INTEGRATED LOCATION ASSESSMENT IViraqdtm.iom.int/images/ILA/20203124330549_IOM - Integrated Locati… · 4 IOM IRAQ Integrated Location Assessment IV ACRONYMS DTM Displacement Tracking

INTEGRATED LOCATION ASSESSMENT IVIOM Iraq

DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

The information contained in this report is for general information purposes only. Names and boundaries on DTM information products do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. The information in the DTM portal and in this report is the result of data collected by IOM field teams and complements information provided and generated by governmental and other entities in Iraq. IOM Iraq endeavors to keep this information as up to date and accurate as possible, but makes no claim – expressed or implied – on the completeness, accuracy and suitability of the information provided through this report. Challenges that should be taken into account when using DTM data in Iraq include the fluidity of the displaced population movements along with repeated emergencies and limited or no access to parts of the country. In no event will IOM be liable for any loss or damage, whether direct, indirect or consequential, related to the use of this report and the information provided herein.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

IOM Iraq thanks the United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) for its continued support. IOM Iraq also expresses its gratitude to IOM Iraq’s Rapid Assessment and Response Team (RART) members for their work in collecting the data, often in very difficult circumstances; their tireless efforts are the groundwork of this report.

PUBLISHER

International Organization for Migration – Iraq Mission

Main Office in Baghdad

Office for Central Iraq UNAMI Compound (Diwan 2)

International Zone, Baghdad, Iraq

Tel.: +3908 3105 2600

Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

Website: www.iraq.iom.int

More information on: iraqdtm.iom.int

© DTM-Iraq Mission 2019. All right reserved

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher.

http://iraqdtm.iom.int

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS 4

E XECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

INTRODUCTION 8

METHODOLOGY AND COVERAGE 8

POPULATION MOVEMENTS 10

T IM ING , D IREC T ION AND RE A SONS TO RETURNS 15

DI SPL ACEMENT, D I STR IBUT ION AND RATE OF CHANGE 17

FUTURE INTENTIONS 18

LENGTH AND GOVERNORATE OF D I SPL ACEMENT 20

OBSTACLES TO RETURN AND RE A SONS TO RESET TLE 21

INFRASTRUCTURE , SERV ICES AND LAND 23

L IV ING CONDIT IONS 25

EMPLOYMENT/L IVEL IHOODS 26

HE ALTH 28

EDUC ATION 29

FOOD 31

SHELTER , RES IDENTIAL DAMAGE AND HOUS ING , L AND AND PROPERTY I SSUES 33

SECURITY, SAFETY AND SOCIAL COHES ION 36

SECURITY INCIDENTS 36

INTERGROUP FEEL INGS , PERCEPT ION OF SECURITY AND C IV IC L I FE SAT I SFAC T ION 37

DOCUMENTATION AND OTHER LEGAL I SSUES 40

ETHNO -REL IG IOUS CHANGE AND COMPOSIT ION 42

ETHNO - REL IG IOUS CHANGE AND COMPOS IT ION 42

ETHNO - REL IG IOUS GROUPS AND MAIN I SSUES 43

CONCLUS ION 49

ANNE X 51

IOM IRAQ4

Integrated Location Assessment IV

ACRONYMS

DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix

HLP Housing, Land and Property

IDP Internally Displaced Person

ILA Integrated Location Assessment

IOM International Organization for Migration

ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

KIs Key Informants

KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq

NFI Non-Food Item

RARTs Rapid Assessment and Response Teams

5


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1

Since reaching the official end of the crisis with ISIL in December 2017, the humanitarian context in Iraq entered a new stage: post‑conflict status has allowed for the return of over 4.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their areas of origin. Refugees from abroad have also started returning from neighbouring Turkey and Syrian Arab Republic as well as from more distant countries, such as Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.

1 All sections of the report – except the first one – are based on the ILA dataset which does not include the displaced population settled in camps. Data of the first section on population movements were extrapolated from the Round 110 (May 2019) and Round 109 (March 2019) Master Lists, which include both out of camp and camp IDPs.

2 The main districts of origin are the districts where the majority of the IDP caseload come from. According to ML 109, the six main districts of origin are: Mosul (20% of current IDPs), Sinjar (18%), Telafar (8%), Al-Ba’aj (7%), Ramadi (4%) and Al-Hawiga (4%).

3 DTM Round 107, December 2018, IOM DTM Iraq.

4 See Return Index (RI) 3. The RI is a tool designed to measure the severity of conditions in locations of return. It is based on 16 indicators that represent a set of minimum or critical living conditions that are necessary to make a place conducive to returns. The RI score explains the likelihood of a population group returns and helps define living conditions in locations of return. Available online at http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/iom_dtm_returnindex_round3_apr2019.pdf.

However, since the second half of 2018 the pace of return – the percentage change in the number of returns – has greatly slowed, dropping from 133 per cent, recorded between May 2017 and May 2018, to 10 per cent observed between May 2018 and June 2019. In the three governorates of Anbar, Diyala and Erbil, returns increased by only five per cent or less between May 2018 and June 2019. At district level, the return process is nearly stalled in both Al-Ba’aj and Ramadi – respectively the fourth and fifth districts of origin for IDPs.2

There are also important variations in terms of rates of return – the ratio of returnees in a specific governorate/district to the sum of returnees and IDPs originally from the same governorate/district. Around 90 per cent of IDPs originally from Anbar have come back to their location of origin versus 64 per cent and 75 per cent respectively of those originally from Ninewa and Salah al-Din. “Critical” districts – those with no returns – include Al-Musayab and Hilla in Babylon Governorate, Adhamia, Al-Resafa, Karkh and Mada’in in Baghdad Governorate, Baladrooz and Ba’quba in Diyala Governorate, and Al-Thetar in Salah al-Din Governorate.

As of June 2019, about 1.61 million people are still living in displacement. The long time spent away from home (70% fled before October 2016) coupled with unresolved inter-group dynamics and new sources of instability (such as concerns over the resurgence of ISIL) impacts their ability to return and in some cases triggers secondary displacement. At the end of 2018, at least 120,000 individuals were secondarily displaced either in new locations of displacement or following a failed attempt to return to their location of origin.3

Long-term intentions are largely consistent with May 2018 findings – suggesting an upward trend towards permanent relocation, which now stands at 25 per cent. Short-term intentions to remain in displacement have also risen from 68 per cent to 75 per cent – pointing in the direction of deferring returns.

When looking at obstacles to return, trends indicate that security and safety concerns have decreased in severity from

81 per cent in 2016 to 36 per cent in 2019, due to the general improvement in security conditions. Fear of changed ethno-religious composition at origin has also decreased to 9 per cent after peaking at 27 per cent in 2018. The obstacle “lack of means to return and restart” dropped from 32 per cent to 17 per cent, with a higher prevalence among IDPs in Sulaymaniyah (56%). This change is similar to the obstacle of blocked returns (from 26% to 5% in 2019), with a higher prevalence among IDPs settled in Salah al-Din (26%).

The three key push factors hindering returns appear to be the lack of job opportunities (73%), services (68%) and shelter (62%) at location of origin. Although housing destruction/damage improved slightly compared to last year (-9%), it is still the main obstacle to return for households settled in Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Qadissiya, Salah al-Din and Wassit.

Evidence of unstable/temporary returns – i.e. households who returned to the location of displacement after first returning to their locations of origin – was also recorded in six per cent of the locations of displacement. This instability seems primarily linked with negative push factors, such as lack of means to remain in displacement (18% of returnee locations across Iraq accounting for around 130,000 returnee households) as well as pressures to return from authorities, either in the location of displacement, origin or both (9% of locations in 2019).

It would also appear that the lack of means to remain in displacement (reported by 42% in 2016 and 47% in 2017) and the issue of ‘pushed’ returns (26% in 2017) triggered many returns at early stages. Incentives/support by government authorities/humanitarian actors (22%) and encouragement by community/religious leaders (28%), were also relatively strong pull factors in 2017. These returns may have been premature, as evidenced by the high number of returnees still living in high severity conditions as per Return Index data (472,350 individuals across 279 locations).4 In addition, these returns did not necessarily meet security conditions: only 67 per cent and 75 per cent of returnees in 2016 and 2017 respectively chose to return because they deemed the location of origin to be safe.

http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/iom_dtm_returnindex_round3_apr2019.pdf

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Access to employment/livelihoods continues to be the main need of returnees, mentioned in around 70 per cent of locations. Over 80 per cent of returnees live in locations where the availability of jobs is ‘insufficient’ and over half live in locations where most individuals “are not economically active”. The lack of training or vocational centres and programmes to support business start-ups is an issue in around 15 per cent of returnee locations – and more so in Anbar (27% of locations).

Return dynamics can be further complicated by security issues, tensions between different population groups and unequal access to resources. While there has been a widespread improvement in security conditions since May 2018, in around 10 per cent of locations (mostly in the eight governorates of origin of IDPs) there is evidence of security incidents associated with the resurgence of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) asymmetric warfare. Specifically, 55 per cent of returnees live in locations where ‘fear about the resurgence of ISIL’ was reported.

In general, the relationship between different population groups (IDPs, returnees and stayers) appears to be positive and stable – overall, the presence of incidents involving physical violence, threats and mistrust in general was reported only occasionally in fewer than five per cent of locations across Iraq.5 The issue of biased access to resources has also largely improved: overall between 8 per cent and 14 per cent of returnees and between 25 per cent and 34 per cent of IDPs live in locations where favouritism regarding employment and political representation was reported (versus 45% of returnees and 50% of IDPs in 2018).

As for practices that could facilitate the reconciliation process, the situation regarding housing, land and property (HLP) issues appears to have improved. Ownership issues were only mentioned in around one per cent of returnee locations (vs. around 10% last year), mostly in Ninewa and Salah al-Din and a few in Diyala and Anbar. Nevertheless, nearly 70 per cent of returnees (and 51% of IDPs) live in districts where legal services are not available, over one third in districts where there are no courts , and 6 per cent of returnees (and 27% of IDPs) live in districts where there are no offices for the replacement of civil documentation.

5 Although this finding is consistent with previous asessment, it is worth observing that social cohesion is very hard to measure and it is highly likely to be under-reported. See section on intergroup feelings, perception of security and civic life satisfaction.

6 The rate of change of the displaced population relates to the proportion of IDPs who have moved in or out the governorate/ district of displacement between May 2018 (ILA III) and June 2019 (ILA IV). A minus (-) sign in front of the percentage indicates a decrease of IDPs while a plus (+) sign indicates an inflow of IDPs. According to the rate of change, governorates/districts of displacement can be categorized into: stationary (rate of change < 10%), fairly stationary (rate of change between 10% and 20%), fairly dynamic (rate of change between 20% and 30%) and dynamic (rate of change > 30%). See Reasons to remain, an in-depth analysis of the main districts of displacement and origin, DTM IOM Iraq, April 2019.

Other key findings of the assessment include:

Movements:

• Compared to May 2018, the number of IDPs has dropped by roughly one fifth (-21%). Decreases were recorded across all 18 governorates, particularly in Ninewa (-23%, around 140,000 individuals), Salah al-Din (-43%, around 80,000 individuals) and Baghdad (-46%, around 50,000 individuals). Significant decreases were also observed in Najaf and Qadissiya (around -60% in both governorates), although the number of hosted IDPs is comparatively smaller.

• The displacement situation appears fluid (either dynamic or fairly dynamic)6 in most districts of Anbar, Baghdad, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadissiya, Salah al-Din and Wassit. The districts of Koisnjak and Soran in Erbil Governorate and Chamchamal and Darbandikhan in Sulaymaniyah Governorate also appear fluid, in contrast to the majority of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) as IDPs are only very slowly moving out of all districts within the region.

• Numbers of IDPs are either static or very slowly decreasing in all districts of Diyala, Basrah and Thi-Qar governorates, whereas in Ninewa stationary or fairly stationary districts include Akre, Al-Hamdaniya, Al-Shikhan and Sinjar. Other noteworthy stationary districts include Kirkuk (in Kirkuk Governorate) and Al-Musayab (in Babylon Governorate).

Intentions:

• Individuals currently settled in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf and Wassit are the most willing to return in the long run (over 90% of individuals in all areas); while in the short term, the most significant inflows of IDPs are expected in Salah al-Din (67%, mostly to Baiji, Balad, Samarra and Tooz) and Diyala (74%, mostly targeting Al-Khalis, Al-Muqdadiya, Baladrooz and Khanaqin).

• Stable relocation appears to be the prevalent intention of IDPs settled in Babylon (97%), Kerbala (64%), Kirkuk (63%), and southern governorates like Basrah (70%), Muthanna (93%) and Thi-Qar (59%). Pull factors in the locations of displacement include security, which seems to be at the root of the decision to stay in southern governorates, whereas push factors – namely blocked

IOM IRAQ7


returns, house destruction and lack of means – are primarily keeping IDPs in Babylon, Kerbala and Kirkuk. The presence of militias and/or a change in the ethno-religious composition at the location of origin is among the top three reasons to stay for over half of IDPs willing to resettle in Diyala, Salah al-Din and Sulaymaniyah.

Living Conditions:

• Access to employment/livelihood opportunities continues to be the main concern of IDPs: 70 per cent live in locations where access was reported among the top three needs. IDPs tend to be employed mostly in the informal sector (especially in Babylon, Basrah, Diyala, Kerbala, Kirkuk and Missan). Compared to returnees, barriers to employement for IDPs are reported more frequently (25% vs. 14%), as well as dependence on savings (12% vs. 2%) and/or remittances from family/friends (17% vs. 2%).

• Around 30 per cent of IDPs (and around 20% of returnees) live in locations where access to food was mentioned as among top three needs – 99 per cent of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah, 53 per cent of IDPs in Baghdad, and 33 per cent of returnees in Anbar reported the issue. High prices are the main issue for both populations (66% and 46% respectively), which in turn influence their capacity to access food.

• Housing remains a pressing issue for the displaced population; 42 per cent of IDPs live in locations where housing was mentioned among the top three needs, with no change compared to May 2018. Only 8 per cent of households remain settled in critical shelter arrangements – it was 16 per cent in 2016 – while the share of the population settled in camps is comparatively increasing each year (from 12% in 2016 to 32% in 2019).

• The share of individuals able to return to their habitual residence has increased from 89 per cent in 2017 to 98 per cent in 2019. The exceptions to this trend are Anbar and Salah-al-Din, where about five per cent of households were not able to reclaim their residence and are mostly living in rented housing. It should also be noted that around three per cent of families are back in their original residence, however these residences may be in poor condition or damaged.

• The increase in the share of families able to regain their habitual residence is linked to reconstruction efforts. Currently extensive damage and destruction (over three fourths of houses are heavily damaged or destroyed)

was assessed in only around three per cent of locations countrywide – with peaks in Khanaqin (20%), Daquq (14%), Sinjar (13%), Tilkaif (16%) and Balad (27%). Reconstruction efforts are ongoing – only in 30 per cent of locations countrywide none or very few houses are being reconstructed/rehabilitated.

Ethno-religious Composition:

• In terms of ethno-religious composition, the most visible change since 2014 has been that of the religious composition of many Sunni majority areas, particularly in the three governorates of Baghdad, Basrah and Diyala, that have become Shia majority or mixed Shia-Sunni areas – mainly Arab in Baghdad and Basrah, and Kurdish in Diyala. Conversely, the presence of Arab Sunnis in the KRI has largely increased, due to the influx of IDPs.

• These changes can be linked with both the tendency of IDPs to ‘cluster’ in displacement and to their fear to return to places where their ethno-religious group is in the minority, particularly if a change in the population composition occurred as a result of conflict.

• At least three fourths of returnee locations fall in the category of ‘homogeneous’ locations, meaning where at least 60 per cent of the population belongs to one of the six main ethno-religious groups: Arab Sunnis, Turkmens (Shias), Yazidis, Kurds (Sunnis and Shias), Arab Shias and other minorities (including Christians, Shabaks and Kakais). The same figure was found for IDPs with regard to Arab Sunnis, Kurds (Shias and Sunnis), Yazidis, Arab Shias, and Turkmen Shias. As for Turkmen Sunnis and ‘other minorities’ homogeneous locations stand respectively at 21 per cent and 36 per cent.

• Main ethno-rel ig ious groups share common characteristics with regard to shelter, intentions, obstacles and reasons to return. For instance, while house damage/destruction, lack of jobs and basic services were the most reported obstacles to return for Arab Sunnis, all other ethno-religious groups were more likely to fear the lack of security/safety at origin. Lack of means to return and restart was mentioned in around one in four homogeneous locations of Arab Sunnis and Shias and around one in two homogeneous locations of Turkmen Shias and other minorities.; and fear of the ethno-religious change in 15–20 per cent of homogeneous locations of Kurdish, Arab Shias and other minorities. It is also worth noting that the issue of blocked returns was reported only in Arab Sunnis’ homogeneous locations (9%).

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INTRODUCTION

7 IOM (2019), ILA IV. Available online at http://iraqdtm.iom.int/downloads/dtm%20special%20reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20IV/Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20IV%20Questionnaire.pdf

8 The definition of returnees is not related to the criteria of returning in safety and dignity, nor with a defined strategy of durable solutions. Displaced families who have returned to their subdistrict of origin are counted as returnees even if they have not returned to their habitual address.

9 Family and household are terms used interchangebly throughout this report, and report to individuals related by birth, marriage or adoption living together. In Iraq, the average household size is 6.

The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is IOM’s information management system to track and monitor population displacement during crises. Composed of a variety of tools and processes, the DTM regularly and systematically captures and processes multi-layered data and disseminates a wide array of information products that facilitate a better understanding of the evolving needs of a displaced population, be that on site or en route. DTM data includes information relevant to all sectors of humanitarian assistance, such as demographic figures, shelter, water and sanitation, health, food and protection, making data useful for humanitarian actors at all levels.

In Iraq, DTM monitors population displacement since 2004. In 2014, following the worsening of the armed conflict and the increasing need for information on the displaced population, the programme was reinforced. Currently the DTM collects data on IDPs and returnees through a system of Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RARTs) – composed of over 100 field staff present throughout the Iraqi territory – which in turn gather information through an extended network of over 9,500 Key Informants (KIs) as well as direct visits to identified locations hosting IDPs, returnees or both (see Methodology).

DTM figures, key findings and reports are published online and available on the portal of DTM Iraq at http://iraqdtm.iom.int. Bi-monthly reports are the core of DTM information, as they provide a countrywide monitoring of displacement and return movements. In-depth location assessments, on the other hand, provide a more exhaustive analysis of displacement and return trends and are conducted yearly.

The Integrated Location Assessment (ILA) belongs to this more comprehensive category, as it provides a simultaneous and rigorous profiling of both displacement and return movements in Iraq. Focusing on both populations at the same time allows to: capture overarching trends of population movements; evaluate the burden that forced displacement poses on some governorates; and outline social and living conditions, basic needs, intentions and vulnerabilities shared by IDPs and returnees.

The report starts with a brief description of the methodology and coverage of the assessment. Chapters are structured around five main topics: (i) population movements, including past trends, current rates of returns and description on future intentions; (ii) status of and accessibility to infrastructure and services; (iii) living conditions, particularly shelter/property issues, employment/livelihood and main basic and recovery needs; (iv) social cohesion and reconciliation, including feeling of safety and security and participation in civic life and (v) ethno-religious composition, and main vulnerabilities. Figures for the returnee and displaced population are provided at overall level and governorate level.

The form used for the assessment, as well as the dataset and additional district and location-level analysis, can be downloaded from the Iraq DTM portal.7

The DTM considers as IDPs all Iraqis who were forced to flee from 1 January 2014 onwards and are still displaced within national borders at the moment of the assessment.

Returnees are defined as IDPs who have now returned to the location (generally village or neighbourhood) where they used to live prior to being displaced, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or to another shelter type.8

METHODOLOGY AND COVERAGE

The ILA collects detailed information on IDP and returnee families living in locations identified through the DTM Master Lists. The reference unit of the assessment is the location, and information is collected at the aggregate level, that is, on the majority of IDPs and returnees living in a location, not on individual households.9

At the start of the cycle, the list of identified locations hosting at least five IDP and/or returnee households in the most up-to-date Master Lists is given to the field RART and is used

as a baseline. The data-collection cycle takes approximately three months and new locations identified during the implementation phase are not subject to the assessment.

http://iraqdtm.iom.int/downloads/dtm%20special%20reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20IV/Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20IV%20Questionnaire.pdf

http://iraqdtm.iom.int/downloads/dtm%20special%20reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20IV/Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20IV%20Questionnaire.pdf




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Where access is possible, identified locations are visited and directly assessed by IOM’s RARTs through interviews with several key informants (including members of the IDP and returnee communities) and direct observation. At the end of the visits, RARTs fill one form with the summary of the information collected and the data is then uploaded to the server and stored as one assessment.

The ILA IV was conducted from May to June 2019 through a network of around 4,000 KI sand covered 3,645 locations hosting at least five or more IDP and/or returnee households, reaching a total of 712,022 returnee households – and 5,641 individuals returned from abroad – and 171,699 IDP households (corresponding respectively to 4,272,132 returnees and 1,030,194 IDPs). Details about the population hosted in the assessed locations are provided in Figure 1. Findings reflect the locations where displaced and/or returned populations resided at the time of the assessment. Whenever applicable, data have been weighted according to the respective number of IDP or returnee households in the location, so that findings are projected at the level of households/individuals.

Overall, coverage stands at 99 per cent10 thanks to the progress in DTM’s field capacity as well as the improvement in security conditions.

Figure 1: Number of assessed locations per population group in location

10 Overall 3,645 locations were directly visited by field teams, three locations were assessed by phone, 52 were excluded because identified as locations with zero IDP or returnee familes and 64 were inaccessible locations.

11 In order to gather a balanced assessment on social cohesion and reconciliation, the questionnaire has been administred to an informant of each population group present at the location (returnees and IDPs) and information obtained has been cross checked. Nevertheless it should be stressed how findings should be carefully handled since all limitations applying to the KIs tool (biases, underpresentation of less visible groups, little basis for quantitication and such) are even more relevant in this case due to the sensitive nature of the issue and the perspective of the informant.

Although some questions specifically target IDPs and other returnees, routinely collected core information includes: • Geographic location• Governorate of origin (IDPs) and of last displacement

(returnees)• Wave/period of displacement and return• Ethno-religious affiliation• Shelter type• Reasons for displacement/return and future intentions

on short and long term• Common security incidents• Specific protection and risk indicators

As in previous ILAs reports, IOM has included a specific section on security, safety and social cohesion – that is, intergroup feelings, social threats and civic life satisfaction, to assess the degree of satisfaction with how civic matters are handled. By incorporating this section, the ILA tool is able to monitor the current reintegration process, including ethno-religious and social tensions that may have arisen or remain active at the local level.11

All sections of the report except for the first on population movements (which was extrapolated from the June 2019 baseline Master List Round 110 and includes the displaced population settled in camps) are based on the ILA dataset collected from May to June 2019. All comparisons with years 2016, 2017 and 2018 come from the datasets of previous ILAs conducted from July to October 2016, from March to May 2017 and from March to May 2018, respectively.

Shelter types were classified into three categories: private dwellings (habitual residence, hosted residence, rented housing and hotels/motels); critical shelter arrangements (informal settlements, religious buildings, schools, unfinished or abandoned buildings and other formal settlements/collective centres); and unknown shelters (when the shelter type cannot be identified or the locations could not be accessed). It is important to note that camps were not assessed, as the ILA methodology is designed for urban and rural areas only (location – fifth administrative level), whereas a different methodology is required for camps – that is, camp profiling and formal site assessment. Camps are usually included in the government’s records. Information on camps can be found in DTM bi-monthly Master List.

Data cleaning was performed in July and preliminary findings were validated with the RARTs. The ILA IV dataset and interactive dashboards were released on the DTM portal in August 2019 and are available at http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA4.aspx.

5656++3434++10+10+DD56%34%

10%

IDPs + RETURNEES (373)

IDPs (2,021)

RETURNEES (1,251)

3,645LOCATIONS

In total, 3,645 locations were assessed, including 301 locations with returnees from abroad.

http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA4.aspx

http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA4.aspx

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POPULATION MOVEMENTS12

The end of the crisis was officially declared in 2017. Since then, post‑conflict status has allowed for the return of over 4,300,0000 IDPs to their areas of origin.

12 All figures for this section – except for those on Intentions, Reasons to stay and Obstacles to return – were extrapolated from Round 110 (May 2019) and Round 109 (March 2019) Master Lists and include the displaced population settled in camps. Conversely figures for Intentions, Reasons to stay and Obstacles to return are based on ILA IV dataset and only pertain to out of camp IDPs.

13 A dedicated section was added in the ILA III and ILA IV questionnaire with the objective to start monitoring returns from abroad. Overall, returns from people displaced internally greatly outnumber those from abroad. In 2018, around 74,000 individuals returning from abroad were observed – 77% of which had regained their location of origin and 89% who had left Iraq before 2014. In 2019, 5,641 returns from abroad were observed – all individuals had left Iraq due to the 2014 crisis, 92% had regained their location of origin, most came back from Turkey, Germany, Syrian Arab Republic, Netherlands and Belgium. According to UNHCR, there are around 270,000 registered Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries namely Turkey (142,640), Lebanon (15,330), Syrian Arab Republic (35,220), Jordan (67,175), Egypt (6,920) and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (3,200): http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/ga2019/pdf/Chapter_MENA.pdf

14 See Round 107 Master List, December 2018.

Refugees from abroad have also started returning from neighbouring Turkey and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as from more distant countries such as Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands.13 Nevertheless, in the second half of 2018 the pace of return has greatly slowed, and around 1,610,000 people are still living in displacement. The prolonged period of displacement, coupled with issues such as unresolved inter-group dynamics and new concerns over the resurgence of ISIL, affects IDPs’ ability to return and in some cases triggers secondary displacement. At the end of 2018, around 120,000 individuals were secondarily displaced either in new locations of displacement or following a failed attempt to return to their location of origin.14

Movement trends since 2014 (depicted below) demonstrate how the pace of displacement reflects the pattern of the Iraqi conflict. People fled their communities either because they were directly targeted (as were ethno-religious minorities from June to September 2014), frightened by the generalized violence, or could no longer make a living. Waves of returns primarily mirror campaigns to retake areas under ISIL control, and following these episodes, reflect expectations of restored stability, which peaked between June 2017 and June 2018.

Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

Ninewa

Erbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Kerbala

Baghdad

Babylon

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JORDAN

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Najaf

Al-Salman

Baiji

Hatra

Kut

Heet

Ana

Al-Ka'im

Ra'ua

Al-Ba'aj

Ramadi

Amara

Al-Zubair

Sinjar

Baladrooz

Badra

Mosul

Falluja

Kifri

Afaq

Telafar

Haditha

Erbil

Tikrit

Tooz

Akre

Khanaqin

Soran

Nassriya

Daquq

Al-Daur

Kalar

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Makhmur

Al-Hai

Fao

Hamza

Balad

Al-Hawiga

Al-Azezia

Samarra

Zakho

Sumel

Koisnjaq

Tilkaif

Al-Thethar

Hashimiya

Kirkuk

Kerbala

Ali Al-Gharbi

Chamchamal

Dokan

Diwaniya

Al-Maimouna

Al-Qurna

Al-Shatra

Al-Khidhir

Al-Mahawil

Halabja

Pshdar

Sharbazher

Shaqlawa

Sulaymaniya

Al-C

hiba

yish

Dabes

Al-Suwaira

Al-Rumaitha

Basrah

Mergasur

Al-Fares

Dahuk

Al-Khalis

Rania

Al-Shirqat

Penjwin

Al-Midaina

Al-Hamdaniya

Ain Al-Tamur

Al-Shikhan

Al-Kahla

Kufa

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Shatt Al-Arab

Al-Na'maniya

Hilla

Qal'at Saleh

Choman

Al-Samawa

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Al-Hindiya

Ba'quba

Al-M

ejar Al-K

abir

Al-Shamiya

Al-Manathera

Darbandikhan

Najaf

Mosul

Hilla

Erbil

Dahuk

Basra

Amara

Samawa

Ramadi

Kirkuk

Samarra

Kerbala

Baghdad

Diwaniya

Nassriyah

Ba'Aqubah

Sulaymaniyah

!. Kut

Baladrooz

Falluja

Balad

Al-Azezia

Kerbala Al-Mahawil

Mada'in

Al-Fares

MahmoudiyaAl-M

usayab

Ba'quba

Karkh

Kadhimia

Abu GhraibA

dhamia

Baghdad

Ba'Aqubah

!.

!.

Al Resa

fa

Thawra

Diyala

Anbar

Wassit

Salah al-Din

Baghdad

Ramadi

Tarmia

Al-Suwaira

Al-MuqdadiyaAl-Khalis

District boundaries

Governorate boundaries

Country boundaries

Governorate capital!.

Map 1: General map of Iraq

This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the desig-nations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/ga2019/pdf/Chapter_MENA.pdf

11

APR

JUN

AUG

OCT

DEC

FEB

APR

JUN

AUG

OCT

DEC

FEB

APR

JUN

AUG

OCT

DEC

FEB

APR

JUN

AUG

OCT

DEC

FEB

APR

JUN

AUG

OCT

DEC

FEB

APR

JUN

2014

2015

2016

2017

2019

0.44

0.86

1.71

1.90

2.12

2.54

2.83

3.10

3.18

3.18

3.29

3.34

3.33

3.32

3.34

3.23

3.06

3.03

3.05

3.35

3.26

3.17

3.22

3.51

3.71

3.90

4.03

4.11

4.16

4.21

4.26

2.61

0.12

0.22

0.36

0.40

0.48

0.56

0.65

0.75

0.85

1.00

1.27

1.49

1.70

1.95

2.17

2.62

2.31

2.10

2.00

1.92

1.86

1.80

1.74

1.66

JAN

201

4

MAY

201

4

JUN

201

4

MAY

2015

AUG

2014

JAN

201

5

DEC

2015

MAR

2016

SEP

2015

Figh

ting

begi

ns in

A

nbar

and

Fa

lluja

h fa

lls,

disp

laci

ng a

bout

85

,000

peo

ple.

Peop

le

disp

lace

d by

vi

olen

ce in

A

nbar

rea

ch

550,

000.

Mos

ul fa

lls a

nd

viol

ence

spr

eads

ac

ross

nor

th-c

entr

al

Iraq.

C

on�i

ct-r

elat

ed

disp

lace

men

ts

incr

ease

to

1.2

mill

ion,

tho

ugh

som

e di

spla

ced

quic

kly

retu

rn t

o M

osul

.

Disp

lace

men

t in

crea

ses

to a

bout

2.

2 m

illion

peo

ple

due

to in

secu

rity

and

con�

ict

in

cent

ral a

nd

nort

hern

reg

ions

.

JUN

201

6O

ver

85,0

00

peop

le a

re r

apid

ly

disp

lace

d fr

om

Fallu

jah

as t

he c

ity

is re

take

n by

Iraq

i se

curit

y fo

rces

.

JUL

2017

Prim

e M

inist

er a

nnou

nced

th

e co

mpl

ete

reca

ptur

e of

M

osul

city

. Ove

r 1

milli

on

peop

le d

ispla

ced.

SEP

2016

Milit

ary

oper

atio

ns a

long

the

A

nbar

and

Mos

ul c

orrid

ors

disp

lace

mor

e th

an 5

00,0

00

peop

le b

y en

d Se

ptem

ber.

Milit

ary

oper

atio

ns in

A

nbar

trig

ger

disp

lace

men

t. A

bout

11

6,85

0 di

spla

ced

peop

le

retu

rned

to

thei

r ho

mes

.

Cho

lera

out

brea

k be

gins

, a�e

ctin

g ce

ntra

l an

d so

uthe

rn Ir

aq. B

y D

ecem

ber,

17

gove

rnor

ates

are

a�

ecte

d, o

ver

2,80

0 ca

ses

are

labo

rato

ry

con�

rmed

and

tw

o de

aths

are

reg

ister

ed.

Cho

lera

out

brea

k be

gins

, a�

ectin

g ce

ntra

l and

so

uthe

rn Ir

aq. B

y D

ecem

ber,

17

gove

rnor

ates

are

a�e

cted

, ov

er 2

,800

cas

es a

re

labo

rato

ry c

on�r

med

and

tw

o de

aths

are

reg

ister

ed.

Milit

ary

oper

atio

ns t

o re

take

Ra

mad

i int

ensif

y, op

enin

g a

new

pha

se in

the

Iraq

cris

is.

Aro

und

30,0

00 p

eopl

e ar

e di

spla

ced

in D

ecem

ber

and

Janu

ary

2016

as

a re

sult.

Att

acks

on

Sinj

ar, Z

umm

ar a

nd

the

Nin

ewa

Plai

ns d

ispla

ce

near

ly 1

milli

on p

eopl

e w

ithin

w

eeks

, pus

hing

the

num

ber

of

disp

lace

d Ira

qis

to 1

.8 m

illion

.

NO

V 20

16Re

turn

s in

crea

se d

ram

atic

ally,

es

peci

ally

to

Anb

ar, r

each

ing

mor

e th

an 1

00,0

00 p

eopl

e pe

r m

onth

. A t

otal

of 1

.2 m

illion

pe

ople

hav

e re

turn

ed h

ome

acro

ss Ir

aq b

y N

ovem

ber.

SEP

2016

The

�ght

for

Mos

ul b

egin

s on

17

Oct

ober

, lea

ding

to

seve

re p

rote

ctio

n th

reat

s fo

r ov

er 1

milli

on c

ivilia

ns.

Aro

und

90,0

00 p

eopl

e ar

e di

spla

ced

in t

he �

rst

two

mon

ths

of b

attle

.

SEP

2017

Milit

ary

oper

atio

ns in

Haw

iga

that

beg

an o

n 21

Sep

tem

ber

disp

lace

app

roxi

mat

ely

42,5

00

peop

le.

OCT

201

7A

ppro

xim

atel

y 18

0,00

0 pe

ople

disp

lace

d du

e to

m

ilitar

y re

alig

nmen

t in

no

rthe

rn Ir

aq in

Oct

ober

.

OCT

201

8

APR

2019

By t

he e

nd o

f Oct

ober

, m

ore

than

4 m

illion

di

spla

ced

peop

le

retu

rned

hom

e. D

espi

te

the

scal

e of

ove

rall

retu

rnee

s, th

e ra

te o

f the

re

turn

has

slo

wed

in

rece

nt m

onth

s an

d sh

ows

signs

of l

evel

ing

out.

Mor

e th

an 1

.9

milli

on ID

Ps r

emai

n di

spla

ced,

50%

of w

hom

ha

ve b

een

disp

lace

d fo

r m

ore

than

thr

ee y

ears

.Re

turn

Inde

x in

dica

tes

that

11%

of

ret

urne

es (4

72,3

50 in

divi

dual

s)

are

livin

g in

hig

h se

verit

y co

nditi

ons.M

AY 2

019

IOM

stu

dy o

n Pr

otra

cted

D

ispla

cem

ent

reve

als

that

61%

of

IDPs

hav

e be

en d

ispla

ced

for

over

3 y

ears

, and

nea

rly a

ll of

th

em a

re a

t ris

k of

long

-ter

m

disp

lace

men

t. In

fact

, ID

Ps a

re

not

(or

only

ver

y slo

wly)

m

ovin

g ou

t of

the

ir di

stric

ts o

f di

spla

cem

ent

(less

tha

n 15

%

since

May

201

8) a

nd n

early

all

plan

on

stay

ing

in d

ispla

cem

ent

for

at le

ast

the

next

12

mon

ths.

NO

V 20

16In

late

Dec

embe

r 20

17, f

or t

he �

rst

time

since

the

Iraq

disp

lace

men

t cr

isis

bega

n in

Dec

embe

r 20

13, I

OM

rec

orde

d m

ore

retu

rnee

s (3

.2 m

illion

indi

vidu

als)

tha

n pe

ople

disp

lace

d (2

.6 m

illion

indi

vidu

als)

in

Iraq

.

2018

1,60

7,14

8

4,30

5,13

8

Figu

re 2

: Disp

lace

men

t an

d re

turn

tre

nds

- A

pril

2014

–Jun

e 20

19

IDP

Indi

vidu

als

Retu

rnee

Indi

vidua

ls

IOM IRAQ12


PACE OF RETURN AND RATES OF RETURN

Compared to the previous reference period (May 2017–May 2018) when the political pressure for returns was substantial, the pace of returns – the percentage change in the number of returns – has greatly slowed, dropping from 133 per cent to 10 per cent. More specifically, the three governorates of Anbar, Diyala and Erbil recorded an increase in returns of only five per cent or less between May 2018 and June 2019.

Table 1: Return, yearly rate of change and rate of return

Returnees May 2018

ReturneesJune 2019

% changeMay 2017–June 2019

% changeMay 2018–June 2019

% of returns as of June 2019

Rate of return June 2019

Anbar 1,264,890 1,305,456 63% 3% 30% 89%

Baghdad 77,046 88,170 188% 14% 2% 69%

Dahuk 780 780 > 200% 0% 0% 3%

Diyala 221,598 225,474 10% 2% 5% 73%

Erbil 39,006 41,070 14% 5% 1% 68%

Kirkuk 293,334 330,882 > 200% 13% 8% 76%

Ninewa 146,424 1,677,912 > 200% 15% 39% 64%

Salah al-Din 543,456 635,394 50% 17% 15% 75%

Total/Average 3,904,350 4,305,138 133% 10% 100% 73%

Map 2: Variation in rate of return between May 2018 and June 2019

The yearly trend of returns for the six main districts of origin Mosul, Telafar, Al-Ba’aj, Ramadi, and Al-Hawiga are detailed below. Mosul accounts for 20 per cent of all individuals still living in displacement, followed by Sinjar (18%), Telafar (8%), Al-Ba’aj (7%), Ramadi (4%) and Al-Hawiga (4%). In all districts there has been a significant decrease in the number of returns; however, while in Al-Hawiga, Mosul, Sinjar and Telafar returns are still progressing though at a slower pace, the return process is nearly stalled in Al-Ba’aj and Ramadi.


THE UN MIGRATION AGENCY

IOM OIM•

MAP 2

This map is for illustration purpose only. The boundar-ies and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endoresement or acceptance by

the International Organization for Migration

Date of creation 10/22/2019Created by Riju Stephen ([email protected])

.

Administrative Boundaries : OCHA (Modified)Data Source : Integrated Location Assessment III & IV

0 80 16040Kilometers

District boundaries


Variation in the the rate of of returns

between May 2018 to June 2019

-0.2% – 2.0%

2.1% – 7.0%

7.1% – 20.0%

20.1% – 33.0%

33.1 – 65.0%

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur

Al-SuwairaAl-Na'maniya

Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir

Al-ShamiyaAl-Manathera

Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

BabylonKerbala

Baghdad


IOM OIM•

MAP 2

This map is for illustration purpose only. The boundar-ies and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endoresement or acceptance by

the International Organization for Migration


.

Administrative Boundaries : OCHA (Modified)Data Source : Integrated Location Assessment III & IV


District boundaries


Variation in the the rate of of returns

between May 2018 to June 2019

-0.2% – 2.0%

2.1% – 7.0%

7.1% – 20.0%

20.1% – 33.0%

33.1 – 65.0%

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

BabylonKerbala

Baghdad

IOM IRAQ13


Figure 3: Return trends in six main districts of origin (2016–2019 / ILA I to ILA IV)

690 9,579

862,848

992,046

MOSUL

0 0 1035

10,320

AL-BA'AJ

21,73826,808

52,158

61,092

SINJAR

0 0

119,118

153,198

AL-HAWIGA

93,846

31,836

458,778 465,348

RAMADI

79,72295,232

296,856

334,572

TELAFAR

37 08 85 00

C M Y K

90 00 36 00

44 04 00 00

18 04 00 00

71 55 45 61

100 82 10 02

172 196 84

R G B

00 176 179

132 204 241

204 226 245

44 54 63

20 73 145

Primary Colors

IOM COLORING PROFILE

Secondery Colors

Shades

Shades

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

00 35 89 00 251 175 5590

%

10

%

83 86 03 00 80 70 15290

%

10

%

32 89 47 13 159 59 9190

%

10

%

00 75 70 00 241 103 8190

%

10

%

31 48 30 00 179 139 15190

%

10

%

12 94 59 01 210 53 86

33 22 47 00 178 180 145

52 00 36 00 120 201 180

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

C M Y K R G B

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS

IOM IRAQ14


Important regional variations in terms of rates of return exist – the proportion of returnees originally from a governorate or district to the total number of returnees and IDPs originally from the same governorate or district (see Map 2). Around 90 per cent of IDPs originally from Anbar have come back to their location of origin, versus 75 per cent and 64 per cent respectively of those originally from Salah al-Din and Ninewa.

Variations at the district level are even more significant. The districts of Mosul and Sinjar are top districts of origin for IDPs; however, 75 per cent of those IDPs originally from Mosul have returned to their location of origin compared to only 17 per cent of those from Sinjar. Other ‘critical’ districts include Al-Musayab and Hilla in Babylon, Adhamia,

Al-Resafa, Karkh and Mada’in in Baghdad, Baladrooz and Ba’quba in Diyala, and Al-Thetar in Salah al-Din. No returns were recorded so far in these districts, regardless of the number of individuals who fled them (which can vary from as few as 60 in Hilla to as many as 39,252 in Al-Musayab).

In addition to Sinjar, the process of returns is very slow in Al-Ba’aj (8% rate of return) and Hatra (30%) in Ninewa Governorate. Other districts experiencing lower rates of return include Al Ka’im (61%), Kifri (50%), Al-Fares (50%), Tooz (49%) and Balad (57%). The number of individuals who fled these areas is highly variable – around 50,000 individuals from Balad and Tooz are still displaced versus around 25,000 from Al-Ka’im and 1,200 from Kifri.

Map 3: Rate of return/Classification of districts based on the percentages of returns


IOM OIM•

MAP 3

This map is for illustration purpose only. The boundar-ies and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply o�cial endoresement or acceptance bythe International Organization for Migration


.

Administrative Boundaries : OCHA (Modified)Data Source : PD 109


District boundaries


Classification of districtsbased on the percentages

of IDP returns

Complete (90 - 100%)

Significant (75 - 90%)

Moderate (61 - 74%)

Low (31 - 60%)

Very low (1- 30%)

No return

Not applicable

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

BabylonKerbala

Baghdad


IOM OIM•

MAP 3



.

Administrative Boundaries : OCHA (Modified)Data Source : PD 109


District boundaries


Classification of districtsbased on the percentages

of IDP returns

Complete (90 - 100%)

Significant (75 - 90%)

Moderate (61 - 74%)

Low (31 - 60%)

Very low (1- 30%)

No return

Not applicable

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

BabylonKerbala

Baghdad


IOM IRAQ15


TIMING, DIRECTION AND REASONS TO RETURNS

15 KIs were asked to to select the main three reasons to return.

Most returns took place in 2016–2017 (80% of total returns) and were intra-governorate (58%), meaning the location of last displacement was in the same governorate of that of origin. Baghdad and Erbil received around 90 per cent of returns from within the governorate; Diyala around 80 per

cent and Ninewa around 70 per cent. Ninewa is also the governorate most likely to have received recent returns (87% since 2017) due to displacement caused by the Mosul crisis, along with Kirkuk (83%).

Map 4: Periods of return

Security (92%), access to property (77%) and services/livelihoods (45%) were the most important factors influencing decisions to return. Around one third of households (29%) were motivated by the emotional desire to return and 10

per cent by the desire to join family members who previously returned. IDPs are also more likely to return if they are pushed by lack of means (18%) or by inadequate or worsening conditions in their community of displacement (12%).

Figure 4: Reasons to return15

District boundaries


Anbar

Ninewa

Erbil

Diyala

Wassit

Salah Al-Din

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Sulaymaniyah

BaghdadAl-Rutba

Baiji

Hatra

Heet

Ana

Al-Ka'im

Ra'ua

Al-Ba'aj

Ramadi

SinjarMosul

Kifri

Telafar

Haditha

TikritTooz

Falluja

Khanaqin

Al-Daur

Daquq

KirkukMakhmur

Al-Hawiga

Samarra

Balad

Zakho

Tilkaif

Dabes

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Shirqat

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Shikhan

Al-Muqdadiya

Mahmoudiya

Tarmia

Kadhimia

Abu -Ghraib

Tarmia

Kadhimia

Abu -Ghraib

2015

2016

2017

2018 and later

Returnee districts

Not applicable

Periods of return

SumelDahuk

Amedi

Mergasur

Akre

Choman

Pshdar

Rania Pshdar

Dokan

Sharbazher

Sulaymaniya

Penjwin

ChamchamalDarbandikhan Halabja

Kalar

Erbil

Shaqlawa

Koisnjaq

Al-Thethar

Baladrooz

Mada’in

Badra

Al-Azezia


92+77+39+29+18+12+10+6+5+3+2+1+0The location is safe

Availability of housing

Availability of services

Emotional desire to return

No means to remain in displacement

Worsening of livelihood/services in displacement

To join family members already returned

Availability of jobs

Encouragement to return by community/religious leaders

Other negative push factors

Availability of assistance

Incentives by government/humanitarian actors

92%

77%

39%

29%

18%

12%

10%

6%

5%

3%

2%

1%

IOM IRAQ16


The importance of push factors is especially apparent when tracking reasons to return over the course of time. Apparently, the lack of means to remain in displacement triggered many returns earlier on in the conflict (42% and 47% in 2016 and 2017 respectively). These returns did not necessarily meet security standards: only 67 per cent and 75 per cent of returnees in 2016 and 2017 respectively chose to return because they deemed the location of origin to be safe. Incentives and/or support by government

16 See Return Index (RI) 3. The RI is a tool designed to measure the severity of conditions in locations of return. It is based on 16 indicators that represent a set of minimum or critical living conditions that are necessary to make a place conducive to returns. The RI score explains the likelihood of a population group returns and helps define living conditions in locations of return. Available online at http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/iom_dtm_returnindex_round3_apr2019.pdf.

authorities, as well as encouragement by the community and/or religious leaders were relatively strong pull factors in 2017 (22% and 28% respectively), when the evidence of ‘pushed’ returns was also seen in as many as 26 per cent of returnee locations (vs. 9% in 2019). These returns may have well been premature, as evidenced by the high number of returnees still living in severe conditions (472,350 individuals across 279 locations).16

Figure 5: Reasons to return, trend 2016–2019

THE LOCATION OF RETURN IS SAFE AVAILABILITY OF HOUSINGIN LOCATION OF RETURN

AVAILABILITY OF LIVEHLIOODS ANDSERVICES IN LOCATION OF RETURN

NO FINANCIAL MEANS TO STAYIN LOCATION OF DISPLACEMENT

TO JOIN SOME OF THE FAMILY MEMBERSWHO HAD RETURNED ALREADY

ENCOURAGED TO RETURNBY COMMUNITY/RELIG IOUS LEADERS

SUPPORT/INCENTIVE FROM AUTHORITIESOR HUMANITARIAN ACTORS TO RETURN

67%75%

93% 92%

43%

18%

63%77%

13%

28%

6% 5% 5%

22%19%

1%

58%66%

28%

45%

33%

18%15%

10%

42%47%

37%

18%

5%8%

13% 14%

OTHER NEGATIVE PUSH FACTORS (WORSENING OF SECURITY/LIVELIHOOD/SERVICES, EVICTIONS, NEGATIVE

INCENTIVES, FAILED TO INTEGRATE)

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

ILA I2016

ILA II2017

ILA III2018

ILA IV2019

http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/iom_dtm_returnindex_round3_apr2019.pdf

IOM IRAQ17


In addition to the improvement in the security situation and the availability of housing, which are common factors to all locations of return, around one third of returns to Diyala were motivated by a lack of means (31%) and/or encouragement by the community and/or religious leaders (33%). The availability of jobs and/or assistance have been

key elements in Baghdad (40% and 23% respectively), while in Ninewa the worsening of livelihood/services in displacement was mentioned more often than the average (21%). The emotional desire to return also motivated households in Salah al-Din (47%), Erbil (40%) and Kirkuk (38%).

DISPLACEMENT, DISTRIBUTION AND RATE OF CHANGE

As of June 2019, 1,607,148 internally displaced persons (267,858 households) remain dispersed across all 18 Iraqi governorates. Compared to May 2018, this number has dropped by roughly one fifth (-21%). Decreases were recorded across all governorates, particularly in Ninewa (-23%, around 140,000 individuals), Salah al-Din (-43%,

around 80,000 individuals) and Baghdad (-46%, around 50,000 individuals). Significant drops were also observed in Najaf and Qadissiya (around -60% in both governorates), although the number of hosted IDPs is comparatively smaller.

Table 2: IDPs, distribution and change (No. of individuals)

According to the yearly rate of change of the displaced population – the proportion of IDPs who have moved into (+) or out of (-) the governorate/district of displacement within the specified time frame – governorates/districts can be categorized into: stationary (rate of change < 10%),

fairly stationary (rate of change between 10% and 20%), fairly dynamic (rate of change between 20% and 30%) and dynamic (rate of change > 30%).

The situation appears fluid, i.e. either dynamic or fairly dynamic, in most districts of Anbar, Baghdad, Muthanna,

No. of IDPs as of May 2018 No. of IDPs as of June 2019 % change since May 2018 % of IDPs June 2019

Anbar 81,192 49,086 -40% 3%

Babylon 25,794 17,454 -32% 1%

Baghdad 107,832 58,710 -46% 4%

Basrah 8,046 7,164 -11% 0%

Dahuk 350,232 326,106 -7% 20%

Diyala 64,674 55,722 -14% 3%

Erbil 222,738 209,784 -6% 13%

Kerbala 27,018 21,744 -20% 1%

Kirkuk 133,770 101,556 -24% 6%

Missan 3,006 2,388 -21% 0%

Muthanna 1,374 1,098 -20% 0%

Najaf 30,396 12,282 -60% 1%

Ninewa 620,628 478,638 -23% 30%

Qadissiya 12,882 5,592 -57% 0%

Salah al-Din 184,854 105,390 -43% 7%

Sulaymaniyah 154,020 142,422 -8% 9%

Thi-Qar 4,098 3,474 -15% 0%

Wassit 13,164 8,538 -35% 1%

Total/Average 2,045,718 1,607,148 -21% 100%

IOM IRAQ18


Najaf, Qadissiya, Salah al-Din and Wassit. With the exception of Koisnjak and Soran in Erbil and Chamchamal and Darbandikhan in Sulaymaniyah, IDPs are only very slowly moving out of all districts of KRI. Displacement is also either stalled or only very slowly decreasing in all districts of Diyala, Basrah and Thi-Qar governorates, whereas in

Ninewa stationary or fairly stationary districts include Akre, Al-Hamdaniya, Al-Shikhan and Sinjar. Other noteworthy districts where IDPs are not or only very slowly moving out include Kirkuk (in Kirkuk Governorate) and Al-Musayab (in Babylon Governorate).

Map 5: Classification of districts based on the rate of change of displacement between May 2018 to June 2019

FUTURE INTENTIONS

In 553 locations hosting 25 per cent of current IDPs, most individuals are willing to go home in the short term (within less than six months), and in 1,659 locations hosting 74 per cent of current IDPs, most individuals are willing to go home in the long term (after six months or more). Long-term intentions are largely consistent with the findings of 2018, suggesting an upward trend towards permanent relocation, which now stands at 25 per cent. Short-term intentions to remain in displacement have also risen from 68 per cent to 75 per cent – pointing in the direction of deferring returns.

Individuals currently settled in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf and Wassit are the most willing to return in the long run (over 90% of individuals in all areas); while the most significant inflows of IDPs in the short term are expected in Salah al-Din (67%, mostly to Baiji, Balad, Samarra and Tooz) and Diyala (74%, mostly to Al-Khalis, Al-Muqdadiya, Baladrooz and Khanaqin). IDPs settled in Missan, for the most part

hailing originally from Kadhimia in Baghdad Governorate and Al-Daur in Salah al-Din Governorate, also seem to be determined to go home in the short term (86%).

Stable relocation appears to be the prevalent intention of IDPs settled in Babylon (97%), Kerbala (64%), Kirkuk (63%), and southern governorates like Basrah (70%), Muthanna (93%) and Thi-Qar (59%). Pull factors – and first, security – seem to be at the root of the decision to stay in southern governorates, whereas push factors – that is, blocked returns, house destruction and lack of means – are primarily keeping IDPs in Babylon, Kerbala and Kirkuk. The presence of militias and/or a change in the ethno-religious composition at the location of origin are among the top three reasons to stay for over half of IDPs willing to resettle in Diyala, Salah al-Din and Sulaymaniyah.

District boundaries


Dynamic

Fairly dynamic

Fairly stationary

Stationary

Not applicable

Increase in IDP figures

Rate of change (IDP departures)

Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

BabylonKerbala

Baghdad

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

RaniaQal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Hilla

Al-Hindiya

District boundaries


Dynamic

Fairly dynamic

Fairly stationary

Stationary

Not applicable

Increase in IDP figures

Rate of change (IDP departures)

Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

BabylonKerbala

Baghdad

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Hilla

Al-Hindiya


IOM IRAQ19


Figure 6: Short- and long-term intentions of IDPs17

17 Data from IOM DTM Group Assessment Cycle I (September 2015) and ILA I, II, III, and IV utilized for short-term and long-term intentions analysis.

25+74+1+D25% 84+92+88+75+74+705+1+2+2+2+0 4+1+4+5+1+0

11+7+9+22+25+262015 2016 2017 2018 2019

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

LONG-TERM INTENTIONS

84%

RETURN

OTHER/UNKNOWN

LOCAL INTEGRATION

MOVE TO A THIRD LOCATION INSIDE OR OUTSIDE IRAQ

2% 2%0% 1%1% 2%1% 3%1% 0%

92%88%

74% 74%

11% 7%9%

22% 25%

74%

1%

RETURN

LOCAL INTEGRATION

OTHER/UNKNOWN

25+75+D75%

25%

63+48+24+32+25+245+1+1+1+1+0 4+1+2+1+1+0

32+52+75+68+75+702015 2016 2017 2018 2019

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

63%

SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS

RETURN

OTHER/UNKNOWN

LOCAL INTEGRATION

MOVE TO A THIRD LOCATION INSIDE OR OUTSIDE IRAQ

3% 2%0% 0%0% 1%0.3% 0.1%0% 0%

48%24% 32% 25%

32%

52%75% 68% 75%

RETURN

LOCAL INTEGRATION

IOM IRAQ20


LENGTH AND GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT

18 See IDPs Districts of Displacement Factsheets, IOM 2019. Available online at http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/IDP_Districts_of_Displacement_Factsheets.pdf

Geographical proximity, together with length of displacement, are key factors in explaining intentions: the farther away people are from their communities and the longer displacement lasts, the less likely they are to return.

The long-term trend depicted in Figure 7 demonstrates how during the first six months of the crisis, most IDPs remained close to their location of origin (60% in June 2014). However, as violence continued to spread and conditions of living became harsher, IDPs were eventually pushed farther away – between June 2015 and June 2016, intra-governorate displacement reached the lowest point at around 37–38 per cent. The displacement triggered by the Mosul crisis caused a new increase in intra-governorate figures that peaked in June 2018 (48%). The figures of 2019 stand at 44 per cent, revealing a slight increase in extra-governorate displacement.

High shares of extra-governorate displacement – as in Anbar (77%) and Baghdad (99%) – are often associated with resettling in the KRI. Nearly 60 per cent of IDPs from Anbar and 90 per cent of those originally from Baghdad are currently living the governorates of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Conversely, higher shares of intra-governorate displacement, and especially of intra-district displacement, as it is the case in Al-Musayab, Daquq, Falluja, Khanaqin, Kifri, Makmur, Tilkaif, Samara and Tooz, seem associated with the prevalence of community tensions in these areas which prevent returns. In Mosul, intra-district displacement (36%) is associated with movement east of the city to flee the significant devastation on the western side.18

Figure 7: Intra-governorate displacement, trend 2014–2019 and by governorate of origin

Map 6: Intra-district displacement

Salah al-Din

Ninewa

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Erbil

Diyala

Baghdad

Babylon

Anbar

440=460=590=1000=500=570=10=370=230=

44%

46%

59%

100%

50%

57%

1%

37%

23%

60%

37% 38%

44%

48%

44%

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019



IOM OIM•

MAP 6

This map is for illustration purpose only. The boundar-ies and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endoresement or acceptance bythe International Organization for Migration


.

Administrative Boundaries : OCHA (Modified)

Data Source : Integrated Location Assessment IV PD 109


District boundaries


No intra-district displacement

1.0% – 3.0%

3.1% – 7.0%

7.1% – 24.0%

24.1% – 52.0%

52.1% – 80.0%

Not applicable

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Al-Hindiya

Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

BabylonKerbala

Baghdad

Intra-district displacement


IOM OIM•

MAP 6



.


Data Source : Integrated Location Assessment IV PD 109


District boundaries


No intra-district displacement

1.0% – 3.0%

3.1% – 7.0%

7.1% – 24.0%

24.1% – 52.0%

52.1% – 80.0%

Not applicable

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Al-Hindiya

Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

BabylonKerbala

Baghdad

Intra-district displacement

http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/IDP_Districts_of_Displacement_Factsheets.pdf

IOM IRAQ21


As for the lenght of displacement – with the exception of Ninewa (32%) and Anbar (60%) – over 70 per cent of all IDPs hosted in other governorates have been displaced for nearly three years or more (prior to October 2016).

In Ninewa, most recent IDPs are settled in Al-Hamdaniya, Mosul and Tilkaif, while in Anbar they are settled in Falluja and Ramadi.

Map 7: Areas of protracted displacement (nearly three years or more)

OBSTACLES TO RETURN AND REASONS TO RESETTLE

In addition to duration of displacement and distance from location of origin, the obstacles that IDPs continue to face can explain both the difference between short- and long-term intentions (in the sense that households postpone their decision to return) and the increase in the share of

those willing to resettle. Three obstacles seem particularly important for households: the lack of job opportunities (73%), services (68%) and a residence to which to return at the location of origin (62%).

Figure 8: Obstacles to return


IOM OIM•

AREAS OF PROTRACTEDDISPLACEMENT



.


Data Source : Masterlist Round 110


SatScan: Kulldorff M. and Information ManagementServices, Inc. SaTScanTM v8.0: Software for thespatial and space-time scan statisticshttp://www.satscan.org/, 2009

Reference:

District boundaries


Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Kerbala

Baghdad

Babylon

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Area of protracted displacement


IOM OIM•

AREAS OF PROTRACTEDDISPLACEMENT



.


Data Source : Masterlist Round 110


SatScan: Kulldorff M. and Information ManagementServices, Inc. SaTScanTM v8.0: Software for thespatial and space-time scan statisticshttp://www.satscan.org/, 2009

Reference:

District boundaries


Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Kerbala

Baghdad

Babylon

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Area of protracted displacement

This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the desig-nations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration. 73+68+62+36+17+12+9+6+5+3+2+0No job opportunities at origin

Lack of basic services at origin

House at origin is damaged/destroyed

The area of origin is insecure/unsafe due to ongoing conflict, armed groups UXOs, etc.

No financial means to return and restart

Living conditions are better in displacement

Fear as a result of the changed ER composition at origin

Children enrolled in school at displacement

Blocked returns

Trauma associated with returning to place of origin

HH assets have been damaged/stolen

73%

68%

62%

36%

17%

12%

9%

6%

5%

3%

2%

IOM IRAQ22


The long-term trend for a selected number of indicators is depicted in Figure 9. It can be observed that security/safety concerns are decreasing over time (from 81% in 2016 to 36% in 2019) due to the general improvement in security conditions. Households settled in KRI and Ninewa are those who mostly report pockets of instability at home. Fear of changed ethno-religious composition in areas of origin has also declined to 9 per cent, after peaking in 2018 at 27 per cent, and it is still currently reported in around 15 per cent of locations in Dahuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din. The

idea that the lack of means to return and restart seems less of a barrier, having declined from 32 per cent to 17 per cent, with a higher prevalence among IDPs in Sulaymaniyah. This change is similar to the obstacle of blocked returns (from 26% to 5% in 2019), with a higher prevalence of this barrier reported among IDPs settled in Salah al-Din (26%). The housing damage indicator displays a slight improvement compared to last year (from 71% to 62%), although it is still the main obstacle to return for households settled in Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Qadissiya, Salah al-Din and Wassit.

Figure 9: Obstacles to return, trend 2016–2019, selected indicators only

Stable relocation appears to be the prevalent intention of IDPs settled in Babylon (97%), Kerbala (64%), Kirkuk (63%), and southern governorates like Basrah (70%), Muthanna (93%) and Thi-Qar (59%). Pull factors – first, security and then the presence of extended family and friends – seem to be at the root of the decision to stay in southern governorates, whereas push factors – that is, blocked

returns, house destruction and lack of means – are primarily keeping IDPs in Babylon, Kerbala and Kirkuk. Services and job opportunities are the most prevalent reasons to stay in the KRI, while the presence of militias and/or a change in the ethno-religious composition at the location of origin is among the top three reasons to stay for over half of IDPs willing to resettle in Diyala, Salah al-Din and Sulaymaniyah.

Figure 10: Reasons to remain

2016 2017 2018 2019

55+52+11+6855%52%

11%

68% 54+51+71+6254%51%

71%

62% 81+67+40+3681%

67%

40%36% 32+30+19+1732%

30%

19%17% 9+11+27+99% 11%

27%

9% 0+26+16+526%

16%

5%

LACK OF BASIC SERVICES AT ORIGIN

HOUSE DAMAGED/DESTROYED

THE AREA OF ORIGIN IS INSECURE/UNSAFE

NO FINANCIAL MEANS TO RETURN AND

RESTART

FEAR AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGED ER COMPO-

SITION AT ORIGIN

BLOCKED RETURNS

51+46+38+35+35+21+17+14+10+8+4+6+0The location is safe

Lack of services at origin

Lack of security at origin

No means to return and restart

House damaged/destroyed

No job opportunities at origin

Availability of services

Presence of extended family/friends

Blocked returns

Availability of housing

Same religious, linguistic or ethnic composition

Other

51%

46%

38%

35%

35%

21%

17%

14%

10%

8%

4%

6%

IOM IRAQ23


INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES AND LAND

This section analyses the access to and conditions of infrastructure and services, as well as agricultural land, in assessed locations across Iraq.19

19 Agricultural damage was assessed in rural locations only (1,723 locations).

To assess the state of infrastructure and services, a composite index was created taking into account access to 11 basic services: electricity, water, schools, health clinics and hospital, waste collection and latrines, market, office for the replacement of civil documentation and legal services for HLP issues. All indicators were weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living at the location where the issue was reported. The assessed services/facilities, to be qualified as adequate, had to fulfil the following minimum standards:

• Electricity/water: at least 75 per cent of residents at the location were connected to the public electricity network/had tap water running.

• Primary and secondary school, health clinic, hospital, markets: functional and present within 5 km – hospital within 10 km.

• Legal services for HLP issues and offices for the replacement of civil documentation: functional and present within the district.

As shown in Figure 11, 87 per cent of IDPs and 79 per cent of returnees live in locations where the presence of most of the selected services or facilities is guaranteed, and around half have adequate access to all or nearly all (10–11 services or facilities). Inadequate access was assessed for around 15 per cent of returnees and 8 per cent of IDPs (only 6–7 services or facilities are guaranteed) and critical access for around five per cent of both IDPs and returnees (5 or fewer of the selected services or facilities). Critical districts include Karkh, Erbil, Al-Hindiya, Najaf, Tikrit and Tooz (for IDPs); Makmur, Al-Hawiga, Samarra, Al Shirqat, Telafar, Tilkaif and Mosul (for returnees); and Falluja, Abu Ghraib, Mahmoudiya and Sinjar for both populations.

Figure 11. Number of selected services or facilities per location ( 0 - none of the services or facilities are present to 11 - all services or facilities are present in location)

Legal assistance for the solution of HLP issues is the least accessible service in all assessed locations, and only 49 per cent of IDPs and 32 per cent of returnees live in locations where it is present within the district. Around 95 per cent of returnees and/or IDPs living in Babylon, Basrah, Diyala, Erbil, Kerbala, Missan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadissiya and south Salah al-Din cannot access them within the district. Health is the second critical service – in particular access to hospital – with as much as 18 per cent of IDPs and 36 per cent of returnees living in locations where there is no functional hospital within 10 km. Access to hospital is particularly low in Ninewa (29%)

and Kirkuk (39%). However, the presence of at least one health clinic within 5 km is more common – 93 per cent and 89 per cent for IDPs and returnees respectively and around 65 per cent in both Ninewa and Kirkuk.

Access to waste management is around 70 per cent overall; however, this figure is lower in Kirkuk (38%). Access to offices for the replacement of civil documentation currently stands at 81 per cent, Najaf being the only location with virtually no access (5%). Access to a functional market stands at 87 per cent (with lowest figures in Kirkuk at 60%).

SERVICES OR FACILITIES SERVICES OR FACILITIES

LOCATIONS IDPS RETURNEES

14+5+614% 19+8+1519% 33+34+3633% 36+53+4334%

0-5 6-7 8-9 10-11

5% 6% 8%15%

34% 36%

53%

43%

IOM IRAQ24


Access to latrines is virtually universal (99%), as is access to primary school – functional schools are available within 5 km for both IDPs and returnees (97% and 99% respectively). Access to secondary school is slightly more challenging (93% both) – especially in Najaf (55%), Ninewa (66%) and Kirkuk (79%).

Around 70 per cent of households live in locations where most of the population (75% or more) have electricity (79% of IDPs and 70% of returnees); however, access drops significantly in the governorates of Qadissiya (31%), Kirkuk (23%) and Wassit (6%). In Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala,

Muthanna, Najaf and Salah al-Din, around 50–60 per cent of IDPs and returnees live in locations where 75 per cent of the population have access to electricity.

Overall, tap water is available to over three fourths of residents in locations where respectively 76 per cent of IDPs and 55 per cent of returnees live, ranging from of 11 per cent in Wassit to 100 per cent in Missan. Again, the provision of tap water is quite variable and nearly universal only in Babylon, Basrah, Dahuk, Missan, Sulaymaniyah and Thi-Qar.

Figure 12: Accessible and usable land (% of IDPs living at the location)

Figure 13: Accessible and usable land (% of returnee locations only)

As for agriculture, arable and grazing lands are safely accessible and usable in nearly all locations (91%). Only in Basrah, arable and grazing land in around 70 per cent of locations is currently not used, possibly due to lack of water – irrigation water supply is lacking in 77 per cent of locations. Lack of usage was also reported in between 10 and 15 per cent of locations in Anbar, Babylon, Erbil and Najaf, though in this case contamination and/or damage may be the reason for poor usage rather than lack of water. Land

is accessible but not usable due to lack of money and/or people in around six per cent of locations overall and was reported more often than average in returnee locations of the three governorates of Anbar (21%), Baghdad (15%) and Erbil (15%). Around ten per cent of returnee locations in Salah al-Din Governorate reported issue with accessibility due to either lack of irrigation/damage (4%) and/or lack of money/people (5%).

37 08 85 00

C M Y K

90 00 36 00

44 04 00 00

18 04 00 00

71 55 45 61

100 82 10 02

172 196 84

R G B

00 176 179

132 204 241

204 226 245

44 54 63

20 73 145

Primary Colors

IOM COLORING PROFILE

Secondery Colors

Shades

Shades

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

00 35 89 00 251 175 5590

%

10

%

83 86 03 00 80 70 15290

%

10

%

32 89 47 13 159 59 9190

%

10

%

00 75 70 00 241 103 8190

%

10

%

31 48 30 00 179 139 15190

%

10

%

12 94 59 01 210 53 86

33 22 47 00 178 180 145

52 00 36 00 120 201 1809

0%

10

%

90

%

10

%

90

%

10

%

C M Y K R G B

Present but not usable due to damage, landmines, lack of irrigation, etc. Present but not used (lack of money, people in displacement, etc.) Safely accessible and usable

15%

71%

13%2%

14%4%

Anbar Babylon Baghdad Basrah Dahuk Diyala Erbil Kerbala Kirkuk Missan Muthanna Najaf Qadissiya Salahal-Din

Sulaymaniyah Thi-Qar Wassit

11%

65%

83% 86%

6%

90%98%

71%85%

100% 100%

29%

57%

98% 100%92%

99% 100%

67%

20%

6%12%

23%

10%

16%

12%

71%29%

4%

33%

Ninewa

1%1%

1%1%2%

1%

Present but not usabledue to damage, landmines, lack of irrigation, etc.

Present but not used(lack of money, people in displacement, etc.)

Safely accessible and usable

18%1%

31%

4%

Anbar Baghdad Dahuk Diyala Erbil Kirkuk Ninewa Salah al-Din

21%

15%

15%

5%

62%

84%

100% 99%

54%

100% 98%91%

1%1%

IOM IRAQ25


LIVING CONDITIONS

This section is dedicated to the living conditions of IDPs and returnees with regards to the fulfilment of basic needs including shelter, food and non‑food items (NFIs), drinking water, education, health, livelihood/employ‑ment, replacement of civil documentation, access to solutions for displacement‑related rights violations and reunification with family members separated during displacement.

After a brief introduction, where concerns for IDPs and returnees are compared at overall level, needs are reviewed one by one and compared with other relevant indicators. Figures are weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living at the location.

Basic needs continue to be regarded as more urgent than recovery needs by both IDPs and returnees. More specifically, access to employment/livelihood opportunities continues to

be the main need in locations where around 70 per cent of both IDPs and returnees reside. In addition, nearly half of IDPs live in locations where they have difficulties accessing adequate housing/shelter (42%) and NFIs (47%), and around 60 per cent of returnees live in locations where they need health services. Among recovery needs, access to a solution for displacement-related rights violations appears to be the most urgent for both populations (around 15%).

Figure 14: Basic and recovery needs for IDPs and returnees

DRINKING WATER

26% – 8%

EDUCATION

21% – 9%

FOOD

21% – 32%

HEALTH

61% – 39%

NFI

38% – 47%

NO NEED MENTIONED

0% – 1%

SHELTER / HOUSING

15% – 42%

EMPLOYMENT/

LIVELIHOOD

71% – 70%

IMPROVED SAFETY, SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF

MOVEMENT

2% – 0%

OTHER

15% – 14%

PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH THE RESIDENT POPULATION

0% – 1%

REMOVAL OF UXO / IEDS

1% – 0%

REUNIFICATION WITH FAMILY MEMBERS SEPARATED DURING

DISPLACEMENT

0% – 3%

ACCESS TO SOLUTIONS FOR DISPLACEMENT-RELATED RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ( JUSTICE, REPARA-TIONS AND COMPENSATION)

15% – 12%

ACCESS TO AND REPLACEMENT OF PERSONAL AND OTHER

DOCUMENTATION

1% – 8%

• RETURNEES

• IDPs

IOM IRAQ26


EMPLOYMENT/LIVELIHOODS

Around 70 per cent of returnees and IDPs are currently living in locations where access to employment/livelihoods was cited among the top

three concerns – with the only exceptions of Anbar, Basrah, Diyala, Kerbala and Sulaymaniyah governorates for IDPs, and Anbar and Erbil for returnees. Over 80 per cent of both IDPs and returnees live in locations where the availability of jobs is ‘insufficient’ and around half in locations where most

individuals ‘are not economically active’. The issue of working minors often goes together with that of unemployment, especially in the case of IDPs; it was reported more often than usual in Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Wassit. It is also worth noting that around 15 per cent of returnees live in locations where the lack of training/vocational centres/programmes to support business start-up is an issue, with peaks of 27 per cent in Anbar.

A TOP NEED FOR

70% 71%ReturneesIDPs

Figure 15: Employment issues (% of IDPs and returnees)

Insufficient jobs

Access to employment among top three needs

Children working

Most are not economically active

Unequal access to fair employment (having a job and being paid equally)

Low paid/occasional/underqualified/unequal jobs/unequal access

Lack of training/vocational centers/programmes to support small businesses star t-up

83%

43%

2%

71%

14%

57%

13%

RETURNEES

82%

49%

10%

70%

25%

43%

6%

IDPs

IOM IRAQ27


Although returnees’ ‘inactivity’ rates – that is, the percentage of population living in locations where most individuals are not economically active – seem higher than those of IDPs (57% versus 43%), and despite the fact that both populations need to rely on multiple income sources to guarantee their subsistence, when employed, returnees tend to be engaged in more stable and remunerating activities than IDPs. The returnees’ most important income source is the public sector (91% versus 41% for IDPs), whereas IDPs tend to rely on the informal sector (78% versus 55% for returnees), which

only guarantees unstable and low-income jobs. In Babylon, Basrah, Diyala, Kerbala, Kirkuk and Missan, 90 per cent of households live in locations where inconsistent labour is one of the main income sources. Barriers to employment were more frequently reported in IDPs’ locations (25% versus 14% for returnees), especially in Babylon, Dahuk, Thi-Qar and Salah-al-Din. IDPs are also more dependent on savings (12% versus 2%) and/or remittances from family/friends (17% versus 2%) than returnees.

Paid job (public)

Informal commerce or inconsistent daily labour

Pension

Paid job (private)

Agriculture / farming / herd animal raising

Business

Money from family and/or friends

Savings

Cash grants or other forms of aid from organizations/government

Rent received from house or land

Figure 16: Main sources of income (% of IDPs and returnees)

91% 41%

RETURNEES

35% 21%

2% 2%

31% 40%

21% 10%

2% 17%

55% 78%

49% 36%

IDPs

2% 1%

2% 12%

IOM IRAQ28


HEALTH

Health is the second most reported need of returnees, mentioned in locations where around 60 per cent of returnees live (versus around

40% of IDPs). Indeed, returnees seem to experience more challenges in accessing facilities, especially hospitals (36% versus 18% for IDPs). However, if indicators on quality are compared, IDPs experience poorer services. Overall, high costs (60%) and poor quality (22%) were reported more

often for IDPs than returnees (12% and 13% respectively). In Qadissiya, Missan, Basrah, Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah, nearly all IDPs live in locations where the price of visits/medicines/treatment is “too expensive”; in Kerbala 21 per cent of IDPs live in locations that lack rehabilitation services (including psychosocial support). As for returnees, health was deemed “too expensive” in Kirkuk and Salah al-Din (around 30%), and of “poor quality” in Ninewa (25%).

A TOP NEED FOR


0% 1%

Access to health among top three needs

Price of health-care visit/treatment/medicines is too expensive

No hospital within 10 km

Quality (poor service, underqualified/unfriendly staff )

No health facil ity within 5 km

Quantity (facil ities are too few or small or overcrowded)

Lack of rehabilitation services (including psychosocial support)

Difficult access (too far, unfriendly opening hours)

Figure 17: Health issues (% of IDPs and returnees)

61%

36%

7%

12%

11%

13%

1%

RETURNEES

39%

18%

9%

60%

7%

22%

1%

IDPs

IOM IRAQ29


EDUCATION

Access to education also appears to be more of an issue for returnees: 21 per cent of returnees live in locations where it was mentioned among top three needs (versus 9% of IDPs), with a peak of 37 per cent among households who regained their location of origin in Kirkuk.

Map 8: Districts where IDPs and/or returnees report education access issues

The most reported issue appears to be the lack of schools (45%) and/or certified teachers (32%) – with peaks in Baghdad (65% and 72% respectively). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that attendance rates are higher for returnees, suggesting that IDPs may not be choosing education simply because employment, food and shelter were still unsatisfied and more pressing issues than education (response options could only include three). Nearly one third of IDPs live in locations where less than 75 per cent of children are

attending primary school (versus 11% of returnees) and nearly half in locations where less than 75 per cent of children are attending secondary school (versus 34%). Access in Najaf is particularly challenging: 52 per cent of IDPs live in locations where education was mentioned among top three needs, 73 per cent in locations lacking certified teachers and 3 per cent in locations where there are still language barriers (for example as is sometimes the case with Turkmen Shia populations).

A TOP NEED FOR

9% 21%ReturneesIDPs

Al-Rutba

Baiji

Hatra

Kut

Heet

Ana

Al-Ka'im

Najaf

Al-Ba'aj

Ra'ua

Amara

Ramadi

Sinjar

Baladrooz

Badra

Kifri

Mosul

Falluja

Afaq

Tikrit

Erbil

Telafar

Haditha

Akre

Tooz

KhanaqinAl-Daur

Soran

Daquq

Kalar

Kirkuk

Amedi

Al-Hai

Makhmur

Al-Rifa'i

KerbalaAli Al-Gharbi

Balad

Chamchamal

Dokan

Al-Azezia

Al-Hawiga

Diwaniya

Zakho

Samarra

Koisnjaq

Sumel

Al-Mahawil

Tilkaif

Al-Thethar

Mada'in

Hashimiya

Hamza

Halabja

Pshdar

Sharbazher

Al-Suwaira

Shaqlawa

Dabes

Sulaymaniya

Mergasur

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Dahuk

Al-Shirqat

Rania

Penjwin

Al-Hamdaniya

Ain Al-Tamur

Al-Shikhan

Kufa

Mahmoudiya

Al-Na'maniyaHilla

Al-Muqdadiya

Choman

Al-Maimouna

Al-Hindiya

Al-Musayab

Ba'quba

Karkh

Tarmia

Al-Shamiya

Al-Rumaitha

Al-Manathera

Kadhimia

Abu Ghraib

Darbandikhan

Adhamia

Al Resafa

District boundaries


Sharbazher

Sulaymaniya

Darbandikhan

Number of returnee families in locations per district where education is the primary unmet need

16 – 63

64 – 135

136 – 368

369 – 1,619

1,620 – 5,474

8 – 15

16 – 30

31 – 60

61 – 141

142 – 1,418

Anbar

Najaf

Ninewa

Erbil

Diyala

Wassit

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

Babylon

Kerbala

Baghdad

IDP – Returnee overlap

Number of IDP families in locations per district where education is the primary unmet need

Al-Rutba

Hatra

Kut

Heet

Ana

Al-Ka'im

Najaf

Al-Ba'aj

Ra'ua

Amara

Ramadi

Sinjar

Baladrooz

Badra

Kifri

Falluja

Afaq

Erbil

Akre

Tooz

KhanaqinAl-Daur

Soran

Daquq

Kirkuk

Amedi

Al-Hai

Makhmur

Al-Rifa'i

KerbalaAli Al-Gharbi

Balad

Chamchamal

Dokan

Al-Azezia

Diwaniya

Zakho

Samarra

Koisnjaq

Sumel

Al-Mahawil

Tilkaif

Al-Thethar

Mada'in

Hashimiya

Hamza

Halabja

Pshdar

Sharbazher

Al-Suwaira

Shaqlawa

Dabes

Sulaymaniya

Mergasur

Al-Fares

Dahuk

Al-Shirqat

Rania

Penjwin

Ain Al-Tamur

Al-Shikhan

Kufa

Mahmoudiya

Al-Na'maniyaHilla

Al-Muqdadiya

Choman

Al-Maimouna

Al-Hindiya

Al-Musayab

Ba'quba

Karkh

Tarmia

Al-Shamiya

Al-Rumaitha

Al-Manathera

Abu Ghraib

Darbandikhan

Adhamia

Al Resafa

Sulaymaniya

Darbandikhan


IOM IRAQ30


Quantity (there are insufficient classes or schools so they are overcrowded)

Less than 75% are attending secondary school

No certified teachers

Quality of environment/service (infrastructure is poor or not adequate, staff skil ls , female/male classes)

Less than 75% are attending primary school

Access to education among top three needs

Price (too expensive; in terms of fees, Books and materials , Uniforms)

No secondary school within 10 km

Distance (too far, difficult to access by road)

No primary school within 5 km

Figure 18: Education issues (% of IDPs and returnees)

45%

32%

21%

34%

11%

20%

17%

7%

RETURNEES

42%

18%

9%

45%

28%

18%

13%

7%

IDPs

2%

1%

5%

3%

IOM IRAQ31


FOOD

Although the crisis officially ended in December 2017, around 30 per cent of IDPs and around 20 per cent of returnees still live in locations where

access to food was mentioned among top three needs – with peaks of 99 per cent in Sulaymaniyah and 53 per cent in Baghdad (for IDPs) and 33 per cent in Anbar (for returnees). High prices are the main issue for both populations (66%

and 46% respectively), which in turn impact on their ability to access food. Around half of returnees live in locations where ‘some individuals are in need of food’ – with peaks in Salah al-Din (50%), Diyala (64%) and Anbar (77%) – and two per cent in locations where ‘a lot of individuals are in need of food’. The respective figures for IDPs are 30 per cent and 1 per cent.

A TOP NEED FOR


Price (too expensive)

Some individuals are in need of food

Access to food among top three needs

Quantity (not enough, inconsistent or sporadic supply)

Quality (poor quality, not fresh or bad taste)

No market within 5 km

A lot of individuals are in need of food

Difficult access (market too far, unfriendly opening hours)

Figure 19: Food issues (% of IDPs and returnees)

46%

21%

7%

48%

11%

16%

2%

RETURNEES

66%

32%

4%

30%

1%

8%

1%

1%1%

IDPs

IOM IRAQ32


DRINKING WATER

Around 25 per cent of returnees versus around 10 per cent of IDPs live in locations where access to water was mentioned among top three needs.

Map 9: Districts with percentages of locations without adequate water supply

Over one third of returnees (35%) live in locations where less than 75 per cent of households have water (versus 24% of IDPs) and nearly half live in locations where there are water-source issues related to taste, colour and smell (versus 26% of IDPs). In Diyala, around 70 per cent of returnees live in locations where they have to occasionally rely on water trucking, and nearly all of returnees live in locations reporting

water-source issues. Around 40 per cent of returnees in Salah al-Din live in locations affected by inconsistent/sporadic supply. As for IDPs, water source-related issues were reported more often in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Muthanna and Ninewa (figures between 51% and 72%), while low access was reported in Anbar, Kirkuk, Muthanna, Qadissiya, Salah al-Din and Wassit (figures between 50% and 88%).

A TOP NEED FOR

8% 28%ReturneesIDPs



IOM OIM•

DISTRICTS WITH PERCENTAGES OF WATER SCARCITY LOCATIONS



.

Administrative Boundaries : OCHA (Modified)Data Source : Integrated Location Assessment IV


District boundaries


1 – 4%

5 – 9%

10 – 17%

18 – 33%

34 – 43%

Districts with percentages of locations without

adequate water supply

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'qubaAl-M

uqdadya

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

BabylonKerbala

Baghdad


IOM OIM•

DISTRICTS WITH PERCENTAGES OF WATER SCARCITY LOCATIONS



.



District boundaries


1 – 4%

5 – 9%

10 – 17%

18 – 33%

34 – 43%

Districts with percentages of locations without

adequate water supply

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'qubaAl-M

uqdadya

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

NinewaErbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah Al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Sulaymaniyah

BabylonKerbala

Baghdad

IOM IRAQ33


SHELTER, RESIDENTIAL DAMAGE AND HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY ISSUES20

20 The section on shelter includes camp population and is based on information gathered from the IDPs and Returnee Master List 110. For trend, see ML May 2018, May 2017 and May 2016.

Housing remains a pressing issue for IDPs – 42 per cent live in locations where it was mentioned among the top three needs, with no change compared to May 2018. Eight per cent of displaced households remain settled in critical shelter arrangements (16% in 2016) while the share of households living in camps is comparatively increasing each year (from 17% in 2016 to 32% in 2019). In Anbar, Ninewa and Dahuk, around one in two households is settled in camps. In Anbar, Kerbala, Qadissiya and Salah al-Din, around one in five households is living in critical shelters – in Anbar mostly in informal settlements, in Salah al-Din abandoned/unfinished buildings and in Kerbala and Qadissiya religious

buildings. Country-wide, one in ten households is hosted by other households, with higher prevalence in Anbar, Baghdad, Basrah, Diyala, Missan, Muthanna, Qadissiya and Thi-Qar (figures between 17% and 39%). In fact, this may be a solution to deal with the most pressing shelter issue of IDPs: the high cost of housing (65% of IDPs live in locations where this is an issue). Rent assistance was deemed quite urgent in Anbar, Najaf, Salah al-Din and, particularly, Erbil (28%), while apparently both evictions and unequal access to shelter are no longer an issue in these locations.

Have issues with water source (related to taste/appearance/smell)

Less than 75% of HHs have water

Quality (poor quality, not safe/contaminated)

Quantity (not enough, inconsistent or sporadic supply)

Sometimes rely on water trucking

Access to water among top three needs

Price (too expensive)

Difficult access (too far, too hard to access)

Figure 20: Drinking water issues (% of IDPs and returnees)

47%

31%

26%

35%

22%

28%

8%

RETURNEES

26%

20%

8%

24%

16%

16%

5%

0%1%

IDPs

IOM IRAQ34


Figure 21: Shelter type, % of IDPs (2019 and trend)

Map 10: Proportion of IDP families living in critical shelters per district

The share of households able to return to their habitual residence also shows an upward trend since May 2017 (from 89% to 98% in 2019). Only in Anbar and Salah-al-Din around five per cent of households were not able to regain their residence and are mostly living in rented housing. It should also be noted that around three per cent

of households are back in their original residence, however these residences may be in poor condition or damaged.

2016 2017 2018 2019

UNKNOWNPRIVATE SETTINGSCRITICAL SHELTERSCAMPS

2+13+0+070+51+61+6016+13+10+812+23+29+32 PRIVATE SETTINGS

CAMPS

CRITICAL SETTINGS

8+32+60+D2019 32%

8%

60%

12%

23%29%

32%

16%13%

10% 8%

70%

51%

61% 60%

2%

13%



IOM OIM•

IDP FAMILIES IN CRITICAL SHELTERS



.



Percent of IDP families living in critical shelters per district

0.0 – 2.7%

2.8 – 8.9%

9.0 – 23.1%

23.2 – 46.1%

46.2 – 80.3%

No data

Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

Ninewa

Erbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Kerbala

Baghdad

Babylon

Al-Muqdadiya

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

SulaymaniyaSh

att A

l-Ara

b

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


District boundaries



IOM OIM•

IDP FAMILIES IN CRITICAL SHELTERS



.



Percent of IDP families living in critical shelters per district

0.0 – 2.7%

2.8 – 8.9%

9.0 – 23.1%

23.2 – 46.1%

46.2 – 80.3%

No data

Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

Ninewa

Erbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Kerbala

Baghdad

Babylon

Al-Muqdadiya

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

Shat

t Al-A

rab

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


District boundaries


IOM IRAQ35


Figure 22: Shelter type, % of returnees (2019 and trend)

Map 11: Proportion of returnees in habitual residences in good conditions per district

The increase in the share of households able to regain their habitual residence is linked to reconstruction efforts. Currently, extensive damage and destruction (over three fourths of houses are heavily damaged or destroyed) was assessed in only around three per cent of locations countrywide – with peaks in Khanaqin (20%), Daquq (14%), Sinjar (13%), Tilkaif (16%) and Balad (27%). Nevertheless,

reconstruction efforts are ongoing – only in 30 per cent of locations countrywide none or very few of the houses are being reconstructed/rehabilitated. Critical districts, where rehabilitation is only very slowly taking place, include Al-Rutba, Heet, Ra’ua and Dabes, Ana, Khanaqin, Al-Hawiga, Al-Hamdaniya, Hatra and Sinjar.

2016 2017 2018 2019

OTHER/UNKNOWN SETTLEMENT

HOST COMMUNITY

OCCUPIED PRIVATE RESIDENCE

HABITUAL RESIDENCE

93+89+95+98 HABITUAL RESIDENCE

RENTED HOUSING

HOST COMMUNITY

UNFINISHED/ABANDONED BUILDING

1+1+2+96+D2019

1.4%

98%

93%0.2%

0.2%

4+0+0+00+6+2+02+3+2+10+2+0+11+1+1+188.7%

95%98%

6%2% 2% 3% 2% 1.4% 1.8% 0.2% 1% 0.5% 1% 0.2%

4%

RENTED HOUSING

UNFINISHED/ABANDONED

BUILDING



IOM OIM• MAP 11

map do not imply o�cial endoresement or acceptance by


.


District boundaries


No returnees

Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

Ninewa

Erbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Kerbala

Baghdad

Babylon

Percentage of returnees in good habitual residences

(District-wise)

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

SulaymaniyabarA-lA ttahS

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


80 – 84%

85 – 90%

91 – 94%

95 – 100%


IOM OIM• MAP 11

map do not imply o�cial endoresement or acceptance by


.


District boundaries


No returnees

Anbar

Najaf

Muthanna

Ninewa

Erbil

Diyala

Wassit

Basrah

Missan

Salah al-Din

Thi-Qar

Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah

Dahuk

Qadissiya

Kerbala

Baghdad

Babylon

Percentage of returnees in good habitual residences

(District-wise)

Zakho

Tooz

Tilkaif

Tikrit

Telafar

Sinjar

Soran

Shaqlawa

Ramadi

Ra'ua

Najaf

Mosul

Makhmur

Nassriya

Kut

Kifri

Heet

Hatra

Khanaqin

Kalar

Haditha

Falluja

Erbil

Daquq

Baladrooz

Badra

Al-Salman

Al-Rutba

Al-Zubair

Al-Ba'aj

Al-Daur

Afaq

Al-Rifa'i

Amedi

Al-Hai

Akre

Amara

Fao

Hamza

Samarra

Sumel

Sulaymaniya

barA-lA ttahS

Sharbazher

Suq Al-Shoyokh

Rania

Qal'at Saleh

Penjwin

Pshdar

Halabja

Hashimiya

Mergasur

Kerbala

Koisnjaq

Kirkuk

Kufa

Hilla

Dokan

Diwaniya

Darbandikhan

Dahuk

Dabes

Choman

Chamchamal

Basrah

Baiji

Balad

Ba'quba

Al-Qurna

Al-Thethar

Al-Hawiga

Al-Khidhir

Ali Al-Gharbi

Al-Maimouna

Al-Shirqat

Al-Shatra

Tarmia

Al-Shikhan

Al-Mahawil

Ain Al-Tamur


Al-Ka'im

Al-Azezia

Abu Al-Khaseeb

Mahmoudiya

Al-KahlaAl-Rumaitha

Al-C

hiba

yish

Kadhimia

Al-Samawa

Mada’in

Ana

Al-Midaina

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Al-Fares

Al-Khalis

Al-Mejar Al-Kabir


80 – 84%

85 – 90%

91 – 94%

95 – 100%

IOM IRAQ36


Map 12: Destroyed houses and the status of reconstruction per districtof return

SECURITY, SAFETY AND SOCIAL COHESION

This section assesses the level of security, safety and social cohesion in IDP and returnee locations across Iraq. Particular attention was given to the factors that can ensure a smooth reintegration of returnees into society, both at collective and individual level – such as access to reconciliation programmes and restoration of prop‑erty, as well as the relationship between different groups of the population, and confidence in security. All indicators are weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living where the issue was reported.

SECURITY INCIDENTS

21 Since the end of the war in December 2017, ISIL has moved back into the shadows and restarted asymetric warfare across Iraq. Areas that should be monitored for signs of ISIL’s rebirth include Anbar’s porous borders with the Syrian Arab Republic, the hilly region between the governorates of Salah al Din, Diyala, Kirkuk and Ninewa and, in general, areas with a lack of a strong nation-State governance – such as ‘disputed areas’ and/or areas with a tribal or warlord type of governance. Security incidents have been reported, as well as recruiting into armed groups and kidnappings as evidence of ‘re-supply’ activitities. See UNAMI, security briefs.

Personal safety continues to be the main concern in daily life, and the occurrence of petty crimes was assessed countrywide in around one fourth of locations (23%). In addition, in around 10 per cent of locations, mostly in the eight governorates of origin of IDPs, there was evidence of other security incidents that can be associated with the resurgence of ISIL asymmetric warfare.21 More specifically, suicide attacks were reported in a few locations: Al-Hawiga, Kirkuk, Mosul, Sinjar, Balad and Samarra; kidnappings in Falluja, Al-Musayab, Adhamia, Al-Resafa, Karkh, Mahmoudiya, Ba’quba, Kerbala, Mosul, Baiji, Balad and Samarra; fire attacks in Adhamia, Al-Resafa, Al-Khalis, Al-Muqdadiya, Ba’quba,

Al-Hawiga, Kirkuk, Sinjar, Al-Shirqat, Baiji, Balad, Samarra, Tikrit and Tooz. Evidence of recruiting by militias and/or terrorist groups was also reported in nearly all districts of Salah al-Din Governorate and in Mosul, Sinjar, Al-Muqdadiya, Ba’quba and Khanaqin. In seven per cent of locations in Salah al-Din Governorate, schools are reportedly used by armed groups.

Explosive devices and landmines are also a safety concern and incidents were reported in two per cent of locations, primarily in Falluja, Al-Muqdadiya, Ba’quba, Makhmur, Al-Hawiga, Kirkuk, Mosul, Telafar, Balad, Samarra and Tooz.

"ô

"ô

"ô"ô

"ô

"ô

"ô"ô

"ô

"ô

"ô

"ô

"ô"ô

"ô

"ô

"ô

"ò

"ò

"ò

"ò

"ò

"ò "ò

"ò

"ò"ò

"ò

"ò

"ò

"ò"ò

"ò

"ò

"ò"ò

Babylon

Dahuk

Erbil

Baghdad

Kerbala

Ninewa

Anbar

Wassit

Kirkuk

Diyala

Salah al-Din

Sulaymaniyah

"ò Less than half repaired

"ô More than half repaired

Destruction level at district level (based on the status of the majority locations in return districts)

Reconstruction status at district level (based on the status of the majority locations in return districts)

None of the houses are heavily damaged/destroyed

Less than quarter of the houses are heavily damaged/destroyed

Less than half of the houses are heavily damaged/destroyed

District boundaries

Governorate boundariesSharbazher

Kalar

ChamchamalDarbandikhan

Sulaymaniya

Al-Thethar

Al-Fares

Ain Al-Tamur

Kerbala

Al-Hindiya

Baladrooz

Badra

KutAli Al-Gharbi

Al-Mahawil

Al-Azezia

Hashimiya

Al-Suwaira

KadhimiaKadhimia

TarmiaTarmia


37


Figure 23: Security incidents (% of locations, overall and by governorate of return)

INTERGROUP FEELINGS, PERCEPTION OF SECURITY AND CIVIC LIFE SATISFACTION

22 Although this finding is consistent with previous assessment, it is worth observing that social cohesion is very hard to measure and it is highly likely to be under-reported. The reasons for these complex social cohesion-linked issues relate not only to the ISIL conflict, but deeper held grievances and root causes of conflict that have plagued Iraq prior to and after 2003. See Reasons to remain, Categorizing Protracted displacement in Iraq, IOM DTM Iraq, Returns Working Group Iraq and Social Inquiry, November 201. Available online at http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/IOM%20RWG%20SI%20Categorizing%20Protracted%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq_November%202018.pdf.

23 These include, for returnees, locations in the districts of Falluja, Mahmoudiya, Al-Muqdadiya, Sinjar, Telafar, Tikrit and Kirkuk. For IDPs, the occurrence of physical attacks was reported in locations within the districts of Falluja, Adhamia, Al Resafa, Thawra2, Ba’quba, Shaqlawa, Soran, Ain Al-Tamur, Kerbala and Kut.

In line with previous assessments, the relationship between different population groups (IDPs, returnees and stayers) appears positive and stable and, overall, the presence of physical incidents, threats and, in general, mistrust was reported only occasionally in less than five per cent of locations across Iraq.22 Both IDPs and returnees feel welcome at the location where they are currently living, with only very few locations23 reporting serious issues such as physical attacks (1% for IDPs and 2% for returnees).

Countrywide, improved safety and security was mentioned among the top three needs in only 2 per cent of returnee locations and 0.1 per cent of IDP locations – with peaks of around 10 per cent in returnee locations in the two governorates of Kirkuk and Salah al-Din. It is worth noting that, given that only three needs were selected, safety/security may have been underreported or not included simply because other basic needs were more pressing.

Figure 24: Intergroup feelings and need of improved security (% of population living at the location where the issue was reported)

23+5+4+3+3+2+1+1+1+1+1+1+0Crime

Knife attacks

Recruitment by militias

Direct fire attacks

Arbitrary arrests

Explosive devices

Kidnappings

Schools/Hospitals used by armed actors

Landmines

Indirect fire attacks

Suicide attacks

Recruitment by terrorist groups

23%

3.2%

2.6%

1.5%

1.5%

1.2%

1.1%

1%

0.7%

0.6%

0.4%

0.4%

2+4+4+31+2+7+14+40+2+0+0+0+0+1+12+8+0+0+0+2+0+9

0+0+0+0+0+1+0+20+2+3+0+1+0+0+00+0+0+0+0+0+0+3

0+0+1+0+0+0+1+30+0+3+0+0+0+1+30+8+0+2+0+0+1+4

1%

3% 1%

1%2%8%

3%

4% 3% 2%8%

2%9%

Anbar

Babylon

Diyala

Ninewa

Baghdad

Erbil

Salah al-Din

Dahuk

Kirkuk

1% 3% 1% 2% 2% 4% 4%

31%

2%7%

14%4%

2% 3% 1% 2% 1% 1%

SUICIDE ATTACKS

DIRECT+INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS

KIDNAPPINGS

RECRUITMENT BY MILITIAS

RECRUITMENT BY TERRORIST GROUPS

SCHOOLS USED BY AGs

ARBITRARY ARRESTS

EXPLOSIVE DEVICES/MINES

Improved safety/security/freedom of movement among top 3 needs

Mistrust

Threats

Incidents

Feeling unwelcome

2.1%

1.8%

2.2%

2.5%

1.8%

RETURNEES

0.1%

0.4%

0.8%

1.7%

0.6%

IDPs

http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/IOM%20RWG%20SI%20Categorizing%20Protracted%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq_November%202018.pdf

IOM IRAQ38


Despite an overall picture of smooth coexistence, households seem very concerned about the resurgence of ISIL and about 21 per cent of IDPs and 55 per cent of returnees live in locations where the issue was mentioned, with peaks in Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa and, particularly, Salah al-Din. Around one fourth of returnees in Anbar and Salah al-Din live in

locations where fear of revenge was also reported. Fear of ethno-religious tensions seems less common among both populations of IDPs and returnees (6% and 9% respectively); however, between one third and half of the displaced households settled in Salah al-Din, Thi-Qar and Wassit live in locations where the issue was mentioned.

Figure 25: Perceptions of security (% of returnees living in the location where the issue was reported)

CONCERNED ABOUT ETHNO-RELIGIOUS TENSION CONCERNED ABOUT REVENGE

CONCERNED ABOUT VIOLENCE CONCERNED ABOUT RESURGENCE OF ISIL

9+27+28+459%

27% 28%

45%

1+7+1+130%7%

0%

13%

3+5+1+63% 5%0%

6%

1+1+1+210% 1% 0%

21%

1+1+1+10% 0% 0% 0%

10+2+2+6110%

4% 4%

61%

3+5+37+643% 5%

37%

64%

12+25+24+8612%

25% 24%

86%

ANBAR

ERBIL

BAGHDAD

KIRKUK

DAHUK

NINEWA

DIYALA

SALAH AL-DIN

IOM IRAQ39


Biased access to resources appears to be another issue that impacts the living conditions of those who are still displaced and may affect the quality of the reintegration process too. Overall, 14 per cent of returnees and 25 per cent of IDPs live in locations where favouritism regarding employment was reported; 8 per cent of returnees and 34 per cent of IDPs live in locations where favourtism regarding political representation was reported. Slightly higher percentages of IDPs also live in locations reporting favouritism in accessing

aid (9% versus 7% of returnees) and services (5% versus 2%), as well as equal participation in public affairs among the top three needs (1.0% versus 0.3%). Favouritism in political representation appears to be the most important issue among IDPs living in Anbar, Babylon, Dahuk, Najaf and Qadissiya (figures range between 58% in Najaf and 100% in Dahuk) and households returned to Anbar and Salah-al Din (around 15% in both governorates).

Figure 26: Discrimination issues (% of IDPs and returnees living in locations where the issue was reported)

Participation in public affairs on an equal basis with the resident population among top three needs

Unequal access to basic services such as health or education

Unequal access to fair employment (having a job and being paid equally)

Unequal access to political representation of any kind (local council , etc.)

Unequal access to aid (including the one provided by the Government)

0%

14%

2%

7%

8%

RETURNEES

1%

25%

5%

9%

34%

IDPs

IOM IRAQ40


DOCUMENTATION AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

Practices to facilitate the reconciliation process such as programmes for the restoration of housing, land and property, offices for the replacement of civil documentation and reporting displacement-related violations are additional important factors that can influence the willingness of IDPs to return as well as the success of their reintegration process. Countrywide, around 15 per cent of both IDPs and returnees live in locations where access to solutions for displacement-related violations was mentioned among top three needs – with peaks of 38 per cent in Diyala (for returnees) and 30 per cent in Babylon (for IDPs). The need

for the replacement of personal documentation was also reported in around 10 per cent of IDP locations, primarily in Erbil and Kerbala (1% of returnee locations).

Overall, nearly 70 per cent of returnees and also 51 per cent of IDPs live in districts where legal services are not available; over one third cannot live in districts where courts are not present, and 27 per cent of IDPs and 6 per cent of returnees live in districts where offices for the replacement of civil documentation are not present.

Figure 27: Legal issues (% of IDPs and returnees living in the location where the issue was reported)

Access to and replacement of personal and other documentation among top three needs

Access to solutions for displacement-related rights violations( justice, reparations and compensation) among top three needs

No legal services office within the subdistrict

No office for replacement of civil documentation within the district

Few individuals are in lack of civil documentation

Children are in lack of bir th certificates

1%

68%

15%

9%

6%

15%

RETURNEES

8%

51%

12%

8%

27%

15%

IDPs

IOM IRAQ41


Compared to May 2018, the situation regarding HLP issues appears to have improved: ownership issues were mentioned in only about one per cent of locations, the majority of which are in Ninewa and Salah al-Din24 (it was around 10% in 2018), with only a few additional locations in Diyala and Anbar. In most cases, returnees either never had the documents to prove ownership (68%) or their documents are not recognized by current authorities (6%). This is the case in Sinjar, Telafar, Tikrit and Tooz. In one location of Balad (Salah al-Din), the Government is restricting households from acquiring and renewing legal ownership.

Another reported vulnerability that might affect the possibility of smooth reintegration into society is the lack of civil documentation. This issue was not reported as

24 There is still evidence of occupied residences in a few locations of Ninewa (in the districts of Mosul, Sinjar and Telafar) and Salah al-Din (in the districts of Al-Shirqat, Balad, Samarra, Tikrit and Tooz).

25 According to the report, ‘Barriers from Birth’ by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) an estimated 45,000 children, most of whom were born in areas controlled by the Islamic State (IS) group, lack valid civil documentation since it is either lost/never obtained or their birth certified were issued by IS and are not recognized by the government. Without valid documents, children are barred from attending school and denied access to health care. According to NRC, obtaining documentation for children from households accused of IS affiliation is “nearly impossible”. NRC receives an average of 170 requests for help each month involving cases of unregistered/undocumented children and their number is likely to increase with the expected return of more than 30,000 Iraqis from the Syrian Arab Republic. Available online at www.unhcr.org/refugeebrief/the-refugee-brief-1-may-2019/

affecting “most individuals” in any location. However, in around 15 per cent of locations (588 locations for IDPs and 197 for returnees) there was evidence that a “few individuals lack civil documentation” and in around 10 per cent of locations, children born during displacement are missing birth certificates.25

Higher figures were found in Kerbala and Kirkuk (among IDPs) and Anbar and Salah al-Din (among both IDPs and returnees). The lack of civil documentation primarily affects freedom of movement (reported at around 30%). Access to basic services appears to be more challenging for IDPs (24% versus 17% of returnees), whereas returnees missing documents are at a higher risk of arrest (17% versus 12% of IDPs).

Figure 28: Consequences of not having documents (% of locations where the issue was reported)

At risk of arrest

Cannot access basic services (health, education)

Cannot access humanitarian assistance

Cannot claim property

Cannot register bir th/marriages

Restricted freedom of movement

17%

12%

27%

17%

21%

6%

RETURNEES

12%

10%

22%

24%

27%

5%

IDPs

https://www.unhcr.org/refugeebrief/the-refugee-brief-1-may-2019/

IOM IRAQ42


ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CHANGE AND COMPOSITION

This section covers issues related to the ethno‑religious composition of returnees and IDPs and the change in the majoritarian ethno‑religious groups.

26 It is not an easy task to find reliable data on the ethnic composition of Iraq since religion and ethnicity often coincide and religious rivalries have often taken a violent form, hence keeping information secret was necessary for security and survival. Information on prior and current ethno-religious composition obtained from ILA dataset has been complemented with information based on the shape file of Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) and ethno-religious maps by Michael Izady based on the adjusted population estimates at district level provided in 2014 by the Iraqi Government. See Ethno-Religious groups and displacement in Iraq, 2nd Report, DTM IOM 2016; Integrated Location Assessment II and III, IOM DTM 2017 and 2018; and http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Iraq_Ethnic_Shift_1947-2017_lg.png.

27 For further details, refer to RWG’s “Areas of no Return Insight Report #1: Babylon Focus on Jurf Al Sakhar”.

28 Arab Sunnis, Turkmens, Yazidis, Kurdish, Arab Shias and other minorities (including Christians, Shabaks and Kakais).

A sub-analysis on main groups is presented – Arab Sunnis, Turkmens Shias, Turkmen Sunnis, Yazidis, Kurds (Shias and Sunnis), Arab Shias and other minorities (including Christians, Shabaks and Kakais) – to outline common characteristics

with regard to shelter, intentions, obstacles and reasons to return. Indicators are presented as percentage of locations where the issue was reported or are weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living at the location.

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CHANGE AND COMPOSITION

One of the most visible change since 201426 has been the loss of many Sunni majority areas in the three governorates of Baghdad, Basrah and Diyala, that have become either Shia majority or mixed Shia-Sunni areas, mainly Arab in Baghdad and Basrah, and Kurds in Diyala. For instance, in the single district of Khanaqin, Arab Sunni majority locations decreased from 81 to 73 (and Kurd Sunnis from 20 to 17) since the start of the crisis. In Babylon Governorate too, Arab Sunni-Shia mixed towns like Jurf al-Sakhr and Musayab have become totally Shia by the end of 2014 and no returns have been recorded until June 2019.27 Conversely, the presence of Arab Sunnis in the KRI has increased: in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, Arab Sunni majority locations went from 2 to 25 since 2014.

The extent of the ethno-religious change in mixed population areas, where diverse population groups were living before the 2014 crisis, is more difficult to assess due to the fact that the ILA collects information only on the two prevalent ethno-religious groups. Still, a decrease in the presence of Assyrian Christians in previously mixed areas of Ninewa Governorate was recorded, together with a decrease in the number of mixed Kurdish Sunni, Yazidi and Shabak Sunni and Shia locations in the districts of Mosul, Sinjar and Telafar. Few mixed Turkmen Sunni areas in Diyala no longer exist, while Turkmens (both Sunnis and Shias) seem to have reinforced their presence in the Kirkuk region.

The change in the ethno-religious composition can be linked with both the tendency of IDPs to ‘cluster’ in displacement

and their fear to return to places where their ethno-religious group is in the minority, particularly if a change in the population composition occurred as a result of conflict in their places of origin. These behaviours are clearly detectable if locations are analysed for ethno-religious homogeneity. At least three fourths of returnee locations fall in the category of ‘homogeneous’ locations, i.e. at least 60 per cent of the population belongs to one of the six main ethno-religious groups.28 As for IDPs, the same figure was found with regard to Arab Sunnis, Kurds(Shias and Sunnis), Yazidis, Arab Shias, and Turkmen Shias. As for Turkmen Sunnis and ‘other minorities’ homogeneous locations stand respectively at 21 per cent and 36 per cent.

Geographical patterns emerge when observing the ethno-religious affiliation of current IDPs. Arab Sunnis can be found in north-central areas (64%) and KRI (36%); Arab Shias are in Kerbala (30%), Najaf (17%) and other mixed Shia-Sunni governorates (such as Baghdad and Salah al-Din) – just like Turkmens Shias (38% in Kerbala and 30% in Najaf ). Nearly all Kurdish Sunnis are in the KRI (76%) or in Ninewa (21%), and nearly all Turkmen Sunnis are in Ninewa (63%) or Salah al-Din (20%). Most Yazidis are in Dahuk (59%) and the remaining share in Ninewa (36%) or other KRI governorates (5%); and the same goes for other minorities, such as Christians and Shabak Shias, with some also resettling in Wassit (23%) and Kerbala (9%). Nearly 90 per cent of Shabak Sunnis are currently living in Ninewa, together with 65 per cent of Kakais.

http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Iraq_Ethnic_Shift_1947-2017_lg.png

IOM IRAQ43


ETHNO-RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND MAIN ISSUES29

29 The analysis was conducted on the displaced and returnee population for the following ethno-religious groups: Arab Sunnis, Turkmens Shias, Turkmen Sunnis, Yazidis, Arab Shias, Kurdish (Sunnis and Shia) and other minorities (including Christians, Kakais and Shabaks). Only prevalent locations, i.e. locations where at least 60% of the population belongs to a specific ethno-religious group were selected for the analysis. A strong homogeinity was detected for returnees, since between three fourths and nearly all locations host a prevalent ethno-religious group. As for IDPs, the same threshold applies to Arab Sunnis, Turkmen Shias, Kurdish, Yazidis and Arab Shias. Prevalent locations for ‘other minorities’ are around one third, thus findings should be handled with greater care, while Turkmen Sunnis were excluded from the analysis since only four prevalent locations host were found.

The sub-analysis conducted on main ethno-religious group of the IDP population shows that Arab Sunnis have been displaced throughout the whole crisis, and mostly between June 2014 and June 2016. Nearly all minorities fled during the summer of 2014 – Turkmen Shias between June and

July, Christians, Kakais and Shabaks (Shia and Sunni) between June and August and Yazidis in August. Movements of the Kurdish minority can be associated either with the summer 2014 waves or with movements in the disputed territories, following the Peshmerga handover in late 2017.

Figure 29: Period of displacement by main ethno-religious group

ARAB SHIA

TURKMEN SHIA

7+21+14+15+13+5+18+7+0+A1+40+40+1+1+1+16+A

1+98+1+A2+77+15+6+A

9+39+36+12+2+2+A1+49+39+11+A

ARAB SUNNI

19%

16%15%

12%7%

6%11%

21%

40%

14%

39%

49%

14% 98%

77%

13%

40%

36%

5%

39%

7%

1%

1%1%

1%

1%1%

2%

9%

1%

KURDISH

YAZIDI

MINORITIES

JANUARY TO MAY 2014

JUNE TO JULY 2014

AUGUST 2014

SEPTEMBER 2014 TO MARCH 2015

APRIL 2015 TO MARCH 2016

APRIL TO SEPTEMBER 2016

OCTOBER 2016 TO JUNE 2016

JULY 2017 TO DECEMBER 2018

JANUARY 2019 AND LATER

2% 2%

IOM IRAQ44


Among households still in displacement, Arab Sunnis seem the most determined to return home in the short term (it is their main intention in as much as 30 per cent of locations), whereas in the long term their intent to regain the location of origin aligns more or less with that of other ethno-religious groups (ranging between 60% and 73% of locations). The only exception is represented by Arab Shias: in 42 per cent of prevalent locations they seem willing to

locally (and voluntarily) integrate, in 19 per cent they may be forced to do so. Voluntary integration is higher than the average also among Turkmen Shias (28%) and Kurds (32%); whereas in around 20 per cent of Arab Sunni locations involuntary resettlement may be the only option. Yazidis and other minorities are the only groups who may still be willing to leave the country (around 2% of locations).

Figure 30: Long-term intentions by main ethno-religious group

ARAB SHIA

TURKMEN SHIA

20+18+59+3+A1+2+32+1+62+2+A

2+3+19+2+71+3+A1+28+71+A

18+42+1+37+2+A2+22+1+73+2+A

ARAB SUNNI

59%

62%

32%

20%

19%

18%

37%

42%

71%

28%22%

73%

71%

3% 3% 2% 3%

2%

2%

1%

2%2%

1%

1%

1%

2%1%2%

18%

KURDISH

YAZIDI

MINORITIES

GO ABROAD

LOCALLY INTEGRATE IN THE CURRENT LOCATION (INVOLUNTARILY, THEY HAVE NO OTHER CHOICES)

LOCALLY INTEGRATE IN THE CURRENT LOCATION (VOLUNTARILY)

MOVE TO A THIRD LOCATION – WITHIN THE COUNTRY

RETURN TO THEIR PLACE OF ORIGIN (INVOLUNTARILY, RETURNS ARE BEING PUSHED)

RETURN TO THEIR PLACE OF ORIGIN (VOLUNTARILY)

UNKNOWN

IOM IRAQ45


House damage/destruction, lack of jobs and basic services are the most reported obstacles to return for Arab Sunnis, Turkmen Shias, Arab Shias and other minorities – figures range between 29 per cent to 85 per cent. These three issues are common also among Kurds and Yazidis, together with the lack of security/safety at origin (66% and 77% respectively), a concern they share with other minorities (55%). Lack of means to return and restart was mentioned in around one in four prevalent locations of

Arab Sunnis, Turkmen Shias and Arab Shias; and fear as a result of the ethno-religious change at origin in 15–20 per cent of prevalent locations of Kurdish, Arab Shias and other minorities. It is worth noting that Arab Shias were the most likely to mention fear to lose humanitarian aid (16%), whereas the issue of blocked returns was reported only in around 10 per cent of Arab Sunnis’ prevalent locations – and 1 per cent of Yazidis’ prevalent locations.

Figure 31: Obstacles to return by main ethno-religious group (% of location)

HOUSE IN PLACE OF ORIGIN IS DAMAGED/DESTROYED

NO JOB OPPORTUNITIES IN RETURN AREA

BASIC SERVICES IN THE AREA OF ORIGIN ARE NOT ENOUGH/AVAILABLE (ELECTRICITY, WATER, HEALTH)

THE AREA OF RETURN IS INSECURE/UNSAFE DUE TO ONGOING CONFLICT, ARMED GROUPS UXOS, ETC.)

NO FINANCIAL MEANS TO RETURN AND RESTART

FEAR AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGED ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE PLACE OF ORIGIN

TRAUMA ASSOCIATED WITH RETURNING TO PLACE OF ORIGIN

FEAR TO LOSE AID/HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

BLOCKED RETURNS (PREVENTED FROM RETURN BY THE COMMUNITY, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, SECURITY FORCES, ETC.)

YAZIDI

ARAB SHIA

ARAB SUNNI

TURKMEN SHIA

KURDISH

MINORITIES

76+74+52+18+22+4+5+1+968+71+48+19+28+9+7+4+1

18+70+69+66+12+15+7+1+1 69+44+83+77+4+3+1+1+185+54+29+17+23+20+6+16+1 62+79+62+55+8+14+1+1+1

76%

68%

38%

85%

69%

62%

74%

71%

70%

54%

44%

79%

52%

48%

69%

29%

83%

62%

18%

19%

66%

17%

77%

55%

22%

28%

12%

23%

4%

8%

4%

9%

15%

20%

3%

14%

5%

7%

7%

6%

0%

0%

0%

4%

0%

16%

0%

0%

9%

0.4%

0%

0%

1%

0%

IOM IRAQ46


In addition to the perceived safety of the current location, house damage/destruction and lack of jobs at origin, in many cases, reasons to relocate match the severity of obstacles reported by each respective ethno-religious group. Arab Sunnis willing to resettle again point out the issue of blocked return (22% of prevalent locations); while Turkmen Shias – and also other minorities – the lack of means to return and restart (around 50%). A key factor for Arab Shias appears

to be the presence of extended family/relatives and friends (51%), while Yazidis seem more willing to resettle in areas where they share the same religious, linguistic or ethnic composition (38%). In five per cent of prevalent locations where other minorities are currently living, a main reason to resettle is the fact that most family/relatives/friends have left the location of origin due to the crisis.

Figure 32: Reasons to relocate by main ethno-religious group (% of location)

CURRENT LOCATION IS SAFE

LOCATION OF ORIGIN IS UNSAFE

NO JOB OPPORTUNITIES AT ORIGIN

LACK OF BASIC SERVICES AT ORIGIN

HOUSE DAMAGED/DESTROYED

NO MEANS TO RETURN AND RESTART

PRESENCE OF EXTENDED FAMILY/RELATIVES/FRIENDS

SAME RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC OR ETHNIC COMPOSITION

BLOCKED RETURNS

MOST FAMILY/RELATIVES/FRIENDS LEFT

YAZIDI

ARAB SHIA

ARAB SUNNI

TURKMEN SHIA

KURDISH

MINORITIES

54+42+35+33+33+22+15+5+22+124+6+26+15+33+49+15+1+1+1

93+28+44+56+19+6+13+9+1+272+17+9+1+31+28+51+23+19+3

48+38+33+33+29+14+1+38+1+140+25+10+35+25+50+1+1+1+5

54%

24%

93%

72%

48%

40%

42%

6%

28%

17%

38%

25%

35%

26%

44%

9%

33%

10%

33%

15%

56%

1%

33%

35%

33%

33%

19%

31%

29%

25%

22%

49%

6%

28%

14%

50%

15%

15%

13%

51%

0%

0%

5%

1%

9%

23%

38%

0%

22%

1%

0%

19%

0%

0%

1%

0%

2%

3%

0%

5%

IOM IRAQ47


Ethno-religious groups also tend to display specific characteristics with the regard to the shelter they are currently settled in. Most households across all groups, except Yazidis, tend to live in rented accommodations. Arab Shias are the most likely to be hosted (24%, which matches with their likelihood to report the presence of extended

family at the location of displacement); Turkmen Shias the most likely to own their property (10%) and Yazidis to be living in critical shelters (43%) or to be hosted (40%). Around 15 per cent of Turkmens are also settled in critical shelters – mainly religious building – which can be explained by their presence in Najaf and Kerbala.

Figure 33: Shelter by main ethno-religious group (% of out of camp IDPs)

As for returnees, recent returnees are mainly Turkmens (64% of Sunnis and 48% of Shias regained their location of origin in 2018-9). Conversely, all returns of Arab Shias and nearly all of Yazidis occurred in the early biennial 2015–6.

2017 was the main year of returns for all other groups and in particular for other minorities, such as Christians, Kakais and Shabaks (96%).

Figure 34: Year of return by main ethno-religious group

ARAB SHIA

TURKMEN SHIA

7+10+82+1+0+A6+11+79+4+0+A

43+40+16+1+0+A16+4+69+10+1+A

8+24+67+1+A10+15+74+1+0+A

ARAB SUNNI

10%

4% 10%

24%

82%

79%

16%

69%

67%

74%

7%

1%

6%

11%

1%

43%

40%

1%

16%

4%

8%

1%

10%

15%

1%

KURDISH

YAZIDI

MINORITIES

CRITICAL SHELTERS

HOST FAMILIES

RENTED

OWNED PROPERTY

OTHER

ARAB SUNNI

KURDISH

YAZIDI

TURKMEN SHIA

TURKMEN SUNNI

MINORITIES

ARAB SHIA

16+29+40+14+4+1+4325+5+49+4+1+1+5744+56+11+34+32+97+114+10+1+48+64+1+116%

25%

44%

14%

29%

5%

56%

10%

40%

49%

11%

0%

14%

4%

34%

48%

4%0%

32%

64%

0% 1%

97%

1%

43%

57%

0% 0%

2015 2016 2017 2018-19

IOM IRAQ48


Nearly all returnee households, regardless of ethno-religious affiliation, have returned to their habitual residence (figures range between 93% and 100%). It is worth noting that Arab Sunnis, Yazidis and Turkmen Sunnis are the most likely to live in shelters in poor conditions (3–5%). In fact, the availability of housing at the location of origin – together with the safety of the location – is a main and common reason to return to all ethno-religious groups. As for specific reasons, the emotional desire to return together with a failed attempt to integrate in displacement were key in Yazidis

prevalent locations (93% and 56% of locations). Arab Shias were more likely to have benefitted of both encouragement from religious/community leaders (30%) and incentives by humanitarian actors (22%), while many returns of Turkmen Sunnis were pushed either by a worsening of their conditions at the location of displacement (52%) and/or the lack of means (20%). Lack of means as a main reason to return was also mentioned more often by Arab Sunnis and other minorities (around 25% both).

Figure 35: Reason to return by main ethno-religious group (% of location)

THE LOCATION IS SAFE

AVAILABILITY OF HOUSING

AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES

EMOTIONAL DESIRE TO RETURN

NO MEANS TO REMAIN

WORSENING OF LIVELIHOOD/SERVICES

JOIN FAMILY ALREADY RETURNED

ENCOURAGEMENT BY COMMUNITY LEADERS

FAILED TO INTEGRATE

INCENTIVES BY GOVERNMENT

INCENTIVES BY HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

ARAB SUNNI

87+77+32+30+26+17+9+8+1+1+187%

77%

32% 30%26%

17%9% 8%

0%

YAZIDI

44+49+4+93+9+7+24+2+56+1+144%49%

4%

93%

9% 7%

24%

2%

56%

0%

ARAB SHIA

83+61+13+39+13+13+4+30+1+9+2283%

41%

13%

39%

13% 13%

4%

30%

0%

9%

KURDISH

93+48+17+33+8+13+2+3+10+1+193%

48%

17%

33%

8%13%

2% 3%10%

0%

TURKMEN SHIA

50+17+9+15+13+28+7+2+1+1+150%

17%9%

15% 13%

28%

7%2% 0% 0%

TURKMEN SUNNI

88+100+24+12+20+52+1+4+8+1+188%

100%

24%

12%20%

52%

0%4%

8%0%

MINORITIES

94+51+6+57+23+1+30+20+1+1+494%

51%

6%

57%

23%

1%

30%

20%

0% 1%

0% 0% 0%

0% 0%

22%

0%

4%

IOM IRAQ49


CONCLUSION

30 The number of IDPs stands at 1,444,500 individuals as of October 2019, DTM IOM Master List 112. Between ILA II (May 2017) and ILA (III) May 2018 it peaked reaching 133 per cent, whereas between ILA III and ILA IV ( June 2019) it barely reached 10 per cent - in the three governorates of Anbar, Diyala and Erbil, returns increased by only five per cent or less.

31 In 1,659 locations hosting 74% of current IDPs, most individuals are willing to return in the long term (after six months or more); it was 74% in ILA III (May 2018) as well.

32 Findings were rated according to rates of return – the proportion of returnees originally from a governorate or district to the total number of returnees and IDPs originally from the same governorate or district. ‘Few’, in this regard, means that less than 50% of the original IDPs have regained their location of origin.

33 See: The Growing Role of Reconciliation in Return Movements: Snapshots from the Return Index, November 2019, IOM Iraq.

34 To assess the state of infrastructure and services, a composite index was created taking into account access to eleven basic services: electricity, water, schools, health clinics and hospital, waste collection and latrines, market, office for the replacement of civil documentation and legal services for housing, land and property (HLP) issues. For further details, refer to the “Infrastructure, Services and Land” section of the report.

Two years after ISIL’s military defeat, nearly four million and a half of those internally displaced since January 2014 have returned to their location of origin. Refugees from abroad have also started returning from neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey, as well as from more distant countries, such as Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. Still, within the time interval between ILA III (May 2018) and ILA IV ( June 2019), the pace of return, defined as the percentage change in the number of returns, has greatly slowed, leaving 1.61 million people in displacement.30

Around three fourths of the remaining IDPs are willing to return in the long term, and their intentions are largely consistent with May 2018 findings.31 However, it appears that more IDPs may be deferring their return – short-term intentions to stay have risen from 68 to 75 per cent – or considering permanent relocation as an alternative – the share of those willing to locally integrate has also slightly risen from 22 to 25 per cent.

Three obstacles continue to be particularly important for displaced households: the lack of job/livelihood opportunities (73%), services (68%) and a residence to return to (62%). Even if security/safety concerns have largely decreased over time (from 81% in 2016 to 36% in 2019), insecurity remains a strong barrier to return in some specific more volatile areas. In 9% of locations where the main intention is to return, IDPs fear ethno-religious change at the location of origin and in 5% of locations, IDPs are reportedly prevented from returning due to a lack documentation or discrimination .

The most ‘critical’ districts – those reporting no or few returns32 – include Al-Musayab and Hilla in Babylon Governorate, Adhamia, Al-Resafa, Karkh and Mada’in in Baghdad Governorate, Baladrooz and Ba’quba in Diyala Governorate, Al Ba’aj, Hatra and Sinjar in Ninewa Governorate and Al-Thetar and Tooz in Salah al-Din Governorate. According to the latest round of the Return Index, reconciliation is the indicator most correlated with lack of returns on the scale measuring social cohesion and safety perceptions (Scale 2).33 The majority of locations where the need for reconciliation was reported are indeed

in the four above-mentioned governorates of Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. These findings are further corroborated when analysing locations for ethno-religious homogeneity. At least three fourths of returnee locations can be tagged as “homogeneous” – i.e. at least 60% of the population belongs to one of the six main ethno-religious groups, namely Arab Sunnis, Turkmen Shias, Yazidis, Kurds, Arab Shias and other minorities (including Christians, Shabaks and Kakais) – showing that the return of IDPs to formerly mixed areas is more difficult.

On the other hand, data indicate that overall conditions across Iraq are improving. Most indicators have risen since ILA III – and particularly services and infrastructure-related indicators. At country level, 87 per cent of IDPs and 79 per cent of returnees live in locations where the presence of most of the key services or facilities is guaranteed, and around half have adequate access to all or nearly all.34 Critical access, where only five or less services or facilities are guaranteed, was observed in around five per cent of locations. Critical districts include Karkh, Erbil, Al-Hindiya, Najaf, Tikrit and Tooz (for IDPs); Makmur, Al-Hawiga, Samarra, Al Shirqat, Telafar, Tilkaif and Mosul (for returnees); and Falluja, Abu Ghraib, Mahmoudiya and Sinjar (for both).

The improvement in services and infrastructure is reflected in the assessment of main needs – these needs are generally less reported as compared to ILA III. Access to employment/livelihood opportunities, though less pressing (70% in ILA IV, 93% in ILA III), continues to be the main concern of IDPs because they tend to be employed mostly in the informal sector and, compared to returnees, are more likely to report barriers to employement (25% vs. 14%), as well as dependence on savings (12% vs. 2%) and/or remittances from family/friends (17% vs. 2%). Around 30 per cent of IDPs (and around 20% of returnees) live in locations where access to food was mentioned among top three needs – it was 51% (and 40% respectively) in May 2018. As for housing, 42 per cent of IDPs live in locations where it was mentioned among the top three needs. It is worth noting that the proportion of IDPs settled in critical shelters

IOM IRAQ50


continues to drop (from 16% in 2016 to 8% in 2019) in comparison to that settled in camps (from 12% in 2016 to 32% in 2019). At the same time, the share of returnees regaining their habitual residence has increased from 89 per cent in 2017 to 98 per cent in 2019. The increase in the share of households able to regain their habitual residence is linked to reconstruction efforts. Extensive damage and destruction (over three fourths of houses are heavily damaged or destroyed) was assessed in only around three per cent of locations country-wide – with peaks in Khanaqin (20%), Daquq (14%), Sinjar (13%), Tilkaif (16%) and Balad (27%). Reconstruction efforts are ongoing – only in 30 per cent of locations country-wide none or very few of the houses are being reconstructed/rehabilitated.

35 Although this finding is consistent with previous surveys, it is worth observing that social cohesion is very hard to measure and it is highly likely to be under-reported. See section on intergroup feelings, perception of security and civic life satisfaction.

Finally, when looking at social cohesion, the relationship between different population groups (IDPs, returnees and stayers) appears to be positive and stable – overall, the presence of physical incidents, threats and mistrust in general was reported only occasionally in fewer than five per cent of locations across Iraq.35 The issue of biased access to resources has also largely improved: overall between 8 per cent and 14 per cent of returnees and between 25 per cent and 34 per cent of IDPs live in locations where favouritism regarding employment and political representation was reported (vs. 45% of returnees and 50% of IDPs in May 2018).

IOM IRAQ51


ANNEX

Tabl

e 1:

IDPs

and

ret

urne

es b

y go

vern

orat

e an

d m

ain

indi

cato

rs

GO

VER

NO

RATE

LOC

AT

ION

S W

ITH

IDPs

RET

UR

NEE

S

IDPs

Retu

rnee

s R

etur

nees

from

abr

oad

IDPs

+

Retu

rnee

sTo

tal

Indi

vidu

als

% c

hang

e

since

May

2018

% o

f

tota

l

IDPs

in

cam

psIn

divi

dual

s

% c

hang

e

since

May

2018

% o

f tot

alR

ate

of

retu

rn

Anba

r69

242

144

267

49,0

86-4

0%3%

57%

1,30

5,45

63%

30%

89%

Baby

lon

760

10

7617

,454

-32%

1%0%

Bagh

dad

401

110

609

502

58,7

10-4

6%4%

6%88

,170

14%

2%69

%

Basr

ah91

045

091

7,16

4-1

1%0%

0%

Dah

uk15

11

391

151

326,

106

-7%

20%

47%

780

0%0%

3%

Diy

ala

176

211

1537

255

,722

-14%

3%13

%22

5,47

42%

5%73

%

Erbi

l11

320

013

320

9,78

4-6

%13

%9%

41,0

705%

1%68

%

Kerb

ala

119

011

011

921

,744

-20%

1%6%

Kirk

uk71

198

4122

810

1,55

6-2

4%6%

12%

330,

882

13%

8%76

%

Mis

san

220

40

222,

388

-21%

0%4%

Mut

hann

a14

01

014

1,09

8-2

0%0%

0%

Naj

af55

00

5512

,282

-60%

1%8%

Nin

ewa

250

648

3217

572

347

8,63

8-2

3%30

%55

%1,

677,

912

15%

39%

64%

Qad

issi

ya93

09

093

5,59

2-5

7%0%

0%

Sala

h al

-Din

152

194

188

258

105,

390

-43%

7%6%

635,

394

17%

15%

75%

Sula

yman

iyah

406

056

040

614

2,42

2-8

%9%

12%

Thi-Q

ar41

041

041

3474

-15%

0%0%

Was

sit

940

094

8,53

8-3

5%1%

0%

Tota

l2,

394

1,62

430

137

33,

645

1,60

7,14

8-2

1%10

0%32

%4,

305,

138

10%

100%

73%

IOM IRAQ52


Tabl

e 2:

Inte

ntio

ns a

t sh

ort

term

and

long

ter

m (

% o

f ID

Ps)

GO

VER

NO

RATE

INTE

NTI

ON

S AT

SH

ORT

TER

MIN

TEN

TIO

NS

AT L

ON

G T

ERM

Retu

rnSt

ayM

ove

else

whe

re/U

ndec

ided

Retu

rnLo

cally

inte

grat

eM

ove

else

whe

re/U

ndec

ided

Anba

r43

%57

%0%

96%

4%0%

Baby

lon

2%98

%0%

3%97

%0%

Bagh

dad

36%

64%

0%96

%4%

0%

Basr

ah0%

100%

0%0%

70%

30%

Dah

uk0%

100%

0%73

%25

%2%

Diy

ala

74%

26%

0%93

%7%

0%

Erbi

l39

%61

%0%

81%

19%

0%

Kerb

ala

5%95

%0%

36%

64%

0%

Kirk

uk12

%88

%0%

37%

63%

0%

Mis

san

86%

14%

0%86

%14

%0%

Mut

hann

a0%

100%

0%0%

93%

7%

Naj

af46

%54

%0%

100%

0%0%

Nin

ewa

24%

76%

0%85

%14

%1%

Qad

issi

ya5%

95%

0%78

%22

%0%

Sala

h al

-Din

67%

33%

0%80

%20

%0%

Sula

yman

iyah

0%10

0%0%

66%

33%

1%

Thi-Q

ar5%

94%

1%40

%59

%1%

Was

sit

0%10

0%0%

99%

1%0%

Tota

l25

%75

%0%

74%

25%

1%

IOM IRAQ53


Tabl

e 3:

Mai

n ob

stac

les

to r

etur

n (%

of I

DPs

who

se in

tent

ion

at lo

ng t

erm

is t

o re

turn

)

GO

VER

NO

RATE

MA

IN O

BSTA

CLE

S TO

RET

URN

No

job

oppo

rtun

ities

at o

rigin

Lack

of b

asic

serv

ices

at

orig

in

Hou

se

dam

aged

/

dest

roye

d

The

area

of o

rigin

is in

secu

re/u

nsaf

e

(con

flict

, arm

ed

grou

ps, U

XO

s)

No

finan

cial

mea

ns t

o re

turn

and

rest

art

Livi

ng c

ondi

tions

are

bett

er in

disp

lace

men

t

Fear

as

a re

sult

of

the

chan

ged

ER

com

posit

ion

at

orig

in

Chi

ldre

n en

rolle

d

in s

choo

l at

disp

lace

men

t

Bloc

ked

retu

rns

Trau

ma

asso

ciat

ed

with

ret

urni

ng t

o

plac

e of

orig

in

Anba

r82

%62

%80

%16

%8%

8%0%

23%

0%10

%

Baby

lon

70%

45%

90%

13%

10%

11%

0%10

%0%

27%

Bagh

dad

81%

62%

88%

0%15

%24

%1%

7%9%

9%

Basr

ah

Dah

uk64

%92

%52

%68

%0%

6%12

%3%

0%1%

Diy

ala

84%

41%

91%

8%11

%7%

9%39

%11

%0%

Erbi

l89

%76

%14

%51

%2%

35%

5%6%

0%1%

Kerb

ala

86%

76%

67%

21%

21%

5%7%

0%0%

6%

Kirk

uk86

%72

%64

%21

%17

%5%

0%1%

0%18

%

Mis

san

100%

89%

96%

0%0%

16%

0%0%

0%0%

Mut

hann

a

Naj

af75

%42

%72

%20

%32

%9%

11%

10%

0%6%

Nin

ewa

71%

71%

68%

36%

25%

4%15

%1%

2%4%

Qad

issi

ya27

%4%

94%

19%

39%

11%

21%

28%

0%13

%

Sala

h al

-Din

51%

73%

85%

19%

17%

4%11

%2%

26%

0%

Sula

yman

iyah

67%

31%

67%

37%

56%

14%

3%0%

6%0%

Thi-Q

ar52

%39

%49

%21

%0%

35%

55%

7%0%

0%

Was

sit

92%

60%

93%

43%

0%2%

5%0%

0%0%

Tota

l73

%68

%62

%36

%17

%12

%9%

6%5%

3%

IOM IRAQ54


Tabl

e 4:

Mai

n ob

stac

les

to r

etur

n (%

of I

DPs

who

se in

tent

ion

at lo

ng t

erm

is t

o re

turn

)

GO

VER

NO

RATE

MA

IN R

EASO

NS

TO IN

TEG

RATE

LO

CA

LLY

The

loca

tion

is sa

fe

Lack

of b

asic

serv

ices

at

orig

in

The

loca

tion

is

unsa

fe (m

ilitia

s,

chan

ged

ER

com

posit

ion)

No

finan

cial

mea

ns

to r

etur

n an

d re

star

t

Hou

se in

plac

e of

orig

in

is da

mag

ed/

dest

roye

d

No

job

oppo

r-

tuni

ties

in r

etur

n

area

Ava

ilabi

lity

of s

ervi

ces

Pres

ence

of

exte

nded

fam

ily/

rela

tives

/frie

nds

Bloc

ked

retu

rns

Ava

ilabi

lity

of h

ousin

g

Sam

e re

li-

giou

s, lin

guist

ic

or e

thni

c

com

posit

ion

Anba

r10

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

33%

0%0%

6%67

%

Baby

lon

2%44

%7%

2%27

%10

%30

%55

%93

%5%

6%

Bagh

dad

85%

6%5%

24%

59%

10%

14%

13%

51%

23%

1%

Basr

ah91

%0%

6%71

%65

%3%

0%44

%0%

9%0%

Dah

uk83

%62

%17

%15

%18

%50

%24

%2%

0%0%

3%

Diy

ala

96%

0%75

%10

%5%

0%3%

36%

23%

26%

14%

Erbi

l73

%43

%12

%36

%0%

18%

62%

44%

0%0%

0%

Kerb

ala

10%

17%

15%

59%

22%

16%

6%17

%8%

5%0%

Kirk

uk38

%71

%8%

65%

69%

19%

11%

0%0%

11%

0%

Mis

san

100%

0%0%

0%0%

0%19

%84

%0%

68%

0%

Mut

hann

a24

%0%

50%

22%

48%

42%

0%13

%0%

0%0%

Naj

af10

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%10

0%0%

Nin

ewa

62%

20%

19%

51%

70%

8%5%

7%1%

2%4%

Qad

issi

ya10

0%0%

0%7%

29%

0%0%

80%

62%

0%9%

Sala

h al

-Din

19%

26%

56%

42%

44%

10%

4%15

%4%

45%

19%

Sula

yman

iyah

46%

49%

100%

6%8%

22%

2%0%

14%

3%0%

Thi-Q

ar80

%0%

6%8%

19%

0%5%

80%

0%12

%72

%

Was

sit

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

100%

0%0%

100%

0%

Tota

l51

%46

%38

%35

%35

%21

%17

%14

%10

%8%

4%

IOM IRAQ55


Tabl

e 5:

Mai

n re

ason

s to

ret

urn

and

forc

ed r

etur

ns (

% o

f ret

urne

es)

GO

VERN

ORA

TE

MA

IN O

BSTA

CLE

S TO

RET

URN

The

loca

tion

is sa

fe

Ava

ilabi

lity

of h

ousin

g

Ava

ilabi

lity

of s

ervi

ces

(for

exam

ple,

educ

atio

n

and

heal

th)

Emot

iona

l

desir

e to

retu

rn

No

finan

cial

mea

ns t

o

rem

ain

in

disp

lace

-

men

t

Wor

seni

ng

of li

ve-

lihoo

d/

serv

ices

in

disp

lace

-

men

t

To jo

in

fam

ily

mem

bers

alre

ady

retu

rned

Ava

ilabi

lity

of jo

bs

Enco

urag

emen

t

to r

etur

n by

com

mun

ity/

relig

ious

lead

ers

Ava

ilabi

lity

of

assis

tanc

e

Faile

d to

inte

grat

e

in H

C

Wor

seni

ng

of s

ecur

ity

situa

tion

in

disp

lace

-

men

t

Ince

ntiv

es/

supp

ort

to

retu

rn b

y

gove

rnm

ent

auth

oriti

es

Forc

ed t

o

retu

rn-

loca

tions

(%)

Anba

r97

%82

%55

%23

%14

%8%

12%

4%1%

1%0%

1%1%

24%

Bagh

dad

95%

58%

3%17

%13

%5%

21%

40%

15%

23%

0%0%

5%0%

Dah

uk10

0%10

0%0%

0%0%

0%10

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

Diy

ala

85%

94%

20%

22%

31%

7%4%

0%33

%3%

0%0%

0%8%

Erbi

l10

0%68

%0%

40%

0%12

%29

%0%

0%0%

0%0%

7%0%

Kirk

uk90

%44

%40

%38

%16

%0%

13%

15%

3%0%

0%0%

0%0%

Nin

ewa

91%

86%

38%

28%

20%

21%

4%1%

4%1%

4%0%

0%1%

Sala

h al

-Din

88%

60%

21%

47%

22%

5%17

%21

%7%

5%0%

3%0%

34%

Tota

l92

%77

%39

%29

%18

%12

%10

%6%

5%2%

1%1%

1%9%

IOM IRAQ56


Tabl

e 6:

Infr

astr

uctu

re a

nd s

ervi

ces

inde

x (%

of l

ocat

ions

, ID

Ps a

nd r

etur

nees

livi

ng a

t lo

catio

ns w

here

infr

astr

uctu

re/s

ervi

ces

are

pres

ent)

GO

VER

NO

RATE

0-5

6-7

8-9

10-1

1

Loca

tion

(%)

IDPs

(%

of

HH

s)

Retu

rnee

s

(% o

f HH

s)Lo

catio

n (%

)ID

Ps (

% o

f

HH

s)

Retu

rnee

s

(% o

f HH

s)Lo

catio

n (%

)ID

Ps (

% o

f

HH

s)

Retu

rnee

s

(% o

f HH

s)Lo

catio

n (%

)ID

Ps (

% o

f

HH

s)

Retu

rnee

s

(% o

f HH

s)

Anba

r7%

9%4%

25%

43%

14%

33%

16%

41%

35%

31%

41%

Baby

lon

1%0%

8%8%

55%

50%

36%

42%

Bagh

dad

18%

18%

32%

21%

8%24

%34

%37

%43

%27

%37

%1%

Basr

ah1%

1%15

%12

%60

%58

%23

%28

%

Dah

uk2%

0%0%

9%1%

0%17

%8%

0%72

%90

%10

0%

Diy

ala

7%0%

4%22

%6%

26%

52%

44%

56%

20%

49%

14%

Erbi

l14

%5%

20%

10%

5%25

%64

%82

%51

%12

%8%

4%

Kerb

ala

12%

27%

29%

36%

36%

24%

23%

13%

Kirk

uk25

%3%

7%31

%6%

24%

30%

73%

42%

15%

17%

26%

Mis

san

0%0%

0%0%

14%

6%86

%94

%

Mut

hann

a14

%17

%36

%26

%36

%42

%14

%15

%

Naj

af36

%39

%45

%48

%15

%11

%4%

2%

Nin

ewa

24%

2%6%

19%

8%10

%25

%19

%27

%32

%71

%57

%

Qad

issi

ya15

%13

%32

%35

%45

%46

%8%

6%

Sala

h al

-Din

20%

11%

8%17

%10

%17

%31

%39

%41

%32

%40

%34

%

Sula

yman

iyah

0%0%

7%3%

8%4%

84%

94%

Thi-Q

ar12

%12

%20

%20

%20

%28

%49

%40

%

Was

sit

12%

13%

13%

11%

68%

66%

7%9%

Tota

l14

%5%

6%19

%8%

15%

33%

34%

36%

34%

53%

43%

IOM IRAQ57


Table 6a: Infrastructure and services index - detail on single indicators (% of IDPs and returnees living at the location)

75-100% HHs have

electricity

75-100% HHs

have water

Access to waste

collection

Access to

latrines

Functional primary

school within 5 km

Functional secondary

school within 5 km

IDPs 79% 76% 89% 98% 97% 93%

Returnees 70% 65% 71% 100% 99% 93%

Functional health

clinic within 5 km

Functional hospital

within 10 km

Functional market

within 5 km

Office for replacement of civil

documentation in the SD

Legal services for

HLP in the SD

IDPs 93% 82% 96% 73% 49%

Returnees 89% 64% 93% 94% 32%

Table 7: Main needs and issues (% of IDPs and returnees living at the location)

EMPLOYMENT

Insufficient

jobs

Access to employ-

ment among top 3

needs

Children

working

Most are not

economically

active

Unequal

access to fair

employment

Low paid/

occasional/under-

qualified/unequal

jobs

Lack of

training/voca-

tional centers/

programmes

Returnees 83% 71% 43% 57% 14% 2% 13%

IDPs 82% 70% 49% 43% 25% 10% 6%

HEALTH

Access to

health among

top 3 needs

No hospital

within

10 km

Quality (poor

underqualified

service/staff)

Price of health-care

visit/treatment/medi-

cines is too expensive

No health

facility within

5 km

Quantity

(facilities are

few/small/

overcrowded)

Lack of reha-

bilitation

services

Returnees 61% 36% 13% 12% 11% 7% 1%

IDPs 39% 18% 22% 60% 7% 9% 1%

EDUCATION

Quantity (insuffi-

cient/overcrowded

classes/schools)

Less than 75%

are attending

secondary

school

No

certified

teachers

Access to educa-

tion among top 3

needs

Quality (infra-

structure/

staff is poor/

inadequate)

Price (too

expensive in

terms of fees/

materials)

Less than 75%

are attending

primary school

Returnees 45% 34% 32% 21% 20% 17% 11%

IDPs 42% 45% 18% 9% 18% 13% 28%

FOOD

Some indi-

viduals are in

need of food

Price (too

expensive)

Access to food

among top 3

needs

Quantity (insuffi-

cient, inconsistent or

sporadic supply)

Quality (poor

quality, not fresh

or bad taste)

No market

within 5 km

A lot of individ-

uals are in need

of food

Returnees 48% 46% 21% 16% 11% 7% 2%

IDPs 30% 66% 32% 8% 1% 4% 1%

IOM IRAQ58


WATER

Have issues with

water source (related

to taste/appearance/

smell

Less than

75% of HHs

have water

Quality (poor

quality, not safe/

contaminated)

Quantity (insuffi-

cient, inconsistent

or sporadic

supply)

Access to water

among top 3

needs

Sometimes

rely on water

trucking

Price (too

expensive)

Returnees 47% 35% 31% 28% 26% 22% 8%

IDPs 26% 24% 20% 16% 8% 16% 5%

RIGHTS AND DOCUMENTATION

No legal

services

office

within the

SD

Few individ-

uals are in

lack of civil

documentation

Access to solutions for

displacement-related

rights violations (justice,

reparations and compen-

sation) among top 3

needs

Children

are in lack

of birth

certificates

No office for

replacement

of civil docu-

mentation

within the

district

Access to and

replacement of

personal and other

documentation

among top 3 needs

Many/most

individuals are

in lack of civil

documentation

Returnees 68% 15% 15% 9% 6% 1% 0.3%

IDPs 51% 15% 12% 8% 27% 8% 0.3%

SHELTER

No

Problem

Quality (infrastructure is

poor, not durable, not strong

enough, sanitary facilities are

not adequate)

Price (too

expensive)

Quantity (there

aren’t enough

houses so there is

overcrowding)

Rent assistance

(lack of or

inadequate)

Rubble, improvised

explosive devices

(IED) and UXO

removal

Eviction/

unequal

access

Returnees 35% 23% 18% 13% 6% 5%

IDPs 10% 14% 65% 4% 7% 0.1%

SECURITY

Presence of

more than one

security actor

Occurrence of

security incidents

other than petty

crime

Concerned

about resur-

gence of ISIL

Favouritism political

representation

Favouritism

employment

Favouritism

aid

Concerned

about ethno-reli-

gious tensions

Returnees 77% 13% 55% 8% 14% 7% 9%

IDPs 84% 8% 21% 34% 25% 9% 6%

IOM IRAQ59


Table 8: Shelter type (% of IDPs)

GOVERNORATE

SHELTER TYPE

Rental

(Habitable)Camp Host families

Critical

shelters

Own

Property

Rental

(Uninhabitable)Other Total

Anbar 4% 57% 22% 17% 0% 0% 0% 100%

Babylon 89% 0% 6% 3% 3% 0% 0% 100%

Baghdad 55% 6% 32% 3% 1% 3% 0% 100%

Basrah 65% 0% 25% 8% 0% 0% 2% 100%

Dahuk 34% 47% 7% 12% 1% 0% 0% 100%

Diyala 66% 13% 17% 1% 0% 2% 0% 100%

Erbil 89% 9% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 100%

Kerbala 58% 6% 1% 19% 16% 0% 0% 100%

Kirkuk 75% 12% 3% 7% 1% 1% 0% 100%

Missan 49% 4% 39% 8% 0% 0% 0% 100%

Muthanna 69% 0% 27% 4% 0% 0% 0% 100%

Najaf 89% 8% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 100%

Ninewa 28% 55% 11% 4% 1% 1% 0% 100%

Qadissiya 55% 0% 23% 22% 0% 0% 0% 100%

Salah al-Din 55% 6% 9% 23% 0% 7% 0% 100%

Sulaymaniyah 85% 12% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 100%

Thi-Qar 72% 0% 27% 0% 1% 0% 1% 100%

Wassit 80% 0% 8% 10% 2% 0% 0% 100%

Total 92% 77% 39% 29% 18% 12% 10% 6%

Table 9: Shelter type (% of returnees)

GOVERNORATE

SHELTER TYPE

Rented

Housing

Habitual Good

Residence

Habitual Bad

ResidenceHost Families Other Total

Anbar 3% 96% 1% 0% 0% 100%

Baghdad 0% 93% 7% 0% 0% 100%

Dahuk 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100%

Diyala 1% 89% 10% 0% 0% 100%

Erbil 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100%

Kirkuk 0% 98% 2% 0% 0% 100%

Ninewa 0% 97% 3% 0% 0% 100%

Salah al-Din 4% 91% 4% 1% 1% 100%

Total 92% 77% 39% 29% 18% 12%

IOM IRAQ60


Tabl

e 10

: Occ

urre

nce

of s

ecur

ity in

cide

nts

(% o

f loc

atio

ns)

GO

VER

NO

RATE

SUIC

IDE

ATTA

CK

S

EXPL

OSI

VE

DEV

ICES

LAN

DM

INES

DIR

ECT

FIRE

ATTA

CK

S

IND

IREC

T

FIRE

ATTA

CK

S

KN

IFE

ATTA

CK

SK

IDN

APP

ING

SA

RBIT

RARY

ARR

ESTS

REC

RUIT

MEN

T

BY M

ILIT

IAS

REC

RUIT

MEN

T

BY T

ERRO

RIST

GRO

UPS

SCH

OO

LS

USE

D B

Y

AG

S

CRI

ME

Anba

r0%

0%3%

0%0%

6%1%

1%0%

0%0%

31%

Baby

lon

0%0%

0%0%

0%1%

3%3%

0%0%

1%21

%

Bagh

dad

0%0%

0%2%

0%10

%3%

0%0%

1%0%

40%

Basr

ah0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

2%0%

20%

Dah

uk0%

0%1%

1%1%

0%0%

1%0%

0%0%

26%

Diy

ala

0%4%

0%4%

4%1%

0%1%

2%0%

0%12

%

Erbi

l0%

1%2%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%

Kerb

ala

1%0%

0%0%

0%16

%5%

0%0%

0%0%

36%

Kirk

uk2%

8%1%

7%1%

0%0%

0%0%

0%2%

28%

Mis

san

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%91

%

Mut

hann

a0%

0%0%

0%0%

7%0%

0%0%

0%0%

7%

Naj

af0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%2%

35%

Nin

ewa

0%1%

1%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

1%4%

Qad

issi

ya0%

0%0%

1%0%

12%

1%0%

0%0%

0%16

%

Sala

h al

-Din

2%2%

2%3%

1%0%

4%14

%31

%2%

7%24

%

Sula

yman

iyah

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

0%24

%

Thi-Q

ar0%

0%0%

0%0%

12%

2%0%

7%0%

0%32

%

Was

sit

0%0%

0%0%

0%10

%0%

0%0%

0%0%

84%

Tota

l14

%5%

6%19

%8%

15%

33%

34%

36%

34%

53%

43%

IOM IRAQ61


Tabl

e 11

: Len

ght

of d

ispla

cem

ent

and

prot

ract

ed d

ispla

cem

ent

(% o

f ID

Ps)

GO

VER

NO

RATE

PERI

OD

OF

DIS

PLA

CEM

ENT

PRO

TRA

CTE

D

DIS

PLA

CEM

ENT

(BEF

ORE

OC

TOBE

R

2016

)Ja

nuar

y to

May

201

4

June

to

July

2014

Aug

ust

2014

Sept

embe

r

2014

to

Mar

ch

2015

Apr

il 20

15

to M

arch

2016

Apr

il to

Sept

embe

r

2016

Oct

ober

201

6

to Ju

ne 2

017

July

201

7 to

Dec

embe

r

2018

Janu

ary

2019

and

late

rTo

tal

Anba

r6%

0%0%

8%16

%30

%8%

32%

0%10

0%60

%

Baby

lon

1%77

%18

%3%

0%0%

0%0%

0%10

0%10

0%

Bagh

dad

14%

19%

20%

20%

18%

4%4%

0%0%

100%

95%

Basr

ah8%

20%

21%

35%

8%2%

5%1%

0%10

0%94

%

Dah

uk0%

16%

79%

0%0%

0%0%

5%0%

100%

95%

Diy

ala

1%34

%14

%41

%2%

1%1%

6%0%

100%

93%

Erbi

l15

%34

%8%

3%16

%4%

12%

8%0%

100%

80%

Kerb

ala

7%92

%2%

0%0%

0%0%

0%0%

100%

100%

Kirk

uk1%

12%

10%

20%

16%

14%

17%

10%

0%10

0%72

%

Mis

san

4%33

%34

%19

%2%

0%6%

0%0%

100%

94%

Mut

hann

a3%

41%

30%

17%

5%0%

4%0%

0%10

0%96

%

Naj

af0%

65%

24%

10%

0%0%

0%0%

0%10

0%10

0%

Nin

ewa

0%5%

23%

1%2%

1%49

%18

%2%

100%

32%

Qad

issi

ya0%

50%

49%

1%0%

0%0%

0%0%

100%

100%

Sala

h al

-Din

1%14

%27

%18

%19

%7%

9%4%

0%10

0%87

%

Sula

yman

iyah

7%19

%12

%25

%9%

8%6%

13%

1%10

0%79

%

Thi-Q

ar8%

39%

31%

16%

3%0%

2%0%

0%10

0%98

%

Was

sit

6%74

%14

%3%

3%0%

0%0%

0%10

0%10

0%

Tota

l4%

18%

29%

8%7%

4%19

%11

%1%

100%

70%

IOM IRAQ62


Table 12: Year of return (% of returnees)

GOVERNORATE YEAR OF RETURN

2015 2016 2017 2018-19 Total

Anbar 2% 68% 23% 7% 100%

Baghdad 1% 52% 46% 1% 100%

Dahuk 0% 0% 100% 0% 100%

Diyala 55% 40% 3% 2% 100%

Erbil 34% 4% 61% 0% 100%

Kirkuk 1% 12% 76% 11% 100%

Ninewa 7% 9% 74% 9% 100%

Salah al-Din 33% 38% 18% 11% 100%Total 12% 34% 46% 8% 100%

Table 13: Ethno-religious composition (% of IDPs)

GOVERNORATE

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

Arab Sunni

Muslims

Kurd Muslims

(Sunni and Shia)Yazidis

Turkmen Muslims

(Sunni and Shia)

Minoritities (Christians,

Kakais, Shabak Shia)

Arab Shia

MuslimsTotal

Anbar 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%

Babylon 92% 0% 0% 8% 0% 0% 100%

Baghdad 94% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 100%

Basrah 59% 0% 0% 1% 1% 39% 100%

Dahuk 9% 50% 35% 1% 4% 0% 100%

Diyala 93% 4% 0% 0% 0% 3% 100%

Erbil 90% 7% 1% 1% 1% 0% 100%

Kerbala 3% 0% 0% 68% 21% 9% 100%

Kirkuk 94% 1% 0% 4% 0% 1% 100%

Missan 24% 0% 0% 11% 10% 55% 100%

Muthanna 15% 0% 0% 22% 3% 59% 100%

Najaf 0% 0% 0% 97% 2% 1% 100%

Ninewa 50% 16% 18% 10% 7% 0% 100%

Qadissiya 0% 1% 0% 35% 0% 64% 100%

Salah al-Din 93% 1% 0% 7% 0% 0% 100%

Sulaymaniyah 81% 15% 3% 1% 0% 0% 100%

Thi-Qar 4% 0% 0% 9% 5% 82% 100%

Wassit 7% 0% 0% 34% 37% 21% 100%

Total 64% 15% 10% 7% 3% 1% 100%

Table 14: Ethno-religious composition (% of returnees)

GOVERNORATE

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION

Arab Sunni

Muslims

Kurd Muslims

(Sunni and Shia)Yazidis

Turkmen Muslims

(Sunni and Shia)

Minoritities (Christians,

Kakais, Shabak Shia)

Arab Shia

MuslimsTotal

Anbar 98% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 100%

Baghdad 89% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 100%

Dahuk 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100%

Diyala 90% 4% 0% 3% 0% 3% 100%

Erbil 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%

Kirkuk 49% 49% 0% 1% 0% 0% 100%

Ninewa 64% 3% 5% 12% 16% 0% 100%

Salah al-Din 93% 4% 0% 1% 0% 1% 100%Total 79% 6% 2% 5% 6% 1% 100%

V`

INTEGRATED LOCATION ASSESSMENT IV

IOM IRAQ

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INTEGRATED LOCATION ASSESSMENT IViraqdtm.iom.int/images/ILA/20203124330549_IOM - Integrated Locati… · 4 IOM IRAQ Integrated Location Assessment IV ACRONYMS DTM Displacement Tracking