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Information-Driven Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

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Page 1: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Information-Driven Cybersecurity

4 June 2013

Bill Russell Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect

Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Page 2: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Layered Cybersecurity Defense Framework

Computer Network Defense Defense-In-Depth

The FanTM

Perimeter Firewall

Perimeter IDS/IPS Advanced

Sensor

Honeypot Message Security

(anti-virus, anti-malware)

DLP

Secure DMZs

Application Security

Malware Analysis NAC/Endpoint

Profiler

Enclave Firewall DLP

Wireless/Mobile Protection

Web Proxy Content Filtering

Enterprise IDS/IPS

VoIP Protection

Virtual Network Security

Enterprise Message Security

Enterprise Remote Access

Endpoint Security Enforcement

DLP Desktop Firewall

Host IDS/IPS

Content Security (anti-virus, anti-malware)

Patch Management

USGCB Compliance

SIEM Digital Forensics Security SLA/SLO Reporting

Escalation Management

Focused Ops

SOC/NOC Monitoring (24x7)

Incident Reporting, Detection, Response (CIRT)

Security Dashboard

Continuous Monitoring

and Assessment Situational Awareness

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Awareness Training

Continuous C&A

IT Security Governance

Security Policies & Compliance

Security Architecture

& Design

Threat Modeling

Penetration Testing

Cyber Threat Intelligence

Security Technology Evaluation

Risk Management Framework

WAF

Static App Testing/Code

Review

Database Secure Gateway

(Shield)

Database Monitoring /Scanning Dynamic App Testing

DAR/DIM/DIU Protection

Data Wiping Cleansing

PKI

FICAM

Enterprise Right Management

DLP

Data Classification

Data/Drive Encryption

Data Integrity Monitoring

© 2013 Northrop Grumman Corporation

Acronyms & Abbreviations: DAR: Data At Rest DIM: Data In Motion DIU: Data In Use

DLP: Data Loss Prevention IDP: Intrusion Detection and Prevention FICAM: Federal Identity Credential and Access Management

NAC: Network Access Control PKI: Public Key Infrastructure SIEM: Security Information Event Management USGCB: US Govt Configuration Baseline

OUTSIDE THREAT

Mission Critical Assets

Inside Threats

The “Fan™” - Layered Cybersecurity Defensive Reference Model

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Page 3: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Where Has This Approach Gotten Us?

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Soviet AN-24 manufactured beginning 1963 – 40 sold to China

Chinese Y-7 manufactured beginning 1983

Chinese Domestic Aviation Circa 1983

Page 4: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Chinese Domestic Aviation Circa 2011

BEIJING — China’s military conducted a test flight of a new stealth fighter jet on Tuesday, overshadowing an important visit to Beijing by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates aimed at improving defense ties — and apparently catching China’s civilian leadership off guard.

(New York Times, July 2011)

U.S. made F-35 Chinese made J-20

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Page 5: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

U.S. made MQ-9 Reaper

Chinese Unmanned Air Vehicle

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Chinese made Pterodactyl 1 (2009)

Page 6: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Think There Is An Interest In Finance?

High-Speed Trading Algorithms

The Knife

The Boston Stumbler

“ China is the world's second-largest economy next to our own. They are a huge trading partner, and our two economies are incredibly intertwined”

Robert Mittelstaedt Arizona State University

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Page 7: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Layered Cybersecurity Defense Framework

Computer Network Defense Defense-In-Depth

The FanTM

Perimeter Firewall

Perimeter IDS/IPS Advanced

Sensor

Honeypot Message Security

(anti-virus, anti-malware)

DLP

Secure DMZs

Application Security

Malware Analysis NAC/Endpoint

Profiler

Enclave Firewall DLP

Wireless/Mobile Protection

Web Proxy Content Filtering

Enterprise IDS/IPS

VoIP Protection

Virtual Network Security

Enterprise Message Security

Enterprise Remote Access

Endpoint Security Enforcement

DLP Desktop Firewall

Host IDS/IPS

Content Security (anti-virus, anti-malware)

Patch Management

USGCB Compliance

SIEM Digital Forensics Security SLA/SLO Reporting

Escalation Management

Focused Ops

SOC/NOC Monitoring (24x7)

Incident Reporting, Detection, Response (CIRT)

Security Dashboard

Continuous Monitoring

and Assessment Situational Awareness

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Awareness Training

Continuous C&A

IT Security Governance

Security Policies & Compliance

Security Architecture

& Design

Threat Modeling

Penetration Testing

Cyber Threat Intelligence

Security Technology Evaluation

Risk Management Framework

WAF

Static App Testing/Code

Review

Database Secure Gateway

(Shield)

Database Monitoring /Scanning Dynamic App Testing

DAR/DIM/DIU Protection

Data Wiping Cleansing

PKI

FICAM

Enterprise Right Management

DLP

Data Classification

Data/Drive Encryption

Data Integrity Monitoring

© 2013 Northrop Grumman Corporation

Acronyms & Abbreviations: DAR: Data At Rest DIM: Data In Motion DIU: Data In Use

DLP: Data Loss Prevention IDP: Intrusion Detection and Prevention FICAM: Federal Identity Credential and Access Management

NAC: Network Access Control PKI: Public Key Infrastructure SIEM: Security Information Event Management USGCB: US Govt Configuration Baseline

OUTSIDE THREAT

Mission Critical Assets

Inside Threats

The “Fan™” - Layered Cybersecurity Defensive Reference Model

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Page 8: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Why COTS Security Will Always Be a Step Behind

PerimeterFirewall

PerimeterIDS/IPS Advanced

Sensor

HoneypotMessage Security

(anti-virus, anti-malware)

DLP

Secure DMZs

Application Security

MalwareAnalysisNAC/Endpoint

Profiler

EnclaveFirewall DLP

Wireless/MobileProtection

Web ProxyContent Filtering

EnterpriseIDS/IPS

VoIPProtection

Virtual NetworkSecurity

EnterpriseMessage Security

EnterpriseRemoteAccess

Endpoint SecurityEnforcement

DLPDesktopFirewall

Host IDS/IPS

Content Security(anti-virus,

anti-malware)Patch

Management

USGCBCompliance

SIEM Digital Forensics Security SLA/SLO Reporting

EscalationManagement

Focused Ops

SOC/NOC Monitoring (24x7)

Incident Reporting,Detection, Response (CIRT)

Security Dashboard

ContinuousMonitoring

and AssessmentSituationalAwareness

VulnerabilityAssessment

Security AwarenessTraining

ContinuousC&A

IT SecurityGovernance

Security Policies& Compliance

SecurityArchitecture

& Design

ThreatModeling

PenetrationTesting

Cyber Threat Intelligence

SecurityTechnology Evaluation

Risk ManagementFramework

WAF

Static AppTesting/Code

Review

DatabaseSecure Gateway

(Shield)

DatabaseMonitoring /ScanningDynamic App Testing

DAR/DIM/DIUProtection

Data WipingCleansing

PKI

FICAM

Enterprise Right Management

DLP

DataClassification

Data/DriveEncryption

Data IntegrityMonitoring

MissionCritical Assets

Well funded adversaries have access to the same technologies as the defenders

Defender’s COTS-based Security Architecture

Advanced Adversaries’ Attack Tool Test Environment

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Page 9: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

COTS Security Technology Misses the Advanced Adversary

• A well architected defense-in-depth security approach based on COTS security technology defeats 80% of the threats

• Determined threat actors have access to all the COTS security products and test their attacks against those tools

• Openly available tools and online collaboration of hacktivists and criminals lower the barrier to entry for adversaries

• Advanced adversaries have state or criminal support including advanced exploits, collection management, and targeting

“Over the course of three months, attackers installed 45 pieces of custom malware. The Times … found only one instance in which … identified an attacker’s software as malicious and quarantined it…” New York Times, 30 Jan 2013

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Page 10: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Offense Always Has An Advantage

• Threat Technical Capabilities • Exploits – Development teams with State or criminal support • Internet distribution points to drop and pick up • Command and Control using Botnets • C2 Obfuscation using DDNS, FastFlux DNS • Process and attack strategy – intel teams, crash and attack teams, exploit teams, exfil teams

• Threat Intelligence Collection • Comprehensive target picture through open source collection • Your friends names, professions, and things they like • Everything and you post, share, like or link to • Social media systems not inclined to provide security

• Further Lowering of the Barrier to Entry • MetaSploit makes attacking easy for the uninitiated • Threat forums for collaboration and sharing of tools • Social Justice and Causes (Anonymous, WikiLeaks, Hacktivists) rallied against your enterprise: • Every employee is a possible vector

Threat Actors Only Need to Be Right One Time to Gain Access to the Enterprise

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Page 11: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

Good Guys Have Some Ways to Level the Field

• Behavioral analytics (Who talks and works with whom)

• Partnerships for threat information sharing

• Threat intelligence team augmentation

• Custom file analysis • Custom monitoring of network traffic

for C2 channels • Organizational agility to respond to

changing threat tactics

PerimeterFirewall

PerimeterIDS/IPS Advanced

Sensor

HoneypotMessage Security

(anti-virus, anti-malware)

DLP

Secure DMZs

Application Security

MalwareAnalysisNAC/Endpoint

Profiler

EnclaveFirewall DLP

Wireless/MobileProtection

Web ProxyContent Filtering

EnterpriseIDS/IPS

VoIPProtection

Virtual NetworkSecurity

EnterpriseMessage Security

EnterpriseRemoteAccess

Endpoint SecurityEnforcement

DLPDesktopFirewall

Host IDS/IPS

Content Security(anti-virus,

anti-malware)Patch

Management

USGCBCompliance

SIEM Digital Forensics Security SLA/SLO Reporting

EscalationManagement

Focused Ops

SOC/NOC Monitoring (24x7)

Incident Reporting,Detection, Response (CIRT)

Security Dashboard

ContinuousMonitoring

and AssessmentSituationalAwareness

VulnerabilityAssessment

Security AwarenessTraining

ContinuousC&A

IT SecurityGovernance

Security Policies& Compliance

SecurityArchitecture

& Design

ThreatModeling

PenetrationTesting

Cyber Threat Intelligence

SecurityTechnology Evaluation

Risk ManagementFramework

WAF

Static AppTesting/Code

Review

DatabaseSecure Gateway

(Shield)

DatabaseMonitoring /ScanningDynamic App Testing

DAR/DIM/DIUProtection

Data WipingCleansing

PKI

FICAM

Enterprise Right Management

DLP

DataClassification

Data/DriveEncryption

Data IntegrityMonitoring

MissionCritical Assets

Defenders Have to Be Right Every Time… The Field Can Be Leveled by Leveraging Information Available Only to the Defender

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Page 12: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise

So What Should I Do Now?

• Keep the COTS infrastructure that defeats the 80%

• Collect as much data as possible about what is happening on your network

• Play Cybersecurity as a team sport (InfraGuard, ISACs, FIRST)

• Train your employees for live threats (Not just CBTs)

• Look at the problem through a different lens (Not just the IT lens)

Approved for Public Release # 13-0985

Protect Your Enterprise

Page 13: Information-Driven Cybersecurity Cybersecurity 4 June 2013 Bill Russell . Cybersecurity Strategist & Senior Architect . Why Do COTS-Based Architectures Fail to Protect Your Enterprise