Integration of Princely State1

8/12/2019 Integration of Princely State1

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Integration of Princely States

Unifying under one

administration, post- Partition

India and the princely states

was perhaps the most important

task facing the political

leadership.


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In 1947 the future of the

princely states once in the

British left became a matter of

concern.

The Indian nationalists could

hardly accept a situation where

the unity of free India would be

endangered by hundreds of large


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or small independent or

autonomous states interspersed

within it which were sovereign.

Besides , the people of the

states had participated in the

process of nation-in-the-making

from the end of nineteenth

century and developed strong


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feelings of Indian nationalism.

The nationalist leaders in

British India and in the states

rejected the claim of any state

to independence and repeatedly

declared that independence for a

princely state was not an

option- the only option open


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being whether the state would

accede to India or Pakistan on

basis of contiguity of its

territory and the wishes of its

people.

With great skill and masterful

diplomacy and using both

persuasion and pressure, Sardar


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Vallabhbhai Patel succeeded in

integrating the hundreds of

princely states with the Indian

union in two stages. Some states

had shown wisdom and realism and

perhaps a degree of patriotism

by joining the Constituent

Assembly in April 1947.But the


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majority of princes had stayed

away and a few, such as those of

Travancore, Bhopal and

Hyderabad, publicly announced

their desire to claim an

independent status.

On 27 June 1947, Sardar Patel

assumed additional charge of the


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newly created states department

with V.P.Menon as its

Secratory.Sardar Patel told

menon at the time that the

situation held dangerous

potentialities and that if we

did not handle it promptly and

effectively, our hard-earned


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freedom might disappear through

the states door.

Fearful of the rising tide of

the peoples movement in their

states, and of the more extreme

agenda of the redical wing of

the Congress, as also Patels

reputation for firmness and even


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ruthlessness, the princes

responded to Patels appeal and

all but three of them

Junagarh, Jammu and Kashmir and

Hyderabad acceded to India by

15thAugust 1947.

JUNAGARH


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Junagarh was a small state on

the coast of Saurasthra

surrounded by Indian territority

and therefore, without any

geoghraphical contiguity with

Pakistan. Yet, its nawab

announced accension of his state

to Pakistan on 15thAugust 1947,


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even though the people of the

state overwhelmingly, Hindi

desired to join India.

The Indian Nationalist Leaders

had for decades stood for the

sovreignity of the people

against the claims of the

princes. It was therefore not


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surprising that in Junagarhs

case Nehru and Patel agreed that

the final voice should be that

of the people as ascertained

through the plebiscite. The

deewan of Junagarh Shah Nawab

Bhutto, father of the more

famous Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, now


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decided to invite the government

of India to intervene. Indian

troops thereafter marched into

the state. A plebiscite was held

in the state in February 1948

which went overwhelmingly in

favour of joining India.


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KASHMIR

The state of Kashmir bordered on

both India and Pakistan. Ruler

Hari Singh was Hindu while,

nearly 75% of the population was

Muslim. Hari Singh too did not

accede either to India or

Pakistan. Fearing democracy in


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India and communalism in

Pakistan he hoped to stay out of

both and to continue to wield

power as an independent ruler.

The popular political forces led

by the national conference and

its leader Sheikh Abdullah

however, wanted to join India.


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The Indian political leaders

wanted the people of Kashmir to

decide whether to link their

fate with India or Pakistan. On

22ndOctober, with the onset of

winter several Pathan tribesmen,

led unofficially by Pakistani

army officers invaded Kashmir


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and rapidly pushed towards

Srinagar, the capital of

Kashmir. The ill-trained army of

the Maharaja proved no match for

the invading forces. In panic of

24thOctober the Maharaja

appealed to India for military

assistance. Nehru even at this


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Sheikh Abdullah and Sardar Patel

too insisted on accession. And

so 26thOctober the Maharaja

acceded to India and also agreed

to install Abdullah as head of

the states administration. Even

though both the national

conference and the Maharaja


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wanted firm and permanent

accession, India in conformity

with its democratic commitment

and Mountbattens advice

announced that it would hold a

referendum on the accession

decision once peace and law and


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order had been restored in the

valley.

After the accession the cabinet

took the decision to immediately

fly troops to Srinagar. This

decision was bolstered by its

approval by Gandhi ji who told

Nehru that there should be no


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submission to evil in Kashmir

and that the raiders had to be

driven out. On 27thOctober

nearly 100 planes airlifted men

and weapons to Srinagar to join

the battle against the raiders.

Srinagar was first held and then

the raiders were gradually


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driven out of the valley though

they retained control over parts

of the state and the armed

conflict continued for months.

Fearful of the dangers of a full

scale war between India and

Pakistan the government of India

agreed on 30h December 1947, on


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Mountbattens suggestion to

refer the Kashmir to the

security council of the United

Nations asking for vacation of

aggression by Pakistan.

HYDERABAD


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Hyderbad was the largest state

in India and was completely

surrounded by Indian territory.

The Nizam of Hyderabad was the

3rdIndian ruler who did not

accede to india before 15th

August. Instead, he claimed amn

independent status, and


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encouraged by Pakistan, began to

expand its armed forces. But,

Sardar Patel was in no hurry to

force a decision on him,

especially as Mountbatten was

interested in acting as an

intermediary in arriving at a

negotiated settlement with him.


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Time, Patel felt, was on Indias

side, especially as the Nizam

made a secret commitment not to

join Pakistan and the British

government, refused to give

Hyderabad the status of a

dominion. But, Patel made it

clear that India would not


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tolerate an isolated spot which

would destroy the very union

which we have built up with our

blood and toil.

In November 1947 the government

of India signed a standstill

agreement with the Nizam, hoping

that while the negotiations


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proceeded the latter would

introduce representative

government in the state making

the state making the task of

merger easier. But, the Nizam

had other plans. He engaged the

services of the leading British

lawyer Sir Walter Monckturn, a


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friend of Mountbatten to

negotiate with the government of

India on his behalf. The Nizam

hoped to prolong negotiations

and in the meanwhile build up

his military strength and forced

India to accept his sovereignty

or alternatively he might


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succeed in acceding to Pakistan,

especially in view of the

tension between India and

Pakistan over Kashmir.

There was rapid growth with

official help of the militant

Muslim communal organization

Itihad Ul Muslimin and its


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paramilitary wing the Razakars.

On 2ndAugust 1947 the Hyderabad

styate Congress launched a

powerful Satyagraha movement to

force democratization on the

Nizam. Nearly 20000 Satyagrahis

were jailed. As a result of

attacks by the Razakar and


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repression by the state

authorities thousands of people

fled the state and took shelter

in temporary camps in Indian

territory. The state Congress

led movement now took to arms.

By then a powerful communist led

peasant struggle had developed


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the Razakars, attacked big

landlords and distributed their

lands among the peasants and the

landless.

PEPSU

In contrast to the south and

Bombay where language


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differences were more important

than religious differences,

religious differences and

communal organizations on

religious lines were more

important in the Punjab in the

19th

century and upto the

partition of the country in 1947


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in which Punjab and the Shiekhs

were at the centre of the storm

the Gurudwara reform movement of

the 1920s brought a critical

change in the institutional

vitality and political

organizations of the Sikha as a

community for it brought into


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being two organizations which

became the central religious and

political institutions of the

Sikh. These are Shiromani

Gurudwara Pravandak Committee, a

central managing committee for

the Punjab Gurudwaras which

controls the Sikh shrines and


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its vast resources and the Akali

Dal the political movement which

led the Gurudwara reform

movement which became the

principal political organization

of the Sikha in Punjab before

and after independence.


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NORTH-EAST

The Reorganization of Assam

In Assam and the north-east

special problems arose

immediately after independence

which made states

reorganization a far more

difficult and violent process


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than elsewhere at the time for

here the central government

faced explicit unequivocal

sessionist demands from non-

Hindu tribal groups.

Several sets of ethnic

confrontations intersect in

Assam between Hindus and Muslim


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linguistic groups plains

peoples and tribal hill people

plains tribals and non-tribals

and the 9indigenous population

and the large migrant

population. Here the specific

problems of state reorganization

centred around the demands of


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the tribal people though the

severe sets of ethnic issues at

time overlapped and influenced

each other. Moreover in the

1990s new insurrectionary and

secessionist have arisen in

Assam bith among the plain

tribal people among the dominant


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and secession was that tribal

people were simply not Indian at

all.

The Naga and the Mizoram

insurrections

The Naga demand for secession

was made by the famous Naga

leader Angami Zapu phizo, at the


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time of Independence when the

Assamese government violated an

agreement with the Naga National

Council to recognize it as the

principal political and

administrative force in the Naga

Hill District and proceeded to

extend its administration to


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the Naga area. When the Naga

movement turned into a violent

insurrection, the central

government adopted a policy of

suppression by military means,

which at times involved an

entire Indian army division and

various other paramilitary and


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police forces, the complete

suspension of civil liberties in

the hills and other drastic

measures such as the regrouping

of villages to separate them

from the guerrillas.

At the same time, as in the

Punjab, the central government


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demonstrated its willingness to

negotiate with moderate non-

secessionist leaders. After

prolonged negotiation the

central government agreed to the

formation of Nagaland as the

sixteenth state of the Indian

union in March, 1960s. In the


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meantime, the Indian army

continued its military

operations against the Naga

rebels, which persisted until

1978, despite the arrangement of

cease-fire agreements in 1964

and 1975.


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underlined bases in economic or

class differences and specific

policies and political tactics

pursued by the central and state

governments. The analysis here

has given primacy to the latter

however; it is also true that

the problems in Punjab in the


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North-Eastern region and in

Kashmir have been complicated by

the presence of other factors

which were not present in the

linguistic reorganization of

states which took place during

the Nehru period. In the Punjab

case the most important


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difference is the fact that the

Sikhs are a separate religious

as well as linguistic groups. In

the north-east the issues have

been tackled by the presence

there of several tribal

minorities whose demands have

been secessionist by the


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migration of large number of

people from other provinces of

India, particularly West Bengal

to the north-eastern states of

Assam and Tripura especially by

illegal migrations from

Bangladesh as well and by the

presence of large numbers of


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both Hindus and Muslims among

the migrant and local

populations. In Kashmir the

issues have been complicated by

the internationalization of the

dispute. The special status

which Kashmir has had since its

integration into the Indian


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union and its perceived integral

connection with the opposed

finding ideologies of the two

principal successor states of

the Bristish Raj. Nevertheless,

the argument here is that the

policies pursued by the

government of India after


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Nehrus death have played a

major role in the

intensification of conflicts in

these three regions and have in

the process highlighted a major

structural problem in the Indian

political system. Although the

same tensions existed in the


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Nehru years, central government

policies then favoured pluralist

solutions, non-intervention in

state politics except in a

conciliatory role or as a last

resort and preservation of

separation between central and

state politics, allowing


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considerable autonomy for the

latter.

Documents

Integration of Princely State1