Inquiring into Indian Theories of Verbal Cognition

Inquiring into Indian Theories of Verbal CognitionSābdabodhamīmāṃsā, an Inquiry into Indian Theories of Verbal Cognition:Subarthavicārātmakaḥ dvitīyo bhāgaḥ, Part 2: Case Terminations and Their Significance by N.S. Ramanuja TatacharyaReview by: George CardonaJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 128, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 2008), pp. 105-111Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25608309 .

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Inquiring into Indian Theories of Verbal Cognition George Cardona

University of Pennsylvania

We are fortunate to have N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya's second volume in a projected series of four volumes, the first of which (S?bdabodhamim?ms?, An Inquiry into Indian Theories

of Verbal Cognition: V?kyav?ky?rthavic?r?tmakah prathamo bh?gah, part I: The Sentence and its Significance) appeared in 2005 and dealt with the sentence and sentential meaning. Volumes III and IV will concern, respectively, nominal stems; and verbs and verbal suffixes. The first volume included both a Sanskrit introduction and a close English rendition. The

present volume also includes an introduction (bh?mik?), but only in Sanskrit (1-35). In addi tion to the detailed table of contents (37-69) in Sanskrit, this work includes a short table of contents in English (i).

As Ramanuja Tatacharya notes at the beginning of his introduction (p. 1), the first volume was extensive, but the present volume is even more so. The main part of the work covers 871 pages, preceded by the above-mentioned introduction and table of contents. There are also four appendices (anubandh?h): a bibliography (ud?hrtagranth?n?m s?ci, 875-87), fol lowed by indexes of slokas (subarthavic?re ud?hrt?n?m slok?n?m ak?r?dikramena s?ci, 889-96), examples (s?bdabodhavarnan?rtham ud?hrt?n?m v?ky?n?m s?ci, 897-932), and notions (vivrt?n?m pad?n?m s?ci, 933-40). The Sanskrit headings for the indexes are more informative than the English terms used in the summary table of contents.

Ramanuja Tatacharya begins his introduction with a summary discussion (1-2) of the different types of speech units recognized in various works and the meanings associated with these. He goes on to summarize the meanings connected with nominal endings, and

explains his procedure as follows (2). A full description is presented of verbal cognitions said to arise from the use of nominal endings based on discussions in works of grammarians,

Naiy?yikas, and Mim?msakas with respect to such cognitions. The basis for presenting all the differences of opinion set forth in these works is the set of P?ninian s?tras that deal with nominal endings and their meanings. Accordingly, the focus is on meanings connected with the rules that assign category class names to direct participants in actions (k?raka), which

play different roles in bringing actions to accomplishment, thus assigning k?rakas to six

categories?ap?d?na, samprad?na, karana, adhikarana, karman, kartr in the P?ninian order

(Ast?dhy?yl 1.4.24-55, headed by 1.4.23: k?rake). To describe the various verbal cognitions considered, the order of s?tras in the k?raka section of Bhattoji Diksita's (last half of the sixteenth to early seventeenth century) Siddh?ntakaumudi is adopted. The s?tras dealt with are explained and the verbal cognitions associated with illustrative sentences are described.

Accordingly, topics are considered in the present work as follows. A section that deals with the defining property of a k?raka (k?rakalaksanam, 1-35) is followed by sections in which are discussed the meanings of the seven vibhaktis, triplets of nominal endings, in the order:

This is a review article of S?bdabodhamim?ms?, An Inquiry into Indian Theories of Verbal Cognition: Subartha vic?r?tmakah dvitiyo bh?gah, part 2: Case Terminations and Their Significance. By N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. Collection Indologie, vol. 100.2. Samskrtavarsasmrtigrantham?l?, vol. 7. Pondicherry: Institut Francais de Pon dichery, Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan. 2006. Pp. xi + 35, 940.

Journal of the American Oriental Society 128.1 (2008) 105



106 Journal of the American Oriental Society 128.1 (2008)

first (pratham?rthavic?rah, 36-66; sambodhanapratham?rthavic?rah, 67-83)?including the use of such endings in vocatives, second (dvitiy?rthavic?rah, 85-301), third (trtiy?r thavic?rah, 303-449), fourth (caturthyarthavic?rah, 451-564), fifth (pancamyarthavic?rah, 565-704), sixth (sasthyarthavic?rah, 705-73), and seventh (saptamyarthavic?rah, 775-871).

In his introduction, Ramanuja Tatacharya ably summarizes the materials, although, under

standably, he does not enter into any details concerning particular usages, such as forms with

second-triplet endings in construction with particular verbs (e.g., adhi-si 'lie, sleep on . . .') and postpositions; these are covered extensively in the texts excerpted for the chapter on

the meanings associated with the endings. As can be seen from the summary given above, the bulk of this volume is devoted to

discussions of meanings connected with individual triplets of endings. These discussions occur in the extensive texts reproduced here?with some introductory statements and rather

incomplete references to editions of other works cited in the selections?from works of

Naiy?yikas, grammarians, and Mim?msakas. I use "reproduced" advisedly. For the most

part, texts are quoted literally from published sources; however, as will be clear from the short sections I have selected for discussion below, very frequently there are divergences,

mostly minor. Knowing from other works by the same author that he is a deeply learned master of the materials dealt with, I consider these to be adaptations. At the same time, this means that scholars who use this valuable collection should also consult the original works to determine the exact texts represented.

The works excerpted date preponderantly, though not exclusively, from the sixteenth

century and later. The principal Naiy?yika works used are the K?rakacakra of Bhav?nanda

(last quarter of the 16th c), Jagadisa's (ca. 1600) Sabdasaktiprak?sik?, the Vyutpattiv?da of Gadh?dhara (17th c), Gokulan?tha's (end of 17th c, early 18th c.) Padav?kyaratn?kara, the Vibhaktyarthanirnaya of Gokukan?tha's nephew Giridhara. In grammar, pride of place is granted to Kaundabhatta's (17th c.) Vaiy?karanabh?sana and its abridgment (Vaiy? karanabh?sanas?ra) and the longer and abridged versions of two works by N?gesabhatta (late 17th-18th c), the Vaiy?karanasiddh?ntamanj?s? and Vaiy?karanasiddh?ntalaghu

manj?s?.1 As I pointed out above, Bhattoji's arrangement serves as a basis for organiza tion; the same author's Praudhamanoram? is drawn upon. Two Mim?ms? works of the

mid-seventeenth century are depended upon heavily: Khandadeva's Bh?ttarahasya and G?

g?bhatta's Bh?ttacint?mani. The emphasis on such relatively late works is understandable

in that Ramanuja Tatacharya wished to deal with the meanings of nominal endings in the

order first, second, and so forth, and these treatises deal with the semantics of endings in

this order. In addition, the authors of the selections included in this work cite from earlier

authors, so that a careful reader can get a historical sense of arguments and counterarguments. One could nevertheless argue with reason that the S?dhanasamuddesa in the third k?nda of

Bhartrhari's (5th c.) V?kyapadiya?which is extensively cited by Bhattoji, Kaundabhatta, and N?gesa and also invoked by authors in other areas?should have been included in the

texts selected. For, after a general discussion, Bhartrhari proceeds to deal with k?rakas in the

order: karman, karana, kartr (and the subtype called hetu), samprad?na, ap?d?na, adhikarana; a short section dealing with residual relations (sesa), designated by sixth-triplet endings and

assumed to be preceded by action-k?raka relations, forms a coda to the section. This order

obviously reflects the order of the seven nominal vibhaktis. To illustrate how information is presented in this volume and the desirability of greater

historical depth, let me consider briefly the selection, given on pages 15-16, of four short

1. Earlier works are occasionally excerpted, including the Ny?yav?rttika and Ny?yav?rttikat?tparyatik? (see

below) and, from P?ninian grammar, v?rttikas of K?ty?yana, a series of which is explained on pages 205-7.



Cardona: Inquiring into Indian Theories of Verbal Cognition 107

passages, two from Uddyotakara's (6th c.) Ny?yav?rttika and two from the Ny?yav?rt tikat?tparyatlk? of V?caspatimisra (10th c.) explaining what Uddyotakara says. This is part of a discussion centered on the terms pram?na, pram?tr, and prameya?all derivates of pra m? (praminoti) 'cognize'?which respectively signify an instrument (karana)?that is the cause of a cognition (upalabdhihetu)?an agent (kartr), and an object (karman) in an act of

cognition. The following problem is brought up. A cognition's occurring presupposes as existent beforehand the participants in the act, including the cognizing agent (pram?tr) and the object cognized (prameya). However, these cannot be cognizing agent and cognized object unless there is an act of cognition, so that the entities in question cannot truly have the properties of being cognizor (pram?trtva) and object of cognition (prameyatva).2 For, just as pram?na is a k?raka term (k?rakasabdo), so are prameya and pram?tr,3 and k?raka

signifying words do not have their status as such without a relation with an action. Nor is a mere thing as such (dravyam?tra) a k?raka nor is just any action connected with this.

When a k?raka word occurs, it is used with reference to something that serves to bring an action to accomplishment (kriy?s?dhana) and is connected with a particular action (kriy? visesayukta).4 Vacaspati explains as follows,5 basing himself on the example of wood

splitting, which would be involved when one used a sentence such as devadattah kuth?rena d?ru chinatti "Devadatta is splitting wood with an axe." A k?raka word is used with reference to something that is directly connected with a particular constituent act (av?ntarakriy? visesayukta) whereby it serves as a means of accomplishing (s?dhan?), that is, a cause (hetu), of the main action in which its act is a constituent. Thus, chid signifies splitting, which re sults in something's becoming split (dvaidhibh?ve), so that this result (phala) is spoken of as the main act in question; and there are constituent acts associated with different k?rakas. The agent's lifting up and letting down an axe?as well as thereby bringing the axe into contact with the wood?is this k?raka's constituent act in bringing the result about. The wood's constituent act, on the other hand, is its coming into contact (samyoga 'conjunction') with a sharp axe that is brought down with speed and comes into contact with it. For it is

thereby that the wood experiences splitting due to its parts being divided as a consequence of their moving when the axe comes down.

Therefore, a k?raka comes about due to a constituent or main act. The argument presented is that, given what is assumed to be true of k?raka words in general, a particular k?raka

2. NVt. (Thakur 1997b: 5.19-20): yadi pram?trpramey?bhy?m sadbhy?th pram?nam janyate tatah pram?nam antarena pram?trprameyabh?vasy?siddhatv?t pram?trtvam prameyatvarh c?nupapannam.

3. NVt. (Thakur 1997b: 5.21): katham. pram?nam iti. yath? k?rakasabdo'yam tath? prameyam pram?teti ca. 4. NVt. (Thakur 1997b: 5.21-6.2): na ca k?rakasabd?h kriy?sambandham antaren?tm?nam labhanta iti. na ca

dravyam?tram k?rakam na ca kriy?m?tramiti. k?rakasabdo hi pravartam?nah kriy?s?dhane kriy?visesayukte pra vartate. This is the first passage cited, at the bottom of page 15, preceded by an introductory sentence noting that this is stated by the author of the v?rttika (v?rtikakarena [sic] evam uktam) on the occasion of discussing, under the first s?tra, the term pram?na?which ends with the suffix lyut (ana) signifying an instrument. Ramanuja Tatacharya refers (p. 15 n. 3) to page 9 of Thakur 1967; he does not use Thakur's later editions of the Ny?yas?tra and its com

mentaries, nor does he list any of these in the bibliography. Note also that the text cited has (p. 15, second line from bottom) labhante instead of labhanta iti found in the source text.

5. NVtTT (Thakur 1996a: 20.2-7): k?rakasabdo hiti: pradh?nakriy?s?dhane hetau av?ntarakriy?visesayukte k?rakasabd?h pravartate. dvaidhibh?ve hi phale pradh?navy?p?re kartuh karanagocara udyamananip?tan?dir av?ntaravy?p?rah. karmanas ca d?runah sparsavegavattiksnakuth?rasamyoga ev?v?ntaravy?p?rah. tena hi d?ru

sv?vayavaparispandalabdhajanmano 'vayavavibh?g?d dvaidhibh?vam anubhavati. tasm?d av?ntarapradh?navy? p?rasampannam k?rakam. . . . This is the second passage cited, p. 16, lines 2-6. Note 1 on this page refers to Thakur 1967, p. 37. Here again, the text quoted deviates from the source: instead of sv?vayavaparispandalabdha janmano 'vayavavibh?g?d it has sv?vayavaparispandajany?t avayavavibh?g?t. Of course, the sense is the same, and instead of ity uktam Ramanuja Tatacharya says iti pratyap?di.




word like pram?tr or prameya is appropriately used only on condition that the referent in

question is actually involved in bringing some particular action about.6 This claim is rebutted as follows.7 This does not hold, since pram?tr, prameya have as their objects of reference entities that have a status in all three times, past, present, and future, in the same way that terms like p?caka 'one who cooks, a cook' do. We do not say that k?raka words are used

exclusively due to an actual relation with an action of the entity signified; on the contrary, these terms have domains of reference in all three times: a person can be referred to appro

priately as p?caka whether he performed the act of cooking at some time in the past, will

perform it sometimes in the future, or is actually cooking at present. If the condition for their use were an actual relation to an action, they would not be used without there being an action

involved, but they do occur without an action relation. The reason for this is that a k?raka word like p?caka designates someone who has the capacity to carry out cooking. V?caspati brings out what Uddyotakara intends, as follows.8 The relation between a term and its

meaning depends on the community of speakers who use it, since this is conventional. The

community of speakers, moreover, uses k?raka words with the intention of speaking of a

relation with an action that is past, has not yet taken place, or is presently taking place, as

when one says p?cakam ? nay a paksyati "Bring a cook; he will cook," p?cako'yam ap?ksit "This cook has cooked," p?cako 'yam pacati "This cook is cooking." The reason for this is that k?rakas have a dual capacity with respect to producing the effect of an action: being apt to perform the act by their very nature (svar?pa)?a cook is a cook?and bringing together the cooperating things that serve to produce the effect. Even if the latter is absent, k?raka words are used, as when one speaks of a cook who performed or will perform cooking but is not presently doing this. Further, even if the referent's natural capacity, which holds for all three possible times, is available, though the effect that is apt to occur at the three times not be possible, one can still use the term in question: one can say someone is a cook, using

p?caka, though he may not actually cook. Therefore, the defining property that serves to

6. NVt. (Thakur 1997b: 6.2): pram?trprameyasabdau ca k?rakasabdau. t?v antarena kriy?m na pravartey?t?m iti "The terms pram?tr and prameya, moreover, are k?raka words; they could not occur without an action."

V?caspati (NVtTT [Thakur 1996a: 20.7-8]) clarifies the transition between what has been established for k?rakas in

general and how this applies to the particular terms in the present context: tasm?d av?ntarapradh?navy?p?rasam

pannam k?rakam iti s?m?nyatah pras?dhya prakrte yojayati: pram?trprameyasabdau ceti. The v?rttika passage I

have quoted and translated here is included, with modifications (tau kriy?m antarena na pravartey?t?m) as the first

part of the third passage excerpted by Ramanuja Tatacharya on p. 16, with a reference (n. 2) to Thakur 1967: 9.

7. NVt. (Thakur 1997b: 6.3-6): na, p?cak?disabdavat trik?lavisayatv?t. na br?mah kriy?sambandhenaiva k?rakasabd?h pravartanta iti. api tu trik?lavisay? ete. yadi kriy?sambandhanimitt? eva syuh na kriy?m antarena

pravarteran. kriy?sambandham antarena tu pravartante. kirn punar nimittam. s?marthyam. tac ca trisv api k?lesv

astiti. This is the second part of the third excerpted by Ramanuja Tatacharya on p. 16 (see my n. 6), with an im

portant deviation: na which begins the passage is omitted. The negative particle is important, however. As V?caspati notes (NVtTT [Thakur 1996a: 20.8]: pariharati?na, p?cak?disabdavad iti), Uddyotakara here begins the argument

refuting the objection advanced.

8. NVtTT (Thakur 1996a: 20.9-16): lok?dhin?vadh?ranah khalv ay am sabd?rthasambandhah. lokas c?tit?n?

gatavartam?nakriy?sambandham?travivaksay? k?rakasabd?n prayuhkte: p?cakam ? naya paksyatiti ca p?cako 'yam

ap?ksid iti ca p?cako 'yam pacatit ca tulyavat traik?lyavisayaprayogadarsanam. tat kasya hetor apacaty api p?

kasambandham praty asti svar?pasaktir devadatt?d?v iti. dvayi hi saktih k?rak?n?m k?ryajananam prati svar?pam ca sahak?rigr?masamavadh?nam ca. tatr?saty api sahak?rigr?masamavadh?ne k?rakasabd?n?m pravrtteh saty

api ca svar?pe traik?lyavy?pini traik?lyayogik?ry?sambhave 'pravrtteh traik?lyopahitamary?dam eva svar?pam

k?rakasabd?n?m pravrttau nimittam. Ramanuja Tatacharya cites this passage?which appears as such also in

Thakur 1967: 37.8-15?on p. 16, without a reference to Thakur and with a deviation: saty api ca svar?pe traik?l

yavy?pini traik?lyayogik?ry?sambhave'pravrtteh is not included. After the citation, he notes that the passage is

worth considering carefully (iti granthas c?tr?vadh?nam arhati).




allow the proper use of such a term (pravrttinimitta 'cause for occurring, being used') is the nature of the entity in question to the extent of its being apt to serve as a direct partici pant in bringing about an act and its result.

Comparable thinking, with similar terminology, is to be found earlier in Ny?ya. Thus, in the bh?sya on Ny?yas?tra 2.1.16, in the course of showing how one and the same entity can, under different circumstances, be a pram?tr, a pram?na, or a prameya, V?tsy?yana (ca. mid-4th to mid-5th c.) notes that in ordinary discourse more than one k?raka word can equally apply to a single entity, according to circumstances, and illustrates this with a tree viewed as playing different roles, illustrated in sentences using forms of vrksa 'tree':

(1) vrksas tisthati "the tree is standing," (2) vrksam pasya "Look at the tree," (3) vrksena candramasam jn?payati ". . . indicates the moon with the tree" (that is, shows someone the moon using the tree as a point of reference), (4) vrks?y odakam ? sincati ". . . is pouring water for the tree," (5) vrks?t parnam patati "A leaf is falling from the tree," (6) vrkse

vay?msi santi "There are birds in the tree." The tree is (1) independent in respect of its

standing, so that it is kartr ('agent') by virtue of its independence (sv?tantry?t); (2) karman

('immediate object') by virtue of being what one most wishes to reach (isyam?natamatv?t) through seeing; (3) karana ('instrument') by virtue of being a means more than any k?raka

playing a different role in the act by someone who shows (jn?payati 'makes to know') the moon to someone; (4) samprad?na since the person performing the act intends the tree as

object by means of the water being poured; (5) ap?d?na according to the s?tra (Ast?dhy?yi 1.4.25) dhruvam ap?ye'p?d?nam ("A k?raka functioning as relative stable point with respect to movement away from it is called ap?d?da"); (6) adhikarana by ?dh?ro'dhikaranam (As t?dhy?yi 1.4.45, see n. 13).9 V?tsy?yana then remarks, using words echoed by Uddyo takara: this being so, a k?raka is not merely a thing in itself (dravyam?tram), nor is there a mere action (kriy?m?tram); on the contrary, a k?raka is an entity that serves to bring an action to accomplishment and is connected with a particular action.10 In turn, V?tsy?yana not only alludes to and cites P?ninian s?tras, as shown, but echoes what was said earlier by Patanjali (mid 2nd c. b.c.). For example, in his discussion of K?ty?yana's (3rd c. b.c.) fifth v?rttika on Ast?dhy?yi 2.1.1, he remarks as follows: someone asks another person, "Where is Devadatta?"?to which the response is, "He's that one by the tree" (asau vrkse). The first

person again asks, "Which tree?" and then receives the answer, "The one that is standing" (yas tisthati). The tree in question is first a locus at which Devadatta is located, then, when vrksa is connected with another word, the tree becomes an agent.11 Further, the emphasis on k?rakas being associated with constituent acts echoes what K?ty?yana said earlier in v?rttikas 7-15 on 1.4.23. Here, the position is taken that k?raka is an agent noun referring to participants which are agents with respect to constituent acts; for example, if Devadatta cooks rice in a pot using wood as fuel (devadattah sth?ly?m edhair odanam pacati), he is the agent of a complex act, which he carries out by putting a pot on the clay stove, pouring

9. Ny?yabh?sya 2.1.16 (Thakur 1997a: 63.9-17): tath? ca loke k?rakasabd? nimittavas?t sam?vesena vartanta iti. vrksas tisthatlti svasthitau vrksah sv?tantry?t kart?. vrksam pasyatiti darsanen?ptumisyam?natamatv?t karma, vrksena candramasam jn?payatiti jn?pakasya s?dhakatamatv?t karanam. vrks?yodakam ? sincatiti ?sicyam?neno dakena vrksam abhipraitlti samprad?nam. vrks?t parnam patatiti dhruvam ap?ye 'p?d?nam ity ap?d?nam. vrkse

vay?msi santiti ?dh?ro 'dhikaranam ity adhikaranam. 10. Ny?yabh?sya 2.1.16 (Thakur 1997a: 63.17-18): evam ca sati na dravyam?tram k?rakam na kriy?m?tram.

kirn tarhi kriy?s?dhakam kriy?visesayuktam k?rakam. 11. Abhyankar 1985: 366.15-17: . . . tad yath? kascit kahcit prcchati kva devadatta iti. sa tasm? ? caste

asau vrksa iti. katarasmin. yas tisthati. sa vrkso'dhikaranam bh?tv?nyena sabden?bhisambadhyam?nah kart?

sampadyate.




water into the pot, putting rice grains in it, setting firewood under the pot, and so on; these

together constitute the cooking of the principal agent. The pot also is agent, but with respect to the acts of enclosing and holding the rice being cooked; and the firewood is agent of

burning that goes on until cooking is complete and the rice is softened. Similarly, when someone splits wood with an axe, he performs the acts of lifting and letting down the axe.12

The emphasis on k?raka words not having any specific temporal reference also echoes what Patanjali said centuries earlier in connection with derivates like ?sana 'seat' and say ana

'bed' in utterances such as ?sana ?ste ". . . is seated in a seat," sayane sete ". . . is lying on

a bed." The locative ending in ?sane, sayane signifies a locus (adhikarana)', the suffix ana

of the bases ?sana, sayana after which the ending is introduced also signifies a locus.13 A

seventh-triplet ending should occur to signify a locus that is not already signified (see n. 13). In sayana ?ste "... is sitting on the bed," the ending in sayane can be justified easily: sayana

signifies a locus with respect to lying, and the ending i which follows this base (sayana-i ?

sayane) designates a locus with respect to a different act, namely sitting. In sayane sete, on

the other hand, lying alone is involved. Patanjali counters that here too there are distinct acts:

lying signified by si in sayana and by si of sete (<? si-td). In addition, one of the affixes

applies regardless of time reference (sarvak?la) but the other affix applies for current time

(vartam?nak?la).14 That is, the suffix of ?sana, sayana is atemporal, while the ending of

?ste, sete occurs when an action is referred to current time.

Such is the general background of thinking to which not only Naiy?yikas but also Mim?rhsakas and others are indebted and which they acknowledge, both through explicit quotations and implicitly in the way they structure their presentations, even when the argu ments they present are meant to uphold their particular viewpoints against those of P?ninian

grammarians. The large numbers of text brought together in the present volume are part of

these later presentations. Valuable as in N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya's collection, it would

gain even greater value through a more sustained effort to draw out the threads of argu ments and views together with their backgrounds.

There are some other things that might make subsequent volumes more valuable to scholars. It would be helpful to indicate more clearly in all instances what parts of the texts

printed are citations, how these may have been modified, and what parts stem from else where. I have already indicated some such places in the present review. Another particularly illustrative place is the excerpt from Khandadeva's Bh?ttarahasya on p. 204.15 The first three

12. 1.4.23 vt. 8: adhisrayanodak?secanatandul?vapanaidhopakarsanakriy?h pradh?nasya kartuh p?kah. 1.4.23

vt. 9: dronath pacaty ?dhakam pacatiti sarhbhavanakriy? dh?ranakriy? c?dhikaranasya p?kah. 1.4.23 vt. 10:

edh?h paksyanty ? viklitter jvalisyantiti jvalanakriy? karanasya p?kah. 1.4.23 vt. 11: udyamananipatan?ni kartus

chidikriy?. 13. Ast?dhy?yi 2.3.36 (saptamy adhikarane ca) introduces a seventh-triplet ending after a nominal to signify an

adhikarana; by 1.4.45 (?dh?ro'dhikaranam), a direct participant that plays the role of locus (?dh?ra 'substrate')

with respect to an action is given the class name adhikarana. By 3.3.117 (karan?dhikaranayos ca [napumsake bh?ve (114), lyut (115)]) the post-verbal suffix lyut (? ana) is introduced to signify a karana ('instrument') or

adhikarana in addition to an action characterized as neuter. Post-nominal endings such as the seventh-triplet end

ings introduced by 2.3.36 are allowed to occur if the k?raka in question is not already signified otherwise (2.3.1:

anabhihite). 14. Mah?bh?sya on 2.3.1 v?rttika 9 (Abhyankar 1985: 442.17-20). . . ?sana ?ste sayane seta iti. atr?py an

yatvam asti. kutah. k?labhed?t s?dhanabhed?c ca. ekasy?tr?ser ?sih s?dhanam sarvak?las ca pratyayah. aparasya

b?hyam s?dhanam vartam?nak?las ca pratyayah. It is neither possible nor necessary to consider details here.

15. Ramanuja Tatacharya refers (204 n. 1) to p. 96 of this text, which shows that he used Subrahmanya Sastri's

edition. However, I cannot find a bibliographic entry for this on p. 882, where the entry Bh?ttacint?manih is imme

diately followed by Bh?mati.




and one-half lines (evam ... bh?van?nvayi) are from Khandadeva's work, and the remainder of the passage (kurunisth?vacchedakat?k? sv?pabh?van? . . . iti bodhah ity abhyadh?yi) is doubtless Ramanuja Tatacharya's addition. Not all such additions are his. Thus, the text within parentheses on page 3, lines 9-10 is cited from a footnote in the edition of the

Sabdasaktiprak?sik? (p. 33 n. 1). Scholars would also be helped by a more thorough iden tification of quotations within texts excerpted. Thus, quotations of P?ninian rules are consis

tently identified in footnotes with precise references to adhy?ya, p?da, and s?tra, preceded by "s?," but frequent citations from the V?kyapadiya are not so identified. To illustrate with but two examples: VP 3.7'.127 (gunakriy?y?m sv?tantry?t. . . , Rao 1977: 143) and VP 3.7.101-2 (pr?ganyatah saktil?bh?n . . . sv?tantryam kartur ucyate, Rao 1977: 140) are cited respectively on pp. 205, 218, 223, and 307 without footnote references. In the sloka index (pp. 891, 893), these k?rik?s are identified as from the V?kyapadiya ("Va.R"), but

without specific references. To be sure, one can find the references in the indexes that

accompany Raghun?tha Sarm?'s edition, which has been used. On the other hand, consider the verse yah svetarasya yasy?rthe sv?rthasy?nvayabodhane I yadapeksas tayoh p?rv? prakrtih pratyayah parah, which defines a base and a related affix as the prior and follow

ing elements such that the one requires the other in order to convey the relation of their

meanings. In the Sabdasaktiprak?sik? (pp. 49-50), Jagadisa says yat tu v?kyapadiye bhar trharinoktam and then cites this; the Vibhaktyarthanirnaya (p. 30) introduces this verse

saying taduktam v?kyapadiye bhartrharin?. The sloka index (p. 894) accordingly identifies this as from the V?kyapadiya. However, to my knowledge the verse does not occur in the

V?kyapadiya editions that have appeared. Had full textual references been the rule, such a citation would have been identified as untraced in the source claimed.

Ramanuja Tatacharya expresses his confidence (introduction, p. 2) that his work will be of great use to research scholars. I agree. The comments I have made are intended to suggest possible improvements to this valuable research tool.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev. 1985. The Vy?karana-Mah?bh?sya ofPatanjali, edited by F. Kielhorn.

2nd edition, revised; volume 1, 4th edition. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

Dhundhir?j S?stri. 1934. The Sabdasakti Prak?sik? by M. M. Sri Jagadisa Tark?lank?ra with Two

Commentaries. Kashi Sanskrit Series, no. 109. Benares: Chowkhamba.

Jivanatha Misra. 1901. Vibhaktyarthanirnaya by Sri Giridhara Bhattacharya. Benares: Chowkhamba.

Rau, Wilhelm. 1977. Bhartrharis V?kyapadiya, die M?lak?rik?s nach den Handschriften heraus

gegeben und mit einem P?da-Index versehen. Abhandlung f?r die Kunde des Morganlandes 42.4.

Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag.

Subrahmanya Sastri, A. 1970. Bh?tta(tantra)rahasyam by Acharya Khandadeva. Varanasi: Sanskrit

Mahavidyalaya, B anaras Hindu University. Thakur, Anantalal. 1967. Ny?yadarsana of Gautama with the Bh?sya of V?tsy?yana, the V?rttika of

Uddyotakara, the T?tparyatik? ofV?caspati and the Parisuddhi ofUdayana, vol. I, chap. I. Mithila Institute Series, Ancient Text no. 20. Vaisali, Muzaffarpur: Prakrit Jain Institute.

_. 1996a. Ny?yav?rttikat?tparyatik? of V?caspatimisra. Ny?yacaturgranthik?, vol. III. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

_. 1996b. Ny?yav?rttikat?tparyaparisuddhi of Udayan?c?rya. Ny?yacaturgranthik?, vol. IV. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

_. 1997a. Gautamiyan?yadarsana with Bh?sya of V?tsy?yana. Ny?yacaturgranthik?, vol. I. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

_. 1997b. Ny?yabh?syav?rttika of Bh?radv?ja Uddyotakar. Ny?yacaturgranthik?, vol. II. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.



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Inquiring into Indian Theories of Verbal Cognition