INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITIES Continuities. T… · INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITIES: THE POLICE IN THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC ORDER AND ALCOHOL IN GHANA A Dissertation Submitted By Raymond

INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITIES: THE POLICE IN THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC

ORDER AND ALCOHOL IN GHANA

A Dissertation Submitted

By

Raymond Akongburo Atuguba

To

The Graduate Program in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD)

In Development Studies

In the Law School of

Harvard University

June 2004

ii

HARVARD UNIVERSITY HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

GRADUATE PROGRAM

Raymond Akongburo Atuguba

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Juridical

Science (SJD) degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation.

………………………………………………………………………..

Lucie E. White

Louis A. Horvitz Professor of Law

Harvard Law School

………………………………………………………………………..

Duncan Kennedy

Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence

Harvard Law School

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate Committee

………………………………………

iii

FIELDS OF STUDY AND FIELD SUPERVISORS

(ORALS COMMITTEE)

The Politics and Economics of Development/Political Economy

Robert H. Bates

Eaton Professor of the Science of Government

Department of Government

Harvard University

Development Economics/Law and Development

Duncan Kennedy

Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence

Harvard Law School

Harvard University

International Law, Human Rights, and Development Issues

Henry J. Steiner

Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Professor of Law and

Director, Human Rights Program

Harvard Law School

Harvard University

Law and Organizing

Lucie E. White

Louis A. Horvitz Professor of Law

Harvard Law School

Harvard University

iv

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to all subalterns.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I will first of all like to thank the Graduate Program and the Human Rights

Program of Harvard Law School for providing me with some financial

assistance towards the execution of this project. The Harvard University

Committee on African Studies also provided partial funding for one of my very

first field research trips under the 2001 Jennifer Oppenheimer Grant for

Doctoral Dissertation Research.

Next, I will like to thank my dissertation committee for their complete

dedication to this project and to my broader agenda. Prof. Lucie White

accompanied me on several of my field trips and pointed out to me insights,

which I could easily have missed. Prof. Duncan Kennedy has remained loyal to

the project and at one time agreed to accompany me to the stacks in Widener

Library to search for historical documents on colonial policing! The other two

professors who were part of my orals committee, Prof. Robert Bates and Prof.

Henry Steiner, helped provide the foundation on which this project is based. I

have also held several conversations with them throughout the period of writing.

Dominic M. Ayine, my colleague at the Law Faculty of the University of Ghana,

provided very exhaustive comments on my final draft. I thank him. I also

benefited from discussions of my project with the following of my friends:

vi

Samuel Amadi, Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Prof. Eboe Hutchful, Shulamith

Koenig, Prof. Otwin Marenin (who also provided leads to very useful sources),

Jennifer Rosenbaum, Peter Rosenblum, and Dotse Tsikata.

The following of my friends also deserve mention: Issah Akolgo, Godwin

Adagwine, Joyce Agyepong, Frank Atuguba, Harold Atuguba, Juliet Atuguba,

Millicent Atuguba, Mahama Ayariga, Abdul Baasit Abdul Aziz, Ameley

Dankwa, Julius Fobil, Euphemia Gandaa, Saani Ibrahim, Daphne Nabila,

Pascaline Songsore, Nihad Swallah. Several times, and at very odd hours, I

have called them up to provide me with some information or to get, process or

transmit to me some document or other.

Sandra Mays, Annemarie Mecca, and Sena Dei-Tutu have also been helpful to

me in the process of organizing the dissertation for the various submission

deadlines.

vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFRC ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

AFRCD ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL DECREE

ASDR AFRICA SECURITY DIALOGUE AND RESEARCH

CDD CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

CEPIL CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW

CID CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT

CPP CONVENTION PEOPLES PARTY

ERP ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAMME

GLR GHANA LAW REPORTS

GNA GHANA NEWS AGENCY

GTV GHANA TELEVISION

IMF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

JJSC JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT

JSC JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

LRC LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE

NDC NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS

NGO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

NGP NATIONAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME

NIRP NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL PROGRAMME

NLC NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL

NLCD NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL DECREE

NLM NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

NPP NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY

NRC NATIONAL REDEMPTION COUNCIL

NRCD NATIONAL REDEMPTION COUNCIL DECREE

NUGS NATIONAL UNION OF GHANA STUDENTS

PNDC PROVISIONAL NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL

PNDCL PROVISIONAL NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL LAW

PP PROGRESS PARTY

SAP STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME

SC SUPREME COURT

SCGLR SUPREME COURT OF GHANA LAW REPORTS

SMC SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL

SMCD SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL DECREE

UGCC UNITED GOLD COAST CONVENTION

UNIGOV UNION GOVERNMENT

WTO WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FIELDS OF STUDY AND FIELD SUPERVISORS ....................................... iii

DEDICATION..................................................................................................... iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................v

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................... vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................. viii

CHAPTER ONE ......................................................................... 1

INSTITUTIONAL DYSFUNCTION AND CONTINUITY ............. 1

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................1

THE POLICE FORCE AND THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC ORDER .........12

THE POLICE AND AKPETESHIE ......................................................................15

RE-ENVISIONING THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE ......................................18

THE STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY OF THIS DISSERTATION .......20

CHAPTER TWO ...................................................................... 23

“BOME KOTOKU” ...................................................................................................23

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................23

THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF THE SLAVE TRADE IN

ABOUT 1830 ........................................................................................................27

THE PERIOD OF CONQUEST AND LEGITIMATE TRADE FROM 1830 UPTIL

1900.......................................................................................................................31

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TIME ..............................................31

THE ORIGINS OF THE POLICE FORCE ......................................................32

PEACE AND STABILITY FOR ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION .............35

PROTECTING THE POLITICAL CLASS ..................................................39

ENFORCING THE “RULE OF LAW” ........................................................43

THE CONSTRUCTION OF A BRUTAL POLICE FORCE IN AID OF

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOMINATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL46

EVIDENCE OF POLICE BRUTALITY ..........................................................53

THE POLICE FORCE AND THE LAW .........................................................59

THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL DOMINATION AND INTENSE ECONOMIC

EXPLOITATION FROM 1900 UPTIL THE MID 1940s ....................................63


POLICE ORGANIZATION OF THE TIME ...................................................64

PEACE AND STABILITY FOR ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION .............66

PROTECTING THE POLITICAL CLASS ..................................................69

ENFORCING THE “RULE OF LAW” AND POLICE BRUTALITY .......71

THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE, THE MID-1940s TO

1957.......................................................................................................................73


THE POLICE FORCE OF THE TIME ............................................................74

POLICE BRUTALITY .....................................................................................80

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................87

ix

CHAPTER THREE ................................................................. 89

POST-INDEPENDENCE “BOME KOTOKU” ............................... 89

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................89

THE NKRUMAH ERA, 1957-1966 .....................................................................94

THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF GHANA AT INDEPENDENCE ............94

THE POLICE IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA ..........98

POLICE BRUTALITY IN THE NKRUMAH ERA ......................................103

THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY, 1966 TO

1981.....................................................................................................................110

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TIME ............................................110

THE POLICE FORCE IN THIS ERA ............................................................111

POLICE BRUTALITY AND CORRUPTION IN THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL

AND ECONOMIC DOWNTURN .................................................................124

SAMPLE EVIDENCE OF THE YEARS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

DECLINE IN THE POLICE FORCE.............................................................130

THE RAWLINGS ERA AND THE PERIOD OF THE ERP, SAPs, AND

CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-1982 TO 2000 ......................................................135

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TIME ............................................135

THE POLICE FORCE IN THE RAWLINGS ERA .......................................141

POLICE BRUTALITY IN THE RAWLINGS ERA ......................................147

THE “BOME KOTOKU” CASE....................................................................149

THE ERA OF “POSITIVE CHANGE”, 2001 TO THE PRESENT ..................162

POLICE SUBSERVIENCE TO AND PROTECTION OF THE POLITICAL

CLASS, AND THEIR USE FOR ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND THE

ENFORCEMENT OF THE “RULE OF LAW” .............................................166

A BRUTAL POLICE FORCE TODAY .........................................................174

PUBLIC DISAPPROBIUM OF THE POLICE TODAY ...............................179

THE MAY 9 STADIUM DISASTER AND THE POLICE .....................181

POLICE REFORM TODAY ..........................................................................184

CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................191

CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................... 195

AKPETESHIE ................................................................................... 195

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................195

THE ‘AKPETESHIE’ SAGA .............................................................................197

ALCOHOL IN PRECOLONIAL TIMES ......................................................197

ALCOHOL IN COLONIAL TIMES ..............................................................203

THE TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT AND ALCOHOL IN THE COLONIAL

ERA.................................................................................................................210

STRANGULATION AND PROHIBITION OF THE ALCOHOL TRADE

DURING COLONIALISM AND THE AFTERMATH ................................214

ENTER “AKPETESHIE” ...............................................................................218

AKPETESHIE EXPLOSION .........................................................................222

x

AKPETESHIE, THE LAW, THE POLICE AND SUB-ALTERN COUNTER

HEGEMONIC PRACTICES ..............................................................................226

AKPETESHIE AND THE INDEPENDENCE ERA .........................................234

AKPETESHIE FROM 1970 TO THE 1990s .....................................................238

THE AKPETESHIE CASE ................................................................................245

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................255

CHAPTER FIVE .................................................................... 258

THE REFORM GAME AND ITS PLAYERS ............................... 258

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................258

INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY ....................................................................258

ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL FORMS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR

NORMATIVE SUPREMACY ...........................................................................263

VISIONS AND DREAMS OF THE FUTURE ..................................................267

THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM TODAY ............................272

INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM- AN AGENDA FOR THE

PRESENT ...........................................................................................................276

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................277

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................... 281

2004 by Raymond Akongburo Atuguba

SJD Dissertation, Harvard Law School

1

CHAPTER ONE

INSTITUTIONAL DYSFUNCTION1

AND CONTINUITY

INTRODUCTION

History is beautiful and history matters, and in this dissertation you will get a good dose

of it. “It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and

the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions. Today’s

and tomorrow’s choices are shaped by the past. And the past can only be made intelligible

as a story of institutional evolution”.2 The starting point for this dissertation is therefore

colonial Ghana.

Many issues that present themselves in Ghana today as simple issues of institutional

dysfunction that need to be reformed are not that simple. They are linked to genealogies

1 The word “dysfunction” is a loaded and tricky word. It has the potential of locking us into a

narrow functionalist way of thinking about institutions. I argue against this way of thinking about

institutions in this dissertation. It also assumes that there is a fixed, instrumentalist, positivist,

rational, high-modernist, deterministic, hegemonic notion of what functional institutions are.

Again, I argue against notion and suggest in this dissertation that moving away from these visions

of institutions problematizes the normative. And that is what it should be. Again, the word evokes

the various pejorative connotations that are often associated with Africa and the Third World. I

still use the word, even if with this long explanatory footnote. It gives me the opportunity to write

this explanation, which is useful in itself. 2 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,

(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; New York, 1990) p. vii.



2

and trajectories that are heavily embedded in historical institutional development from

the pre-colonial through the colonial to the post-colonial and post-modern eras. They are

products of intense contestations between the forces of colonialism (past and present) and

those of the colonized, and their respective agents, allies and sympathizers. The outcomes

of these contestations in the colonial era were basically crystallized as political, economic

and social institutional forms during the transfer of power to a Ghanaian government at

independence.

In the context of the political turmoil, maneuvers and compromises that took place

immediately before independence, it was a very rational choice to take over the

institutions, warts and all. Reforming these institutions could after all follow from

political independence. This was not to be. The dysfunctional institutional forms, cheap

to maintain, and serving for the new elite the same instrumental purposes as they did

during colonialism, were mostly retained and upgraded by the new ruling class,

undergoing very limited adaptations. In any case, the two decades following

independence were rough for the continent, and Ghana, a beacon on the continent, was at

the center of it all. There were the many countries emerging from colonialism, the

attendant struggles, and the calls on sister countries for support of all kinds; there was the

worldwide economic crises following the oil shocks, and there was the cold war. Within

Ghana, the colonial institutions were left to endure as Nkrumah struggled to achieve

African unity. If anything, the dysfunctional institutions were retained, refurbished and



3

deployed to defend the fragile Nkrumah regime and all the other post-independence

regimes.

When intensive institutional reforms started in the mid-1980s with the Economic

Recovery Programme (ERP), the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), and later the

National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP), the colonial institutions could have

been changed. Again, this was not to be. It was not just inertia, or incapacity on the part

of the new governments to govern properly that resulted in institutional continuities. New

structures, interests and patterns of resource control coincided with those of the colonial

era and ensured a perpetuation of the institutional forms that were developed during

colonialism and crystallized at the dawn of independence. The following quotation is

illustrative indeed:

The disintegration of the colonial empires brought about a strange and

incongruous convergence of aspirations. The leaders of the independence

movements were eager to transform their devastated countries into modern

nation-states, while the ‘masses’, who had often paid for their victories with

their blood, were hoping to liberate themselves from both the old and the new

forms of subjugation. As to the former colonial masters, they were seeking a

new system of domination, in the hope that it would allow them to maintain

their presence in the ex-colonies, in order to continue to exploit their natural

resources, as well as to use them as markets for their expanding economies or as

bases for their geopolitical ambitions.3

3 Majid Rahnema, “Introduction” in MAJID RAHNEMA (ed) The Post-Development Reader (Zed

Books: London & New Jersey, 1997) p. ix.



4

Rahnema was not exactly right. The convergence of interests excluded the masses, and it

is mostly from their struggle “to liberate themselves from …the old and the new forms of

subjugation” that we can begin to find answers to institutional dysfunction.

The former colonial masters sought and found a new form of domination in international

financial and trade institutions. These institutions ensure post-modern colonialism. In this

agenda, the colonial inherited institutions become great assets. This is because the basic

tenets of colonialism and post-modern colonialism are the same and require the same

basic institutional structure to be effective. The rhetoric of institutional reform is

therefore greater than the deed. And the deed is limited to sophist, skin deep, flippant

adaptations without tampering with the core character of the dysfunctional institutions

that perpetuate power hierarchies, poverty and patriarchy.

Without appreciating the fundamental logic of institutional continuity, frustrated persons

and groups in Ghana and all over the African continent, have taken over the reins of

power and attempted to institute institutional reform. Authoritarianism, heady

revolutions, overthrowing and killing the ruling class, have all occurred in a desperate

search for solutions to the gigantic and complex issue of institutional malaise, but to no

avail. There have also been condemnations of the ills of colonialism and of the unfair

world political and economic order, followed by exhortations to make a clean break from

them, but these have not worked. Today, high-sounding human rights refrains and

templates for magical institutional reform, marketed by consultants of international



5

financial institutions and their local governmental and non-governmental collaborators

are faring worse.

In the last decade, persons and groups have sought the help of the courts of law in the

agenda of institutional reform, but the general approach of the courts has been to decide

on very narrow issues and to hint that the proper agency to engage in extensive

institutional reform is the executive.4

Something else must be the solution to the problem of institutional malaise. The

beginning, I propose, is to look carefully at the history of the various reform issues, and

note the convergence and divergence of interests that have attended them. These should

then be mapped to determine the institutional forms that were produced by various

constituencies as they strove, in the context of politico-socio-economic changes,

eventualities, and accidents over time, to ensure the protection of their interests. These

patterns, together with the patterns produced by countervailing forces, are the key to the

enduring character of institutional forms, the reason for their dysfunction, and the

possibilities for reform.

4 New Patriotic Party v. Inspector General of Police [1993-94] 2 GLR 459, at 466, per Archer C.J.

See also DOMINIC M. AYINE, Constitutionalism, Governmental Accountability and Economic

Transformation in Ghana: A Law and Economics Perspective, 1998 (Unpublished Paper, on file

with author).



6

In none of the contestations and discussions about institutional reform has there been a

thorough historical analysis of institutional dysfunction. Nor has there been a serious

consideration of the convergence and ill convergence of interests that lead to institutional

continuity and the implication of these for reform efforts. Virtually all participants in

these discussions see the problem as a current one of institutional ineffectiveness and

inefficiency that need to be fixed with the aid of institutional performance improvement

models and kits.

In what way will historical institutional analysis help us in this quagmire? What are the

historical questions that have not already been asked? How will my type of historical

institutionalist research pay off as we identify ways of reforming institutions today? In

this dissertation I adopt a narration of history that shows interplay of changing

ideological formations and changing institutional forms. I show how these two shift

overtime and the interplay between them. I then show the light that the interplay sheds on

new forms of institutional ordering; new institutional forms, that produce new

possibilities and new countervailing technologies of power, capable of meeting the ways

in which the power of post-modern colonialism mobilizes itself.

The colonial infrastructure was not imposed on pre-existing states that were tabular rasa,

or which were governed by loose, and inferior norms and practices, as the early European

writers will have us believe. The political, economic and social systems of colonialism

and the new “rule of law” were superimposed on a set of highly developed systems and



7

rules that constantly mutated in accordance with the political economy of the societies

that occupied the territory now called Ghana.

The colonial enterprise interacted with these pre-existing systems producing two main

effects: first various variants of obliterating effects on a range of institutional forms, from

absolute expurgation and excision, through mutilation to pruning5 and modification. This

was executed mainly through superior military force and other forms of coercion. The

second effect of the interaction of the colonial enterprise and pre-existing forms of

organization was resistance. This took two forms: open, radical resistance that was

mostly crushed through military and police force, and more subterraneous and

sophisticated forms of resistance and survival skills that were used by ordinary folks to

beat the system. The latter forms of practical and pragmatic resistance were sustained and

made more complex by their interaction with other forms of political, economic and

social institutional and organizational forms that were left pretty intact by the colonial

enterprise. The resulting mesh of pragmatic resistance and pre-existing institutional

forms, deployed through physical, mental and rhetorical survival skills, made resistance

stronger still and more difficult to detect, contain and counter. When akpeteshie was

banned, there is evidence that some people beat the system through tricks like stringing

gallons of the “illicit” gin together, belting them to their waist, and covering them up with

a large cloth that is loosely draped over the body, a perfectly traditional dress style that

5 Pruning is chosen to convey the potential of fuller and better growth after the exercise.



8

was still legal.6 When the Poll Tax ordinance was in force, signals were sent round the

village when tax collectors were in sight. The result, everyone was in hiding when they

arrived. Information flow was effected through the use of drum language for example. In

confrontations with colonial officials and in the courts of law, rhetorical survival skills

were at play. Deliberate misinterpretation, and the use of coded language and proverbs to

outwit those colonial officials who had learnt the local language were rife. Counter

hegemonic activities of subalterns flourished. Most of these survival skills are now

chronicled in various African film and television dramas and in various literary works,

especially the African Writers Series.

As noted earlier, the negotiations for independence and the, at first, hesitant but

progressively highhanded and radical steps of the new governments unwittingly

crystallized the existing institutional forms for the same instrumental reasons as the

colonial government, but to different ends. The aim of the colonial government was

political domination and control for the purpose of economic exploitation and social

penetration and transformation. That of the independent government was centralized

political control for the purpose of extracting economic rent to build a unified socialist

developmentalist Africanist state, where all will have “work and happiness”7 and to fund

6 EMMANUEL K. AKYEAMPONG, Drink, Power, and Cultural Change: A Social History of

Alcohol in Ghana (Heinemann: Portsmouth, NH; James Currey: Oxford, 1996) p. 108. In High

School, our disdain for school uniforms and our love for this form of dressing, made us make up

stories about having infections and boils in our scrotums such that we could not wear the tight

fitting school shorts. This allowed us to dress traditionally. 7 This was one of the slogans of Nkrumah’s party, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP).



9

the goal of African Unity as a counter weight to neo-colonial imperialism.8 Political

subjugation and control of the masses, in order to ensure centralized political authority

and social control, the better to extract economic rent and ensure radical social

reorganization and unification of a conglomeration of diverse ethnic groups, thrust

together by the European partition of Africa at the Berlin conference of 1884, “called…to

settle Africa among the rival powers”9, required the same policies, laws, practices and

instruments of brute force and exploitation that the colonial government used. The new

independent government could not afford to let go of these. Indeed, they made the pre-

existing repressive institutions more sophisticated. The institutional forms that were

developed by the colonial regime were not only cheap and represented the line of least

imagination for the new governments; they were effective for crushing resistance and

exploiting the populace.

To the extent that they decided to keep the institutional forms of the colonial regime, the

new governments met with even more sophisticated forms of resistance than the colonial

government; resistance mechanisms and survival skills that had been revised, updated

and refined over the years. This was met with even greater forms of repression. When

“criminals” evaded the police, they will arrest their relatives and literary hold them

ransom. As late as 1993, the Supreme Court was still decrying this practice.10

8 KWAME NKRUMAH, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. (International

Publishers: New York, 1969), passim. 9 LYNN PAN, Alcohol in Colonial Africa, (Helsinki: Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies;

New Brunswick, N.J.: [Distributed By] Rutgers University Center of Alcohol Studies, 1975) p. 31. 10 Tehn-Addy v. Electoral Commission and another [1996-97] SCGLR 589



10

This state of institutional dysfunction continued until the early 1980s. The ERP and SAPs

of this period, launched by the government of Ghana and the World Bank and IMF,

brought economic benefits to the upper classes through a series of economic stabilization

programs, and the concomitants of engineered foreign direct investment, loans and grants

from development partners, mainly G-8 countries. The economic benefits hardly reached

the poor.11 Only two decades later was this sought to be corrected by various “Poverty

Reduction Strategies”12; and even this more in rhetoric than in practice. The second effect

of buying into the neo-liberal consensus was the opening up of democratic spaces within

Ghana. A liberal Constitution, a comprehensive bill of rights, various governmental

efforts at doing “National Institutional Renewal” under the NIRP13 and the National

Governance Program (NGP), and the rise of NGOs interested both in human rights and

institutional renewal, coincided to create and ensure the utilization of various democratic

spaces in Ghana for the purpose of reforming her institutions.

Whilst the upper classes were busy apportioning the benefits of the ERP/SAP and the

NIRP/NGP, and musing about institutional reform, the poor were equally busy polishing

up their forms of resistance and survival skills. When the upper classes were ready to do

serious reform, the lower classes had developed parallel and elaborate systems of

institutional ordering. They had mastered the art of combining the appropriate levels and

11 JIM YONG KIM et al (eds) Dying for Growth: Global Inequity and the Health of the Poor

(Common Courage Press, 2000), passim. 12 Many African countries under Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) are now required to

develop and implement “Poverty Reduction Strategies”. 13 The National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) is a Government of Ghana/World Bank

Project that aims at improving the performance of various institutions of state. It was started in the

mid-1990s and is currently being reviewed.



11

mix of overt and covert resistance that was necessary for self-help and survival. Current

institutional reform efforts mostly ignore these developments, either because they are not

aware of their existence and/or their ubiquitousness, potential, and value as alternative

forms of institutional ordering, or because they do not have the capacity to identify, learn

about, understand and address them.

In this dissertation, I explore the themes of institutional continuities, subaltern counter

hegemonic practices, and institutional reform by examining the regulation of public order

and alcohol in Ghana. The critical role of the police in these regulatory areas is

instructive at a number of levels and in several ways, as we shall soon see. I discuss how

the British political, economic and legal infrastructure penetrated and disrupted pre-

existing regulation of public order and alcohol that was conducive to a particular political

economy and various social practices. I emphasize the enduring character of the new

institutions14 created around public order and alcohol, and how they crystallized at

independence and were perpetuated in the post-independence era. As is to be expected,

the process of rough interaction between pre-existing norms on public order and alcohol,

and the imposed colonial infrastructure, was settled in favor of the latter, a process that

was ultimately dis-empowering to Ghanaians. It was only in the 1990s that groups of

Ghanaians thought that the situation should be changed. They felt oppressed by the

various relics of colonialism that were propped up and used by the new colonizers. As

14 Institutions are defined here as repetitive patterns of human behavior. North, Supra note 2; ANN

SEIDMAN, ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, NALIN ABEYSEKERE, Legislative Drafting for

Democratic Social Change (Kluwer Law International; Hague, London, Boston, 2001), passim;

ANN SEIDMAN AND ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, State and Law in the Development Process

(Macmillan: London; St. Martin’s: New York, 1994), passim.



12

shown in chapters three and four, they sought the help of the Supreme Court15 to address

some of the issues in the regulation of public order and alcohol that worked against them.

By showing that serious colonial issues around public order and alcohol, were still

nagging only a few years ago, I make explicit, the enduring character of institutional

dysfunction in Ghana today. This dissertation is the story of institutions, the reasons for

their endurance, resistance to them, and efforts at reforming them.

THE POLICE FORCE AND THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC ORDER

Systems of policing existed in the states that inhabited the territory now called Ghana

when the Brits formed their police force. Indeed, the concept of village or native policing

that was later introduced, was intended, in part, to incorporate and subsume the pre-

existing systems of policing as part of the broader design of indirect rule. The story of the

colonial enterprise was as much a story of economic exploitation as it was a story of legal

and political penetration and social reorganization. The police were critical to this

function.

There were several background rules that established the political and legal authority of

the British in the Gold Coast. Treaties- however tenuous, laws on treason, sedition and

15 The Supreme Court is the highest court in Ghana. It is also the only Constitutional Court,

subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce the constitutional provisions on

Fundamental Human Rights.



13

other crimes against the state16, arms and ammunition regulations,17 and laws on public

order18 were all aimed to secure British political authority. Other laws on property, tax,

and liquor licensing also distributed economic and social power in subtle but critical and

effective ways. It is the entire gamut of these laws which constructed the social reality of

the colonized by regulating their interactions inter se and in a subordinate capacity with

the colonizers, and in some cases, their fellow colonized. It was the police that was called

upon to enforce these laws. The police were therefore the basic instruments for

maintaining a particular political economy and social organization that was conducive to

the colonial enterprise. Part of the argument in this dissertation is that the police were

again central in maintaining the political economy of neo-colonialism, and are today,

central in maintaining the political economy of the globalization of capital, which I refer

to as the era of post-modern colonialism.19 To take one little example, this continuity is

seen clearly in the use of the police by the nationalist leaders as instruments for national

integration and the policing of the high modernist developmentalist state, and in the use

of the police as implementers and policers of neo-liberalism, another form of integration,

but integration into the world economy under the tutelage of the World Bank, the IMF

and the WTO.

16 Criminal code, 1832 (CAP 32). 17 Arms and Ammunition Ordinance, 1922 (CAP 253). 18 Public Meetings and Processions Regulations, 1926 (No. 10 of 1926). 19 Susan S. Silbey, “Let them eat cake: Globalization, Postmodern Colonialism, and the

Possibilities Of Justice”. 31 Law and Society Review 207, (1997).



14

It is essential here to graphically illustrate the type of historical continuity I am trying to

describe with one extensive quotation from an intelligent observer:

The baseline is that policing the empires developed largely in response to

several imperial demands, the most important of which was the global

expansion of capitalism, particularly in the nineteenth century, and the need

to control international markets in raw materials as well as outlets for

Europe’s industrial goods…[T]he police forces that eventually emerged in

the colonies were essentially ‘hybrids’, with many having characteristics that

did not mirror police models in the ‘mother-country’ but were shaped by

colonial events and needs…

The impact of colonial policing on the colonized are many and varied. The

link between policing and military action in the pacific territories, and the use

of the colonial police forces generally to maintain unfavourable colonial tax

and labour policies earned them the reputation of being nothing but

instruments of state coercion, representing an unquestionable political

authority and existing only to serve the political and economic interests of the

colonialists. Incidents of police brutality, corruption, violence, murder and

abuse of power punctuated almost every decade of colonial police history.

The political image of the colonial police was most visible during the period

of decolonization when development in colonial policing shifted rapidly

towards political policing against the ‘enemies’ of the colonial states.

However, the colonial policing legacy did not disappear in the developing

world after independence, even in those post-colonial states that adopted anti-

colonial revolutionary governments. Many post-colonial states continued in

the colonial tradition of political policing, using the police as the most visible

symbol of political power and control, to legitimize and entrench largely

authoritarian governments. Thus, in many respects, the post-colonial police

forces, like their colonial predecessors, are still misused and abused. The

question of their autonomy is yet to be resolved in constitutional

arrangements that emphasize government control. Various accounts of the

police in Africa continuing in the colonial tradition as agents of the state

against trade unionists, students and political opponents, persist…In a

nutshell, the strategic position that the police occupied in the colonization

process together with their operation as an arm of authoritarian governments

ever since have enabled them to consolidate their position as an instrument of



15

the central state which functions to perpetuate existing power relations in the

interest of the different factions of the post-colonial political classes.20

It is against this background that various governmental and non-governmental groups,

including the police itself, are working for reform of the force. This is a daunting task

indeed. Daunting because, the incentives to reform are very low in key sectors. As

Bankole notes, “there appears to be a general lack of political will…to make radical

changes for the future. For many post-colonial African countries, the inherited colonial

tradition is simple, manageable and perhaps cheap.”21 And I will add that it fits into the

pattern of neo-liberalism and post-modern colonization, more decently called

globalization. It will be a damn thing indeed for those who benefit from post-modern

colonialism to want to change the colonial character of the police. Flowing from the

above, I make the point in this dissertation that the reform issues facing the police in

Ghana today are less about changing or reforming the police than they are about policing

change or reform.

THE POLICE AND AKPETESHIE22

A vital component that must go into the institutional reform game is the product of the

various forms of resistance to the institutional forms that developed in the colonial era,

transformed through the independence era, and matured in the era of post-modern

20 Bankole A. Cole, “Post-Colonial Systems” in R.I. MAWBY Policing across the World: Issues

for the Twenty-first Century, (UCL Press: New York, 1999) p. 100-102. 21 Ibid p. 102. 22 This is the most popular name of the locally brewed “illicit” gin that replaced imported liquor

when import restrictions were imposed.



16

colonialism. The various sophisticated rhetorical and other survival skills that subalterns

developed to avoid being crushed by these forces, and the various sub-institutional forms

that proliferated thereby, are a major factor in the reform game, and we discount them at

our peril. Already, there is increasing tension between the police and the citizenry,

serious security voids, and the proliferation of extra-state security institutions, some legal,

most “illegal”, as we shall see in chapters three and five.

In this dissertation, I explore this theme by reference to the regulation of alcohol in

Ghana. First, I showed how the British colonial infrastructure penetrated and disrupted

pre-existing regulation of alcohol. This complements the story of the colonial

construction of institutions that I discuss in the case of the police. The complex contests

between men, women and young persons, between local and foreign temperance

movements and the colonial government, between the colonized and the colonizers,

between the police and persons who brewed, sold or consumed akpeteshie and several

other constituents, all around the regulation of alcohol, demanded a pragmatic and

experimentalist negotiation of power. All this was further complicated by the rise and fall

of revenues from liquor and from other sources, the rise of the nationalist movement and

various other historical events and accidents.

Contests over the regulation of alcohol was settled against the subalterns of each era,

women and children in the pre-colonial era, the colonized in the colonial era, and the

working-class and the poor in the post-colonial era, outcomes which I think are ultimately



17

dis-empowering to the Ghanaian citizenry. Thus, at the dawn of independence, there was

a crystallization of the institutional forms for the regulation of alcohol that placed

enormous power in the hands of the government and its agents. As was the case with the

police, these institutional forms were preserved by the new independent government and

used for social control and revenue mobilization purposes. Again, as was the case with

the Bome Kotoku case, the akpeteshie case, decided by the Supreme Court in the 1990s is

living testimony to the currency of the issues of institutional dysfunction.

On a lighter note, the emulation of the colonial European lifestyle, by the new leaders of

Ghana, which included elaborate and quite heavy drinking, was an outward manifestation

of the enduring character of institutional dysfunction and portends worse forms of

subterranean dysfunction.23 As one observer has noted:

It is perhaps an irony…that among the small national bourgeoisie of officials

and intellectuals created after independence, the emulation of the life style of

their ex-colonial rulers made possible by their raised standards of living has

meant the increased import of spirits along with cars and other consumer

goods…[and] the adoption of drinking habits more characteristically

European.24

23 LYNN PAN, Alcohol in Colonial Africa, (Helsinki: Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies;

New Brunswick, N.J.: [Distributed By] Rutgets University Center of Alcohol Studies, 1975) p.13-

14. 24 Ibid p. 14.



18

RE-ENVISIONING THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE

The colonial experience is normally thought of in terms of economic exploitation. This

diminution of the colonial experience to economic exploitation, discounts all the serious

issues of legal penetration, political governance and social reordering that took place

during the period and their enduring character today. This dissertation helps fill this void

by showing how the economic exploitation imperative, operating through law-the

command of the sovereign-had gross and lasting effects on political and economic

governance and social ordering. I have tried in this dissertation to move away from the

narrow, economic historicisation of the colonial reality, and proffer a legal, and political

institutional historicisation of colonialism. I describe the colonial state as a legal and

political enterprise in aid of economic exploitation. I am, however, quick to add that the

legal and political aspects of the enterprise had a life of their own and led to the

establishment of peculiar institutional forms. The police were key to the making of these

institutions. Because the police were formed for the sole purpose of enforcing the laws

and the political economy of colonialism, that institution acquired a particular culture and

ethos. That culture and ethos has since not left the police due to the continuity of

colonialism in various mutations.

If we consider that the crises of state collapse in Africa relates only to the collapse of

what is left of the colonial state,25 then police reform in Ghana today can only take place

25 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the

Political Legacy of Colonialism, 2004. (Unpublished Paper, on file with author).



19

by devising the mechanisms for presiding over the collapse of those aspects of the police

which are legitimate descendants of the colonial construction of the force. In the peculiar

case of the police, the entire institution was a product of the colonial enterprise. This

means that the force has to be completely reconfigured.

There is nothing that is not constructed. So to reconstruct or reform, we need to know the

nature of the engineering that constructed the phenomenon we are trying to reconstruct.

And the better it is constructed, the more it withstands all the bloody reform forces

directed against it. In the case of the police force, reform is a complex matter because its

colonial characteristics are conducive for the current era of post- modern colonialism.

The colonial state lives on. To reform it, we need to rediscover emancipatory legacies

that were officially silenced by the colonial power and are being silenced today by the

powers of post-modern colonialism. I conclude that a reform of the police in Ghana will

have to be grounded in the reform of the political economy that the police are called upon

to police.

Any such strategy for institutional redesign has to have a stubborn ability to resist the

discourse of post-modern colonialism; contain a proliferation of alternatives-an inventory

of institutional social normative forms on the basis of which contestations and policy

decisions will be made; and be situated in the prevailing array of democratic possibilities.



20

THE STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY OF THIS DISSERTATION

After this introductory chapter, I discuss in chapter two how the police force in the Gold

Coast, now Ghana, came to acquire its status as a key institution of governance. This

chapter covers the period up till political independence in 1957. It provides a re-reading

of the traditional role of the police-the maintenance of law and order- and suggests that

law and order are empty categories that can be filled with anything. In this case, it was

filled with the core imperialist objectives of political domination, economic exploitation

at the onset of industrial capitalism, legal penetration, and social reordering. This will be

the first part of a detailed account of how institutions in Africa came to be what they are.

A police force, constructed to meet certain core imperialist objectives and a political

economy conducive to same, cannot but be dysfunctional today.

In the next chapter we bring this story up to the present by showing how the opportunities

for the reform of the police were lost as political independence approached and through

the years of political and economic decline up till the present. I conclude this chapter by

noting that the reasons for this type of stubborn institutional continuity can be located in

the continuity of colonialism and imperialism in different forms and under different

names.

Chapter four deals with a different aspect of colonial political control, economic

exploitation, legal penetration and social reordering. Here, I discuss an example of more

micro-level institutional construction-the control of alcohol-from the colonial, through



21

the post-colonial, to the current period. The role of the police in this enterprise is

underlined. As in the case of the police, this story is also one of historical continuity. In

this example of fiscal and cultural control, however, the forms of resistance are different.

Conquered and “pacified”, the colonized could not but engage in various subterraneous

counter hegemonic activities against imperialist hegemony. These forms of subaltern

resistance have endured and continue today.

In the last chapter, chapter five, I do two main things. First, I discuss the general

character of current forms of subaltern resistance to existing institutional forms. I then

reflect on the implications of this, and other themes in the dissertation, on institutional

reform efforts that are being attempted today by a range of diverse interests and

constituencies. The key reflections relate to the limited information and knowledge on

institutions in Ghana, the importance of the colonial character of these institutions, and

the possibilities for a complete re-envisioning of institutional forms.

Next, I reflect on institutional continuity as it relates to the reform of institutions in Ghana

today. I look closely at the one hundred and seventy-five years of history of the police

force in the regulation of public order and alcohol and identify a number of alternative

forms of institutional ordering in the security sector over the years which were “the roads

not taken”. I proffer some reasons why these “roads [were] not taken”, remain obscure,

un-documented, and un-researched. I then present these reasons as the missing links in

the current process of reforming Ghana’s institutional heritage.



22

My dissertation provides crucial knowledge gaps on the police as an example of the

information deficit on the institutions that are sought to be transformed; develops a theory

for analyzing the genesis, growth and development of colonial institutional forms;

develops a theory of institutional continuity for mapping immediate post-colonial and

current institutional forms; and finally, a theory for grafting that historical institutional

analysis into reform initiatives of the present.

The bureaucratic state is unintelligent, and so we have political contestation to guide it.

This contestation, including contestations on what institutions should exist, what form

they should take, what they should do, and how they should do what they do, is guided by

two discourses: the discourse of power and the discourse of reason informed by

knowledge and experience. The fact that subaltern counter-hegemonic forms of resistance

have the capacity to disrupt institutional forms is evidence that the discourse of power is

very unreliable and in any event, too costly. The only other option is the discourse of

reason informed by experience. The beginning of this is historical institutional analyses,

more so in the case of ex-colonies with their peculiar and complex histories. In the words

of my barber at Central Square in Cambridge, Massachusetts, “how can you be yourself if

you do not know yourself”?



23

CHAPTER TWO

“BOME KOTOKU”26

INTRODUCTION

The “traditional role” of the police is said to be that of “maintaining law and order”.27

What constitutes “law” and “order” varies from place to place and from time to time. In

this chapter, I argue that the police are not just there to maintain “law and order”,

whatever that means. The police, the most visible arm of the state’s internal sovereignty,

are a key player in the creation, maintenance, and demise of the political economy of a

nation state. They do this by implementing policies and laws of the nation state. These

policies and laws are the infrastructure of the state’s political economy. Thus, the

existence of the police, their importance, functions, activities, relationship with the

government and the citizenry, are determined by the political economy of the state. Yet,

the nature of the political economy is also determined by the extent to which the police

enforce “the rule of law”. In sum, the nature of the political economy, no matter how

26 This expression means “box me” and was used to describe akpeteshie (see post, Chapter 4, note

1 for the definition of akpeteshie). It captures the assault on persons who were arrested for

brewing, selling or consuming the illicit gin. The most widely known and most detested function

of the police is their arrest function and the brutality with which it is executed is encapsulated in

this expression. 27 1992 Constitution of Ghana, Article 200(3).



24

contested, warped or subterraneous, can be seen clearly in the relative importance and

functions of the police.

The role of the police in the political and economic development of nation states has not

received much attention in the literature.28 In Western societies, the roles of the police are

defined primarily in terms of the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of

offenders, and the maintenance of public order and safety. This holds true for the

developing world, but there is more to the police in those nation-states. The role of the

police in less-developed countries, are defined broadly and include political, economic

and social governance. Persons and groups who seek to understand and possibly contest

and change a particular political economy, will do well to watch the police and policing.

In this and the next chapter, I trace the historical and social contexts within which the

police as an institution of governance was created in Ghana, and how its role was shaped

through time. Policing in Ghana changed drastically between the pre-colonial and the

colonial, from the enforcement of moral and religious order to the protection of political

and commercial interests. There has, however, been little fundamental change, during the

various post-colonial phases.

28 John A. Arthur and Otwin Marenin, “British Colonization and the Political

Development of the Police in Ghana, West Africa”, in CHARLES B. FIELDS AND RICHTER H.

MOORE, JR, Comparative Criminal Justice: Traditional and Nontraditional Systems of Law and

Control (Waveland Press, Inc.: Prospect Heights, Illinois, 1996), p. 163.



25

In tracing the political economy and law and order maintenance functions of the police in

the Gold Coast/Ghana29 through time, I have identified the following critical phases:

1. The pre-colonial period, up until the formal end of the slave trade in about

1830;

2. The period of conquest and “legitimate trade” from about 1830 to 1900;

3. The period of political domination and intensive exploitation of natural

resources from about 1900 to the mid 1940s;

4. The tumultuous period of transition to independence, beginning in the mid-

1940s, through the attainment of independence in 1957;

5. The Nkrumah30 period, ranging from 1957 to 1966;

6. The period of economic downturn and political uncertainty, that witnessed

the rise and fall of five military regimes and two democratically elected

constitutional governments, between 1966 and1981;

7. The Rawlings era31 and the period of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP)

and the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), beginning in 1982 through to

2000; and

29 Most of the entity now called Ghana was formally a British colony in the latter part of the

nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries. It was then called “The Gold Coast”. It gained political

independence in 1957, with the Queen of England as the titular Head of State. It became a full

Republic, with a President as Head of State and Head of Government in 1960. Henceforth in this

dissertation, I will refer to the entity through time as Ghana. 30 Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was the first Prime Minister of Ghana from 1951 to 1960. In 1957, when

Ghana became independent, he continued as Prime Minister till he was voted and installed

President with the coming into force of the 1960 First Republican Constitution. He was

overthrown by a Military-Police coup d’etat on 24th February 1966. 31 Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings became Head of State on 4th June 1979, following a military coup

d’etat. He handed over power to a civilian democratically elected Head of State who was installed



26

8. The current period, 2001 to date.

The purpose of this exercise is to examine, very broadly, the political economy of Ghana

at each point in time, and identify the role of the police in same. Each period will contain

a brief account of the political economy of the time and a corresponding account of the

role of the police. As David Bayley32 has argued, the police have not generally been

independent actors. They rarely act on their own in politics, but usually as instruments of

others. He adds that in the case of the colonial police, they were closely tied to the

political purpose of the colonial regime, and the roots of police systems in the colonies

are to be found in colonial policies: “police forces are the creatures of politics”.33

But before we examine British imperialism as it played out in the creation of the Police

Force in Ghana, it is imperative to examine what forms of security provisioning were

available before the advent of the police force. This will remind us that Ghana was not

with the coming into force of the 1979 Third Republican Constitution on the 24th September 1979.

On 31st December 1981, Rawlings overthrew the government he handed over power to in another

coup d’etat and became Head of State again till 6th January 1993, when the fourth Republican

Constitution came into force following elections. Rawlings became President under this

constitution and ruled from 7th January 1993 to 6th January 1997, when he was re-elected for a

second and final term that ended on the 6th of January 2001. The main opposition party during the

Rawlings era won the elections of 2000 and was installed on the 6th of January 2001. The term of

that government ends on the 6th of January 2005. The ERP and SAP that were initiated by the

Rawlings government from the mid-1980s, under the tutelage of the World Bank and the IMF

have basically been continued to date, if even under different names and with minor substantive

changes. 32 Quoted in RICHARD B. KRANZDORF, The Military and Police in the Gold Coast/Ghana

Through February 1966: A Study of Limited Institutionalization. Ph. D Dissertation, University of

California, Los Angeles, Political Science, 1973) p. 20. 33 Ibid, p. 63.



27

tabular rasa security-wise, and that the creation of the new force went along with a good

deal of extirpation of what existed before.

THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF THE SLAVE TRADE IN ABOUT 1830

The police as a centralized and formal body of trained officers with specific policing

duties did not exist within the groups that inhabited pre-colonial Ghana. This came with

formal British rule in the early part of the nineteenth century. The idea of policing was

not, however, totally unknown to these groups. In the traditional system, there were men

who did police duties. These law enforcing agencies in the traditional system included

individuals who performed citizen arrests and the Linguist, (chief spokesman of the

chief), when as a linguist to a sub-chief he ensures the attendance of his sub-chief at the

court of the paramount chief to be tried for an offence. The community as a whole would

also act in concert and in response to an alarm to catch a fleeing offender or search for an

offender in hiding. Bands of adult men would also lie in wait to apprehend thieves34 or

patrol the village. There were also the Messengers of the Chiefs who were given oral

warrants by the paramount chief to arrest offenders35.

34 S. K. ANKAMA, Police History: Some Aspects in England and Ghana (Silkan Books, Essex,

UK 1983) p.22. Ankama does not discuss the role of the police during the era of slave raiding and

trading. This is probably because slave raiding was a military and not a police function in pre-

colonial Ghana. 35 Ibid, p. 20-26.



28

Thus, pre-colonial Ghana had well-developed institutions for maintaining social order

and bringing under control behaviors that threatened the stability of ordered society.

Although security, law and order provisioning was essentially a collective communal

responsibility, the greater onus fell on local chiefs who retained a system of courts with

agents whose primary roles consisted in enforcing local edicts. Tribal elders, chiefs, and

their ruling councils derived this power of social control from religious norms and

beliefs, which permeated the fabric of pre-colonial society in Ghana.36

The extended family system also played an important role in social control and the

maintenance of social order. Norm violation brought shame not only to the offender but

also to his or her extended family and kin group. There was, therefore, collective pressure

from extended family members to ensure the compliance and conformity of family

members. It was very common for members of the extended family to intervene to

protect the honor of the family when one of its members went against the norms of the

society. They would impose swift and certain punishment on their own, after an

adjudicatory process that determined that his or her actions had gone against the common

weal. Again, norm violations could be arbitrated within the extended family nexus of the

victim and the offender.37

In this period, common norm violations included witchcraft and sorcery, acts of sexual

improprieties, thefts, assaults, and adultery. Following some of these crimes, and to

36 John A. Arthur and Otwin Marenin, supra note 28, p. 165. 37 Ibid, p. 166.



29

restore harmonious relationships, the entire community had to be purified in the manner

prescribed by customary law. This gave an intricate communal twist to the various

delicts. Forms of punishment included being expelled from the community, fines, and

restitution. Incarceration as a form of punishment was a British colonial importation.38

The kingdom of the Ashanti, one of the several kingdoms that inhabited the territory now

called Ghana, had agents of social control who performed various judicial roles and they

were provided training according to the law, customs, and traditions of the kingdom. In

most parts of the then Northern Territories, a similar system of law enforcement based

upon Hausa and Islamic doctrines of law prevailed.39 The northern-most parts of the

Northern Territories, however, remained significantly untouched by Islam. In these areas,

social control was based on customary laws and traditions of the kind described by

Marenin below.

In the words of Marenin:

The traditional precolonial system of social control was very effective in

preserving social order and ensuring social stability. In conjunction with the

institutions of government and the extended family system, the precolonial

agents of social control maintained order by taking steps to prevent events

that disturbed or threatened social cohesion. Acts of normative violations

were few and far between. Collective punishment and enforcement of social

regulations solidified the shared norms and values of law-abiding citizens

while alerting all to the boundaries of unacceptable behaviors….

38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.



30

The legitimacy of policing was authorized by the community or its

recognized representatives and, in a larger sense, by the religious beliefs that

stressed the harmony between the living and their current and past

environments. The structure of policing was decentralized, often done

informally by kin and community. Policing served broad and numerous

functions, from crime control to order maintenance to the reaffirmation of

secular and religious authority.”40

Most of this was to be wiped away with the advent of colonialism. If anything was

retained, it was the native authority police, but they had lost their independence and

operated somewhat as junior appendages to the Gold Coast Police Force. Writing in

1952, Sir Charles Jeffries had this to say:

In addition to the regular government police, some of the native authorities

have their own police forces, which are normally unarmed and locally

recruited. They have powers of arrest and search and are required to assist the

Gold Coast Police when necessary.41

It will appear that, even in respect of these forces, the colonial government set out to

introduce a completely new form and purpose of policing in the Gold Coast. In the

grinding words of Gillespie:

The customs of the savage and barbarous native states have left no mark on

modern organisation or methods, for the Native Authority Forces of to-day

are copies of the Government Police rather than survivals of indigenous

methods of Peace preservation.42

40 Supra note 28 p. 166-167. See also M. FORTES AND E. E. EVANS –PRITCHARD, African

Political Systems, (Oxford University Press: London; New York; Toronto, 1958). 41 SIR CHARLES JEFFRIES, The Colonial Police, (Max Parrish: London, 1952) p. 94. 42 W.H. GILLESPIE, The Gold Coast Police: 1844-1938 (The Government Printer: Accra, Gold

Coast, 1955) p. 1.



31

The indigenous and pre-existing systems of policing were considered inappropriate for

the exploitative agenda that was to unfold. To this agenda we will now turn our attention.

THE PERIOD OF CONQUEST AND LEGITIMATE TRADE FROM 1830 UNTIL 1900

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TIME

The colonization of Ghana came in stages. First, there was the colonization of the colony,

then Ashanti and then the Northern Territories. These processes, especially in the case of

Ashanti, involved serious warfare. The various wars, treaties and pacts that led to the

consolidation of British rule over Ghana took place during this period. The role of the

military and police in conquest and the pacification process is evident.

Again, by 1830, the slave trade was ending. The European trading companies needed to

substitute the illegitimate trade with “legitimate trade” in primary agricultural and

mineral products. Slave-raids could often be conducted in short spells of time, not so with

legitimate trade. The production of primary agricultural products like cocoa and palm oil,

or the extraction of gold, diamond and other mineral resources required greater

investments of time and resources. Like most of the other colonies, Ghana commenced its

imperial connection as the private domain of limited companies based in London. These



32

colonial ventures were profit-motivated.43 To ensure returns on these investments, the

sites for the production of the agricultural and mineral raw materials, and the routes for

charting them from the sites to the coast for export, needed to be kept safe. When these

primary products were exported to Europe, they were turned into manufactured goods,

some of which were sold in the colonies. For this, trade routes had to be created,

maintained and kept safe.

THE ORIGINS OF THE POLICE FORCE

Flowing from the above, the key reasons for establishing the police force in Ghana, was

to ensure the protection of representatives of trade companies, supervise convict labor on

plantations, maintain the peace and security necessary for the extraction and export of

agricultural and mineral products, and the maintenance of the colony as a market for

European goods through the protection of trade routes. The colonial governments saw the

economic imperative as foremost in establishing a professional police.44 The early

policing of the colony, therefore, had the primary function of protecting the assets of the

companies. Originally performed by the companies themselves, the costs of the operation

grew too great, and were absorbed by the imperial government. And the imperial trading

43 Mike Brogden, “The Emergence of the Police-The Colonial Dimension”, British Journal of

Criminology vol. 27 no. 1 (Winter 1987) p.4 at 12. 44 Ibid.



33

companies voluntarily ceded this function when they deemed it more profitable for the

state to undertake the burden.45

The declared policy of the British colonial government, according to the principle of

indirect rule that was formulated and championed by Lord Luggard46, was to employ the

well-centralized local systems of traditional social control and law enforcement that were

in place prior to their arrival. To this end, they established local-authority police forces.

They were charged with enforcing traditional laws and directives or ordinances of the

chiefs, so long as these ordinances and directives did not threaten British political or

economic interests. The local authority police wore uniforms but were not permitted to

bear arms. Between the 1820s and the 1890’s, the British then established new

institutions of social control and law enforcement. These were to protect their newly

acquired territorial and economic interests. The colonial project of subordination and

transformation of native policing systems had started. In name, the new institutions

included, more or less sequentially, the Royal African Colonial Corps, the West Indies

Regiment, the Militia and Police, the Gold Coast Corps, the Armed Police, the Gold

Coast Artillery, the Gold Coast Constabulary, the Lagos Constabulary, and a Volunteer

Force. Their functions included the protection of the coastal forts, the resident constables

at the courts of prominent chiefs instructed to inform the Governor of whatever was

going on, the guarding of prisoners, the maintenance of order in the towns, the attending

45 Mike Brogden, “An Act to Colonise the Internal Lands of the Island: Empire and the Origins of

the Professional Police”, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, vol. 15, no. 2 (May 1987)

p. 179 at 205-6. 46 See LORD LUGGARD, The Dual-Mandate in Tropical Africa, (London, 1922), which

discusses the theory of Indirect Rule.



34

of Magistrate’ and Judicial Assessor’s Court, the acting as messengers, the actual going

to war against Ashanti, and finally, the patrolling of the interior and countering any

incursions by the French, to the north and west or Germans, to the east, of the Gold Coast

in the 1890’s.47 As the various names of the force and its functions show, it was a

military cum police contingent.

These new security institutions were not created primarily for the preservation of law,

order, peace and security in the colony, but rather to protect the persons, territory and the

economic interests of the British companies that were now operating along the Atlantic

corridor of West Africa, such as the United Trading Company (UTC) of Ghana, the

Imperial British East African Company, and the Royal Niger Company.48 Professional

policing was thus directly linked to the commercial interests of an expanding capitalism

in search of new markets and resources. With the pacification of the interior going on,

and trade expanding, “some kind of armed constabulary was required for the protection

of British traders, missionaries, and officials and for the support of friendly tribes”49 and

“…so many aspects of Police work closely [concerned] the policy of the Government that

a high-grade police force [was] by way of being an economic insurance in the long

run”50. The New Police were clearly driven by the economic imperative to safeguard and

enhance exploitation through trade and through the control of new industrial labor. They

47 Supra note 32, p. 75. 48 Supra note 28, p. 167-8. 49 Supra note 45, p. 202. 50 Ibid.



35

were inextricably linked to the new era of imperial legitimation and Victorian capitalism.

Their origin was materially based.51

The core functions of the police in this domain are best summed up in the activities of the

Escort Police, a branch which has survived as a branch to date and which still has a very

huge percentage of the total number of policemen and women in Ghana52.

The Escort Police had an initial force of fifty men…created to guard specie,

particularly from the mines and the banks, to escort officials, accompany carrier

caravans of the newly formed Government Transport Service, supervise convict

labour and provide additional armed force for the business of civil

administration. By 1914…the Escort Police had become the largest branch of

the police…”.53

In fact, the role of the Escort Police, the successor to the Lagos Constabulary or Hausa

Police, was that of an obedient paramilitary unit that could be counted on for

unquestioning fidelity to the European officers.54

PEACE AND STABILITY FOR ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION

The demands of commerce in the Gold Coast dictated that trade routes and customs posts

51 Supra note 45, p. 205. 52 As late as 1999, the Escort Branch still commandeered 12.5% of the total strength of the police

force. POKOO-AIKINS, The Police in Ghana: 1939-1999 (J.B. Pokoo-Aikins, 2002) p. 47. 53 David Killingray, “Guarding the Extending Frontier: Policing the Gold Coast, 1865-1913” in

DAVID M. ANDERSON AND DAVID KILLINGRAY (eds), Policing the Empire: Government,

Authority and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester University Press: Manchester, New York, 1991) p.

106 at 122. 54 Supra note 32, p. 83



36

should be policed,55 and in Governor MacLean’s estimation, magistrates and policemen

were the primary “instruments of civilization”.56 Indeed, the origins of the Gold Coast

Police Force, lies in efforts by the British council of merchants to protect trading routes

and depots. In 1830 the council hired numerous guards and escorts for this purpose and

Governor, MacLean, "let it be known that to interfere with travelers and with trade-in the

local phraseology, to 'close the paths'-was a serious offence".57 He generally succeeded in

maintaining the law and order necessary for “keeping trade routes open and recovering

commercial debt”.58 This was done through the enforcement of peace treaties which

provided, to take one famous example, that “the first objects of law are the protection of

individuals and property”,59 necessary pre-requisites for “individuals” to trade in

“property”. According to Gillespie, "In tracing the history of the Gold Coast Police…the

starting point must be the second assumption by the Crown in 1844"60 with the Bond of

1844 and the change to imperial government. This was when the new Force began to

exercise true police powers throughout the country. It was at this time that the British

established the 120-member Gold Coast Militia and Police.61

55 David M. Anderson and David Killingray, “Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: Policing

the Empire, 1830-1940 in DAVID M. ANDERSON AND DAVID KILLINGRAY (eds), Policing

the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester University Press:

Manchester, New York, 1991) p. 1 at 6. 56 Ibid, p. 9. 57 W.B. F. WARD, A History of Ghana (London, 1958) (Second Edition) p. 191. 58 Supra note 53, p. 111. 59 See the full text of the Bond of 1844, regarded by the Gold Coast/Ghana in colonial times as its

Magna Carta, and signed by the Governor and by eight chiefs in W.B. F. Ward, Supra note 57 p.

194. 60 Supra note 42, p. 1. 61 Information Courtesy: The Library of Congress - Country Studies, (1Up Info All Rights

reserved, 2003).



37

In 1830, it was essential for the police to enforce peace treaties and laws and thereby

ensure the stability that was necessary for agricultural productivity and mineral extraction

to feed the population and the industries in Europe; for "The chaos of the last twenty-five

years had made it impossible to develop the rice, maize, indigo, palm oil and timber

trades...as substitutes for the slave trade. The establishment of internal peace and security,

and the development of trade went together...".62 It appears that the 120 man strong police

force that was available to MacLean chalked some successes for, "In ten years he more

than trebled the country's trade..." and in another ten years, the then Governor was able to

report: “almost entire absence of lawless violence in any part of the old settlements, and

that property in goods or bullion to any amount can be and is transported for scores of

miles...without the lightest risk of danger”63.

Reading the peace treaties, it is clear that the British basically cut a deal with the local

chieftains, which ensured that the latter were protected by the former from various

invading and marauding forces both within and without the colony. For this purpose, the

colonizers needed a police force as the visible instrument of the internal and external

sovereignty of the colonial state. In return, the colonizers were given access to the trade

routes and the markets of the coast and the interior, first for the slave trade and second for

"legitimate trade". The police force was used to enforce this deal.

The above conclusion is evident from the duties of the Force. They performed escort

62 Supra note 57, p. 190. 63 Supra note 42, p.5.



38

duties, attended the Magistrates' and Judicial Assessors courts and performed prison

duties.64 These constitute the complement of steps needed to apprehend, try and imprison

various offenders who breached the peace necessary for trade or interfered with the

import and sale of manufactured goods or the extraction and export of agricultural and

mineral produce.

When it was decided to concentrate on the recruitment of Hausas for the force, it was not

only their martial qualities and the policy of “policing strangers by strangers”, but the fact

that they had experience in guarding “the Lagos hinterland and the trade routes to the

British colony”65 that informed the decision. The Hausa Police became the paramilitary

arm of the colonial government and aside guarding the “key [trade] route north to Kumase

and Prasu”, they generally formed patrols and punitive expeditions to assert British

sovereignty and authority, thus providing the coercive force that enabled British authority

to be established throughout the Gold Coast.66 The Constabulary was also regularly

required to deal with urban riots and faction or ‘company’ fights which erupted

frequently. A major aim of the British administration being territorial and fiscal control it

was essential to ‘protect British territory from violation and stop smuggling’ of tobacco,

rum and trade routes and increase the colony’s revenue. New customs posts were also

created, and the Hausa force stationed in the area built blockhouses and redoubts.67 In a

series of campaigns over a period of more than ten years, they suppressed the

64 Ibid, p. 3 65 Supra note 53, p. 107. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid, p. 113.



39

independence and trade of the south-eastern Ewe peoples.68

PROTECTING THE POLITICAL CLASS

The police force was always under the control of the political class in this period.

According to a number of narratives, formal policing in the Gold Coast is said to have

started in 1831 when Captain George MacLean, the then Governor, formed a body of 129

men to maintain and enforce the provisions of the "treaty of Peace" which he signed with

the coastal chiefs and the King of Ashanti.69 Ward70 tells us that a police force was in

existence as at 1831 and was in the service of Governor MacLean, but he put the figure at

120. It is certain that this very force was used to police the bond of 1844, another treaty of

peace, protection and trade. Gillespie writes that when Lieutenant-Governor Hill assumed

the government in 1844 he found under the management of the President and Council,

who had administered the government of the forts under the African Committee, two

small bodies of troops, "the Gold Coast Corps of 129 men and the Militia of 62"71. This

force was obviously the successor to the force that was at the service of MacLean. It is

safe to conclude that when Governor MacLean took office in the Gold Coast in 1830, he

either formed or had at his disposal, a body of about 120 men who either performed or

were called to perform police duties under his control, even if they were not formally

68 FRANCIS AGBODEKA, African Politics and British Policy in the Gold Coast 1868-1900: A

Study in Forms and Force of Protest, (Longman: Northwestern University Press, 1971) p. 62-76. 69 EMMANUEL KWESI ANING, An Overview of the Ghana Police Service. Paper prepared for

the African Security Dialogue and Research, October 2001. (Unpublished, on file with author) p.

1. 70 Supra note 57, p.190. 71 Supra note 42, p. 1.



40

called a police force. It appears that they were a type of militia and had police cum

military duties. Lieutenant-Governor Hill, who succeeded MacLean, renamed the Gold

Coast Corps of 129 men the "Militia and Police". Hill then used the "Militia and Police",

"a body under the undivided control of the Lieutenant-Governor and consisting of local

men" for civil employment72. It appears that the force dwindled some where along the line

and had to be reorganized. In 1846 Lt.-Governor Winniett sent a dispatch to the Secretary

of State for the Colonies seeking approval for the establishment of a Police Force of 60

men in Ghana73. The Secretary of State’s approval was granted,74 and in 1865, the then

Lt. Governor wrote to the Secretary giving a progress report on the re-organization of the

force.75 Digest of Rules for the maintenance and good order of the new Police Force were

prepared in November 186576 and the Lt. Governor sought and received approval of these

from the Secretary of State the following year.77

It is clear from the above that at its inception, the force was without any officers and was

under the direct control of the Governor himself.78 The armed police of 1873-4, and their

military successors and the civil police, also came under the direct control of the

governor of the colony. He acted as the commander-in-chief of the military and directed

the local organization and conduct of the civil police.79 Earlier, in 1869, Acting

72 Ibid. 73 Despatch No. 28 dated 16th June 1846, (ADM. 1/2/3). 74 Despatch (Military) No. 2 of 14th October 1846. 75 Despatch No. 138 dated 9th November 1865 (ADM. 1/1/4). 76 (ADM. 1/3/14). 77 Despatch No. 299 dated 17th January 1866 (ACC No. 3135/56). 78 Supra note 42, p. 3 79 Supra note 53, p. 111.



41

Administrator Simpson had proposed “a ‘Governor’s Guard’ to police the courthouse and

guard Government House”.80 The day-to-day direction of the constabulary and the civil

police was done by District Commissioners.81

Aside the Gold Coast Colony and British Togoland, there were two other areas of British

jurisdiction, which form present day Ghana. These are Ashanti and the Northern

Territories. The control of the forces in these areas was no different. The Police were

first stationed in Ashanti in 1896, accompanied the governor in his escape from a siege

and returned when British Authority was re-established. Their numbers in Ashanti were

gradually increased and an Assistant Commissioner was stationed there in 1905. It was

not until 1922 that the Police Ordinance of that year provided: “There shall be established

for the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti, a Police Force to be known as the Gold Coast

Police Force”. In 1929 an ordinance was passed to apply the Police Ordinance of 1922, to

the Northern Territories.82

A remarkable thing that one observes whilst sifting through the colonial literature on the

police are the pictures of colonial officers heavily guarded by police forces. One

80 Ibid, p. 107. 81 Ibid, p. 112. 82 S. K. ANKAMA, Police History: Some Aspects in England and Ghana (Silkan Books: Essex,

UK 1983) p. 58-9. In 1906 an Ordinance had been passed forming a Constabulary for the Northern

Territories at the time when frantic efforts were being made to replace the Constabulary at the

Coast with the Civil Force. It will appear that the only reason for this was that with the declaration

of a Protectorate over the Northern Territories (NTs), such a force was needed to pacify the area. It

was only in 1929 that the Constabulary in the NTs was abolished and immediately replaced with

the Civil Police Force.



42

illustration83 shows “Captain Rupert Lonsdale, Commissioner of Native Affairs on the

Gold Coast…on an official mission to the Asante capital, Kumase, in June-August 1887,

accompanied by Assistant Inspector Barnett and a fifty-strong Hausa escort.”

Protection of property and the political and propertied class was self-evidently the

principal aim of urban policing. Constables in colonial towns in walking their beat,

covered only the commercial and upper and middle-class residential areas of the town.84

Given the reasons for the establishment of the force and the role of the political executive

in that agenda, it made sense that “the different police forces were put under the control

of the Governor of the colony, while the District Commissioner supervised [their] day-to-

day affairs.85” As Ward tells us, the Force was directly under the Governor’s control and

the then Governor, sent them out on specific duties.86 It was this strict political control,

which the Commission set up in 1951 to enquire into the police force thought should be

changed. 87 It never was changed.

83DAVID M. ANDERSON AND DAVID KILLINGRAY (eds), Policing the Empire:

Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester University Press: Manchester, New

York, 1991) p. viii. 84 Supra note 55, p. 10. 85 Mathieu Deflem, 1994 “Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis

of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya” Police Studies 17 (1): 45-68. Also

on the World Wide Web at: http://www.cla.sc.edu/socy/faculty/deflem/zcolpol.html. Visited on

26th October 2003. p. 5. 86 Supra note 57, p. 191 87 COLONIAL A.E YOUNG, A report upon the Gold Coast Police (Accra: Government printer,

1951).

http://www.cla.sc.edu/socy/faculty/deflem/zcolpol.html



43

ENFORCING THE “RULE OF LAW”

Conquest, political and then economic domination, the creation of a police force under

the direct control of the political class and for their protection and the protection of the

propertied class and trade routes, required one complement to complete the web of

domination. The “rule of law”, which in eighteenth-century England had become the

central legitimizing ideology, was exported to the colonies88. According to the

distinguished English jurist William Blackstone, writing in 1765, "if an uninhabited

country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English laws are

immediately there in force. For the law is the birthright of every subject, so wherever

they go they can carry their laws with them."89

The demands of the colonial political economy required a certain type of the rule of law.

Legislative controls in colonial settings frequently gave colonial police greater powers to

enforce inimical laws to political and economic ends, especially so in Africa where the

question of policing by consent was largely immaterial90. The enforcement of tax laws,

vagrancy, and liquor laws in order to ensure a supply of labor, right down to the

employment of soldiers in the police function of attempting to control petty thieving from

European houses, evidences how much the colonial police became entwined with the

88 Stefan Petrow, “Policing In A Penal Colony: Governor Arthur's Police System in Van Diemen's

Land, 1826-1836” Law and History Review, Summer, 2000, p. 351. 89 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press: Chicago, 1979), 1:104-5. 90 Supra note 55, p. 10.



44

requirements of colonial capital. “Curbing slaving, kidnapping and human sacrifice

provided further moral imperatives”.91

In the colonies the rule of law was essential for under-girding the criminal codes and

rules of contract and property that sought to protect individual liberty (especially the

security of the person) and of private property by putting in place certain social

constraints. The colonial government used the rule of law to enhance its power, remake

and enforce contract and property laws, and ensure economic exploitation of the colonies

in terms of free or cheap agricultural, mineral and human (labor) resources. All natives

and residents could seek redress for wrongs in courts that were sponsored by the colonial

government, and presided over by judges appointed by them. What constituted a wrong

was determined by the laws passed by that government.

Police work had an important bearing on the rule of law. They made the orders of law

“meaningful” and constituted its "coercive function."92 The Police were in charge of

enforcing the “rule of law” as just described. As British authority grew, constabulary

officers increasingly became District Commissioners and acted as magistrates, thus

adding to their political administrative functions, the roles of, policeman, prosecutor and

judge in local criminal and civil cases93.

91 Supra note 53, p. 111. 92 See DAVID NEAL, The Rule of Law in a Penal Colony: Law and Power in Early New South

Wales (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991) p. 67. 93 Supra note 53, p. 112.



45

The history of British colonialism, therefore, always entailed an alien imposition of

power and a mixture of political and economic interests, which determined the

government of the conquered territory and its “rule of law”. Whilst at the inception of

the Metropolitan Police in London in 1829, their General Orders, at page 1, provided that

“The primary object of an efficient Police is the prevention of crime; the next that of

detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed” and then the “protection of

life and property”94, the Squad Notes95 of the Ghana Police provide, also at page 1,

provide that the “objects of the Ghana Police Force [shall be the] Protection of life and

property [and only second] the Prevention and Detection of Crime”. For how else were

the British colonial officers to protect their persons and those of their families and to

protect the labor, mineral, agricultural and other produce that were badly needed in the

metropolis. It was only after 1897 that crime detection was seriously put on the agenda.96

In practice, this meant that colonialism involved the maintenance of peace and security

necessary for trade, the extraction of agricultural and mineral resources, the collection of

taxes, recruitment for low-wage labor, and other forms of economic exploitation. Key to

this was the enforcement of various laws, which were designed to operationalize this

agenda. A particular type of police force for the enforcement of a particular type of “rule

of law” emerged as an ideal construct to meet these various needs.

94 Supra note 41, p. 24. 95 Ghana Police Squad Notes. 96 Supra note 53, p. 121-2



46

THE CONSTRUCTION OF A BRUTAL POLICE FORCE IN AID OF

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOMINATION AND SOCIAL

CONTROL

The forms of political, economic and legal domination and exploitation that were planned

for the colony needed a particular kind of police force to succeed. In 1855, the then

Governor argued that the regular maintenance of law and order required an armed police

force, “under strict military discipline”.97

During the first phase of the development of the force, various experimentations and

improvisations were undertaken to find the right balance of brutality and civility that was

necessary for the peculiar duties of the Gold Coast Police Force.98 The force at its origin

“was primarily a military body, but included a civil police section.”99 In 1851, a Gold

Coast Corps was raised and assigned some police duties although it was officially part of

the army. This was to supplement the work of the small police force that was

“insufficient for the preservation of the peace throughout the coast”100. This gendarmerie

was converted to Artillery in 1856 and disbanded in 1863 “as a result of its

unreliability”101. Before this, “Owing to lack of men…soldiers had to be used to fill the

97 Ibid, p. 106-7. 98 Supra note 41, p. 219. 99 Ibid, p. 92-3. Mantieu Deflem, supra note 85, also notes that “the British conquest of the Gold

Coast initially relied heavily on a military force for the establishment of the territorial boundaries

of British colonial rule. In 1845 detachments of the West India Regiment were brought into the

territory, and the first official police force was organized in 1865.” Mathieu, p. 5. 100 Supra note 42, p. 5. 101 Ibid.



47

ranks [of the police force] and keep it in existence”102. The police force itself was a

“Militia and Police”. When the Militia and Police was transformed into a messenger

corps in 1860, “Cape Coast… was patrolled by soldiers. And “The early Inspectors of

Police were almost all military men”103.

The military nature of the force is very evident indeed. The first official police force

organized in 1865 was modeled after the Lagos Armed Police, and the police force

consisted, next to British officers, largely of Hausas, the ethnic group which was

considered a martial race. By 1872, one writer reports that there had been raised “a force

of Hausas to both garrison the forts and police the country”.104 The Hausas were

increasingly identified as the archetypal Martian race—sturdy, amenable to discipline,

steady in battle, and able to march great distances with few provisions.105 The colonial

government would take nothing less than a brutal and ruthless force capable of clamping

down riots, company fights, and other disturbances of the peace. The extraction of natural

resources and agricultural produce from the colonies and their use as markets for

European goods could only take place in a peaceful environment.

In 1886, when the Gold Coast was declared not to be any longer under the Governor-in-

Chief at Sierra Leone, but to be united with Lagos in one colony, a number of services

including police services were to be shared. A fresh organization of the force was decided

102 Ibid. 103 Ibid p. 9. 104 Ibid p. 11. 105 ANTHONY CLAYTON AND DAVID KILLINGRAY, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in

British Colonial Africa, (Ohio University Center for International Studies: Athens, 1989) p. 175



48

upon. All troops were to be withdrawn and the armed police increased in number to 975

men, at least 400 of who were to be either Hausas or natives of countries outside the

protectorate106. This force became the paramilitary police arm of the colonial government

even before the proclamation of the colony in 1874. Apart from Hausas, the police force

also consisted of members from the Fante ethnic group who initially were the only

policemen instructed in civil police duties.107 Although there was to be “only one Police

Force, the Gold Coast Armed Police”, the Hausa and Fante companies of the Force were

to be kept distinct108.

In the estimation of the colonial government, “The government of a barbarous country

and the existence of a very vague jurisdiction necessitated constant semi-military

expeditions …[and]…the government hoped to establish a semi-military force under its

own exclusive control”109. It is clear that the Gold Coast experienced a pretty decent

amount of military style policing. And Imray, a distinguished colonial police officer was

to say in 1997 that: “In the colonial territories, it was necessary in the interests of security

that there should be complete accord between the police and the armed services”.110

The British had two models of policing with which to experiment in the colonies: the

centralized, military styled, and armed force of Ireland kept away from the local

community in barracks; and the consciously non-military, unarmed, preventive English

106 Supra note 42, p. 13. 107 Supra note 60. 108 Supra note 42, p. 11. 109 Ibid, p. 8. 110 Colin Imray, Policeman in Africa, (The Book Guild Ltd: Sussex, England, 1997) p. 44.



49

police supposedly working in partnership with, and with the consent of, the local

community. Both models were employed and adapted to suit local circumstances and

times. The assertion that colonial policing was an Irish import is now very doubtful as

several studies show that the colonial reality was far more complex. True, there is

evidence of the influence of the “Irish Model” of policing, but this is different from

asserting that the force was an Irish import. The “realities of policing the empire were

simply too varied and complex to be held within the models of nineteenth-century

policing that emerged in England or Ireland.”111 “[T]he Gold Coast police developed in a

pragmatic way,” in response to local circumstance, with influences from other African

countries (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Egypt), India and the Caribbean Islands. It

benefited from the structural model, the personnel and the training facilities of the Irish

Constabulary; the methods of organization of English county forces; the London beat

system and some of their accoutrements112 and emergency policing techniques from

Palestine113. The system was essentially hybrid in origin and development. The one

indispensable criteria was this: whatever the model, however variegated the model,

wherever the model came from, it had to ensure a police force that was capable of

pacifying the restless peoples that were conquered or being conquered, and ensure peace

and security for economic exploitation and trade.

As already noted, the Irish model was distinct from the English (or Scottish) Model of the

111 Supra note 55, p. 12. 112 Supra note 53, p. 112. 113 DAVID M. ANDERSON AND DAVID KILLINGRAY (eds) Policing and Decolonisation:

Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917-65(Manchester University Press: Manchester, New

York, 1992) p. x.



50

nineteenth and twentieth centuries along three main lines: organization along military

lines (they were armed); housing in barracks rather than living among the community

they served; and were directed and centrally controlled by a national or territorial

force.114 Yet these are grave influences indeed, and to the extent that it is mostly these

characteristics of the police force which are sought to be reformed in Ghana today, it

makes some sense to refer to the force as an Irish export even if with a long explanatory

footnote. As one writer notes: “After the 1860’s, the second phase [of its development]

shows the police forces being organized on a fairly uniform quasi-military pattern,

modeled very closely upon the Royal Irish Constabulary, which had been found a more

practical prototype than the British police.”115

Another commentator notes as follows:

…from the point of view of the Colonies there was much attraction in an

arrangement which provided what we should now call a “para-military”

organisation or gendarmerie, armed, and trained to operate as an agent of the

central government in a country where…the recourse to violence by members

of the public who were ‘agin the government’ was not infrequent. It was

natural that such a force, rather than one organized on the lines of the purely

civilian and localized forces of Great Britain, should have been taken as a

suitable model for adaptation to Colonial conditions…So long as the Irish

Constabulary existed…it was a constant source of recruitment for officers of

many Colonial police forces, and its training depot was regularly used as a

center for courses of instruction for colonial police officers.116

In the early stages of the establishment and extension of colonial rule, the colonial police

114 Supra note 55, p 2-4. 115 Supra note 41, p. 219. See also Supra note 85, p. 9-11. 116 Ibid, p. 30-31.



51

were often indistinguishable from a military garrison, in function and form. “The

troublesome frontiers, unruly peoples and ‘unsettled’ territories required military force to

guard, extend and uphold the authority of the crown and what was often new and alien

law”.117

To ensure that the force could be unabashedly brutal, the policy of “policing strangers by

strangers” was adopted.118 “The colonial policeman was seldom the familiar local who

knew his beat well and who could use that knowledge to act with discretion, but rather

the feared alien, a man who could be relied upon to carry out the instructions of his

colonial masters”.119 This was another reason for the preference for Hausa men as recruits

for the force. Aside “showing great steadiness under fire…the Hausas made a most

favourable impression… [and] were free of many of the faults of the local police by

reason of their lack of connections with the people”120. To ensure that the force was

disconnected enough from the people in order to better brutalize them, the force included

European officers, persons from other parts of British West Africa and the West Indies.

These Countries included Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togoland (now Togo), and

Dahomey (now Benin). At some point Palestinian policemen were brought in.121 At

particular times during the history of the force, policemen from the Gold Coast were a

117 Supra note 55, p 4-5 118 Ibid, p 7. 119 David Killingray and David M. Anderson, “An Orderly Retreat? Policing the End of Empire”

in DAVID M. ANDERSON AND DAVID KILLINGRAY (eds) Policing and Decolonisation:

Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester University Press: Manchester, New

York, 1992) p. 8. 120 Supra note 42, p. 10. 121 Supra note 110, passim.



52

minority compared to foreign policemen122. By 1913, for example, most branches of the

police were alien occupying forces regarded with hatred, fear or suspicion by all sections

of the population.123

The initial and often continuing role of the colonial police force as an arm of the conquest

state was indeed reflected in these patterns of recruitment.124 One commentator has

succinctly summed-up the recruitment policy of the colonial government thus:

The only unifying guidelines that determined the police recruitment policy

were the notion of the martial race, responsible for the high number of

Hausas, and the principle of policing strangers by strangers. Africans from

other territories were called in to join the police force because they were

considered to stand sufficiently close, yet not too close, to the native…125

Of the men who were from within the colony, a good percentage were from the Northern

Territories, the more remote and poorer parts of the colony, where paid jobs were few,

where the people were habituated to traveling for trade or war, and where many young

men looked upon military and police service as a convenient form of wage employment.

Many writers have commented on the extreme loyalty of these men to the colonial

masters and their propensity to brutalize their southern, richer brethren:

Northerners were preferred, while Southerners were viewed with

suspicion…The Northerners, especially the Mossi, Dagombas, Grunshis and

Mamprusis (or Fra-Fra), were said to be of good fighting quality, loyal and

122 Supra note 42, p. 11. 123 Supra note 53, p. 122. 124 Supra note 55, p. 7. 125 Supra note 85.



53

obedient. A breakdown of the Constabulary in 1900 showed 66 percent of

the Africans came from the Northern territories and neighboring French

colonies, 29 percent were Hausa/Fulani from Nigeria, and 5 percent were

unidentified. Even when Southerners were recruited during World War I,

better than 90 percent of the men were from the North, evidence of both the

Europeans’ preference... Through the end of the period the conviction

remained that certain Northerners were of better fighting stock and that these

men had mutual antipathies with the Southerners, much to the approval of the

expatriate officers.126

The preference for warrior tribesmen from remote areas of the colony was very

understandable. In the context of imperialism, it was completely justifiable: such fighters

would be detached from and even hostile to the urban folk who were the main initiators

of internal security problems.

EVIDENCE OF POLICE BRUTALITY

The force appears to have been successful in brutalizing the citizenry, for the police was

unpopular with the native population. It had a significant127 number of Ghanaians within

it, but was generally conceived of as an intrusive alien force128. Complaints about the

brutal character of the Hausa Constabulary and the Gold Coast Regiment were legion.129

In Accra, “a large part of the population stoned the civil police”130 in 1886, because they

were considered traitors of the native African community131. In 1885 the Commissioner

had written thus:

126 Supra note 32, p. 98. 127 Ibid. 128 Supra note 55, p 7. 129 Supra note 53, p. 119-120. 130 Ibid p. 119. 131 Supra note 85.



54

The Force is unpopular with the natives and the great majority of the natives

would rather do anything than become a constable132.

A South African observer had this to say:

The most worthless body of men on the coast are the rank and file of the

Native Police, recruited from among the worst classes of West African

native-Sierra Leone Niggers and the lazy, good-for-nothing ignorant slum

blackguards who imagine the duties of a Policeman to consist in wearing a

uniform and getting drunk-the Policeman on the coast is a disgrace to his

cloth.133.

More disgrace was attached to the calling of a Policeman than to the fact that a man was a

convict or ex-convict, “the latter receives sympathy for having been unfortunate enough

to have been found out, but everyman’s hand is against a Policeman who is looked upon

as a traitor to his race”.134

The Native Authority Police in the rural areas was also similarly feared and disliked by

the people. The men, poorly trained and irregularly paid, often acted on their own in

carrying out assignments and making arrests. Another commentator notes that:

Very often, the Native Authority Policemen whose province has not been

determined, used any amount of force within their power to bring offenders

to Court even on a very minor charge.

132 Supra note 42, p. 34. 133 Ibid, p. 12. 134 Ibid, p. 38.



55

It was a common thing to see people being beaten and dragged along by these

officers.

Many were disgusted with the overbearing manner by which these officers

went about their duties…135

Indeed, the most objectionable thing about the Native Authority Police was the way and

the manner they exercised their powers of arrest.

This commentator notes further:

It was in this sphere that brutality and absolute disregard for the liberty of the

citizen were more manifest. … [T]he rural areas where people were mostly

illiterate and not aware of their rights offered a fertile ground on which

arbitrary use of power could thrive. They arrested with impunity. …136

These comments were mainly consequent upon the numerous punitive expeditions and

the brutal and licentious soldiery exhibited by the military and police of the period. By

the end of the 1870s the force was getting into more trouble. Its reputation fell. Issues of

discipline of both the Hausa and Fante companies of the Force were now in sharp focus.

An inspecting officer on a visit had this to say:

The Force is injured by enlisting “Haussas” who are not Haussas at

all…They are merely semi-savage and half-pagan slaves, and on detachment

duty they get quite out of hand. 137.

135 S. K. ANKAMA, The Police and Maintenance of Law and Order in Ghana, (Ph D.

Dissertation, University of London, 1967) p 163-164, Quoted in Kranzdorf, Supra note 7, p. 107. 136 Ibid, p. 17 quoted in Kranzdorf, ibid, p. 153. 137 Supra note 42, p.22.



56

And as for the Tarkwa detachment he described it as “drunken Fanti Policemen and

plundering Haussa soldiers”138. The men enlisted are described as ‘bushmen and very

stupid”. These are the words of the then Governor:

The present force is worst than inefficient…only those who can not get any

respectable employment join the Police Force; and one-third of the Force

may be said to consist of men who belong to the criminal classes” and they

were very unpopular139.

But could anything better be expected of a force that was “cut from whatever cloth was

available: rank-and-file ex-servicemen, vagabonds and adventurers…and added to this

motley crew…former slaves and refugees of various sorts, along with a substantial body

of men who may have been compelled into service by one device or another”.140 The

following painless words capture the state of affairs then:

Glover recruited runaway slaves for his Hausa force in Lagos, a practice he

continued in Accra in 1873, buying slaves at £ 5 a head…When the Hausa

Armed Police became the Gold Coast Constabulary in 1879 the majority of

the 800 rank and file were former slaves…

…men who have plundered their masters or committed other atrocities…sent

back to them [their masters] with read coats on their backs, [police uniform]

to enforce the orders of Government; which they, of course, do with all the

insolence natural to their sudden change of fortune.”141

A Ghanaian publication summarizes military/police-civil relations of this period thus:

138 Ibid. 139 Ibid, p. 30. 140 Supra note 55, p 7. 141 Supra note 53, p. 116.



57

Until just before the [second world] war, soldiering to most educated

Ghanaians was taboo—a profession fit for only the uneducated, the social

misfit, the frustrated and the unwanted individual. In fact, if perchance your

instinct of adventure drove you to join the Army, you were immediately

ostracized by your family, village and friends. Many were the times when the

inhabitants of a whole village took to their heels at the sight of one uniformed

soldier.142

A Ghanaian officer put the matter even more strongly when commenting on the

abongo—the local name used for a soldier during the colonial period:

“ ‘Abongo? Not for all the breath that holds me—not in my life time. You

can join your abongo only when I’m dead and gone you damned one; and

even that my ghost shall keep on haunting you for proving refractory to my

advice…’ These are no unfamiliar outbursts a few decades ago, expressing

the indifferent wont of many a parent towards the Armed Forces. They were

usually provoked by the least inclination of their sons to enlist in the army.

Almost invariably accompanying such reproof was wailing by mothers,

especially if the son happened to be the only one in the family. Such

unhealthy impression of the Armed Forces in this country was pronounced at

a time when for one reason or the other the military institutions was looked

upon as a haven for criminals and illiterates.”143

A former police officer recalled townspeople attacking his wife when she was alone. He

was a young constable in the late 1930’s when a policy was announced by the

Commissioner that policemen and their families should live in the community and

fraternize more, rather than in separate barracks. Since every soldier and policeman was

viewed as the enemy, the people reacted in their own way. The experiment was thus

abandoned.144

142 “The Ghana Army,” Ghana World Magazine, April 1959, quoted in Kranzdorf, Supra note 32,

p. 153-4. 143 Lt A. Enninful, “From Civil to Military Rule,” Ghana Armed Forces Magazine, I, No. 1, 19

quoted in Kranzdorf, ibid. 144 Interview with Theo Adjirackor, Winter, 1969, Kranzdorf, Ibid, p. 154.



58

It is important to note that the distinction between the military and police during this

period was nebulous indeed. The police had stipulated functions but, being an offshoot of

the military, continued to have a paramilitary bearing, complete with long-service army

men among both Europeans and Africans serving in it. As late as the Second World War,

the exigencies of the time again blurred distinctions in both function and personnel

realignments, and Africans were shuttled between the military and police.145 In some

situations there were some distinctions. “While the soldier was viewed with fear, the

policeman was often looked upon as a traitor. This was especially true of those who

helped to stamp out illicit distilling or acted as under-cover agents or generally waded

into an unruly crowd.”146

The colonial police and military also had a great partiality for drink. “Drinking and

affairs with women represented the main leisure activities for these forces.”147 On

Christmas evening 1882, at Cape Coast, free “license seems to have been given to the

soldiers of the West India Regiment, and they used the license to annoy all whom they

met who were not in the same state of drunkenness as themselves” and “some of the

Hausa Constabulary and Soldiers were even arrested for stealing liquor from the

shops”.148 Also in 1882, the Gold Coast Times declared the Ada police as “useless; they

145 Supra note 32, p. 116-118. 146 Ibid p. 108. 147 Supra note 105, p. 186-189. 148 EMMANUEL K. AKYEAMPONG, Drink, Power, and Cultural Change: A Social History of

Alcohol in Ghana (Heinemann: Portsmouth, NH; James Currey: Oxford, 1996) p. 51-52.



59

are generally seen sitting outside grog-shops and strive to escape work”.149

The need for a brutal para-military force was always considered important and when this

clashed seriously with the need for a civil police, the response of the colonial government

was to create two police forces: The Gold Coast Regiment with a paramilitary mission;

and the Gold Coast Police Force with civil police functions.150 The official separation

between military and policing tasks, however, was more rhetoric than reality151. The civil

police, created as an unarmed force, were rearmed in 1897.152 Military discipline and

armaments, especially artillery, and machine guns, introduced in 1888, were seen as

essential to repress and intimidate a truculent and unreliable population. Indeed, the civil

police force experiment was ultimately very unsuccessful.153 The police remained first

and foremost an armed paramilitary force directed at the protection of the political and

economic interests of the colonial powers.154

THE POLICE FORCE AND THE LAW

The “troublesome frontiers, unruly peoples and ‘unsettled’ territories required military

force to guard, extend and uphold the authority of the crown and what was often new and

149 Ibid, p. 52 150 Supra note 61. 151 Supra note 85. 152 Supra note 53, p. 121. 153 Ibid, p.110. 154 Supra note 85.



60

alien law”.155 The administrative and legal systems within which the colonial police

worked and the laws, which they sought to enforce, were often significantly different in

many respects from those, which prevailed in England. True, English law was

transplanted in the Gold Coast, but colonial legislative codes were invariably hybrids,

formed of parts from other colonies as well as from England, and these were molded to

fit the local environments. 156

All this had profound implications for the forms and methods of policing. Legal and

administrative categories that were distinct and separate in England were often confused

and overlapping in the colonies. Administrator, magistrate, policeman might be one and

the same official.157 The operation of the criminal law was a de facto mixture of local

customs and legislative codes neither of which was likely to be familiar to the police

recruit. “Colonial policing evolved as part of these hybrid legal and administrative

systems, and so the practice of policing in each colony came to acquire certain distinctive

features”.158

155 Supra note 55, p. 4-5. 156 Ibid. 157 Police Magistrates Ordinance, (CAP 132), 1st February 1916. 158 Supra note 55, p. 4-5. “The legal system that accompanied British colonialism is characterized

by a mixture of different laws related to the principle of indirect rule…Much like the way in which

African political authorities were incorporated within the overall structure of British government,

native law was taken up in the colonial legal framework. Customary law, purported to represent

the legal principles of native Africa, was essentially amalgamated with colonially imported law.

As was the case with native political government, customary law was only accepted on the

condition that it did not conflict with the basic principles of British law, which were in any case

considered superior on a presumed evolutionary scale of legitimate legality. Customary law did

concern native Africans, and was settled in separately organized native courts, but its premises

grew out of British understanding of traditional African legal systems. What was accepted as the

native African legal tradition was fundamentally a British invention, probably having more sense

of reality in the minds of the British rulers than actually being founded upon the concrete

historical practices of the African population. Thus, the incorporation of African political



61

In 1874, an “Ordinance to Provide for the Better Regulation and Discipline of the Armed

Police Force in the Settlements on the Gold Coast” was passed, though the force, in its

them current form, had been in existence since the previous year. The Ordinance was

based on the one in force in Lagos159. The Ordinance was meant to do exactly what its

long title preempts. It gave the governor enormous powers, including the power to

formulate regulations for the efficient running of the Force. A commission of inquiry was

later to recommend, as early as 1951160 that the police should be made independent of

political and other extraneous influences.

This Ordinance of 1874 was to be followed by the passage of a criminal code in 1892161

and strict control over the possession of arms and ammunition,162 and control over the

press163. The police was used to enforce these. Policemen magistrates were appointed in

various Police Districts with “judicial, coronatorial and magisterial powers” including the

power to enforce the criminal law through fines and imprisonment.164 The police, unlike

soldiers, were in those early days expected to interpret and administer the law and were

free to exercise personal judgment.165 All these were necessary for the preservation of

institutions in British government, based on the principle of indirect rule, was complemented at

the level of legal procedures by an appropriation of customary law into British imported law.”

Supra note 85, p. 2. 159 Supra note 42, p. 11. 160 Colonel A. E. Young Young A.E colonial - A report upon the Gold Coast Police (Accra:

Government printer, 1951). See also Ankama, Supra note 82, p. 56-7. 161 Criminal code 1892 (CAP 9). 162 Arms and Ammunition Ordinance (Cap 144) No. 22 of 1952. 163 Supra note 161, section 344. 164 Police Magistrates Ordinance, (CAP 132), 1st February 1916. 165 Supra note 85.



62

alien rule.

The structure of the Penal Codes shows that they were meant primarily to suppress the

people and protect and perpetuate alien rule. The Criminal Code begins with chapters on

assault, unlawful damage to property, stealing, offences against the person and property,

and ends with offences against public order and the state. In the Criminal Procedure

Code, the chapters on security for keeping the peace and maintenance of public order,

including the use of force and arrest and detention take precedence over the provisions on

the investigation and trial of criminal offences.166

The colonial government would take nothing less than a brutal and ruthless force capable

of clamping down riots and other disturbances of the peace. To do this, there was the

need to establish a particular rule of law conducive to the enterprise. The extraction of

natural resources and agricultural produce from the colonies and their use as markets for

European goods could only take place in a peaceful environment. Such an environment

had to be created at all cost and a brutal paramilitary force and a particular rule of law

were essentials for this. As the colony was consolidated in the very early years of the

twentieth century, it was practically inconceivable that this will change.

166 See parallel developments in India in B. P. SAHA, The Police in Free India: Its Facets and

Drawbacks, (Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 1989).



63

THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL DOMINATION AND INTENSE ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION FROM 1900 UNTIL THE MID 1940s


British intrusions into the area, which came to be known as the Gold Coast, were hesitant

from the first. A combination of factors accounted for this. There were doubts as to the

commercial potential of the area and discomfort about past and possible future wars with

the powerful Ashanti. There was also the inhospitable natural conditions, especially the

mosquitoes with its malaria to which many European lives were lost. There was finally

the temptation to focus imperial attention on other areas of the African continent and

elsewhere in the world.167

Somehow they decided to stay. The initial move occurred in 1874 when the coastal states

were annexed following a sixth Anglo-Ashanti war. Following a final war against

Ashanti in 1900-1901, Ashanti proper was annexed as a colony also. Then came the

formal declaration of a Protectorate over the Northern Territories on January 1, 1902. The

formation of the Gold Coast was essentially complete, lacking only a slice of the German

colony of Togoland, which became a British mandate following World War I, and an

integral part of the country in 1956.168

167 Supra note 32, p. 66-8. 168 Ibid.



64

The period beginning in 1900 and ending in the mid-1940s was, therefore, a period of

political consolidation of the territorial gains from war and intense economic exploitation.

After political consolidation, it was decided that the Gold Coast was to be made a going

concern. The colonial government set itself to the economic task of developing the

immense and hitherto neglected wealth, mineral, agricultural, sylvan and pastoral, for the

benefit of Europe, Asia, and Africa, either as raw materials for their industries or as food

for their congested population.169 As we shall soon see, police functions had to change

accordingly.

POLICE ORGANIZATION OF THE TIME

After the Ashanti wars in 1876, the British government had converted the Gold Coast

Armed Police Force into the Gold Coast Constabulary, which existed until 1901. In that

year the constabulary was split in two. The paramilitary functions were assigned to the

Gold Coast Regiment and the police functions assigned to the Gold Coast Police Force.

After the declaration of a Protectorate over the Northern Territories in 1902, the colonial

administration established the Northern Territories Constabulary. Just before the First

World War in 1914, this constabulary was absorbed into the Gold Cost Police Force, thus

establishing a unified police force for the entire colony. This unified system of police

existed in the gold coast until independence in 1957.170

169 Ibid. 170 Supra note 28, p. 168.



65

The Gold Coast Police Force, the entity with police functions was also divided into two

sections-the General Police and the Escort Police. The Escort Police developed in

response to demands by financial institutions and mining companies for escort services.

The Escort Police recruited men who did not have any formal education, although they

were required to have a rudimentary command of spoken English. Aside from providing

escorts to banks and mining companies, they were also used in routine patrol duties,

prisoner escort and sedentary guard duties, and they were trained in crowd and riot

control. A unit of the Escort Police was attached to each regional police headquarters as a

mobile force available for emergency deployment.171

To summarize, before the creation of the police force, the colonial military force,

composed mainly of Europeans, had a dual military-police function. With the wars of

conquest over, the colonizers decided to establish a civil police force made up mainly of

Africans from various parts of British Africa172. This was obviously cheaper and

conformed to the broader colonial strategy of indirect rule.173 As noted in the previous

section, the key reasons for establishing the force was to ensure the protection of colonial

officials, maintain peace and security necessary for economic exploitation through the

production and trade in primary agricultural and mineral resources and manufactured

goods, and to generally enforce the “rule of law” to various political and economic ends.

171 Ibid p. 168-9. 172 Supra note 69, p 12. 173 Supra note 46.



66

These various functions of the police are best summed up in the activities of the Escort

Police of this time, a branch which was created at this time, has survived as a branch to

date, and still has a very huge percentage of the total number of policemen and women in

Ghana.

The Escort Police had an initial force of fifty men…created to guard specie,

particularly from the mines and the banks, to escort officials, accompany

carrier caravans of the newly formed Government Transport Service,

supervise convict labour and provide additional armed force for the business

of civil administration. By 1914…the Escort Police had become the largest

branch of the police…”.174

PEACE AND STABILITY FOR ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION

In the twentieth century, the basic economic functions of the police discussed in the

previous section were perhaps at their zenith. As the value of Gold and cocoa exports

increased, so also did government revenue from taxation and the state-owned railway.

Between 1901 and 1914, for instance, the value of cocoa exported from the Gold Coast

had increased more than fifty-fold (from £43,000 to £2,194,000), and future progress

seemed assured. By 1926, the entire cocoa exports of the colony stood at £9,181,000, an

impressive rise from £ 16,000 in 1899.175 Foreign trade also grew tremendously in the

Gold Coast. In 1913, the value of imports in pounds sterling was 4,952,494 and exports

174 Supra note 53, p. 122. 175 L.H. GANN AND PETER DUIGNAN (eds), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: Volume 2 The

History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960, (Cambridge University Press, 1970) p. 5.



67

5,427,106. In 1938-9, they were 10,626,284 and 16,235,288 respectively.176 The Gold

Coast exports of cocoa, gold and other produce grew by leaps and bounds. Detailed

commercial statistics speak an eloquent language.177

This new and expanding capitalist infrastructure of mining, cash crops and transport,

much of it in the form of movable property, needed to be protected. Again, a rapidly

growing, and ethnically varied, migrant labor force in the gold-mining towns led to a rise

in crime. Mine closures and reductions in wages in the years 1900-06 resulted in

increased labor militancy and officials feared serious civil disorder. To oil the wheels of

the expanding capitalist infrastructure, and to combat the labor unrests, separate divisions

of the police were established in 1901.178

By the beginning of 1902 three fresh divisions of the police, known collectively as the

“Khaki Police” were in place. The Mines Police, hired out to the mining companies, had

been created ‘specially and solely for the purpose of preserving law and order in different

mining centres’ and to protect property. Local detachments of military volunteers, armed

with rifles and machine guns were also established from European employees on the

railway and mines. During the years 1902-06 the mining companies frequently used the

Mines Police to break strikes and to regulate labor disputes.179 There was also the

Railway Police to ensure the transport of agricultural and mineral loot to the ports for

176 Ibid, p. 15-16 177 Ibid, p. 16. 178 Supra note 53, p. 121-2. 179 Ibid.



68

export. And finally the Escort Police, made up mostly of Hausas and Grunshies, to satisfy

the demands of the Mines and the Bank for reliable escorts since the General Police could

not satisfy this demand. Indeed the Escort police became one of the two main branches of

the police, the other being the General Police. Whilst the General Police was comprised

of literates who understood the Criminal Code and criminal procedures, kept records and

maintained administration, “the Escort Police, about half of the force, were generally

illiterate and were used for routine watch and ward duties, town and village patrols, guard

duties, and bullion escorts”180. According to some writers, the Escort Police was larger

than the General Police, were trained in the use of arms and many of them were ex-

soldiers.181 Some statistics show that in June 1926, there were 809 Escort Police out of a

total of 1,546 non-commissioned officers servicing seven divisions of the force. This

constituted more than half of the men of the force. There were only 73 other Superior

Officers and Superintendents182. The Marine Police was raised in 1916 to patrol the beach

and sheds, and also went to sea in canoes. Pilfering by carriers and canoe men was

immensely reduced.183 The inspection of Weights and Measures became a police duty

since 1898, and the growth of the Cocoa trade made this branch more important at this

time.184 The economic imperatives for the establishment of the police force are indeed

manifest in these developments.

180 Supra note 105, p. 14. 181 Supra note 41, p. 93. 182 Supra note 42, p. 64. 183 Ibid, p. 53. 184 Ibid, p. 42-3.



69

As is clear, the specialization of the Force was directly related to the creation of a

security system in aid of the extraction (Mines Police) and safe transport (Railway

Police) of natural resources (Mines Police and Escort Police) from the hinterland to the

coast (Marine Police) for export abroad. The police also engaged in fiscal control

through the collection of taxes185 and the crack down on smuggling186.

PROTECTING THE POLITICAL CLASS

As noted earlier in this chapter, a remarkable thing that one observes whilst sifting

through the colonial literature on the police are the pictures of colonial officers heavily

guarded by police forces. In a booklet titled “The Gold Coast (A Publication of the Public

Relations Department, Accra, Gold Coast Colony, 1950), page 4 carries a picture of a

Governor of the Gold Coast, heavily guarded by “The Governor’s escort of mounted

troops” outside Christianborg Castle, the colonial seat of government. At no moment was

this more evident than during the riots of 1948.187 The shooting and killing of two of the

rioters was to prevent the advance of the party to Christianborg Castle, the seat of the

government.188 For this great job, the then commander of the police force, who personally

did the shooting and killing, was decorated with a medal.189

185 Supra note 85. 186 Supra note 83, p viii, illustration 7. 187 Details of these riots are discussed later in this chapter. 188 Supra note 110, passim. 189 Ibid, p 147-148.



70

Of one thing there was no doubt: “those in charge of the [police]…would not

countenance any act undermining the government in power, the principle of colonial rule,

nor the life style, values, authority relationships, and roles of its representatives. Thus, in

building the loyalty of the African to Imperial rule all were expected to pledge allegiance

to that rule:

I,…………………………..’ do hereby solemnly and sincerely declare and

promise that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty the

King, His Heirs and Successors, and that I will faithfully serve and defend

His Majesty the King, His Heirs and Successors, and the Government of the

Gold Coast, for the period of my enlistment or re-enlistment, provided His

Majesty should so long require of my service………” 190

One commentator has noted that “…outside interference in purely regimental duties of

the force has reached such proportions that often District Commissioners, holding no

military command (and even treasury clerks) could authorize a ‘detail’ required for escort

duty, etc., without reference to the commanding officer of the detachment from which the

men were drawn. This greatly undermined the standing of such commanding officers

with their men.”191

Given the reasons for the establishment of the force and the role of the political executive

in that agenda, it made sense that “the different police forces were put under control of

190 Supra note 32, p. 91- 92. 191 SAMSON C. UKPABI, The West African Frontier Force, 1897-1914 (Unpublished M.A.

Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1964) pp. 183-184, quoted in Kranzdorf, Supra note 32, p.

149.



71

the Governor of the colony, while the District Commissioner supervised [their] day-to-

day affairs”.192

ENFORCING THE “RULE OF LAW” AND POLICE BRUTALITY

By 1900, there was a police force trained to use brute force to suppress disturbances,

capable of assuming a military posture to repress uprisings, with a system of political

supervision and control that prevented the development of professionalism, and deployed

to maintain a “rule of law” comprising a body of criminal, contract and property laws that

were fashioned for the specific purposes of maintaining empire and advancing economic

exploitation in the Gold Coast.

Colonial rule rested to a certain extent on a mixture of bluff and consent of the colonized,

however tenuous. Effective colonization, therefore, depended ultimately on the ability of

the colonial rulers to coerce their colonial subjects by the threat or use of armed force.

The police, which developed first as a para-military and then a civilian force separate

from the army, provided the front line coercion with the regular military in reserve as the

ultimate deterrent.193

Indeed Section 5 of the Police Ordinance of 1922 made provision for the police to

assume the status of an army under certain conditions. In many cases, political

192 Supra note 85. 193 Supra note 105, p. 145



72

paternalism replaced the British policy of indirect rule when local politics did not

resemble appropriate government in their estimation and when it conflicted with the

imperial policy, which sought to make colonial conquest a commercially viable

enterprise194. The police, in their dual police-military status, were essential for this, and

other related purposes.

This period witnessed intense economic exploitation and the attendant issues of riot,

crime, social disorganization, ordering, and class control. Colonial policing at this time

functioned to control these distractions to imperialism and ultimately legitimate central

rule from Westminster.195

A mark of successful brutality of the police force at this time is that, imperial police

practice seems to have informed British police practice. Colonial methods of policing

labor and political disturbances have been employed in Britain since the early twentieth

century. Also, there was a high number of officers who returned from service in the

colonies to take up senior positions in the Metropolitan and County constabularies in

Britain.196

194 Deflem notes that “This is further shown by the fact that indirect rule could be interventionist

or non-interventionist. In the case of interventionist indirect rule, the native chiefs were governed

as dependent rulers and their traditional administration was gradually adapted to the alien

institutions of British rule. Non-interventionist indirect rule left the traditional authorities to their

own devices, but only to the extent that the over-all political and economic goals of colonialism

were not threatened.” Supra note 85, p. 2. 195 Supra note 43, p. 9. 196 Supra note 55, p. 12-13.



73

The rule of law waxed strong and throughout the period, the police remained first and

foremost an armed paramilitary force directed at the protection of the political and

economic interests of the colonial powers.197 As independence approached, it was

conceivable that this will change. But did it?

THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE, THE MID-1940s TO 1957


In 1957, the Gold Coast became politically independent and was renamed Ghana.

Various constitutional reforms had granted a great deal of internal self government for

the colony beginning in 1951, but the Queen of England was still the titular head of state.

In 1960, Ghana became a Republic with its own Executive President, Dr. Kwame

Nkrumah. This section deals with the police force in the years of transition to

independence, that is, the period between the start of serious nationalism in about 1948 to

1957.

The Second World War occasioned many economic hardships. The Allied colonies could

no longer trade with the German-occupied parts of Europe, nor with the regions under the

sway of Imperial Japan. The great industrial powers of the world turned most of their

energies to making implements of war, hence, consumer goods became expensive.

197 Supra note 85.



74

Capital goods were hard to obtain, prices rose and money kept losing its value. War,

thus, created a great demand for African raw materials. The British, therefore, looked

upon Africa as a vital strategic bastion and were only inclined to make limited changes to

the colonial imperialist infrastructure while the war was in progress. Beyond limited

constitutional changes, it was not intended to initiate the devolution of government to

Africans.198

Students of colonial rule in West Africa commonly treat the fifteen years from 1945 to

1960 as the most significant period in the history of decolonization. Yet, the Second

World War did not mark a completely new departure. It may be considered to have

accelerated political developments already apparent in the late 1930s. In the Gold Coast

the British realized by about 1950 that new policies would have to be formulated to

accommodate social forces not actually created by the war but strengthened in the course

of it.199

THE POLICE FORCE OF THE TIME

The character of policing in the Gold Coast, as in many parts of the British Empire, can

be shown to follow a historical sequence involving at least three periods. I have discussed

in previous sections, the first period, which was a time of intense coercion associated

198 Supra note 175. p. 19. 199 K.W. J. Post, “British Policy and Representative Government in West Africa 1920 to 1951, in

L.H. GANN AND PETER DUIGNAN (eds), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: Volume 2 The

History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960, (Cambridge University Press, 1970) p. 31.



75

with the establishment of imperial authority. I have also discussed briefly the second

period of the consolidation of imperial rule through the establishment of the “rule of

law”. Our concern in this section is the multiple parts of the third period200. This period

was characterized by a mounting breakdown in order, attendant upon the strains induced

by war, economic crisis, and the development of indigenous trade union and nationalist

consciousness. This period includes the phases of insurrection, reform201, reorganization

and recruitment,202 and the fall of empire.203

The events leading up to the fall of empire placed the police closer in proximity to the

forces of nationalist politics and anti-colonial protest than any other agency of

government. Again, in the final arrangements for the transfer of powers, the transition of

the police from their role as the principal agency of colonial control to becoming an

institution at the service of a new independent government was the most sensitive and

important of political issues.204 Despite several self-government gains, colonial control of

the police remained, with the key posts in the sensitive areas—Special Branch, C.I.D.,

and radio communications manned by expatriates.205 These developments were

significant for the police and are important if we are to have a complete sense of the state

200 I discuss other relevant parts of this period at the beginning of chapter 3. 201 “From the later 1930s… a Colonial Police Service was established to coordinate and regulate

policing throughout the dependent empire, and London took an increased role in dictating the

methods and standards adopted in colonial policing and in monitoring the performance of

individual police forces”. Supra note 88 p. 4. The Metropolitan authorities were as concerned with

central appraisal and control, as with international fears of alleged global communist conspiracy

and their links within the colonies. See Supra note 88 p. ix-x. 202 As empire was to fall, between 1945 and 1956 police numbers increased from 2500 to 5360 in

the Gold Coast. Supra note 94 p. 4. 203 Supra note 113, p. ix. 204 Supra note 119, p. 1. 205 Supra note 32, p. 179.



76

of the police force at empire’s fall. To do this, we will lift “the veil of anonymity that has

shrouded the…[Gold Coast] police …[and] reveal their central role in the histories of the

end of empire and the birth of [Ghana].”206

After the wars of conquest and the consolidation of British rule in the Gold Coast, and

before the 1940s, police work had usually been limited to local issues, tribal clashes,

boycotts, destoolment disputes, and opposition to taxation in which a small number of

policemen had almost always been sufficient. The riots of February 1948, chaos and

widespread rioting and looting closely related to nationalist activities, caught the colony

and its police force unprepared.207 The years 1948-1951 saw unrest, lawlessness, rapid

changes of policy, and turbulence. Challenges to the colonial government and its laws,

was heralded by nationalist militants as patriotic. At the height of the riots the Gold

Coast’s own troops and reinforcements from Nigeria had to be deployed.208

After a century, organized opposition to the police force finally emerged in the context of

the liberation struggle. Opposition to the police force was a tangential by product of

opposition to the entire British imperialist architecture. One commentator summarizes the

sentiments of the time in the following long quotation:

206 Supra note 119, p. 18. 207 See F. M. BOURET, Ghana-The Road to Independence 1919-57, (Stanford University Press;

Oxford University Press, 1960), especially pp. 157ff. for political context of the riots. See also

Supra note 85 passim. 208 Supra note 105, p 13-14.



77

While colonial rule at times evinced considerable stability, it never gathered

the active support of more than a fraction of the Gold Coast population.

World War II saw that support become more tenuous still, and in the

following years it disappeared almost completely. Between 1946 and 1948

different types of dissatisfaction among different groups in the population

coalesced, providing a broadly based opposition to the established order. Ex-

servicemen berated the Governor for a lackluster pension and gratuity

program, too few resettlement offices, failure to provide sufficient job

assistance for the unskilled and semi-skilled, and failure to free soldiers still

in jail for wartime offenses. Economic difficulties included an outbreak of

swollen shoot disease which damaged some 15,000 [cocoa] trees a year,

steady rise in the cost of living, and soaring import prices resulting from

overseas shortages and possibly made still more critical by expatriate-run

monopolies. This last factor resulted in sporadic boycotts of European

commercial firms beginning in 1947. A host of social problems existed,

especially in the burgeoning urban areas, where an already high rate of

unemployment was further augmented by a growing number of primary-

school leavers who could not find work, as well as distressed farmers and

bored ex-servicemen. There were shortages in housing, an inability to meet

increased demand for public services, and a rise in the crime rate. Resentment

was also voiced over the pace of Africanization—especially inasmuch as a

new scheme allowed officials from other parts of the Commonwealth to

transfer to the Gold Coast—and generally over delays in implementing

schemes of economic development and social improvement. The resulting

demand for political advances was not met by a new constitution of 1946,

which increased African membership in the Legislative and Executive

Councils, while providing for the Town councils in the large coastal cities to

have elected majorities. Rather, the whole question of where ultimate

authority resided was raised and suggestions were voiced that there were

alternatives to alien rule.209

The nationalists and their followers hated the police force to the extent that it ensured the

continuance of British imperialism. Thus, the 28th February 1948 social movement had as

its target, the Governor, as representative of the British Crown. The showdown with the

police occurred when the latter prevented them from marching to the office of the

Governor.

209 Supra note 32, p. 157-8.



78

For the police, these crucial years of resistance meant rapid expansion and reform, all

under the pressure of strenuous events.210 From the mid-1920’s to the mid-1940’s, the

Police Force had only grown from 2,000 to 2,500 and the number of European officers

from 80 to 100 despite the growing population and the needs of the people.211 The events

of 1948 necessitated an expansion of the Gold Coast Police Force to some 8,000 men to

provide for any emergency. Re-equipment of the force, left with little transport and no

wireless, was expedited. Troop-carrying vehicles, signals equipment, riot equipment,

were all brought in, and twenty former gazetted Palestine Police officers experienced in

police mobile force work were seconded to the colony. An armored car unit was added as

a final dressing.212 In the months which followed, exercises in crowd control and anti-

guerrilla techniques were held by the military. In 1949, with warnings of Positive Actions

already in the air, it was decided to form a third battalion. The military was rarely

actually called out to aid civil authorities and never used its firearms in such operations.

Nevertheless, conditions in the country had led to policy decisions by the authorities to

expand the armed forces as a back-up to the police.213 Thus, faced with renewed violence,

the police force grew dramatically, became more paramilitary in character, developed

more centralized command systems, and established special branches. In coping with

210 Supra note 85 p. 5-6. 211 Supra note 32, p. 177. 212 Supra note 80 p 13-14. 213 Supra note 32, 170.



79

this complex of problems, they drew upon the personnel, practices and ideas of

supposedly comparable revolts: Irish, Palestinian and Malayan disturbances.214

The police were obviously required, under the pressure of the new circumstances, to

reform and to reform fast. The Police Mobile Force had been set up in 1947 and was to

be used no fewer than 200 times between December 1947 and September 1951215. After

the war, there was further clouding of the roles of the military and the police, as many

who had served in the army used the standards learned there for service in the police and

its auxiliary, the Mobile Force.216 The men of this force were in a perpetual state of

alertness and moved to any troubled spot to quell rioting.217 As already noted, a new

police wireless network was in operation by March 1949 and the Special Branch was

beefed up as part of a general expansion of the police force, which saw it double in size

between the end of 1947 and 1952.

It was realized that intelligence operations prior to the upheaval had been inadequate and

that officials had been lulled in to a false sense of security by a belief that the Gold Coast

was a model colony. The woefully understaffed Criminal Investigation Department

(C.I.D) had not been effective in its dual function of collecting of intelligence data and

the investigation of crime. The C.I.D., whose numbers were barely over 100 in 1948, was

214 Supra note 113, p. ix-x. 215 Richard Rathbone, “Political Intelligence and Policing in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s” in

DAVID M. ANDERSON AND DAVID KILLINGRAY (eds) Policing and Decolonisation:

Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester University Press: Manchester, New

York, 1992), p 84. 216 Supra note 32, 119. 217 Supra note 52, p. 68-9.



80

expanded to almost 175 by 1950 and close to 250 by 1953, against an outside report

urging further expansion to at least 700. As already noted, the Special Branch was also

inaugurated to deal with intelligence matters.218

In effect, the1948 riots proved a catalyst for police reform, and every dimension from

orientation, equipment, administration, through training procedures to specialized

departments, underwent major change. The result-the Gold Coast retained a militaristic

Police Force, now better organized and equipped, and that was ready to descend upon the

citizenry at the command of the Government.

POLICE BRUTALITY

The political protests of the time constituted fodder for police brutality. After the 1948

disturbances, the authorities decided they needed additional manpower with paramilitary

training. Such manpower was available among European police men who had served in

Palestine and were no longer needed. The thirty-seven officers from this source who were

introduced into the Gold Coast were accused of “acting in a roughly hewn manner, of

making facile judgments, and not adjusting to the new culture” and had no “respect for

Africans at all”.219

218 Supra note 32, p. 172. 219 Ibid, p. 185.



81

Various opportunities for police brutality presented themselves. With the riots of 1948,

the lack of support for the official classes became clear, as did the preaching of

nonviolence:

Economic frustrations, the anger of ex-servicemen, and new political leaders

combined to produce demonstrations in Accra. When a parade to the

Governor’s residence got out of hand, armed police under a European

Superintendent were called in, shots were fired, men were killed and

wounded, and the crowd broke ranks and went on a rampage. They were

joined by others in the capital who were not happy with a new price structure

posted in expatriate-run stores that day. The military was called, but the next

day rioting flared anew, this time throughout the country. The Government

declared a state of emergency, later claiming that “… a Communist

conspiracy had occurred but…the Government had arrested the leading

Communists.” Although the African leadership under Dr. J.B. Danquah per

se was not labeled communist, six top members of an inchoate political

party—the United Gold Coast Convention—were arrested and removed to

isolated areas of the Northern Territories until a Commission of inquiry

arrived from London.

…In early 1950’s, Positive Action, a campaign of civil disobedience

involving propaganda and boycotts of European firms, was instituted…

Several figures were convicted on charges of promoting an illegal strike and

attempting to coerce the government. Nkrumah himself was sentenced on

three counts of sedition to run a total of three years…220

As already noted, the Mobile Force, a body especially trained in riot control, was formed

after the 1948 riots. It had an establishment of at least 100 and sometimes more at each

provincial headquarters. Indeed, it earned the wrath of segments of the population. In

addition, in order to deal with serious disorders when they were beyond the resources of

220 Ibid, p. 160-1.



82

the regular police, a Voluntary Police Reserve was established which could quickly call

out over 2,000 Africans, Asians, and Europeans.221

Among the more elite classes there was disagreement between the left and the right. The

left was pushing for immediate independence from the time of Positive Action. The right

questioned all talk of expansion of the public sector, and wanted less power to reside at

the center and more in the several regions. From both sides there were charges of

sycophancy and nepotism, of Government failure to act in a temperate way to combat a

new outbreak of swollen shoot disease in Ashanti, of plans to harness the power of the

Volta River which would mainly benefit the South, of low wages to laborers, and of the

slow pace of Africanization.222 In Ashanti, considerable opposition remained,

championed by the National Liberation Movement (NLM), which had opposed the

Government since 1954. In Accra, protests of the Ga people that they were being taken

for granted began in the weeks and days before independence.223

Thus, from 1948 until independence, there was almost continuous political instability.

Demonstrations, riots, competition for political office, clashes among the followers of

various political parties, were the order of the day. The police had their hands full

clamping down on these various disturbances and threats to the peace. Many laws and

regulations were invoked or passed to give the police greater leeway in matters of internal

221 Ibid, p. 173. 222 Ibid, p. 160-1. 223 Ibid, p. 164.



83

security. These included various ordinances dealing with the influencing of public

opinion in a manner prejudicial to the public safety, restricting or preventing publications

which might disturb the populace, imposing curfews, sanctioning the stopping and

searching of vehicles, and additional authority to act against looters or those causing

disaffection. Others provided for arresting without a warrant any one who might act

against the public safety, restricting or prohibiting processions and meetings224, and

finally allowing Detention and Removal against those believed to be undermining

national security.225

As late as April 1951, the colonial government was still striving to create or re-create a

militaristic force for the colony in order to contain the nationalist activities and internal

political differences of the time, which promoted violence and civil unrest:

…the subjects dealt with at the [conference of commissioners of police in the

colonies] ranged from fundamental issues such as relationship of police and

government, to matters of practical detail, such as riot procedure, training and

the procurement of equipment. While, naturally, there were differences of

opinion upon some points, there was complete unanimity about the essential

principles. The main point emphasized by the conference was that Colonial

police forces should be organized as civilian forces existing for service to the

community on the general lines obtaining in the United Kingdom, but with

one important qualification. It was recognized that in many territories, owing

to the absence of military forces, the larger areas to be controlled, the nature

of the population, or to some combination of these factors, it was necessary

for some or all of the police to be employed in a semi-military manner, so as

to be able to deal with disturbances, whether in urban or rural areas, without

the immediate support of military forces. These police bodies must, therefore,

224 See the Public Order Ordinance and the Bome Kotoku case discussed post. 225 Supra note 32, p. 166-72.



84

in present conditions, be equipped with arms and trained in their use…226

With this consensus the official seal had been placed on the conception of the Colonial

Police. It was to be pragmatic and experimental and not precisely copy the British police

system, but adapts its principles to the social and political realities of the Colonies.227

With reforms, the colonial police were able to carry out their duties more efficiently and

with greater reliability, but the nature of those duties remained coercive rather than

consensual. The improved policing of the period was to a large extent directed at

strengthening the ability of the colonial state to coerce an increasing number of industrial,

agrarian and political opponents more effectively.228

In 1951229, Colonel A. E. Young was to recommend the establishment of a Police Force

that was truly independent of political and extraneous influences to the service. In 1952, a

memorandum by the Commissioner of Police accepting the Young report defined “a

Police Constable [as] a citizen serving the office of a Constable, thereby having certain

powers and being liable to certain responsibilities. He serves the Sovereign…and is a

servant of the state exercising original authority”.230 It would have been more honest if

the words “Sovereign” and “state” were replaced with “Governor” and “Government”.

226 Supra note 119, p. 16-7. 227 Supra note 41, p. 218-9. 228 Supra note 55, p. 12. 229 Supra note 87. 230MEMORANDUM BY THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, The Present Role and Statutory

Functions of the Ghana Police Force, its Organisation and Distribution of the Force, Staffing,

Training and Equipment. (Accra, June 1952) Para. 2 (Unpublished).



85

Colonel Young also recommended a massive decentralization of the operational and

administrative machinery of the force and consistent with the changes that were occurring

in Ghanaian society as a whole. He thought that it was necessary to characterize the status

of a police officer in an emerging democratic society. This was essential to place the

functions and role of the officer squarely within society and thereby permit the officer to

function optimally. These useful recommendations do not seem to have sunk in.

Reform within the colonial police services, first conceived in the 1930s and were being

implemented in the 1940s and 1950s were seriously disrupted by the politics of

nationalism. These political challenges only succeeded in bringing more resources to the

police, which remained basically the same in orientation and tactics. 231 The plan to

change from a military to a civil force following territorial consolidation never

materialized and nationalist activities prevented this from happening at the fall of empire.

Indeed, at this time, there was actually a re-militarization of a force that hitherto was

being demilitarized.

Policing throughout the colonial period was imposed on the people and never enjoyed

their consent. “Colonial policing in the Gold Coast had little to do with serving the

community and everything to do with upholding the authority of the colonial state.”232

During this period under review, the colonial police invariably served the political

interests of the colonial state more overtly than ever before, and were nowhere in any real

231 Supra note 119, p. 9-10. 232 Supra note 53, p. 123.



86

sense accountable to the community.233

In the settlements in Canada, Australia and parts of South Africa, policing generally

evolved with the consent of the community.234 In the Gold Coast, and the other colonies

in West Africa, (and in line with the political economy of colonization), the question of

policing by consent was largely immaterial.235 In these places, and also in south-east

Asia, where the majority populations were not of European descent, there was little

concern even in the twentieth century with any notion of policing by consent. The police

served the interest of the state and were hardly accountable to representative bodies or the

community. Also, there was a marked difference between the development of policing

ideologies and practices in Britain and in Africa.236 While the metropolitan and county

forces in England moved closer to the ideals of consensual policing during the twentieth

century, this trend was not mirrored in the police forces in Africa. The policing of labour

disputes, and then of political agitation linked to nationalist or other anti-government

activities, pushed the colonial police into a prominent internal security role from whence

it has not returned. “They continued to carry arms, and to be viewed as an important

element in the defence of the colonial state: coercion was a necessary element of control,

consensus at best a dim and distant goal.”237 Today, Africa, in reforming its police forces,

must learn from the community of consent and the accountability mechanisms that

changed colonial policing in Canada, Australia and New Zealand into relatively

233 Supra note 55, p. 12. 234 Supra note 53, p. 120-1. 235 Supra note 55, p. 10. 236 Ibid, p. 9. 237 Ibid, p. 11.



87

functional police forces.

CONCLUSION

When the British set out to establish a Police Force in the Gold Coast, the reasons for

doing so were clear. The conquered peoples were restless and unwillingly or strategically

signed peace treaties and treaties of protection with the British.238 To govern, the political

class-the Governors and their officials-needed security. The Gold Coast Police Force was

to provide this needed security. Again, with the end of the slave trade and the beginning

of “legitimate trade”,239 there was the need to preserve peace and security for trade in

European goods and for increased agricultural and mineral production to feed the

industries in Europe, which produced the goods that were then sold in Africa. The police

were used to maintain this law, order, peace and security through the enforcement of the

“rule of law”. Flowing from this, the police were also used to enforce tax laws and other

laws, such as eviction and property laws that were meant to bring economic benefit to the

imperial powers.

In this chapter, I have located the emergence of the police in Ghana within the project of

empire building and the onset of industrial capitalism. The backward peoples had to be

conquered and then pacified; the wheels of capital had to be protected and kept moving;

238 My good friend Samuel Amadi, Director of the Centre for Public Policy and Research, a

Nigerian NGO, and an expert on Nigerian Political Economy and Sharia in Northern Nigeria

reminds me that when Northern Nigeria was overwhelmed by British Forces, the Leadership of the

area told their people to “Love them with their mouths and hate them with their hearts”. 239 It is very contested, how legitimate this trade was.



88

and the nascent working-class had to be disciplined by new forms of coercion and

legitimation in order to ensure the stability of the social relations of production. Thus,

policing lay very much at the center of the ideologies of imperial rule that informed

political domination as well as economic and social construction. As private policing

increased in cost to the trade companies, the police institution was nationalized and its

cost transferred from the private to the public sector. This basic posture of the police has

continued to date. In the next chapter I bring the story up to the present, and reveal how

the state of affairs came to be.



89

CHAPTER THREE

POST-INDEPENDENCE “BOME

KOTOKU”

INTRODUCTION240

In the previous chapter, I have shown how opportunities for the reform of the police force

were lost. The force, therefore, remained one for the preservation of empire through the

protection of the political class, the maintenance of peace and security for economic

exploitation, and the enforcement of the “rule of law” in aid of political, economic, and

social subjugation. True, there were the pre-nationalist forms of resistance and the

resulting wars. And there was the nationalist struggle, but these had a far broader agenda

of dethroning imperialism and not focused specifically on imperialism’s effects on

particular institutions such as the police. The nationalist movement was led by, and

independence ultimately negotiated by the upper-class elite, more interested in replacing

the colonial political class as controllers and managers of pre-existing institutions than in

the re-making of those institutions. The story of how the dysfunctional institutions the

240 A good but short summary of the development of the police in Ghana post independence, up

until the Rawlings era is contained in John A. Arthur and Otwin Marenin, “British Colonization

and the Political Development of the Police in Ghana, West Africa”, in CHARLES B. FIELDS

AND RICHTER H. MOORE, JR, Comparative Criminal Justice: Traditional and Nontraditional

Systems of Law and Control, (Waveland Press, Inc.: Prospect Heights, Illinois, 1996).



90

independence leaders and their successors assumed control over, ultimately changed the

leaders, and not the other way round, will be noted.

In this chapter, I also bring the story of the institutional evolution of the police in Ghana

up-to-date. I will show that there were two main challenges that faced the new political

administration under the leadership of President Nkrumah. First, there was the need to

consolidate the hard-won political and economic freedom of the country and to build the

necessary infrastructure for economic and political development. A second challenge was

to establish social institutions that would foster the integration of diverse ethnic and clan

groups into the process of nation-building and development. It was toward the fulfillment

of these two objectives that the Ghana Police emerged as a powerful social and political

institution. To implement his agenda, Nkrumah called in aid the strongest institution of

coercion and governance that had been constructed by the colonial regime-the police.

Under his reign, Dr. Nkrumah used the police to shore up his fragile regime and to keep

political opponents as bay. However, he also mistrusted independent sources of power,

and so maintained strict political control over the police and divested it of several of its

powers when he sensed they were being disloyal.

By 1964, just seven years after the departure of the British, Nkrumah had transformed the

country into a one-party state and used preventive detention to imprison his opponents.

He used the police to enforce this and numerous other laws that curtailed civil liberties

such as political assembly and a free and independent press. Several police officers were



91

expelled from the force for refusing to enforce these ordinances, or enforcing them in a

way and manner that was not pleasing to Nkrumah. When in 1964 an unsuccessful

attempt was made on Nkrumah’s life by a police constable, the president reacted by

disarming the police, reducing their size, and sacking the commissioner of police, nine

other senior officers, and detaining eight others. The police were instrumental in his

overthrow two years later and were active in the new administration.

The direct involvement of the police in Ghana’s administration led to the revamping of

the police institution. Its size and resources increased dramatically. Over three years,

from 1965 to 1968, the size of the force almost doubled. Through out the period of

political and economic decline, 1966 to 1981, the police used its increased human

resources and increased material resources from the United States, under the Office of

Public Safety (OPS) program to protect the political class, ensure peace and security at all

cost for economic activity, and to enforce the rule of law to particular ends. As would be

expected, the relationship between the police and the citizenry remained as strained as it

was during the colonial era and the Nkrumah period. During this period, issues of

corruption within the service also became central.

The Rawlings regime, which took over power after the OPS program folded up in Ghana,

attempted two contrasting reforms in the force. First, there was the leftist approach of

decentralizing policing functions and involving non-police officers in policing; and

second there was the hi-tecking of a force to police a new era of neo-liberalism and post-



92

modern colonialism. The first set of reforms crumbled with the marriage of the regime to

the IFIs. The second set of reforms endured, and have continued to date. The

governments of the last two decades have thus preserved the police force in the basic

form in which it was created, and then improved its human, institutional, and material

resources. This has been possible because the colonial agenda and the agenda of post-

modern colonialism coincide in their basic tenets, and require a certain type of police

officer to be effective.

The very first attempts at reform were modest indeed and involved calls on the Supreme

Court, the highest and constitutional court of the land, to prune specific powers of the

police. Of late, and perhaps emboldened by various successes in piece-meal reform,

governmental reform agents, development partners, NGOs, and civil society groups are

calling for a complete overhaul of the police service. Consequently, there is a rush to

reform the Ghana Police Service, rather like the rush to reform the Ghana Police Force

beginning in 1948, which ended up hi-teching and militarizing an already brutal force.

There are many calls for extending the tentacles of the National Institutional Renewal

Programme (NIRP) and National Governance Programme’s (NGP) to the police.

These reform agents, overwhelmed by the symptoms of the problem as described in this

chapter, are all calling for a reform of the brutal, unfriendly and corrupt police officer.

Virtually no one is talking about the reform of the political economy that determines the

functions of the police, nor the reform of the police in the political economy of neo-

liberalism and post-modern colonialism.



93

Two centuries after the beginning of the colonial agenda, and half a century after it

formally ended, the Gold Coast Police Force, now called the Ghana Police Service retains

the same basic objectives that were set for it by the imperialist powers. This is very

consistent with the thesis that colonialism was the single most important institutional

restructuring in the continent and should be the starting point of any agenda of

institutional change.

After independence, the Gold Coast Constabulary was renamed the Ghana Police Force,

and later the Ghana Police Service. The institution as created during colonial rule has

endured indeed, and remains patterned after the British imposed police system, enforcing

laws inherited from British colonialism.241 The police are still used mainly for the

protection of the political class; the key aim of the police is still stated as providing the

peace and security that is needed to attract foreign investors; and the police still enforce a

whole range of laws and conduct evictions of poor and powerless people in order to

create space and wealth for the powerful and the rich242. The reasons for this, and what

lessons it holds for institutional reinvention, are central themes in this chapter. They are

also the crux of the theory of institutional continuity.

241 Mathieu Deflem, 1994 “Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis

of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya” Police Studies 17 (1): 45-68. Also

on the World Wide Web at: http://www.cla.sc.edu/socy/faculty/deflem/zcolpol.html. Visited on

26th October 2003. p. 5-6. 242 See for example ISSAH IDDI ABBAS and 10 Others V. ACCRA METROPOLITAN

ASSEMBLY AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, Suit No. Misc. 1203/2002, where the Center

for Public Interest Law (CEPIL) contested one such eviction in court. See also www.cepil.org,

CEPIL’s website for information on the case.

http://www.cepil.org/



94

THE NKRUMAH ERA, 1957-1966

THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF GHANA AT INDEPENDENCE

The years following the Second World War saw a rapid movement in the Gold Coast

from presumed model colony to a demand for self-government and then independence.

All these tendencies received full expression after independence. During the years 1957-

66, Ghana was ruled by the Convention Peoples’ Party (CPP) of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.

There were serious attempts during this time to impose Party-Government over the

politics and economy of the country, culminating in the declaration of a one-party state in

1964. True, there was opposition to this agenda mainly from the Ashanti-based United

Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and later the National Liberation Movement (NLM), but

these were generally crushed.

In the political sphere, for instance, the first years of independence witnessed a series of

constitutional and legislative measures, which were aimed at stifling political opposition

to the CPP. The Avoidance of Discrimination Act in late 1957243 forbade the existence of

parties on a regional, tribal, or religious basis. The Ashanti-based parties and the

Northern Peoples Party (NPP) were obviously affected, and opposition forces, formed on

ethnic lines, had to come together to form the United Party (UP) as a way of getting

around the law. The Preventive Detention Act of 1958244 gave the government the right

243 Avoidance of Discrimination Act, 1957 (No. 38). 244 Preventive Detention Act, 1958 (No. 17).



95

to detain persons without trial for up to five years.245 The 1960 Constitution, the first

republican constitution that replaced the independence constitution of 1957, created the

position of Executive President, a position that was filled by Nkrumah, the Prime

Minister under the 1957 Constitution. The constitution gave the president a lot of powers,

and did not contain an actionable and enforceable bill of rights.246 Then in 1964, Ghana

was made a one party-state. A new era, based on a consistent, centralized government,

was now in place. But agitation against the system continued.

The Ga people in Accra, the national capital, were frustrated that they were being

overwhelmed by others who were moving into their midst and that the C.P.P. and

Nkrumah were not repaying them for their pre-independence support. As early as July

1957, the Ga Shifimo Kpee (the Ga Standfast Organisation) was officially born.

Nkrumah, returning to Accra from a Prime Ministers’ Conference in London, was met by

former supporters who now held banners of protest and hurled epithets at him. Marches

and demonstrations turned bloody as the police intervened. By late August arrests had

begun, though not exclusively of opposition figures. From the standpoint of the Ga

Shifimo Kpee, the police were shutting their eyes to C.P.P. terrorism, unfairly arresting

opposition supporters, offering false testimony in court, and not allowing them public

meeting or rally permits.247

245 Ibid, section 4. 246 As interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of RE AKOTO [1961] 2 GLR 525. 247 RICHARD B. KRANZDORF, The Military and Police in the Gold Coast/Ghana Through

February 1966: A Study of Limited Institutionalization. Ph. D Dissertation, University of

California, Los Angeles, Political Science, 1973) p. 253-55.



96

Ashanti had always had a history of opposition to rule from Accra, whether colonial or

indigenous. Though the National Liberation Movement had waned in the immediate post-

independence era, few government supporters were to be found in Ashanti. The

authorities dared not take actions against the Asantehene, but had no such trepidation in

regard to other leaders, such as those of the Muslim community in Kumasi. In the

summer of 1957 deportation orders were served against two of these leaders, though both

were Ghanaian citizens, and public disorders in both Kumasi and Accra resulted. Again

the police bore the brunt of the people’s anger. In Ashanti as in Accra there were protests

that the police were making it difficult for the newly formed United Party to hold rallies.

Then in the fall of 1958, four more deportations were carried out by the police despite a

court order delaying such action until the nationality of the men was determined. Large

scale hostility toward the police again was re-enforced.248

In the Volta Region, the bases of friction with the Nkrumah regime were both political

and economic. Some “voltarians” wished the area to merge with what would become an

independent Togo, whilst others wanted all Ewes in Eastern Ghana to join their brothers

across the border in a new nation-state. Yet others wished to keep and strengthen ties to

Accra.249 On the economic front, a long –standing, lucrative smuggling operation

between Ghana and Togo, had been endangered for the first time.250

248 Ibid, p. 255-6 249 Ibid. 250 FRANCIS AGBODEKA, African Politics and British Policy in the Gold Coast 1868-1900: A

Study in Forms and Force of Protest, (Longman: Northwestern University Press, 1971) p. 62-76.



97

“While clashes between Government and Opposition grew in the first years and more

restrictive legislation was passed, many of the pre- 1957 trappings were to be seen,

complete with a functioning parliamentary democracy and an economy in which

expatriates had even more of a controlling interest than before”251. By 1960-61, there

were complaints that a once-healthy economy was in trouble, attributable by the Left to

foreign and domestic exploitative interests. Economically, Ghana was in decline and her

foreign policy was meeting with rebuffs, both elsewhere on the African continent and

overseas, even from some who had been thought of as her friends. This was not helped by

a widening wealth gap and rumors of ostentatious living by state officials.

All this led to the general strike in September of 1961. This not only provided grounds

for arresting opposition leaders or driving them into exile, but for a Government shake-

up. An assassination attempt against the President at Kulungugu in Northern Ghana on

his return from a visit to Upper Volta (now Burkina Fasso) in August 1962 was followed

by months of uncertainty. Here again the ferociousness of the in-fighting led to the use of

Preventive Detention against three nationally known politicians. They were held for trial

on the basis of very tenuous links between them and evidence uncovered in connection

with the assassination attempt. Almost a year and a half later the Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court found the three innocent. The President responded by calling for a

plebiscite to change the constitution, giving him power to dismiss any judge whose

decision he questioned, as well as sanctifying Ghana as a single-party state and himself as

251 Supra note 247, p. 243.



98

lifetime chief executive. The plebiscite overwhelmingly passed, but instability remained.

When in 1965, it was announced that the first parliamentary elections since 1956 were to

be held, and that the 198 candidates were all personally selected by the President and the

C.P.P. Leadership, many knew that the CPP government was set to develop a centralized

one-party state with limited opportunity for dissent.252

THE POLICE IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA

The police underwent an increase in size in the wake of the 1948 demonstrations and

intelligence procedures were updated, but these measures were insufficient to keep up

with the national situation just described. The force was increased from 4,000 in 1957 to

7,000 in 1960. The force faced several challenges during this period. Generally, they

adapted to a surprising degree, British police practices, but these were modified by the

influence of a mélange of expatriate officers with experience in Palestine, Malaya and

elsewhere.253 Also, the European members of the police force were facing new challenges

as they realized they would soon be forced to leave. At another level, local nationalists

and politicians were calling to indigenous forces to be less loyal to the colonial

Government. All this was complicated by a rise in competition amongst the Ghanaian

forces because the years leading to independence witnessed a transition, with the

European members of the force being phased out and the Africans moving ever more

252 Ibid, p. 247. 253 L.H. GANN AND PETER DUIGNAN (eds), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: Volume 2 The

History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960, (Cambridge University Press, 1970) p. 315 and

Supra note 8 p. xi.



99

quickly into higher positions. The internal divisiveness that this caused, and the various

political pressures that were a function of nationalist activity, were carried into the

independence era.254

This is not to say that all or even most of the activities in which the police were involved

differed from what they had been before 1957. For the most part, the police went about

its business of apprehending criminals, patrolling highways, and aiding relief efforts in

civil disasters. During the nine years of Nkrumah’s rule, the police grew from

approximately six thousand, to fourteen thousand. Aside its traditional duties, this growth

was aimed at dealing with overtly political activities of the opposition forces and other

functional matters such as smuggling. The volatile areas of Accra, the Volta Region, and

Ashanti had been simmering before independence, but had been controlled by the

expatriate-run police. After independence, they needed to be contained. The containment

involved renewing intimate and sensitive police relations with the local populations,

which I shall discuss in some detail in the next section.

The event in the three sites just referred to (Accra, Kumasi and the Volta Region)

occurred mainly in the first three years of independence and led to a stress in the

traditional functions of the police for preserving order. The police was already under

stress occasioned by the new political climate in the country. It was difficult for the

African police officers to remain impartial or above the battle between government and

254 Supra note 247,, p. xi.



100

opposition, even if they so wished. The new independence government believed the

police were relics of colonialism, while their opponents in the opposition parties saw

them as tools of an oppressive regime. Whichever way they turned, the police were

roughly criticized for their action or their inaction, and some succumbed to the pressures.

Plots against the government were seen as rooted within the military and police and, in

truth, some of the men were so involved, either because they believed legitimate

channels for grievances had been closed or for more parochial reasons.255

By 1961, the independent Government was demanding political commitment from the

force and some police officers heeded the call. Later in 1968, Nkrumah clarified the

impetus for this:

…I… had to accept a police force many of whose higher officers were

politically hostile to the new Ghana. They, after all, had been those chosen

for promotion by the colonial regime and they had thus a monopoly of the

specialist training required. Further many of them were corrupt but to obtain

proof of this was a difficult matter. …256

The General Strike of 1961 depicted the situation graphically. In mid-August President

Nkrumah left on a trip to Eastern Europe, appointing a three-man Presidential

Commission to rule in his absence. Two days before his departure, a compulsory savings

scheme was introduced, with five percent of the worker’s wages withheld. Labor, the

backbone of C.P.P. support, was very displeased. The cost of consumer goods was sky

255 Ibid, p. xi to xii. 256 Ibid, p. 189.



101

high and now the rank-and-file felt it was being made to pay for the excesses of fancy

living by government bureaucrats. Bomb blasts began in Accra that November. By

December, a strike had begun and as discontent rose, a limited state of emergency was

declared, with both military and police called upon to take a more active role. The army

was to be held in reserve. But for the police there was no hesitancy. Several thousand

men under Commissioner Madjitey searched for the ringleaders of the strike. When few

arrests were immediately forthcoming, the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner,

Harlley, were chastised by the President. Deputy Commissioner Amaning was personally

put in charge of the intensive man-hunt. Civil liberties were severely abridged, and any

code of decency discarded. In the aftermath, hundreds of figures, large and small, were

jailed by the police.257

It is clear from the above that Nkrumah used the police to shore up his fragile regime and

to keep political opponents at bay, in his bid to establish centralized control over the new

nation-state. He completely mistrusted independent sources of power, and his mistrust for

the police was evident in several of the changes that he introduced. First, he used party

loyalists from the ruling Convention People’s Party (CPP) to infiltrate the ranks of both

the police and the military. Second, he replaced the police on guard duty at Flagstaff

House, the official residence of the president, with Chinese and Russian trained officers.

Third, he established the Special Branch, a specialized unit within the Ghana Police, to

monitor the activities of political opponents. As noted earlier, matters got to a head when

257 Ibid, p. 257-8.



102

in 1964, an unsuccessful attempt was made on his life by a police constable. The

president reacted by disarming the police, reducing their size, and sacking the

commissioner of police, nine other senior officers, and detaining eight others.258

In the same year, Nkrumah transformed Ghana into a one-party state and used preventive

detention to detain and imprison his opponents. He moved the country ideologically more

to the left, and the country became a benefactor of Soviet and Chinese military and

economic assistance. Increasingly, his concept of Pan-Africanism and his successful

courting of socialism, alienated the country from the West. Frequently, he used the

somewhat reluctant police to enforce numerous ordinances that curtailed civil rights such

as political assembly and a free and independent press. Several police officers were

expelled from the force for refusing to enforce these ordinances, especially the frequent

dusk-to-dawn curfews that were imposed. The police were confused. They were not sure

if they should allow themselves to be used by the government to suppress democratic

rights of the citizens. Yet they knew their role was to ensure public safety and enforce the

law, what ever it was. Some even considered remaining passive.

Two senior police commissioners, John W. Harlley and Anthony Deku, both trained in

England, were the first to suggest that the president be overthrown. They managed to find

sympathizers in the army. This was the genesis of the police-cum military alliance that

258 John A. Arthur and Otwin Marenin, “British Colonization and the Political Development of the

Police in Ghana, West Africa”, in CHARLES B. FIELDS AND RICHTER H. MOORE, JR,

Comparative Criminal Justice: Traditional and Nontraditional Systems of Law and Control,

(Waveland Press, Inc.: Prospect Heights, Illinois, 1996) p. 170-2.



103

was to change the political landscape of Ghana. The Ghana police participated

extensively in the planning and execution of the February 1966 coup that overthrew

Nkrumah. This was evident in the composition of the new military government, the

National Liberation Council (NLC). The NLC comprised eights members, four of whom

were senior police officers, including the then Inspector General of police, John Harlley.

Senior ranking members of the police were also made regional and district political

administrators. Thus emerged the police as a broker in political affairs in Ghana,

overseeing the disbanding of the proscribed Convention People’s Party of Nkrumah.259

POLICE BRUTALITY IN THE NKRUMAH ERA

The political tensions of the 1948 riots and the Positive Action of 1950 continued into the

independence era. Only this time, it was between Nkrumah’s party, the C.P.P., and the

opposition parties. Nkrumah used the police to his advantage during this era. In the

circumstances, the basic functions of protecting the political class, ensuring peace and

stability for development and enforcing the “rule of law”, including deportation and

detention orders against political opponents, continued. There was still the standard

excuse that the police was necessary for curbing crime and ensuring social stability. A

wave of burglaries in Kumasi, for example, led to the creation of the Zongo Volunteer

Force, a group of volunteers from the North, which formed a local defense force. They

were illegal but they were useful in aiding the police in their never-ending duties. They

259 Ibid.



104

also clashed with the Ashanti based NLM (a key opposition group to Nkrumah’s CPP)

and acted as a semi-vigilante committee, but overall the regular officers winked at such

excesses260

Post-1948, the regular Force, which was still far too militaristic, embarked on intelligence

functions which obviously did not help its standing with the people. The Mobile Force

which was formed after the riots, and used to quell real and imagined riots, meet with the

people’s displeasure so much so that it had to change its name. The complaints against

the police in the pre-independence era were the same as those in the post-independence

era and more. One commentator noted:

A rising crime rate brought in its wake renewed condemnation of the

organization. Further, there were charges of being impolite, using harsh

methods, telling plaintiffs or witnesses to “go and come,” however many

miles they might have traveled, spontaneously altering complaints against

those accused, being quite authoritarian and brooking no opposition, locking

people up in cells and trying to force confessions, jailing people for making

false accusations when they issued complaint, and generally beating,

detaining, and bullying individuals when possible. From the public’s

standpoint, therefore, it was not wise to help the police in tracking down

criminals, nor to go to court and become mixed up with police officers. In the

rural areas the view of the regular police was even worse. A member of the

Legislative Assembly commented in this regard:

The Policemen are a terror in the rural areas. …

The Policemen do not in fact respect the views of the common

people, and in my own constituency, a Policeman…will never

respect whatever views are put before him.261

260 Supra note 247, p. 236 261 Ibid, p. 196



105

By late 1957, the year of independence, the Ga organization had joined the United Party

and the Special Branch was calling for Preventive Detention for large numbers.

Independence week itself had seen first the military and then the police called in to quell

disturbances and guard against an armed uprising, with the ringleaders subsequently

receiving three-to seven-year jail sentences for their efforts. Later in the same year two

Members of Parliament were arrested and imprisoned for conspiring with others to

prepare for an insurrection. In December 1958, some forty-three members of the United

Party were arrested under the new legislation on changes of holding secret meetings and

plotting the overthrow of the government. Three months later, all major leaders of the Ga

Shifimo Kpee were behind bars and the movement was in decline. Obviously, antipolice

sentiments did not decline, and the people were now more hostile than before. Relations

between police and public plunged still lower in 1960 when Preventive Detention orders

were issued for some two dozen men who were charged with planning another uprising,

this time to coincide with Togolese independence.262

By 1959, with one plot to overthrow the Government already uncovered, the Special

Branch of the police service became the executors and sometimes also the originators of

imprisonment without due process. Individual policemen were able to act more and more

often on their own, or with District or Regional Commissioners in the rural areas. This

was especially so in late 1962 and 1963 when different sections of the police began

262 Ibid, p. 254-8.



106

acting in a semiautonomous manner. There were now criminal, political, and unclassified

detainees. Enforcement authorities included the Special Branch, C.I.D., Uniformed

Branch, and a non-police intelligence unit under Ambrose Yankey, Sr., a close confidant

of the President. And in those years, lifetime detention became a possibility. All of these

variations took place in a worsening political climate with the Special Branch now having

almost carte blanche.263

From the Usher Fort Prison in Accra, there were reports that police practices included

banging on doors in the middle of the night and hauling off those whose names appeared

on some new list, without even allowing the unfortunate persons to dress or say good-bye

to his family, and with the lack of any court procedures to justify the arrests. Police

functions were certainly growing.

A former colleague of Nkrumah, indeed, the one who called him back to Ghana from the

United States to assume post as the General-Secretary of the UGCC, the party from

which Nkrumah broke off to form the CPP, himself in detention, wrote the following to

the Clerk of Parliament:

…As Mr. Wiafe, as an MP, represents anything between 30,000 and 50,000

registered voters of Ghana, three or four times greater than the total number

of 10,000 paid persons in the Ghana Police Service, one had to wait, but wait

in vain, for the particular law under which a police constable or a police

officer could proceed to place a member of our Ghana Parliament in his own

custody for 34 days. The only law in Ghana on the subject being one which

263 Ibid, p. 262.



107

allowed the Police to arrest a citizen (but not an M.P.) for a suspected offence

and keep him in his own custody for 24 hours (not 24 days), taking him, as

soon as might be possible within that period before a Magistrate for an order

as to custody or bail. It is in fact the statutory position in Ghana that in the

case of an M.P., no arrest is to be effected without specific permission of the

Speaker, the reason being that an M.P. is not just an individual but the elected

representative of a sovereign constituency entitled to the requisite immunities

which Ghana and other civilized nations accord to all ambassadors or

representatives. But perhaps our country is in such a sad condition our police

are not aware of this fundamental guarantee without which no representative

democracy can claim to have legs, not to talk of possessing a thinking brain.

…Sir, You are in a position to appreciate that the contemplation of the

possibility of 10,000 officers and men of the Ghana Police Service being let

loose on 104 elected representatives of the people, plus 10 (ten) appointed

women members, a total of 114 M.P.s (about 87 Police to each M.P.), does

not make it easy for any Ghanaian to be sure that Parliamentary seats are

what they are under the law.

…According to current practice any Policeman, or any number of Policemen,

could at any time, and, in particular, in the middle of the night, surround an

M.P.’s house and, without the Speaker’s Warrant, take the M.P. to a Police

Station, lock him or her up in a Police cell, and not tell any judicial authority

or Court about it, but keep him or her there for as long as 34 days at his

Police Pleasure. Has Ghana then, under her new dispensation, her hard-worn

freedom, been sentenced to Police servitude for life? Where the laws of a

country passed by the democratic Parliament of the people (“one man, one

Vote”), come to be treated so easily with utter contempt by the executive arm

of the law, that country has ceased to be classified by civilized people as

Democratic and has become a Police State or a savage country.264

At the time of independence, Ghana had two types of forces: the “modern” Gold Coast

Police Force, which was divided into General and Escort Police, and the “traditional”,

local-authority forces.265 The story of the native authority police during this period was

264 Excerpts from a Statement Dr. Danquah Wrote To the Clerk of the National Assembly from

Ussher Fort Prison on April 30, 1962. The excerpt begins with Danquah referring to the case of a

Member of Parliament, W.A. Wiafe, CPP, who had told him he had then been in jail for 34 days

without any justification for his interment being given. Dr. J.B.Danquah, Detention and Death in

Nsawam Prison, pp. 93-94, quoted in Kranzdorf, supra note 247, p. 455-6. 265 Supra note 258, p.169.



108

no different. A national commission in the late 1940’s had recommended against the

retention of any such force. Shortly thereafter, Colonel Young touched on this subject in

his overall assessment of the police in the Gold Coast in 1951, also recommending that

the Native Authority Police be assimilated into the Escort Police branch. Instead, a

compromise was reached in 1952-53 when the central government set down some

guidelines for these men, putting them under a Local Government Ordinance.266 The

inhabitants of rural areas continued to view local policemen with fear and scorn until

their final absorption into the regular Force in 1962.

Control over local-authority forces had rested with local leaders whose interests were

often at odds with those of the independence leadership and, later, post-independence

governments. Although in 1953, local-authority forces were brought under the

supervision of the central government, operational control remained with the chiefs.

Their functions were “to maintain and safeguard the public order and the safety of

persons and property within the administrative area; to execute the process issuing of

local courts; [and] to assist the Ghana Police Service in the execution of their duties”.

Bringing these forces under local government control did little to improve their habits.

They now served local government “with the same disregard for the law as they had

exhibited in the old days when they were under chiefly control”267

266 Ibid, p. 169-70. 267 Ibid, p. 169.



109

The forces existed until 1963 when Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the president of the country,

acted upon the recommendation of a committee of inquiry into abuses of power during

elections preceding political independence and ordered that the local forces be abolished.

Local forces did not only brutalize the citizenry. They had become a hindrance to

effective policing and also posed political problems to the president, since they continued

to be controlled by local governments, many of which were in opposition to the

president’s policies. Members of the local forces who met certain educational and

training criteria were absorbed into the Ghana Police Force.268

In sum, the police role in intelligence operations and the enforcement of deportation and

detention edicts, reinforced public fears, and almost collapsed police-civil relations The

situation at this time was the same as it was in 1951. Colonel Young who investigated the

police force in that year complained in his report that “it is difficult for the public to

esteem the police as a public service when they realize that it can so easily be turned into

a military force.…”269 The Colonel pointed out that the police had started out as an

occupational, paramilitary force and had continued as an internal backer of civil

authority, a stance which had to change. As we have seen, it did not change in the

immediate post independence era. The coup of February 1966 terminated the Nkrumah

regime, but no assurance could be given that the difficulties from which the police

268 Ibid, p. 169-70. 269 COLONIAL A.E YOUNG, A report upon the Gold Coast Police (Accra: Government printer,

1951).



110

suffered were also at an end. I shall now examine whether or not the police changed in

the period after that.

THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY, 1966 TO 1981


This period was the severest in terms of political and economic depression. In the

difficult post-independence period, the indigenous elite and the overseas scholar,

disillusioned with the concept of the political party as the institution to promote rapid

beneficial change, turned their hopes in another direction-the men on horseback and those

in patrol wagons and their ability to intervene and to rule.270

In Ghana, at least, the first generation of post-independence military and police leaders

faced several leadership problems. There was the wave of independence of several

African countries in the late sixties and seventies, and the continuing struggles for

independence by several other such states, with the attendant crisis and their calls for

support from their brethren on the continent. And there was the global economic

downturn of the 1970s and the cold war. Added to all this was the temporary nature of the

military (and police) regimes. All of them took over power with a proclaimed aim of

cleaning up and returning the country to constitutional democratic rule. They were thus

270 Supra note 247, p. 3.



111

from the very start, temporary regimes. Again, the ethnic, class and political divisions

they inherited did not just go away and were not responsive to the quick fixes the men on

horseback and patrol wagons imagined would do the trick. Neither did corruption. In fact,

in 1974, the “Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Bribery and Corruption”

called the phenomenon an “endemic canker”271, and listed the police as the most corrupt

institution in the eyes of the public.

THE POLICE FORCE IN THIS ERA272

The direct involvement of the police in Ghana’s political administration after Nkrumah

led to the revamping of the police institution. Its size and resources increased

dramatically. Over three years, from 1965 to 1968, the size of the force almost doubled,

from 10,709 to 19,895.

Ghana also invited the United States to supply assistance to Ghana under the Office of

Public Safety Program (OPS), which had been established in November 1962 to help

271 See pages iii and 103 of the report. 272 Most of the material from this section is taken from: United States, Department of State, Ghana

Police Assessment: Summary of Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations and Equipment

Specifications-Sept. 12- Oct. 23, 1968, Reviewed and Declassified by John Weiss, OPS, February

24, 1975.; United States, Department of State, “Termination Phase-Out Study: Public Safety

Project Ghana (Agency for International Development, Washington D.C., March 1974): Otwin

Marenin, “United States’ Aid to African Police Forces: The Experience and Impact of the Public

Safety Assistance Programme”, African Affairs, vol. 85, no. 341 (October 1986) p. 509.; John A.

Arthur and Otwin Marenin, “British Colonization and the Political Development of the Police in

Ghana, West Africa”, in CHARLES B. FIELDS AND RICHTER H. MOORE, JR, Comparative

Criminal Justice: Traditional and Nontraditional Systems of Law and Control, (Waveland Press,

Inc.: Prospect Heights, Illinois, 1996).



112

train and equip the police forces of developing countries. I will analyze the OPS program

in some detail since it was one of the most important aspects of Ghanaian policing during

this time.

The Office of Public Safety was created in the United States during the Kennedy years

when concerns about insurgency movements and guerrilla wars reached new heights.

Kennedy, after noting the fall of Cuba to Castro and Che Guevera’s peregrinations in

Latin America and Africa, the chaos in the Belgian Congo and the defeat of the French in

Indochina, decided to look for ways to deal with such threats. Neither direct military aid

or intervention, nor secret and frequently illegal assistance passed through CIA operatives

were favored. The Kennedy government decided on a middle ground-assistance to police

forces.273 There was another reason for the choice of the police. The advisory group

which Kennedy had set up to study how best to determine internal security needs and

design programs to deal with them, had decided that ‘the chief role of police assistance

programmes is to counter Communist emphasis on subversive aggression. Indeed the

police constitute the first frontline of defense and are the ones on whom the greatest

burden falls in the pre-insurrectionary stage’274.

There were three types of assistance programs under OPS: training for middle and upper

level police officers in the USA (either at the International Police Academy (IPA) or by

273 Otwin Marenin, “United States’ Aid to African Police Forces: The Experience and Impact of

the Public Safety Assistance Programme”, African Affairs, vol. 85, no. 341 (October 1986) p. 516. 274 Cited in Lobe, U.S. Police Assistance, p. 52, and quoted in Marenin, Ibid, p. 516.



113

contract with other federal government agencies, local police departments, private firms

and universities); commodity assistance in transportation, communications, arms and

ammunition, and miscellaneous items such as books, educational equipment and

uniforms (but excluding certain items such as automatic rifles, electrified batons and

sickening gas which were prohibited); resource persons from the United States, usually in

the form of two-and-three-men evaluation teams sent to assess the state and needs of

public safety and police forces in countries which requested assistance, or advisors and

liaison officers to supervise and train home-country police officers in the proper

utilization and maintenance of the equipment which had been supplied or to advise on

general principles of police administration or the organization of specific tasks, records

management, investigation, riot control.275

The overall official impetus for spending United States dollars on these countries was

this: without stability and order, that is an effective police force, “efforts to promote

political and economic developments”, democratic norms and the legitimacy of

governments were likely to fail. A legitimating order, it was argued, is best provided by a

police force, which “protects people and their property”, deals with them politely, helps

them in times of emergency, “abides by the rule of law” and “uses violence as a last

resort”. This legitimizes the prevailing order. Such a police force will “reduce unrest”,

lead to “fewer riots” and “lessen the chance that malcontents can stir up and organize

275 Supra note 273, p. 514.



114

subversion or insurrection.276 Police aid also aimed at establishing effective, humane and

civil police institutions. These reasons and the words in quotations are very very familiar

from our analysis of the colonial and immediate post-independence police force. Also

familiar are the seemingly conflicting goals of the police assistance program: on the one

hand, a para-military force for suppression, repression and counter-insurgency; on the

other, effective institution building of a humane and civil force:

One perspective stressed an armed, militarized, secretive, non-uniformed and

intrusive police which could act as a fighting unit when necessary; the other

perspective led to a less well armed, dispersed, visible, accessible and

service-oriented force which interacts freely and gently with its community.

This conflict over basic goals was never resolved.277

The quandary was reflected at the very top of officialdom in the United States. Testifying

before Congress in 1964, Daniel E. Bell, then administrator for AID, stated these

objectives of public safety assistance:

1. strengthening the capability of civil and para-military forces to enforce the

law and maintain pubic order with the minimum of physical force, and to

counter Communist-inspired or exploited subversion and insurgency; and

2. encouraging the development of responsible and humane police

administration and judicial procedure to improve the effectiveness of civil

and para-military forces and enable them to become more closely integrated

into the community.278

276 Ibid p. 517. 277 Ibid. 278 Ibid.



115

OPS aid to Africa exhibited the conflicts over goals and objectives and resulting program

mix which characterized the venture as a whole. Africa being peripheral to US concerns,

OPS aid was limited indeed. The vast influx of advisors, equipment and associated

military assistance, which occurred in South East Asia, and to a lesser extent, in Latin

America, simply did not happen in Africa. In Zaire, the country that received more OPS

assistance than any other sub-Saharan country, aid amounted to about $600,000 annually

between 1964-1974, with about forty per cent spent on salaries for US advisors. Only five

countries received over one million dollars in aid and by 1973 only four OPS programs

were still in place- in Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia and Zaire. And even then, an internal OPS

study, conducted in 1973, found that the global OPS program had generated private sales

of $32,470,915, of which $6,996,219 was equipment sold to Ghana, Liberia and Zaire.279

Aid to Africa included all three components: participant training, commodity assistance

and US advisors. Another difference between OPS in Africa and in other parts of the

world was a lesser emphasis placed on counter-insurgency. The main thrust of OPS aid to

Africa sought to create effective civil police institutions by promoting “the development

of leadership, organization and administration; training systems; transportation and

communication systems and the training of technicians to operate and maintain such

systems; urban, rural and border patrol operations; and humane civil disturbance control

279 Ibid, p. 522.



116

capability”. Of course, increased efficiency in transportation, communications,

management and disturbance control can have counter-insurgency applications.280

OPS had little positive impact. The large presence of OPS in Ghana, Ethiopia, Somalia,

and Zaire did not help improve the performance or image of the police. OPS was doomed

to fail in its police civilizing mission even before it started. The small size of the

program and the conflicting and uncertain goals of the venture have already been noted.

There was also an over-estimation of the capacity of outsiders to affect local

implementation of the program. Other reasons were political naivety and the basic

autonomy of politics.

A few foreign police advisers stationed in a country for a short period of time could really

to nothing to change the police of that country. Commodity assistance helped set up

specific programs which probably worked for some time but then fell into disuse when

spare-parts and training were in short supply. Training of police officers of beneficiary

states abroad could have made the largest impact, since there was a concentration on

middle and higher level officers, but this suffered from superficiality in teaching, too

much anti-Communist rhetoric and only had a sight-seeing effect. Foreign officers were

glad to be selected and sent to the United States and not because they would be taught

how to be good police officers and train their junior ranks when they got back.

280 Ibid p. 516-518.



117

Secondly, it was not easy to have the two antagonistic goals of building a para-military

counter-insurgency force for easy deployment to crush rebellion and breaches of the

peace, and a humane civil police running simultaneously. These competing perspectives

led to clashes among bureaucracies and personnel in Washington and host countries over

the extent, distribution and format of OPS aid. The State Department and embassies in

host countries were on both sides of this conflict as personnel and views shifted. OPS

programs were consistently caught up in bureaucratic struggles over whether they were

being too military or not military enough.

A third reason why OPS failed was the overestimation of its capacity to make a

difference and the underestimation of obstacles to successful implementation and impact.

One obstacle arose simply from the continuity of policing practices. Police forces were

ongoing concerns when aid reached them; they had established routines, an ethos and

culture of policing which was not easily changed as it reflected long-standing local

adaptations by the police to their environment, the requirements of the work and their

won interests. OPS helped change organizational structures, modernize equipment, and

establish training programs, but did nothing to change the most important factor in police

reform efforts-police culture, their ways and justifications for doing things one way and

not another. Again, the police officers in aid recipient states with whom advisors dealt, as

counterparts or in teaching, were powerful officials at the national level who often came

from the educated elite, had high status, and had participated in and were intimately

familiar with national politics. To them, foreign advisors often appeared as uncivilized



118

boors who possessed some specific practical knowledge, and were useful for that, but

with whom one would not otherwise associate. It is hard to be effective when the people

one deals with do not think much of you. There was also a lot of political naivety on the

part of police advisers. They had a circumscribed notion of the political role of the police

and had no experience of national politics. Nor did they appreciate the importance and

high political stakes attached by political leaders to controlling the police. Personal

relations, naivety, and contrasting environments limited the capacity of the foreign

advisers to implement their vision of change.

The fourth reason for the failure of the OPS program in Africa was the inapplicability of

the professional model of policing promoted by advisors and taught during training of

African policemen abroad. OPS tried to develop in aid recipient states, the professional

model of policing that replaced the corrupt and inept politicized machine police in the

United States. Proven practices in the United States, e.g. centralized and hierarchic

administrative arrangements, were offered and taught as if their universal validity were

established and obvious. Yet, professional policing needs a supportive environment, in

the mind set of a police force interested in promoting public order, in the capacity of the

police to oppose partisan and other sectarian demands, in organizational cultures, in

political processes and the like. And these were absent in the police forces in Africa

because they were established for very different purposes. Making policing more

effective and efficient without such supportive environments merely enhanced the

efficiency and effectiveness of what the police was doing before OPS.



119

The fifth reason, political naivety by OPS strategists and implementers, is very well

captured by Marenin thus:

Both the counter-insurgency and the institution-building model of police

assistance rest on distorted perceptions of the political process in Third

World countries. Counter-insurgency thinking rests on the simplistic

assumption that no internal shove against the ruling government would exist

without external push, that insurgencies and unrest arise more from external

interference than internal causes. The institution building focus rests on the

false assumption that the police can be neutral agents of the law and thereby

help reproduce the legitimacy of governments, an assumption also central to

the professional model. Clearly the police cannot be non-political even when

they enforce existing law fairly and civilly, nor are they perceived by people

they deal with as neutral. Both misperceptions-all politics is subversive and

all policing is non-political—enhanced the powers of local police and

politicians who could use either justification to argue for their preferred

policies, and the resources to make them effective.281

The last and most important reason why OPS had little impact can be found in the politics

of the receiving countries. In these states, decisions as important as policing are very

political. Despite the strings attached to OPS aid, how it was utilized and the effects it

had, were determined largely by the actions of recipients who had different priorities than

United States donors. This was all the more possible because of the naivety of the donor

discussed in the previous paragraph. With the political stakes of controlling the nature

and functions of the police very high, OPS planners and advisors lost out and the aid they

delivered served the interests of the powerful in countries receiving aid. Aid was used by

281 Ibid, p. 543.



120

the elite in these countries to protect themselves at all cost, whilst making repression

more effective. Because OPS in Africa neglected to deal explicitly with the political

functions of policing in African states, the basic autonomy of local politics ensured that

aid was channeled towards projects and goals which were not those of donors, but those

of an elite that was interested in protecting themselves and their property, ensuring peace

and security for economic exploitation, and enforcing a particular type of rule of law that

worked to their benefit.282 As agents of post-modern colonialism, the local elite were

indirectly serving their masters. We will now turn to how OPS fared in Ghana.

Before the start of the program, a study mission sent to Ghana in 1968 concluded that the

“Ghana Police Force has not yet completely emerged from the trauma of the Nkrumah

regime.” The communications, transport, and criminalistic resources of the Ghana Police

were found to be virtually nonexistent. The mission observed “no research and planning

element” nor statistical documentation for the work of the police. But, “paradoxically, the

police officers and men are most impressive; they fully understand the scopes of their

responsibilities and are cognizant of the many internal security problems facing the police

today in their emerging society”.283

282 Ibid, p. 511-44, especially 540-4. 283 United States, Department of State, Ghana Police Assessment: Summary of Findings,

Conclusions, Recommendations and Equipment Specifications-Sept. 12- Oct. 23, 1968, Reviewed

and Declassified by John Weiss, OPS, February 24, 1975.; United States, Department of State,

“Termination Phase-Out Study: Public Safety Project Ghana (Agency for International

Development, Washington D.C., March 1974.



121

The study mission recommended that the necessary communications and transportation

facilities, coupled with the training of specialists, be implemented. Based upon the

recommendations of the mission, the United States government started to provided

resources and guidance to the Ghana Police in key areas such as police management,

records managements, and training. A number of officers also attended the International

Police Academy in Washington, D.C. Equipment was also provided.

In 1973, an evaluation team found that a lot of the equipment supplied by the United

States had not been effectively utilized or maintained. The team also noted that the

internal regulations of the police did not recognize or reward specialized training, and

promotion based on professional merit had not yet permeated the Service; promotion

being based on arduous examinations in British law as adapted to Ghana.284

The OPS program was not very successful in reforming the police and making it more

effective. The global failure of the program discussed in this section hold true for Ghana.

Specifically, it was “charged with the following transgressions”:

…that OPS advisors worked hand in hand with secret intelligence agencies

and frequently were but frontmen for the CIA; that OPS programmes assisted

repressive and reactionary regimes and helped them stay in power (more

specifically, that OPS programmes helped set up national intelligence

systems, trained riot and secret police forces, and propagated a Cold War

view which identified any progressive group in society as subversive and

communist elements which deserved repression and extinction); that OPS

was designed to maintain the exiting imperialist and exploitative international

284 Supra note 273, p. 172-3.



122

system by shoring up friendly governments and protecting US investments

and personnel; and that OPS advisors helped train police forces (or actually

participated in inhumane and barbaric practices, torture and killings). 285

One commentator has noted that the growth of police assistance programs is linked to

crisis conditions in the world system, particularly the decline of hegemony experienced

by the dominant power, the United States. As a consequence, exporting good policing:

“becomes necessary as crises undermine the legitimacy of peripheral elites

and states, as economic rewards are inadequate or unavailable and as ‘legal

and other ideological concepts and constraints may be insufficient to

maintain this order’ and ward off dissent and pacify the exploited. The

incorporation of peripheries into the system and the participation of local

allied classes in the exploitation of their people must be supported by force as

the social and economic consequences of incorporation increasingly disrupt

the lives, hopes and futures of people.286

Another commentator notes the following:

Political repression in the periphery is a logical extension of colonial

repression in a new and more sophisticated form…Direct repression is still

required to insure the integration of the dependent state into the imperial

system. The metropolis finds it necessary to guarantee the creation of the

formal machinery of public administration and the economic infrastructure

and the suppression of internal dissent by efficient military, police and

intelligence networks. Economic loans and aid accompanied by military and

counterinsurgency aid and the training of police, intelligence and armed

forces are the foremost means to achieve these goals. The creation of such a

system in the periphery is absolutely essential…. The creation and

285 Ibid, p. 511. 286 Ibid.



123

perpetration of puppet regimes that repress their people is, then, the last

alternative for international capital in the periphery.

Marenin has tried to tame the debate on the value of OPS in this way:

Much of the critique and the defense of police assistance is based more on

ideological preferences than systematic and empirical analysis of

international police assistance programmes. Both defense and critique have

been extremely selective in choosing reasons and episodes to defend or attack

international assistance; both have been based on extremely simplified

images of the police at work; and both radical critics and defenders of police

aid seem to accept the rhetoric of police assistance programmes as accurate

descriptions of the motives, implementation and impacts of assistance and

neither seem to know much about the police.

My main argument is this. OPS programmes failed to achieve their goals or

make any significant beneficial or harmful impact on police forces in African

states largely because goals for OPS programmes were continuously

reconstituted in the process of implementation (implementation necessarily

distorts rhetoric and policy goals), because conceptions and practices of

‘good’ policing are not easily transferred and, most importantly, because the

people charged with implementing specific programmes were politically

naïve. They did not understand the political realities of countries which they

assisted and in which the police forces they aided worked. In short, both

critics and defenders of police aid understate the constraints and exaggerate

the impact of international police assistance.287

Even if we accept Marenin’s synthesis, one thing remains clear. There was not very much

impact by OPS on the police. This means that the post-independence police, itself a

replica of the colonial police in its orientation and functions, remained basically the same

during this period, but with one important addition. It was now equipped under the OPS

287 Ibid, p. 152-3.



124

program to do what it was first established to do, and even better. We shall now turn to

how the police used OPS assistance during this period to brutalize the citizenry to various

political, economic and “rule of law” ends.

POLICE BRUTALITY AND CORRUPTION IN THE PERIOD OF

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOWNTURN

It is said that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. This is true for the

police in Ghana in this period. By getting close to government during this period, the

police gained political power. The training and other resources they received under OPS

were another source of power. The police became more corrupt than ever and used the

new resources to brutalize the citizenry.

During the period under review, the police became the king of dash “whether he worked

in the licensing office, on the roads, near the borders, or along the coast. Even at the

Police Depot there was a widespread belief among public and recruit alike that unless a

potential member of the Force gave a bribe he would not be accepted.” 288 The police

soon gained notoriety as the most corrupt institution in the country. A former Deputy

Police Commissioner, John Coles, suggests the basis for this legacy of bribery among the

Gold Coast/Ghana Police.

288 Supra note 247, p. 196



125

Bribery and corruption must be understood in the climate of opinion and

traditional feelings in the country. The dash (i.e., gift) system goes back to

the time of the Portuguese explorers and before. In the days of the silent

trade, a system by which the trading ships put goods on shore under

observation of Africans and then came back later to pick up an equivalent

amount of local goods which had been left, such dash was already well

established. By Akan tradition, one brought a customary present when

visiting an important figure. The gift, however, was not intended to influence

judgment being of negligible financial value, but rather out of courtesy and

supplication.

The Portuguese would bring gifts to show they wanted new or more

extensive contact with a particular coastal group. But they had an imperfect

idea of the custom and brought gifts which were acceptable in their terms.

The chiefs safeguarded themselves from such contacts by creating

ambassadors and linguists who acted as go-betweens though the Portuguese

did not realize this. These go-betweens of course liked the practice and

perverted its original purpose, since it was lucrative for them to do so. Thus

the gift as the basis for bribery and corruption was initiated.

Since the practice had some respectability, the more blatant forms did not

attract the same perfidium as would otherwise be the case. Expatriate police

tried to decide each individual case on its merits, determining whether the

gift was within traditional behavior patterns or was meant to influence. In

other words, what was the gift’s value? To refuse all gifts would have given

utmost offense. …

Certain government departments were notorious for the dash system, for

instance the medical department in hospitals and dispensaries where the

nurses charged for pills, drinking water and injections. On a petty level

within the police, bribery and corruption was impossible to suppress in its

entirety. The most one could do was lay down the machinery and framework

for detecting excesses and swiftly investigating all complaints. …what

remained after all this was still a good deal of gift-giving but with a general

struggle to make sure it remained within tolerable limits. But since such gifts

were not alien to indigenous tradition, it was incredibly difficult to get rid of.

Of course the descending of an extended family upon an African policeman,

thus increasing the overall demands upon him, didn’t help the situation.289

289 Ibid, p. 423-4.



126

On this latter point, J.A Braimah, an opposition Member of Parliament, argued in the

early 1960’s that:

We must…recognize the fact that as members of the community, in common

with all other civil servants, members of the Police Force have friends and

relations in all walks of life…….290

At another level, the police remained as brutal as they were since they were created. True,

a public relations bureau was established in 1969291 and in 1976 the “Police Week” was

introduced so that policemen might have the opportunity to rethink their role in society

and “the public educated about what they could do to help the police help society to live

in peace and tranquility”292. But there was obviously no opportunity for the public to

educate the police on what the police could do to help the public-it was a one way street.

The consuming public had to remain docile recipients of the largesse of the strong and

mighty police. From this perspective, the introduction of the public relations bureau and

the police week were sophisticated ploys to salve the wounds of a public that was

thoroughly displeased with the police. These ploys could be dramatic indeed. The police

band “entertained the public from time to time free of charge” and this was meant to

“merit the goodwill of the public”293. And from the late 1970s’ virtually every police

station has a notice with the following seductive message to the public:

“Every caller at this Station is a potential ally. He will describe his treatment

to his friend, thus the fabric of public opinion is woven. The Police can only

290 Ibid, p.62. 291 J.B. POKOO-AIKINS, The Police in Ghana 1939-1999 (J.B. Pokoo-Aikins, 2002) p. 55. 292 Ibid, p. 57. 293 Ibid, p. 58.



127

function properly and effectively with the accord and goodwill of the public.

Let us therefore merit this goodwill”294.

It is not only that these posters do not seem in the most part to have been changed for

fresher notices so that they are weathered, worn and torn, the atmosphere at the Police

Stations and the treatment citizens generally receive there make a mockery of the notice.

Some police stations have allowed the notice to wither away and have been honest

enough not to replace them.

During this period, police training still concentrated on practical police training in

weapon handling, map reading and law related courses such as Criminal Law, Criminal

Procedure, and Law of Evidence295. It was only in the 1980s that the curriculum of the

officer class of the Force was changed to include liberal arts subjects such as Psychology,

Sociology, Community Relations, and Management.296 In 1971, a key recommendation

of the Boyes Report was the reduction in the arms training component of police training

in order to moderate the militaristic aspects of the training.297 As late as 2001298

commentators were still calling for human rights training for the police to ensure that the

“tough cop culture” developed in the Service over the decades would be changed.

294 Ibid. 295 Ibid, p. 89. 296 Ibid, 92. 297 A Report on the Ghana Police Service, December 1971 referenced in EMMANUEL KWESI

ANING, post, note 59 p. 7, 24-25. 298 EMMANUEL KWESI ANING, An Overview of the Ghana Police Service (Paper prepared for

the African Security Dialogue and Research, October 2001), (Unpublished, on file with author) p.

42



128

The police used their type of training effectively. In 1970 the Police Striking Force was

formed as a “special unit to fight crimes and to quell riots, conflicts and other civil

disorders which tended to slow down the socio-economic development of the country”299.

And on the softer side, a police research unit, set up in 1976 to look into matters

adversely affecting the police, and make relevant recommendations, disbanded in

1980300. Only tough things survived during this period. The Acheampong regime (1972-

1978), attempted to establish a Union Government (UNIGOV) that would have a

military, police and civilian triumvirate to rule the country. The effort to retain the direct

involvement of the security agencies in political administration aroused much resentment

among the civilian population that saw the proposal as a ploy to legitimize and perpetuate

military and police rule. Workers and student groups organized demonstrations and

boycotts against the UNIGOV scheme. To settle the crisis and escape the political

quagmire, the regime scheduled a referendum and immediately a Movement for Freedom

and Justice was formed to mobilize opposition against a “yes” vote. The Association of

Professional Bodies (an amalgam of several professional organizations) and the National

Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) were particularly vociferous in their opposition to

UNIGOV and waged a relentless campaign to defeat it.301 The police were used to silence

all these dissidents.

The panthers units formed in 1980 was tasked to hunt down hardened criminals engaging

299 Supra note 291, p. 73. 300 Ibid, p. 74. 301 BAFFOUR AGYEMAN-DUAH, Civil-Military Relations in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, Critical

Perspectives No. 9 (Ghana Center for Democratic Development, CDD-Ghana, June 2002). p. 4.



129

in armed robbery and homicide, clamp down dissidents and anti-government elements

and combat riots, civil conflicts, chieftaincy disputes and land disputes. In 1984 a

“Commando Unit” derived from the Panthers Unit. It consisted of men from the unit who

were specially trained to combat crime, civil disorder and government dissidents or anti-

government activities302. It is difficult indeed to see any difference between the police

force of this era and the colonial police force that was used to quell the 1948 riots and the

contain the civil disorder in the years preceding independence, or the police of the

Nkrumah era.

Before we turn to the period after political and economic decline, it is essential to narrate

certain critical developments in the history of the police force at the end of the period of

decline. In 1981 the military coup led by President Rawlings brought a “revolutionary”

military government into power. It established populist institutions at all levels of

government to defend the revolution and the government. Populist tribunals were set up

alongside the regular courts and Revolutionary Defense Committees were created to

assume the “function of protecting the poorest strata of the population” and to help

enforce the “observance of revolutionary law”.303 For about six years, these committees

became involved in all economic, political and law-and-order policies at the local levels.

Their activities severely subordinated the regular police and delegitimized them to an

extent. When the defense committees were disbanded in about 1988, the police had to fill

in the void. When, in 1997, the Rawlings regime set up a high level commission to




130

inquire into the affairs of the police and make recommendations for its reform, it was

conceding the incapacity of the police to perform the revolutionary and populist functions

that the Revolutionary Defense Committees were meant to perform.

SAMPLE EVIDENCE OF THE YEARS OF POLITICAL

AND ECONOMIC DECLINE IN THE POLICE FORCE

That the years under review in this section are really the years of political, economic and

social decline can be illustrated by looking at women in the police force. During this

period of decline, very little, if anything was done by way of developing the status and

career prospects of women in the force. In my estimation, this is the greatest evidence of

the years of decline.

The story of women in the police force not only depicts the enduring institutional form of

the police, post-independence. It also shows the periods of progression and retrogression

in the force. A June 1952 Memorandum by the Commissioner of Police on the present

role and statutory functions of the Ghana police force, its organization and distribution of

the force, staffing, training and equipment was very gender insensitive.304

On 1st September 1952, however, 12 Women Police Recruits were enlisted from about 70

304 In Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, supra note 298, p 11. The document was: Memorandum by the

Commissioner of Police on The Present Role and Statutory Functions of the Ghana Police Force,

Its Organisation and Distribution of the Force, Staffing, Training and Equipment. (Accra, June

1952) Para. 2 (Unpublished).



131

applicants. Women Police recruitments, by way of comparison, started in Kenya in

1944305 and in Barbados in 1950.306 Like their counterparts in Mauritius who were

assigned clerical duties 307 and perhaps in other colonies, they were assigned to cases of

“juvenile delinquency, female criminals, searching of females, taking care of people at

the Zebra Crossing, as well as performing Station Orderly duties.”308. When the branch

“was increased by 12 constables during…[1954] and now [consisted] of three non-

commissioned officers and 21 constables”, “they continued to be employed on duties in

connection with juvenile delinquency and offences committed by women.”309 “In recent

years female Police have additional responsibility of taking charge of missing children

until their parents are located.”310

The Police Squad Notes used to train Policemen and women has the following in its page

7:

“UNIFORM BRANCH- WOMEN:- They may perform station duties like

station Orderlies, Telephone Operators, Clerical duties, search and Escort of

female prisoners. They are chiefly employed in dealing with women…and

juvenile delinquency.”

It is intriguing that women in the force were always classified as a branch, as in

305 Sir Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Police, (Max Parrish, London, 1952) p. 104. 306 Ibid, p. 62. 307 Ibid, p.143. 308 Supra note 291, p.58 and Police Squad Notes, p. 2. See also EMMANUEL KWESI ANING,

supra note 298, p. 11. 309 Colonial Reports, Gold Coast 1954 (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), p. 95. 310 Supra note 291, p. 61



132

Jamaica311 and perhaps in other colonies, on its own with very specific and very limited

powers and duties, which mostly related to dealing with their womenfolk and children

and other, almost menial tasks. According to the Squad Notes, the “Force Orders”, which

are weekly publications compiled in the office of the Inspector-General of Police dealing

with items of news from all the Police Regions respecting administrative matters, has a

separate section on “Women Police”312. There appears to be no justification for this

because in Singapore women police “formed part of the regular force” and were “found a

great success”, 313 and by 1950, Hong Kong had a woman Police Inspector.314

The first female recruits to the Ghana police had only 3 months of training because of

“the pressing need for policewomen at that time”.315 Both the Criminal Procedure

Code316 and the Police Standing Orders No. 171 (3) provide that no female prisoner shall

be searched except by a female. “In the light of this, the Women Police Branch was given

prominence to ensure that the requirements of this enactment were fully adhered to.”317

The post independence Police Five-Year Development Plan (which was part and parcel

of the Government’s Second Five-Year Development Plan) included a program to

“Increase the strength of the Women Police Section which was only 36 strong in order to

311 Supra note 305, p. 67. 312 Ghana Police Squad Notes, p. 9. 313 Supra note 305, p. 82. 314 Ibid, p. 86. 315 Supra note 291, p. 58 316 Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, (Act 30). 317 Supra note 291, p. 60



133

take more effective measures to combat juvenile crimes and delinquencies”. 318

The idea of engaging women to prosecute at the Magistrate and Circuit Courts was

hatched in the late 1960s and implemented soon after.319 It is abundantly clear that there

was a scheme for keeping women out of what was then considered main stream police

functions.

Only in 1991 were women engaged as dispatch riders and in “routine duties including

highway patrols, dispatching and escorting”.320 By 1999, out of a total of 16,212 police

personnel, only 12.5% were women. And women were still considered a distinct

“Branch” of the police.321

A male police officer observed in 1999, that policewomen are treated equally with their

male counterparts as far as salaries, allowances and other remuneration are concerned.

“However, in practice, and not as a matter of policy, women in the Service were scarcely

considered for the post of District, Divisional and Regional Police Commanders as well

as International Peace-Keeping Operations.”322 Such forms of discrimination were not

new. In 1968, policewomen who were married to senior police officers were asked to

resign from the service. The general contention was that the policewomen refused to take

318 Ibid, p.19. 319 Ibid, p 58-9. 320 Ibid, p.61. 321 Ibid, p 47. 322 Ibid, p.60.



134

instructions from other Senior Officers.323

This story is a good example of how the recruitment of women into the police force

became a receptive avenue for new outlays of culture and patriarchy. There was at first a

complete exclusion of women from the force and when they had to be brought in there

was strategic non-incorporation of women into mainstream policing. All except the

limited and specific aspects of police work for which women were needed, plus a few

other more menial police tasks, were insulated from female participation for a long time.

To date, women police officers do not have the opportunity to perform all the tasks their

male counterparts are assigned. This is how female participation in policing acquired and

retained the character of tokenism and restriction to particular functions.

Another key point that should be noted is this. During the years of decline, there were

practically no positive steps taken towards addressing the gender issue in the police force

beyond those taken before that time. This is some evidence of the stagnation that

occurred in the police force during that time. It was only in the late 1990s that there was a

renewed interest in the women police with the establishment of the Women’s and

Juvenile’s Unit of the police force, (WAJU) on October 26, 1998. Sadly, this

development shows the historical continuity of the separate treatment of women and the

limited functions of women in the police force.

323 Ibid.



135

THE RAWLINGS ERA AND THE PERIOD OF THE ERP, SAPs, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-1982 TO 2000


Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings became Head of State in 1979 following a military coup

d’etat. He handed over power to a civilian democratically elected Head of State who was

installed with the coming into force of the 1979 third Republican Constitution. On 31st

December 1981, Rawlings overthrew the government he handed over to in another coup

d’etat and became Head of State again till 1993, when the fourth Republican Constitution

came into force following elections. Rawlings became President under this constitution

and ruled from 1993 to 1997. He was reelected for a second and final term that ended in

2001. The main opposition party during the Rawlings era won the elections of 2000 and

was installed in 2001. The term of that government ends on the 6th of January, 2005.

The Economic Recovery Programmme (ERP) and Structural Adjustment Programme

(SAP) that were initiated by the Rawlings government from the mid-1980s, under the

tutelage of the World Bank and the IMF have basically been continued to date, if even

under different names and with minor substantive changes.

The second Rawlings military regime took over the reins of government on 31st

December 1981. They inherited a weak economy that had been so for many many years,

thanks to the period of global economic decline. Ghana was debt-ridden. His regime



136

began by moving the country ideologically to the left, but this was not for long. Dry

national coffers, the depletion of the nations foreign reserves, a mounting debt service

burden, shortages of essential commodities, drugs and equipment, and in the mist of all

this, severe drought, caused the Rawlings regime to strategically rethink their ideological

leanings. Lest than two years into the regime, the regime called for food aid to deal with

the threat of famine, and with this, all forms of aid was offered. The World Bank and the

IMF offered tempting assistance if only the regime will divest itself of its ideological

trappings. Internecine conflict within the leadership of the regime led to the expurgation

of the ultra left-wing guard of the regime, and the assumption of full control by the

moderates. There were also new centre and right-wing recruits into the regime. With this,

a new era of liberalism, some will say post-modern colonialism, was born. The fanciful

code names for the new trend of affairs were Economic Recovery Programme and

Structural Adjustment Programme. These code names have been variously changed over

the years, but have retained the same essential characteristics and the same tutors (the

World Bank and the IMF) over the Rawlings era and the present. What then is the

political economy of post-modern colonialism?324

Under post-modern colonialism, state institutions in general are subjected to strong

globalizing pressures, which at once call for the strengthening of state power, in say the

324 The term post-modern colonialism, which I have borrowed from Susan Silbey, ‘ “Let Them Eat

Cake”: Globalization, Postmodern Colonialism, and the Possibilities of Justice’ 31 Law and

Society Review, (1997) p. 207, is apt here because it captures the theory of historical continuity

which I have endeavored to establish in this dissertation, by drawing the linguistic relationship

between colonialism and post-modern colonialism.



137

enforcement of the “rule of law” and the fight against crime, and the weakening of state

power in areas such as economic regulation and welfare policies.

The basic principles of post-modern colonialism, as the term connotes, are not new. In

the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, the model of European modernity

and its civilizing practices-economic, political, religious, familial- extended its reach

around the globe, displacing local beliefs, identities and social forces, which were labeled

as “traditional” or “backward” in the name of an alternative attaining then a global reach.

Today the forces of post-modern colonialism are the English language, fast food, the

Hollywood star system, the new intellectual property rights, free-trade zones,

deforestation to pay the foreign debt, or vernacularization of historical and religious sites

for tourists.

Since 1945, and most intensively since 1989, the architects of post-modern colonialism

have promoted the idea that United Statesian and European-style modernity equals

progress, and therefore should be everyone’s goal. They claim that democracy, whatever

that means, has triumphed over other forms of political and social organization of nation

states and that we are at the end of history.325 They also claim that history, at its end, has

taught us that market regulation is superior to state and political intervention. The project

in the last decade has been to replace the other side of the cold war with Islam and its

325 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, The End of History and the Last Man, (Perennial, 1992).



138

proponents, the west, representing civilization, pitted against Islam, representing

traditionalism.326

The project of post-modern colonialism, also called the Washington consensus, has four

dimensions: a neo-liberal economic consensus; a weak state consensus; a liberal-

democratic consensus; and a consensus about the rule of law and the role of courts.

Neo-liberal economics envisages a global economy, characterized by global production

and global markets for goods, services and finance. The institutional underpinnings of the

new social relations of production and commerce are international free trade,

deregulation (especially of labor markets), non-regulate (especially the environment),

privatization, macro-economic policies that favor control of inflation over employment

creation, and an export-oriented development strategy. The state is supposed to withdraw

from direct participation in the economy and provide an enabling environment for the

market to operate. And it must withdraw from many areas of regulation or else encounter

regulatory capture. Finally, the state must reduce social expenditures.

Flowing from the above, post-modern colonialism favors a weak and limited state. Yet,

the very definition of the state is its capacity to exercise sovereign power over a given

territory, thus, accession to statehood, including the movement out of colonialism or

other statuses linked to imperialism, required the capacity to exercise sovereignty in

326 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

(Touchstone Books: London, New York, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Singapore, 1996).



139

terms of the use of force and regulation. The consensus of the limited state, abandons this

second dimension of state sovereignty. It however retains the first for certain purposes.

Under post-modern colonialism, the weak state must be strong in at least one respect. It

must be capable of ensuring the survival of the formal structures of post-modern

colonialism at all cost. There must be periodic elections, and administrators and judges to

oversee electoral processes to ensure that formal legal norms and formalities are fulfilled.

These empty formal structures are then filled with a “rule of law” that is conducive for

post-modern colonialism. Such an enforceable framework depends on the state providing

a judicial system, which can maintain the rule of law. A well-functioned judiciary in

which judges apply the law in a fair, even, and predictable manner without undue delays

or unaffordable costs is part and parcel of this rule of law. The state, which retains it

monopoly over the use of force, then enforces this “rule of law”. This elevation of

formal, state law and judicial adjudication to the status of sole criterion for the evaluation

of political, economic and social action requires “the rule of law” to be effect.

Without a sound legal framework, an independent and honest judiciary, the economic and

social agenda of post-modern colonialism risks collapse. The alternative to the rule of law

is chaos. Only if the rule of law is widely accepted and effectively enforced can there be

confidence that certainty and predictability will be guaranteed, transactions costs

lowered, property rights clarified and protected, contractual obligations enforced, and

regulations applied. These are the building blocks of post-modern colonialism, the



140

framework that is then filled with the substance of the project. From this perspective, the

judiciary becomes responsible for delivering equitable, expeditious and transparent

judicial services to citizens, the state, and corporations, both domestic and foreign.

It is clear from the above analyses that the rule of law, while being an old feature of

western dominance, as we have seen in its critical role in the era of colonialism, has

recently assumed new prominence as global capitalism subjects more and more social

interactions to its logic. Thus, the judicial system-which has in most countries been up

until now an obscure, weak and often corrupt institution-has been called upon in the last

two decades to take a prominent role in the expansion of both global capitalism and

liberal democracy.327

In Ghana, the police, the visible arm of the state that is used to enforce the rule of law as

provided in the codes of law and as interpreted by the judiciary, has also been receiving

serious attention. Whilst the judiciary is sought to be reformed in order to give it a more

prominent role in the project of global capitalism and liberal democracy, the police,

whose historical role has been consistent with global capital is sought to be retained in its

basic form, only better trained and equipped to do what is has been doing since its

creation in the early nineteenth century-the protection of the owners of capital, the

crushing of dissent in the name of the preservation of law and order for the exploitation

327 JANE JENSON AND BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS (eds), Globalising Institutions:

Case Studies in Regulation and Innovation (Ashgate: Burlington USA, Singapore, Sydney, 2000)

p. 10-25.



141

of resources and for trade, and the enforcement of “the rule of law” to the above stated

ends. These remain the elements of post-modern colonialism. The story of the police

force in Ghana during the period under review is the story of how this agenda was

operationalized, and some efforts at taming same.

THE POLICE FORCE IN THE RAWLINGS ERA

The use of Revolutionary Defence Committees to perform various aspects of police

duties ceased by 1988. Conceivably, the police assumed full control. In any case, on 7th

January 1993, a new constitution came into force in Ghana, marking the end of the

military regime of Jerry John Rawlings. Rawlings contested and won the presidential

elections and was sworn in as President of the Republic on the day the constitution came

into force, and his party had an overwhelming majority in Parliament.328 Because the

fourth republican constitution is liberal indeed and contains a comprehensive bill of

rights, to a great extent, various military-style excesses were either nipped in the bud,

executed clandestinely, or vociferously resisted as we shall see in the “bome kotoku case”

close to the end of this chapter. During the period of military rule, and despite

constitutional guarantees in the period afterwards, the Rawlings regime used the military

and the police to suppress dissent to its regime and its policies, as we shall see in the next

section. There was severe, if muffled opposition to the regimes’ sudden marriage to the

328 The opposition parties boycotted the Parliamentary elections, the result, Ghana started its

fourth attempt at constitutional democratic governance with an almost one party state.



142

IFIs and the few who voiced their dissent openly, were arrested and imprisoned. A good

many of them claim they were tortured.

On the police institution itself, the Rawlings government329 set up a high level

commission of inquiry into the police service in 1996, just three years into the new

democratic dispensation. The commission presented its report in March, 1997. The terms

of reference of the commission, its methodology, and its conclusions, were very

consistent with the post-modern project of post-modern colonization that required a hi-

tecking of a police force to protect the political class, ensure peace and security for

economic exploitation, and enforce a rule of law whose interstices were now populated

with the agenda of post-modern colonialism.

The terms of reference of the Presidential Commission were revealing indeed:

a. To review the structure and operations of the Service and determine its

response to the law enforcement needs of the nation.

b. To consider the report of the Chief Constable of Nolfolk Constabulary on

the Assessment of the Police Service in 1992 and make the necessary

recommendations.

c. To assess the manpower needs of the service and determine appropriate

ways of securing and maintaining a motivated service.

d. To examine ways and means of decentralizing aspects of Police

administration so that Regional and District Organisations can be

involved in the provision of the logistics needs of the Service.

329 “Rawlings regime” refers to the military rule of Jerry John Rawlings as Head of State between

31st December, 1981 and 6th January, 1993; “Rawlings government” refers to the democratic

constitutional rule of Jerry John Rawlings as President between 7th January, 1993 and 6th January,

2001.



143

e. To look into all other matters that would enhance the effectiveness of the

Service.330

The Commission almost completely disregarded the first and last Terms of Reference.

These would have served as effective vehicles for examining issues such as the historical

construction of the police, police culture, and the police as agents of governance. In the

event, no fundamental change in the nature, orientation, posture, and functions of the

police were inquired into. These, consistent as they were with post-modern colonialism,

were to remain intact. The priority for the Commission was to make the police more

effective at doing what it has been doing since the 1830s. Effectiveness was seen in terms

of more and better human and material resources.

The Commission proved equal to the narrow task it set for itself and was more exuberate

than the government might have bargained for. It decided that certain critical human

resource and material needs of the police could not await the final report of the

Commission. It therefore “submitted five (5) interim reports to his Excellency the

President for the purpose of his office initiating prompt action on them. These covered

proposals on the Special Monitoring Team, the deteriorated condition of the National

Police Academy and Training School, the issue of police uniforms, police promotions

and accommodation.331

330 Report of the Presidential Commission into the Ghana Police Service, March 1997, popularly

called the Archer Report, p. 2. 331 Ibid.



144

The Commission presented its Report in two parts. The first part covered areas such as

the Command structure, devolution of powers, relationship between the Service and

Regional/District political authorities, recruitment and training, promotions, transfers,

civilianization, appraisal system and discipline. The second part covered issues such as

accommodation, transportation, communications, remuneration etc. The report, and the

government statement on the report, are detailed indeed and contain recommendations

that go to the length of providing specific numbers, proportions and cost figures.332

Witness the following:

“46. MOUNTED SQUADRON

46.1 The Commission noted the following:

1. That the current number of horses is inadequate for ceremonial

occasions….

2. The stable is in a deplorable state and the horses are not properly

fed…

3. The riding accessories are inadequate and the ceremonial dress for the

riders is unpresentable…

4. Heads of units are not given any preparatory training before they are

posted to the Mounted Squadron…

46.2 The Commission made the following recommendations, which

Government endorses:

1. The deplorable condition of the stable should be improved as a matter

of priority…

2. Feeding of the horses should be improved and sustained with the

release of funds at the appropriate times…

3. Additional horses should be purchased to enable the Service acquire

the full ceremonial complement of 36 horses…

332 Ibid, passim.



145

4. A civilian veterinary officer should be employed to take care of the

animals under the overall supervision of the head of the Squadron

…333

The commission went on to characterize the “basic requirement of the Service” as follows:

a. adequate accommodation

b. provision of transportation ie. Staff cars and operational vehicles such

as transfer/troop carriers, land rover, bicycles etc.

c. workshop/maintenance apparatus

d. radio communication and teleprinter links with the regions and hand-

held radios

e. general supply –e.g. stationery

f. ration (food) for emergency operations

g. medical supplies

h. arms and ammunition

…In addition to the above, there is also the crucial need to modernise the

means and methods of crowd control using modern equipments such as

smoke bombs, water-cannons etc. instead of truncheons and firearms as a

present.334

Although the thrust of the Commission’s report was how to make the police effective at

doing what it has been doing, there were statements littered around the report, which

pointed to an appreciation by the Commission of the more systemic causes of the malaise

in the police institution, as when they observed thus:

Not much time is devoted to the objective of making recruits understand the

responsibilities of a Police officer and the proper realisation of the

relationship between the Police and the public…335

333 Ibid, p. 31. 334 Ibid, p. 38. 335 Ibid, p. 9.



146

Alas, not much was done on these more systemic factors by the Commission.

Another important event relating to the police that occurred during the Rawlings era was

the enactment of the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526). In 1963,

during the Nkrumah period, a law was passed, the Security Service Act, giving the

President enormous powers to set-up, discipline, dismiss and generally control a security

service and use it to “defend the Republic from external and internal dangers arising from

activities directed from within or without Ghana which are subversive of the Republic,

and to perform any other functions relating to the Security of the State assigned to the

Service by the President”.336 The new Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, is less

centered on the President, although the President remains the Chairman of the Council

and largely determines who should be a member of the Council. The new Act also

establishes branches of the Security Council in every region and district of the country. It

also contains safeguards, though limited, against abuse of power by security agencies.

Instances of alleged abuse of power are resolvable by written complaints that may be

considered by an ad hoc Tribunal under the Act to be set-up by the Chief Justice. The

functions of the new security service are essentially internal and external police

intelligence functions, and their retirement benefits are equated to those of the Police

Service:

…an employee of any of the Internal Intelligence Agencies shall in the

performance of his duties under this Act, have the same rights and powers as

336 Security Service Act, 1963 (Act 202), Section 3.



147

are conferred by law on a police officer in the performance of his duties and

shall have the same protection.337

It is true that the Special Branch or Bureau of National Investigations and the Research

Department had been performing internal and external security intelligence activities

before this act. This Act, however, streamlined their structure, composition, functions,

activities, and therefore, their relationship to the police. What did the Rawlings regime

use the police and the other security agencies to do?

POLICE BRUTALITY IN THE RAWLINGS ERA

During the period of decline, the police emerged as a paramilitary force in concert with

the military, in a political equation characterized by political and economic domination,

corruption, abuse of power, and the violation of basic human rights. Together with the

military, the police emerged as the new internal colonizers, using the force of the gun to

obtain complete compliance and conformity from powerless citizens. Having tasted

political power with the military and found it to be “sweet,” the Ghana Police provided

support to shore up unpopular and repressive regimes. They used the force at their

disposal to crush the student uprising in the late 1970s. During this time and throughout

337 Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526).



148

the 1980s, the police became the state apparatus for the enforcement of decisions of

fragile or ideologically doctrinaire governments. 338

The police, the security services, and the military, brutalized, arrested and tortured

opponents of the Rawlings regime, including those who were opposed to the marriage of

the country to the Breton Woods institutions. Like in the 1970s, the police were used to

quell riots, including various student demonstrations against government policies.339 As

opposition increased, the range of prohibited actions broadened and rights under the laws

were becoming eroded and more restricted.340 In 1991, the Special Police Command was

created within the service. This unit was tasked with investigating public complaints and

reports of unprofessional conduct against police personnel and checking police abuse of

power. The unit was also to make spot checks at Police Stations, Police Posts and other

Police duty posts.341 The unit is generally seen as ineffective, and this has been attributed

to the fact that it is internal to the police service.342

338 Supra note 258, p. 177-8. 339 These include demonstrations by the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) against

commercialization of residential halls in Universities on Friday, May 29, 1998; a demonstration by

students of the University of Ghana against residential user fees in August 1998. Recently,

Polytechnic Students demonstrated against irregular polytechnic policies in terms of grading,

academic progression and job description of polytechnic graduates. This demonstration turned

very violent when the police tried to stop the students. They threw missiles at the police, the police

retaliated, there was disorder and 20 students were arrested. See The Ghanaian Chronicle,

Wednesday, February 27, 2002., vol. 10 no. 71; The Free Press, Tuesday, March 5, 2002, vol. 25

no. 8. 340 Supra note 258, p. 178. 341 Supra note 291, p. 75. 342 This view has been expressed at various workshops and fora on Police Reform held in Ghana

in the last three years by the Africa Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), the Center for

Democratic Development (CDD) and the Legal Resources Centre (LRC).



149

The story did not change after the return to constitutional democratic rule, as the country

struggled to sustain its fragile democracy. In 1995, during a public demonstration led by

opposition forces, against the introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT) by the

government, and code-named “Kume Preko”343 , a number of lives were lost when the

police intervened.344

For a decade, opposition to the ill effects of SAPs was crushed mostly by the police and

other security operatives. With the coming into force of the 1992 Constitution, the brutal

antecedent role of the police, the oppressive arm of the regulatory state, came into

conflict with the new constitutional human rights guarantees that were in force from

January 1993. The “bome kotoku” case illustrates this conflict and gives a sense of how

such matters were resolved. We will now turn our attention to the “bome kotoku case”, as

a classic example of how the police was used to enforce the agenda of post-modern

colonialism in this era.

THE “BOME KOTOKU” CASE

As noted in the last section, as late as 1997, the Presidential Commission was still

recommending processes for making the police effect at riot control. The policies of the

post-modern colonialist state excited dissent from various quarters, and these had to be

343 Kume Preko is Twi for “You may as well kill me” and encapsulates the hardships faced by

Ghanaians under SAPs and the absence of avenues for ventilating them. 344 ALEX AKURGO and CAMILLUS ABONGO, May 9 at Accra Stadium: A gripping story of a

Disaster that Turned Ordinary People into Heroes (Blue Volta Associates, 2001), P. 52.



150

quelled. The “bome kotoku” case is an example of how policy contestations were sought

to be resolved through demonstrations, the difficulties the dissenters encountered in the

face of a “rule of law” that was unfriendly to dissent, and how the dissenters used the

liberal democratic constitution-a function of post-modern colonialism-to contest that

“rule of law”. As we have seen, police functions changed from period to period. The

“bome kotoku” case is a logical last step in the evolution of police public order control

from the colonial era through to the era of post-modern colonialism.

On the 3rd of February 1993, the Police in Sekondi in the Western Region had granted

the members of the plaintiff party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), then the main

opposition party in the country, a permit to hold a rally on 6th February 1993 in Sekondi.

However, on 5th February 1993, the police withdrew the permit and prohibited the

holding of the rally. Again, on the 17th of February 1993, the Kyebi Police in the Eastern

Region granted the plaintiff a Permit to hold a rally at Kyebi to commemorate the 28th

anniversary of the tragic death of Dr. Joseph Boakye Danquah On the day when the rally

was to be held, the police withdrew the permit and prohibited the holding of the rally.

On 16 February 1993, members of the NPP in conjunction with other political parties,

embarked on a peaceful demonstration in Accra to protest against the 1993 budget of the

government. While they were peacefully demonstrating, they were violently assaulted by

the police and some of them were arrested and charged with the offence of demonstrating

without a permit and failing to disperse contrary to sections 8, 12 and 13 of The Public



151

Order Decree345.

The plaintiff therefore filed a writ in the Supreme Court for a declaration that Section 7

of the Public Order Decree, which gives the Minister for the Interior the power to prohibit

the holding of public meetings or processions for a period in a specified area; section 8 of

the said Decree which provides that the holding of all public processions and meetings

and the public celebration of any traditional custom shall be subject to the obtention of

prior police permission; section 12(c) of the said Decree which gives to a Superior police

officer the power to stop or disperse such a procession or meeting; and section 13 of the

said Decree which makes it an offence to hold such processions, meetings and public

celebrations without such permission, are inconsistent with and in contravention of the

Constitution, 1992 especially the freedom of assembly and demonstration provisions

thereof. In sum, the plaintiff, contended before the Supreme Court that the Public Order

Decree was inconsistent with article 21 (1)(d) of the Constitution, 1992 that guarantees

the freedom to assemble and to demonstrate. The defendant, the Attorney-General, in his

statement of defense admitted the facts of the plaintiff's case but contended that sections

7, 8, 12 and 13 of the Decree are reasonable and lawful restrictions on the freedom of

assembly granted under the Constitution.346

In their unanimous judgment, the seven justices of the Supreme Court did, in my opinion,

345 1972, (NRCD 68). 346 NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY v. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE [1993-94] 2 GLR 459,

at 460-1 and 484, per Hayfron-Benjamin JSC.



152

a better job than those in the “akpeteshie case” which we shall discuss in the next chapter.

Indeed all the judges in this case were older judges who were appointed to the bench in

the 1960s and 70s and are now either dead or retired. By contrast, all the judges in the

akpeteshie case were appointed in the 1990s. Only Bamford-Addo JSC was on both

panels. Not surprisingly, the panel made up of the older judges took a very historical

institutionalist approach to the case. In his lead judgment, Charles-Hayfron Benjamin

JSC set the tone thus:

Before coming to [the Decree] itself, some account should be given of the

history leading up to it. This court cannot be insensible to the fact of the

colonial status from which we have evolved into a nation; nor can we be

oblivious of the fact that while in the main we have received the laws from

our British colonial masters-the common law-these laws were often qualified

by Ordinances and regulations designed to remind us of our subject status

and to ensure that our colonial masters had the peace and quiet necessary to

enable them live among us and rule us.347

The court noted that the first Criminal Code was passed on October 1892348 and included

such common law offences as sedition, unlawful assembly, rout, and riot. The nearest

mention of a “permit" was contained in section 142(10) where it was stated that who

ever:

…in any town, without a licence in writing from the Governor or a District

Commissioner, beats or plays any drum, gong, torn-torn, or other similar

347 Ibid, p. 487, per Hayfron-Benjamin JSC. 348 Ordinance No 12 of 1892. By various later arrangements in the order in which it stood in the

statute book, the Criminal Code became Ordinance No. 50 of 1952 and was until 1960 known as

"Cap 9".



153

instrument of music between eight o'clock at night and six in the morning

shall be liable to a fine of forty shillings.

It is clear that ritual and festive occasions in the colonial era became opportunities for

political resistance and so the colonial government sought to control them. Again, the

various musical instruments, especially the drums, could be used for mobilization

purposes by sending out coded messages of resistance to the whole village.

A clearer concept of a permit, however, first appears in regulations349 made by the

Governor under the Police Force Ordinance350. Section 2 of the regulations states:

…Any person who desires to hold or form any meeting or procession in a

public way shall first apply to a police officer not below the rank of Assistant

Commissioner of Police, or, if there be no such officer, then to the District

Commissioner, for permission to do so; and, if such police officer or District

Commissioner is satisfied that the meeting or procession is not likely to cause

a breach of peace, he may issue a permit authorising the meeting or

procession, and may in such permit prescribe any special conditions,

limitations, or restrictions to be observed with respect thereto.

Thus started the use of law for the social penetration and remaking of Ghanaian society,

together with the development of patterns of resistance. It is indeed possible to tell a story

of the regulation of drumming and dancing in the Gold Coast in the same manner and

with the same themes as is now being told for the police, alcohol and public order. The

social penetration and control imposed by colonialism through law was pervasive indeed.

349 Public Meetings and Processions Regulations, 1926 (No. 10 of 1926) made on 26 April 1926. 350 1922, (Cap 37).



154

In 1961, after independence, the Public Order Act351 was passed, its long title read thus:

An Act to replace, with minor modifications, enactments relating to the

control of the procession or carrying of arms, the holding of public meetings

and processions and the imposition of curfews.

It contained provisions identical to colonial regulations of 1926 quoted above. However,

this new law related not to “public ways” but to the broader concept of “public places”

and applied to the whole country, not just parts of the country as did the Regulations of

1926. Lastly, it was passed under a Constitution, which, according to an interpretation of

the Supreme Court, did not contain an enforceable bill of rights.352

Thus the Public Order Act of 1961 lost none of its operational efficacy and the consent of

the minister or "permit" from the police remained a necessary prerequisite for the holding

or formation of "any meeting or procession in a public place." The Public Order

(Amendment) Act, 1963 (Act 165) restated section 16 of the 1961 Act and extended the

permit requirement to the celebration of traditional customs and the display of asafo353

company flags. The law, the validity of which was contested in this case, the Public

Order Decree, was in essence a consolidation of the previous public order legislations and

the public meetings and processions regulations.

351 1961, (Act 58). 352 RE AKOTO [1961] 2 GLR 523, (SC). 353 The Asafo companies of the Ashanti were groups of young men who were the focal points for

political mobilization, community economic and social activities, and security provisioning in the

pre-colonial era.



155

If the newly independent governments maintained the legislative control over alcohol in

order to ensure economic rents from same and to regulate the use of a fluid that was

becoming the center of social mobilization and protest, leading to the akpeteshie case, as

we shall see in the next chapter, the same government maintained the legislative control

of public gatherings and the like in order to check the post-independence party and ethnic

rivalries between the ruling government and the mainly Ashanti parties and political

movements.354

The public order laws in one form or the other have existed during the period up to 1993,

and through four Republican Constitutions. The first republican Constitution did not

contain an enforceable bill of rights. The second and third republican Constitutions did

contain same, but these were not as elaborate as those in the fourth republican

Constitution, and those Constitutions lasted just 27 months each.355

Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court, interpreting the 1992 Constitution, which contains

the most elaborate bill of rights of all Ghanaian Constitutions, held that the concept of

consent or permit as prerequisites for the enjoyment of the fundamental human right to

assemble, process or demonstrate are unconstitutional. Although some restrictions as are

354 Jean Marie Allman, “The Youngmen and the Porcupine: Class, nationalism and Asante’s

Struggle for Self-Determination, 1954-57. The Journal of African History, vol. 31, no. 2 (1990),

263-279. 355 The last reason is not particularly strong because the 1992 Constitution came into force on the

7th of January 2003 and by February of that year, this and similar court cases were already

brewing.



156

provided for by the Constitution may be necessary from time to time and upon proper

occasion, the right to assemble, process or demonstrate cannot be denied. In the words of

Amua Sekyi JSC:

I would have thought that it was self-evident that the continued enjoyment by

any community of fundamental human rights was incompatible with any

requirement that a permit or licence be first obtained. Whoever has power to

grant a permit or licence has power to refuse it…Any such restriction on the

right to freedom of assembly would make it meaningless and a sham. Based

as they are on a requirement that permission be sought of the executive or

one of its agencies before the right of freedom of assembly is exercised…

Our own experience and that of other Countries which have gone down the

slippery road to dictatorship teach us to bear in mind Lord Acton's

well-known aphorism, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts

absolutely." The lessons of history are there for all to see: we ignore them

at our peril. (My Emphasis).356

Whilst agreeing with the reasons given by Hayfron-Benjamin JSC, the then Chief

Justice, Archer C J, felt compelled to:

…add a few words to demonstrate that police permits are colonial relics and

have no place in Ghana in the last decade of the twentieth century.

…the Native Customs (Colony) Ordinance..., restricted the celebration of

native customs without the permission in writing of the district commissioner

in certain towns in the colony…Krobo customs like dipo were also

prohibited. Penalties were imposed for violations of these restrictions and

prohibitions. A district commissioner was also empowered to make an order

prohibiting the holding of company meetings in a public place of ten or more

members of a native company under the direction of a supi or headman.

Company flags or tribal emblems could not be exhibited without the

permission in writing of a district commissioner. The police were given

powers to seize such items.

356 Supra note 346, p. 473, per Amua-Sekyi JSC.



157

Then on 1 July 1922 when the Police Force Ordinance357…was enacted, the

police were … given powers to regulate traffic by stopping and diverting the

course of traffic. The Governor in Council was also empowered to make

regulations with respect to the assembling, and movements of meetings and

processions in public ways and public places. It is interesting to note that

section 54(3) of [the Police Force Ordinance] and the Native Customs

Ordinance of 1892 prevailed until they were repealed by the Public Order

Act, 1961358…which introduced police permits for meetings and processions

in public places.

It seems incongruous that legislation that was originally meant to control

asafo companies, yam festivals, fetishes a century ago, should be allowed to

develop into hideous and ugly tumors on the near immaculate face of our

present Constitution, 1992. Those who introduced police permits in this

country do not require police permits in their own country to hold public

meetings and processions. Why should we require them?359

From colonial times and through the constitutional dictatorship of the first republican

government ending in 1966, constitutional democratic freedoms were seriously curtailed.

Between 1967 and 1993, there were only two constitutional democracies with a

comprehensive bill of rights in force amongst the seven odd regimes and governments

Ghana had. And these lasted twenty-seven months each, as if by design. The rest of the

period was of military dictatorship during which the various constitutions, together with

their bill of rights were suspended. It was only with the coming into force on 7th January,

1993 of the 1992 constitution that real opportunities for using the courts to reform aspects

of dysfunctional institutions inherited from colonial times and perpetuated through

various post-independence dictatorial regimes opened up. Indeed, the challenges to the

imperial regulation of alcohol and public order occurred in the very year that the 1992

357 Cap 37. 358 Act 58. 359 Supra note 346, p. 465-6, per Archer CJ.



158

Constitution came into force.360 Referring to aspects of this phenomenon in the

akpeteshie case, Acquah JSC (as he then was), stated:

In 1962 when LI 239 was made, the 1960 Republican Constitution, which

was then in force, made no provision for an enforceable individual's right of

association, at least as held in Re Akoto…. And in the face of elaborate

human rights provisions in our 1992 Constitution, this compulsory

requirement of a membership of a body, whose aims and objective are simply

for the promotion of their economic interests, can no longer stand side by

side with the provisions of…the said Constitution.”361

And in the words of Amua-Sekyi JSC in the bome kotoku case:

It was to rescue us from such an abyss of despair that on three successive

occasions, in 1969, 1979 and 1992, elaborate provisions on fundamental

human rights have been set out in our Constitutions and the courts given clear

and unequivocal power to enforce them. The Constitution, 1992 is now the

supreme law of the land, and any enactment or executive order inconsistent

with it is null and void. Thus, except for the periods of dictatorship when

these fundamental humans were suspended, our courts have since 1969 had

power to protect people from the abuse of legislative and executive power.

Unfortunately, we have had too little experience of true democracy since

independence. Like a bird kept in a cage for years, we have come to think of

the cage as home rather than a prison. The door has been flung open, yet we

huddle in a corner and refuse to leave.362

Later events were to prove this learned justice wrong as a flurry of actions were initiated

360 The reasons why this did not occur during the two previous constitutional democratic regimes

cannot, therefore, be limited to the brevity of those governments-they both lasted 27 months. The

wind of democracy and human rights that was blowing across the world during the period under

review is a more solid explanation. 361 MENSIMA and others V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL and others [1996-97] SCGLR 676, at 721,

per Acquah JSC. This case is discussed in chapter 4. 362 Supra note 346, p. 470, per Amua-Sekyi JSC.



159

in the courts in feeble attempts to reform the dysfunctional inherited institutions in

Ghana.

In a succinct and very short two paragraph judgment, Edward Wiredu JSC (as he then

was) said of this theme:

…The police permit has outlived its usefulness. Statutes requiring such

permits for peaceful demonstrations, processions and rallies are things of the

past. The police permit is the brainchild of the colonial era and ought not to

remain in our statute books.363

The Chief Justice summed it all up by calling on the legislature to act beyond the court

orders striking down some of the provisions of the law as unconstitutional:

Finally, I would urge that the whole of [the Public Order Decree] should be

reviewed and modernised in its entirety to enable the Police Service to carry

out its duties effectively without contravening any provision in our current

Constitution, 1992.364

He should have called for an entire review of all dysfunctional legislation and institutions

in Ghana or at least, the central institution in the regulation of public order, the police.

Bankole Cole maps this theme beautifully unto the police:

363 Ibid, p. 477-8, Edward Wiredu JSC. 364 Ibid, p. 466, per Archer CJ.



160

Although many post-colonial countries have, since independence,

experimented with different types of governments, most of them have

preserved in their new political structures several features of the colonial

state, some practically in their original forms. This is particularly true of

policing.365

One commentator has summarized the issues discussed in the “bome kotoku” case very

clearly in this rather long quotation:

“The interesting point…is this, far from wanting to change the outmoded

Colonial laws, the Government… seems to be quite happy in retaining

them and utilizing them, especially those laws designed by the Colonial

regime to suppress freedom of association and expression.”

In 1968, a contributor and an editor of a Ugandan magazine were charged

with sedition for publishing the above statement. Although acquitted by what

has been described as a “courageous” ruling by the magistrate, the editor was

not released for a further 13 months, and the contributor for a further 31

months. If we peruse the statute books of many African countries today, we

might be forgiven for mistaking such statement as recent. There are many

“colonial relics” which in a number of countries, have “escaped” reform and

continue to be utilized on a regular basis almost 40 years after the so-called

‘winds of change” began to sweep Africa. Since that time, constitutionalism

has received a battering from a number of autocratic regimes characterized by

personal rule and patronage which has had the effect of inhibiting the

development of strong and independent institutions and a civil rights culture.

With the end of the Cold War, the re-introduction of multi-party politics and

the attendant debate on constitutional reform, the prospect for genuine

change, however, appears to have gained a second wind.

The fact remains that questionable laws (of colonial origin or otherwise)

cannot be examined by a court unless they are brought thereto. In pondering

the question as to why the licensing of assemblies was being challenged as

unconstitutional for the first time, AMUA-SEKYI, J.S.C., expressed the view

that:

365 Bankole A. Cole, “Post-Colonial Systems” in R.I. MAWRY Policing across the World: Issues

for the Twenty-first Century (UCL Press: New York, 1999) p. 96.



161

“[Ghanaians] unfortunately…have had too little experience of true

democracy since independence. Like a bird kept in a cage for years, we

have come to think of the cage as a home rather than prison. The door has

been flung wide open, yet we huddle in a corner and refuse to leave”

But when was the door flung open? In one sense at independence. In another

sense with the introduction of a justiciable Bill of Rights. Yet the presence of

one-party and military regimes in many African countries (often legitimated

by constitutional amendment or decree), and those buttressed for protracted

periods by emergency powers, can only have had the effect of casting a

shadow over the constitutional provisions relating to freedom of expression,

assembly and association and, moreover, the likelihood of successful

challenge.

History teaches us that legal reform can only march hand in hand with

political reform. Whereas, technically, the judiciary has always been in a

position to guide and set the pace of reform, there is only so far that a partner,

if reluctant, can be dragged. Whether the transition to multi-partyism has

resulted merely in the repeal of a “one-party clause” or an entirely new

constitution, judges, as evident from the assembly permit judgments, have

become less uncomfortable in embracing their role as “Guardians of the

Constitution”. By being prepared to examine the origin of the legislation and

the “mischief” that the colonial framers were seeking to address; in

recognizing that the abuse of such unguided legislation was not purely

hypothetical but had in fact occurred both before and after independence; and

by rejecting finally any special need in the African context to be subject to

laws for decades relegated to the dustbin of history elsewhere, the judiciary

has taken a lead and, moreover, left open the door to further challenge.366

This commentator could not be more right. In the next section, we will examine the

currency of the enduring character of institutional dysfunction in the Ghana Police

Service today and the various efforts at broader institutional reform of the Service,

beyond piece-meal judicial reform.

366 Joanna Stevens, “Colonial Relics I: The Requirement of a Permit to Hold a Peaceful

Assembly” Journal of African Law, vol. 41 no. 1 (1997) p. 118 at 132-3.



162

THE ERA OF “POSITIVE CHANGE”,367 2001 TO THE PRESENT

On 7th January 2001, the Rawlings government was replaced by the Kufuor government

following general elections the previous year. Kufuor was the presidential candidate of

the NPP, the party that was plaintiff in the “bome kotoku” case. In his inaugural speech,

he promised an era of “positive change” in everything in the country. Will “positive”

change affect the police?

The Kufuor government began to pay attention to the police. They ordered new vehicles

and other equipment for the police force, approved the recruitment of thousands of new

policemen, appointed two Deputy Inspectors General of Police and generally talked of

improving the force to make it capable of maintaining law and order. Various NGOs

piggy-backed on this, and focused on monitoring police performance and on police

reform issues.368 The reform efforts of the government and the NGOs are still ongoing.

Unfortunately, the government seems to be merely implementing the recommendations

of the Presidential Commission on the police that was set up in 1996. As noted earlier,

the basic thrust of that report is the hi-teching of a police force to continue to do what it

has been doing since it was established.

367 The new government of Ghana, which took office on The 7th of January 2001, promised the

citizenry “Positive Change” in everything. The government is best known for this refrain. 368 ASDR, CDD, LRC.



163

The Government has secured a $20 million package from South Africa to

upgrade police stations and barracks with modern facilities. Arrangements

are also being made to source $40 million to connect all police stations in the

country to the Internet to facilitate effective communication.

The Minister for Interior, Mr Hackman Owusu-Agyeman, who made this

known, said plans were also under way to secure seeker and surveillance

aircraft as well as helicopters for the police to help them combat armed

robbery and other crimes…

Mr Owusu-Agyeman pointed out that the new changes taking place in the

Police Service were part of a comprehensive National Programme to equip

all security agencies in the country to help strengthen internal security.

According to him, the recent spate of sophisticated crimes with sometimes

resulted in the loss of lives of some police, had necessitated the need to equip

them to be able to effectively deal with such unpatriotic citizens.

The Minister, however, urged the police and other security agencies to be

loyal to the citizenry and the government, adding that “no matter who is in

power, the police have a constitutional obligation to support it to combat

crime.369

Another report on this issue is also illustrative:

The Minister of Interior, Mr Hackman Owusu Agyeman, said the

government was putting in place comprehensive measures to facilitate the

work of security agencies in the country.

He also said the government would provide 425 vehicles, a 40 million-

dollar communication network, 20 million dollars riot control equipment,

construct buildings and create training opportunities and improve

conditions of service of personnel.

Addressing personnel of the Police Service, he said the Kufour's

administration was determination (sic) to improve the operational

efficiency of the service and had already provided it with 425 vehicles,

while a contract for the rehabilitation and expansion of the Police Hospital

369 Police stations and barracks to be modernized General News of Wednesday, 10 December

2003 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=48030 Visited

on 11th April 2004.

http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=48030



164

had been signed.

Mr Owusu Agyeman said the Police would set up an elite Special Security

Force to be equipped with helicopters, medical vehicles and that two

financiers from the United States had visited the country to study the

housing problem of the Police Service and Prison Service for investment.

He said the Ministry of Interior was holding discussions with the Ministry

of Defence for senior officers from the two bodies to attend the Ghana

Armed Forces Staff College to improve their capacity while assistance

was being sought from the United Kingdom and South Africa for the

rehabilitation of broken down vehicles.

Mr Owusu-Agyeman said the government took delivery of sanitation

equipment worth 3.5 billion cedis for the police and three billion cedis was

being sought for the rehabilitation of barracks and plans were advanced to

increase the number of police personnel from the current 16,000 to 20,000.

He urged personnel of the services under the Ministry of Interior to be

loyal and dedicated to the government of the day…

He announced that joint military/police patrols would be organised along

the highway and the Kwahu-Tafo-Afram Plains road to deal with robbery

and reckless driving during the Christmas and New Year period.

The Minister was accompanied by the Inspector General of Police…370

Flowing from the above, today, in 2004, all the three reasons for the establishment of the

police force in the Gold Coast in about 1830 have hardly changed, believe it or not.

Perhaps the only difference is that instead of providing physical protection to the colonial

Governor and other officials of the colonial office, the police now protect a President and

Ministers who are mostly trained in London, Europe and the United States, and have left

their loves, lives, businesses, and interests there, perhaps temporarily, to come home to

lead the country-for a political term; instead of the Trade Companies we now have

370 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=48020 visited 11

Dec 2003.




165

Foreign Investors and Ghana Club 100371; and instead of the Rule of Law imported from

the Colonial Office in London, we now have the Rule of Law imported from the World

Bank, IMF and WTO offices in Washington, DC and Geneva.

The police force maintains its three-pronged duty of prostration before and protection of

the political class; maintaining peace for foreign investment, trade and exploitation; and

enforcing the rule of law necessary for the political economy of neo-liberalism. I will

now map the colonial narrative to the present and illuminate the enduring patterns of

institutional forms of Empire and Imperialism in which the police still play a very central

role.

To date the police is severely mistrusted and attracts a good deal of hostility. It is still

considered the most corrupt institution in Ghana from evidence in surveys as far apart as

1974372 and 2001/2003373. In some extreme cases serious confrontations between sections

of the public and the police have occurred leading to riots, street battles and resultant loss

of lives and property. Writing in 2002, one commentator has noted that “the burning and

seizing of Police Stations and equipment, and killing of police personnel…is gaining

currency in the country nowadays.”374 Let us now turn our attention to the enduring

patterns of colonial policing in Ghana today.

371 Ghana Club 100 is the Ghanaian equivalent of Fortune 500. 372 Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Bribery and Corruption, 1974, popularly called

the Anin Report on corruption. 373 Ghana: Police-Community Relations in an Emerging Democracy. CDD-Ghana Research Paper

No. 12 (CDD-Ghana, August, 2003). 374 Supra note 291, p. 110.



166

POLICE SUBSERVIENCE TO AND PROTECTION OF THE

POLITICAL CLASS, AND THEIR USE FOR ECONOMIC

EXPLOITATION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE “RULE OF

LAW”

In terms of economic exploitation, the role of the police is still stated in policy documents

and statements as providing the peace and security that is needed to attract foreign

investors. And the mining and other companies not only have their own sophisticated

security systems, they regularly call in aid the police force to help contain residents

angered by the degradation of their environments and other ills attendant to the

exploitation of natural resources.

And the Escort branch is still a branch of the police, the only surviving branch from its

contemporaries, and still protects natural resources (and now physical cash) being charted

from foreign companies and foreign banks to safe havens from whence they may be

exported.

In the rule of law arena, the police still enforce a whole range of laws, some dating back

to the colonial period, meant essentially to produce social ordering that is conducive to

the thriving of investors and their businesses. In some cases the police are let loose on

poor communities that have set-up their own systems of security provisioning which are

regarded by the law as illegal. Again, the police are often used to clean-up urban

settlements inhabited by the poor in order to make way for some project or other which

essentially benefit investors. In this, they resort to various rules of property law against



167

squatting, nuisance, trespass and the other familiar legal concepts to support the mass

evictions of urban and rural inhabitants alike.375 Thus, in 2004, the basic DNA of the

police force, established during colonialism and crystallized around 1960, was enduring

indeed. Today, all the three reasons for the establishment of the force during the colonial

era have not changed one bit.

Almost two centuries after the colonial agenda started, and half a century after it ended,

the Gold Coast Police Force, now called the Ghana Police Service retains the same basic

objectives that were set for it by the imperialist powers. The police are still used mainly

for the protection of the political class. Most of the political class today have one or two

(sometimes a whole platoon) of policemen at their service. Ministers of State and their

deputies, the Speaker of Parliament, judges and other political appointees appropriate this

disproportionate amount of public security at the expense of the citizenry who, given the

shortage of public security, buy private security from private security companies (if they

are rich) or develop their own systems of private security such as land guards, vigilante

groups etc (if they are poor). The police is also still under strict political control. As will

be shown in the next section, the Inspector General of Police (the chief executive and

administrator of the Service), appointed by the political class, is under the supervision of

the Police Council, a body mostly appointment by the President. The craze for

375 For a good example of an eviction of thousands of people to make way for a project in Ghana,

see http://www.cepil.org/prjstory.asp?id=13. See also the case of ISSAH IDDI ABBAS and 10

others v. ACCRA METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY and the ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note

242.

For a recent parallel example in Nigeria, see Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Mass forced

evictions in Lagos must stop”, AI Index: AFR 44/034/2003 (Public) News Service No: 250, 31

October 2003. Also available at the Amnesty International website: http://www.amnesty.org

http://www.cepil.org/prjstory.asp?id=13

http://www.amnesty.org/



168

community policing is as much a First World as it is a reaction, conscious or

unconscious, to bourgeois policing as a form of institutional continuity.

The above analysis shows how the institution of the police has endured indeed. Today, it

performs the same functions it performed two centuries ago, and in aid of the same grand

design of the political economy. The police are most brutal when it comes to its

traditional functions of protection of the political class and the preservation of the regime

in power and the regulation of resources. And they do this through the implementation of

the rule of law. The historical institutional continuities are apparent indeed. The

following three examples show how these play out.

The Brong Ahafo Regional Chairman of the NDC, A…D… was last

Thursday, detained at the Police CID headquarters for parking his private car

opposite the President’s residence at Airport. He was also accused of

engaging in a conversation with a member of the security team guarding the

President, Chief Inspector O...

Mr D… who is a former Member of Parliament…was picked up at about

10:30 pm on Thursday November 27 at his Baatsona, Accra residence with a

provisional charge of causing a security scare around the residence of the

President.

He was then taken to the CID headquarters where the CID boss…

interrogated him for close to an hour about his mission to the President’s

house.

According to A…D…, he went to (sic) President’s house in the company of

Chief Inspector O…’s estranged wife, Pat, to have discussions with the

former who happened to be his next door neighbour at Baatsona.

He explained that his children attend the same school with Chief Inspector

O…’s children and he sometimes pick (sic) them home from school.

However, he realized that O…’s children left school earlier than expected



169

these days. He therefore enquired from Pat who explained that the children

had been sacked from school for non-payment of fees.

A… D… said based on the mutual respect existing between the two families,

Pat pleaded with him to accompany her to O…’s house to impress upon him

to pay the fees. They however met O…’s absence and were told he was on

duty.

A… D… said Pat persuaded him to accompany her to O…’s duty post since

he [A…D…] was traveling to the Brong Ahafo region the following day.

They therefore went to the President’s house at about 7pm, but he parked his

car a few metres from the main gate, where other cars had also parked.

The NDC Regional Chairman said he sat in his car, while Pat got down and

went to call O… After talking to O… for about five minutes, still standing by

his car, he left. The two men promised to continue the discussions. It was

about three hours later that he was picked up by the police and detained. O…

was also interrogated.

A… D… explained that he was taken out of cells the following day and taken

to the spot where he parked his car. He was then taken to his house where a

thorough search was conducted for weapons. But the police found none.

In an interview with JOY FM, the CID Boss… justified the detention of A…

D… and O… He explained that [A…D…’s] visit to the President’s house

posed a security threat and the police therefore had to interrogate the two men

to know what their discussions centered on.376

To appreciate the next report, one has to factor in the fact that the Ghana Broadcasting

Corporation, the state run radio and television station is one of the first targets of any

military coup d’etat. It is from there the leader of the coup announces the fall of the last

government and the birth of the new, and generally justifies the coup. It is also the

medium for communication of important issues especially during military regimes: these

range from the announcement of states of emergency and curfews, through the

376 Police Detain NDC Regional Chairman, Regional News of Tuesday, 02 December 2003

http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=47670 visited 11 Dec

2003




170

summoning of accused persons to appear in court, to the dismissal of state

functionaries.377

The life of one of the brilliant upcoming journalists could have ended had he

not been dragged away by a passerby when a police officer, O… K…,

primed his rifle and threatened to shoot if he moved, after physically

assaulting him.

This alleged notoriety of some of the police officers guarding the Ghana

Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) came to the fore on November 20 this year,

when M…A…’s chest was turned into a punching bag and he was hit several

times by an officer on duty called O…K… to provoke him to walk past a

“restricted” path at the GBC.

The officer then primed his rifle, took a few paces back and threatened to

shoot him if he moved.

The incidence of police beating up people at the main entrance of GBC has

become rampant and chronic recently.

According to Chronicle’s investigations, both visitors and the GBC staff have

frequently complained that when entering the corporation, the policemen

strut about outside the main gate with their weapons in full display and lean

against the walls with their guns pointed at people entering GBC. The

Chronicle can report that this same officer, O…K…, had threatened to beat

D… Q… of GTV News up when he intervened in a scuffle between the

officer and a civilian visitor to the GBC.

Apart from this incident, there was another physical assault on a radio

presenter at Uniq FM, when about seven policemen, in broad daylight, beat

up the presenter. He had apparently started an argument with the police and

was branded “too known” and beaten up.

Chronicle has also learnt that a cameraman on attachment at the GBC was

beaten up and repeatedly kicked as he lay writhing on the ground in agony by

a policeman at the Station of the Nation because he wanted to seize the

camera the guy was using. In this particular incident, it was alleged that a

rifle was aimed at the cameraman while he was on the ground and was

377 NAUNIHAL SINGH, Making Facts: A Theory about the Role of Expectations in Coup

Dynamics and Outcomes. Paper Presented at the Psychology and Behaviour Workshop Organized

by the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University, May 2nd, 2002.



171

threatened with words like “I will shoot if you get up”…

According to M…A…, a formal complaint was made to the GBC Union and

to Inspector M. M. D… and they promised him an investigation into the

incident. …

When The Chronicle contacted the GBC police, they confirmed the story,

saying that the matter was still under investigation.378

The attitude and posture of the police is similar in issues relating to key resources.

…The people of Akyem Bomso in the Eastern Region have accused the

Police of perpetrating a series of brutalities against them over a protracted

land dispute they have with the people of nearby Tweapease.

They have, therefore, appealed to the Minister of the Interior to appoint a

commission of enquiry to investigate "the horrendous acts of brutalities by

the Ghana Police against the humble and peace-loving Ghanaians of Bomso

to bring the perpetrators of these despicable acts, who have driven the image

of this nation into disrepute, to book".

In a petition to the Inspector General of Police signed by six elders of the

town, including the Assemblyman, Mr A…B…, and copied to the Ghana

News Agency, they alleged that the Police at Asuom, Kade and Koforidua

had been influenced by the Tweapeasehene to visit mayhem on them.

The petition said on June 7, 2003 the Police swooped on the sleeping town at

about 0300 hours and arrested five men and a woman amidst the firing of

gunshots, handcuffed them and took them away to Koforidua. Those arrested

said they were kept in cells and denied food.

On October 17 the Police made another swoop on the town and arrested four

men and took them to Tweapease, where they were subjected to severe

beatings for about five minutes before being taken to Koforidua.

On November 3 the Police swooped on the town again. They entered the

378 Police beats up journalist, General News of Thursday, 04 December 2003. See


2003.




172

Palace of [the]…Chief of the town, who is a serving Policeman, arrested him,

beat him up and handcuffed him and took him away.

The petition said the Police, who numbered about 90, beat up the people

indiscriminately and arrested 39 of them including seven women, three boys

and a septuagenarian O…A…

It said O…A… had since died at the Akwatia Saint Dominic Hospital as a

result of the beatings he received at the hands of the Police.

Reacting to the petition, Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) in charge

of Public Relations, Mr K…O…told the Ghana News Agency that the people

of Bomso had fired on and wounded four Policemen, who were among a

team detailed for an operation to retrieve illegal firearms from the town. The

Police Headquarters on Tuesday said the four were out of danger and have

been discharged from hospital.

ASP O…said on November 3 a contingent of Policemen went to Akyem

Bomso, to search for arms used in attacking the Police, who had on October

16 gone to the town to arrest some young men, who were suspected to have

caused damage to young oil palm seedlings, which Juasco Company Limited

of Tweapease had cultivated.

He said at about 0600 hours, while the search was being conducted, some

youth of the town mobilised and started throwing stones after the Chief of the

town; B…O… was arrested for possessing two cap guns without authority.

ASP O… said the Police arrested 36 others while the rest ran away only to

mount a barricade on the road leading to Tweapease, apparently to prevent

them from carrying B…O… away.

He said when the Police attempted to remove the barricade they were fired

upon from about 50 metres away and four of them were wounded. A Police

handset got missing during the operation.

ASP O... said 35 of those arrested are in custody while B… O… and other

person (sic) had been granted bail to assist in the tracing and retrieval of the

missing handset as well as the identification of the other suspects.

There has been a protracted land dispute between the people of Bomso and

Tweapease.

The people of Bomso claim that 243 hectares of cocoa, oil palm, citrus and

foodstuff farms belonging to them had been leased out to Juasco Company.



173

They said they had made representations to the Okyenhene, A… O… P…;

the Kwaebibirem District Chief Executive, Eastern Regional Minister and

President John Agyekum Kufuor.379

Here, the root cause of the friction is the parceling out of land, belonging to ordinary

citizens, to an investor, and the use of the police to enforce that “rule of law”.

There are hundreds of such instances of police-community frictions both of minor and

enormous proportions and evidence of public disrespect and loathe of the police. I

personally grew tired of collecting them from the newspapers. The Country Report on

Human Rights Practices is instructive in this respect:

In recent years, the police service in particular has come under severe

criticism following incidents of police brutality, corruption, and negligence.

Public confidence in the police remained low, and mobs attacked several

police stations due to perceived police inaction, a delay in prosecuting

suspects, rumors of collaboration with criminals, and the desire to deal with

suspects through instant justice. The Ghana Governance and Corruption

Survey completed in 2001 found that the police were among the "least

trusted, least effective, and most corrupt" government institutions in the

country.380

To date the police is severely mistrusted and attracts a good deal of hostility. It is still

considered the most corrupt institution in Ghana from evidence in surveys as far apart as

379Police accused of high-handedness, GNA

http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=47730 visited 11

December 2003. 380 See http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18206.htm and generally, www.state.gov, visited

13th November 2003.


http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18206.htm

http://www.state.gov/



174

1974381 and 2001/2003382. In some extreme cases serious confrontations between sections

of the public and the police have occurred leading to riots, street battles and resultant loss

of lives and property. Let us examine some examples of these.

A BRUTAL POLICE FORCE TODAY

Speaking in 1993, a justice of the Supreme Court of Ghana had this to say:

It is very tempting for some policemen to adopt the attitude of being too

ready or willing to give orders, or misuse their authority and be bossy and

interfering, ready to show the public where power lies. This is why it is

dangerous, if not unconstitutional, for the police to be given the power under

section 12 of [the Public Order Decree].383

Another justice, in response to the plea of the Deputy Attorney-General for the court to

avoid constricting the powers of the police noted:

The public interest demands that the police maintain law and order in society.

Therefore the police will continue to maintain law and order and to ensure

that there are no infringements of the criminal laws of the land by those

exercising their rights, eg to hold public demonstrations. The Deputy

Attorney General appearing for the defendants expressed concern that a

decision in favour of the plaintiff in this case would make the work of the

381 Supra notes 372 and 373. 382 For 2001 see Ghana Governance and Corruption Survey completed in 2001 quoted in the 2002

Country Report on Human Rights Practices-Ghana, supra note 141. For 2003, see CDD, Ghana:

Police-Community Relations in an Emerging Democracy-Survey Report. August 2003; CDD,

Police-Community relations in Ghana. Report of a Workshop on “Enhancing Police-Community

Relations and Democratic Policing”, August 21-23,2003. 383 Supra note 346, p. 476-7 per Aikins JSC.



175

police more difficult. That may be so but this is the price we have to pay for

democracy and constitutional order. The police like any other organ of

government are required to operate within the four walls of the Constitution,

1992 but with their crime preventing powers, I believe they can rise up to the

occasion and satisfactorily discharge their duties within the constitutional

limits despite any difficulties.”384

These pronouncements of the highest court in Ghana are living testimony first, to the

range of powers the police possess, the dictatorial and highhanded manner in which those

powers are exercised, and the continuous attempts by the agency of government, the

executive, in this case, the Deputy Attorney-General, to preserve and protect their powers

from erosion.

It is not difficult to appreciate the dilemma in which the modern police force finds itself.

Trained as a militaristic, intrusive, commandeering force, they have to carry out all the

functions of a modern civil police organization. As noted earlier, police training

concentrated on practical police training in weapon handling, map reading and law

related courses such as Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, and the Law of Evidence385. It

was only in the 1980s that the curriculum of the officer class of the Force was changed to

include liberal arts subjects such as Psychology, Sociology, Community Relations and

Management.386 In 1971, a key recommendation of the Boyes Report was the reduction

in the arms training component of police training in order to moderate the militaristic

384 Ibid, p. 483-484 per Bamford-Addo JSC. 385 Supra note 291, p. 89. 386 Ibid, p. 92.



176

aspects of the training.387 As late as 2001388 commentators were still calling for human

rights training for the police to ensure that the “tough cop culture” developed in the

Service over the decades would be changed.

The Police Striking Force, formed in 1970 as a “special unit to fight crimes and to quell

riots, conflicts and other civil disorders which tended to slow down the socio-economic

development of the country”389, is still in full fledged operation. The panthers unit,

formed in 1980 to hunt down hardened criminals engaging in armed robbery and

homicide, clamp down on dissidents and anti-government elements and combat riots,

civil conflicts, chieftaincy disputes and land disputes, and the “Commando Unit” of 1984,

derived from the Panthers Unit, and specially trained in crime combat and dealing with

civil disorder and government dissidents or anti-government activities390 are also still in

operation.

It is interesting that, this type of vice regulation, leading to the construction of a corrupt

and repressive police force, and a repressive understanding of the policing function is

then blamed on the police as individual actors who do not know, do not learn, do not

understand, and so cannot adhere to various human rights principles and practices,

whatever that means. It is not the police that are corrupt and need to be reformed. It is our

concept of the policing function that is corrupt and needs to be reformed.

387 A Report on the Ghana Police Service, December 1971 referenced in EMMANUEL KWESI

ANING, supra note 298, p 7, 24-25. 388 Ibid, note 58. 389 Supra note 291, p. 73. 390 Ibid, p. 74-5.



177

For evidence of police brutality, the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in

Ghana released annually by the United States Department of State, are a good place to

start. The self monitoring of the police ensures that data on such issues are either

unavailable or jealously guarded. As already noted, only in 1991 was the Special Police

Command created within the service to investigate public complaints and reports of

unprofessional conduct against police personnel and to check police abuse of power.391

This, together with the neglect of this area by researchers in Ghana, ensure that, aside

newspaper reports, the only other sources are the US State Department reports and the

reports of the national human rights Commission. A little extract from the 2002 State

Department report says as follows:

Security forces committed a number of unlawful killings of criminal

suspects. The number of deaths reportedly caused by members of the security

forces during the year was unavailable.

In recent years, the police service in particular has come under severe

criticism following incidents of police brutality…

On May 22, security forces broke into a house in the Odorkor neighborhood

of Accra and dragged two suspected armed robbers outside. They beat the

men and hit them with the butts of guns, which resulted in the death of one of

the men…

On June 13, security forces responding to a robbery report killed four persons

who later were reported to be members of a local neighborhood watch

committee...

In May 2001, 126 persons were crushed and trampled to death when police

used tear gas to control a portion of the crowd who were vandalizing the

391 Ibid, p. 75.



178

stadium during a soccer match at the Accra Sports Stadium. An official

Commission of Inquiry concluded that the police overreacted to fan

vandalism and bore primary responsibility for the incident…”392

After the incident just referred to, the police were nowhere to be found. They had

vanished into thin air.

Minutes after shooting the 15 canisters of oxygen-sucking teargas into the

crowd, the police mounted their two anti-riot armoured vans and other

vehicles, and noisily sped away from the stadium as the stampede…reached

its zenith.

A conspiracy theory began to build up before dawn as public anger turned on

the police. Many police vehicles were stoned at Nima, Maamobi (sic) and

Newtown and as day broke, information filtered through that one of the

officers who probably gave the order to shoot the teargas was also involved

in police duties at the 1995 Kume Preko demonstration against the

introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT) by the National Democratic

Congress (NDC) government.393

That Kume Preko demonstration also saw loss of lives when the police, and perhaps other

agents, shot into the demonstrating crowd.394

The 2003 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Ghana has the following entry:

…security forces committed some unlawful killings of criminal suspects and

innocent bystanders with excessive force. Incidents of police brutality,

negligence, and corruption contributed to low public confidence in police,

392 Supra note 380. 393 ALEX AKURGO and CAMILLUS ABONGO, May 9 at Accra Stadium: A Gripping Story of a

Disaster that Turned Ordinary People into Heroes. (Blue Volta Associates, 2001), p. 52. 394http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=179;

http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=432. Both websites

visited on the 20th of May 2004.





179

mob attacks on police stations, and a widespread desire to deal with

suspected criminals through vigilante justice…

The Constitution prohibits [Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment]; however, there were continued credible reports

that police and customs officials beat prisoners and other citizens. It generally

was believed that severe beatings of suspects in police custody occurred

throughout the country but largely went unreported.

On September 19, the Deputy Inspector General of Police informed a

graduating class of police that "use of unreasonable force, resort to firearms

without justification and other acts that may constitute criminality, will no

longer be treated by the Police Administration as misconduct, but

criminal."…395

Cases of police misconduct also abound in the annual reports of the Commission on

Human Rights and Administrative Justice.396

PUBLIC DISAPPROBIUM OF THE POLICE TODAY

As is event from the above, public distrust and disapprobium of the police is so high that

conspiracy theory is proffered as a reason for some of their brutal actions. The police

know this and have tried to deal with it. As noted earlier, the Public Relations Bureau was

created in 1969397 and the “Police Week” beginning in 1976, was so that policemen

might interact with the public and disabuse their minds about certain misconceptions of

the police. The police band also “entertain[s] the public from time to time free of charge”

395 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27730.htm. Visited on 11th April 2004. 396 Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Annual Reports, 1994-2002. See

also, CHRIS DADZIE, Reconciling Police Practice and Procedure with Fundamental Human

Rights and Freedoms as Enshrined in the Constitution. Paper Presented at a Seminar on Policing

and Detection of Crime in a Democratic Environment, 2001. (Unpublished, on file with author). 397 Supra note 291, p. 55.




180

and this is meant to “merit the goodwill of the public”398.

Efforts of the police to get the support of the public have continued to date, but alas, with

little success. It is certain that the absence of, or limited training and practice in public or

community relations has affected the functioning of the police in a very relational society.

According to one commentator, the Gold coast policemen had a limited co-operative

attitude in dealing with the public. He attributes this to the “master say” phenomenon

where policemen were trained and socialized to carry out the orders of their superior

officers to the letter in all circumstances.399. This was complicated by the inability of

policemen to communicate effectively with the public. If we remember that the majority

of the force, at its inception, consisted mostly of foreigners, and that there were policy

decisions to maintain and increase foreign presence in the force, it is easy to see that

communication and relations with the public was a problem. Again, as late as 1950, the

number of illiterate policemen was 1,928 out of a total of 3,353400 and so it was not

possible for them to communicate effectively with the public in the English Language or

in the dozens of local dialects spoken all over the country. The absence of training in

police-public/community relations, the difficulties of communication, the resultant

impatience and the “master say” phenomenon on the part of policemen got

institutionalized in the force and remains long after policing by strangers, and the

communication problems have largely disappeared. Increased public disillusionment

398 Ibid, p. 58. 399 Ibid, p. 109 400 Ibid, p. 86.



181

with the police is the result. A most illustrative example of this state of affairs is the story

of the May 9 stadium disaster.

THE MAY 9 STADIUM DISASTER AND THE POLICE

Never since the riots of 28th February 1948, did public disapprobrium of the police rise as

high as they did no May 9th, 2001. In this section, I narrate this story as a micro example

and draw lessons on institutional continuity of the police force therefrom.401 About 126

people were killed in a stampede at the Accra sports stadium on that day. The stampede

occurred when police officers fired tear gas into a rowdy crowd in the stadium. Of this

number, over 30 were residents of Nima, Mamobi and New Town. On Friday, May 11th

2001, some residents from the Nima, Mamobi, and New Town communities went to bury

their dead relatives. Afterwards, the youth of these communities headed for their homes.

An advance team of motorbike riders displayed riding skills in ways that violated traffic

regulations. As they approached the Nima Police Station, the police stopped them and

detained one motorbike. This resulted in some verbal exchanges between the riders and

the police. This was aggravated by the arrival of the party of youth from the funeral that

was on foot. When the youth became very rowdy the police fired a warning shot. At this

point the youth began to gather into large numbers around the police station and as they

attempted to vandalize the Nima Police Station, the police called for support from the

401 Both quantitative and qualitative research on the police in Ghana is virtually non-existent, and

we cannot but rely on micro examples and media reports in exercises such as I am engaged in.



182

military, who tactfully managed to move the youth from the vicinity of the police station

amidst shouts of “We want soldiers, we don’t want police” from the youth.402

One newspaper reported:

Soldiers fired warning shots and tear gas to disperse hundreds of youths who

attacked a police station in Ghana's capital on Friday in a protest over a

soccer stampede that killed 126 people, witnesses said.

The youths (sic) blame police for causing Wednesday's stampede by using

excessive amounts of teargas in a packed stadium.

Military police have taken over regular police duties in most areas of Accra

amid mounting public anger and anti-police demonstrations since Africa's

worst soccer tragedy.

President John Kufuor renewed his appeal for calm on Friday during a

memorial service for victims at Accra's central mosque.

But in the teeming and poor Muslim suburb of Nima, home to many of the

victims, angry youths attacked a police station, blocked roads and set fire to

kiosks and tyres.

Scores of armed soldiers and around a dozen armoured police and military

vehicles took up positions on the main access roads to Nima. A military

helicopter circled the scene until a tense calm was restored late on Friday

evening.

The protest took on a political tone, with youths chanting for the return of

former President Jerry "JJ" Rawlings, who stood down in December after

nearly two decades in office.

"We want JJ," witnesses quoted the youths as saying. "We don't want police."

Some carried pictures of Rawlings…”.403

402 Legal Resources Centre, Report on the May 9, 2001 Stadium Disaster and the Aftermath for

Nima, Mamobi, and New Town, August 2001. Report prepared by Cheryl Maman and Janis Sims.

(Unpublished, on file with author). 403 “Youth attack police over Ghana soccer tragedy” and “APPEAL FOR CALM”

http://www.rediff.com/sports/2001/may/12soc.htm.

http://www.rediff.com/sports/2001/may/12soc.htm



183

Another newspaper reported:

At least 126 people died in the stampede at the end of a match between

leading teams Hearts of Oak and Asante Kotoko.

Local radio said up to 130 people had died…

Outside the mosque, youths chanted anti-police slogans at officers. Police

also fired shots in the air on Thursday after a mob, bent on revenge, attacked

the same police station in Nima.

Many in Ghana think police overreacted to crowd trouble when they fired

several canisters of teargas into the stands of the packed stadium after fans

hurled missiles onto the pitch.

"I would say this was not a tragedy but the perpetration of sheer ignorance.

When will the Ghana police force use common sense instead of force?" asked

fan Baba Saidu on Friday in a comment on the Web site of Ghana's popular

Joy FM radio.

Bereaved relatives continued to besiege the morgue at a military hospital,

waiting to collect the bodies of the dead or still searching for their loved

ones. Medical officials said they had identified 80 of the victims, mostly

Muslims.

"This is not the time to apportion blame or seek scapegoats. Let us not rush to

judgment," Kufuor said in a national broadcast on Thursday night,

announcing the creation of a five-member commission of inquiry. "I appeal

to all of you to show restraint and calm. The eyes of the world are upon

us."404

404 Ibid.



184

These events caused a very strained relationship between the police and the communities.

Members of the Nima and Mamobi communities could not seek assistance from the

police and the police could not come into the community to prevent crime or apprehend

offenders, for fear of being harmed by residents of the community.405 This micro

example represents the general state of affairs in most of the country.

POLICE REFORM TODAY

Despite public loathing of the police, most people realize how much they depend on the

police in order to go about their daily activities in peace, freedom and security.406 This

complex of an evil police force that misuses its powers and a corrupt force that extorts

money from the citizenry on the one hand, and on the other hand, a much loved police

force that ensures that people live their lives in peace has been the subject of at least two

studies.407

As discussed earlier on in this chapter, the very first attempts at police reform were

modest indeed and involved calls on the Supreme Court, the highest and constitutional

405 Ibid. 406 Supra note 291, p. 110. 407 Supra note 373 and 380. See also RAYMOND A. ATUGUBA, Police Oversight In Ghana.

Paper Presented at a Workshop on “Security Sector Governance in Africa” Organized by African

Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), in Collaboration with the Global Facilitation Network

for Security Sector Reform (GFN/SSR), Elmina, Ghana, November 24-26, 2003 (Unpublished, on

file with author); RAYMOND A. ATUGUBA, Improving Community-Police Relations. Paper

Presented at a Workshop on “Enhancing Police-Community Relations and Democratic Policing”

Organized by the Center for Democratic development (CDD), 21-23 August 2003. (Unpublished,

on file with author), drawing attention to the phenomenon.



185

court of the land to prune specific powers of the police.408 Of late, and perhaps

emboldened by various successes in piece-meal reform, governmental reform agents and

civil society groups are calling for a complete overhaul of the police service. Within this

call, however, is a deep canker. We will now examine the broad agenda for the reform of

the service.

It is now increasingly the consensus that effective police performance will depend on

public participation in and approval of police work. This and other ideas about

community-policing are being pushed by various NGOs doing work in security sector

reform and advocacy.409

Lending and donor agencies, more decently called “development partners”410 and the

National Governance Program, a division of the Office of the President in charge of

reforming “governance institutions”, whatever that means, are also now interested in

police reform. The National Governance Program is funded mainly by various

development partners and is basically the evidence of government’s buy-in to a program

that is funded and controlled by “development partners”.

408 Supra note 346. 409 RAYMOND A. ATUGUBA, Monitoring Police Performance in Ghana. Paper Presented At

“Roundtable On Police And Policing” Organized by African Security Dialogue And Research.

Accra, August 20-22, 2001. (Unpublished, on file with author); RAYMOND A. ATUGUBA, Key

Issues in Contemporary Ghanaian Policing: Identifying Reform Priorities to Generate Consensus

on Proposals for Reforming the Police Service. Paper Presented at a Workshop Organized by

African Security Dialogue and Research. Accra, August 21-22, 2002. (Unpublished, on file with

author); RAYMOND A. ATUGUBA, Improving Community Police Relations, supra note 407. 410 DFID for example.



186

The thrust of the various NGOs which are involved in police reform in Ghana is to

inquire into the real reasons for institutional malfunction in the police service in order to

work towards fixing them and ensuring better policing for the citizenry. This is why there

is so much emphasis by NGOs on the historical institutional development of the force and

building more productive police-citizen relations. The agenda and resulting process of the

government and its development partners is to built a police force that is capable of

coming down hard on crime, reduce crime and create “an enabling environment” for

“foreign direct investment”. These two quotes are examples of the most popular refrains

in the catalogue of development agenda refrains in the last two decades in Ghana.

It is vital to note here that to the extent that the NGOs involved in police reform are

funded by development partners and external NGOs that have agendas similar to those of

the developmental partners, the form, but not necessarily the content, of their agenda is

similar to that of the development partners working through government institutions. The

phenomenon of NGOs presenting formal proposals and attendant formal reports to their

donors in line with donor requirements, whilst using the funds for more useful work that

addresses the more systemic (as opposed to symptomatic) aspects of social problems is

gaining currency, although it could do with greater leeway and more sophisticated

strategy.

The contrast of the two agendas and the resulting processes are set out in a little

document I prepared as a commentary to a nascent government/development partners



187

agenda for police reform.411 The agenda of the government/development partners is

contained in the Technical Proposal on Transformation of the Ghana Police Service.

Prepared by Webconsult Ltd in March, 2003. The Proposal, prepared on the invitation of

the National Governance Programme and the Ghana Police Service was premised on the

following:

1. The need for the Service, as part of the public services of Ghana, to reinvent itself

in conformity with the ongoing reform of the entire public sector412;

2. The declared intention of the government “as one of its primary policies” to

transform and adequately equip the Service to enhance its capacity to perform its

traditional role in a modernizing society;

3. The need to reorient the police to concentrate on its core operational functions and

to perceive administration as, essentially, a management support service; and

4. The need to transform the police in order to institutionalize the practice of

strategic planning, performance targeting and specifying measurable outputs for

divisions, units and individual officers.

The agenda is clear: The high-teching of a brutal force to ensure ruthless clamping down

411 RAYMOND A. ATUGUBA, Review of Technical Proposal on The Transformation of the

Ghana Police Service Presented To The National Governance Programme. May 2003. (On file

with the National Governance Programme and with author). I consult on Police issues for the

National Governance Programme, the Africa Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), the Center

for Democratic Governance (CDD), and the Legal Resources Centre (LRC). 412This is a reference to the Public Sector Reinvention and Modernization Strategy (PUSERMOS)

launched in 1997.



188

on “criminals” in order to maintain the “peace and security” needed for foreign direct

investment and to strictly monitor this through agenda setting and strict performance

indicators. Thus, the proposal is heavy with the ideas and language of contemporary

Ghanaian consultancy firms. These ideas and language are modeled on thoughts and

processes of the industrial state and an ardent, docile, non-participating consumer public.

I have argued in this dissertation that addressing the problems of the police force

symptomatically is not good enough, and that police reform must start from the reform of

the purpose of policing. From this perspective therefore, the industrial corporate capacity

and performance improvement model of police reform that is now being considered by

the NGP and the development partners will only craft a police force that will advance

post-modern colonialism. This is because the agenda basically seeks to improve the

capacity and performance of the “machine”called the police, without tempering with its

core antecedent character and functions. Particularly, I accuse this agenda of a number of

transgressions.

In the first place, the model treats all institutions as basically the same and seeks to apply

a set of performance improvement models to them. The police is thus treated as part of a

wider Public Sector Reinvention and Modernization Strategy (PUSERMOS). The history

of the police in Ghana shows that it is anything but an ordinary institution. No other

institution in Ghana has been the subject of as many committees and commissions of

inquiry, both directly and tangentially as the police. As the institution that is legally

chartered to operationalize the state’s monopoly of force and the state’s responsibility to



189

maintain security, law and order, it is a critical institution indeed. In addition, practical

considerations have ensured that the police now undertake a key role in the

administration of justice, another key sector of national life. By doing the bulk of

criminal investigations and prosecutions, the police occupy a significant part of the

justice sector. If we add to this the fact that many cases of a civil nature are reported to

and dealt with by the police all over the country, the police must be considered a key state

institution indeed. In this regard, any effort at reforming the police must be carefully

designed and tactically deployed with a fair deal of sophistication.

Flowing from the above, a 1974 report on corruption listed the police as top of the list.

As previously noted, surveys in 2001 and 2003, on public perceptions of the police

confirmed that this has hardly changed. The reason for this is not far to fetch. The police

is the state institution that is given power to administer two of the most vital roles in the

modern state: the administration of force and of justice. A reform of the police must deal

centrally with mechanisms for managing these powers that are vested in the police and

the attendant issues of state and subject; power and corruption; security versus human

rights. Taking account of and managing these dialectics will involve more than the

application of performance improvement models to the Ghana Police Service.

Reformers must also acknowledge the public character of the police and its functions and

the implications for police reform. Nowhere has the police been fully privatized. Even in

countries where several aspects of policing have been privatized, significant public



190

aspects are retained. This underlines the public character of the institution. It is,

therefore, important to be very careful in the design of a reform package for the police

not to see the institution as an entity capable of imbibing the standard reform package for

rejuvenating a private entity or a public entity that is capable of complete privatization.

National security, public order, human rights concerns, state-citizen relations, and other

related governance issues remain matters of a public nature. As the work of the police

impinge mainly on these issues, a reform package for the police must take into account

the discourse and contestations surrounding them. Thus, the standard reform agendas

must be significantly modified to make them work for the police.

Finally, the various reform efforts are obviously aims at reinventing the various

institutions. To do this, a very careful investigation of how the institutions were invented

in the first place is more than crucial. This is true for the police. The police in particular

has a complex pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial history, which accounts for its

current status and condition. To ignore all this is to do so at the peril of the reform effort.

A reform agenda that is too forward looking risks an under-consideration of the historical

evolution and conditioning of the police. That history is an indispensable part of any

reform effort. This is because it is historical factors and conditions which created the fault

lines in the police that are now sought to be addressed.



191

The ideas just discussed constitute the thrust of the civil society views on police reform in

Ghana today. Various expanded versions of the comments formed the core ideas of police

reform initiatives by various civil society organizations in Ghana in the last three years.413

Increasingly, civil society groups are also engaging in policy reform issues in the GPS.

The ASDR, the LRC and CDD are examples of such groups. The ASDR in particular has

in the last two (2) years sponsored several policy dialogues and fora on the reform of the

GPS. Whilst these efforts are very commendable, several fault lines still exist.

The police in Ghana remains very very under studied. The origins, history, and actual

functions of the police remain shrouded in mystery. Part of the argument in this

dissertation is this: a proper exploration of the origins, history and actual functions of the

police in Ghana will lead to the conclusion that it is not the police that need to be

reformed. The police are products of a particular political economy that they serve. To

reform the police, we need to either reform the political economy, or reform their role in

that political economy. We shall return to this matter in the last chapter.

CONCLUSION

The Ghana Police Service is still primarily controlled by the political class. It is still used

to protect the propertied class and the political class. It is still the frontline brutal enforcer

413 Supra notes 407 and 409.



192

of various inimical rules of law that are detestable to the ordinary citizenry and it is to

that extent loathed.

The following quotation about the military in Ghana, written in June 2002, holds true for

the police. The only difference is that the term used for the police is Koti Koti instead of

Abongo, and is by no means a more flattering terminology:

Occasional reports of military assault on civilians, particularly when soldiers

have been deployed to enforce the law and effect civilian arrests, have also

created the perception of the soldier as a brute and a robot. The behaviour of

soldiers and the perception of them reflect the age-old image of soldiers as a

‘bunch of disgruntled good-for-nothing school dropouts.’ This unflattering

image dates back to the colonial formative years of the military when enlisted

men were mostly illiterates and dropouts. In Ghana the local parlance for

soldiers is Abongo, an epithet that is understood to mean empty-headed robot.

Nigeria’s Fela Ransom Kuti’s popular song, zombie, equally taunts “men in

uniform.” Reinforcing the negative image is the folkloric version of

recruitment into the forces, as narrated by one commanding officer:

“One troublemaker who disappeared from the village because

the chief wanted him disciplined for misconduct resurfaced a

year later wearing the military uniform. His new status as a

soldier made him untouchable and his earlier misconduct

became unmentionable history when he was around. This gave

currency to the Akan saying: Ode ahometee akodi soja,

literally: “he has joined the military out of desperation.” The

general feeling was that the military provided safe haven to

social misfits.”414

These symptoms of the dysfunction of the police service abound and are today on the

national agenda. Consequently, there is a rush to reform the Ghana Police Service, rather

414 Supra note 301, p. 14-15.



193

like the rush to reform the Ghana Police Force beginning in 1948, which ended up hi-

teching and militarizing an already brutal force. There are many calls for extending the

tentacles of the National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) and National

Governance Programme’s (NGP) to the police.

All stakeholders are agreed that the police need to be reformed. There is, however, not

even broad agreement on how that reform should be done. This is not a bad thing. In my

estimation, such an agreement at this time will be disastrous indeed. This is because the

police in Ghana remain very very under studied. The origins, history, and actual functions

of the police remain shrouded in mystery. Part of the argument in this dissertation is this:

a proper exploration of the origins, history and actual functions of the police in Ghana

will lead to the conclusion that it is not the police that need to be reformed. The police are

products of a particular political economy that they serve. To reform the police, we need

to either reform the political economy, or reform their role in that political economy. I

have, in the previous chapters, sought to fill this knowledge gap. Yet broad institutional

analyses of the kind I have engaged in so far has its weaknesses. It gives little clue to how

those institutions function in practice. Institutions do not function in a vacuum, and so we

need to turn to a specific micro-example that illustrates the continuity of the institutional

form of the police force. It is these specific, sometimes mundane occurrences and non

occurrences, reflecting distinctive, peculiar national conditions and traditions, threat

environments, and even historical accidents and how they are managed, which produce

institutional continuities.



194

The cultural, historical and political context in which an institution develops, makes the

institution. In this, the formal, legal, administrative, bureaucratic framework of the police

force, and the political economy within which it operates is important. Also important are

the informal relations, processes and interactions within and without the force. It is the

combination of these two functions, which provides the real definition of an institution.

In the next chapter, I will describe how the police in Ghana acquired several aspects of its

current institutional form by looking at how the force was used to implement various

economic, fiscal and cultural aspects of the political economy of the country over time.



195

CHAPTER FOUR

AKPETESHIE415

INTRODUCTION

In the last two chapters, I concentrated on the role of the police in the macro aspects of

institutional design in Ghana through time. In this chapter, I will discuss the role of the

police in more micro aspects of institutional design-aspects of the regulation of fiscal and

cultural affairs in Ghana. I will concentrate on the evolution of the regulation of alcohol.

As in the previous chapters, I trace the regulation of alcohol from the colonial era through

neo-colonialism to the current period of post-modern colonialism. If we add to this, the

regulation of political organization, economic enterprise and social control (law and

order) in the previous chapters, we get a near complete picture of the face of imperialism.

I have endeavored in this chapter to show the relationship and intersections between the

more micro issues of fiscal and cultural regulation and the broader imperialist agenda of

political, economic and social domination. The special role of the police in managing the

interface of the micro and macro is emphasized. Again, by showing the critical role of the

police in fiscal and cultural control, I indirectly relate the historical institutional

415 This is the most popular name of the gin that was brewed and sold illicitly during the colonial

era.



196

development of some aspects of the police force as a complement to the more macro

narration in the last two chapters. Finally, this chapter discusses the origin of various

forms of subaltern resistance and counter-hegemonic activities against the police, and

other forms of national and international domination, which have survived to date.

As in the case of the “bome kotoku” case in chapter three, the “akpeteshie” case at the

end of this chapter is meant to establish that many issues that arise and are contested

within and without the courts of law today are not isolated events. They are a logical last

step in a process of imperialism that began with colonialism, through neo-colonialism

and into the current period of post-modern colonialism. The resolution of these issues, in

this case the regulation of public order and fiscal and cultural aspects of life, determines

whether and to what extent the agenda of post-modern colonialism will be sustained. The

currency of the contestations that surrounded the development, crystallization, and

perpetuation of institutional forms, emphasize the currency of the history of imperialism.

Institutional reform in Ghana today will benefit from historical institutional analysis à la

“bome kotoku” and “akpeteshie”. In order to clearly draw out the theme of historical

continuity and properly situate the role of the police force in fiscal and cultural control, I

am compelled to thoroughly discuss alcohol use in Ghana over the last several centuries.



197

THE ‘AKPETESHIE’ SAGA

The story of akpeteshie is not only about how “the advance of European economic and

political power into African societies…disrupt[ed] controlled-and fundamentally benign-

indigenous patterns of alcohol use.”416 Alcohol control was one of the arena’s where

tension, conflict, resistance and contumacy, ensued between colonizer and colonized. As

we shall soon discover, this led to the paradoxes of continuities and discontinuities,

stability and change, in this area. In other areas, (as is the case with the police)

imperialism of the sword and the pen, combined, rode rough-shod over pre-existing

institutional forms, virtually obliterating them to points of non-recovery, but that is

another matter.

ALCOHOL IN PRE-COLONIAL TIMES

Alcohol has for centuries played a prominent role in the social and religious life of

African societies south of the Sahara. As early as the eleventh century A.D., Al-Bakari

described offerings of alcoholic drinks in royal funeral rites in the kingdom of Ghana417.

Before the latter part of the nineteenth century, distillation was largely unknown and

imported distilled drinks were confined to a few areas. Virtually every community

416 CHARLES H. AMBLER, Alcohol and Disorder in Precolonial Africa, Working Papers in

African Studies No. 126 (African Studies Center, Boston University, 1987) p. 2. 417 “Ghana” here refers to an ancient African Kingdom from which the current country called

Ghana got its name. It covered a greater area than its successor in name. See ADU BOAHEN,

Topics in West African History, (Longman: England, 1986).



198

produced one or more types of fermented drinks from grain, fruits, honey, palm sap or

sugar cane. Consumption of these beers commonly accompanied celebrations of season

and passage, legal deliberations, and meetings of elders. Gifts of beer were made to

prospective in-laws, to patrons and rulers, and to honored guests; and the pouring of

libations mediated relations with gods and ancestors.418

Pre-colonial drinking modalities were characterized by social, physical and

environmental constraints on alcohol consumption. Alcohol was not an everyday

consumption item in most people’s lives. As noted earlier, indigenous alcoholic drinks

were fermented, not distilled and could not be conserved for more than a few days.

Sorghum, maize and millet beer and palm wines dominated, and they were usually of low

ethanol content, generally between two and four percent. Also, alcohol production and

consumption tended to be highly seasonal, especially with respect to the grain-based

beers419.

Among the Akan of the Gold Coast, alcohol and drinking occupied an essential place in

traditional religion and culture and was used for both symbolic (ceremonial) and

substantive purposes. The ancient origins of the use of intoxicating liquor by the Akan

during funerals customs and other rites de passage (birth, coming of age, marriage,

death) are shrouded in obscurity. Rum probably came into vogue among the Akan during

418 Supra, note 416, p. 1. 419 Deborah Fahy Bryceson, “Changing Modalities of Alcohol Usage” in DEBORAH FAHY

BRYCESON, (ed) Alcohol in Africa Mixing Business, Pleasure and Politics (Heinemann:

Portsmouth, NH, 2002) p. 24.



199

the seventeenth century, and its use in ceremonies was reported by foreign travelers

during the eighteenth century. Akan priests relate that prior to the coming of European

spirits, the wine of the raffia palm served the same ceremonial purposes420. The pouring

of libation421, the formal uses of alcohol as symbolic gestures in sealing legal or business

contracts, particularly those involving the transfer of land, in swearing oaths in legal

disputes, and in acknowledging a betrothal ascribed further importance to these fluids.

Alcohol in pre-colonial times was a metaphor for power, and by extension,

disempowerment, and perhaps still is. In pre-colonial times it represented a hot fluid

(aggressive, flamboyant, domineering and male).422 It was so central to political power

that it was accommodated in Asante architecture. The palace of the Asantehene423 had a

palm wine house and a place for the distribution of drinks.424 Alcohol use was not

undifferentiated. In the organization of its production and patterns of consumption, it

displayed social stratification. Alcohol was strongly associated with male elders, who

held the highest status in Africa’s rural communities and received preferential access to

alcohol.425 Male elders in pre-colonial southern Ghana viewed alcohol as possessing

potent spiritual power as it was necessary for communicating with the ancestors and the

420 Raymond E. Dumett, “The Social Impact of the European Liquor Trade on the Akan of Ghana

(Gold Coast and Asante), 1875-1910”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 5, no. 1 (Summer,

1974), 69-101, p. 81-82. 421 This is a form of prayer that involves an invocation of the spirits of the ancestors, gods and God

by pouring alcohol or a mixture of flour and water on the ground or on symbols-wood, earth

moulds, metal etc- of ancestors, gods or God. 422 EMMANUEL K. AKYEAMPONG, Drink, Power, and Cultural Change: A Social History of

Alcohol in Ghana (Heinemann: Portsmouth, NH; James Currey: Oxford, 1996) p. xvi, 4. 423 The King of the Ashanti. 424 Supra, note 422, p. 43. 425 Supra, note 419, p. 24.



200

gods through libation.426 It was male elders who were generally in charge, and those

elders who were wealthier and possessed greater labor resources could have alcohol in

greater amounts and more often. Healers and chiefs could demand alcohol as payment

and tribute. Nineteenth-century traveler accounts describe time and again the offerings of

pots of beer or palm wine that visitors received from their local hosts427.

For chiefs and male elders, the ritual use of palm wine in communication with the gods

and ancestors reinforced their secular power. They incorporated the ritual use of palm

wine and other drinks into all important social contracts428 and occasions429 and

fastidiously excluded women and young men from using alcohol. This was facilitated by

the monopoly of the male elders over access to land on which palm trees, the source of

palm wine, grow. Control over land thus subordinated women and young men to the

power of male elders. In Akan traditional society it was normally not considered proper

for women to drink, except perhaps on certain ceremonial occasions and then not to the

same extent as men. Drinking by young men, even those in their twenties, was frowned

upon by elders in both Akan and Ga-Adangbe society, and there was no drinking by

children.430

426 Supra, note 422, p. 5. 427 Supra, note 416, p. 11. 428 GORDON R. WOODMAN, Customary Land Law in the Ghanaian Courts (Ghana Universities

Press: Accra, 1996). 429 G. K. NUKUNYA, Tradition and Change in Ghana: An Introduction to Sociology (Ghana

Universities Press: Accra, 1992). 430 Supra, note 420, p. 79-80.



201

Among the non-Akan people of the savannah areas north of the forest zone, the most

popular drink was pito, a beer made from the mash of millet or guinea corn. 431 It is

closely identified with food, and in many cases these drinks were thick, filling, and

nutritious. The ingestion of food (such as the solids in pito) has been shown to slow the

absorption of alcohol into the bloodstream, ensuring that it is only slightly inebriating.432

Travelers who visited West Africa in the nineteenth century, and who commented

repeatedly on what they saw as drunken excess in coastal areas, often made little mention

of the use of alcohol in the interior.433 The gradual advance of Islam in West Africa and

the dramatic success of revitalization movements in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries led to a decline in the use of alcohol among converts. In northern Ghana, which

was heavily islamized, perhaps more than any other outward aspect of behavior,

abstinence symbolized adherence to Islam.434

The country was therefore divided broadly into those who drank mostly beers from grain

and those who drank palm-wine, with a group of ethnic groups in the mid-stream who

drank both. This was the function of mainly ecological factors; grains are common in the

northern parts, whilst palm trees are almost exclusively in the southern parts, where root

431 Ibid, p. 85. 432 Supra, note 416, p. 5. 433 Ibid, p. 7. 434 Ibid, p. 9.



202

tubers are the staple food. In the mid-stream areas, both gains and palm trees are common

and account for the equal prevalence of pito and palm wine.435

Generally, and in both Akan and non-Akan areas, an indigenous ethic of temperance was

forged by male elders to strengthen their monopoly over alcohol use and to codify their

own temperate use of alcohol. For alcohol to contribute to the power of male elders, its

sacred links had to be preserved through moderation in its use.436 But this was not to be

for long.

The relevance of the special drinking modality as a composite construct faded during the

colonial period, as an array of drinking modalities began to surface.437 It is true from the

available evidence that the major portions of European liquor imported into the Gold

Coast in this period were absorbed into the traditional religio-cultural system.438 And it

may well be that a prior affinity for alcohol based on consumption of palm wine and pito

paved the way for the acceptance of stronger distilled beverages imported from Europe.

Yet, these traditional beverages had a low alcoholic content of about three to five percent,

compared with a mean range of about twenty and fifty-five percent (usually after dilution

by merchants) for European commercial spirits.439 The thesis cannot therefore be

435 I stayed among the Gonja, an ethnic group that straddles the border between Northern Ghana

and Brong Ahafo and Ashanti Regions for the eight years, 1982 to 1990. This observation is based

on my sojourn in this area. 436 Supra, note 422 p. 15. 437 Supra, note 419 p. 25. 438 Supra, note 420 p. 84. 439 Ibid p. 93.



203

absolutely correct and points to a more complex set of factors that unfolded during the

colonial era.

ALCOHOL IN COLONIAL TIMES

When colonial administrations were being established in coastal West Africa, inland

Africa was still almost untouched by the European influence.440 The Northern territories

of the Gold Coast were thus relatively unaffected by colonialism until the beginning of

the twentieth century and even then, more as a formal protectorate than as a conquered

territory. With very little resources, aside human beings as slaves and as recruits to fight

European wars and to police various human and natural resources of the colonial

administration in the coastal areas, little attention was paid to this area. The interaction of

the pre-existing institutional forms in this area with the Islamic raids of the immediately

preceding centuries, the fact that beer brewing was a preserve of women, (the tapping of

palm wine in the south was the preserve of men), and the later penetration of akpeteshie

into this area, are interesting un-researched themes indeed, but that is another matter that

must await another dissertation. Suffice it to say that the market for alcohol varied, being

less significant in the Moslem areas to the north but more highly developed in the coastal

and the immediate hinterland.441 Difficulty of transportation also accounted for low

incidence of alcohol in the northern parts of the Gold Coast. And these areas, distant from

440LYNN PAN, Alcohol in Colonial Africa, (Helsinki: Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies;

New Brunswick, N.J.: [Distributed By] Rutgets University Center of Alcohol Studies, 1975) p. 39. 441 Ibid, p. 7.



204

the bustling trade of the coast, and having no ready natural resources like minerals,

cocoa, palm oil and timber to exploited, had far less purchasing power to indulge in the

consumption of European liquor. Thus, the availability of imported alcohol in the coastal

towns, where most of it was drunk, did not seem to have affected drinking in the

hinterland, which continued to be predominantly of native brews.442

To maintain an alcohol dry zone in the north, the Northern Territories Spirituous Liquors

Ordinance of 1909 made it illegal for any African to be in possession of any spirituous

liquor or wine. Any non-African wishing to import liquors or wines into the Northern

Territories for sale to Africans had to have obtained a permit from the Chief

Commissioner of the Northern Territories. It appears that the success of the alcohol dry

zone experiment is due less to socio-cultural constraints, legal regulation and executive

enforcement than to the fact that spirits were beyond the economic reach of the

inhabitants in this relatively poor region and that a high proportion of the population were

Moslem.443 Indeed, one authority on the matter has noted that the importation and sale of

liquor in the Northern Territories was prohibited by colonial ordinance as far back as

1902, yet some European-bottled liquor continued to find its way into the market towns

of the North.444

442 Ibid. 49. 443 Ibid, p. 71-72. 444 Supra note 420, p. 78, footnote 21.



205

Even for the immediate hinterland from the coast, fairly large quantities of European

alcohol had to await the coming of the railway and improvement of roads after the turn of

the century.445 The isolation of many communities by sheer geographic distance from the

major sources of liquor supply to the coast, and the fact that the weight and high cost of

head porterage hindered the bulk distribution of liquor and beer, ensured that European

liquor trade was just beginning to penetrate into the north of the Gold Coast Colony and

Protectorate only in the 1890s.446 The story of alcohol in colonial Ghana is therefore

almost exclusively the story of alcohol in the coastal areas and in Ashanti.

Alcohol was part and parcel of the commerce, which for centuries constituted the basic

tie between Europe and Africa. It was an article in the barter trade, which involved the

exchange of European goods for African slaves. The European colonization of the

Americas and the West Indies and the development of the plantation method of

cultivation created a voracious demand for labor that was being fed by the trade in human

beings. As the transatlantic market grew, Great Britain, France, Holland, Portugal, and

even small nations such as Denmark and Sweden clustered in slave ships along the

African coast vying for a share in the lucrative trade in men. The coast between the Gold

Coast and the Niger Delta in fact came to be known as the Slave Coast, “with its rum-

carrying coast-boats…”447

445 Ibid, p. 81. 446 Ibid, p. 80. 447 Supra, note 440 p. 7.



206

The importance of liquor as currency was such that distilleries were established in the

eighteenth century in Liverpool, England, specially for supplying ships bound for Africa.

An African chief is said to have remarked early in the nineteenth century: ‘We want three

things, powder, ball and brandy, and we have three things to sell, men, women and

children…’448 As Dike observed, it was profitable to the slave traders “to spread a taste of

liquor on the coast, not only because it provided a means of giving little for the men but

also because it was a convenient form of currency; a bottle of rum was much easier to

transport than a bag of salt”.449 The motto then was “trade spirits in and slaves out”.450

The slave trade plummeted in the nineteenth century, but contrary to legend, alcohol

played a more prominent part in the period of “legitimate commerce” than in the earlier

slave trade era. Merchants trading in Africa contended that Africans would not produce

any raw materials for export except in exchange for imported spirits.451 Alcohol also

formed part of the payment for territorial concessions extracted from African chiefs by

the envoys of European governments. By the end of the nineteenth century, cases of gin-

that could conveniently be broken down into individual bottle units- had become a

common currency in many areas of West Africa.452

Dike was led to the conclusion that:

448 Ibid p. 8 449 KENNETH ONWUKA DIKE, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885 (Clarendon

Press: Oxford, 1956), p. 106. 450 Supra, note 440 p. 104, quoting W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore, the British Under-Secretary of State for

Colonies speaking in the Permanent Mandates Commission. 451 Ibid, p. 8-9. 452 Supra, note 416 p. 14-15.



207

Little of permanent value came to West Africa from the 400 years of trade

with Europe. In return for the superior labour force, the palm oil, ivory,

timber, gold and other commodities, which fed and buttressed the rising

industrialization, they received the worst type of trade in gin and meretricious

articles.453

The gradual expansion in the use of imported spirits was spurred by the introduction of

industrially produced alcoholic drinks, which accelerated rapidly during the century and

especially after the Second World War. The argument that the rapid expansion of spirit

consumption in the late nineteenth-century Gold Coast brought little disruption because

these drinks were incorporated into the “traditional religio-cultural system” has already

been noted. It is also argued that the flood of spirits did not cause the human devastation

that temperance advocates claimed. Rum had been an established trade good on the West

African coast for centuries, and had long before entered the ritual life of coastal societies,

allowing for smooth integration of imported drinks into local practices of the people.454

Yet there is no escaping the fact that rum or gin was different from palm wine or pito,

and these differences continually reasserted themselves as the spirit trade pushed into the

interior during the nineteenth century. While beers and palm wine were produced locally

from local plants, the process through which spirits were made rendered them essentially

more toxic. Not only were spirits stronger than fermented drinks; they were also much

less perishable. Beers and palm wine would last no more than a few days, while gin and

rum could last for years. As a consequence, it was not necessarily the presentation and

453 Supra, note p. 114. See also, supra note 440 p. 8-9. 454 Supra, note 420 passim.



208

consumption of spirits that was the emblem of high status but their possession. That

graves were covered with various bottles of rum and gin was not an indication of the

cause of death-as temperance advocates sometimes imagined-but a sign of the wealth of

the deceased.455

The importance of liquor revenues to the colonial administration in Ghana ascribed a

parallel importance to alcohol in the political economy of British colonialism.456 Revenue

from alcohol duties was one of the crucial props on which colonial empires in Africa

were built and maintained. Once colonial administrations were founded, it was alcohol

revenue, which largely paid for their upkeep. There were several reasons for this. The

pre-1914 policy of metropolitan countries was that colonies should pay for themselves

and grants were minimal from the metropolis. Secondly, imposition of direct taxation as a

source of revenue was unpopular and government efforts to tax directly were generally

and repeatedly unsuccessful. The 1852 poll tax, for example, witnessed increasing

antagonism, reached open conflict, and was eventually repealed in 1862. Thirdly,

European economic investment was conditional upon the freedom to repatriate profits so

that most of what money there was went abroad. Customs duties were therefore of prime

importance for the financial solvency of colonial governments, and those levied on

alcohol were clearly crucial.457

455 Supra, note 416 p. 14-15. 456 Supra, note 422 p. xv. 457 Supra, note 440, p. 16.



209

The colonial government continued throughout the period, to balance the concerns of

liquor revenue against social control. But prohibition was an option successive Governors

denied.458 Increasing imports of liquor quickly made liquor duties one of the important

constituents of the colonial government’s finances. And the colonial government’s

minute regulation of alcohol imports, the licensing of liquor outlets, and rigid hours of

sale ensured that liquor consumption would not threaten the colonial order. By the

immediate pre-World War I period, liquor duties were contributing as much as 40 percent

of total government revenues in the Gold Coast.459 Typically, the Gold Coast derived

about $5 million a year during the mid 1920s from duties on imported alcohol. At this

time, when the temperance movement was on the rise and liquor regulation was being

tightened, a third of the revenue still came from liquor revenue.460

The reason why colonial administrations were reluctant to entertain a policy of

prohibition is patently clear. They knew they could not afford it. As one observer noted,

without liquor revenue, “their whole administrative machinery would become

temporarily paralyzed, seeing that from 45 per cent to 75 per cent of the revenue of their

Colonies is derived from this traffic’461.

The expansion of trade and economic exploitation of the Gold Coast brought about a

considerable increase in wealth, and consequent purchasing power of the Gold Coasters,

458 Supra, note 422 p. 16-7. 459 Ibid, p. 80-82 460 Supra, note 440 p. 16. 461 Ibid p. 17-18, Quoting E. D. Morel in his book Affairs of West Africa published in 1902 (cited

in Sir Harry Johnson, Alcohol in Africa. The Nineteenth Century and After, September 1911).



210

so that any deterrent effect which the imposition of higher duties might have had was

almost completely nullified462. The coincidence of higher taxes for alcohol and the ability

to pay of Gold Coasters, and in an area where “the indigenous population had become

accustomed, through decades of use, to drinking distilled spirits” and where “the drinking

of European alcoholic beverages secured” a “firm foothold”463 meant greater revenue for

the colonial government and less willingness to do without alcohol imports. This was the

challenge of the temperance movement.

THE TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT AND ALCOHOL IN THE

COLONIAL ERA

During this period, the temperance movement was on in Britain, attempting to curb

massive alcoholism of the British working class. The British liquor firms found an outlet

for their spirits in the colonies. Indeed, a number of breweries were established specially

for production for African consumption. In 1889 a number of European powers met in

Brussels and drew up an international treaty under which they agreed to observe certain

moral principles with regard to their African territories, including the principle of limiting

the importation of liquor into Africa. This was the first of several international

instruments created to deal with the liquor trade.464 In the forty or so years beginning

from 1889, various meetings of European powers to agree on mutual methods of

462Ibid, p. 39. 463 Ibid, p. 39. 464 Ibid, note 440 p. 1.



211

imperialism in Africa and to sort out squabbles and power contests in that terrain had

alcohol control on the agenda.

The infamous “drink traffic” in Africa became- a burning political and social issue which

captured the attention of large sections of the English public and which few political

leaders could ignore with impunity. This was due to the propagandist efforts of the

British temperance societies. At the head of the campaign for abolition of the liquor trade

to Africa stood the Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee, formed in the late

1880s as an offshoot of the greater British temperance movement, and the Aborigines

Protection Society465.

The moralists believed that the sheer volume of liquor unloaded by merchants on the

coast of West Africa each year was prodigious, and this, combined with the

susceptibilities of most Africans, led to heavy drinking, intoxication, addiction,

immorality and crimes of violence. The anti-liquor moralists also believed that “regular

drinking of rum and gin had reduced large numbers of men to a state of incapacity and

sloth which halted useful commerce and hindered economic development…”466.

Although a total of about nine million gallons of liquor had been imported into the Gold

Coast during the twelve-year period preceding 1895, what the temperance societies and

other critics failed to note was the relationship of the West African liquor trade to the

465 Supra, note 420 p. 70-71. 466 Ibid, p. 71-72.



212

total import trade. “Liquor trade expansion was not an isolated phenomenon but part of a

larger economic upsurge associated, first, with great advances in rubber and palm product

exports in the period 1886-1891, and, second, with the railway-gold mining boom and

burgeoning cocoa exports of the period 1895-1910”.467 But increase it did, even if with an

increase in other imports.

Temperance activities in other countries were a boast to British temperance movements

and allowed for the various attempts at signing and enforcing international anti-liquor

treaties for Africa by the European nations. In France, temperance movements were

“urging that trade spirits be prohibited in French possessions; that other varieties of

alcohol be heavily taxed; that the practice of paying African workers with alcohol in lieu

of wages be forbidden; that heavy penalties should be imposed on violation on

prohibition, and that coins should replace alcohol as a form of currency…”468

In the US, “the leading national temperance organizations gave their support to the anti-

liquor cause in Africa, and exerted pressure on the American government to prevent US

companies from participating in the liquor trade…US exportation of alcohol to Africa

was automatically stopped by the eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”469

467 Ibid, p. 76. 468 Supra, note 440 p. 26. 469 Ibid, p. 26.



213

In Germany, the North German Mission Society of Bremen waged an intensive campaign

to pressurize the home government to levy a high duty on alcohol imports to Africa as a

measure of control.470

The liquor traffic was also arming Islam, the rival to Christianity in the continent, with

the argument that it was the liquor of the so-called Christian nations, which was causing

havoc among Africans. There was therefore an added reason for the missionaries to fight

the liquor trade and thereby clear the way for the advance of Christianity.471

Indeed, European missionaries were achieving a measure of success in converting

Africans to Christianity. In their letters and reports home, they selectively stressed certain

features of African life and helped to change the stereotype of the African from that of

the savage, to that of the sinful creature requiring salvation. “And one of the sins from

which they sought to deliver him was the sin of drunkenness.”472 The allies of the

missionaries was the Committee for the Prevention of the Demoralisation of the Native

Races by the Liquor Traffic.473 The interest of missionaries, foreign and local, other

temperance movements, the Islamic north, and some colonial administrators, who

thought that it was bad economic policy to reduce the value of native labor with drink,

coincided. For example, evidence of the destructive effect of liquor on the local

populations was gathered from Mohammedan Emirs. It has been suggested that “[w] hat

470 Ibid. 471 Ibid, p. 25. 472 Ibid, p. 9. 473 Ibid, p. 10.



214

probably proved to be the most persuasive argument of all those advanced by the anti-

liquor group was one based on the premise that the liquor trade was an uneconomic

proposition in the long run. As the governor of Sierra Leone put it, ‘if you take away

from the natives the liquor, other wants would be created, and they would purchase other

articles which would be more remunerative to the British merchant’…Furthermore,

according to the Senior Assistant Treasurer of the Gold Coast, much of the gin and rum

trade was in the hands of France, Germany and the US; the fact that foreign capital,

foreign shipping and foreign operators were involved was as good a reason as any for

attacking the trade.”474 Indeed, clashes over the liquor trade were but an expression of

wider national rivalries involving economic and political influence in Africa.475 Whether

the reasoning was economic, geo-political, religious, or that Africans were “children to

be taught and redeemed” or were “a labour force to be exploited”, there was a

coincidence of wants of the various actors: stop the influx of alcohol.476

STRANGULATION AND PROHIBITION OF THE ALCOHOL

TRADE DURING COLONIALISM AND THE AFTERMATH

In 1919, the allied powers signed the St. Germain Convention for the regulation of liquor

traffic to Africa. The Spirituous Liquors Ordinance, 1920 (subsequently renamed Liquor

Traffic Ordinance) was passed in the Gold Coast to give effect to the convention.477 This

474 Ibid, p. 12. 475 Ibid p. 18. 476 Ibid, p. 11. 477 Ibid p. 67-68.



215

piece of legislation which required the licensing of liquor outlets and related matters

remained unchanged until 1929, with the exception of clauses inserted into the amending

Ordinance of 1927 providing for the publication of licenses and for the lodging of

objections to applications. In 1929, amendments were made which were of a more drastic

nature; the fees payable for retail license to sell spirits were drastically increased, whilst

the hours of sale were constricted from fifteen hours a day to eight hours a day, 10AM to

6PM. Retail sale of spirits on credit was also made illegal. The number of spirit licenses

plummeted in the Gold Coast (including Ashanti and the Southern Section of British

Togoland) by about 52 percent within six months of this amendment. This combined with

the low price fetched by cocoa in the two preceding years, leading to a fall in the overall

importation of spirits in 1929.478

Further agitation for the prohibition of the sale of spirits in Gold Coast led the

government of that colony to set-up, in 1930, a Commission of Enquiry into the

consumption of spirits in the territory to determine if and how the consumption of spirits

could be controlled and “in the event of action being advised which would be likely to

result in an appreciable loss of revenue, what means should be adopted to make good

such loss”479.

478 LYNN PAN, Alcohol in Colonial Africa, (Helsinki: Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies;

New Brunswick, N.J.: [Distributed By] Rutgers University Center of Alcohol Studies, 1975) p.

70-71. 479 Ibid, p. 73.



216

“As a result of the Commission’s recommendations, the import duties on spirits were

increased and the scheme of an annual reduction in the permitted gallonage of gin was

introduced, with the expectation that in ten years from 1930 the importation of gin in the

Gold Coast would have ceased completely”.480 High taxation of alcohol will have the

quadruple benefit of: ensuring revenue for the colonial administration that was

experiencing budget cuts after World War I; encouraging temperance to salve the

temperance movement in England and the local church-based movements; ensuring

quality working class labor; and maintaining public order by decreasing the chances that

alcohol will be used to fuel resistance and protest against the colonial government.

Then the Gin and Geneva (Restriction of Importation) Ordinance of 1930 was passed,

intended to gradually prohibit gin and Geneva over a period of ten years. Next, the

Liquor Traffic Amendment Ordinance481 prohibited the importation of cheap brandy,

rum, and whisky (the prices of which were below a certain figure) to preempt their

replacing gin. Further liquor laws were enacted in 1930 to restrict the importation of

some alcoholic beverages. The import duty on portable spirits was raised by almost

twenty-two percent in June 1930482 and the Liquor Licences (Spirits) Amendment

Ordinance, 1930483 was passed imposing further restrictions on licensing, hours of sale

and transportation of spirits.484

480 Ibid p. 74. 481 Ordinance No. 17 of 1930. 482 Supra note 422 p. 93-4. 483 Ordinance No. 18 of 1930. 484 Supra note 440 p. 74.



217

The number of spirit licenses fell. The following table shows the decrease in the said

licenses over the period under review.485

Year Ordinary Licenses Occasional Licences

1927-28 6,540 21

1928-29 3,844 42

1929-30 2,078 48

1930-31 1,462 57

1931-32 865 131

April to December, 1932 303 101

January, 1933 243 11

SOURCE: Gold Coast Colony Legislative Council Debates, First Session, 1933, (Government Printer,

Government Printing Office (Publications Branch), Accra), p. 25.

Commenting on these figures, a member of the Legislative Council had this to say:

One of the replies dealt with the number of spirit licences taken out in this

country not only this year but for a few years previously, and it was stated

that in January, 1928 something over 3,000 were in existence. It seems clear

to me, Sir, that this alarming decrease is due largely to the increased cost of

licences. The effect of recent legislation which has made the cost of imported

485 Gold Coast Colony Legislative Council Debates, First Session, 1933, (Government Printer,




218

spirits prohibitive to the people of this country in these very hard times,

coupled with the high licence fees…486

The temperance movement seemed to have finally caught-up with the colonial

government. The latter quickly discovered, however, that Gold Coasters had not given up

gin, but that a local source of illicit gin had emerged to compete with the old shops that

sold imported gin.487 A shift in the control of alcohol, from pre-colonial spiritual and elite

control, through colonial administrative control, to popular control was eminent.

ENTER “AKPETESHIE”

In response to restrictive liquor laws and economic depression, commoners resorted to

illicit gin. Speaking in the Legislative Council, Mr. R. Harris, the representative of

merchants noted as follows:

Your Excellency: I beg to move that Government do take into consideration

the advisability of relaxing the restrictions imposed on the importation and

sale of spirits and generally of re-examining its avowed liquor policy.

My reason for tabling the motion now before Council is to draw attention to a

state of affairs prevailing in this country which can only be described as

deplorable. I have the feeling that, rightly or wrongly, some sections of the

community are shutting their eyes to facts and it is therefore true to say, in

my view, that the liquor problem in this country is drifting along aimlessly

and is creating a situation which, if it has not already got out of hand, will do

so completely within a short time, unless it is re-examined very closely and,

486 Ibid, p. 34. 487 Supra note 422 p. 98. And supra note 440 p. 74.



219

if thought advisable, by everyone concerned, especially by Government,

some amendments to the present regulations are made. The answers to certain

questions put in this House yesterday merely confirm the conclusions that I

have drawn from personal observation in traveling round the Colony,

particularly in the Central and the Eastern Provinces. I realize that my action

in drawing attention to this matter will be viewed with some mistrust and

possibly a certain degree of annoyance by some sections of the community

and I also realize that I am probably rushing in where angels fear to tread. At

the same time, Sir, I think the replies to the questions I put here yesterday do

definitely indicate that some further re-examination of the liquor problem is

necessary. One of the replies dealt with the number of spirit licences taken

out in this country not only this year but for a few years previously, and it

was stated that in January, 1928 something over 3,000 were in existence. It

seems clear to me, Sir, that this alarming decrease is due largely to the

increased cost of licences. The effect of recent legislation which has made the

cost of imported spirits prohibitive to the people of this country in these very

hard times, coupled with the high licence fees, has led to the growth of a very

undesirable local industry: I refer to illicit distillation of spirits. The effect of

this, Your Excellency, in my view, is that it must have a very harmful effect

on the people of this country both morally and physically. It is undoubtedly

turning a large number of people into criminals and while the number of

prosecutions mentioned also yesterday in this Council does not reveal

anything particularly alarming, there has been a striking increase during the

last two years.488

Akpeteshie, distilled from palm wine, corn and cassava, began to make their entry into the

market on a fairly widespread scale.489 The government banned its production. To the

Gold Coast government, patronage of illicit akpeteshie not only compromised respect for

law; it represented a loss of revenue as it undercut liquor imports and the taking out of

retail licenses.490 Again, the palm, which yielded the oil, so sought after by European

merchants at the end of the slaving era also yielded the wine for the ‘palmwine drinkard’

488 Supra note 485 p. 34. 489 Supra note 440 p. 74. 490 Supra note 422 p. 99.



220

and the akpeteshie consumer. Felling and tapping the palms was detrimental to the palm

oil trade.491 It is certain that this consideration was relevant in the banning of akpeteshie

that was partly produced from palm wine.

This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that there does not seem to be any evidence that

alcohol abuse was a serious health hazard in the colony. Information reaching the

Colonial Secretary’s office revealed that:

Death from alcoholism were one in 1940, two in 1943 and nil in 1946. It is

not known whether or not these were caused by illicit gin.492

The people of the gold coast knew this and when the colonial government sought the

opinion of the colonized on this matter, the responses were very strategic, playing into

what the British wanted to hear. To the question whether or not “Ordinance No. 16 of

1931 [which] provides for the gradual decrease in the importations of gin until they cease

altogether at the end of 1940” should be repealed, the Ga Mantse 493 and President of the

Ga State Council responded thus on behalf of his subjects:

The State Council recommends that Ordinance No. 16 of 1931 should be

repealed as it unduly places restrictions on trade and affects revenue.494

491 Supra note 440 p. 20. 492 CSO 11/13/34. File No. 6055, 1947, titled “Alcohol Drinks-Casualties Arising From”. 493 The chief of the Ga ethnic group who inhabit Accra, the Capital city and its environs. 494 CSO 21/18/18.



221

On the same question, the Manya Krobo State Council was even more strategic:

We urgently advise the abolition of this Ordinance No. 16 of 1931, which

provides for the gradual decrease in the importation of gin until its final

abolition at the end of 1940. We use it for medicinal purposes as well as

drinking, and funeral performances, and we think the importation of gin will

increase the revenue, and will revive the cocoa and Palm oil trade.495

Only the members of the Legislative Council were forthright:

The majority of the natives there are fishermen. Those living along the

littoral area are between two waters, namely, the sea and the lagoon. They

usually do their fishing mostly in the night and when they come home feeling

cold they need liquor to make them warm. Any attempt to prevent them from

getting liquor must surely lead to smuggling, as they do not know what to do

to keep themselves warm. Last year, that is from the month of August to

September, there was felt a severe cold in the district, and this led to the

people involving themselves in the distillation of illicit liquor. I remember

when his Excellency the Acting Governor visited Keta in October last year,

the people urged upon me to discuss the question of liquor restriction with

him. What they had wanted me to say was that if the Government will not

legalise the local distillation of liquor, then rum should be imported and sold

at a cheap price…

I wish however to add that from what I have seen of the local stuff, just a

little improvement is required to make if perfect.

I venture to predict that more money will be kept in the country if the

Government will authorize and regulate the local distillation of spirits.496

495 CSO 21/18/18. 496 Supra note 485 p. 40.



222

And another added:

Now as to the farmer- that valuable asset of the community, on whom

everything depends, he is the worker; that gentleman wants his drink when he

goes out into the field in the early morning, and if he is not permitted to buy

it, he has to get it otherwise so that we are not preventing him from

drinking.497

AKPETESHIE EXPLOSION

The evidence is that there were isolated cases of akpeteshie distillation before this period.

The first written reference to it being in 1887, when government officials reported

attempts by Ghanaians to produce the drink.498 It appears that mass distillation at the turn

of the century became possible only after Ghanaians were able to procure airtight metal

tubing for makeshift home stills from the engines of European motorcars in the 1920s.

Hence, the manufacture and consumption of akpeteshie did not precede the European

liquor trade but was an interesting economic and social byproduct of it.499

The akpeteshie explosion took virtually everyone by surprise. A member of the

Legislative Council was to note:

I happened to be a member of the Commission which brought about a good

many of the restrictions which are in question to-day…But the present

difficulty or the innovation in the form of illicit distillation did not present

497 Ibid, p. 43. 498 Supra note 420 p. 93, footnote 66. 499 Ibid, p. 93-94.



223

itself to us. I do not remember our discussing that at all. I personally did not

credit my people with such ingenious methods. I never at any time thought

that they could be so clever as to distil their own alcohol.500

The same sentiments were expressed in the 11th March 1933 edition of the Gold Coast

Independent. In a piece titled “The Drink Problem”, the following extract appears:

...our plans and schemes, purposely formulated to solve or control the drink

problem of this country, have panned out. The resultant situation created is as

much a problem now as ever. It is a safe bet that not one of those who formed

the membership of the Committee set up by Government to investigate and

advise on the limitation and regulation of the traffic in what is known as

‘trade spirits,’ ever thought for a moment that a more serous problem would

be set up as a direct result of their findings and recommendations…

But as has been hinted the remedy has introduced situations infinitely worse

than the disease. These are the extensive setting up of illicit stills for the

distillation of spirits from palm-wine and other suitable raw products in

which the country so abundantly abounds. With the gradual diminution of the

importation of Holland gin, the people changed on to whisky and the other

properly rectified gins of British manufacture; but with the increase in duty

and licence on premises the price to the consumer rose in sympathy,

eventually getting out of pocket-range of the average consumer. The desire

yet remained and to satisfy the craving the people have now taken to the

production of cheap spirits more harmful perhaps than the trade goods…

The largest volumes of commercial distilled spirits were sold in towns of the coastal belt

where the population was densest and, the heaviest drinking in the Colony and the

Protectorate took place among the fishing and laboring classes.501 It soon became the




224

symbol of the protest movement.502 “Akpeteshie’s illicitness unified its patrons-male and

female-against the colonial forces of law and order…and the growing class consciousness

of akpeteshie patrons reinforced African political radicalism in the prelude to the

independence struggle”.503 Protest against liquor policy and illicit distillation represented

prominent aspects of popular politics. Not surprisingly, popular culture-and in particular

drinking bars-became crucial to mass mobilization in the nationalist politics of the 1940s

and 1950s.”504 For the colonial government, “akpeteshie distillation not only threatened

the government’s finances, it raised the specter of crime and disorder, compromised

colonial concerns about urban spacing, and exposed the weakness of colonial rule…As a

cheap drink, akpeteshie came to encapsulate the working-class experience, and as such it

could not be ignored by the powerful…”505

The explosion was also fuelled by prohibition. In the words of one of the Justices of the

Supreme Court during the hearing of the akpeteshie case discussed post:

Akpeteshie…acquired such notoriety that it was invariably referred to by

various appellations such as bomkotoku, kill me quick, ogogro, mete

megyaho, maka maka, kwankyensorodo, VC 10, fametu, etc. The word came

into use because of the obnoxious law which empowered the police to appre-

hend distillers of the drink as well as sellers of the liquor…During that period

it was an illicit gin; distillers distilled it secretly in forests and remote

villages. The Liquor Ordinance dated 31 December 1920, chapter 219 of the

Laws of the Coast, banned the drink. Section 5 of that law provided that it

502 Supra note 422, p. 94. 503 Ibid, p. 96. 504 Ibid, p. xv. 505 Ibid, p. 97.



225

shall not be lawful for any person to manufacture a distilled alcoholic

beverage of any kind…506

A member of the Legislative Council of the time had the following rather long reflection

on the matter:

Another aspect of the situation, Your Excellency, that occurs to me, and it is

the result of conversations I have had with quite a number of people, is that I

have been led to believe that some of the unrest prevailing in this Colony

during the last two years has been due to the difficulty the people of the

country, who have been from time immemorial accustomed to strong drinks,

have in getting them. I am quite prepared to accept that view. I think it

probably has had some effect on the temper of the people. Furthermore, in

my view, it may rightly be regarded as unfair interference with the liberty of

the subject. In some of the regulations, there are provisions which make the

carrying on of any business with regard to spirits irksome, and one of them, is

the restriction of the sale on credit. I asked a question yesterday about this

point and I understand that the records do not readily give the answer. I do

not think, Your Excellency, that it is necessary to go any further into this

matter because I think I can supply the answer. There have been practically

no prosecutions under that section of the law. I well recall that when those

regulations came up for discussion here, one Honourable Member said he had

already been informed of four ways of evading that particular point and that

was before the law was passed. If I may, without being unduly prolix,

mention a personal incident bearing on the interference with personal liberty,

I would like to say that for two years I did not touch any spirits and got to the

stage where I did not mind very much whether I ever touched them again.

Towards the end of last year, I decided to take a trip down the coast and my

selection fell on a ship flying the American Flag. When I booked my passage

I was told the ship was dry and that I would not be allowed to take any spirit

on board. As a free born British subject, I took exception to this and took the

precaution of taking on board a case of suitable personal luggage carefully

wrapped up in a cacao bag in case the crew got hold of it, and thus dealt with

the situation properly. The point I wish to make is that because I was told

506 MENSIMA and others v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL and others [1996-97] SCGLR 676, at 706-

7, per Ampiah JSC.



226

definitely I was not allowed to have spirits, I wanted them, and I think that

attitude is typical of the people of this country.507

Liquor legislation, apart from being linked to issues of revenue, taxation without

representation, and taxation without internal development, was also implicitly linked to

notions of power in the African mind, which associated control over the use of alcohol

with sacred and secular power. Liquor policy thus became one of the most politicized

arenas in the 1920s and 1930s up-till the immediate post-independence era.508

AKPETESHIE, THE LAW, THE POLICE AND SUB-ALTERN COUNTER HEGEMONIC PRACTICES

A member of the legislative council had this to say about akpeteshie, the law, and

resistance:

What are the results of the operation of the Ordinance which we find to-day?

It is the actual and deliberate breaking of the law in every direction…Under

the circumstances, I feel that Government will go thoroughly into the matter

and see that we arrive at a decision where all concerned will assist in seeing

that something is done to bring about peace, unity and contentment in the

country. I beg therefore to support the mover of the Resolution by relaxing

restrictions imposed by the Liquor Traffic Ordinance…509

507 Supra note 485, p. 35-6. 508 Supra note 422, p. 68, 82, 117-130 509 Supra note 485, p. 39-40.



227

The colonial government adopted the strategy of vigorous prosecution of akpeteshie

patrons. During the early colonial period, court records indicate that women were active

as retailers of liquor. On February 14, 1898, Abba Muria, Adjua Mannu, Adjuah Moshi,

and Abba Yewuh were found guilty for selling liquor from their living quarters and were

deprived of their licenses in the Kumasi District Court. Animah was on July 23, 1909,

fined £5 for selling liquor without a license in the town of Nsawam.510 In 1932, in

Kumase, S. A. Onyinah and others were charged before the court for being in possession

of illicit distilled liquor. In what the government believed to be a display of defiance,

persons convicted of trafficking in illicit liquor preferred to go to jail rather than pay the

fines. “The perception of akpeteshie as an “African drink”, a product of African

ingenuity, turned it into a symbol of political discontent in the 1930s and 1940s. Official

persecution was seen as a typical colonial response to African enterprise. The police

department report for 1934-35 highlighted the African complicity to shield akpeteshie

patrons:

…it is very rarely indeed that any assistance or information is volunteered to

the police in this matter by Africans who could, by reason of their social

status or their education, be expected to disapprove of the trade in cheap

potent illicit spirits (emphasis added).511

510 Supra note 422, p. 64. 511 Ibid, p. 113-4.



228

The 1930s witnessed a phenomenal increase in police duties compared to the 1920s, and

the Gold Coast police force was stretched in their endeavor to stamp out illicit

distillation. The following table is illustrative of this512.

Year Cases Cases sent No. of Cases No.

Reported to court in which of persons

convictions convicted

were recorded

1930 122 113 96 102

1931 130 103 81 97

1932 346 289 237 301

SOURCE: Gold Coast Colony Legislative Council Debates, First Session, 1933, (Government Printer,


In January 1934, a highly successful raid was made by police forces between the villages

of Kpong and Amedica, “where 50 Bush Stills, 40 gallons of distilled spirits and 500

gallons of palm wine were sized and destroyed”.513 “In 1930-31, only six cases of illicit

liquor traffic had been reported with eleven persons convicted. These offenses jumped a

hundred times to 558 reported cases with 603 persons convicted between April 1, 1933

and March 31, 1943. The colonial government was astounded.”514 The police Department

report for 1934-35 noted that, “The spirits are usually distilled in the country districts at a

512 Supra note 485, p. 26. 513 Gold Coast, Report on the Police Department, 1933-34, p. 5. 514 Supra note 422, p. 98.



229

distance of 20 miles or more from the town where they are marketed, and are transported

to the town in four-gallon petrol tins by motor transport”.515 For “every case reported to

the police scores go undetected”.516The Eastern Province Commissioner in despair stated:

It is quite obvious, however, that definite action must be taken by the

government, who cannot remain passive under the reproach which is

conveyed in the native name of the liquor “the whiteman’s shame”…517

And “Hodson confessed to the colonial secretary that he had been ‘advised that no efforts

by the police can successfully deal with the problem’. Persons convicted for trafficking in

illicit gin preferred to go to prison instead of pay the fine…The resources of the colonial

police were not adequate to deal effectively with the widespread trafficking in

akpeteshie.”518

Trained in crowd control and the use of force to ensure compliance with law, the police

were certainly not equipped to do the type of investigation that will uncover the

underground world of akpeteshie.

The Tuesday, March 7, 1933 edition of “The times of West Africa” titled “Illicit

Alcohol” had this to say:

515 Gold Coast, Report on the Police Department, 1933-34, p. 7. 516 Supra note 485 p. 35. 517 PRO, CO 96/715/21702. Eastern Province Commissioner’s Report, December 28, 1933, quoted

in Akyeampong, Supra note 422, p. 108. 518 Akyeampong, Ibid, p. 110-111.



230

We have been watching with some alarm and concern the illicit distilling of

alcohol pass from a mere affair of the few and gradually assume the

proportions of something on a more expansive scale supported by a very

large crowd who have readily take to this form of providing a certain market

with liquor that received its sources in the past from smuggling. That the

traffic has now become a menace goes without much doubt. From every

corner of the colony come the echo of police prosecution, and convictions

involving many persons of various shades of intelligence and standing in the

country. It is now certain that prosecutions will not put a stop to this very

disagreeable traffic. They have failed to effect the moral change anticipated

by the authorities, and apparently the trade is so lucrative and the risk of

detection so small that persons rather go on playing at a precarious traffic

irrespective of the authorities. It has now supplanted the great evil of

smuggling and the money that was put into this sort of affair is now being

applied in the distillation of gin and other spirits.

And the 11th March, 1933 edition of “The Gold Coast Independent” also had the

following comment under the title “The Drink Problem”:

The Authorities have been putting forth a good deal of energy and drastic

steps have been taken to discourage the manufacture; but it is evident from

the extent of success that has attended their efforts so far that means other

than fines and imprisonment are necessary to checkmate them.

When the Brits banned the importation and use by unauthorized persons of

tubing and metal piping for the distillation process, Ghanaians developed

further survival skills:

But in order to show to what length some people have gone in order to get

hold of tubes, I may recall that when I was in Takoradi some few weeks ago I

wished to pay a visit to a mail ship in a launch which refused to start. When

the engineer examined the engine he found that all the copper tubing had

been stripped. A similar thing happened in Ada quite recently; in fact it was



231

on the occasion of the visit of Sir Ransford Slater but that may have been

deliberate.519

…I referred to the ever-growing demand for pipes and copper tubing.

This demand still exists in even greater intensity.

Government very wisely imposed a restriction in piping and tubing, which

has, I think, helped to curb the manufacture of distilling plants.

On the other hand, however, this restriction has resulted in a greater

determination on the part of still makers, to procure piping. Consequently we

have found it necessary in order to prevent pilferage of tubing to keep motor

vehicles enclosed in cases until actually required, which creates delay and

inconvenience in assembling. I agree with the Honourable Mercantile

Member that many subterfuges are being resorted to by Africans to obtain

pipes and tubing, and in my tours around the Colony, I have witnessed many

examples of the ingenuity and adaptability of would-be still manufacturers.

The main demand of our storekeepers throughout the Colony is for petrol

piping and tubes, and they assured me of their ability to dispose of any

quantity we could supply. Naturally, we have discouraged the sale of pipes

except for legitimate purposes. On another occasion I met a former

blacksmith of ours and on enquiry from him how he was getting on he replied

“Oh Massa, I get good job. I get kerosene pan and pipes and make fine ting

for 35s. I get three boys for help me.” When I informed him I should report

him to the Police he replied “Massa I beg you, what I told you be lie.”

Well, Sir, whether he told a lie or not, does not remove the impression that

quite a trade is developing in the manufacture of stills for illegal purposes. I

saw a contraption reminiscent of Health Robinson, consisting of a large pan,

and sections of piping made from galvanized sheets- a very crude though

ingenious device which must have taken many days to solder the sections of

pipes together, but which was obviously useless for the purpose the maker

desired.520




232

In Cameroon, their comrades in the struggle for the survival of homemade gin were

producing similar effects:

The administration responded by preventing the importation by unauthorized

persons of tubing and metal piping for the distillation process and by

introducing a law to inflict heavier penalties, but on the whole, it seems that

there was little it could do. According to Cameron [the Permanent Mandates

Commission’s accredited representative for British Cameroons]….

The natives failed to understand the Europeans’ attitude on this subject. They

argued that they were only producing better palm wine than before. It was

useless to tell the natives they were damaging their health. They did not

believe it…He was frankly at a loss to know how the practice could be dealt

with.’521

Akpeteshie continued to reign strong, despite “the rigorous prosecution of akpeteshie

patrons and the imposition of heavy sentences522. "Akpeteshie" is a Ga word meaning

“going around the corner” or “hide-out”, because distillation and consumption were

secretive523. The name captures the colonial experience of its patrons. Another revealing

name was bome kotoku (“box me”), which described the sound of the beating the arrested

culprit received from the colonial police. A general atmosphere of “daring the state”

developed, and baiting the authorities became fun. “A contemporary witness in Sekondi

remembered that his father found it amusing outwitting policemen by stringing his

521 Supra note 440, p. 88. 522 Supra note 422, p. 109. 523 Ga is a Ghanaian language. If Ghanaians were socialized to hide from the Police, as the

meaning of akpeteshie conveys, why will they not, as the famous police plaint today goes, refuse

to volunteer information to the police.



233

purchased akpeteshie bottles around his waist, and then putting on his cover cloth.”524

All this is captured in the words of Mr. A.E.A. Ofori-Atta, then the Minister for

Presidential Affairs, when in 1961 he moved the motion for the second reading of the law

that was to legalize Akpeteshie in Ghana:

Mr Speaker, this Bill will, I trust, be acclaimed by all…Members as a bold

and imaginative attempt on the part of the Government to put on a sound

basis, and to provide the conditions for development into a respectable means

of earning a livelihood, an industry which has been operated in this country

for upwards of forty years in devious illegal ways. On behalf of our

resourceful leader, Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah, I would state that as soon

as possible after this Bill has become law, there will be published the

Regulations necessary to achieve this laudable end of establishing firmly a

legal activity in which none would be ashamed to participate. I beg to

move.525

The British government had eventually approved the private distillation of local gin by

Africans in 1943, and the Gold Coast and Nigeria were advised to proceed with the

necessary legislation.526 They did not, mainly because of internal church-based

temperance movements. Independence came soon after, but “certain images associated

with akpeteshie-its connections to political protest and social transformation, and its

identity as a working class drink-made the new government apprehensive about

legalizing it.”527 Again, as a government in power, they had also come to appreciate the

financial relevance of duties on imported liquor. With the world market price for cocoa

524 Supra note 422, p. 108. 525 Extracts from Parliamentary Debates, 24th July 1961, reproduced in MENSIMA and others v.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL and others, supra note 506 p. 690, per Bamford-Addo JSC. 526 Supra note 422, p. 112. 527 Ibid, p. 143.



234

declining sharply, the government desperately searched for other viable sources of

revenue. It became unwilling to surrender a lucrative alcohol industry into private

Ghanaian hands.

In frustration, one critic in parliament noted:

Since the [government] promised the electorate in the 1951 and 1954

elections that no arrests of people selling illicit gin would be made, will the

minister [of interior] instruct the police not to arrest any dealer in illicit gin in

order that the government might fulfill their promise to the people.528

AKPETESHIE AND THE INDEPENDENCE ERA

In December 1959, the Spirits (Distillation and Licensing) Bill was passed in Parliament

and received the royal assent on 22 December 1959. According to the Minister of

Presidential Affairs at the time, the purpose of the Bill was to legalize the distillation,

sale, and taxation on locally made gin. Provision was made for the said Act to be brought

into force on a specified date by order of the Governor-General. This order was never

made and the Act never came into force. The Act in section 4 thereof required the

formation of the Ghana Association of Alcohol Distillers, and it took time to form that

association. This is said to have contributed to the non-making of the order to bring it into

528 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, July 23, 1958.



235

force.529 Obviously, the newly independent government, realizing the crucial political,

economic, and social role of alcohol, especially akpeteshie, decided not legalize it until it

had put in place a mechanism to control it once it was legalized. As later events will

show, the use of Cooperative Societies such as the Association of Alcohol Distillers was

that mechanism.

Nkrumah’s postcolonial government not surprisingly followed essentially the same line

of aiding the local production of akpeteshie in order to reap the liquor revenues through

taxes. When the new government eventually legalized akpeteshie, in 1962, the Ghana

Distillers Cooperative Association was officially recognized, and the state decreed that all

akpeteshie distillers should be registered members of this cooperative. The government

sought to centralize its control over akpeteshie production, the better to impose taxes on

distillers530 and for other purposes.

The state has had a strong fiscal interest in alcohol dating back to the colonial

penetration. When domestic alcohol production gradually replaced imports, other forms

of liquor taxation had to be devised. Because the licensing and collecting of taxes from

alcohol producers in the ubiquitous informal sector is difficult, the new government

extracted taxes and revenue in two main ways. First, they devised alcohol control

legislation that ensured greater returns by increasing the reach of the tax net, and second,

529 MENSIMA and others v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL and others, supra note 506 p. 687-8, per

Bamford-Addo JSC. 530 Supra note 422, p. 144.



236

they encouraged industrial production of alcohol at the expense of the cottage industry.

Ghana’s alcohol legislation, decreeing compulsory membership in the alcohol

cooperative societies was in aid of the first mechanism. These strategies were ultimately

meant to tap enough revenue to fund the ambitious national development programs of the

immediate post-independence era.531

Under the first revenue maximizing mechanism, the new independence government in

Ghana decided to take akpeteshie out of the private illicit domain and make it legal and

public. More than that, they decided to centralize control over it and the revenues it could

turn out. Like the centralized marketing boards for the purchase and sale of cocoa, the

government set-up cooperatives to which all akpeteshie distillers and marketers had to

belong. This way, the extraction of akpeteshie rent to fuel the socialist high modernist

plans of the state will be assured. To do this, the industry had to be strictly controlled and

the co-operatives were the mechanism for control. Indeed, when the 1959 law was passed

legalizing akpeteshie, it could not come into force because the co-operatives had not been

set-up yet, and the law required these as a pre-requisite for legalization of akpeteshie. It

was only in 1961, when the cooperatives were set-up, that akpeteshie was legalized. This

represented a post-independence nationalist re-assertion of control over resources for

economic and ultimately political ends.

531 Deborah Fahy Bryceson, “Alcohol in Africa: Substance, Stimulus, and Society” in DEBORAH

FAHY BRYCESON, (ed) Alcohol in Africa Mixing Business, Pleasure and Politics (Heinemann,

Portsmouth, NH 2002) p. 8.



237

The need for developing countries to minimize the drain on foreign exchange to pay for

their imports had led many to adopt an import substitution strategy aimed at replacing

imports by home manufacture. This was the second revenue maximizing mechanism.

Industries manufacturing consumer goods catering to the demands of the wealthy were

frequently the first to appear in developing countries, and for many countries in Africa, a

brewery has been the first major plant.532 When the Minister for Presidential Affairs, Mr.

A.E.A. Ofori-Atta, urged the putting “on a sound basis, and to provide the conditions for

development into a respectable means of earning a livelihood, an industry which has been

operated in this country for upwards of forty years in devious illegal ways” he was

referring to the reigning economic development paradigm of the time, import substitution

industrialization, and envisaged that, akpeteshie will soon replace the imported spirits and

save badly needed foreign exchange for the country533.

To return to the akpeteshie cooperatives as a revenue mobilization mechanism, when

Ghana became a Republic in 1960, it was recognised that certain amendments had to be

made to the earlier 1959 akpeteshie legalization Act before it could be brought into

operation. It was the amended version, which was moved by Mr. Ofori-Atta in July 1961.

The Akpeteshie Act534 gave power for the making of regulations for purposes under the

Act, and the Akpeteshie Regulations535 were passed to regulate the manufacture and sale

of akpeteshie. It can be seen that government policy in the 1959 Act, which was never

532 Supra note 440, p. 103. 533 Extracts from Parliamentary Debates, 24th July 1961, reproduced in MENSIMA and others v.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL and others, supra note 506 p. 690, per Bamford-Addo JSC. 534 1961, (Act 77). 535 1962, (LI 170).



238

brought into effect, is the same as that contained in Act 77, Act 154, and Act 331 as well

as LI 239, successors to that Act.536 It was these last genealogical successors to the first

akpeteshie Act and its regulations that were attacked in the Supreme Court of Ghana

during the 1990s. But before we turn to that, it is important to see how alcohol and

akpeteshie fared through the two oil shocks and structural adjustment, up until the 1990s

when this suit was brought.

AKPETESHIE FROM 1970 TO THE 1990s

One’s class, gender and age identity are communicated by where, what and how one

drinks, and whether or not one gets drunk. In any event, this is the story of alcohol in this

period in Ghana. Again, the age at which one starts drinking is often highly significant,

and conveys a message to the public, and so young men in Kumasi, Ghana are attracted

to hard drinking as a way of proving their masculinity.537

The major class divide is between local home brews and distilled liquors as opposed to

manufactured bottled alcohol. Since the independence era, drinking clear, bottled lager

has been the hallmark of membership in the educated urban middle class, the price

differential between bottled beer and informal-sector brews being the boundary between

poor, rural/urban informal, rustic ways and rich, urban sophistication.

536 MENSIMA and others v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL and others, supra note 506 p. 693, per

Bamford-Addo JSC. 537 Emmanuel Akyeampong, “Drinking with Friends: Popular Culture, the Working Poor, and

Youth Drinking in Independent Ghana”, in DEBORAH FAHY BRYCESON, (ed) Alcohol in

Africa Mixing Business, Pleasure and Politics (Heinemann: Portsmouth, NH 2002) passim.



239

Drinking also affords considerable psychic value. Alcohol stimulates emotional feelings

of exhilaration and even liberation, whilst the camaraderie of men is across the

generations during impromptu drinking sessions. Kumasi’s hard-drinking young men

participate in an urban popular culture in which men of all ages are bound together by

poverty and the use of alcohol. “Alcoholically joyful, creative exchanges have been

described as “poor man’s opera” for those who do not have the financial means to

procure more expensive aesthetic experiences or exhilarating pastimes….”538

In the first two decades after national independence, the industrial production of alcohol

expanded rapidly throughout the countries. Official thinking of the time saw

industrialization as the lynchpin of rapid economic development. Alcohol manufacture,

offered reliable and quick profits despite the innumerable handicaps faced by African

industry. A ready market and the natural import barrier inherent in perishable beer in

heavy bottles made it not only profit-making, but also revenue-generating for fledging

young African governments in search of fiscal funding for their ambitious economic

development plans.539

By contrast, working-class drinkers could not afford lager beer except on rare occasions.

They were reliant on cottage industry-produced beers or akpeteshie. Cheap and powerful,

akpeteshie gave value for money in terms of getting drunk fast, “but it was as much the




240

conviviality of male drinking groups as the alcohol itself that made drinking a major

social pastime among Ghanaian urban working-class men. In and out of employment,

one’s neighborhood drinking companions could provide needed social back-up to see one

through lean times…such bars also served as centers for mobilizing strike action during

turbulent periods in Ghana’s political history”.540

In the postcolonial era, it is the association of akpeteshie with the lower classes that has

persisted. Highlife songs about poverty often included references to akpeteshie. It

consoled the poor and provided escape from economic hardship. The continuous decline

of Ghana’s economy enhanced akpeteshie’s grip on the poor. “Networks of friendship

and solidarity among the poor have sprung up around akpeteshie bars…”541

In addition, akpeteshie was incorporated into marriage and funeral ceremonies in the

postcolonial era, especially among coastal fishing communities. It then became for the

working class the drink for all occasions. Rapid political and economic decline since

independence has made adulthood, marriage and the family fragile, increasing the lure of

cheap hard liquor. Ghana has experienced more than ten different governments since

independence in 1957, half of them being ushered in through military coups with their

attendant human rights abuses and social dislocations.542 This and persistent economic

crisis has made akpeteshie the solace of the poor.

540 Ibid, p. 35. 541 Supra note 537, p. 220. 542 Ibid, p. 220-221.



241

The protracted economic and political upheavals of the 1980s and 1990s reverberated

through alcohol production and consumption patterns. Drink preference moved

“increasingly towards higher alcoholic content, the drinking population continued to

expand and embraced more women, and collapsing class formations and new rural-urban

relations gave rise to fluctuating, often unexpected patterns of alcohol drink supply…”543

These effects were experienced both in the rural and urban areas for a complex of

reasons.

Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic crisis was chiefly precipitated by two successive oil-

price spirals, one in the mid-1970s and the other in 1979. This seriously undermined the

viability of peasant agriculture. The heavy costs of transporting the relatively low, un-

capitalized agricultural output of widely scattered peasant households to centers of urban

demand and ports for export, caused the already inefficient para-statal companies that

transported and processed such crops to buckle. This again had serious ripples on the

parasitic urban economy. As agriculture floundered, the relative affluence of urban

government and para-statal employees was quickly dissolved. National governments fell

into debt.544

The economic crises led to increasing industrial under-capacitation as countries lacked

foreign exchange to import vital spare parts for factories, including beer factories. The




242

drying up of the breweries gave the informal sector space for market expansion, and with

it the retention of the heavy regulatory hand of government for tax and other purposes. As

is obvious, both the rural and urban folks were not spared. Unable to sell their produce

and in the face of global competition, “African peasants farmers had the classic need for a

drink, be it in the form of light-hearted social drinking to take one’s mind off one’s

problems or heavier drinking to get drunk with the power to temporarily erase all

care.”545 The situation was no different in the urban centers. The words of a Dar es

Salaam546, senior civil servant describing the situation in that town capture the situation

in Ghana as well:

I have so many friends. They are used to having three or four bottles each

when we meet after the office is closed. Now beer has become very

expensive. They cannot have three, four bottles every day. So they turn to

stronger drinks…[V]ery often they drink [akpeteshie]. And they get sick.

They look worse with every day taking that stuff. It is a tragedy. Government

has to increase the production of beer and set low prices, otherwise…547

And government did increase the production of beer and set low prices by parceling out

to multinational companies, the beer breweries, which increased production so that

“senior civil servant’s can once again have “three, four bottles every day”. In this they

were subject to the conditionality of structural adjustment programs enforced by the

545 Ibid, p. 41. 546 Like Ghana, Tanzania was touted by the World Bank as a “success” story of Structural

Adjustment leading to economic recovery under its tutelage. 547 Supra note 419, p. 37.



243

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.548 “As successive counties’ reform

programs gained donor approval and national markets were opened to foreign investment,

there was a surge in bottled beer sales. The African middle-class reclaimed their role as

“modern” consumers”.549

By the 1990s, the implementation of economic liberalization programs under the rubric

of structural adjustment were well advanced in Ghana. But this did not trigger the

promised economic recovery. Ghana, a model of the World Bank got mired in more debt.

Yet structural adjustment had effected profound changes. Occupational restructuring

away from peasant agriculture, (and into mining, with gold overtaking Cocoa as the

highest foreign exchange earner), and the erosion of formal sector employment through a

massive retrenchment in the public sector led to an army of unemployed.550 Structural

adjustment had stipulated the trimming of the civil service in a country where the

government is the largest employer and where unemployment and under employment

were already rife. Structural adjustment also dictated the withdrawal of government

subsidies in the health and education sectors. In desperation, the poor turned to

akpeteshie.

I conducted several interviews in the summer of 1992 at Green Partition, a

popular akpeteshie bar in Nima, Accra. The bar was empty on my first visit,

and the bartender informed me that the patrons came in around 6:00 A.M. on

their way to work and at 6:00 P.M. as they returned from work. For many

548 Ibid, p. 36. 549 Ibid, p. 42. 550 Ibid, p. 41.



244

workers, drink fortified them for jobs they disliked, and then prepared their

entry into tense domestic situations.551

The only counterweight to the alcohol dispensation in Ghana now, are the new churches,

which have turned alcohol into a site for contestation. Alcohol is representative of

worldly desires that the “born-again” must strive to avoid. The anti-alcohol stance is also

political capital against the more established churches (which still condone the use of

alcohol) in the ongoing competitive proselytization process. Rejection of alcohol, a

symbol of ancestral worship, is also symbolic of a break from the heathen world by the

“born again Christian”.552 In any case, the new churches offer an effective alternative to

alcohol. A visit to some of them reveals that the spiritual ecstasy in which the “born

again” revel, complete with their utterances and motions, create an environment that is

functionally and instrumentally very very similar to the mood in the akpeteshie bar. To

transcend the myriad of problems that stare the poor in Ghana in the face, one needs to be

intoxicated, and it matters little whether the intoxication comes from akpeteshie or from

spiritual ecstasy.

Formerly limited to spiritual rituals and public ceremonies where relatively few imbibed,

drinking has became a temporal, communally shared leisure pastime in which broader

sections of the community participate. Previously limited by seasonal supply, the market

551Supra note 537, p. 221. 552 For parallel developments in Malawi, see Rijk van Dijk, “Modernity’s Limits: Pentecostalism

and the Moral Rejection of Alcohol in Malawi”, in DEBORAH FAHY BRYCESON, (ed) Alcohol

in Africa Mixing Business, Pleasure and Politics (Heinemann, Portsmouth, NH 2002) p. 249, at

261-2.



245

now offers year-round availability. Differentiated consumption patterns have began to

coalesce around a proliferating array of drinks distinguished by their production source,

price and varying alcohol content; and “a stylized…schema of drinking modalities

indicative of the trends and differentiated drinking patterns that had emerged by the early

postcolonial period…evolved alongside processes of urbanization and economic class

formation during the colonial period and in the first decades after independence” is

evident.553 Most recently, the popular contention in some parts of Ghana is that

akpeteshie may well be the cure for HIV/AIDS.554 The lessons from historical

institutionalism are evident. But before we discuss the high theory of institutionalism, let

me tell the mundane story of the akpeteshie case.

THE AKPETESHIE CASE

As noted earlier, a long-standing battle between colonial government enforcement

officers and mostly urban women akpeteshie gin distillers and traders appeared to turn in

favor of the women with the legalization of akpeteshie. In fact, Kwame Nkrumah’s

ambitious post-independence government had its eye on the tax revenues it could extract

from the gin. But the distillers were far from eager to pay license fees and be taxed.555

553 Supra note 419, p. 29. 554Source: Ghana News Agency,

http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=48994 visited on 29th

December 2003. 555 Supra note 419, p. 27.




246

It was a challenge to this forced governmental centralization of the industry for tax and

other purposes which led to the case of MENSIMA and others v. ATTORNEY-

GENERAL and others556, decided by the Supreme Court in 1997. Unfortunately, the

Supreme Court judges did not seem to appreciate the full historical significance of the

governmental policy and the piece of legislation that they were asked to strike down as

unconstitutional. Indeed the legislation was only partially struck down and even then by a

very slime majority of 3-2. The theme of limited information and knowledge about the

history of our institutions for the purpose of reform efforts, finds expression here, as it

will in the following chapter. At the time this case was being argued, Emmanuel K.

Akyeampong had finished his Ph. D dissertation on the topic and his book, an excellent

(and the best available) exposition on the broader issues in contest in the court case, had

just been published557. Neither the full extent of the broader issues, nor these writings,

was considered in the case.

With almost complete amnesia of the complex power contests surrounding alcohol, the

lawyers on both sides and the Supreme Court reduced the institutional reform questions

raised by the plaint of the plaintiffs, to the thin and narrow one of freedom of association

and the constitutional propriety of the regulation of economic activity for tax and public

health purposes under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Globalization and its various

elements, including market liberalism and a liberal Constitutional order ensured that

aspects of the regulation of alcohol (including compulsory membership of cooperative

556 Supra note 506.. 557 Supra note 422. This book was based on his doctoral dissertation.



247

societies, the better to ensure the collection of liquor duties) were struck down under the

freedom of association clause of the Constitution. Liberalized, the industry is now pretty

opened up for the participation of multinational companies through the penetration of

international capital, which being very mobile and enjoying tax holidays and easy

repatriation of profits, will escape the tax net created by the institutions such as the

cooperative societies.

With this case, control over alcohol had indeed maintained its historical connections to

power. From its moorings to the male elders in pre-colonial times, it was grasped by the

colonial government, and now post-colonial governments of Ghana are seen guarding it

jealously. This feat is linked to alcohol’s value as “a cultural artifact, a ritual object, an

economic good,…a social marker…”558, “its connections to political protest and social

nonconformism, and its identity as a working class drink…”559 These various power

shifts were, however, at the cost of the disruption of pre-existing laws and norms on

alcohol, and the creation of new laws and institutions on same. And these endured

indeed. As late as 1997, the legal and institutional issues around the colonial regulation of

alcohol were still being contested. The parties, processes, choice of turf and the outcome

of the contest, tell us a lot about inherited dysfunctional institutions, institutional

continuities, and historical institutionalism. During the deliberations by the justices of the

558 Supra note 422, p. 14. 559 Ibid, p. 143



248

Supreme Court on this case, it was generally referred to as “the akpeteshie case”.560 To

the resolution of the akpeteshie case, it is now necessary to turn.

Local brewing and distilling activities expanded massively as people scrambled to earn

cash during economic crisis of the 1980s. Demand for less costly alcohol, due to the

relatively higher costs of bottled beer produced by import substitution industrialization

breweries, swelled the supply of akpeteshie from the informal sector. During the 1990s,

economic liberalization and privatization policies ensured that these breweries were

parceled out to multinational corporations, which had no pretensions as to the class of

consumers it was catering for. Drinking patterns became highly variable depending on

the consumer’s income standing and rural or urban ties.561 The parallel informal market

for akpeteshie expanded to take care of the working class.

On 8th October 1993, some members of the Egyaa Co-operative Distillery/Retailers'

Society, took a decision to withdraw their membership of the said society and, after

sending a petition to this effect, proceeded to form a separate company. They called it

Egyaaman Distilleries Limited. Among the objects of this company was the manufacture

of akpeteshie. While engaged in the distilling enterprise, agents of the government, with

the assistance of the police, started to harass them by impounding their products namely

akpeteshie, on the ground that the plaintiffs were not members of a registered distiller's

co-operative society and could not by virtue of regulations 3(l) and 21 of the Manufacture

560 Interview with Justice W.A. Atuguba, Supreme Court of Ghana, December 2001. 561 Supra note 531, p. 14.



249

and Sale of Spirits Regulations562, sell akpeteshie. The Registrar-General of companies

also advised the plaintiffs to amend the objects of their company to exclude the

manufacture of akpeteshie.

The plaintiffs applied to the Supreme Court, for, inter alia, a declaration that the

regulations, lineal descendants from colonial statutes, which restricted their capacity to

distil akpeteshie, were unconstitutional as offending against the provisions on freedom of

association and sound economic management for the benefit of Ghanaians in the 1992

Constitution563. They also sought an order setting aside the said regulations as being

inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the 1992 Constitution; an order of perpetual

injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants and assigns from doing

anything to prevent the plaintiffs from distilling and retailing akpeteshie; and an order of

perpetual injunction restraining the second and third defendants from in any way doing

anything to prevent them from including in the objects of their company the distillation

and retail of akpeteshie. They contended that as individuals or a group, they are entitled

as citizens to retail akpeteshie without necessarily being members of any distiller's

co-operative; nor is it right for them to be compelled to dispose products exclusively to

the co-operative society.564

562 1962, (LI 239). 563 See articles, 21(l)(e), 36(1), 36(2)(a) and (b), 36(6), 37(1) and 37(2)(a) of the 1992

Constitution. 564 Supra note 506, MENSIMA and others v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL and others p. 677-678.



250

The Supreme Court held in part for the plaintiffs, ruling that they could not be compelled

to join a co-operative society as a pre-requite for distilling akpeteshie. The court,

however, maintained that the requirement that the plaintiffs dispose of their products to

specified persons or bodies was constitutional. This they justified on the need to facilitate

tax collection and the maintenance of public health, since the consumption of akpeteshie

could have deleterious health effects.

Of the five justices, only Bamford-Addo and Ampiah JJSC realized the importance of the

history of regulation of akpeteshie and delved into it somewhat. Bamford-Addo JSC

ultimately held, however, that the provisions complained of were not unconstitutional.

Reading her judgment, it is almost certain that had she not made a drastic leap from the

short discussion of the colonial regulation of akpeteshie (which she disposes of in

seventeen words) to the post-colonial regulation of same, she would have concluded

differently. The following represent her very words:

The processing and distillation of akpeteshie was forbidden in this country by

certain laws until December 1959…565

The rest of the judgment is a discussion of post-independence regulation of akpeteshie

ending with a ruling that such regulation “far from being inconsistent with the

Constitution, are laws reasonably necessary and permitted by the Constitution itself for

565 Ibid, p. 687.



251

the protection of public health and public order, and to ensure effective collection of

taxes, all in the public interest”.566

In contrast, the other judge who took a historical institutionalist approach, Ampiah JSC,

started the meat of his judgment thus:

…it is necessary for a proper and fuller understanding of the matter to trace

the history of akpeteshie…567

Inevitably, he concluded that akpeteshie, once described as an illicit gin, can no longer be

so described, since the obnoxious laws of the colonial period, which empowered the

police to apprehend distillers of the drink as well as sellers of the liquor are no longer in

force. He also noted that the days when, as an illicit gin, distillers distilled it secretly in

forests and remote villages were over.

Now akpeteshie is manufactured and sold publicly. Apart from Schnapps, it

is now proudly and publicly served at funerals and on festive occasions. Like

any other consumable commodity, its health hazards can now be adequately

controlled; there are protective provisions under LI 239 to do that without

necessarily tying distillation to membership of a co-operative society.

"Akpeteshie” therefore cannot now be referred to as an illicit gin. The attempt

therefore to control its manufacture by the requirement that any person who

intends to distil it should be a member of a co-operative society, to say the

least, is discriminatory and a derogation from the principle underlying the

formation of co-operative societies. A co-operative society is not the only

association in the country which manufactures consumable products which

566 Ibid, p. at 698. 567 Ibid, p. 706, per Ampiah JSC.



252

pose health hazards. There are chop-bars568, meat-sellers, palm-wine sellers,

kenkey-sellers569, etc. All these have associations which need not be

members of co-operative societies. It is presumed that there is adequate

control of these associations, without the need to join co-operative societies.

Although Ampiah JSC appears in portions of his judgment to narrow the issues to the

need to protect public health, the above quotation, and the one immediately below, show

that he perceived the issues more broadly. For were the issue one of public health,

persons engaged in all other similar trades would be required to join cooperatives.

This reasoning of the minority is exposed for what it is by the following statement from

Ampiah JSC:

The district chief executive, who is empowered to issue the distiller's licence,

has the responsibility of seeing to it that all the required conditions for the

issue of a licence are satisfied. The State, independently, has organs for the

control and checking of economic activities in the country generally. The

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has machinery for the collection of taxes; the

Custom, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) collects all customs and

excise duties and sees to it that no goods are smuggled in or out of the

country; the National Standards Board controls the quality of goods

manufactured in the country and those coming into the country. Staff of the

Ministry of Health go about checking and controlling the health hazards

involved in the manufacturing and selling of food and drinks. With the

existence of all these organs, I do not see the necessity for requiring an

individual or association to join another association before it could obtain a

licence to carry out its trade, particularly when it has not been demonstrated

satisfactorily that the other association has the machinery or a better form of

machinery for checking or controlling the mischief which Act 331 and LI 239

568 Chop bars are restaurants for low-income people, which serve mostly local dishes. Authorities

are generally concerned about the health hazards that chop bars could create. 569 Kenkey is a Ghanaian dish made from grounded maize meal.



253

are presumed to avoid.”570

That the health and tax reasons are quite bogus is further underlined by Acquah JSC (as

he then was):

...the objective of a registered co-operative is the promotion of the economic

interests of its members and not, as alleged by the defendants, the promotion

of the health, security and safety of the consuming public…

The position therefore is that, the defence that the membership requirement

of a registered distillers co-operative is necessary for the safety, security and

health of the public is patently unfounded and unsupported… The defendants

have been unable to produce any material in support of their bare and

speculative claim. Nothing is said of the nature, aims and functions of a

registered distillers co-operative in neither Act 331 nor LI 239. And from the

objective of a co-operative society as set out in section 2 of NLCD 252, it is

evident that the health, safety and security of the public are not on their

priority list.

Indeed, elaborate provisions are made in Act 331 and LI 239 to ensure the

health, safety and security of the public. And in all those provisions, a

registered distillers co-operative plays no part. Act 331 mandates inspectors

and police officers in uniform to enter and inspect a distillery in respect of

which a distiller's licence has been granted. Regulations 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17

of LI 239 regulate the locality and construction of a distillery, the

specification for the vessels and plant, and the materials used in the

production of spirits. Apart from the requirement that an applicant must be a

member of a registered distiller's co-operative, this body plays no part under

the law in the issue of licence. The licence is issued by the District Assembly.

And if one talks of the health of the public, the District Assembly has its own

health team better knowledgeable than a group of distillers whose objective is

to promote their economic interest.”571

570 Supra note 506, p. 709, per Ampiah JSC. 571 Ibid, p. at 720-1, per Acquah JSC.



254

If the approach of Bamford-Addo JSC (and Kpegah JSC who agreed with her) was not

thoroughly informed by the complex historical institutional development of the regulation

of akpeteshie, the approach of Acquah and Atuguba JJSC displayed almost complete

amnesia of it. In very contemporaneous572 judgments, they preferred to hold that:

In the face of elaborate human rights provisions in our 1992 Constitution, this

compulsory requirement of a membership of a body, whose aims and

objective are simply for the promotion of their economic interests, can no

longer stand side by side with the provisions of article 21(1)(e) of the said

Constitution. The compulsory membership requirement cannot be justified in

terms of article 21(4) (c) for the reasons already stated. I am therefore of the

firm view that regulation 3(1) of LI 239 is inconsistent with the letter and

spirit of the 1992 Constitution, particularly article 21(1)(e) thereof. And so I

declare.573

Thus was lost the opportunity for the courts to delve into the historical construction of

dysfunctional institutions, expose them for what they are, and both order changes or

recommend to the Executive and Parliament, measures that will lead to the reform these

institutions and free the citizenry from the fetters that such institutions place on them. As

late as December 2003, various issues relating to the regulation of akpeteshie for tax and

other purposes were still simmering in public discourse in Ghana.574

572 This word is used here to mean “of the moment”, without regard to history. 573 Supra note 506 p. 721, per Acquah JSC, Atuguba JSC agreeing with him also at p. 721. 574Source: Ghana News Agency:


2003




255

CONCLUSION

Alcohol control was one of the arena’s where tension, conflict, resistance and contumacy,

leading to the paradoxes of continuities and discontinuities and stability and change in the

political, economic and social relations between individuals and groups of the Gold

Coast, now Ghana, ensued. In other areas, imperialism of the sword and the pen,

combined, rode roughshod over pre-existing forms, obliterating them to points of virtual

non-recovery, but that is another matter.

Before the coming of the Whiteman, locally brewed wine and beer were symbols of the

power of chiefs, elders, and men. They controlled the use of alcohol in various ways in

order to retain this power and use it for various social control purposes. With the start of

the slave trade, rum was introduced by European slave merchants as currency for the

trade.

Though slavery eventually waned, rum and spirited alcohol became an important feature

of colonial life. The native softer drinks had been replaced by the stronger ones during

the slave trade and were now used for all the ritual, spiritual, and social purposes for

which native wine and beer were used. More important, the use of these spirits was

promoted by the colonial authority and British and European commercial interests. The

former wanted revenue from alcohol to run the colony in the face of budgetary cuts and

the policy of getting the colonies to be self-reliant. The latter wanted markets for their

goods. At the same time, the colonial authorities wanted to control the inflow of alcohol



256

so as to preserve social control and preserve quality labor necessary for “legitimate

trade”-the exploitation of the natural resources of the colony-which replaced the slave

trade. It was this contradiction which was exploited by local and foreign temperance

movements.

The temperance movement succeeded in severely constricting the flow of alcohol into the

colony. This led to the growth of an underground world of “illicit” alcohol- “akpeteshie”.

The police were then set loose on this world. This in turn led to the development of a

cultural site for resistance against the police as representatives of the entire British

colonial architecture. These increasingly vibrant, subaltern, and counter-hegemonic anti-

colonialist activities became too sophisticated for the police to effectively manage.

Today, in the era of post-modern colonialism, these forms of resistance by subalterns are

still rife, although they are hardly understood by the internal and external components of

the machinery of government.

Like in the case of the regulation of public order, I have shown the enduring character of

the akpeteshie institutions575 and how they crystallized at independence and were

perpetuated in the post-independence era. This is because the institutions were a cheap

form of social organization and were valuable instruments for a post-colonial agenda that

required the same instrumental means as was used by the colonial government, albeit to

different ends.

575 Institutions are defined here as repetitive patterns of human behavior.



257

It was only in the 1990s that a group of Ghanaians thought that the balance of power

should be changed. They sought the help of the Supreme Court576 to address some of the

issues in the regulation of alcohol and public order that worked against the citizenry, but

alas, with very limited success. The courts settled the issues quite narrowly, although they

recognized the colonial roots of the phenomenon they were dealing with. In the public

order case, the court realized its limitations and asked the executive to intervene to

provide more structural solutions to the issues of institutional dysfunction they were

called upon to address. By showing that serious colonial issues around alcohol and public

order were still nagging only a few years ago, I have prepared the ground for the

concluding chapter which reflects on the enduring character of institutional forms in

Ghana today and the implications for the reform of those institutions.

576 The Supreme Court is the highest court in Ghana. It is also the only Constitutional Court,

subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court to interpret and enforce the constitutional provisions

on Fundamental Human Rights.



258

CHAPTER FIVE

THE REFORM GAME AND ITS

PLAYERS

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters I have established historical institutional continuity over a period

of about one hundred and seventy-five (175) years. In this last chapter, my main concern

is to reflect on institutional continuity as it relates to the reform of institutions in Ghana

today. By doing this, I hope to illustrate the missing links in the current process of

reforming Ghana’s institutional heritage. The missing links relate to various institutional

forms that were “the roads not taken”.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY

I have so far analyzed a lot of historical data, mapping this to the present, for the purpose

of making the simple point that knowing the historical institutional development of

particular institutions is indispensable to understanding their current nature and how they

may be reformed. I also make the more specific and more complex point that the

evolution of the police force, and other sub-institutions like the police regulation of



259

public order and alcohol, was a process of contestation and pragmatic experimentalism

that was dictated more by responses and policy shifts occasioned by various historical

events and accidents, than by the importation and transplantation of alien institutions. The

micro-dynamics of pragmatic experimentalist institutional design are important because

development and institutional reform are contested projects, and what institutions result

are often a product of the contestations and the experimentalism attendant to them.

The vertical spine of this dissertation is this: in the sequence of pre-colonial forms of

social control, there is a moment when the police force takes over for a specific set of

objectives. This is met with varying forms and intensity of resistance, coalescing in a

model of policing. The model that is there for the first generation of nationalist leaders to

takeover, is modified slightly, and used for the same instrumental purposes as the old

colonial regime, although to different ends. When we get to the point of liberalism, there

is still institutional inertia because, the objectives of the colonial masters, and those of the

post independence nationalist leaders (which coincided), are basically the same as the

objectives of the modern liberal era. This is why the era of neo-liberalism and

globalization is more appropriately referred to as “post-modern colonialism”.577

Though formal colonial rule has disappeared, its murky legacy is still alive. The post-

independence political class who thought of a clean police in pre-independence days were

not in a mood to reform the police. They used it to perpetuate their rule and for what they

577 Susan S. Silbey “Let them eat cake: Globalization, Postmodern Colonialism, and The

Possibilities of Justice”. 31 Law and Society Review 207, (1997).



260

thought was the greater cause of national progress and prosperity. The power-loving

politicians found no urgency to nudge the prevailing archaic system so long as they could

control and utilize the police for these purpose.578 This has continued to date.

Thus, this institutional inertia: half-hearted reforms; closure of the imagination to

different normative forms of institutional ordering; discouraging and preventing the

proliferation of alternatives for institutional design; all serve a purpose. It constitutes a

neo-liberal engineering for the maintenance of the status quo. Institutional continuity

serves the neo-liberal agenda. Let us take one example of institutional alternatives: a shift

from the concept of changing the police or reforming the police, to policing change or

policing reform, will include devising innovative ways of policing the liberal political

economy to particular ends that may not coincide with the ends of neo-liberalism. Since

the current mode of policing is ideal for, sustains, and in turn derives its sustenance from

the political economy of neo-liberalism (as shown in chapter three), such a move will be

neo-liberalism shooting itself in the foot. Thus, the halfhearted and sophist efforts at

police reform are themselves serious reform efforts aimed at ensuring institutional

continuity of a police force whose orientation and functions fit squarely with the new era

of post-modern colonialism.

The endurance through time of the colonial policing model is an explicit statement of

institutional continuity. The political economy of policing in Ghana today, still works to

578 For parallel developments in India, see B. P. Saha, The Police in Free India: Its Facets and

Drawbacks, (Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 1989), p. viii.



261

protect the political class; ensure physical and proprietary security, peace and stability for

the extraction of resources (labor, mineral, financial) by investors, mostly foreign; and

the enforcement of “the rule of law” for the realization of the first two objectives and for

the enforcement of a particular form of political, economic and social ordering that is

conducive for post-modern colonialism.

The exact definitions of “political class”, “investors”, and “rule of law”/“social ordering”

may have changed in form but not in substance. Again they are fluid, and quite any

institution may assume or use those labels and become an agent of post-modern

colonialism. So that, where the state, using “the rule of law”, enforced by the police,

performs the political act of forcefully organizing akpeteshie producers into cooperatives,

and extracting economic gains and rent from them (as shown in the akpeteshie case in

chapter four), the state is acting as an agent of post-modern colonialism. The same is true

when the government uses the police, as we see in the bome kotoku case in chapter three,

to prevent mass protest and demonstration against the budget of the country-often

constructed in Washington according to the tenet of neo-liberalism. Where a mining

company enters into a set of agreements with a local chieftain, according to which the

extraction of natural resources will be conducted according to a certain “rule of law” that

is unduly favorable to the mining company, which agreement is enforceable by the courts

and the police, we see a private company acting as the agent of post-modern colonialism.



262

In all this, it is the state, which has the added task of policing the broader political

economy of post-modern colonialism. And the police become central to this. From the

use of the police in the colonial era to regulate cultural enterprise and political activity in

the name of public order; the deployment of the police against the economic enterprise of

subjects, and in favor of foreign entrepreneurs, as seen in the use of the police to arrest

the distillers and retailers of akpeteshie; to the use of the police, today, against “illegal

miners” and demonstrators against a neo-liberal budget.579

It is interesting that, this type of vice regulation, leading to the construction of a corrupt

and repressive police force, and a repressive understanding of the policing function, is

then blamed on the police as individual actors who do not know, do not learn, do not

understand, and so cannot adhere to various human rights principles and practices,

whatever that means. It is not the police that are corrupt and need to be reformed. It is our

concept of the policing function that is corrupt and needs to be reformed. But are there

any other ways of envisioning the police and policing? To answer this question we need

once again to go historical. We start from the dawn of political independence.

579 There is always a kind of humanitarian and utilitarian twist to it (moral case for empire), as

when it was argued that the regulation of akpeteshie was to protect the health of the citizenry; and

when it was argued and is still argued today that the extraction of mineral resources is for the

internal development of the country and the stamping out of illegal miners is in aid of the “Rule of

Law”.



263

ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL FORMS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR NORMATIVE SUPREMACY

To realize their ultimate intentions, the new independent rulers used the institutional form

of the police that was inherited from colonialism for political subjugation of the masses,

political centralization and social control, the extraction of economic rent, and the radical

reorganization and unification of a conglomeration of ethnically diverse peoples, thrust

together by the Berlin Conference. To do this, they used the same repressive institutional

forms of the colonial era that had been virtually frozen in time and crystallized through

the delicate negotiations for independence. The new rulers were met with resistance,

overt and radical, subterraneous and incipient, as it perpetuated the colonial institutional

forms. Greater oppression to eliminate the resistance led to police states, coups,

chieftaincy and ethnic conflicts, human rights abuses and general social dislocation.

Subalterns responded with another range of survival skills: emigration; smuggling580; the

consumption of alcohol581; and extreme religiosity.582

Enter the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s. These years were extremely tricky years

for all but those at the pinnacle of the economic pyramid. Through the 1980s and 1990s

580 Which at one time became a capital crime. See Paul Nugent, “Educating Rawlings: The

Evolution of Government Strategy Towards Smuggling” in Donald S. Rothchild (ed) Ghana: the

Political Economy of Recovery (L. Rienier Publishers: Boulder, Colo., 1991). 581 Deborah Fahy Bryceson, “Changing Modalities of Alcohol Usage” in Deborah Fahy Bryceson,

(ed) Alcohol in Africa Mixing Business, Pleasure and Politics (Heinemann, Portsmouth, NH

2002). 582 Deborah Fahy Bryceson, (ed) Alcohol in Africa Mixing Business, Pleasure and Politics

(Heinemann, Portsmouth, NH 2002), passim, especially chapters 11-14.



264

one’s economic ascent or descent depended on how strategically one was positioned to

grab the opportunities thrown up by liberalization and the privatization bonanza.

Legitimate economic benefits hardly reached the poor.583

The other effect of the neo-liberal consensus of the World Bank and the IMF was the

opening up of democratic spaces within Ghana. The liberal 1992 Constitution was

outdoored, with its comprehensive bill of rights. Various governmental efforts at doing

“National Institutional Renewal” began. Various NGOs arose and proclaimed their

interest in human rights and institutional renewal. These developments allowed for the

utilization of democratic spaces to call for institutional reform.

Whilst the middle and upper classes were busy apportioning the benefits of liberalism,

generated through economic stabilization, foreign investment, grants and loans, and the

opening up of democratic spaces for the civil society industry, the poor were equally busy

polishing up their forms of resistance and survival skills. When the middle and upper

classes were ready to do serious reform, the lower classes had developed parallel and

elaborate systems of institutional ordering. They had also mastered the art of combining

the appropriate levels and mix of overt resistance and covered resistance that was

necessary for self-help and survival.584

583Jim Yong Kim, et al (eds) Dying for Growth, Global Inequity and the Health of the Poor

(Common Courage Press, 2000), passim. 584 These observations, and several of the observations in this chapter, are based on my

experiences as I work: first as a community lawyer with these “illegal” groups as they negotiate

their relationship with various state institutions including the police; and second, as I work as a



265

By the time they were being thought of under the “poverty reduction” program of the

following century, they had developed parallel institutional forms in all sectors of

national life: mutual health organizations and support groups in the health sector;

“illegal” security operatives in the security sector, and what have you.

Thus, a crucial aspect of contemporary governance of the security sector is the way

institutions have proliferated since SAPs. These institutions are products of internal

struggles in the security sector. Private security companies, legal and illegal alike, local

community initiatives, have all sought to advance their agendas in the security sector,

either by collaborating with existing institutions, or creating new ones. This has been

given a shot in the arm by the privatization bonanza.

Because there are so many potential claimants to security provisioning, and resulting

contestations, informal sector security operatives are experiencing oppression, repression,

and legislative, executive, judicial or administrative exclusion.

Yet these informal institutions, mostly falling outside the purview of state, formal,

statutory regulation, are the only ones that have survived the constricting forces of

colonialism and the modernization programs of postcolonial regimes because of their

adaptability. We cannot just dismiss then or force them in line.

consultant for various governmental and non-governmental institutions that are into security sector

reform.



266

The current neo-liberal reforms consistently discounted these developments for several

years. First, the architects of these reforms did not know the fact of their existence, (they

were mostly illegible to them), and when they did, underestimated their pervasiveness

and sophistication and their potential and value as alternative forms of institutional

ordering. In this they were aided by some human rights activists who unwittingly label

those developments as illegal and, therefore, unacceptable.

In the last few years, reformers are beginning to think otherwise.585 The forces that have

consistently attempted to eliminate, destabilize, cajole, coerce, subsume, these alternative

forms of institutional ordering are now seeking them out and wanting to understand them

and work with them. Reformers cannot but work with them.

Flowing from the above, subalterns are now strategically aligning themselves with public

and private sector institutions. With the assistance of these institutions, they are

appropriating various avenues available to them within the state, the law and institutions

to further their cause. This process of strategic integration with centers of state power is a

585 At the Workshop on Security Sector Governance in Africa, Organized by the African Security

Dialogue and Research (ASDR), in Collaboration with the Global Facilitation Network for

Security Sector Reform (GFN/SSR), and held at Elmina, Ghana, from November 24-26, 2003,

participants were finally agreed that security sector reform could not proceed without appreciating

and trying to understanding the various “illegal security operatives”. I attended and presented a

paper at this conference. Again, most of my work as a community lawyer is to work with the

police to understand these security operatives. Similarly, the National Health Insurance law started

off by making pre-existing mutual health insurance systems illegal and then had to slowly

incorporate them as the negotiations on the bill progressed. Various mutual health insurance

schemes sought the help of health reform and legal reform institutions to advocate for their

continued legality and for other advantages under the law.



267

most important factor. This tactical and nuance process of at once developing “illegal”

institutional alternatives, and appropriating the “legal” spaces within the state and the law

to advance same is the kernel that has to be broken if institutional reform is to be done

intelligently. In its relations with the forces of post-modern colonialism, the state has to

learn from how subalterns mediate their relations with the state.

It is the encounter between the formal sector and these counter hegemonic forces, these

crucibles of alternative forms of institutional ordering, that is falsely termed the crises in

security governance in Ghana today. The Neo-liberal reforms are finally meting their

match. The future promises to be a hot contest. Having established the thesis of historical

institutional continuity in Ghana and the various avenues for alternative normative

institutional formations, it is essential to consider their implications for institutional

reform today.

VISIONS AND DREAMS OF THE FUTURE

In this era of post-modern colonialism, it is difficult to think and act and experiment

without a hegemonic vision. The growing relationship between formal and informal

sector institutions should not fall into this trap. The key is to ensure the proliferation of

alternatives, not a unifying vision and plan of action that will erase all differences and

individual characteristics of societies, communities and persons. This will ensure a

varied, dynamic, and constantly growing and changing set of institutional alternatives



268

that can be drawn upon. This is a huge task in the age of globalization, which proffers

one unifying vision, as opposed to a multiplicity of visions.

It is only the “illegal operatives” that appear capable of creating new institutional forms

that are capable of meeting the globalizing forces of post modern colonialism on their

own terms. These institutions, falling outside the purview of state, formal, statutory

regulation, and involving chiefs, headmen, earth priests, other holders of traditional

authority, Opinion Leaders, grassroots level political operatives, and bands of rich and

poor and educated and uneducated young men, are critical in the security sector. They

have survived the constricting forces of colonialism and the modernization programs of

postcolonial regimes not only because of their adaptability, but also because of their

strategic alliances with emerging centers of power.

When we586 organized a series of fora on police-community relations in low-income

communities in Ghana in 2001 and 2002, we were educated. We got a sense of the range

of security institutions in these communities, servicing the peculiar needs of the

communities. We got a sense of their genesis, their operation, and the reasons for their

choice to stay “illegal”. Our sophist and ignorance scheme of getting them registered and

formalized with the state policing system never fell through and we realized the stupidity

of our idea after a series of close interactions with these groups. It is the police who need

to learn from, be integrated to, these groups, and not the other ways round. They know

586 This refers to the Legal Resources Centre, a human rights and legal services organization I

work for.



269

the terrain, the do the job that the police are nationally funded to do. We soon found

ourselves working for them.

Their success appears to lie in their capacity to mobilize and reinvent themselves in

multiple ways, even as globalizing forces mobilize new and constantly changing

technologies of power in multiple ways in order to come against them. The processes by

which these operatives align themselves with public and private institutions in order to

rewrite law and state power, and create shifts in political and economic relations at the

micro level is just one example of their capacity to open up a range of fluid opportunities

for themselves.

Flowing from the above, it is not because there are no alternatives. There are alternatives

starring us in the face. Yet the political economy of the financing of information

gathering and knowledge production that is essential for reform ensures that these

alternatives remain relegated to the background. The origins of the police showed the

process of capturing human bodies and matter, (slavery, forced labor, wealth in the form

of gold and other minerals, timber etc); the story of the reform of the police force is the

story of the capture of the mind, as avenues for the evolution of institutional possibilities

are constricted.

Because neo-liberalism resolves issues such as police reform at very high levels of

abstraction, aided by abstract, fluid, and manipulable concepts such as “human rights”,



270

“public sector reform”, “national institutional renewal”, “public order”, “rule of law” and

the like, institutional innovation is unduly circumscribed, as they are assumed away or

subsumed under the abstract categories. The interpreters of those fluid and manipulable

categories ultimately interpret them to exclude innovative institutional reform

alternatives.

At another level, human rights activists are consistently using global human rights

standards and the rule of law to close-up institutional alternatives, spaces, and ways of re-

envisioning institutions. It is sad when the force of human rights, which should be on the

side of subalterns, is used, consciously or unconsciously, against the latter. The

globalizing forces of postmodern colonialism have succeeded in seductively sucking in

human rights activists to their side through the use of the manipulable categories of

“legality”, “rule of law” and all the other usual suspects. Viewed carefully, this should

not be surprising. In the institutionalization of empire today, Human Rights, Democracy

and the associated fetishism of particular institutional forms are the moral cases for

empire-immaculate conceptions of the eighteenth century justifications for British

Empire Building.

It follows that concepts such as Human Rights should not occupy the whole terrain of

counter hegemonic impulses, unless it can serve as an open vehicle for carrying all the

impulses in its interstices. The attraction to give human rights that role in Ghana is



271

tempting indeed in the light of our overwritten Constitution, with its elaborate human

rights provisions.

Yet mere rhetorical expressions of human rights, and attendant institutional tinkering,

cannot appropriately deal with these gigantic issues of institutional dysfunction. This is

seen clearly in the results of the presentation of some aspects of the issues surrounding

the regulation of alcohol and of public order to the Supreme Court for resolution in

human rights terms.

The mere reform of some rules to, as in the case of the akpeteshie case, improve freedom

of association in economic enterprise, and as in the bome kotoku case, to improve

freedom of association, assembly, and demonstration, are not enough. The dysfunctional

power hierarchies will remain as it did with the passage of the Public Order Act soon

after the Supreme Court struck down some provisions of the Public Order Decree as

unconstitutional. The way to understand domination is not as a list of human rights

violations. It is not the forceful integration of persons to a cooperative system that

subordinates them. It is the lack of alternatives to the integrative cooperative model for

the execution of a particular economic enterprise that subordinates them. Thus, a system

of limited opportunities exists independently of the cooperative integrationist model, and

the rules affirm and endorse that system.



272

To argue for alternatives, is to argue implicitly for another system, and therefore

constitutes a blasphemous and heretical rejection of the integrationist “system”. There is

an unwarranted fear that the integrationist “system” has a certain organicism, a holistic

balance of things, a culturally and historically dense and innovatively rich, sometimes

precariously balanced system of things, that ensures that it disappears if you dare to touch

it. This is the unwritten thematic which runs through the judgments of the minority when

they failed to strike down the provisions of the akpeteshie Act under the freedom of

association clause of the Constitution. They essentially said that there are too many

interrelated practices related to the cooperative system for us to pick one strand of it,

evaluate it in terms of western human rights norms, and seek to change it to achieve

equality of opportunity.

THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM TODAY

There is a serious problem of institutional malaise in Africa today. On that we are agreed.

Institutional reform is therefore imperative.

Colonialism must be the starting point for any intelligent reform agenda. It was the single

most important institutional reordering in Africa and, as this dissertation shows, created

institutions, which have endured to date in basically the same form in which they were

created. The colonial institutions were constructed with state power, acting through the

law, and directing political ordering and market forces. This is clearly shown in the use of



273

the police, the visible arm of the power of the state, to control the citizenry and enforce

the rule of law on the one hand and in economic exploitation and fiscal control on the

other. It will be folly indeed to assume that institutions so constructed, can be

reconstructed without a strong purposeful agency that intelligently generates the

information, knowledge, and processes on the basis of which institutional reconstruction

may proceed.

In Africa today, the state is the titular agency for institutional reform. But the

bureaucratic state is unintelligent and needs information and knowledge from somewhere

to do reform of its institutions. What is being thrust on Africa now are information and

knowledge and reform toolkits à la post-modern colonialism. International institutions

and development partners, blood descendant of colonial forces and members of the post-

modern colonialism group are the real architects of reform.

Sadly, the particular character of post-modern colonialism does not allow for the

proliferation of information and knowledge from which a garden variety of institutional

reform possibilities may be created. To take one little example, the rule of law of post-

modern colonialism that governs the security sector characterizes as illegal all creative

methods of private security provisioning that are not chartered by the state. Again, the

reform movement assumes that there is a policing function, which every body knows, or

ought to know. This is not true. The constitution and the Police Act define the purpose,

functions and duties of the police in very very broad terms and in an inclusive (as



274

opposed to an exclusive manner), thus leaving a lot of room to maneuver. To assume a

basic function of the police is a smart way to constrict institutional possibilities in the

security sector and endorse the current system. But are there any alternatives?

The alternatives, in practical and experimental terms, have been few, far between, and

short-lived. And they remain undocumented, un-researched, or under-researched. In this

dissertation, I have attempted to draw attention to these “paths not taken”. Here I point to

two counter hegemonic practices and two experiments in security provisioning as the

crucibles of alternative institutional forms in this area.

First, there is the process, still shrouded in mystery, by which the military cum police

regime that overthrew Nkrumah (and its immediate successor in office, the government

of the Progress party) utilized money from the US Office of Public Safety (OPS) Program

for internal security purposes that barely met the formal requirements of the OPS

program. In reality, assistance was deployed by the ruling class to bolster up their fragile

positions and to silence dissent. I have discussed this program in chapter three. Two

legacies attest to the sophistication that attended this path not taken. Nkrumah’s political

party, the CPP, has never recovered from being dismantled by the then ruling

governments. Within the constraints of available documentation, it is safe to conclude

that the ruling government deployed the anti-communist rhetoric and objectives of the US

OPS program to direct resources to dismantling the CPP. Nkrumah, according to the CIA,



275

was a communist. The second legacy is that US money, according to State Department

rules, cannot any longer be used to assist the police in Ghana.

The second example of counter hegemonic practices are found in the series of tactics that

were used by the brewers of akpeteshie to promote the industry, avoid arrest, ridicule the

system when they were arrested, and completely bring the agents of law and order to their

knees. This is described in chapter four.

The third example, and the first path not taken, is the one that involved the devolution of

police powers to Revolutionary Defence Forces under the government of Rawlings, also

discussed in chapter three. This was also short-lived and under researched and,

significantly, ended with the marriage of the Rawlings regime to the IFIs.

Lastly, there are the various “illegal security operatives”, mentioned in this chapter,

which are mushrooming in Ghana today and finding niches within various legal spaces to

exist.

My own future research will focus on roads not taken.

Three things generally happen to these “paths not taken”. As already mentioned, they

remain quite invisible, undocumented, under-documented, un-researched or under-

researched. Second, they are stuck down as illegal (illegal security operatives) or



276

inefficient, dangerous or costly (Revolutionary Defence Forces). Third, when they are

finally legible, fairly documented, and coalescing into observable patterns of alternative

institutional ordering, they are captured and transformed by the globalizing forces of

postmodern colonialism.

How do we deal with this rabid need of post-modern colonialists to ensure particular

institutional forms and to capture and re-make institutional alternatives to be consistent

with a particular political economy? I repeat: in its relations with the forces of post-

modern colonialism, the state has to learn from the tactics subalterns use to mediate their

relationship with the state.

INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM- AN AGENDA FOR THE PRESENT

Repetitive patterns of peoples’ interactions, against the background of their history,

which then informs their forms of social ordering, is the real definition of institutions.

There is a language that is peculiar to the “the reform game” and its “players”. It is the

language of the contemporaneous. It is a language that is almost ahistorical. An

exploration of the reform industry’s varieties of reform toolkits and variegated players

shows that they pay scant attention to history. We saw some of this in chapter three. It is

understandable that the globalizing forces of post-modern colonialism will be

uncomfortable with the dark history of colonialism. But the interpretations and

reinterpretations put upon past events quite often determine current approaches and



277

courses of action. And these interpretations in turn hinge upon the questions which each

age asks.

An approach to institutional reform that is historical will ask questions related to “the

roads not taken”. These roads not taken are the crucibles of alternative institutional

ordering and the tools for beginning to confront the hegemony of post-modern

colonialism. History exposes, describes, names, these different trajectories of institutional

forms. What I have done in this dissertation is to set a theoretical framework for more

historical institutionalist and anthropological work in this area.

At every time in the periodized history we have related in the previous chapters, there is a

complex, multilayered, contingent shaping of events, which show the roads taken and the

roads not taken. We need to look back at the patterns of interaction that produced that

history in order to determine what interventions are needed by way of institutional reform

today.

CONCLUSION

An institutional reform agenda must contain a stubborn ability and capacity to: meet and

challenge the discourse of post-modern colonialism; generate an inventory of institutional

social normative forms; identify, understand and utilize all emancipatory legacies of

cultural, traditional modes of social ordering; and feed these into processes of



278

contestation over policies and laws within the prevailing array of democratic possibilities.

No single mind or institution has real, as opposed to assumed or fake, mastery over these

processes.

The roads not taken teach us at least one lesson. If we look carefully and critically at

historical institutional development, we will find that there are alternatives; and the

reasons why those roads were not taken have almost nothing to do with their intrinsic

value as alternative institutional forms. The reasons had to do with the hegemony of the

forces of post-modern colonialism.

Today, those forces still hold sway. The funding of research and policy formulation still

forwards the agenda of post-modern colonialism. Research into alternative forms of

institutional ordering, is funded only as a prelude to neo-liberal capture and control of

those alternatives.

The story of institutional reform in Africa is the story of how little we know our

institutions and, simultaneously, how often we are called upon day by day to mop up

institutional mess. The examples of the historical institutional development of the police

force, the control of alcohol and the control of public order in Ghana lay bare this

scenario in a vivid way. These policies and laws were the foundation of the formation of

the colonial state, and coincidentally, the foundations of the creation of the neo-liberal



279

state. Dressed in new garbs, the new policies and laws, nevertheless, retain the

refurbished garbs, and the strong and pungent scent of the old.

My dissertation provides crucial knowledge gaps on the police as an example of the

information deficit on the institutions that are sought to be transformed; develops a theory

for analyzing the genesis, growth and development of colonial institutional forms;

develops a theory of institutional continuity for mapping immediate post-colonial and

current institutional forms; and finally, a theory for grafting that historical institutional

analysis into reform initiatives of the present.

My type of historicization has the capacity to meet and challenge the hegemonic

discourse of post-modern colonialism, which basically says that institutions are

dysfunctional and so we need to repair them with this toolkit and make them functional

and efficient. And if this toolkit fails we try that tool kit. And if that fails, then it is the

people who run the institutions who are the problem and should be changed or killed.

It also points to the enduring but silenced forms of institutional forms that are part of the

inventory of a garden variety of institutional possibilities that need to be part of the

reform discourse. The colonial experience created a multilayered, contested, contingent,

experimentalist shaping of events that led to various trajectories of institutional

development in key sectors. We need to look back at these trajectories, these roads not

taken, if we are serious about institutional reform.



280

The key is the development of an African587 intelligentsia that will look at the roads taken

and the roads not taken, and produce the information and knowledge on the basis of

which contestations over policy alternatives and choices of reform agendas may be made.

587 African not in terms of geography or race, but in terms of a genuine commitment to the

advancement of Africa.



281

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

CONSTITUTIONS

Constitution of Ghana, 1957.





STATUTES

Arms and Ammunition Ordinance, No. 22 of 1952 (Cap 144).

Arms and Ammunition Ordinance, 1922 (CAP 253).

Avoidance of Discrimination Act, 1957 (No. 38).

Criminal code, 1892 (CAP 9).

Criminal code, 1832 (CAP 32).

Laws of the Gold Coast Colony, 1919 (CAP 31).





282


Local Forces Ordinance, 1936, No. 41 of 1936.

Ordinance No 12 of 1892.

Ordinance No. 17 of 1930.

Ordinance No. 18 of 1930.

Ordinances of the Gold Coast Colony, 1928 (CAP 35).

Police Force Ordinance, 1922, (Cap 37).

Police Magistrates Ordinance, 1916 (CAP 132).

Police Service (Administration) Regulations, 1974 (L.I. 880).

Police Service (Amendment) Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 303).

Police Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Amendment) Regulations, 1986 (L.I.

1333).

Police Service (Pensions) Law, 1985 (P.N.D.C.L.126).

Police Service (Private Security Organisations) (Amendment) Regulations, 1994

(L.I. 1579).

Police Service (Private Security Organisations) Regulations, 1992 (L.I. 1571).

Police Service Act, (Commencement) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 25).

Police Service Act, 1970 (Act 350).

Preventive Detention Act, 1958 (No. 17).

Public Meetings and Processions Regulations, 1926 (No. 10 of 1926).

Public Order Act, 1961, (Act 58).



283

Public Order Decree 1972, (NRCD 68).

Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526).

Security Service Act, 1963 (Act 202)

CASE LAW

ISSAH IDDI ABBAS AND 10 OTHERS V. ACCRA METROPOLITAN

ASSEMBLY and the ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUIT NO. MISC. 1203/2002.

MENSIMA AND OTHERS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL and others [1996-97]

SCGLR 676.

NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY V. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE [1993-94]

2 GLR 459.

RE AKOTO [1961] 2 GLR 525.

TEHN-ADDY V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION and another [1996-97] SCGLR

589.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

ADM. 1/3/14.

COLONIAL A.E. YOUNG, A report upon the Gold Coast Police (Accra:

Government printer, 1951).



284

Colonial Reports, Gold Coast 1954 (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,

1956).

Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, (Act 30).

CSO 11/13/34. File No. 6055, 1947, titled “Alcohol Drinks-Casualties Arising

From”.

CSO 21/18/18.

Despatch (Military) No. 2 of 14th October 1846.

Despatch No. 138 dated 9th November 1865 (ADM. 1/1/4).

Despatch No. 28 dated 16th June 1846, (ADM. 1/2/3).

Despatch No. 299 dated 17th January 1866 (ACC No. 3135/56).

Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Bribery and Corruption, 1974 (Anin

Report).

Ghana Police Squad Notes.

Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, July 23, 1958.

Gold Coast Colony Legislative Council Debates, First Session, 1933,

(Government Printer, Government Printing Office (Publications Branch), Accra).

Gold Coast, Report on the Police Department, 1933-34.

National Archives of Ghana and Catalogue of Special Exhibition (1971).

Police Standing Orders.

Report of the Presidential Commission into the Ghana Police Service, March 1997,

(Archer Report).

Standing Orders of the Parliament of Ghana, 1st November 2000.



285

BOOKS

AGBODEKA, FRANCIS, African Politics and British Policy in the Gold Coast

1868-1900: A Study in the Forms and Force of Protest, (Longman: Northwestern

University Press, 1971).

AKURGO, ALEX and ABONGO, CAMILLUS, May 9 at Accra Stadium: A

gripping story of a Disaster that Turned Ordinary People into Heroes (Blue Volta

Associates, 2001).

AKYEAMPONG, EMMANUEL K., Drink, Power, and Cultural Change: A

Social History of Alcohol in Ghana (Heinemann: Portsmouth, NH; James Currey:

Oxford, 1996).

AMBLER, CHARLES H., Alcohol and Disorder in Pre-colonial Africa, Working

Papers in African Studies No. 126 (African Studies Center, Boston University,

1987).

ANDERSON, DAVID M. AND KILLINGRAY, DAVID (eds) Policing the

Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester University



286

Press: Manchester; New York, 1991).

ANDERSON, DAVID M. AND KILLINGRAY, DAVID (eds) Policing and

Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester

University Press: Manchester; New York, 1992).

ANKAMA, S. K., Police History: Some Aspects in England and Ghana (Silkan

Books: Essex, UK 1983).

AUSTIN, SARAT AND SCHEINGOLD, STUART (eds) Cause Lawyering and

the State in a Global Era. (Oxford University Press, 2001).

AUSTIN, SARAT AND THOMAS, KEARNS R., (eds) The Rhetoric of Law

(The University of Michigan Press: 1994).

BAYLEY, DAVID H. Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to

Do it. (National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, June 2001).

BLACKSTONE, WILLIAM Commentaries on the Laws of England

(Chicago:University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1979).

BOAHEN, ADU Topics in West African History, (Longman: England, 1986).



287

BOURET, F. M. Ghana-The Road to Independence 1919-57, (Stanford University

Press: Oxford University Press, 1960).

BRODEUR, JEAN-PAUL, (ed) How to Recognize Good Policing: Problems and

Issues (SAGE Publications: London; New Delhi, 1998).

BRYCESON, DEBORAH FAHY (ed) Alcohol in Africa Mixing Business,

Pleasure and Politics (Heinemann: Portsmouth, NH, 2002).

CAWHRA, GALVIN AND LUCKHAM, ROBIN (eds) Governing Insecurity:

Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional

Democracies (Zed Books: London, New York, 2003).

CLAYTON, ANTHONY AND KILLINGRAY, DAVID, Khaki and Blue:

Military and Police in British Colonial Africa, (Ohio University Center for

International Studies: Athens, 1989).

DIKE, KENNETH ONWUKA Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885

(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1956).



288

DUAH, BAFFOUR AGYEMAN Civil-Military Relations in Ghana’s Fourth

Republic, (Critical Perspectives No. 9, Ghana Center for Democratic

Development, CDD-Ghana, June 2002).

ERROL, MENDES P. et al (eds) Democratic Policing and Accountability: Global

Perspectives (Ashgate: Aldershot, Brookfield, 1999).

FIELDS, CHARLES B. AND MOORE, RICHTER H., JR, Comparative Criminal

Justice: Traditional and Nontraditional Systems of Law and Control, (Waveland

Press, Inc.: Prospect Heights, Illinois, 1996).

FORTES, M. AND EVANS –PRITCHARD, E. E. African Political Systems

(Published for the International African Institute, Oxford University Press:

London; New York; Toronto, 1958).

FUKUYAMA, FRANCIS, The End of History and the Last Man, (Perennial,

1992).

GANN, L.H. AND DUIGNAN, PETER (eds), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960:

Volume 2 The History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960, (Cambridge

University Press, 1970).



289

GILLESPIE, W.H., The Gold Coast Police: 1844-1938 (The Government Printer:

Accra, Gold Coast, 1955).

LUGGARD, LORD, The Dual-Mandate in Tropical Africa, (London, 1922).

HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P., “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of

World Order” (Touchstone Books: London; New York; Sydney; Tokyo; Toronto;

Singapore; 1996).

IMRAY, COLIN Policeman in Africa, (The Book Guild Ltd: Sussex, England,

1997).

IPU-DCAF, Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles,

Mechanisms and Practices, Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 5- 2003, (IPU-

DCAF:Geneva, 2003).

JEFFRIES, SIR CHARLES, The Colonial Police, (Max Parrish: London, 1952).

JENSON, JANE AND SANTOS, BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA (eds),

Globalizing Institutions: Case Studies in Regulation and Innovation (Ashgate:

Burlington USA; Singapore; Sydney, 2000).



290

KIM, JIM YONG, et al (eds) Dying for Growth, Global Inequity and the Health of

the Poor (Common Courage Press, 2000).

MARENIN, OTWIN AND DAS, DILIP .K. (eds) Challenges of Policing

Democracies; A world Perspective, (Gordon and Breach Publishers: Amsterdam,

2000)

MAULA, JOHANNA et al (eds) Alcohol in Developing Countries: Proceedings

from a Meeting in Oslo, Norway, August 7-9, 1988. (Nordic Council for Alcohol

and Drug Research (NAD): Finland, 1990).

MAWBY, R.I. Policing across the World: Issues for the Twenty-first Century,

(UCL Press: New York, 1999).

METCALFE, GEORGE EDGAR, Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana

History, 1807-1957 (T. Nelson on behalf of University of Ghana: 1964).

NEAL, DAVID The Rule of Law in a Penal Colony: Law and Power in Early

New South Wales (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991).

NKRUMAH, KWAME, Neo-colonialism: The last stage of Imperialism

(International Publishers: New York, 1969).



291

NORTH, DOUGLASS C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic

Performance, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; New York, 1990).

NUKUNYA, G. K. Tradition and Change in Ghana: An Introduction to Sociology

(Ghana Universities Press: Accra, 1992).

OTWIN, MARENIN (ed) Policing Change, Changing Police: International

Perspectives (Garland Publishing Inc. New York, London, 1996).

PAN, LYNN Alcohol in Colonial Africa, (Helsinki: Finnish Foundation for

Alcohol Studies; New Brunswick, N.J.: [Distributed By] Rutgers University

Center of Alcohol Studies, 1975).

BOURDIEU, PIERRE Acts of Resistance (The New Press: New York, 1998).

POKOO-AIKINS, The Police in Ghana: 1939-1999 (JB Pokoo-Aikins, 2002).

RAHNEMA, MAJID (ed) The Post-Development Reader (Zed Books: London &

New Jersey, 1997).



292

RATTRAY, Ashanti Laws and Constitution, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929).

ROTHCHILD, DONALD S. (ed) Ghana: the Political Economy of Recovery (L.

Rienier Publishers: Boulder, Colo., 1991).

SAHA, B. P. The Police in Free India: Its Facets and Drawbacks, (Konark

Publishers: New Delhi, 1989).

SASKIA, SASSEN Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on The New

Mobility of People and Money. (The New Press: New York, 1998.)

SEIDMAN, ANN AND SEIDMAN, ROBERT B., State and Law in the

Development Process (Macmillan: London; St. Martin’s: New York, 1994).

SEIDMAN, ANN, SEIDMAN, ROBERT B., AND ABEYSEKERE, NALIN,

Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change (Kluwer Law International:

Hague; London; Boston, 2001).

WARD, W.B., F., A History of Ghana (London, 1958) (Second Edition).

WOODMAN, GORDON R. Customary Land Law in the Ghanaian Courts

(Ghana Universities Press: Accra, 1996).



293

ARTICLES

Allman, Jean Marie “The Youngmen and the Porcupine: Class, Nationalism and

Asante’s Struggle for Self-Determination, 1954-57. The Journal of African History,

vol. 31, no. 2 (1990), 263-279.

Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi, “Regulating Illicit Trade in Natural Resources; The

Role of Regional Actors in West Africa”. Review of African Political Economy

No.95; 99-107.

Brogden, Mike “An Act to Colonise the Internal Lands of the Island: Empire and

the Origins of the Professional Police”, International Journal of the Sociology of

Law, vol. 15, no. 2, (May 1987), 179-208.

Brogden, Mike “The Emergence of the Police-The Colonial Dimension”, British

Journal of Criminology vol. 27 no. 1, (Winter 1987), 4-14.

Deflem, Mathieu “Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative

Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya” Police

Studies 17 (1) (1994), 45-68.



294

Dumett, Raymond E. “The Social Impact of the European Liquor Trade on the

Akan of Ghana (Gold Coast and Asante), 1875-1910”, Journal of Interdisciplinary

History, vol. 5, no. 1, (Summer, 1974), 69-101.

Engel, David M and Munger, Frank “Rights, Remembrance, and the

Reconciliation of Difference”, Law and Society Review, vol. 30 no. 1 (1996), 7-

53.

Ewick, Patricia and Susan, Silbey, “Narrating Social Structure: Stories of

Resistance to Legal Authority.” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 108 no. 6,

(May 2003), 1328-1372.

Marenin, Otwin “Policing African States: Toward a Critique” Comparative

Politics, vol. 14, no. 4, (Jul., 1982), 379-396.

Marenin, Otwin “The Goal of Democracy in International Police Assistance

Programs”. Policing: An international Journal of Police Strategies &

Management, vol. 21, Issue 1 (1998), 159-177.

Marenin, Otwin “United States’ Aid to African Police Forces: The Experience

and Impact of the Public Safety Assistance Programme”, African Affairs, vol. 85,

no. 341, (October 1986), 509-544.



295

Petrow, Stefan “Policing in a Penal Colony: Governor Arthur's Police System in

Van Diemen's Land, 1826-1836” 18 Law and History Review, (Summer, 2000),

351.

Read, James S. “Studies in the Making of Colonial Laws: An Introduction”.

Journal of African Law, vol. 23, no. 1 (Spring 1979), 1-9.

Sarat, Austin ‘“…The Law is all Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal

Consciousness of the Welfare Poor’ Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities,

volume 2, no. 2, (Summer, 1990), 343-379.

Silbey, Susan S. “Let them eat cake: Globalization, Postmodern Colonialism, and

the Possibilities Of Justice”. 31 Law and Society Review, (1997), 207-234.

Stevens, Joanna “Colonial Relics I: The Requirement of a Permit to Hold a

Peaceful Assembly” Journal of African Law, vol. 41 no. 1 (1997), 118-133.

Styles, John 1987, "The Emergence of the Police-Explaining Police Reform in

Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century England," British Journal of Criminology 27:

15-22.



296

REPORTS

ASDR, Roundtable on Police and Policing. August 20-22, 2001.

ASDR, Key Issues in Contemporary Ghanaian Policing: Identifying Reform

Priorities. December 2002.

ASDR, Strengthening Regional Capacity for Conflicts Resolution in West Africa:

A Response to NEPAD. October 2002.

ASDR, South- South Dialogue on Defence Transformation. May 2003.

CDD, Ghana: Police-Community Relations in an Emerging Democracy-Survey

Report. CDD-Ghana Research Paper No. 12, August 2003.

CDD, Police-Community relations in Ghana. Report of a Workshop on

“Enhancing Police-Community Relations and Democratic Policing”, August 21-

23, 2003.



297

CLINGENDAEL INSTITUTE, Enhancing Democratic Governance of the

Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework. A report prepared for

the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003.

Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Annual Report, 1994.









INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, Crime, Public

Order and Human Rights: Draft Report for Consultation, March 2003.

DFID, Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure:

High Risks for Donors, High Returns for Development. Report on an



298

International Symposium Sponsored by the UK Department for International

Development, London, 2000.

ISACSON, ADAM AND BALL, NICOLE, U.S. Military and Police Assistance

to “Low-Income Poorly Performing States”. Report Prepared for the center for

Global Development Project on Poorly Performing States, November 2003.

OFFICE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Humanitarian Challenges in West

Africa. Report of the Conference held 19-21 May 2003, in Accra, Ghana.

Sponsored by the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, African

Security Dialogue and Research and the Institute for Security Studies.

United States, Department of State, Termination Phase-Out Study: Public Safety

Project Ghana. (Agency for International Development, Washington D.C., March

1974).

United States, Department of State, Ghana Police Assessment: Summary of

Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations and Equipment Specifications-Sept.

12- Oct. 23, 1968, Reviewed and Declassified by John Weiss, OPS, February 24,

1975.



299

PERIODICALS

CENTRE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT EDUCATION, Law Enforcement

Review. A Quarterly Magazine of the Centre for Law Enforcement Education,

Nigeria. December 1999.



Nigeria. December 2000.



Nigeria. March 2001.



Nigeria. June 2001.



300

UNPUBLISHED WORKS

AGBLOR, P.K., Establishing Linkages in the Criminal Justice System for Effective

Control: The Role of the Police. Paper presented at a symposium organized at the

Ghana Borstal Institute on 28th November 2001.

ANING, EMMANUEL KWESI, An Overview of the Ghana Police Service.

Paper Prepared for the African Security Dialogue and Research, October 2001.

ANSU-KYEREMEH, KWESI and ESSUMAN-JOHNSON A National Survey on

Public Perception of the Police in Ghana. Accra, MFWA, 2001.

ATUGUBA, RAYMOND A., Monitoring Police Performance in Ghana. Paper

Presented at “Roundtable On Police And Policing”, organized by African Security

Dialogue And Research. Accra, August 20-22, 2001.

ATUGUBA, RAYMOND A., Key Issues in Contemporary Ghanaian Policing:

Identifying Reform Priorities to Generate Consensus on Proposals for Reforming

the Police Service. Paper Presented at a Workshop on “Key Issues in

Contemporary Ghanaian Policing: Identifying reform Priorities”, organized by

African Security Dialogue and Research. Accra, August 21-22, 2002.



301

ATUGUBA, RAYMOND A., Improving Community-Police Relations. Paper

Presented at a Workshop on “Enhancing Police-Community Relations and

Democratic Policing”, organized by the Center for Democratic Governance (CDD),

21-23 August 2003.

ATUGUBA, RAYMOND A., Police Oversight In Ghana. Paper Presented at a

Workshop on “Security Sector Governance in Africa”, organized by African Security

Dialogue And Research (ASDR), in Collaboration with the Global Facilitation

Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN/SSR), Elmina, Ghana, November 24-26,

2003.

ATUGUBA, RAYMOND A., Review of Technical Proposal on The Transformation

of the Ghana Police Service. Paper Presented to the National Governance

Programme.

AYINE, DOMINIC. M, Constitutionalism, Governmental Accountability and

Economic Transformation in Ghana: A Law and Economics Perspective, 1998.

BALL, NICOLE, Democratic Governance in the Security Sector. Document

prepared for UNDP Workshop on “Learning from Experience of Afghanistan”. 5

February 2002.



302

CHRIS, ABOTCIE, Training For a more Responsive Policing in Ghana. Paper

Presented at “Roundtable on Police and Policing”, organized by the Africa

Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), Accra, August 20-22, 2001.

DADZIE, CHRIS, Reconciling Police Practice and Procedure with Fundamental

Human Rights and Freedoms as Enshrined in the Constitution. Paper Presented at

a Seminar on “Policing and Detection of Crime in a Democratic Environment”,

2001.

HILLS, ALICE, Trends in Police Oversight in Africa. Paper presented at a

Workshop on “Security Sector Governance in Africa”, organized by the ASDR,

Elmina, Ghana, November 24- 26 2003.

HUTCHFUL, EBOE, Security Sector Governance in Africa, Draft Concept Paper

for the Workshop on “Security Sector Governance in Africa” organized by the

ASDR, Elmina, Ghana, November 24- 26 2003.

HUTCHFUL, EBOE Governance of the Armed Forces in Ghana Paper Presented

at a Workshop on “Security Sector Governance in Africa”, organized by the

ASDR, Elmina, Ghana, November 24- 26 2003.



303

KORNEY, H.O, Establishing Linkages in the Criminal Justice System for

Effective Crime Control; The Role of the Ghana Prisons Service. Paper presented

at a symposium organized at the Ghana Borstal Institution on 28th November

2001.

KRANZDORF, RICHARD B., The Military and Police in the Gold Coast/Ghana

Through February 1966: A Study of Limited Institutionalization. (Ph. D

Dissertation in Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, , 1973).

LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE, Report on the May 9, 2001 Stadium Disaster

and the Aftermath for Nima, Mamobi, and New Town. Report prepared by Cheryl

Maman and Janis Sims, August 2001.

MAMDANI, MAHMOOD, Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities:

Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism, 2004.

MARENIN, OTWIN, SSR in Africa: International/Comparative Implications and

Lessons. Paper presented at the Workshop on “Security Sector Governance (SSG)

in Africa”, Organized by Africa Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) Accra,

November 24-26, 2003.



304

MOMOH, ABUBAKAR Vigilantism as a Policing Option in Nigeria. Draft Paper

Presented at Roundtable on “Police and Policing” organized by the African

Security Dialogue and Research, Accra, August 20-22, 2001.

NAUNIHAL SINGH, Making Facts: A Theory about the Role of Expectations in

Coup Dynamics and Outcomes. Paper Presented at the Psychology and Behavior

Workshop Organized by the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences,

Harvard University, May 2, 2002.

PELSER, ERIC Community Policing in South Africa: Policy and Practice. Paper

Presented at “Roundtable On Police And Policing” Organized by African Security

Dialogue and Research. Accra, August 20-22, 2001.

QUIST, JUSTICE CHARLES, Establishing Linkages in the Criminal Justice System

for Effective Control: The Role of the Judiciary, Paper presented at a symposium

organized at the Ghana Borstal Institute on 28th November 2001.

TIETAAH, GILBERT K.M. Press Coverage of Crime and Police-Related Stories

From January 1 to July 31, 2001. A Report on Content Analytic Study of Four

Newspapers in Ghana. Presented at a Seminar for Journalists on “Media and

Coverage of Crime” Held at the Police Headquarters, August 23, 2001.



305

WEBSITES

http://www.amnesty.org

http://www.cepil.org

http://www.cepil.org/prjstory.asp?id=13.












http://www.state.gov


http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27730.htm.

http://www.amnesty.org/

http://www.cepil.org/

http://www.cepil.org/prjstory.asp?id=13












http://www.state.gov/

