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Core Intel Krzysztof Adamski # Mariusz Derela On the bank secret service Miami 18th May 2017

ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

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Page 1: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Core Intel

Krzysztof Adamski # Mariusz Derela

On the bank secret service

Miami 18th May 2017

Page 2: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Are security breaches common?

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/432412/bis-15-302-information_security_breaches_survey_2015-full-report.pdf

Page 3: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Carbanak

3

https://securelist.com/blog/research/68732/the-great-bank-robbery-the-carbanak-apt/

Page 4: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Core Intel is a part of ING Cyber Crime Resilience Programme to structurally improve the capabilities for the cybercrime

• prevention• detection and the • response

CoreIntel

4

Page 5: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

• Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even prevent, a cybercrime attack• (This kind of intelligence is available via internal and external parties and includes both

open and closed communities)• Monitoring, detection and response to “spear phishing”• Detection/mitigation of infected ING systems’ • Baselining network traffic/anomaly detection• Response to incidents (knowledge, tools, IT environment)• Automated feeds, automated analysis and historical data analysis

The reasoning

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Page 6: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

What is there on the market nowadays?

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Page 7: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

The world is not enough

Page 8: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

So the challenge is…

Page 9: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Market leaders Benelux

Growth markets

Commercial Banking

Challengers

Most of our data is within Europe

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Page 10: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Market leaders Benelux

Growth markets

Commercial Banking

Challengers

but we operate globally

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Page 11: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Expect the unexpected to collect all the data

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Page 12: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

• What kind of data do we need?• Where is our data located?• How we can potentially capture it?• What are the legal implications?

So there is a challenge to capture „all” the data

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Page 13: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Core Intel architecture

Page 14: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

So what you would like to see is…

Photo credit: edgarpierce via Foter.com / CC BY

Page 15: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

…In fact it is slightly more complicated

Page 16: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

All has its own purpose. Let’s see in details.

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Photo credit: https://www.pexels.com/photo/dslr-camera-equipments-147462/

Page 17: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Local data collector

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Page 18: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

But tell how to capture that data

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https://observer.viavisolutions.com/includes/popups/taps/tap-vs-span.php

Page 19: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Broker settings:Replication factor >= 3min.insync.replicas = 2unclean.leader.election.enable = falsereplica.lag.time.max.ms

Producer settings:acks = allretries = Integer.MAX_VALUEmax.block.ms = Long.MAX_VALUEblock.on.buffer.full = true

To have data in ordermax.in.flight.requests.per.connection = 1

Kafka producer configuration (as we don’t like losing data)

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Good overview here: https://www.slideshare.net/JayeshThakrar/kafka-68540012

Page 20: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Central data collector

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Page 22: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

But your business data more, so proceed with caution

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Photo credit: https://www.pexels.com/photo/white-caution-cone-on-keyboard-211151/

Page 23: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

• Network bandwidth control• quota.consumer.default• quota.producer.default

Kafka mirror maker configuration

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Page 24: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Secure data:listeners=SSL://host.name:portssl.client.auth=requiredssl.keystore.locationssl.keystore.passwordssl.key.passwordssl.truststore.locationssl.truststore.password

Kafka mirror maker configuration

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Securedata in transit

Page 25: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Streaming data

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Page 26: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

spark.yarn.maxAppAttemptsspark.yarn.am.attemptFailuresValidityIntervalspark.yarn.max.executor.failuresspark.yarn.executor.failuresValidityIntervalspark.task.maxFailuresspark.hadoop.fs.hdfs.impl.disable.cachespark.streaming.backpressure.enabled=truespark.streaming.kafka.maxRatePerPartition

Spark on yarn streaming configuration

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Page 27: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

In memory data grid

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val rddFromMap = sc.fromHazelcastMap("map-name-to-be-loaded")

Page 28: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Let’s find something in these logs

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Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/65363769@N08/12726065645/in/pool-555784@N20/

Page 29: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Matching

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Tornado - a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library - http://www.tornadoweb.org/MessagePack – binary transport formathttp://msgpack.org/

Page 30: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

• Automatically & continually match network logs <->threat intel • When new threat intel arrives, against full history network logs• When new network logs arrive, against full history threat intel• Alerts are shown in a hit dashboard• Dashboard is a web-based interfaces that provide flexible charts, querying, aggregation

and browsing • Quality/relevance of an alert is subject to the quality of IoC feeds and completeness of

internal log data.

Hit, alerts and dashboards

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Page 31: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Be smart with your tooling

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Photo credit https://www.flickr.com/photos/12749546@N07/

Page 32: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

and leverage e.g. elasticsearch templates

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Page 33: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Data mapping:- doc_value- fielddata- fields

Cluster settings to check:gateway.recover_after_nodesgateway.recover_after_master_nodesgateway.recover_after_data_nodesindices.recovery.max_bytes_per_secindices.breaker.total.limitindices.breaker.fielddata.limit

Elasticsearch configuration

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Page 34: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

For those who know how to use heavy equipment

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Photo credit: News Collection & Public Distribution @techpearce2 via Foter.com / CC BY

Page 35: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Long data storage - HDFS

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Page 36: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Kafka offset management

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Page 37: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Core Intel allows users to perform advanced analytics on network logs using a set of powerful tools

• Spark API to write code to process large data sets on a cluster• perform complex aggregations to collect interesting statistics

• run large scale clustering algorithms with Spark’s MLLib

• run graph analyses on network logs using Spark’s GraphX

• transform and extract data for use in another system (which are better for specific analytics or

visualization purposes)

• Kafka, co you can write own Consumers and Producers to work with your data• to perform streaming analysis on your data

• to implement your own alerting logic

• Toolset• Programming languages: Scala, Java, Python

• IDE’s: Eclipse / Scala IDE, IPython Notebook and R Studio

Advanced analytics

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Page 38: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

How do we schedule the jobs

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Page 39: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

How to keep everything under control

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Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/martijn141

Page 40: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Monitoring crucial points in your data pipeline

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Page 41: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Something for smart guys

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Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/jdhancock/5173498203/

Page 42: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Plenty of data to analyze

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Page 43: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Challenger on the operations side. Are containers the answer?

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Page 44: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift HA deployment

44

http://playbooks-rhtconsulting.rhcloud.com/playbooks/installation/installation.html

Page 45: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift Architecture

45

OSE VXLAN

RT - zone

Openshift set of clusters

BR0(OVS) VTEP

Phisical Network (ISP ECF)

T1: VlanT1T1: Nodes

Affinity: T1Anti Affinity:

[O66|R41]

. . .

Tenants namespaces

BR0 (OVS) VTEP

T2: VlanT2T2: Nodes

Affinity: T2Anti Affinity:

[O66|R41]

Tn: VlanTnTn: Nodes

Affinity: TnAnti Affinity:

[O66|R41]

OSE - masters Infra nodes

T1 nodes T2 nodes Tn nodes

InnerPodT110.1.1.2

InnerPodT210.1.2.2

T2 ProjectVNID: 302

T1 ProjectVNID: 301

Tn ProjectVNID: n

InnerPodT310.1.3.2

T3 ProjectVNID: 303

...

...

InnerPodTn10.1.n.2

Page 46: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Ingestion Layer

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Page 47: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Ingestion Layer

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+

Page 48: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Ingestion Layer

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Page 49: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Ingestion Layer

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Page 50: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Ingestion Layer – Pros & Cons

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• Rolling Update

Page 51: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Ingestion Layer – Pros & Cons

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• Rolling Update

• Triggers

Page 52: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Ingestion Layer – Pros & Cons

52

• Rolling Update

• Triggers

• AutoScale

Page 53: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Ingestion Layer – Pros & Cons

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• Rolling Update

• Triggers

• AutoScale

• Healthchecks

Page 54: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Elasticsearch Stack

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Page 55: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Challanges

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• Persistent Storage

• Rack Awarness

http://dailypicksandflicks.com/2011/10/25/did-you-know-the-worlds-best-selling-toy/cat-with-rubiks-cube/

Page 56: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – „PetSet” (Stateful Services)

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Page 57: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Persistent Storage

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Page 58: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Rack Awarness

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Page 59: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

OpenShift – Capacity

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Page 60: ING PP Example Reference 16x9 - June 2015 · • Measures against e-banking fraud, DDoS and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). • Threat intelligence allow to respond to, or even

Q&A

[email protected]

@adamskikrzysiek

https://pl.linkedin.com/in/adamskikrzysztof

[email protected]

@mariusz_derela

https://www.linkedin.com/in/mariusz-derela-30649a69

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