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Informing the Next Generation Air Force
Information Age Warfare
Industrial Age Information Age
• Mechanised elements (aircraft, ships,
tanks, etc)
• Segregated Air, Land and Maritime
warfare domains
• Independent governance structures
• Individual weapon systems
• Communications systems treated as a
support function to facilitate C2 and
situational awareness
• Reactive analysis
• Distributed, self-forming, self-healing,
resistant to attack, all domain
combat/battlespace cloud
• System of systems enterprise
integrated through domain and
mission-agnostic information links
• Information superiority and control of
the EM spectrum acts as a conventional
deterrence
• Advanced networking and computing
capabilities, utilising plug & play
systems
• Information is a combat mission
• Predictive analysis
• Unique CONOPs for each platform
• Disparate and disconnected systems
that pass as ‘Joint’
• Individually networked platforms,
eg L-16, L-11, IFDL, MADL
• Stove-piped Acquisition process
• Equipment-centric budgeting, focused
on platforms, sensors and weapons
Warfare Evolution
Service aligned,
platform-centric construct
Network-Centric Age
Loosely federated, Joint &
Combined construct
Highly Integrated, interconnected
enterprise that collaboratively
leverages broad information
exchange through
cross-domain synergy
Contemporary Operating Environment: Network-Centric Age
Key Attributes of a Future Air Force Capability
• Information-driven air and space operating
environment
• Rapid transfer and exploitation of data and
information to enable timely decision-making
• Delivery of Joint and Coalition effects at range
across a broad spectrum of air and space
operations
• Persistent strategic effect
• Adoption of Whole Force principles to exploit
advances in technology, niche skills, education and
training opportunities
Future As-is DLOD
Training
Equipment
Personnel
Infrastructure
Doctrine &
Concepts
Organisation
Information
Logistics
Interoperability
Operating Model
• The military cannot ‘train as they expect to fight’ in the information age
• Live and synthetic training is largely piecemeal using stand-alone synthetic systems
• Marginal and incremental gains only are made to Capability by limiting advances in
information technology to augmenting or accessorising current organisation, processes
and equipment
• Reducing number of uniformed personnel without compensating processes or systems in
place to ameliorate workload
• Attrition and lengthy training pipelines are adversely affecting specialised resources
• Information secure facilities isolated from everyday working environments
• Lack of investment in infrastructure ‘as-is’ upkeep
• Intelligence capability is built around the fusion of largely secret intelligence, augmented
loosely by open-source material
• Doctrine and Concepts that do not reflect information-age warfare
• Large deployed footprint required to support traditional HQ structure
• Ability to Collect is overmatching ability to Process and Disseminate
• ISTAR outputs/outcomes are not specified, measured or reported
• Focus on requirements is on network requirement rather that the data or information
requirement
• Fragmented and stove-piped logistics based around platforms, organisations, contracts
and forward/depth
• Support solutions for legacy aircraft are not optimised for high demand requirement (eg
as Collectors)
• Proliferation of stand-alone, non-interoperable systems/capabilities
• Lack of meaningful mechanisms to ensure that critical enablers are available
• No focus for pan-DLOD capability management
• Mission rehearsal through simulation using operational equipment linked to real-world
data
• Ability to ‘train as you fight’ within an operationally representative environment on a daily
basis through the employment of advanced synthetics
• All platforms combat-cloud capable
• All (Air) platforms capable of Collect
• Intellectual edge maintained through investment in education and training focused on
growing innovative leaders and followers able to exploit information-age technology and
operate in the Future Operating Environment
• A Workforce Mix enabled by the Whole Force Concept that provides an optimum, resilient,
agile workforce that is capable of meeting changing demands and an evolving threat
• Mechanisms in place that consider, predict and enact infrastructure measures based on
the needs of the Whole Force
• Intelligence capability built around open-source managed by Big-Data analytics and
augmented by classified intelligence
• Doctrine and Concepts that reflect information-age warfare and enable the direction of a
distributed system
• Greater use of reach-back through greatly improved connectivity
• Smaller deployed support footprint
• Single, clear view of the Defence information environment with requirements driven by
information/data need rather than network
• Real time exploitation of data and information utilising search and retrieve from Big Data
capability
• Routine exploitation of Social Media to influence through shaping opinion and understanding
• Automatic registration and tracking of consumption to predict and move materiel to the
point of need
• Full connectivity to contractors
• An integrated battlespace through an airborne gateway that receives, bridges and
distributes communication services between users, offering interoperability between
dissimilar networks, reach-back, range extension and BLOS
• Open and modular architectures are the norm with exceptions only where necessary
• Inter-agency interoperability is commonplace
• Mechanisms in place to manage interdependencies across Commands
• Clear lines of responsibility and accountability for pan-DLOD capability management,
supported by robust C2
DLOD Framework Analysis
Provenance evidenced by Air Command-commissioned Niteworks studies and Industry engagement
DLOD Framework Analysis
Change Description DLOD
Training
Equipment
Personnel
Infrastructure
Doctrine &
Concepts
Organisation
Information
Logistics
Interoperability
Operating Model
• Connect training (individual, collective, mission rehearsal) to combat /battlespace cloud, using real-world data where appropriate to enhance the learning
experience
• Ensure resilience through retaining an ability to operate in reversionary modes in a network degraded environment
• In parallel with the cultural revolution necessary to inculcate an information-led approach to Defence capability, continue the evolutionary path of enhancing
capability through the acquisition of extant and emerging technological architecture
• Create a compelling Personnel offer with tailored career paths to enhance recruitment and improve retention
• Recruit innovative and creative thinkers, including from outside the traditional background and age range
• Broaden the network of Industry partnerships
• Upgrade 1st Generation infrastructure to enable a 4th Gen+ network
• Improved ability to reach-back will increase requirement for home-based infrastructure
• Although largely enabled by Air and Space domains, the combat/battlespace cloud is a Joint user capability and must be developed as such
• To maintain political relevance and interest ensure that, by informing the future Air Force Vision, the aspirations remain affordable and achievable
• Adopt a Whole Force approach, to include Industry secondments and Reservist schemes, to grow and maintain a cadre of Suitably Qualified and
Experienced Personnel (SQEP)
• Flatten organisational structures to improve agility and reduce decision-making processes
• Define an Information Sponsor for Defence
• Space and cyber capabilities are integral to successful future operations, offering national resilience and redundancy
• Defensive cyber is essential to support digital trust and information assurance
• Exploit best practice from extant and emerging commercial models
• Reduced scale Defence capability demands greater cost-effectiveness, which is best achieved through consideration of improved interoperability early in the
acquisition cycle
• Top-down cultural revolution required to draw the MOD away from focussing on equipment capability and towards information-driven capability
• Agile acquisition, to include commercial engagement from the outset
• Partners Across Government (PAG) approach to relationships
Provenance evidenced by Air Command-commissioned Niteworks studies and Industry engagement
Airborne Communications Node (ACN) Network: Stage 1 UK MOB Deployed Operations A2AD
Permissive Airspace EW Threat GBAD
Air C2 / DCA / ISR Air C2 / SEAD / ISR
OCA / Deep
Strike / ISR
F-35 with MADL
secure TDL
Minimal
transmission to
maintain LO
• Tactical & Operational Air C2
• ISR Reach-back
• Mission Data Reach-back
• Global Eng & Logs Support
Multiple ACNs to optimise battlespace coverage
DOB
NASOC
ACN
ACN
ACN
ACN
BLOS Reach-back
Typhoon with L-16,
V/UHF Voice, possibly
SATCOM
SPEAR weapons
for tactical stand-
off Link-Equipped
Platforms
Airborne Communications Node (ACN) Network: Stage 2 UK MOB Deployed Operations A2AD
Permissive Airspace EW Threat GBAD
Air C2 / DCA / ISR Air C2 / SEAD / ISR OCA / Deep
Strike / ISR
F-35 with MADL
secure TDL
Minimal
transmission to
maintain LO
• Tactical & Operational Air C2
• ISR Reach-back
• Mission Data Reach-back
• Global Eng & Logs Support
All Platforms providing ACNs to optimise battlespace coverage
NASOC
ACN
BLOS Reach-back
Typhoon with L-16,
V/UHF Voice, possibly
SATCOM
SPEAR weapons
for tactical stand-
off
DOB
CONUS
A more developed scenario might see all platforms fitted with ACNs or coherent integrated communications solutions which would offer
a more meshed network for greater resilience across all environments
Air Operational Battlespace
UK MOB Deployed Operations A2AD
A more developed scenario might see all platforms fitted with ACNs or coherent integrated communications solutions which would offer
a more meshed network for greater resilience across all environments
Permissive Airspace
(with exception of Cyber threat)
CEMA
Contested CEMA &
GBAD
Threat
CONUS
UK
• Airborne Communications Node • Modular payloads – plug & play
• Minimise platform integration
• Minimise airworthiness challenges
• Absorb fast commercial technology change
• Network Air’s operational battlespace
• Mitigate contested EW spectrum for A2AD
• Every platform a ‘node in the Network’
• Self-forming, self healing
Airborne Communications Node (ACN) Network: Stage 2
Information Dominated Battlespace: Air
Use Case 1: Operating in a Contested Environment
Use Case 2: Homeland Defence - Maritime