The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 15 | Issue 11 | Number 4 | Article ID 5045 | Jun 01, 2017

1

Integration and Conflict in Indonesia’s Spice Islands

David Adam Stott

Tucked away in a remote corner of easternIndonesia, between the much larger islands ofNew Guinea and Sulawesi, lies Maluku, a smallarchipelago that over the last millennia hasbeen disproportionately influential in worldhistory. Largely unknown outside of Indonesiatoday, Maluku is the modern name for theMoluccas, the fabled Spice Islands that werethe only place where nutmeg and cloves grewin the fifteenth century. Christopher Columbushad set out to find the Moluccas but mistakenlyhappened upon a hitherto unknown continentbetween Europe and Asia, and Moluccan spiceslater became the raison d’etre for the Europeanpresence in the Indonesian archipelago. TheDutch East India Company Company (VOC;Verenigde Oost-indische Compagnie) wasestablished to control the lucrative spice trade,which was more valuable than gold, becomingboth the world’s first multi-national companyand the globe’s foremost trading and transportenterprise. So prized were the Moluccas that in1667 the Dutch swapped their colony ofManhattan with the British for the latter’s tinyisland of Run in the Banda Islands, valued forits nutmeg. Subsequent Dutch conquests unitedthe sprawling Indonesian archipelago for thefirst time and provided the precursor to themodern successor state of Indonesia.

Maluku thus occupies a special place amongIndonesia’s myriad islands, which make up theworld’s largest archipelagic state and thefourth most populous country in the world.Ironically, whilst its existence subsequently ledto the creation of the modern Indonesian state,Maluku’s integration into that state has longbeen contested and was afflicted by severecommunal conflict in 1999-2002 from which ithas yet to fully recover. In order to quell the

violence, in 1999 Maluku was divided into twoprovinces – Maluku and North Maluku - but thispaper refers to both provinces combined as‘Maluku’ unless stated otherwise.

Given the scale of violence in Indonesia afterSuharto’s fall in May 1998, the country’scontinuing viability as a nation state wasquestioned. During this period, the spectre ofBalkanization was raised regularly in bothacademic circles and mainstream media as thecountry struggled to cope with economicreverse, terrorism, separatist campaigns andcommunal conflict in the post-Suhartotransition. With Yugoslavia’s violent breakupfresh in memory, and not long after the demiseof the Soviet Union, Indonesia was portrayed asthe next patchwork state that would implode.In hindsight these fears were unrealized sinceonly East Timor separated from Indonesia in1999. The Indian Ocean tsunami helped triggeran end to secessionist hostilities in Aceh in2005, and separatism in West Papua was drivenunderground after a period of unprecedentedopenness between 1999 and 2001.In additionto these so-called vertical conflicts in whichlocal separatist forces resisted state control,Indonesia was also wracked by severehorizontal conflicts in which various ethnicgroups fought communal battles against theirneighbours. Eastern Indonesia was particularlyhard hit since all six of the country’s majorcommunal conflicts of this period occurred inthe provinces of West Kalimantan (twice),Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Malukuand North Maluku between 1996 and2002.1 This communal violence can be broadlycategorised either as conflict betweenindigenous and migrant groups or betweenChristians and Muslims.

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

2

The violence of 1996-2002 was at its mostsavage in Maluku and North Maluku. Theviolence in these two provinces aloneaccounted for between 5,000 and 10,000deaths, and internally displaced between oneth i rd and one ha l f o f the Mo luccanarchipelago’s total population.2 By 2015 around7,500 people remained displaced, somedistricts still segregated and many minoritygroups have never returned to their homecommunities. Whilst ethnic violence in bothKalimantan and Sulawesi has since faded, ithas occasionally returned to haunt Maluku inthe years since peace was re-established in2002, most recently in March-May 2012 andJuly-August 2014.

Whilst East Timor, Aceh and West Papuaundoubtedly represent the highest profile casesof separatist conflict in Indonesia’s modernhistory, Maluku has also experienced acontested integration into the Unitary Republic.The roots of this stretch back to the colonialperiod when the status of Maluku and itspeople was much higher than it is elsewhere incontemporary Indonesia. Maluku is anexceptional case study of communal violencefor, unlike the other episodes in easternIndonesia, its horizontal conflict has also beenimbued with undertones of separatist intent.This article aims to explain some of thedifficulties behind Maluku’s fraught integrationinto the modern Indonesian state.

Maluku and the Spice Trade

Maluku’s two provinces together comprise overone thousand islands, only a few of which arelarger than one thousand square kilometres.The area remains remote and difficult to accessdespite the huge advances in transportationsince Indonesian independence in 1949. It istherefore ironic that the story of modernIndonesia forming as a successor state to theDutch East Indies can be traced to the firstEuropean arrival in Maluku of 1512. During theMiddle Ages, this was the only place in theworld where nutmeg and cloves were found.The most valuable of these was the clove,which could command higher prices than gold.Maluku’s spices were vital in preserving meatsince large cattle herds could not be kept aliveduring the European winter, meaning thatlivestock had to be slaughtered before itsonset.

Prior to the European arrival, the spice trade inthe region was controlled by the rivalSultanates of Ternate (founded in 1257) and ofTidore (founded in 1109), both now situated inNorth Maluku province. Both sultanates soldtheir spices to Chinese, Malay, Arab andJavanese traders who transported it throughSoutheast Asia and the Persian Gulf on boats orby pack animals on the Silk Road. The spiceseventually made their way to Damascus andConstantinople (modern day Istanbul) beforefinally arriving in Europe. Various Europeanpowers sought ways to break the Muslimtraders’ monopoly on these highly lucrativespice imports into Europe.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans toarrive in the Moluccas with a 1512 expeditionfrom their outpost of Malacca on the MalayPeninsula. Upon their arrival in Ambon, theSultan of Ternate invited some members of themission to his island, where the Portuguesewere initially welcomed as traders.3 Therebyencouraged, from 1513 the Portuguese begansending a trading fleet annually to theMoluccas and started construction of a fort inTernate in 1522. However, Portuguese

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

3

attempts to monopolise Ternate’s spice trade,along with their interference in local politicsand Christian proselytising, strained relationswith the Muslim Sultan and eventually lead totheir expulsion in 1575 after a five-year siege oftheir fort.4 The Portuguese subsequently shiftedtheir base of activities in Maluku further southto Ambon, where they had established a factoryin 1521. Despite having constructed severalforts across the Moluccas, the Portuguesenever managed to wrest control of the region’sspice trade.

Spanish merchants, who formed an alliancewith the Sultan of Tidore 1603, subsequentlyfollowed the Portuguese. Even though Tidorewas officially incorporated into the SpanishEast Indies (Indias Orientales Españolas) theSultan continued to rule the island. As with thePortuguese, the Spanish built forts and begantrading from them. Seeking to consolidate theirmercantile empire, Spanish forces invadedTernate in 1606, prompting the Sultan ofTernate to appeal to the Dutch for assistance.The following year the Dutch seized thenorthern half of Ternate island but the Spanishretained both the southern half of Ternate andthe whole of Tidore until 1663, when theyretreated north to their colony of thePhilippines.

The defeat of the Spanish Armada by theEnglish in 1588 signalled a shift in Europeannaval power northwards and the subsequentwaning of Portuguese and Spanish influence inthe Moluccas. The Dutch arrived in 1599aiming to usurp their southern European rivals,and managed to evict the Portuguese in 1605thanks to their superior technological andfinancial resources. The larger Dutch shipswere able to navigate faster, more direct routesaround Africa that were navigable all yearround, whilst the Portuguese and Spanishpersisted with slower, seasonal coastal traderoutes that were delayed by the Indian Oceanmonsoon.

The Bay of Ambon, Seventeenth Century

Having founded the VOC in 1602 to profit fromthe Moluccan spice trade, Ambon became thecompany’s headquarters from 1610 to 1619until the establishment of Batavia (present dayJakarta) further west. In order to secure a spicemonopoly the Dutch dealt ruthlessly with localopposition in the Moluccas, especially in theBanda Islands where recalcitrant residentswere killed and replaced by Dutch-ownedslaves. By the mid-1660s, local opponents toDutch rule across Maluku had been defeatedand the remaining Spanish garrisons in Ternateand Tidore removed, leaving the British as theirsole remaining opposition. The British werelargely preoccupied with establishing afoothold in the Indian subcontinent but stillperiodically fought vicious battles with theDutch for the right to maintain trading links inthe Moluccas. The 1667 Treaty of Bredaformalised the Dutch spice monopoly since itspecified that the British would give up officialcontrol of the tiny island of Run, a source ofnutmeg, in exchange for the island ofManhattan in the fledging colony that becamethe United States. The Dutch were now thedominant power in the region, with Ambon atthe epicentre of world clove production. Toprotect their monopoly the Dutch banned thecultivation of cloves in all the other islands theycontrolled.

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

4

1707 map of the Spice Islands. In thebackground of the map’s cartouche avolcano erupts while men harvest spice. Inits foreground, Dutch merchantspresumably discuss trade with a spiceisland sultan. Source: Princeton UniversityL i b r a r y(https://libweb5.princeton.edu/visual_mater i a l s /maps /webs i t e s /pac i f i c / sp i ce -islands/spice-islands-maps.html).

Fort Belgica in Banda Neira town today,built by the Dutch in 1611 to protect thenutmeg trade.

The spice monopoly contributed greatly to thefortunes of the Netherlands, a legacy of whichcan be seen in the glorious buildings of presentday Amsterdam. However, the VOC collapsed

into bankruptcy in 1798 and was nationalised.The following year the British occupied theMoluccas, taking advantage of Dutch weaknessafter the French Revolution. Even though theDutch re-established control of Ambon in 1814this interregnum spelt commercial disaster forthe islands since the British had been able tosmuggle out valuable nutmeg and cloveseedlings which they used to cultivateplantations in their colonies in Malaysia, SriLanka and east Africa. These began to flourishby the early 1800s, thus forcing the price of thespices down, and within decades Maluku fadedinto obscurity as its spices could now be grownmore cheaply overseas, nearer to the mainconsumer markets in Europe. Maluku’s declinewas compounded by the fact that Dutchenergies were now focused on developing aplantation-based economy in the much largerand more populous islands of Java andSumatra, which were also much closer toregional trading ports.

Integration and the Dutch Legacy

Islam arrived in North Maluku with Arabtraders in the thirteenth century andestablished a foothold across much of theIndonesian archipelago, especially in coastalsettlements. Christianity first arrived with thePortuguese in the sixteenth century, and thenumbers of Christian missionaries increased asthe Dutch consolidated their power in theMoluccas. Whilst Islam had made inroads in thenorthern part of Ambon Island, Christianity wasconsolidated in the southern part of the islandwhere the capital is situated and from wherethe Dutch based their centre of operations.Even today, Christianity has a wider followingin southern Maluku where the Dutch Protestantmission was more successful than in most ofthe Dutch East Indies.

European influence meant that ‘by 1650,complex horizontal conflicts were alreadyevident, dividing local populations alongfact ional , commercial and rel ig ious

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

5

lines’.5 Christians received preferentialt reatment under the Dutch co lonia ladministration, especially in the regionalcapital of Ambon city, and enjoyed muchgreater educational opportunities than non-Christians in the Moluccas. As a result,Malukan Christians disproportionately filledthe ranks of the colonial bureaucracy andinstitutions, not just within the Moluccas itselfbut also further afield. For instance, inneighbouring Dutch New Guinea, Christianteachers, officials and professionals from theMoluccas and North Sulawesi were brought inby the Dutch administration to help run theterritory prior to World War II.6 Although theDutch forced the departure of many of thesefunctionaries after 1945 to prevent the spreadof Indonesian nationalism, some 14,000 werestill living in Dutch New Guinea in 1959, some8,000 of whom were from Maluku.7

Seeking to preserve their status and fearingMuslim domination in a post-colonial successorstate, Malukan volunteers, mostly from Ambon,formed the core of the Royal NetherlandsIndies Army (KNIL; Koninklijk Nederlands-indisch Leger), established to suppress theIndonesian independence campaign (1945-49).Under the negotiated settlement that followedin December 1949, the Dutch transferredsovereignty to a federal republic, the UnitedStates of Indonesia. The Moluccas were part ofthe state of East Indonesia, along with all theislands east of Java. However, on 17 August1950, the fifth anniversary of PresidentSukarno’s proclamation of Indonesianindependence, this federal system was replacedby the present Unitary Republic of Indonesia.The imminent disappearance of a federalIndonesia prompted Chris Soumokil, the EastIndonesian Minister of Justice, to declare anindependent Republic of South Maluku (RMS;Republik Maluku Selatan) in April 1950. Whilstthis largely Christian rebellion quickly ended infailure, and Soumokil was executed in April1966, the RMS remains a symbol of sectarianrivalry in Ambon and maintains a government

in exile. Such divisions were compounded bythe fact that more than 40,000 RMScombatants, supporters and their families weregiven sanctuary in the Netherlands in theaftermath of the rebellion’s failure, from wherethey continue to agitate for an independenthomeland.

RMS flags in the Netherlands, 2011, hometo the South Moluccan government in exile

This colonial legacy ensured that Maluku’sintegration into the unitary Indonesian statewould be contested from the beginning. ThatMaluku was still acting as an autonomous statewas noted in a cabinet report of early 1957.8 InMarch 1957 members of the military andcivilian elite in East Indonesia began thePermesta rebellion (Perjuangan Semesta orUniversal Struggle), which although based onthe neighbouring island of Sulawesi alsoattracted much sympathy in Maluku. TheAmerican Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)offered substantial material and financialsupport to the Permesta movement, includingfifteen B-26 bomber aircraft and Americanpilots. Ambon was among several cities ineastern Indonesia bombed by these B-26s, in arebellion that rumbled on until 1961. Malukanleaders also forged links with the Sumatra-based Revolutionary Government of theIndonesian Republic (PRRI; Pemerintah

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

6

Revolusioner Republik Indonesia), anotherrebel movement led by army officers which alsoemerged to challenge Sukarno’s regime in1958.9

In response to these various challenges tocentral government control in Maluku, Sukarnoadopted policies to encourage deeper Malukanintegration into the Indonesian state. Theseincluded several large government projectssuch as the Wayame shipyard and theOceanography Research Institute on AmbonIsland, and the large Makariki sugar mill onSeram Island.10 However, central governmentpolicy towards Maluku changed during theSuharto era (1966-98) as its large governmentprojects were either scaled down or moved toother provinces as Jakarta promoted a greatercentralisation of political and economic power.For instance, the Wayame shipyard wasrelocated to Indonesia’s second city ofSurabaya in East Java province, whilst theMakariki sugar mill was moved to Jatiroto, alsoin East Java. Moreover, the status of theOceanography Institute in Ambon wasdowngraded and construction of its mainlaboratory was cancelled.11 Shipping routesbegan to bypass Maluku, and intra-island tradewithin the region declined. Furthermore,Suharto began awarding prov inc ia lgovernorships to non-Malukan military officials,and firms associated with the regime struckdeals to exploit Maluku’s natural resources. Innorthern Maluku, this centralisation of powerin Jakarta also diminished the status of thesultanates in Ternate and Tidore.

Suharto’s authoritarian regime also crackeddown on civil society activists throughoutIndonesia, and in Maluku such figures werebranded RMS sympathisers. DespiteIndonesia’s democratic reforms since 1998,approximately 50 RMS supporters continue toserve long jail sentences for non-violentprotest. The most notable of these politicalprisoners is primary school teacher JohanTeter issa who was sentenced to l i fe

imprisonment for leading a RMS flag-raisingincident during a visit by Indonesian PresidentSusilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Ambon in June2007. Another 22 RMS sympathisers, most ofwho were teachers and farmers who took partin the peaceful protest, received sentences ofseven to 20 years. Whilst Teterissa’s jail termwas subsequently reduced on appeal to 15years, in 2009 he and other Malukan activistswere moved to prisons on Java over onethousand kilometres away, making family visitsvery difficult. Advocacy groups estimate thereare around 170 political prisoners in Indonesiaas whole, most of whom have been jailed forbeing involved in peaceful protests ordisplaying banned regional flags in Maluku andPapua. This is another irony of post-colonialIndonesia since these controversial ‘rebellion’laws, which carry heavy sentences and arefrequently used against non-violent protestors,date back to the Dutch East Indies but stillremain on the books. The Dutch used similarexile tactics to those still applied to RMSmembers, most famously in the case ofSukarno, Indonesia’s first president.

Communal Conflict

Indonesia’s remarkably diverse ethnic mosaichas resulted in a melting pot of cultures acrossthe archipelagic state. Horizontal conflictamong Maluku’s various ethnic and religiousgroups can be seen as both a legacy of itscolonial history and an irony of its uneasyintegration into the modern Indonesian unitarystate. Sectarian conflict in Maluku firstsurfaced in the 1650s, as European influencebegan changing the ethnic and religious mix ofthe islands. Christian conversions in Malukucommenced after the Portuguese arrival and bythe 1560s it was estimated there were some10,000 Catholics in the area, largely on Ambon,which had grown to perhaps 50,000 to 60,000by the 1590s. Much of the gains in the Catholicpopulation is attributed to the work of Spanishmissionary Saint Francis Xavier.12 The numberof Christians subsequently expanded under

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

7

Dutch rule, bequeathing Maluku a delicatebalance of Muslims and Christians. Forinstance, Indonesia’s census of 2000 put thepopulation of Maluku province at 1.15 million,almost evenly divided between Christians(50.2%) and Muslims (49.1%). Meanwhile, thenew province of North Maluku was over 85%Muslim with a total population of around670,000.

Although this religious balance was a directconsequence of European influence, the socialand political changes of the Suharto eracontributed significantly to the savagecommunal conflict that afflicted Malukubetween 1999 and 2002. Perhaps the mostprofound of these changes was a large increaseof internal migrants from other parts ofIndonesia into Maluku, much of it officiallye n c o u r a g e d b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ stransmigration programme. The Dutch firstinstituted this policy in the early nineteenthcentury to provide a plantation workforce onSumatra. Although the scheme wound down inthe twilight years of the colonial era it wasrevived by Sukarno, and then expanded by hissuccessor Suharto. Then as now Indonesia hasan unbalanced population with parts of thecountry subject to intense population pressure,with others covered by vast tracts of forest. Thepolitically dominant island of Java houses some58% of Indonesia’s population within only 7%of its landmass, and its six provinces have thehighest population densities in the country. Bycontrast, the other islands account for some90% of the country’s landmass but contain onlyaround 42% of the population.

For Suharto’s New Order regime, its revivedtransmigration programme had many facets.These included alleviating poverty in the coreislands by distributing ‘empty’ land in theremoter regions; exploiting the various andabundant natural resources of these outerislands; inculcating a shared Indonesianidentity by bringing together the differentethnic groups; and consolidating central

control over distant peripheral regions such asMaluku. Formerly sponsored by the WorldBank and Asian Development Bank, large-scaleofficial migration programs came to a halt inAugust 2000 but informal or spontaneousmigration still continues, particularly in easternIndonesia. At its height between 1979 and1984, some 535,000 families, or almost 2.5million people, took advantage of the officialtransmigration program.

Official transmigrants who moved as part of thegovernment scheme were often outnumberedby so-called spontaneous migrants who movedfreely and without any government support.Both types of migration affected delicate ethnicand religious balances, especially in easternIndonesia, since most transmigrants and alarge number of spontaneous migrants wereJavanese Muslims. Moreover, transmigrationsites were frequently located on communal landthat traditionally belonged to local communitiesand the associated infrastructure developmentsto support the transmigration settlementsfrequently uprooted local indigenousc o m m u n i t i e s o r d a m a g e d t h e i renvironment.13 Compounding matters, internalmigrants have frequently been ignorant ofindigenous customary law and traditions, thuscreating further tensions. Christ iancommunities in eastern Indonesia have feltparticularly vulnerable since Muslims make uparound 80% of Indonesia’s total population, andare concentrated in the much more populouswestern half of the country. The fact that mostofficial transmigrants have been JavaneseMuslims, from the most densely populatedregion of the country, has fed the widespreadperception among Christians that officialtransmigration is restricted to Muslims.However, in the case of Maluku provinceinternal migrants constituted only 6.6% of thepopulation in 2000 and were almost evenly splitbetween Christians (52.1%) and Muslims(47.3%). By contrast, in North Malukuprovince, Muslim internal migrants were 9.1%of the total population and were 84.7% Muslim,

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

8

as opposed to 15.1% Christian. In bothprovinces these migrants came mostly fromJava and Sulawesi.14

In the months immediately before and afterSuharto’s resignation in May 1998, sectarianconflict spread throughout Indonesia,particularly across the more ethnically diverseeastern reaches of the archipelago that havebeen subject to significant internal migration.In Maluku’s case, the mostly Christian-Muslimfighting began on January 19, 1999 in thelargest city Ambon when a local public minivandriver quarreled with two male Muslimmigrants from South Sulawesi province.According to court testimony, the two menattempted to extort money from the minivandriver with threats of violence. The angrydriver responded by gathering several friendsand going after the two migrants. In trying toescape one of the two Bugis men apparentlyshouted, “There is a Christian who wants to killus”. This led to a mass brawl since theargument had taken place in a predominantlyMuslim district of Ambon. A Christian churchwas among the properties burnt down in thefighting, and members of Ambon’s Christiancommunity undertook reprisals on mosques inthe area. The following morning, a false rumourcirculated that the city’s largest mosque hadbeen set on fire, and the conflict escalated in acycle of revenge attacks on public and privateproperty by those from both the Muslim andChristian communities. The Ambon riotssnowballed from a minor criminal dispute into asavage regional conflict replete with complexpolitical and economic undertones.

Sectarian Conflict in Maluku

Whilst the sectarian conflict started in Amboncity, many localised conflicts broke out acrossthe region and spread to the new province ofNorth Maluku in August 1999. Whilst internalmigration from elsewhere in Indonesia wasundoubtedly a factor in the communal violencethat erupted across both provinces, the

movement of indigenous people within NorthMaluku province also played a role in theconflict. This was particularly the case for the1975 resettlement of the largely Muslimpopulation of Makian Island to the Christianmajority Kao area of northern Halmahera,following an upsurge of volcanic unrest onMakian. Communal rivalry over traditional Kaoland rights was already visible by the late1970s, and the 1997 discovery of gold in thearea exacerbated these tensions. The Kaogenerally viewed their new Makian neighboursas overly assertive since they frequentlylobbied for their own administrative sub-district.15 The proposed sub-district of Makian-Malifut would comprise Makian farmers’territory in addition to several Kao villages, andthe gold mine would also fall inside the newunit of Makian-Malifut. The mine was due tocommence operations in mid-1999, andalthough it was destined to be in operation forjust four years, local residents envisagedsignificant financial return to its host sub-d i s t r i c t i n the fo rm o f employmentopportunities, infrastructural developmentsand expanded tax revenues under Indonesia’snew decentralisation laws. Indeed, there wasspeculation that Makian-Malifut might evenbecome the new provincial capital of NorthMaluku.

The violence in North Maluku began in August1999 with deadly skirmishes between theindigenous Kao and the migrant Makians andescalated over the following months assectarian mob violence fanned out across NorthMaluku. Whilst this followed a precedentestablished in Maluku province, the violence inNorth Maluku was shorter than in Maluku butmore intense than any of the horizontalconflicts across Indonesia during this period.Attacks by the Kao prompted all 17,000 Makianto flee across to southern Ternate and Tidore,where Muslims retaliated by attackingTernate’s Christians. This resulted in much ofTernate’s Christian community escaping toChristian-majority areas, mostly in North

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

9

Sulawesi province. Thus, North Maluku wasethnically cleansed of most Christians,following a pattern that began with theexpulsion of Muslim Butonese migrants onAmbon. In Ternate, seat of the provincialcapital, the Christian retreat left the islandbereft of much its middle class since mostChristians worked in the professions, educationand business. It was speculated that theseexpulsions were linked to local electoralengineering, insofar as they would tip thebalance in favour of certain candidates.16

The fighting became increasingly violent andcomplex in both provinces over the next twoyears as the armed Laskar Jihad militia arrivedfrom Java to support the Muslim side, whilstsome Christian combatants identified with theold RMS separatist movement. The centralgovernment imposed a civil emergency in theterritory in June 2000 since the local securityforces, divided along ethnic and religious lines,took sides in the conflict and proved unable tostop the fighting. The deployment of neutralsecurity forces in both provinces changed thenature of the conflict from open rioting andmob violence to bombings and sniper attacks.Eventually, these troops from outside ofMaluku were able to restore peace but thecentral government was criticised for notdeploying them much sooner. Finally, inFebruary 2002 the Malino II Peace Agreementwas signed to end the conflict, although deadlyChristian-Muslim riots have occasionallyresurfaced subsequently. Fortunately, theseincidents have not escalated as in 1999-2002.

Both structural and proximate causes havebeen cited as explanations for the communalconfl ict in Maluku and North Malukuprovinces.17 This theory posits that a weakeningof traditional social structures was a majorfactor behind the escalation of violence acrossboth provinces. This was because thesestructures had traditionally provided both arepertoire of conflict avoidance mechanismsthrough intra-community relations, and a

shared sense of common identity that overrodeethnic and religious differences. Internalmigration from elsewhere in Indonesia erodedthese traditional structures to the point wherethey were unable to contain the outbreak ofwidespread communal violence. Across much ofthe region the result was a series of escalatingrevenge killings. This erosion was compoundedby the inability of state institutions shapedunder Suharto to mediate conflict in a non-violent fashion. Moreover, ethnic and religiouspartiality within the police and armed forcesresulted in a loss of confidence in the securityforces and local residents responded byestablishing armed militias to protectthemselves and their property. Moreover, thereis a widely held belief that the militarydeliberately instigated some of the sectarianconflicts across Indonesia in 1999-2002 inorder to stall attempts at military reform thatwould have blunted the power of the armedforces. Lastly, it is suggested that long-standinginequalities between Christians and Muslimsalso fed the violence, especially given thecreeping Islamisation of Indonesia during thelast decade of Suharto’s rule.

Of the proximate causes, Indonesia’s economiccrisis, which started in late 1997, magnifiedpre-existing tensions by promoting greatereconomic rivalry between different ethnic andreligious groups and between migrant andindigenous residents. At the same time, thiscompetition was given greater impetus by thei m p e n d i n g d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n a n ddemocratisation reforms that began afterSuharto’s resignation in May 1998. Forinstance, decentralisation promised localgovernments greater control over their ownfunding; thereby raising the financial value ofcapturing political office for corrupt local elites.Furthermore, democratisation ensured thatgenerating popular support would now becomemore necessary to secure political officeinstead of simply cosying up members of thepolitical elite in Jakarta. The result was a muchgreater political mobilisation along religious

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

10

and ethnic lines than during the Suharto era.Indeed, all of the communal conflicts in easternIndonesia during 1996-2002 were led bypolitically involved individuals from the lowermiddle class in provincial or district capitals,places that were reliant on state funding.18 Inanticipation of the decentralisation anddemocratisation reforms, and in the powervacuum that followed Suharto’s departure,previous coalitions began to disintegrate intoopen competition and appeals made to ethnicand religious identities became a majorcurrency of political campaigns.

In the decade since the conflict ended, theresults of communal reconciliation have beenmixed. North Maluku province seems to havemade relatively good progress, which may belargely due to the fact that most of its Christianpopulation was expelled. In Maluku province,with its much more delicate religious plurality,tensions between Christians and Muslims haveremained high, periodically surfacing intodeadly violence. The first major post-conflictepisode was in April 2004 when over 40 peopledied in Ambon city after riots broke outfollowing the raising of the banned RMS flag.More recent riots and mob violence in theprovincial capital occurred in September 2011,March 2012 and May 2012, and Malukuprovince has largely been segregated intoChristian and Muslim areas. In 2012 it wasfound that over 3,000 families were stilldisplaced from their homes as a result of the1999-2002 violence, with all but 26 of thosefrom Maluku province.19

The ethnic and religious makeup of Maluku hasbeen altered by in-migration from elsewhere inIndonesia, and was the spark that lit thehorizontal conflict. This is an irony of theregion’s integration into Indonesia, and oncethe violence began it was driven by local elitecompetition over access to state funding in apart of the country heavily reliant on it.Furthermore, the impending division of thelarge and unwieldy Maluku province, and the

creation of many new districts and sub-districtsprovided greater incentive for local elites tomobilise support through appeals to ethnic andreligious allegiances. Ironically, one aim ofthese new administrative divisions was tocontain local intra-elite conflict by stimulating agreater transfer of central governmentresources to support the new province and itsnew districts. Indeed, greater decentralisationand the creation of new local government unitsin the outlying regions of Indonesia was seen asan antidote to Suharto’s stifling centralisationpolicies, which many viewed as unsustainableafter the longtime leader’s fall. Instead, itinflamed communal violence in Maluku andother parts of Indonesia that had either beensubject to internal migration or had a delicateethnic and religious balance.

Relative Deprivation

A further irony for Maluku in its integrationinto Indonesia is that despite its formerprominence and the fortunes that it made forlocal and foreign traders, it has been one of thecountry’s poorest regions since independencein 1949. Data collected in 2002 revealed thatthe poverty rate in the eastern Nusa Tenggara& Maluku region was 26.1%, the secondhighest in Indonesia after West Papua andmarkedly above the national average of16.7%.20 During this period Maluku was in themidst of communal conflict that took a heavytoll on the local economy. However, in thedecade since conflict ended Maluku hasremained one of the country’s worst offregions, as indicated in Indonesia’s RegionalEconomic Governance Index, which surveyed245 regencies and municipalities across 19 ofIndonesia’s 33 provinces in 2011. Districts andcities in Maluku and neighbouring West Papuacomprised nine of the 10 lowest ranking unitsin the survey.21 Most of the best performingdistricts were located in Java and Sumatra.

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

11

Interestingly, government statistics from March2012 indicate that North Maluku province wasfaring somewhat better than the rump Malukuprovince (see table below). For example, ruralareas in Maluku province had almost twice theproportion of poverty stricken people comparedwith the national average, and the province’spoverty severity index was also much worsethan that of Indonesia as a whole.22 Mostpeople in both provinces still live a mixedsubsistence lifestyle of fishing and farming. In2005 less than five percent of the population ofMaluku province were employed in theindustrial sector.23 As elsewhere in Indonesia,Sino-Indonesians dominate most of the largerbusinesses, whilst internal immigrants from theneighboring island of Sulawesi control mostsmall-scale trading enterprises.

Despite the region’s relative economicdeprivation, education enrolment and outcomesin Maluku have consistently been above thenational average since the colonial period.Dutch policy in Maluku awarded greatereducational opportunities to Christians andthose who performed well were rewarded withsecure employment in colonial public service.

Thus greater importance was attached toeducation than elsewhere in Indonesia, and thislegacy continues to the present day. The tablebelow details enrolment at primary, middle andhigh school levels, in addition to those forhigher education.

Literacy, a key indicator of educationaloutcomes, also sees Maluku place above thenational average, as shown in the data belowfor illiteracy across different age groups.Indeed, only North Sulawesi province - anotherChristian-majority province that supplied manyfunctionaries to the Dutch colonial regime - andthe capital city of Jakarta - presently have lowerilliteracy levels than Maluku province.

In contrast to its education figures, healthindicators in Maluku paint a less rosy pictureas life expectancy has lagged behind theIndonesian national average. In 1996 thenational average life span was 64.4 years,compared with 63.1 years in Maluku. By 2002,life expectancy was 65.5 years in new Malukuprovince and 63.0 years in North Malukuprovince, whilst for Indonesia as a whole it was66.2.24 Despite the national increase, Malukuand North Maluku were the only provinces inthe country that saw an overall drop in life

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

12

expectancy and a concurrent rise in infantmortality between 1999 and 2002, largelyattributable to the communal conflict. Inaddition, those with access to health services inNorth Maluku fell from 66 to 58% of thepopulation between 1999 and 2002, againlargely as a result of the violence.25 Whilstprogress has been made in the decade sincethe conflict ended, both Maluku and NorthMaluku provinces were cited by Indonesia’sHealth Ministry as being among 10 provincesthat in 2011 failed to provide adequate healthcare to their residents.26 Maluku province wasalso cited by the Ministry as one of 20provinces still suffering from a high rate ofinfant and maternal mortality as a result ofpoor access to health care facilities andshortages of skilled staff.27 The highly dispersednature of the Moluccan archipelago and itspoor transportation links continue to blighthealth care delivery.

Using a combination of education, health andincome data, Maluku’s human developmentindex (HDI) for 2015 was 67.05, placing it 24thamong the country’s 34 provinces, whilst NorthMaluku was 65.91, placing it 27th. TheIndonesian national average HDI was 69.55,with most of the best performing provincesbeing located in Java and Sumatra. EasternIndonesia as a whole lags significantly behindthe western half of the country in humandevelopment, with Sumatra’s Lampungprovince (ranked 25th) the only westernprovince in the bottom 10. This is exacerbatedby the fact that when large industrial projectsare established in regions such as Maluku andPapua the workforce has often been importedfrom Java.28 As a result, in recent years manyethnic Malukans have been making the reversejourney to Java in search of greateropportunities.

A 2011 survey of businesses by RegionalAutonomy Watch (Komite PemantauanPelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah, KPPOD) lookedat perceptions of the qual ity of local

infrastructure across all provinces of Indonesia,focusing on water supply, electricity, roads,street lighting and telecommunications. Theprovinces of Maluku and North Maluku, alongwith Southeast Sulawesi, scored worst in allfive types of infrastructure.29

Indeed, for both the resident and the visitor toMaluku the challenges of navigating the regiona r e n u m e r o u s . O n l i n e b o o k i n g f o rtransportation or accommodation is not anoption, and even finding ferry schedules andtimetables can be very difficult. Whilst severalairlines do service the provincial capitals ofAmbon (Maluku) and Ternate (North Maluku),travelling onwards to the other islands requiresa great deal of time and patience. For instance,it is not uncommon to wait days for a boat to aneighbouring island, and there can even be upto two weeks between scheduled passengerferries. Another alternative is to negotiate withthe captain of a cargo or oil ship that haslimited space to take some paying guests,although safety could be a concern when takingsuch an option. Such issues are compounded bythe fact that Indonesia’s domestic airlineindustry was hard hit by the Asian economiccrisis of 1997-98 and many routes in easternIndonesia were slashed. Despite a recentburgeoning of domestic low cost carriers, manyof the less profitable routes in easternIndonesia have not recovered. As a result,Maluku sees relatively few foreign visitors. Thisis ironic given that Maluku was the first regionof Indonesia to have substantial contact withEuropean visitors.

Conclusion

The genesis of the modern Indonesian state,the fourth most populous country in the worldand the largest country in Southeast Asia, canoriginally be traced back to Maluku, a largelyforgotten group of small islands in Indonesia’sremote east. Yet Maluku itself has had atroubled and contested integration into thatstate. Both Maluku’s centrality to Indonesia’s

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

13

formation and the roots of its fraughtintegration can be traced back to the Dutchcolonial period (1602-1942) for Indonesia is thesuccessor state to the Dutch East Indies whoseexistence stemmed from control of Maluku andthe spice trade. Perhaps the beginning of themodern age and globalization can also betraced back to the spice trade, in which Malukuplayed a central role. These spices were theraison d’etre for the European arrival in theIndonesian archipelago, and were morevaluable than gold at the height of the trade.

Maluku’s integration into the successor state ofIndonesia has been contested since even beforeindependence was formally gained. Eventhough its economic importance declinedprecipitously after the Dutch moved theircentre of operations to Jakarta and the Britishmanaged to cultivate Maluku’s preciousnutmeg and cloves in their own colonies, manyethnic Malukans continued to receive greateropportunities than other Indonesians underDutch rule. Southern Maluku, in particularAmbon, was the first place in Indonesia whereChristian missionaries made significantheadway, and Ambonese Christians enjoyedprivileged access to education and governmentpositions during the colonial period. Anxious topreserve their status, many Christian Malukansfought in the Dutch colonial army trying tosuppress the Indonesian nationalist struggle forindependence (1945-49). Malukan leaderssubsequently agreed to jo in the newindependent Indonesian state under a federalsystem designed to give its member statesconsiderable autonomy. However, just eightmonths into formal independence this federalarrangement ceased to exist and thus began aMalukan separatist campaign to resistintegration into the Indonesian unitary state.Whilst this rebellion was quickly quashed,echoes of the separatist movement reappearedin the savage communal conflict of 1999-2002,the most violent of the various conflicts thatafflicted Indonesia during that tumultuousperiod. In 2017 its legacy continues with some

50 political prisoners serving long jail terms forpromoting independence for southern Maluku.

Communal violence has occasionally flared upsince the Malino II Peace Agreement ofFebruary 2002 formally ended the fighting of1999-2002. Like nearby Papua, the ethnic andreligious makeup of Maluku has been alteredby in-migration from elsewhere in Indonesia,f ac i l i t a t ed by advances i n moderntransportation and encouraged by centralgovernment policy. This internal migration wasthe spark that lit Maluku’s horizontal conflict,and was fanned by local elite competition overaccess to Indonesian state funding in an area ofthe country that has become heavily reliant onit. Ironically, Maluku continues to enjoy someof the best educational outcomes in the wholeof Indonesia but its poverty and unemploymentlevels remain higher than the national average.As a result, it will likely remain heavilydependent on Indonesian central governmentfunding for the foreseeable future.

Related Issues

Jim Elmslie, The Great Divide. WestPapuan Demographics Revisited. SettlersDominate Coastal Regions, but theHighlands Still Overwhelmingly Papuan(https://apjjf.org/2017/02/Elmslie.html)Camelia Webb-Gannon, SalvagingDemocracy for West Papuans in the Faceof Australia-Indonesia Obstruction(https://apjjf.org/-Camellia-Webb_Gannon/4400)Jim Elmslie and Camelia Webb-Gannon,M S G H e a d a c h e , W e s t P a p u a nHeartache? Indonesia’s MelanesianF o r a y(https://apjjf.org/2014/12/47/Jim-Elmslie/4225.html)David Adam Stott, Would An IndependentWest Papua Be A Fai l ing State?(https://apjjf.org/2011/9/37/David-Adam-Stott/3597/article.html)Dav id Adam Sto t t , Indones ian

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

14

Colonisation, Resource Plunder and WestP a p u a n G r i e v a n c e s(https://apjjf.org/2011/9/12/David-Adam-S

tott/3499/article.html)

David Adam Stott is an associate professor at the University of Kitakyushu, Japan and anAsia-Pacific Journal contributing editor. His work centers on the political economy of conflictin Southeast Asia, Japan's relations with the region, and natural resource issues in the Asia-Pacific.

Notes1 As a geographic or political entity ‘eastern Indonesia’ remains somewhat vaguely definedbut this paper follows the convention set by the Indonesian government and the World Bankwhich use the term to cover the provinces in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku,and Papua. By this definition the remaining islands of Sumatra, Java and Bali are classifed as‘western Indonesia’. 2 International Crisis Group (ICG) Report No.31, Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku(https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/28344/031_indonesia_peace_in_maluku.pdf), Jakarta/Brussels, 8February 2002, p. 1.3 M.C. Ricklefs, 2001. A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200, London: Palgrave, p.284 Ricklefs, 2001, p.285 Ricklefs, 2001, p.766 C.L.M. Penders, 2002. The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia,1945-1962, Adelaide: Crawford House, p.89.7 Rodd McGibbon, 2004. Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the PapuaConflict, Washington: East-West Center8 Graham Brown, Christopher Wilson, and Suprayoga Hadi, 2005. ‘Overcoming ViolentConflict: Peace and Development Analysis in Maluku and North Maluku’ in OvercomingViolent Conflict: Volume 4, Jakarta: United Nations Development Programme and LembagaIlmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, p.119 For more details see Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, 1999. Feet to the Fire CIA CovertOperations in Indonesia, 1957–1958. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.10 George Aditjondro, ‘Guns, pamphlets and handie-talkies: How the military exploited localethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges’(http://www.oocities.org/ambon67/noframe/gja2110y2k1.htm), Conflicts and Violence inIndonesia - Conference Proceedings, Humboldt-University in Berlin, 3-5 July 200011 Aditjondro, 200012 Ricklefs, 2001, pp.28-2913 Jennifer Leith, 1999. ‘Resettlement and Restless Tree Spirits: Shifting Identities andResource-based Livelihoods in North Halmahera’ Cakalele vol.10 pp.62-7614 BPS data cited in Brown, Wilson and Hadi (2005), p. 915 Gerry van Klinken, 2007. Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small

APJ | JF 15 | 11 | 4

15

Town Wars, London: Routledge, pp.117-11916 Van Klinken, 2007, p.11917 Brown, Wilson and Hadi (2005), pp.20-3118 Van Klinken, 2007, p.10919 Musthofid, ‘Refugees still waiting for resettlement’, The Jakarta Post, 25 March 201220 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Indonesia Human Development Report 2004(http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/indonesia_2004_en.pdf), 200421 This survey was based on nine indicators: regional infrastructure; business expansionprograms; interactions access to land between the government and business; transactionfees; business licensing; security and business conflict resolution efforts; the capacity andintegrity of the head of the region; and local regulations.22 Badan Statistik Indonesia (BPS)23 2005 figures from BPS Provinsi Maluku, cited in Craig Thorburn, 2009. ‘Maluku: The LongRoad to Recovery’ in Budy P. Resosudarmo, and Frank Jotzo (eds.) Working with Natureagainst Poverty: Development, Resources and the Environment in Eastern Indonesia,Singapore: ISEAS24 UNDP figures cited in Budy P. Resosudarmo, 2009. ‘A Note on Socio-economic Developmentin Maluku’ in Budy P. Resosudarmo and Frank Jotzo (eds.) Working with Nature againstPoverty: Development, Resources and the Environment in Eastern Indonesia, Singapore:ISEAS25 Government of Indonesia and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), PeaceThrough Development Programme for North Maluku, Maluku and Central Sulawesi(http://www.undp.or.id/archives/prodoc/Prodoc-PTD.pdf), January 200626 Elly Burhaini Faizal, ‘Inequality dogs RI’s progress’, The Jakarta Post, 5 January 201227 Elly Burhaini Faizal, ‘Maternal, infant deaths in 20 provinces remain high’, The JakartaPost, 11 May 201228 Van Klinken, 2007, p.10929 KPPOD 2011. Local Economic Governance, A Survey of Business Operators in 245Districts/Municipalities in Indonesia(https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/IndonesiaEGI2011English.pdf)