Institution of Multilateralism, Power Capabilities, and Domestic Politics

institution of Multilateralism, Power Capabilities,

and Domestic Politics

Jimyoo Choi

In the field of international relations, there have been renewed attempts to integrate domestic analysis into theoretical framework.’ A notable trend in this direction is the proliferation of the literature on two-level game analysis heralded by Robert Putnam’s publication in 1988.2 In his seminal work, Putnam contends that the debate on whether domestic politics really determine international relations is fruitless. The question now,

1. The attention to domestic politics resonates the recent critique of the literature on international cooperation for the neglect of domestic politics. According to Milner, the reason for the neglect of domestic politics stems from the fundamental assumptions shared by international relations theories. The one is the assumption of “the centrality of anarchy as the (emphasis hers) condition for differentiating between domestic and international politics.” Another is the assumption of states as “unitary, rational actors”(He1en Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weakness,” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3(1992), pp. 46&496), p.489). 2. Recently, several scholars attempt to apply, refine, or modify htnam’s work through studies of variety of cases. The examples include: Howard P. khman and Jennifer L. McCoy, ”The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Ne- gotiations,” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4(1992), pp. 600-644; Frederick w. Mayer, “Man- aging Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-payments,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 4(1992), pp. 793-818; Dale L. Smith and James Lee Ray, “European Integration: Gloomy Theory versus Rosy Reality,” in Smith and Rayhis.), The 1992 Project and the Future of Integration in EuropdArmonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993); Leonard J. Schoppa, ”Two-level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why gaiatsu S u d s in Japan in Some Cases But Not Others,” International Organization. Vol. 4, No. 3(1993), pp. 353-386; Richard H. Friman, “Side-payments versus Security Cards: Domestic Baragaining Tactics in International b n o m i c Negotiations,” Intematwnal Or- ganizution, Vol. 47, No. 3(1993), pp. 387410; and Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam(eds.), Doubk-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politicdkrkeley: University of California Press, 1993). For other examples of studies that emphasize the importance of domestic dimension, see John G. Ikenberry et al.(eds.), The State and American Foreign Economic Policy(1thaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

Pacific FOCUS, Vol. XI, No. I(Spring 19961, 119-133. @ 1996 by the Center for International Studies, Inha University.

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it is declared, is not whether domestic level variables matter, but “When” and “How” they do.’

However, in recent scholarly works, the interest in the significance of domestic politics for international phenomena so far has been mainly at- tracted to the “How” part of Putnam’s questions, with far less attention paid to the question of “When.” This study attempts to fill this gap, by exploring the varying degree of the effects of domestic politics under different conditions. If domestic factors do matter, this study asks, when and ro what extent?4 What are the conditions for domestic politics to become relevant in determining international outcomes? Is the significance of domestic factors as an independent variable constant?

The perspective that domestic factors are important in explaining international outcomes is based on the recognition that domestic politics pro- vides the s o m of government prefxaxs. The emphasis on domtic politics as a source of government preferences espoused by Putnam’s two- level game analysis poses two important challenges against neo-realist view of international relations. First, it challenges neo-realism’s exclusive focus on system-level variables. Its emphasis on domestically formed government preferences sharply contrasts with the realist view that state preferecnces are imposed by the logic of survival in anarchic international society. Furthermore, it also questions the power-centered view of neo-realism. Win-set analysis of two-level game model implies that the variation in preference intensity of nations couched in terms of ‘win-set size,’ not just the distribution of power capabilities, is an important factor in determining international outcomes.

In this paper, I attempt to build the hypothesis that domestic politics would matter where power differentials among nations do not matter. It is to say that, to the extent that power is unusable, domestic politics, as a source of government preferences, becomes important as a determinant of international outcomes. Where the effect of power dnerentials is constrained, domestic politics comes into play. Under certain conditions, domestic politics matters a lot, because power does not count much,

I suggest that the principle of multilateralism embodied in the decision- making process of international institutions could provide one such condition under which the impact of power is constrained as a determinant of outcomes of interaction among states. If the effect of power is constrained by the institutional setting characterized as multilateralism, the room for domestic politics to come into play would be created. This, in

~ ~~

3. Robert D. Putnam, ”Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games” Inte~lionnl Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3(1988), pp. 427-460. 4. In fact, Putnam does call for the attention to both “When” and “HOW” domestic factors matter. But in his own work, he only concerns himself with the second question, and does not really tackle the first one.

Institution of Multilateralism /121

turn, is tantamount to say that the significance of domestic politics as an explanatory variable sometimes would depend on the extent to which multilateralism is embodied in the decision making process of an institution. This paper hypothesizes that the more multilateralism, the greater the constraint on power, and hence the more room for domestic politics.'

In the remainder of this pater, I will first summarize the powercentered view of neo-realism. Then I will introduce Putnam's two-level game model and show how it challenges neo-realism. Then I wil go on to elabo- rate the notion of multilateralism and discuss the implication of the principle of multilateralism embodied in institutional settings of international relations for the relative effect of power and preference intensity on international outcomes. This paper, as a first step to combine the discussion of domestic politics approach and that of institution of multilateralism, will be limited to theoretical discussion, without attempting to support the hypothesis with empirical data.

Power-Centered View of Neo-realism

According to the neo-realist theory of international relations, states, posited as rational and unitary, are the key actors, and the ordering principle of international politics is anarchy. States posited as unitary, their internal affairs -unit-level variables -do not constitute a problem: What explains the outcome of international politics is system-level variables. Since a system of international relations is characterized as anarchic, the most important system-level force in this view is the distribution of relative power capabilities among states.' As Keohane and Nye note, "powerful states make the rules."s In Waltz's words, "force remains the final arbiter."9

Since relative power capability is the major determinant of international outcomes, states are primarily motivated to seek to improve, or at least to

5. However, this is not to say that only the institution of multilateralism can play the role of a constraint on power. There could be many other factors that can attenuate the effects of power, rendering them less relevant as an explanatory variable. Another example where the effects of power are attenuated may be the special historical relationship that exists between the US and Britain. Although it would be wrong to say that the effect of power differential is entirely absent in the relationship between the two countries, it is probably safe to say that the effect of power is far less prominent in this relationship than in others, say, the relationship between the U S and Iraq. 6. Mayer, op. cit.. p. 793. 7. Waltz notes that "The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide concept." See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Polirics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 98. 8. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed.(Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresnan and Company, 1989), p. 42. 9. Waltz, op. cit., p. 180.

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prevent the degradation of, their relative position in relation to other states. As Grieco observes, "the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities."1o The preference of a state lies in the improvement of its relative position defmed in terms of power capabilties. States, in order to either survive or thrive, behave accordingly. It is the system of international relations that determines the preferences of major actors-states -and it is power, or, the desire and attempts to accumulate more power relative to others that determine the outcomes of interaction among states. In the realist world, therefore, the cooperation among states is super-

ficial and temporary, because every state wants to gain more than others, and no state wants others to gain more than it does. Thus Waltz force- fully argues:

When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are com- pelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gain for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities.''

Even if cooperation brings about an absolute increase in welfare, the concern about relative gain would outweigh the desire to make absolute gain, rendering cooperation very difficult. In this situation, "international institutions effect the prospects for cooperation only margin ally."^*

While the powercentered, conflictual view of the realist theory is claim- ed to be capable of providing a parsimonious and eloquent explanations for a variety of phenomena ranging from security conflicts to economic affairs, it has been criticized for the lack of attention to institutions, and for its overly pessimistic view about international cooperation.

The neo-liberal institutionalism, with its emphasis on the role of institutions such as international regimes and international organizations and with its far more optimistic view about the international cooperation, is ofleen suggested as an alternative perspective to realism. Resonating with the recent surge of institutionalist analysis, this view regards international institutions as capable of promoting cooperation among states by lower-

10. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," I~ernufional Orgm'zatwn. Vol. 42, No. 3(1988), p. 498. 11. Waltz, op. cit., p. 105. 12. Grim, op. cit., p. 488.

Institution of Multilateralism /123

ing transaction co~ts,~J by solving collective action problem^,'^ or by changing perceptions through learning pro~ess.~s

While neo-liberal institutionalism no doubt increases our understanding of international relations phenomena, some argue that the pendulum swung too far. Recent critics suggest that the advantage of neo-liberal institutionalism comes at the expense of a valuable insight of the realist approach-the emphasis on relative power capabilities. For instance, h e r argues that “for a very large class of global issues - - - power need to be given pride of place,” but “neoliberal speculations ... obscure considera- tion of relative power capabilities.”16 Garrett also complains that many analyses based on the neo-liberal institutionalism “downplays the distribu- tional conflicts between states and the impact of power asymmetries on conflict resolution. ”17

According to Krasner and Garrett, the neo-liberalist theory fails to re- cognize the limit of institutions’ role. They acknowledge that institutions help overcome individual state’s powerful incentive to freeride, hence pro- mote the possibility of cooperation, ultimately leading to the overall increase in the aggregate welfare. But, they argue, while institutions are in- strumental in increasing the level of aggregate welfare, the issue of distribution of the pie inevitably entails conflict, and the resolution of distribu- tional disputes is in many cases determined by relative power capabilities among states. In other words, reaching the Pareto frontier is one thing and moving along the frontier is quite another, and it is the power that decides which point on the Pareto frontier is chosen.

From the neo-realist point of view, in short, power is the determinant of international outcome, and state preferences are difined in terms of the drive for power accumulation. This view, as will be shown below, sharply contrasts with the one forwarded in Putnam’s two-level game model.

13. For excellent discussions of the institutional effect on transaction costs, see Margaret kvi, Of Rule and Revemre(Rerke1ey: University of California Press, 1988); Douglas North, Structure and Change in Economic History(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981). 14. Wayne Sandholk “ESPRIT and the Politics of International Collective Action,“ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. XXX, No. 1(1992), pp. 1-22; Sandholtz, ‘Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in Western Europ,” World Politics. Vol.

15. Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” International Organizufion, Vol. 46, NO. 2(1992), pp. 391-26; Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Inter- national Policy Coordination,” Interntional Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 1-36; and Robert 0. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4(1988), pp. 379-396. 16. Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,“ World Politics. Vol. 43, No. 3(1991), p. 366. 17. Geoffrey Garrett, ”The European Community’s Internal Market,” International Organ’- miion, Vol. 46, No. 2(1992), p. 534.

45, NO. 2(1993), pp. 242-270.

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Domestic Source of Preference Formation

Neo-realism’s exclusive focus on system-level variables notwithstanding, state preferences are not entirely determined and uniformly shaped by the power-driven international system. They also have domestic origins. Since domestic situations of states differ from each other, domestically formed state preferences also vary in contents and in intensity. The contents of state preferences and the intensity of the states’ pursuit of their goals has a lot to do with national governments’ incentive to stay in power as long as possible, which requires them to address the demands of important domestic actors properly.

Located at the intersection between international and domestic arena,’* national governments will try to translate international outcomes into domestic political assets. They will seek to use international outcomes to improve their popularity at home. Therefore, they pursue international outcomes that they believe improve their political fortune in the domestic arena. If an outcome were to have a damaging effect on, say, their elec- toral prospects, they would resist either the specific outcome or the way the outcome is produced, or both.IP As states interact with others, they vie for the realization of their preferences that are consistent with domestic situation.

Putnam captures the essence of the implication of domestic politics for the process and outcome of international bargaining by advancing what Putnam himself calls “the logic of two-level game.”m The logic of two- level game suggests that negotiators in international negotiations(primarily governments) are subject to “the constraint that any tentative agreement must be ratified” by their constituencies.*l

The maneuvering space of negotiators at international bargaining table is limited by their need to satisfy the concerned domestic actors and to secure the approval from them for the negotiation outcome. If the outcome of international bargaining dissatisfies too many domestic constituencies and hence fail to obtain approval, it means that those who brought home such outcome risk losing public support and being unseated from their

18. For an analysis based on the notion that states are located at the intersection between domestic and international area, see Theda Skocpol, Stares and Social Revolution: A Com- paraiive A d y i s of France, Rusia, and C h d N e w York: Cambridge University Press, 19791, pp. 30-32. 19. For example, a country which participates in an international regime may protest a specific outcome of the regime or challenge the fundamentals of the regime seeking its drastic change or trying to create a new one. 20. Putnam, op. cit. 21. Ibid., p. 435. Ratification does not necessarily have to be a parliamentary function. It could also mean, for example, the approval of coordinated economic policy by social partners, the approval of arms treaty by the military, or public support of economic aids to poor countries jointly conducted by several countries.

Institution of MuItiIateraIism/l25

job. Therefore, the ex ante expectation about the response of constituencies at home heavily influences the moves that negotiators make in deal- ing with their counterparts at an international table, and ultimately, the outcome of the bargaining.

The fact that the agreement at international bargaining table must pass the ratification test at domestic level faces every negotiator with a dilem- ma. On the one hand, if a negotiator makes too much concession to his/ her negotiation partner(s) in order to facilitate international agreement but without accurately reading the preference of domestic constituencies, he/she might will risk losing domestic support and even hidher job. On the other hand, if all negotiators are determined to deliver strictly what their domestic constituents prefer most and do not bother to make any concession, then no agreement would be possible. Therefore, in order to secure both the agreement at an international bargaining and the domestic ratification, negotiators have to find a middle point that properly addresses both negotiation partners’ concerns and the preference of domesitc constituencies.

From this perspective, the possibility for an agreement to be reached by negotiation partners has a lot to do with relative intensity of government prefeences formed within domestic arena and taken to the negotiation table. In other words, it depends on, first, the degree of domestic constraints imposed on each negotiator, and second, the extent of the counterpart’s flexibility. For an international agreement to be possible, there should be an overlapping area between negotiators’ preferences. For example, if a negotiator(A) is severely constrained by domestic actors and thus has a very small range of choices, A will have difficulty fmding a common ground with hislher counterpart(B). Even if A had a relatively free hand, finding common ground with B still could be a daunting task if B is severely constrained by its own domestic factors. If both A and B’s negotiation capabilities are severely constrained by the domestic situation, an agreement would be unlikely unless either A or B risks punishment back at home. On the other hand, if both A and B are free from domestic pressures, then an agreement could easily be reached.

The question of relative preference intensity has two important impli- cations for the outcome of internatonal negotiations. First, the less the domestic constraints on negotiators, the more likely the international agreement, ceteris puribus. Second, bargaining outcomes tend to favor the governments with more severe domestic constraints, hence more intense preferences. Because these governments do not have much maneuvering space, they would maintain very stubborn negotiating positions, forcing concessions on other governments. As long as it is in the interest of the latter to reach an international agreement, the former would have bar-

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Note that there are two important differences between this view and the neo-realist perspective. First, this view posits that the domestic situation-unit-level variables-plays an important part in the process of government preference formation. Second, this view is also different from realism in that it stresses relative intensity of government preferences, not power, as an important determinant of international outcome. In this for- mula, power has no place as an explanatory variable for the outcome of interaction among states.

However, while it is acceptable that power-oriented perspective of neo- realism cannot explain every single international relations phenomena, all too often in history have we seen the cases where power dominates. The realist account of world politics, to say the least, should be credited with its contribution to parsimonious and accurate analysis of so many international relations phenomena. In this regard, the prime focus of neo-realism -power -cannot be just written off. Power simply tells too much in too many occasions. And yet, it shoudd be stressed, not always. That is the problem that I am now turning to.

Institution of Multilateralism, Power, and Relative Preference Intensity

R u d e and Caporaso suggest that there are three alternative con- ceptions of how the world might be organized: imperialism, biateralism, and multilateralism.22 The institution of multilateralism differs from other forms in that it embodies three principles of ordering relations among states : 1) generalized non-discriminatory codes of conduct ; 2) indivisibility ;and 3) diffuse Nondiscrimination implies that the code of conduct applied to one member is equally applied to all, as in the use of the MFN(most favored nations) clause in trade agreements. Indivisibility means that members treated as a collectivity. So, for example, an attack on one member by an outside actor is regarded as an attack on all. The principle of diffuse reciprocity entails that the benefits of the arrangement are roughly evenly distributed among members over time.

When an international institution is organized on the basis of multi-

22. John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Or- ganizution, Vol. 46, No. 3(1992), p. 571; James A. Caporaso, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations,” Jntemorionol Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3(1992), p. 602. 23. This defmition of multilateralism is gaining wider currency among students of international relations. peter. F. Cowhey, “Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of Inter- national Commitments: Japan and the United States,” Inrernutional Organjzatwn, Vol. 46, No. 419921, pp. 765-792; and the articles in International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3(Sum- mer 19921, which is devoted to the issue of multilateralism.

Institution of MuItiIateraIisrn /I27

lateralism, it is observed that the institution displays a strong leveling im- pulse. As Kahler notes :

In their formal institutional designs at least, most postwar multilateral institutions incorporated a larger role in decision making for states that were not great powers and could not aspire to be.”

By contrast, bilateralism is believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to disadvantage smaller, weaker states.25 An- other alternative institutional form, imperialism, also accentuates the power of the powerful. The institution of multilateralism is thus dis- tinguished from other forms of institutions by its constraint on the effect of power on outcomes of interaction among states.

Then, if the institutional framework in which states interact with each other happens to be that of multilateralism, we can suppose that it constrains the wielding of power by the powerfd and allows the interest of the weak to be advanced more than any other form of institutional arrangement would allow. That is, if interstate relationship is framed in an institutional network that is based on the principle of multilateralism, it is conceivable that the outcomes of interaction among states sometimes defy the logic of power, producing results preferred by weaker countries. If this is the case, then there could be some occasions when internation outcomes cannot be adequately explained solely by the power-center view espoused by realism.

If power is an irrelevant variable in explaining some phenomena, what would explain them? We can speculate that, if the variation in power capabilities among states (variable X) cannot explain a specific outcome (Y), there must be something else(Z) that explains it. Then we can say that Z affects Y under the condition that the influence of X is reduced. When there is something (W) that attenuates the influence of X, there is a good chance that the effect of Z on Y increases. This is, in essence, the question of the generalizability, or limit thereof, of observed relationship between relative preference intensity (Z) and international outcome (Y). If Z affects Y, under what condition? Does Z affects Y anywhere all the time or does it do so only under a specific condition? Is the effect of Z on Y universal or does it depends on circumstantial factors? The literature on multilateralism introduced above points to the principle of multilateralism embodied in institutional framework as playing the role of the variable W. In the presence of W(institution of mltilateralism), then, what (Z) explains the outcome Y that X(power) does not?

24. Miles Kahler, ‘Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers,” Ituemtionnl Organ- ization, Vol. 46, No. 3(19!92), p. 681. 25. Ibid.

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I suggest here the possibility that the relative preference intensity, which is in large part derived from domestic situation, may be an alternative explanatory variable in the presence of the W, institution of multilateralism, and in the resulting absence of X, power. Provided that the institution of multilaterafism is one (among many) possible constraints on power and allows the intensity of domestidy formed government preferences to come into play, we can also discuss the extent to which domestic politics matters. In some cases, countries are enmeshed in a dense network of institutions, while in others cases countries are only engaged in a loose institutional network. Depending on the density of the institutional network, the scope of the countries’ behavior covered by the rules and norms of the institution will be different. The more multilateralism, the greater the constraint on power and hence the more room for relative preference intensity, with which domestic politics has a lot to do. The following discussion elaborates this point.

States operating at the international level enjoy Werent degrees of power capability, be it economic or military. There are superpowers like the US, middle range powers like Britain and France, and numerous minus- cule powers. The preference intensity of each state on certain issues also varies. The French government’s incentive to resist the US pressure in the farm deal as a part of the global trade talks known as the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations has been consistently stronger than, say, that of Germany. Combining together in a simplified form the variation in power capabilities and the difference in preference intensity, we can create a 2x2 table that constains four different categories of states.

Table 1 depicts the four groups of states categorized according to two criteria - the strength of power and the intensity of preferences. The first group represents the states with strong power and high preference intensity; the second group weak power and high preference intensity; the third strong power and low preference intensity; and the fourth weak power and low preference intensity.

Table 1. Four Categories of States with Different Bargaining Leverage

power strong weak

111 a state with strong [21 a state with weak high power and high power and high

preference preference intensity preference intensity intensity

[31 a state with strong [4] a state with weak low power and low power and low

preference intensity preference intensity

Instit tion of MuItilateraIism/fZ9

These four groups of states, when confronting each other on a diplo- matic front, will have different levels of bargaining leverage, depending on the institutional context. The following formal description is intended to show how institutional factors come into play affecting the negotiation leverage among the four groups of states.

i) when there is no institutional constraint on power so that power is the dominant factor, the ordering of the bargaining leverage is : [I1 = [31 > [21 = [41

power is somewhat constrained : 111 > [31 2 (21 > (41

of power is severely constrained : [ll 2 121 > 131 2 HI

complete constraints on power. [I1 = 121 > [31 = 141

ii) when there is some institutional constraint so that the effect of

iii) when there is a significant institutional constraint so that the effect

iv) when institutional arrangement renders power irrelevant due to

For example, we can consider an anarchic situation where there is no institution to constrain the use of power, or a situation where the institutional form is such that it does not at all restrain states from relying on power. In this case, power is the dominant factor, because there is noth- ing to stop the powerful from exploiting their superior capabilities - case (i). This is the realist image of world politics.

On the other hand, we can think of a hypothetical situation where all states, weak or strong, are given the same decision-making power in a multilateral setting withouut the possibility of reward or retaliation through bilateral means. In that event, the underlying power distribution among states would not matter much in producing a decision, and the intensity of preferences shaped by the domestic situation will be the major factor. If states are to reach an agreement, the states with low preference intensity, whether weak or strong, would end up making concessions to those with higher intensity. Here, what matters is preference intensity, not power -case (iv).

Needless to say, these two examples are extreme cases. More realistic cases would be located between the two. In the remaining two cases - (ii) and (iii) - the effect of power differential remains an important variable, but it is constrained by institutional arrangements to varying degrees. To the extent that power is constrained, the preference intensity becomes an explanatory variable as well. In these cases, power does not necessarily dominate outcomes of interaction among nations.

Case (ii) represents the situation where power retains its status as the dominant factor, but the variation in preference intensity also could become an khportant factor, expeCially between two equivalent powem. Even

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the outcome of the interaction between countries with power discrep ancies might not accurately reflect the the power discrepancy between them, owing to institutional constraints imposed upon the use of power by the powerful and aggressive pursuit of policy goals by the countries with weak power but intense preferences.

On the other hand, case (iii) depicts the circumstance under which international outcomes often defy the logic of power, so that powerorient- cd perspective is struck by unsolvable puzzle from time to time. In this case, institutional arrangements puts a significant check on the use of power by powerful nations. This opens the door for the domestically formed preferences of weak nations to come into play. The effect of preference intensity may outweigh the effect of power distribution in determining the outcome, as shown in the confrontation between the type [2] country (strong preference plus weak power) and the type 131 country (weak preference plus strong power) in the institutional context of case (iii).

Depending on the kind and depth of institutionalization, institutional arrangements puts a check on the use of power by powerful nations. Es- pccially, the institution of multilateralism could play the role of constraint on power. In other words, the effect of institution of multilateralism is such that it constrains thc wielding of power by the powerful and allows the interest of the weak to be advanced more than any other form of institutional arrangement would allow. When an international institution is organizd on the basis of the principle of multilateralism, it is conceivable that interaction among states under this institutional framework, at least sometinis, may produce the outcomes that defy the logic of power, producing results preferred by weaker countries. These outcomes, then, cannot be adequately explained solely by the power-centered view espoused by realism. Under the condition of multilateralism, domestically formed government preferences may explain what the powercentered view leaves unexplained.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I suggest that the value of the domestic politics a p proach varics with the extent to which the constraint on power is present.% Domestic-level analysis would carry more weight where power speaks more sotlly, because we need to know not only what the government pref-

26. It does not mean that the domtic analysis is useless where power dominates outcomes. Even in this ax!, the utility cf domestic analysis can be signscant in that the outcomes reflect preferem of the powerful, and the powerful states’ preferenos arc still f d within domestic arena.

Institution of Mul1ilateralism/l31

erences are, but also how they are ordered and prioritized. That said, as a fiial note, it is ironic to point out that the utility of

domesitc-level analysis could be determined by system-level conditions, that is, whether there exist conditions that creates the room for preference intensity to come into play. In this regard, this study calls for a balanced attention to both system-level and unit-level variables. As the exclusive focus on system level variables makes realism blind to the relevance and importance of unit-level analysis, and exclusive focus on domestic politics will make us blind to the value of relative power capabilities as an explanatory variable. As Moravcsik points out, "the decision to begin with systemic theory is essentially arbitrary," because "systemic theories are not inherently more parsimonious, nor more powerful, nor more precise than their domestic counterparts."27 Likewise, the contention that domestic analysis is superior to, hence should precede, systemic analysis would be equally arbitrary, because there is no a priori reason to believe so.

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Documents

Institution of Multilateralism, Power Capabilities, and Domestic Politics