end. The Japanese defensivesystem was all-around, and consisted of a series of one-mansniper posts leading from a common connecting trench which ranin an unbroken line around the terrain feature.

The connecting trench was 1 ^ feet wide, and normally 2 to2l/r> feet deepexcept where it passed a stretch of vegetation sosparse that the trench had been dug 12 feet deep to provide adequate concealment.

In excavating, the Japanese had taken care not to destroy theundergrowth; as a result, concealment against air and groundobservation was unusually good. The enemy had disposed of thespoil so successfully that no trace of it ever was discovered.

The sniper posts had been so dug that they were oppositeplaces where there was a natural thinning of the undergrowth.These positions were occupied day and night.

Kitchens and other service installations usually were nothingmore than sections of the connecting trench, which had beenwidened and roofed with bamboo mats; however, two kitchenswere found 20 yards in front of the connecting trench on theslopes of the hill. A number of dugouts leading from the connecting trench had been built into the hillside.

When British troops first attacked this terrain feature, the defenders fired a red Very light, and the enemy placed mortar,grenade, machine-gun, and small-arms fire on his own positionfrom mutually supporting features, to pin down the advancingforce. Then, before British troops could stage a concentratedattack, the Japanese evacuated the position.


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IN BRIEF 5 3JAPANESE 105-MM A M M U N IT IO N

A study of Japanese 105-mm ammunition has revealed somelimitations with respect to interchangeability, which will be ofinterest to U.S. troops who may have occasion to fife capturedJapanese artille ry. The results of this study have been incorporated in the chart which appears on page 54.

The chart shows the interchangeability of projectiles only.Cartridge cases for three of the guns are of different lengths,and information about the Model 14 and Model 38 guns islacking.It should be noted that Model 88 fuzes occur in the instantaneous and delay versions. Both Model 88 Instantaneous andModel 88 Delay may be marked either "for howitzers and mor

tars" or "for guns." Rounds fitted with fuzes marked "for hoviritzers and mor tars" may be fired from guns, as well. However,fuzes marked "for guns" may be fired from guns only.The "pointed HE rounds" are also called "streamlined projectiles." The best information available indicates that theModel 92 (193 2) gun, which fires this ammunition, has a maximum range of 20 ,000 yards. The maximum range for the sameweapon with other types of high-explosive ammunition is only15,000 yards.

Throughout the chart the letter " M " is used as an abbreviation for "model."


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JAPANESE 105-MM ARTILLERY AMMUNITIONWEAPONS (and Length of Cartridge Case)

Projectile

M91 AA Pointed H EM 9 1 H EM 9 1 H EM95 APHEM 1 4 H EM91*HEM14* HEM91 Pointed H EM95 Pointed H EM95 IncendiaryM95 ShrapnelM14 ShrapnelM14* Pointed HEM14 SmokeType "A" APHEType "B " APHEType "A" Cast Iron APH EType "B " Cast Iron APHET ype "C " Cas t Iron AP HEIVx38 Shrapnel

Bursting Charge

TNT (or Amatol)TNT (or Amatol)Ammonium NitrateGuanidine NitrateCyclonitePicric AcidDinitronapthaleneTNT (or Amatol)TNT (or Amat(.l)TNT (or Amatt.l)TNT (or Amatol)TNT (or Amatol)Black PowderBlack PowderTNT (or Amatol)Black Powderl'icric At:idDinitronapthalenePicric AcidDinitronapthalenePicric AcidDinitronapthalenePicric AcidDinitronapthaleneBlack PowderBlack Powder

ProjectileWeight(lbs.)

35.2635.2634.91

35.0635.2635.2635.2631.7131.7135.2636.9436.9435.2635.643A7639.7640.1839.673.173.-67

M 14A/AG un22.26"Y esN oN o

N oN oN oN oN oN sN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN o

M 91HowitzerApprox.9W

N oY esYes

Y esY es} es" esY esY esYes^ esN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN o

M 92G u nApprox.2 9 "

N o"i es Yes

Yes N oYes N oYesYes YesN oYes N oN oN oN oN oN oN oN o

M 14Gun

N oYesN o

Y'esYes Yes YesYes Yes YesN oYes Yes Yes N oN oN oN oN oN o

M 33Gun

N oY esN o

Y esYesYes YesYes YesYes N oY'esN oYes YesYesYes YesY e s\ e s

Standard Fuze

M89 Pointed A A1\.!!8 InsL. and DelayM88 Inst. and Delay

M 95BDM88 Inst. and DelayM88 Inst. and DelayM88 Inst. and DelayM88 Inst. and DelayM88 Inst. and DelayM5 CombinationM5 CombinationM5 CombinationM88 Inst. and DelayM5 CombinationM88 Base (for guns)M88 Base (for guns)M88 Base (for guns)M88 No. 2 BaseMS3 No. 2 Base]U5 Cognation

red t o "Steel t


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55N BRIEF

05-mm High-explosive Shell and Cartridge Case for 105-mm Howitzer.


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Long-pointed High-explosive Projectile and Cartridge Casefor Model 92 (193 2) 105-mm Field Gun.


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IN BRIEF 57

Model 88 Fuzes for 105-mm and 150-mm Guns and Howitzers.(Left, instantaneous type; riglit, delay type).


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GERMANY 1

GERMAN ANTITANK WEAPONS

German antitank weapons are divided into several classes.The main class comprises guns built specifically for antitankmissions and falls into three groupsguns of conventional German design, guns built with tapered-bore tubes, and capturedantitank weapons.

German antitank guns of the normal type. At the left is the 3.7-cm Pak;at the right, the 5-cm Pak 38; in the rear, the 7.5-cm Pak 40.

The orthodox German guns in the first group are designed toachieve armor penetration at maximum ranges by using rela

*In Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. Ill, No. 2, p. 19, lines 9 and 10 should read". . . . the Germans have a new 88-mm (3.46-inch) tank gun, the Kw.K. 43. . . ."58


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59ERMAN ANTITANK WEAPONStively heavy projectiles with high velocities. The first such gunwas the 37-mm Rheinmetall (the 3.7-cm Pak). This was toolimited in power at the time of the Battle of France (1940),and was superseded by the 50-mm 5-cm Pak 38. This 50-mmweapon is gradually being replaced, in turn, by the 75-mm7.5-cm Pak 40, which is the standard German antitank gun oftoday. Since the Pak 40 is capable of penetrating 4.43 inchesof armor at 500 yards, it ij considered an adequate weapon.These three guns all have similar basic features: split tubulartrails, a low silhouette, and a large shield. All have been keptas light as possible to increase tactical mobility. The 50-mmand the 75-mm guns employ muzzle brakes to reduce recoil andthus permit lighter carr iages. In 1944 another gun, the 88-mm

The tapered-bore 28/30-mm gun, s.Pz.B. 41,Glossary of German Terms

Llefant (Elephant)an 88-mm gun mounted on the Panzerjdger Tiger P (a highlymodified Tiger tank chassis). This was formerly known as the Ferdinand.(/) a French weapon officially adopted by the German forces. The letter followsthe weapon designation.


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The airborne 28/20-mm anti tank gun.

8.8-cm Pak 43/41, was added to this group. Although this gunis extremely powerful (it penetrates 4 .4 inches of armor at2,500 yards), its great weight on its split-trail, two-wheeled carriage somewhat reduces its mobility. Another version of thisgunthe 8.8-cm Pak 43mounts the same tube, but on a carriage like that of the well-known 88-mm antiaircraft guns of theFlak 18 and 36 types.Faustpatroneobsolete name for a Panzerfaust.Flak (Flugabwehrkanone)antiaircraft, or antiaircraft gun.Gr. B. (Granatbilchse)a special rifle for launching antitank grenades.Jagdpanther an 88-mm antitank gun mounted on the Panzerjdger Panther (ahighly modified Panther tank chassis).


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GERMAN ANTITANK WEAPONS

The tapered-bore 42/28-mm 4.2-cm Pak (right)resembles the 3.7-cm Pak (left).

The guns in the tapered-bore group are intended to havegreater mobility than conventional guns capable of achievingidentical armor penetration. Tapered-bore guns seek to achievepenetration at short ranges, using light projectiles fired at veryhigh muzzle velocities. Tungsten, which is becoming increasinglydifficult for the Germans to obtain, is necessary in the manufacture of projectiles for these guns; also, the performance of theguns in combat has been a disappointment to the Germans. Allthree of the tapered-bore guns bear the same date of standardization1941. First to be introduced was the very light28/20-mm gun 2.8-cm s.Pz.B. 41. So light that it can easily beMarder (Marten)name of a bird, used to designate three types of tank destroyer(Panzerjdger) chassis:Marten Ithe Panzer dger Lr.S. chassis, which is a highly modified French Lor-raine tractor chassis.Marten IIthe Panzer dger II chassis, which is a highly modified Pz.Kpfw. IIchassis.Marten IIIthe Panzer dger 38 chassis, which is a highly modified Pz.Kpfw.38(t) chassis.

These chassis when designated Marten mount either the 75-mm Pak 40 m the76.2-mm Pak 36 (r).


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The 75/55-mm tapered bore 7.5cm Pak 41.manhandled by one gunner, the 28/20 has been used by mountain troops, who can break it up into loads and climb with it,and also has been used in an airborne version. It has been issued extensively to armored and motorized infantry as a riflecompany antitank weapon. The next larger tapered-bore gun,'the 42/28-mm 4.2-cm Pak 41, is mounted on a modified 3.7-cm

The French Model 1937 47-mm Gun.Nashorn (Rhinoceros)an 88-mm antitank gun mounted on the Panzer dger III/IV,and formerly known as the Hornisse (Hornet) . (The Panzerjdger III/IV is ahighly modified chassis made from parts of the Pz.Kpftv. Ill and IV.)Pak (Panzerabwehrkanone)antitank, or antitank gun. (Panzerjdgerkanone is thenew word for antitank guns, but the abbreviation still is Pak.)Panzerfaustra. recoilless, one-man antitank grenade launcher. At one time Panzerjaust referred only to one model of launcher


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63E R M AN A N T IT A N K WE A P O N S

Pak carriage; this weapon also has been used by mountaintroops. The largest is the 75/55-mm 7.5-cm Pak 41. The 75/55has a most unusual carriage. There is no axle; instead, thewheels are secured to the thick shield, with the gun trunnioning on the shield as well. This gun has not been issued in largequantities,

The group of captured antitank weapons includes a numberof types that the German Army had seized in the course of its

Two non-German guns that the German Army uses in an antitank role areshown at the left an d right. At the left is the French 75 fitted with amuzzle brake and mounted on the Pak 38 carriag e. At the right is theRussian Model 1936 field gun rebuilt as the 7.62-cm Pak 36 (r). T hegun in the center is the gun with which the Russians intended to replacethe Model 1 9 3 6 ; it is know n as the 76.2 -m m M odel 1939 field gun. Th eGermans have fitted it with a muzzle brake, and although they class itas a field gun, they also use it in an antitank role.

Pz.B. (Panzerbiichse)antitank rifle; if preceded by the letter "s", a heavy antitank rifle.Pzjdg. (Panzerjager) (1) Antitank and tank destroyer (new term ).(2) A chassis of some vehicle highly modified in order to mount an antitank gun.Pz.Kpfw. (formerly Pz.Kw.) (Panzerkampfwagen)tank.(r ) a Soviet (R us sia n) weap on officially adopted by the German forces. Theletter follows the weapon designation.


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con qu ests. M ost of these guns had been designe d and builtbefo re 19 40 . Th e Germ ans have used them as stop-gap weapons,substituting them for the better materiel that German factorieshave not been abl e to pro duce in sufficient quan tit y; Fo r example , extensive use is m ad e of the Fr en ch M ode l 19 37 47-mm gun(4.7-Pak 181 (f)), which h as an effective ra nge of only 550yards . However, there are two really useful and efficientwe apo ns that the Ge rm ans have p ut to co nsid era ble use . One isthe Soviet 76.2-mm Model 1936 field gun, which the Red Armydesigned with an eye to using it for antitank and even antiaircraft p urp os es. Th e Germ ans have foun d this high-velocity gunvaluable, and have modified it by adding a double shield and,som etimes, a mu zzle b ra ke . A lthou gh it is an alte rna te weaponwith the 75-mm Pak 40 and the 88-mm antitank guns in the Germ an A rm y, the Soviets hav e fou nd it too heavy and badly balanced, and have issued what they consider superior antitank andfield guns to repl ac e it. Ano the r fore ign gun favored by the German is the famous 75-mm Schneider field gun, Model 1897.Many of these have been captured from various European countries, espe cially from Fr an ce . Th e Germ ans have modified the75-mm Schneider by fitting it with a large muzzle brake andby putting the gun on their own 50-mm antitank gun carriage.They call the result the 7.5-cm Pak 97/38. Since the French 75lacks muzzle velocity, it cannot be regarded as a satisfactorymodern anti tank gun.R.Pz.B. (Raketen-P anzerbuch.se) a rocket launcher of the bazooka type.U.G. (Schweres Infanteriegeschiitz)a heavy infantry cannon.Stu.G. (Sturmgeschutz)an assault gun (refers to complete unit of gun and carriage).(/) a Czechoslovakian weapon officially adopted by the German forces. The letterfollows the weapon designation.


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65ERMAN ANTITANK WEAPONS

A second and highly important class of antitank weapons consists of antiaircraft guns employed in an antitank role. The highvelocity of antiaircraft guns makes them suitable for antitankmissions, and, since 1940, German designers have paid specialattention to the possibility that any German antiaircraft gun maybe used as a dual-purpose weapon. The smaller guns the20-mm 2-cm Flak 30 and 38, and the 37-mm 3.7-cm Flak 18and 36are now of little value in an antitank role because oftheir lack of power. They remain effective against lightly armored vehicles, and against the vision slits, ports, and optical

The 20-mm antiaircraft gun, 2-cm Flak 38.


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apparatus of larger tanks. The newer 50-mm 5-cm Flak 41,which resembles the 37's, is not much more effective. The88-mm g un s a re no torio us for thei r effectiveness against tanksof all sizes. Th ese gun s inc lud e the Flak 18 series (that is, theFlak 18, 36, and 37) and the Flak 41. Those in the Flak 18series have mobile cruciform carriages with four outriggers, andare ca pab le of effective fire w ith heavy pro jec tiles at greatran ge s. The y differ in m ino r de tails only . Th e Flak 41 is asomewhat similar weapon, but much more powerful, having agrea tly increa sed mu zzle velocity. Intr od uc ed in 19 42, it issimilar to the 8.8-cm Pak 43/41 in that its great weight renders

T h e 8.8-cm Flak 36, emp laced ( in R us sia ) . W hen this gun is off its car-riag e, as sho w n here , it can fire a gain st aircra ft. Ho wever, the Germansfit it with a shie ld w hen th ey in ten d to u se it p rim arily against tanks,


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GERMAN ANTITANK WEAPONS 6 7

it less mobile than would seem desirab le. Fitted with a largeshield, it was designed with greater consideration for antitankfire than were the guns in the Flak 18 series. The latter, a3 amatter of fact, usually are fitted with a special carriage and

An 8.8'cm Flak 41, emplaced (in Italy).shield when they are to function primarily in an antitank role.This carriage permits a limited field of forward fire from thewheels without the necessity of emplacing the gun. A Sovietgunthe 85-mm Model 1939has been fitted with an 88-mmliner, and is now in German service as the 8.5/8.8-cm Flak30(r). This gun bears a general resemblance to those in theFlak 18 series, and gives a similar performance.


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It is notable that, in the case of most of the guns mentioned,the G erm an s hav e m ad e ev ery effort to cut dow n on weight soas to gain tactic al m ob ility . W hi le the u se of ligh t metals andlighter carriages through employment of recoil-reducing milzzlebrakes has been general, there has been a recent tendency to retain m ob ility bu t to incre ase m uzzle v elocity by reducing thegun-tube safety fa ctor. Th is ap pe ar s to hav e been done even inthe case of such heavy weapons as the 88-mm Pak 43/41 andthe Flak 41. Th e tend

Documents

Intelligence Bulletin ~ Nov 1944