Informal Relations and Corruption in the West Balkans Åse B. Grødeland NIBR Argument --- Pro Media ---Prism Research/GfK Bosnia Research Council of Norway

Informal Relations and Corruption in the West Balkans

Åse B. Grødeland

NIBRArgument --- Pro Media ---Prism Research/GfK Bosnia

Research Council of Norway Grant No 174856/S30 (2006-10)

Corruption and Terrorism

• Corruption affecting terrorism both indirectly and directly

• Indirectly – by affecting factors of importance in terms of recruitment

– Strength of government– Quality of life (GDP per capita)– Level of democracy (quality/strength of opposition & civil society)– Level of integration, ethnic and religious minorities – Level of protection, ethnic and religious miniorities

• Directly – by terrorists to further their cause

– Access to territories (border guards)– Weapons/equipment (army/police)– Shelter/food (politicians/ordinary people)

AC Efforts, Post-communist States

• Internationally driven AC efforts primarily focused on

– awareness raising & copying of very similar AC programmes across geographical and cultural borders (1990s)

– capacity building – involving a wide range of national and local organisations

(2000s).

• Have resulted in numerous ”products” but not significantly reducing corruption. Why?

– vagueness of programs (”Cover everything”)

– few points in programs funded by donors

– insufficient political commitment to AC reform

– primarily addressing institutional behaviour

– largely addressing ”manifestations” of corruption rather than the root-causes facilitating them

Alternative Approach to Corruption

• Investigate the mechanisms that (may) facilitate corruption– Informal practice: the use of contacts and informal networks

• Post-communist states: informal practice used in response to transition, but its use rooted in national culture and the socialist experience

”Try harder”-hypothesis: informal practice used as a strategy to compensate for real or perceived disadvantages when dealing with the state.

• Big distance between ”rulers” and ”ruled” Low institutional trust Use of informal practice (corruption) Lack of faith in the ability of the ”rulers” to tackle corruption Lack of faith in, and commitment to, ”traditional” AC reform?

• Implications: efforts to contain corruption

Data collection

• Two projects: Informal Practice & Corruption I (ECE + SEE) & Informal Practice & Corruption II (WB)

• Focus: politics, public procurement, the judiciary and post-war/conflict reconstruction (WB).

• Extensive collection of qualitative and quantitative data amongst 9 relevant categories of elites

– Structured (open-ended) in-depth interviews (414 + 360)

– Quota-based, quantitative surveys (N=600 x 7).

• Present partial findings from 414 in-depth interviews & 3 quota-

based quantitative surveys.

Table 1. Most law-abiding sectors/groups (in per cent)

Serbia Bos-Herzeg. Macedonia

Politicians 4 5 5

Government officials 10 9 11

Public procurement officials 3 7 5

Local business reps 10 10 5

Foreign business reps 23 16 18

Judiciary 13 16 12

NGOs 13 14 10

Media 4 5 6

Foreign donors 17 9 21

Other 3 7 5

DK 1 2 3

N= (300) (311) (191)

Note: Text units = respondents’ answers and/or comments to a question. Decimals rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

Table 2. Most trusted sectors/groups (in per cent)


Politicians 3 3 6

Government officials 7 7 10

Public procurement officials 1 3 2

Local business reps 9 14 6

Foreign business reps 25 16 11

Judiciary 15 21 12

NGOs 15 16 20

Media 7 6 9

Foreign donors 12 5 16

Other 4 7 4

DK 2 2 5

(189) (205) (161)


Table 3. Whether (COUNTRY) society formal or informal (in per cent)


Formal 36 41 48

Mix 15 12 21

Informal 40 35 29

Other 5 9 0

DK 4 3 1

N= (143) (153) (137)


Table 4. Use of contacts in (OWN SECTOR)... (in per cent)


Common 55 58 38

Used 16 9 14

Uncommon 19 19 28

Never used 4 7 15

Other 4 3 4

DK 1 3 1

N= (138) (149) (144)


Table 5. Informal networks in (OWN SECTOR)… (in per cent)


Active 73 61 70

Not active 18 26 24

Other 4 6 3

DK 4 7 3

N= (134) (146) (135)


Table 6. Whether contacts & informal networks facilitate corruption in (COUNTRY)… (in per cent)


Facilitate 88 80 85

Do not facilitate 5 8 6

Other 6 11 7

DK 1 1 3

N= (136) (146) (136)


Table 7. Whether political will in (COUNTRY) to tackle corruption... (in per cent)


Will 31 16 45

No will 53 68 39

Other 9 13 11

DK 7 3 6

N= (141) (151) (142)


Conclusions & Recommendations• Informal practice widespread in the WB – perceived to facilitate

corruption.

• Root causes vs. manifestations of corruption: different measures required.

• Politicians perceived more as the problem than the ”solution”: not law-abiding, not trustworthy, not committed to anti-corruption reform.

• Strengthen investigative bodies and judiciary (Michael).

• Work on public mentality & on bridging the gap between the ”rulers” and the ”ruled”: must in be locally-driven, cannot successfully be

imposed ”exclusively” from the outside.

• Implications - terrorism

Q281. Most efficient measure for limiting the negative impact of informal networks

Average%

Bosnia%

Serbia%

Macedonia%

Strengthen the rule of law 29 29 30 27

Change people’s mentality and values through education 25 24 27 24

Strengthen law-enforcement 10 8 13 8

Strengthen public trust in the state 8 7 9 8

Introduce new and better legislation 5 6 5 4

Enhance the efficiency and independence of the judiciary 4 4 3 5

Strengthen the accountability of politicians and government officials 4 4 3 6

Make government administration more open & transparent 4 3 4 4

Strengthen anti-corruption bodies and anti-corruption 3 5 3 1

Expose the negative aspects of informal networks in the media 3 3 3 2

Prepare for EU membership 2 2 2 2

Introduce codes of ethics and professional codes both in the public and private sectors

1 1 1 1

Properly regulate political party funding 1 1 1 1

Properly regulate lobbying 1 2 1 0

Better regulation of public procurement 1 1 1 0

Limit the influence of the former nomenklatura through lustration 0 1 0 0

Documents

Informal Relations and Corruption in the West Balkans Åse B. Grødeland NIBR Argument --- Pro Media ---Prism Research/GfK Bosnia Research Council of Norway