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Policy Paper
Information Sharing in the Law Enforcement Community
Information sharing in the law enforcement community is not only a vital task, it is a very
difficult one to accomplish. Many law enforcement agencies have failed to successfully share
important prudent information and intelligence amongst other active member’s in the law
enforcement community. In the days, weeks, months, even years leading up until the tragic
events that occurred on September 11th, 2001, research shows that law enforcement agencies
failed to recognize the importance of information sharing and intelligence. This major failure
was one of the main reasons why the attacks on 9/11 were so successful.
Fifteen years later, countless studies and commission reports, law enforcement agencies
at the federal, state, and local levels failed at improving the ability to effectively share
information throughout the law enforcement community. In today’s modern world, agencies
must be able to keep up with the fast paced criminal environment. Criminal enterprises and
terrorist organizations use various forms of technology in order quickly communicate, research,
plan and attack a specified location. Law enforcement agencies and its personnel must use these
technologies to its advantage so it is able to identify the vast amounts of criminal activity and
threats that exist today early and often. Law enforcement agencies must be committed to this
difficult task in order to improve preparedness and preventative measures relative to national
security. This policy memo identifies the areas in which law enforcement agencies have failed in
terms of sharing information and aims to provide the material needed in order to establish
effective information sharing practices and programs throughout all law enforcement agencies.
1
BRIEF HISTORY OF INFORMATION SHARING AND COLLECTION
In order to understand information sharing and how to improve it, it is necessary to
explain a brief history of the practice. Throughout history information sharing has played a very
important role in the law enforcement community. The act of sharing information and collection
dates back as early as the 1920s. Law enforcement agencies would collect information on
individuals suspected of engaging in criminal activity. The information was not often shared
with other agencies, rather kept in a file system and not disseminated. During World War II,
military branches would collect information and effectively share it quickly to the appropriate
individuals. Information sharing was very important during the war because it allowed various
branches of the military to fully understand the enemy and its practices.
Fast forward to the Cold War, information sharing became a little more complex
followed by much scrutiny. During the Cold War federal agencies were collecting large amounts
of information on individuals and groups that were suspected “Communists.” As Carter notes in
his book “Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement
Agencies,” he explains that during the Cold War era, “responding to expressions of public and
government concern, local law enforcement agencies began creating intelligence dossiers, known
as “Red Files,” on persons who were suspected Communists and Communist sympathizers”
(Carter, 32). During this time, agencies again would not collect and disseminate information to
other agencies. Agencies were simply collecting information on individuals that did not portray
any criminal predicate. This information was then kept on a file system for an undisclosed
period of time. Agencies were technically allowed to do this because there were no rules or
regulations put into place to protect civilians from unethical practices like the dossier system. It
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was not until after the mid to late 70s where law enforcement agencies began to erase the
intelligence collection sector. In M.C. Waxman’s text “Police and National Security: American
Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11” he mentions that “following exposure
of abusive law enforcement surveillance tactics during the 1950s to 1970s, many police agencies
dismantled their intelligence collection units altogether.” (Waxman, 385) After this ‘era’ law
enforcement information collection and intelligence sharing practices started over from scratch.
INFORMATION SHARING FAILURES – PRE-9/11
As mentioned above, law enforcement agencies failed in many different categories in the
days, weeks, months, and years leading up until September 11th, 2001. Information sharing was
one of these large failures that ultimately led to the tragic deaths of thousands. The 9/11
Commission report published in 2004 points out many of the failures that happened before and
during the attacks of 9/11. On page 328 of this report, it states “the government’s ability to
collect intelligence inside the United States, and the sharing of such information between the
intelligence and law enforcement communities was not a priority before 9/11.” (Kean) In 2006
Miami Police Chief John F. Timoney stated “it was often the feeling at local law enforcement
prior to 9/11 that intelligence gathering was a Federal responsibility.” (Waxman, 385) Law
enforcement agencies and its personnel made too many assumptions in the time leading up until
9/11. Such assumptions led to poor communication and coordination efforts throughout the law
enforcement community. It is necessary to look back at the root cause of the problem so that
improvements to such policies can be made.
3
POOR COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION
Many agencies did not see the benefits to sharing information throughout the law
enforcement community. The general philosophy during this time was that agencies would “not
widely disseminate intelligence records out of concern that critical information would fall into
the wrong hands, thereby jeopardizing the inquiry as well as possibly jeopardizing undercover
officers, informants, and collection methods.” (Carter, 69)
Even on rare occasions when information was shared from agency to agency, there were
were several problems there as well. According to the journal “Re-forming Intelligence” by the
Center for National Interest, there was an “inadequate coordination and sharing of information
within the intelligence community, especially between the CIA and the FBI; the intelligence was
not always timely; and that estimates and analysis were often flawed.” (Chambliss, 80) Many
times agencies would hold back certain pieces of information when disseminating an intelligence
product. This may seem like a small issue, but leaving any information behind could sometimes
be the difference between a thwarted attack or a successful one. Policies and procedures did not
exist for this type of situation before 9/11. According to the “9/11 Commission Report,” the
FBI’s information systems were graded as poor. Kean writes, “analysts had difficulty getting
access to the FBI and intelligence community information they were expected to analyze. The
FBI’s information systems were woefully inadequate. The FBI lacked the ability to know what it
knew: there was no effective mechanism for capturing or sharing institutional knowledge.”
(Kean, 77)
Another example was in December of 2000. The CIA and FBI had a joint partnership in
attempting to identify individuals involved in the U.S.S. Cole bombing. The CIA and FBI had a
4
source that identified a few individuals that were indeed involved in the bombing. According to
the 9/11 commission report, the CIA failed to notify the FBI that the two individuals that were
identified knew each other. Because of this, the FBI did not start looking for the other ‘person of
interest’ until it was too late. This is “an example of how day-to-day gaps in information sharing
can emerge even when there is mutual goodwill.” (Kean, 267) Poor communication, lack of trust
in joint partnerships, and deficiencies in informational database technologies are the main
reasons why information sharing was almost non-existent before 9/11.
A NEW WAY FOREWARD? – POST 9/11 REFORM
Shortly after the attacks on 9/11, the failure to share information properly came to the
forefront. Attorney General John Ashcroft stated in November 2001 that “in order to meet this
new threat and to prevent future attacks, law enforcement officials at all levels of government—
federal, state, and local—must work together, sharing information and resources needed both to
arrest and prosecute the individuals responsible and to detect and destroy terrorist cells before
they can strike again.” (Waxman, 377) The first Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano noted that “partnerships with state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies affect DHS’s
ability to identify threats and bolster preparedness before an incident, and that information
sharing between DHS and state and local governments is particularly critical to our security.”
(Waxman, 377) It is evident from these quotes that information sharing is imperative in order to
prevent and mitigate future attacks within our nations borders.
Since 2001, the law enforcement community has undergone some restructuring. In order
to improve upon the lack of information sharing, the federal government created various reforms
5
and established new agencies to assist with protecting our nations security. Agencies like the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Fusion Centers, Officer of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), Transportation Security Administration and National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) were direct results of the catastrophic events on 9/11.
In 2004 the “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act” (IRPTA) of 2004 was
created. Section 1016 in the act states the creation of the Information Sharing Council,
Information Sharing Environment, Program Manager, and Terrorism Information. (IRTPA,
3665) Under this section it reads “the terms ‘‘information sharing environment’’ and ‘‘ISE’’
mean an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information, which approach may
include any methods determined necessary and appropriate for carrying out this section.”
(IRPTA, 3665) This section states that the President shall “create an information sharing
environment for the sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national
security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties; designate the
organizational and management structures that will be used to operate and manage the ISE; and
determine and enforce the policies, directives, and rules that will govern the content and usage of
the ISE.” (IRPTA, 3665) IRPTA was promising and seemed as if the ‘practice’ of information
sharing was going to be improved.
In order to create an efficient information sharing environment, strong partnerships must
be created. In the Information Sharing Environment text “A Brief History of the Information
Sharing Environment” it looks to “promote partnerships across federal, state, local and tribal
governments, the private sector, and internationally. Engagement, training and management
support are key to building the organizational capacity of our partners at all levels. Successful
engagement will help create a culture shift that will instill partners with an enduring commitment
6
to responsible information sharing.” (ISE, 9) Establishing joint partnerships among all levels of
law enforcement as well as the private sector will be highly beneficial to the overall information
sharing mission. In order to mesh together these joint partnerships and improve communication
functions, Fusion Centers were created.
In the journal “An Examination of the Effectiveness of State and Local Fusion Centers
Toward Federal Counterterrorism Efforts” fusion centers were created in order to alleviate
information and intelligence gaps between agencies. (Davis, 3) The centers were designed to
have a “bottom up approach that facilitates intelligence dispersal to all levels of law enforcement
in an effort to “connect all the dots” and eliminate the stovepipe effect present within the
intelligence community prior to 9/11.” (Davis, 3) In the beginning fusion centers seemed to fall
short of the overall anticipated mission the federal government had in mind. Some fusion center
throughout the country seem to still fall short of their mission due to lack of resources and man
power. Fusion centers should remain in tact because it provides a bridge between local law
enforcement agencies and federal law enforcement agencies that would not exist otherwise. It
will be explained later how fusion centers can be improved.
Fifteen years later, law enforcement agencies still struggle with the act of sharing
information. A recent study completed by Bruce Hoffman the text “The FBI: Protecting the
Homeland in the 21st Century” stated that “there is still wide room for improvement in the
Bureaus sharing practices with local law enforcement and the private sector.” (Hoffman, 111)
This review also found “lapses in communication, coordination, and collaboration among Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in FBI field offices; between FBI Headquarters and the field; and
between the Bureau and its federal, state, and local partners in law enforcement and
intelligence.” (Hoffman, 111) These lapses in communication and coordination is unacceptable.
7
Even after countless policy changes and guidelines, agencies like the FBI still cannot resolve the
lack of communication and coordination with other agencies.
THE CULTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Trusting partnerships between law enforcement agencies are still an issue today. Federal
agencies are hesitant to share information to other agencies sometimes due to lack of trust. The
culture that still exists today can be broken down into a “buyer vs seller” concept. In the text
“International Politics of Intelligence Sharing,” the “sellers of intelligence can’t be sure that the
‘buyers’ will adequately protect what they receive, and ‘buyers’ cannot be sure of the veracity of
the intelligence they get from ‘sellers.’” (Webb, 1) This lack of trust between agencies provides
even more inefficiencies throughout the law enforcement community. Lack of trust between
agencies will only make information sharing that much more difficult. If agencies cannot trust
each other in terms of “buying and selling,” informational gaps will form and the overall risk of
criminal activity and terrorist attacks will rise exponentially. Informational gaps must be
avoided at all costs in order to preserve the stability of national security.
Informational gaps can also stem from other actions. The “the culture of agencies feeling
they own the information they gathered at taxpayer’s expense must be replaced by a culture in
which the agencies instead feel they have the duty to the information—to repay the taxpayers’
investment by making that information available.” (Kean, 417) What this is saying is that
instead of each agency protecting ‘what is theirs,’ agencies must do the exact opposite and share
this information to other agencies because it may be vital to do so. In order to have fluid
8
intelligence operations between federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, information
must be shared.
Another concept that is relevant to todays law enforcement community is called
“information asymmetry.” Gavin Clarkson points out in the text “Information asymmetry and
information sharing,” that “information Information asymmetry exists when a party or parties
possess greater informational awareness pertinent to effective participation in a given situation
relative to other participating parties.” (Clarkson, 828) In the current law enforcement culture,
federal agencies are the parties that ‘possess greater information awareness’ about a given topic
more so than local law enforcement agencies. Lack of information sharing creates this
asymmetrical system that exists today. Asymmetrical information sharing lacks partnerships and
flexibility that is needed in order to prevent and mitigate future criminal acts. If one agency has
more knowledge than another agency about a given topic but fails to share such information, it is
an injustice to the entire law enforcement community. In 2010 former Senator, now United
States Secretary of State John Kerry said “isolating information vital to protecting Americans
from terrorists within a single agency sacrifices the rigorous, multidisciplinary analysis required
to improve our odds of stopping the next attack. When one agency sits on intelligence essential
to another, whether out of ignorance or reluctance to share, the chance of system failure is
astronomic.” (Freedman, 4) Kerry’s quote goes hand in hand with the asymmetrical information
sharing concept Clarkson offers. Clarkson goes into much greater detail about the asymmetrical
system and it is beneficial to share it here:
“horizontal information asymmetry exists when valuable
information is scattered among similarly-situated entities.
While some of those entities may have more information
9
than others, no entity has the complete set of information.
External entities with access to greater information about
the information poor entities will have informational power
over any individual entity among the class possessing
scattered information and over the entire class as a
whole.” (Clarkson, 830)
Relating this concept back to law enforcement is very easy. The law enforcement
community is currently structured in such a way where information sharing is not placed on the
forefront. For example, just because one agency collects a piece of information does not
necessarily mean that it would be the right agency to analyze or act on it. (Jackson, 192) This is
why it is important to change the culture that exists in todays law enforcement. Although
Clarkson describes this as horizontal in nature, it really is a vertical hierarchy and information
tends to flow from the top down. The underlying concept Clarkson and Kerry present is
important to understand in order to improve the culture that currently exists within the law
enforcement community.
THE ISE: THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Since the hierarchy is top down in nature, local law enforcement agencies tend to be
forgotten. Local law enforcement agencies play a vital role in the law enforcement community
and are essentially on the ‘frontlines’ when it comes to criminal and terrorist activity. There is a
common misconception that terrorism is just a ‘national security issue.’ Although terrorism is
definitely a national security issue, the main threat is happening within the jurisdictions of local
10
law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement agencies must be knowledgeable and aware of
what potential threats exist within their respective jurisdiction. In order for law enforcement
agencies to help mitigate future threats and attacks that could severely harm civilian life and
critical infrastructures, a solid plan must exist.
Waxman points out that “local police are often believed to be better suited to perform
counterterrorism functions because of their superior familiarity with their local communities”
and that “local police are positioned naturally to collect and process information about
communities and activities within.” (Waxman, 386) Since many local law enforcement agencies
are engaging in community oriented policing, it allows for vast information to be collected. Vital
pieces of information can be gained multiple ways as mentioned in the brief “Building on Clues:
Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and Characterize Terrorist Activity.”
Such information can be obtained from 911 calls and responses, direct reports of planning an
attack such as a ‘tip’, large purchases of explosives, weapons, chemicals or suspicious
surveillance of critical infrastructures. (Strom, 4) Law enforcement personnel must take this task
very seriously. It has been reported and I have physically seen law enforcement officers
disregard any real threat that exists within a given jurisdiction. The mentality that exists within
some officers is that ‘it won’t happen here.’ That mentality is one of the main reasons as to why
the 9/11 attacks were so successful. Threats still exist today and should not be taken lightly.
Proper education on these issues can help further stress the importance of local law agencies in
the war on terror.
There are many ways for law enforcement agencies to find clues that could prevent a
catastrophic event. Since law enforcement agencies are indeed on the ‘frontlines’ of these types
of events, it is so very important for the personnel and even the public to be educated on what to
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look for regarding suspicious activity. Local law enforcement agencies should be the foundation
in the information sharing operations structure. In order to be successful in mitigating future
terrorist attacks, law enforcement agencies must disseminate vital information to surrounding
local agencies as well as to state and federal agencies. What this means is that local law
enforcement agencies have the power and responsibility to be aware of the current threats that
exist within their jurisdiction and to identify and investigate any known suspects or groups. If
law enforcement agencies act as the foundation to information sharing operations, it will
drastically help mitigate future terrorist plots and threats that exist within our country today.
Instead of having an asymmetric hierarchal structure that is ‘top down’ in nature, one
would think creating a reverse hierarchal structure that is ‘bottom up’ in nature would alleviate
this problem. This is not the case. By creating a linear path to information sharing (i.e. the
hierarchal structure) some agencies will be excluded from information sharing partnerships. In
order to solve this issue is to create a triangular structure. This ‘information triangle’ structure
would produce greater information sharing techniques and would provide a much more effective
and efficient way to share information across the law enforcement community. The triangular
structure will be explained in greater detail during the recommendation portion of this policy
memo.
CURRENT THREATS
Before going into the recommendation portion of this policy memo, it is necessary to
provide a quick overview of the current threats that exist today in national security.
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Understanding the current threats that exist will assist in making improvements to the overall
structure of the information sharing environment.
The crime of today has changed drastically since the establishment of information sharing
practices. The results of criminal acts have not changed much, but the way criminals and
terrorists work in the days, weeks, months, and years leading up to an attack or other event has
drastically changed. Many technologies that exist today did not exist fifteen years ago.
Technologies like: the internet (it existed but much greater and complex now), smartphones,
tablets, interactive online gaming networks (Xbox Live, Playstation Network, social media
outlets (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, etc.), and drones did not exist fifteen years ago.
Individuals can communicate ideas, opinions, and plans very quickly and easily now with the
creation of these technologies. In general, the world wide web has given criminals and terrorist
organizations a much easier means to collect and disseminate information to its counterparts.
(Kean, 88) Every single year technology improves, new programs are developed. This swift
improvement of technology provides many opportunities and challenges for law enforcement
agencies. (Chau, 2)
The law enforcement community at all levels must be able to establish practices that help
identify criminal and terrorist threats during the planning stages so that attacks can be prevented.
Because of these technologies, it is vital that effective information sharing practices are
established throughout the law enforcement community. In the journal “Intelligence Reform:
The Logic of Information Sharing,” Calvert Jones states that “today’s rapidly evolving threats,
by contrast, call for ‘quick, imaginative, and agile responses. To develop this capability,
information must be shared more widely. Information should be set loose from the outdated
need-to-know standard for sharing that constricted its flow during the Cold War.” (384-385)
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Agencies must rapidly share information efficiently and accurately throughout the law
enforcement community in order to keep up with the ‘rapidly evolving threats’ that exist today.
Information sharing is the Achilles heel in the law enforcement community and is “the nervous
system to a more collaborative, networked intelligence community better suited to today’s
threats.” (Jones, 385)
Technology is not the only thing that changes rapidly every year, criminals also rapidly
change and adapt as well. Throughout the United States there are thousands of individuals that
are extremist in nature. These individuals can also be called lone wolf terrorists or extremists.
Some of these individuals are heavily influenced by groups like ISIS and attempt to fight a
‘leaderless jihad.’ (Waxman, 406) Since lone wolves are very difficult to identify, it is important
for not only local, state, and federal agencies to share information but the public as well. Many
of the research that is completed on information sharing fails to mention how important the
general public can be. The general public and business owners must be educated in how to
properly identify suspicious activity or suspicious persons. If the general public and business
owners are trained properly in this area, it will limit the “oversaturation” of information.
Oversaturation occurs when too much irrelevant information is being shared. The challenge is to
“process better information and avoiding problems of too much information—addressing the
challenges of too many “dots’” (Patel, 47) In order to reduce this from happening, properly
educating and training the general public and law enforcement personnel is a must. A database
should also be created in order to quickly share information between business owners and law
enforcement agencies. More details will be provided in the recommendation section of this
policy memo.
14
POLICY OPTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
1. CULTURE IMPROVEMENTS
a. This memo has provided vast amounts of information in regards to the current
toxic culture that exists within the law enforcement community. Federal, state,
and local agencies are failing to effectively share information efficiently with one
another. Failing to share information properly will result in increased criminal
activity and an increased chance of another successful catastrophic attack. The
Project Manager of the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) should be
responsible in creating the following items:
b. Provide incentives to agencies that share information correctly
i. “Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a
better balance between security and shared knowledge.” (Kean, 417)
ii. These incentives do not have to be of any monetary value in order to keep
spending at a minimum.
iii. Incentives could be in the form of issuing a congratulatory “time off”
b. Awards should be given out throughout the law enforcement community to
help establish a culture that intel analysts and other individuals are
rewarded for sharing information effectively and accurately.
i. Although reward programs do exist, there are zero ‘information sharing’
awards
ii. Rewards could be in paper form, pins, or recognition in a department
15
iii. Providing rewards and incentives will help increase participation efforts in
terms of sharing information
c. “Need-to-Know” culture must be replaced with “Need-to-Share” culture
i. As Kean writes on page 417 in the 9/11 Commission Report “There are no
punishments for not sharing information. Agencies uphold a “need-to-
know” culture of information protection rather than promoting a “need-to-
share” culture of integration.”
1. Establishing the ‘need-to-share’ culture is beneficial for all parties
involved.
d. Create a new Triangular Structure for joint partnerships and information
sharing
i. As mentioned previously, a triangular structure should be created in order
for information to be shared for effectively and efficiently.
ii. Each agency that has information must be willing to share it when
necessary
iii. By creating a triangular structure, no agency is above or below each other.
Every agency has the right to know.
iv. Creating this structure will build trust throughout the law enforcement
community.
e. Implementation Problems & Unintended Effects:
i. A problem that may arise from increasing participation efforts to
information sharing, it may cause agencies to “over-share” meaning that
the system would be over saturated with information that has little to no
16
importance
1. This over saturation can get in the way of high priority issues and
could lead to information & intelligence gaps
ii. How to mitigate issue:
1. Supervisors within each given agency should review information
before it is disseminated throughout the law enforcement
community.
2. Supervisors must not make a decision based off of any biases, but
rather the importance of the information and intelligence product.
3. The PM-ISE should implement a bi-annual conference every year
in a given location in order to establish continuity between law
enforcement agencies as well as providing opportunities for
individuals from each agency to network. By doing so, trust and
coordination efforts would be improved.
f. Overall, this recommendation provides little to no negative effects and could be
highly beneficial for all agencies. Since this is a ‘culture’ improvement, there are
no changes monetarily.
2. HOLD AGENCIES ACCOUNTABLE
a. Agencies must be held accountable if information is not being shared. This memo
has presented many examples as to why information sharing is so important and
what the negative effects it can have if not used properly.
i. Withholding information can lead to catastrophic events like 9/11 or the
Boston Marathon Bombing. That is why a zero tolerance policy must be
17
put in to place. Agencies must be held accountable for such failures.
b. Create a “Rules of Information Sharing Guideline.”
i. The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) already has guidelines about
implantation and privacy issues.
ii. A “rulebook” must be created that strictly states the rules of information
sharing as well as punishable acts if information is not properly shared
effectively.
1. Such punishments could be as follows: suspension with or without
pay and even termination
2. A zero tolerance policy must be established in this rulebook
iii. Annual audits should be conducted to make sure agencies remain on track
and achieve the information sharing goals
c. Implementation Problems & Unintended Effects:
i. There does not seem to be any unintended effects that would stem from
this move.
3. CREATE A UNIVERSAL DATABASE FOR LOCAL BUSINESSES AND
GENERAL PUBLIC
a. This database could be run by the Fusion Center in the given geographical area.
Fusion centers are the important bridge between federal, state, and local agencies.
Having the database set up and run through the Fusion Center, it will allow the
database to be accessed by all agencies in that given area.
b. The database would have a username, password, and company details. This will
provide law enforcement agencies the necessary information to understand where
18
resources must be assigned.
c. Local law enforcement agencies have the vast knowledge in its jurisdictional
boundaries. Since local law enforcement agencies are on the ‘frontlines’
essentially in terms of national security, it is necessary for local businesses to
share suspicious activities and known threats with local law enforcement
d. This would go along the same concept as the NYPD “Operation Nexus” database.
Local businesses can provide information on suspicious activity and suspicious
purchases.
e. This database would bridge the gap between law enforcement and the general
public. The idea behind this is that the more people who share and receive
information, there is a higher likelihood that a threat can be identified before an
attack occurs. (Carter, 69)
f. Implementation Problems & Unintended effects
i. Database could be over saturated with unimportant information if the
general public is not properly educated on the: who, what, where, when,
and how of reporting
ii. If Fusion Centers do not have the adequate staffing levels, database would
be rendered useless. Heavy influx of information is expected with this
database. This is the reason why there must be adequate staffing levels.
iii. Budgetary concerns: it is unknown the exact amount of monies that must
be allocated for such a database.
iv. Privacy concerns: civil rights activists may dislike this idea because
private companies would be assisting law enforcement agencies with
19
personal information such as ‘buyer information.’
g. How to mitigate issue
i. Provide free of charge classes a few times a year to educate the general
public and business owners on what kind of information to report and
when to report it
ii. This database should only be used by Fusion Centers that have adequate
staffing levels. Supervisors or the Director of the particular center would
be able to provide if the center has adequate staffing levels to run this
database
iii. Privacy concerns can be solved by being transparent. Information that is
being collected into the database must be investigated and analyzed before
either dissemination or purging. It is important to protect information “in
our care to safeguard citizens’ privacy and civil liberties, as well as to
shield our sources and methods. Our investigative agencies must wait until
the activities of the persons under investigation reach a level of validity
and clarity before the information is shared.” (DOJ, 5)
1. Agencies must follow the guidelines set forth by 28 CFR Part 23
that states that information can only be collected and kept if there I
reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal
activity. It also states that information cannot be collected and
kept because of political, religious or social views or affiliations
with any group unless again there is reasonable suspicion that the
group or individual is involved in criminal activity. (28 CFR Part
20
23, 23.20 (a)(b))
SELECTING A POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Reviewing the three recommendations and the individual challenges that exist within
each one, the policy that would be best would be recommendation number one: Culture
Improvements. Although the other two recommendations are important in order to increase the
efficiency of information sharing, recommendation number one provides greater results right
away. Changing the culture is the main issue in terms of information sharing. It evident that the
culture that has existed throughout the past fifteen years has been toxic. In order to improve
information sharing, the culture and ideology must change. Policy recommendation number one
provides the areas that need to be improved and explains how to do it. This recommendation
helps the entire law enforcement community while minimizing costs and improving overall
effectiveness of the information sharing program.
Appendix A:
Policy: Implement Culture Change throughout the entire information sharing environment.
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Annotated Bibliography
1. 28 CFR Part 23 Executive Order. (n.d.). Retrieved March 29, 2016, from
https://www.iir.com/28CFR_Program/28CFR_Resources/Executive_Order/
a. 28 CFR Part 23 was an executive order put in place in order to protect the civil
liberties and privacies of U.S. Citizens. This order provides a guideline for law
enforcement agencies to follow so that further abused in collecting information is
eradicated.
2. A Brief History of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE). (n.d.). Information Sharing
Environment.
a. This journal provides all the information needed to fully understand the ins and outs
of Information Sharing Environment (ISE). One of the main concepts mentioned in
this journal is the idea of promoting partnerships across federal, state, and local
agencies. By creating strong, joint partnerships, criminal enterprises, threats and
attacks can and will be thwarted. The concepts provided in this journal proves to be a
beneficial source for this policy paper.
3. Carter, D. L. (2009). Law enforcement intelligence: A guide for state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services.
a. Dr. Carter of Michigan State University created a detailed outline for local, state, and
federal agencies to follow in order to implement law enforcement intelligence the
correct way into their respective agencies. There are many pages within this
guideline that speaks about the importance of information sharing and what the
benefits are when it is implemented correctly. Since criminal acts, terrorism threats,
22
criminal enterprises are multijurisdictional, information sharing must be accurate,
secure, and readily available for all agencies that need it. Dr. Carters guideline has
been used by the Department of Justice and shared thousands of times to various
agencies throughout the country. This is a very important source in this research
paper.
4. Chambliss, S. (2005). Re-Forming Intelligence. Center for National Interest, (79), 79-83.
a. This particular journal focuses mainly on the adoption of human intelligence as
opposed to open source intelligence, etc. It does, however, make a great point as
to why there must be intelligence reform: “In addition, we found that there was
inadequate coordination and sharing of information within the intelligence
community, especially between the CIA and FBI; that intelligence was not always
timely; and that estimates and analysis were often flawed.” (Chambliss, 80) This
would be the only quote used from this journal, but I definitely think it is
worthwhile for citation purposes.
5. Chau, M., Atabakhsh, H., Zeng, D., & Chen, H. (2001). Building an Infrastructure for Law
Enforcement Information Sharing and Collaboration: Design Issues and Challenges.
a. With the rapid growth in technology and the use of the internet in the 21st century,
it is necessary to understand the challenges law enforcement faces in terms of this.
Information sharing can be shared much easier and more effectively now with the
current technology that exists. This article describes the studies done with the
Tucson Police Department and the databases that were created in order to help
share information much easier. This article is good for the research at hand for
this paper.
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6. Clarkson, G., Jacobsen, T. E., & Batcheller, A. L. (2007). Information asymmetry and
information sharing. Government Information Quartely, 24, 827-839.
a. Clarkson and Jacobsen describe this idea of Informational Asymmetry and
Informational Sharing. This article does not directly mention law enforcement in
any capacity, but the concepts behind the informational asymmetry and
informational sharing fits perfectly in terms of this paper. Asymmetry is when
multiple agencies know things about a given topic but not the complete picture. It
is shown by three bubbles listed as “A, B, C” respectively. Each bubble has one
arrow pointing to the next bubble but it is only a one way relationship. This is
Asymmetry in terms of information sharing. This is the type of relationship that
must be avoided. The other figure shows bubbles “A,B,C” all connected with two
way arrows showing the continuity between all agencies, allowing more
informational flow between each other. These concepts are very beneficial in
understanding how to fix the information sharing problem that exists today
amongst law enforcement agencies.
7. Congress. (2004). Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Public Law.
a. IRPTA was created in 2004. This act established the Information Sharing
Environment (ISE) and provided a guideline for agencies to follow in order to
share information more effectively and efficiently. It is important to provide this
information for this policy because recommendations will be built off of this act.
8. Davis, T. (2014). An Examination of the Effectiveness of State and Local Fusion Centers
Toward Federal Counterterrorism Efforts. Intelligence and National Security Studies, 1-2
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a. After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, there was a federal mandate that
information must be shared amongst local, state, and federal agencies. Shortly
after, Fusion centers were created in order to streamline information sharing
among all types of agencies on every level. There is a lot of negative things said
about fusion centers, but this article refutes those claims and comments that state
and local fusion centers have played very important roles in deterring terrorist
threats and acts from coming to fruition.
9. FBI Information Sharing & Safeguarding Report 2012. (2012). U.S. Department of Justice,
1-53.
a. This governmental report written and issued by the FBI in 2012 shows the steps the
agency has taken since 2001. The sharing of information is a main issue in report and
it describes the many steps the agencies has taken in the years leading up until this
document. The agency also provides the importance of civil rights and civil liberties
and the steps it also takes in order to protect these things. This is a great
informational guide that provides the steps the FBI has taken in order to improve its
overall efficiency.
10. Freedman, H. N. (2010). Assessing the Effectiveness of Post 9/11 Intelligence Information
Sharing. Defense Intelligence Agency.
a. Provides great insight into the effectiveness of information sharing post 9/11.
Freedman quotes John Kerry about isolating information sharing to one agency
instead of sharing it to agencies that need to know. This journal is a great source for
this paper because it shows proof that even other entities in the federal government
see that information sharing is an issue.
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11. Hoffman, B., Meese, E., III, & Roemer, T. J. (2015). The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in
the 21st Century. 9/11 Review Commission, 1, 1-124.
a. The FBI was directed by the United States Congress to put together a commission
and provide research and evidence stating the progress made since 9/11. This
commission consisted of three researchers/authors that looked back within the
FBI and created assessments, analysis’s, and recommendations in regards to the
successes and failures of the FBI since 2001. There have been numerous failures
as well as successes that the FBI has been apart of. Information sharing has been
a failure and this article provides in-depth analysis in this area.
12. Jackson, B. A. (2009). The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society. Homeland
Security Program and the Intelligence Policy Center, 1-241.
a. In this journal it describes the current and future state of domestic intelligence
within the United States. Each chapter breaks domestic intelligence down into
multiple categories: the history, the current state, civil rights and civil liberties
protections, and information sharing. It is necessary to know these characteristics
of a domestic intelligence agency in terms of this paper. In order to make
improvements in this area, the overall structure of domestic intelligence must be
known so that we can dissect the problems inside and out.
13. Jones, C. (2007). Intelligence reform: The logic of information sharing. Intelligence and
National Security, 22(3), 384-401.
a. Jones writes a fantastic article in regards to information sharing and its
importance in the overall intelligence mission. Jones brings up the multiple
events that happened in history and what was learned from these events.
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Intelligence has been around for a very long time and by providing pieces of
history of events when intelligence was used is necessary in order to understand
this improved policy. In addition to this information, Jones also explains the logic
of information sharing and how agencies go about improving this tough task. In
today’s modern world where crimes are happening at a rapid pace, information
sharing must be placed at the forefront in the missions of government agencies.
Swift, accurate information sharing is a must in order to prevent and mitigate
future attacks by an enemy.
14. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States., Kean, T. H., & Hamilton,
L. (2004). The 9/11 Commission report: Final report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.
a. This final report that was released in 2004 is a great informational guideline to pas
and future issues in regards to homeland security and intelligence. In multiple
chapters it states that every level of law enforcement failed to recognize the
threats that existed in the days, months, and years leading up until September 11th,
2001. By looking through this guideline, it is a great tool to not only view the
multitude of failures that happened then, but also what can be learned from such
failures. This report makes various recommendations to help mitigate future
catastrophic failures. A large portion of the report also describes how law
enforcement agencies failed to properly share information between local, state,
and federal agencies. In review, the report portrays the importance of information
sharing and also provides recommendations in how to improve in this area.
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15. Patel, F. (2011). DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: OUR RIGHTS AND SAFETY. Brennan
Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 1, 1-131.
a. Faiza Patel writes in this academic journal that domestic intelligence in America
is broken. Not only this, but agencies involved in the intelligence community
have violated and continue to violate civil rights and civil liberties of American
citizens. This article presents past and present abuses in terms of collection and
sharing of information. It is important to understand the history of the
intelligence process in order to make improvements and changes moving forward.
When creating recommendations and policy improvements or changes, history
sometimes cannot and should not repeat itself. This article provides information
that provides information about past issues and also helps provide information on
how to avoid such abuses in the future.
16. Strom, K., Hollywood, J., Pope, M., Weintraub, G., Daye, C., & Gemeinhardt, D. (2011).
Building on Clues: Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and
Characterize Terrorist Activity Final Report. Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 1-62.
a. This journal provides information about the poor coordination and communication
between local, state, and federal agencies in terms of counterterrorism procedures.
Since there is no standardization to the information sharing process among all
agencies, sharing falls by the wayside. This journal provides in depth details of its
findings on this issue and provides ways to improve this problem.
17. Waxman, M. C. (2009). Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and
Counterterrorism After 9/11. Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 3, 377-407.
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a. This article is broken down into five important parts. Waxman provides great
insight in the failures of information sharing and partnerships between local, state,
and federal law enforcement agencies. Waxman also provides multiple
challenges that stems from improvements in this area: organizational challenges,
accountability challenges, and functional challenges. Many challenges exist still,
but Waxman provides answers to such challenges.
18. Webb, J., & Walsh, J. I. (2009). The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing.
Intelligence in Public Literature.
a. Webb provides a great ‘concept’ to bring to this policy memo. Webb’s concept is the
“buyer vs. seller” concept and it provides an interesting approach to broken
information sharing environment that exists today. Under this concept the sellers of
the intelligence product are weary of the buyers and vice versa. In other words,
Webb is stating that there is still a lot of trust issues that remain in the law
enforcement community.
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