INEF Report 79/2005

79/2005

Institute for Development and Peace

Towards a New Profile?

Development, Humanitarian and Conflict-Resolution NGOsin the Age of Globalization

Tobias Debiel/Monika Sticht

IN

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NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

Tobias Debiel, Dr. sc. pol., is Executive Director of the Institute for Developmentand Peace (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, INEF), University of Duisburg-Essen.Before he took over this position in August 2004, he worked from February 2003 to July2004 as Senior Researcher and Head of Research Group at the Center for DevelopmentResearch (Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung, ZEF), University of Bonn, includingtwo terms as interim professor of Political and Cultural Change at the same institute.His areas of research include: Crisis Prevention as a Leitmotif for Development andForeign Policy; Global Governance and World Peace Order; Violent Conflict, StructuralStability and Human Security in Sub-Saharan Africa; Post-Conflict State-Building.

E-Mail: [email protected]

Monika Sticht, M.A., Monika Sticht, M.A., was Research Assistant at the Centerfor Development Research (Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung, ZEF), Department ofPolitical and Cultural Change, University of Bonn, from April 2003 to April 2005. Herdissertation on the contribution of the Council of Europe to democratic transformationin Middle and Eastern Europe since 1989 is due to be finished soon. Her areas ofresearch include: Promotion of Democracy; Rule of Law and Human Rights; theCouncil of Europe.


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE:Tobias Debiel/Monika Sticht: Towards a New Profile? Development, Humanitarian and Conflict

Resolution NGOs in the Age of Globalization. Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace,

University Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 79/2005).

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Development, Humanitarian andConflict-Resolution NGOsin the Age of Globalization

INEF Report 79/2005

Institute for Development and Peace University of Duisburg-Essen

Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF) Universität Duisburg-Essen

AbstractTobias Debiel/Monika Sticht: Towards a New Profile? Development, Humanitarianand Conflict Resolution NGOs in the Age of Globalization. Duisburg: Institute forDevelopment and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 79/2005).

Both the significance and the profile of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)have undergone a fundamental transformation in the past twenty years. In de-velopment cooperation new fields such as ecological sustainability and thepromotion of democracy have emerged besides ‘traditional’ issues like povertyreduction. Furthermore, confronted with the realities of war and state decline,developmental NGOs pay increasing attention to crisis prevention and the reso-lution of conflicts; even a new type of nongovernmental organization has ap-peared, conflict-resolution NGOs. The change has been particularly dramatic inthe area of humanitarian aid: even before the end of the Cold War some NGOs– Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) at the head of all of them – freed themselvesfrom the “straitjacket” of only conducting humanitarian operations with thepermission of the (often illegitimate) local government; meanwhile the conceptof sovereignty has been substantially redefined. NGOs, however, also con-formed to the imperatives of globalization and commercialization, and formedoligopolies on the market for humanitarian aid. At the same time, they are alsoconfronted with their own “powerlessness” in conflict zones: actors of violenceand power-holders successfully attempt to instrumentalize humanitarian aidfor their own purposes, and western military forces threaten the independenceof humanitarian work by demanding subordination to political and strategicgoals.

Must we, at the beginning of the 21st century, bid farewell to the conventionalimage of unselfish, flexible and diverse nongovernmental actors which blossomfreely like flowers? What criteria exist to assess the success of NGOs involved indevelopment policy, humanitarian aid and the resolution of conflict? This studypresents empirical data and illustrates it using concrete examples. It explainsabove all which basic principles, codes of conduct and instruments of self-assessment and self-control NGOs develop in order to safeguard and improvethe impartiality, credibility, transparency and effectiveness of their work.

Content

Introduction 5

1. Types, profiles, and players: the complex reality ofNGOs active in development policy, humanitarian relief,and conflict resolution 7

2. Privatization of public functions? Eroding stateauthority and NGOs in the age of globalization 9

3. Some reflections on the independence,market power, networking, and legitimacyof development NGOs 11

3.1 Independence at risk – NGOs as vicarious agents of the state? 12

3.2 Commercialized, media-minded development agencies? 14

3.3 Between self-organization and oligopolization: umbrellaorganizations, networks, and BINGOs 15

3.4 Legitimacy, transparency, and the key resource of credibility 17

4. NGOs and the growing number of humanitariandisasters: challenges, dilemmas, and attempts tocome up with solution 19

4.1 Coordination and codes of conduct 20

4.2 Dilemmas and politicization of humanitarian aid 22

4.3 Humanitarian aid and the military 24

5. Crisis prevention and crisis resolution: newchallenges posed by war and state failure 27

5.1 Conflict-resolution NGOs – a new area of responsibility inthe midst of a worldwide boom 27

5.2 Instruments used to anchor crisis prevention in developmentcooperation and humanitarian aid 31

5.3 Assessment of the conflict work of NGOs 35

6. Bibliography 37


5

Introduction*

The age of globalization and theend of the Cold War have dramati-cally heightened and altered therole played by private actors for thefields of development policy, disas-ter relief1, and conflict resolution.

Some new themes – including theissues of ecological sustainability,promotion of democracy, or globalstructural policy – have been placedon the agenda. These have beenadded to the project- and program-based work engaged in by devel-opment NGOs2, which has in themain centered on the "classic" fieldsof poverty reduction, healthcareprovision, promotion of the ruralpopulation, or education (Eberlei2002: 24; Hermle 2001: 16). But oneof the main reasons for the growinginfluence of NGOs has been theerosion of state authority in crisiscountries of the South. And notleast, NGOs are more and moreforced to work under the condi-tions of "fragile peace", or indeed ofongoing violent conflict.

* The original version of this paper (Ent-wicklungspolitik, Katastrophenhilfe undKonflikbearbeitung: NGOs zwischen neuenHerausforderungen und schwieriger Profil-suche) appeared in: Achim Brunnengrä-ber/Ansgar Klein/Heike Walk 2005: NGOsim Prozess der Globalisierung. MächtigeZwerge – umstrittene Riesen. Bonn: Bundes-zentrale für politische Bildung. We thank thefederal Agency for Civic Education for thepermission to publish an English version ofthe article.

1 The terms “humanitarian relief,” “disas-ter relief,” and “emergency aid” are usedsynonymously in the present paper.

2 The English term NGO (nongovernmen-tal organization) is used for the most part inthe German-language discourse; see Holtz1997: 13; Altvater/Brunnengräber 2002: 8.

The growing importance and trans-formation of development NGOscast a new light on some importantbasic issues: How independent ofgovernment funding and influenceare these NGOs in the actual workthey do? How are NGOs respond-ing to the commercialization pres-sure exerted by the market for do-nations and the need to build na-tional and transnational networks?How, finally, must we assess theeffectiveness, legitimacy, and trans-parency of development, humani-tarian-aid, and peace NGOs? Thesequestions play a key role for hu-manitarian work: in the first half ofthe 1990s NGOs saw themselvesconfronted in entirely new wayswith "complex emergencies". Tothis extent disaster relief has be-come a growing important field ofactivity. Worldwide, NGOs likeCARE international Caritas interna-tional, etc. provide a sizable contri-bution in this field (Reinhardt2000). At the same time, NGOs arefaced not only with substantialcoordination problems but withmoral dilemmas as well: Doesshort-term emergency aid contrib-ute in the medium to long term tosustaining structures of force andviolence? How are relations withthe military to be defined in theframework of "humanitarian inter-ventions"?

There is, in addition, another phe-nomenon closely associated withhumanitarian disasters. The pictureof war has changed in the course ofthe past 15 years: Political-ideo-logical motives have been increas-ingly supplanted by war-economy-


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related rationales. The conflict par-ties have multiplied and movedinto shifting alliances. “Classic”military conflicts have lost some oftheir significance, and events arenow dominated by guerilla warand massacres of civilians. In manycases the conflict parties are at thesame time the principle war profi-teers; and this of course means thatthey have very little incentive toseek lasting peace. The stubbornreality of the "new wars" (Münkler2002, Kaldor 2002) has also led to asituation in which NGOs have,since the mid-1990s, turned moreand more of their attention to pre-vention of crises and violence (For-berg/Terlinden 2002). This issue hasin the meantime found its place inthe "traditional" fields of develop-ment cooperation and humanitar-ian assistance. Is this more thanactionism, a merely fashionableissue? How should and can wemeasure the success of conflict-resolution NGOs? To what extent isit possible to integrate crisis andviolence prevention into the every-day work of aid organizations ac-tive in both development assistanceand humanitarian relief?

The present paper is an attempt tocome up with some answers to the

questions raised above. The paperpresents empirical data and illus-trates them with concrete examples.The aim pursued here to shed light,from a critical distance, on some ofthe challenges and problems facingthe work of NGOs in developingcountries and – above all – coun-tries in crisis.

We will start out by briefly definingand systematizing NGOs; we willthen go on to present some of theimportant actors at the interna-tional and national levels. Second,we outline the ways in which thefunctions and the role of NGOshave changed in a situation markedby eroding statehood in the age ofglobalization. Chapter 3 looks intothe independence and marketpower, the networking efforts andthe legitimacy of developmentNGOs. Fourth, we take an in-depthlook at the challenges and dilem-mas faced by humanitarian relief.We then, finally, discuss how crisisprevention and conflict resolutionhave become established as a newfield of activity and how thesefields can be integrated into devel-opment cooperation and humani-tarian relief.


7

1. Types, profiles, and players: the complexreality of NGOs active in developmentpolicy, humanitarian relief, and conflictresolution

Following Gordenker/Weiss (1996),we will define NGOs as privatenonprofit organizations with thefollowing features: they result froma voluntary association of people,are not subject to government di-rectives, are designed to operate fora certain period of time, and have aformal character based on statutes.International NGOs (INGOs) pur-sue transnational goals and arecharacterized by their transnationaloperations and relations.

A brief look at the realities, though,indicates that only some NGOsmeet this definition in its "pureform". Instead, many NGOs movein a gray zone between political-financial independence and moreor less strong ties to governmentaland multilateral donors. One phe-nomenon typical of day-to-daywork in the fields of humanitarianassistance and development andpeace policy is the great number ofdifferent interlinkages found be-tween NGOs, the state, and politics.The actors in the NGO sector can-not be classified and typologized interms of their distance or closenessto the state or with a view to theirfinancial (in)dependence. Othercriteria include the resource base,size, and membership of NGOs.There are, for instance, a goodnumber of small, highly flexible,indeed even ad hoc NGOs thatdiffer considerably in terms of theircompetence and reliability. Thereare also large, well-established

NGOs that are increasingly seekingto build networks and associationsat the international level. This led toa situation in which, in the first halfof the 1990s, nearly 50% of the US$8-10 billion aid market was con-trolled by oligopolistic players – i.e.by a limited number of NGOs(Donini 1996). Some of the "globalplayers" active in this area haveincluded: CARE, World VisionInternational, Oxfam Federation,Doctors without Borders/ Ärzteohne Grenzen and Save the Chil-dren. The transnational umbrellaorganizations that represent theinterests of their member organiza-tions and develop joint positionswould include the Catholic Co-opération internationale pour ledéveloppement et la solidarité(CIDSE), the Association of WorldCouncil of Churches related Devel-opment Organisations in Europe(APRODEV), and Eurostep.

In Germany too, a large share offunding (including donations)mainly benefit a small number oflarge NGOs.3 A study published in2000 by the Organisation for Eco-nomic Co-operation and Develop-ment (OECD) indicates that in Ger-many the 10 largest NGOs havereceived some 70% of all donationsand other revenues provided forNorth-South work (Woods 2000:

3 See also BMZ 2002: 254-258.


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62).4 As regards activity profiles, wecan distinguish between an opera-tional profile and a public policyprofile. The former centers on con-crete operational work on theground. Policy-oriented NGOs, onthe other hand, seek to create pub-licity and transparency as well as togain influence on the agendas, theproblem perceptions, and the deci-sions of political and social deci-sion-makers. This may include con-crete lobbying in political decision-making processes aimed at achiev-ing certain self- or public-interestgoals (lobbying), monitoring of theimplementation of standardsagreed upon, "advocacy" or"awareness-raising" on specific,value-oriented issues in the publicand political sphere, or provision ofgeneral information for a broaderpublic (public education).

Most non-state actors may be seenas a mixture of these two profiles.In addition to their core operationalbusiness, some larger and estab-lished NGOs like e.g. Oxfam orDoctors without Borders/ Ärzteohne Grenzen also have sizableresources for their activities in thefield of public policy. Only in thisway are they able to credibly con-vince the public and politicalspheres of the goals of and the needfor their work. In Germany, thechurch-based aid organizations

4 These 10 NGOs are the Catholic relieforganization Misereor, the Friedrich EbertFoundation, the Hermann Gmeiner Fund,Adveniat (founded by the German episcopalconference), Brot für die Welt/ Bread for theWorld, the (Protestant) Church Develop-ment Service, Welthungerhilfe/ GermanAgro Action, the Deutsche KomiteeUNICEF/ German Committee of UNICEF,the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, and theInternationale Christoffel-Blindenmission/Christian Blind Mission International (CBMinternational).

(e.g. Misereor and the KatholischeZentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe/Catholic Central Agency for Devel-opment Aid and the EvangelischerEntwicklungsdienst/ Church De-velopment Service and Brot für dieWelt/ Bread for the World), andother organizations without eitherchurch or party affiliations (e.g.Deutsche Welthungerhilfe/ GermanAgro Action, Kindernothilfe/ KNH,Terre des Hommes, or medico in-ternational) are to be mentioned inparticular.

A close linkage between opera-tional and policy-oriented profilesmarks the German political founda-tions, which play a pronouncedrole in Germany's developmentcooperation. At the same time,there are also organizations that arededicated unequivocally to oneprofile. Leading public policyNGOs like Human Rights Watch orthe NGO think tank InternationalCrisis Group (ICG), for instance, donot engage in any operational workat all. In Germany a similar situa-tion may be noted for organizationslike WEED (World Economy, Ecol-ogy and Development), German-watch or FIAN (FoodFirst Informa-tion and Action Network).5

NGOs for the most part pursuespecific objectives bound up withtheir origins and their ideologi-cal/worldview backgrounds (Karp1998: 296). For instance, the church-based aid organizations are notonly engaged in efforts aimed atpoverty reduction and improve-ment of living conditions, they arealso committed to building a justsocial order. The political founda-

5 See <http://www.weed-online.org>, or<http://www.germanwatch.org>, and <http://www.fian.org/> or <http://www.fian.de>.

http://www.weed-online.org

http://www.germanwatch.org

http://www.fian.de


9

tions in turn, in keeping with theiraffiliations to political parties, seepromotion of democracy as their

"core task" (Kesper 2002: 31; BMZ2002: 256).

2. Privatization of public functions? Erodingstate authority and NGOs in the age ofglobalization

The surge of globalization experi-enced during the past two decadeshas served to boost the significanceof internationally active NGOs.Since the 1980s these NGOs havegone through a period of exponen-tial growth, a fact documented e.g.by various issues of the "Yearbookof International Associations". UNorganizations like e.g. UNESCO(United Nations Educational, Scien-tific, and Cultural Organization),UNICEF (United Nations Chil-dren’s Fund), or WHO (WorldHealth Organization) have set up agreat number of different commu-nication channels to facilitate directcooperation with NGOs. Further-more, NGOs are increasingly takingon operational tasks in UN-peacemissions and humanitarian assis-tance as well as in the field of hu-man rights and environmental pro-tection.

We can observe a “privatization ofworld politics” (Brühl et al. 2001)that has permitted nonprofit or-ganizations and private companiesto expand their radiuses of action inboth spatial and substantive terms.This trend cannot be traced back toany one single cause; nor did it takeplace overnight. The background ofthis development is, instead, amore complex one (Debiel/Hummel2001). To cite a number of factorsthat should not be underestimated

in this context: first, the diffusion ofnew information technologies andmass media. This operates in favorof the transnational networking ofnon-state actors. Second, the end ofthe Cold War has accelerated ten-dencies toward privatization. Thebig powers have largely ceased togenerously support their clients inthe South, leaving the task of pro-viding for crisis regions more andmore up to NGOs. Third, the worldconferences of the 1990s, includinge.g. the UN World Conference onEnvironment and Developmentheld in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, con-stituted a substantial incentive tofound new NGOs or to enlarge theradius of action of existing NGOs(Messner/Nuscheler 1996; Fues/Hamm 2001). The reform of theguidelines for NGO accreditationwith the UN was also an influentialfactor at work here.

Last but not least, a central role isplayed here by the triumph of the“neoliberal project”, which experi-enced a breakthrough in the 1980s.It is in the dismantling of the wel-fare state, flexibilization of theworld of work, monetarist moneypolicy, major steps toward privati-zation of state welfare and infra-structure services, and worldwidetrade liberalization that the neolib-eral approach sees the key to over-coming the slump that has beset the


10

dynamics of world economicgrowth since the 1970s. Neoliberalthinking is keyed to an attitudehighly skeptical of the state, onethat is reflected in the emphasisgiven to the principle of subsidiar-ity and the privatization of servicesotherwise provided by the state. Tothis extent neoliberalism has ineffect promoted the development ofcivil society since the 1980s (Wahl1996: 41).6 For one thing, NGOshave, in the sense of subsidiarity,been assigned new service func-tions, especially in the social andhealth sectors, for which the statehad until then been responsible.The progressive critique of thestate, concerned about the emer-gence of a growth-oriented, expan-sive, "authoritarian security state",here ran up against a neoliberal,conservative critique of the statethat had set itself the task of trans-forming the "bureaucratic welfarestate". Civil-society organizations,however, have also emerged as amovement working counter to thegrowing – and not least: commer-cial – tendency toward privatiza-tion and calling for transparencyand democratic control (this goes inparticular for public-policy NGOs).

Since the end of the Cold War moreand more public funds have beenchanneled via NGOs – a trend,though, that now appears to beabating. To cite an example: theaverage amount of funds channeledby OECD countries via NGOs wasUS$ 3.1 billion in 1985-1986 peryear, US$ 5.2 billion in 1990-1991per year, US$ 6.7 billion in 1999,and US$ 7.2 billion in 2001.7 NGOs

6 See Schrader 2000: 46-47; Roth 2001: 45;Windfuhr 1999: 539.

7 The figures are based on: OECD/ Devel-opment Assistance Committee (DAC), The

have thus, since the early 1990s,become an actor second in size onlyto bilateral donors (Donini 1995:426). The state's direct role in opera-tional emergency and developmentassistance is growing smaller andsmaller, with nonprofit organiza-tions increasingly conducting pro-jects and programs on behalf ofcountries from the North. This newrole of NGOs is as noteworthy as itis ambivalent (Sogge 1996). Whiledonor governments are increas-ingly outsourcing the implementa-tion of aid programs, this by nomeans implies that they are leavingthe political decisions up to privateactors. Indeed, in many cases de-velopment organizations are moreand more assuming the role of the"private arm of donors" (Luder-mann 2001).

In view of the declining scope ofstate activities, development NGOsincreasingly see themselves facedwith the need to take on originallygovernment tasks in given devel-opment countries – e.g. in health-care or education. NGOs heresometimes even undercut the au-thority of public agencies and gov-ernments. The International Mone-tary Fund has often forced thistrend and the World Bank, whosestructural adjustment programshave pushed for cuts in govern-ment services. And yet, precisely incrisis regions, the term "denation-alization" does not adequately de-scribe this process of privatization,

Total Net Flow of Long-Term FinancialResources from DAC Countries to Devel-opment Countries, available under:<http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/dac-stats.htm> (13 May 2003). The data are nolonger available online in this form. Up-to-date DAC statistics on North-South financialtransfers can now be found under: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats>.

http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/dac-

http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats


11

since some such areas lack even afunctioning state. Mark Duffield(1993: 140-141) succinctly referredto this development as the "interna-tionalization of public welfare" (seealso Fowler 1992). Since the 1990sthe field of conflict managementhas ceased to be the undisputed

domain of state and multilateralactors – indeed, newly foundednon-state actors have become in-volved in this area at a pace thatcan only be termed breathtaking.They have in many cases done sowith state support (see Chapter 5).

3. Some reflections on the independence,market power, networking, and legitimacyof development NGOs

In science, politics, and the publicsphere NGOs are seen as havingsome comparative advantages that,initially, served to earn them a"good reputation". The first pointhere is their political independence– one of the features of NGOs thathas lent a high level of credibility tothe arguments and activities ofcivil-society actors in the publiceye. NGOs are seen as particularlyflexible and effective: they are oftenable – sometime at short notice – tomobilize considerable resources,e.g. to respond rapidly to emer-gency situations or to provide sup-port for victims of human rightsviolations. NGOs are, however,faced with organizational and fi-nancial limitations. The more theyprofessionalize and gear their act-ivities to efficiency criteria, and themore they develop bureaucracies oftheir own, the heavier may be thetoll in terms of voluntary commit-ment and discourse on an equalfooting, the sources of theirstrength. On the other hand, NGOsare unlikely to be able to achievethe professionalism of state bu-reaucracies or the efficiency of pri-vate-sector companies as long as

they remain committed to theiroriginal logic of action. Moreover,bureaucratic apparatuses necessar-ily develop an existence and logicof their own, not least because oftheir constant need of funds (De-biel/Hummel 2001).

The high level of respect originallyenjoyed by NGOs – one of the fac-tors that accompanied their boomin the first half of the 1990s – has bynow been impaired somewhat; andthere are more and more skepticalvoices to be heard. Four centralpoints of criticism are advancedhere: NGOs, it is aid, are not asindependent as they are oftenclaimed to be; their profile hastaken a problematic turn thanks totheir orientation to the media andmarkets for donations; their attract-ive diversity is increasingly givingway to hierarchically structuredand largely intransparent networks;and finally, it is claimed, the devel-opments referred to are increas-ingly undermining their legitimacyand transparency.


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3.1 Independence at risk –NGOs as vicarious agentsof the state?

As our discussion has indicated,there are some good reasons to castdoubt on the independence ofNGOs. In part, nongovernmentalorganizations are consciously re-cruited, outsourced, to serve as anextension of government policy.Also, official and nongovernmentaldevelopment cooperation have be-come closely intertwined owing tofinancial transfers and numerousprocesses of consultation as well asto the inclusion of NGOs in gov-ernment delegations and a greatvariety of oversight and advisorybodies. The German Federal Minis-try for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment/ Bundesministeriumfür wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeitund Entwicklung (BMZ) has, par-ticularly over the past fifteen years,increased the funds it provides toNGOs.8 Cooperation and consulta-tion are part and parcel of day-to-day operations, and have becomecustomary practice in working outdevelopment-related country andregional concepts.9 But does thisfact imply – as noted by AnsgarKlein (2002: 3) – that nongovern-mental organizations "are often nomore than the vicarious agents ofstate interests or a policy involvingprivatization of development assis-tance and humanitarian programs"?In this case the consequence wouldbe plain to see: both "states andprivate business interests are cash-

8 See BMZ 2002: 255, 375. For instance, in2002 NGOs were given a total of EUR 459million for their work. This amounts toroughly 10% of the ministry's overall budgetexpenditures.

9 See BMZ 2002: 253-255; Eberlei 2002: 25-26.

ing in on the expert competence,flexibility, effectiveness, and publicesteem of NGOs" (ibid.).

In the financing of German NGOsand political foundations, the pub-lic-sector share is substantial. Notmany NGOs have a broad member-ship base that would permit themto finance their work exclusively onthe basis of membership contribu-tions and individual donations.Many NGOs rely on outside financ-ing by public authorities, privatefoundations, or other sources. Inindividual cases this can in effectmean that NGOs assume the role ofimplementing agencies of statebureaucracies or mutate into com-mercial service companies. This,however, deprives them of theirmain advantage and the base onwhich their public reputation rests,namely their independence. In all,though, the relationship betweenstate bureaucracies and NGOs hastended more to be one of mutualinfluence. In his thoroughgoinganalysis, Markus Karp (1998: 95-99)emphasizes that the BMZ expectsNGOs to adapt their activities tothe broad lines of its developmentpolicy. At the same time, he notes,the ministry is also interested in asemi-autonomous status for NGOs– otherwise there would be littlereason to make use of them insteadof the ministry's own quasi-independent implementing agen-cies (GTZ, KfW)10 (Karp 1998: 97).

What are the concrete figures in-volved? It is difficult to determinethe “public-sector share” of NGOsactive in development policy and

10 GTZ = Deutsche Gesellschaft für tech-nische Zusammenarbeit/German Agency forTechnical Cooperation; KfW = Kreditanstaltfür Wiederaufbau (German Financial Coop-eration).


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cooperation, since this would re-quire both a comparative tabulationof the bi- and multilateral publicsubsidies they receive and a goodmeasure of transparency concern-ing the internal resources and thedonations of all NGOs. Against thisbackground we can do no morethan seek to compile some ap-proximate relative figures and dis-till trends from them. One indicatorin the German context is the publicbilateral subsidies (net disburse-ments) provided to NGOs underSection 23 of the BMZ’s budget.These figures can then be set inrelation to the funds that NGOsraise from their own resources andfrom donations.11 The percentage ofpublic subsidies based on thesecriteria never exceeded 50% of theiroverall revenues during the periodextending from 1974 to 1987. In thisperiod the figure ranged between37.7% (1985) and 46.5% (1987). Inthe five years that followed, theshare of funds provided to NGOsby the BMZ exceeded their ownresources and donations, and con-tinued to rise. 1992 was the highpoint for the share of public-sectorsubsidies provided to NGOs as apercentage of their total revenues;the figure for this year was 64.7%.In 1993 this public-sector sharedeclined to 56.9%, while the fundsraised by NGOs themselves were atthe same time on the increase. Inthe years between 1994 and 1997NGOs financed some 50% of theiractivities on the basis of public sub-sidies, and from 1998 to 2000 thefunds they received from section 23

11 The following data are based primarilyon the table “Bilateral public subsidies (netdisbursements to nongovernmental organi-zations from Section 23 (BMZ)”, in: BMZ2002: 375. These data cover the period from1965-2000.

continued to decline from 46.2% to42.7% of their own revenues.

Between 1998 and 2000, as well asin the period up to 1987, the NGOsactive in development policy anddevelopment cooperation thusfunded their operations more fromown resources and donations thanfrom government subsidies. Fur-thermore, the donation revenues ofNGOs were not subject to any ex-traordinary fluctuations in the1990s. In other words, averagedover the years, the figures do notindicate any dominance of BMZ-funding in the revenues of NGOs.In just about every year considered,though, the figure has been over40%, a clear indication that statesubsidies for NGOs have been andare sizable and relevant. It is aboveall the years 1990 and 1993 thatjump to the eye, with public subsi-dies accounting for some 60% asper section 23 of overall NGO reve-nues. A percentage share of thislevel is without any doubt oftenbound up with state influence inthe work of NGOs, e.g. as regardstheir orientation to the BMZ's pri-orities and criteria.12 Still, thesefigures should, in the end, not beoverestimated: the major share ofthese public subsidies goes to theGerman political foundations. Inthe year 2000, for instance, theGerman federal government pro-vided these foundations with 37.9%of the public-sector support fundsthey received; the figure for church-based organizations was 35.9%. Allof these groups are self-assuredactors with an identity and history

12 For comparison: in 1993 in the OECDframework the share of nonpublic subsidiesfor NGOs averaged 58%, while in the sameyear the public-sector share amounted to42% (Woods 2000: 15-17).


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of their own, and none of them isparticularly likely to dance to thetune of state financiers.

There is a broad spectrum of de-pendence and independence re-spectively on state funds. In 1997several NGOs financed their activi-ties wholly without public-sectorsubsidies; they include e.g. CapAnamur and Ärzte ohne Grenzen/Doctors without Borders. Othersrelied on a funding mix. Medicointernational, for instance, financedits activities half from public-sectorsubsidies and half from otherfunds. An organization like HELP,on the other hand, funded 92.5% ofits costs from public-sector fundsand was thus just about completelydependent on public-sector subsi-dies (Deutscher Bundestag: 110). Atthe same time, dependence versusindependence is not something thatis indicated solely (and perhaps noteven primarily) by funding struc-tures. Despite its noteworthy shareof state subsidies, medico interna-tional, for instance, enjoys greatpublic respect for its statements andcampaigns, which may well dealcritically with government policy.Dependence is thus also a matter ofan organization's credibility and –hard-worked-for – standing in thepublic eye, factors that can make anorganization less susceptible tostate leverage. In addition, devel-opment ministries like the BMZmay be forced to rely on NGOs tostrengthen their own hand vis-à-visother ministries. NGOs that, in thiscontext, prove able to generate pub-lic support are, in a certain sense,natural allies that are difficult toinstrumentalize for other purposes.Finally, it is essential to analyzehow the relationship betweenNGOs and donors is anchored indifferent political cultures. In Scan-

dinavia, for instance, NGOs aremore closely involved in the policy-making process than they are inGermany. Here the high share ofpublic funds is not so much a signof political independence as it is areflection of a close mutual rela-tionship.

3.2 Commercialized, media-minded developmentagencies?

The second point of criticism goes,in a certain sense, in the oppositedirection: The more NGOs concen-trate on acquiring donations andnew members, the more they areforced to adapt to the laws of themarket and the media world. Thisentails a risk that such organiza-tions may mutate more and moreinto commercialized developmentagencies, losing sight of their ori-gins and instead narrowing theirfocus down on the impacts of pub-lic relations. To cite an example:this charge of commercializationwas pointedly formulated by SylvieBrunel, former president of ActionContre la Faim, as follows:

“I have the feeling that some NGOsuse the argument of suffering tojustify their existence and increasetheir market share. To keep goingbecomes their main reason for be-ing and their real 'beneficiaries'their nomenklatura. Many NGOsare only associations by virtue oftheir fiscal statutes and the fact thatthey don't give out dividends. Buttheir marketing practices distancethem from their true objectives andmake them real businesses.”13

13 Interview with Sylvie Brunel, formerpresident of Action Contre la Faim, by Jean-Dominique Merchet, in: Libération, March 7,2002, ("Humanitarian Organizations Have


15

In fact, NGOs are – not unlike po-litical parties – coming, in qualita-tively new ways, to be reliant onthe media, not only as a means ofgetting their message to the publicbut just as much with an eye toacquiring resources. This has impli-cations for their practical work, asThomas Gebauer (2001: 113) aptlyemphasizes: "The doubtful conse-quences of the mass-media-mindedness of NGOs and theirwork include a tendency toward areversal of the relationship betweenends and means and a restriction oftheir activities to issues that can be'sold' in and through the media."Since NGOs are forced to rely on anunbroken flow of donations to fundtheir project and program work aswell as to cover their own operatingcosts, they have no choice but toadapt to the functional mechanismsof the media (Gebauer 2001: 113-114; Roth 2001: 45-46). True, this isa reciprocal relationship: the mediaalso depend on NGOs – for onething, because the latter knowsomething about launching issuesand giving them a slant congenialto the media; for another because incases of humanitarian disasterNGOs often have transportationand infrastructure networks thatenable reporters to capture anddeliver "good image material".

This growing media-mindedness isencouraging NGOs to shed theiroriginal profile and instead to focuson events with high public visibility(e.g. the conflicts and wars in Soma-lia, Rwanda, and Iraq). Without anup-to-date media image NGOshave trouble sustaining their in-flows of public and private funds.

Become Businesses"), via Internet: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/role/globdem/credib/2002/0307bus.htm> (22 July 2005).

This trend takes on a problematichue when NGOs focus on generat-ing make-believe world and cuttheir grass-roots at the local level,losing sight of both the interests oftheir social base and their contribu-tions to "helping people to helpthemselves" (Schrader 2000: 112).

3.3 Between self-organization andoligopolization: umbrellaorganizations, networks,and BINGOs

In the 1990s BINGOs (big NGOs)like CARE, Caritas international, ormedico international came to playan increasingly important role.Furthermore, NGOs increasinglyorganized in national and transna-tional associations and networks.14

The year 1995, for instance, saw theemergence in Germany of VENRO,der Verband Entwicklungspolitikdeutscher Nichtregierungsorgani-sationen e.V./"the Association ofGerman Development Non-govern-mental Organisations", a federationof some 100 NGOs, which also in-clude some regional NGO networkswith local initiatives (VENRO 2003;Eberlei 2002: 26-27; Reinhardt 2002:382). At the European level, too,there are networks that have theireye on the European Union as acontact partner. On January 30th,2003, for instance, Europe was wit-ness to the birth of a new associa-

14 Generally speaking, one distinguishingfeature of NGO associations versus net-works is that the former represent theirmember organizations, while networks tendmore to be loose associations that focus theirwork e.g. on achieving progress on specificindividual issues.


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tion of European NGOs calledCONCORD.15

The goal pursued in forming NGOnetworks and associations is to givemore effective shape to lobbyingand advocacy activities by assum-ing the function of mediators be-tween different levels (local, na-tional, international) and differentactors (states, international organi-zations, other NGOs). Networkscan in this way contribute to im-proving the internal coordination ofNGOs, enabling NGOs to appearjointly before decision-makers andinternational agencies, and facilitat-ing the definition of joint codes ofconduct (Altvater/Brunnengräber2002: 9).

However, NGO associations arealso concerned with carving up andcontrolling the donation market.Finally, the later 1980s/early 1990ssaw the emergence of a regularmarket in which NGOs competedfor funds that were becoming in-creasingly scarce. Apart from theabove-mentioned aims and possi-bilities of NGO associations, thelatter also have advantages as far astheir presence in the media andtheir media reach are concerned.They furthermore facilitate out-flows of government funds in thatgovernment authorities can now

15 See E+Z (Entwicklung + Zusammenar-beit), (March 2003), vol. 3, p. 94; also: <http://www.eu-platform.at>. CONCORD standsfor European NGO Confederation for Reliefand Development; it is the legal successor tothe Liaison Committees of DevelopmentNGOs (CLONG). CONCORD representssome 1.200 NGOs, some of them alreadyrepresented by a great variety of other Euro-pean NGO associations like CIDSE orAPRODEV, while others, like terre deshommes and Caritas Europa, are membersof CONCORD. See also <http://www.concordeurope.org>.

fall back on a number of alreadyconsolidated non-state contact part-ners with whom they have littletrouble reaching agreements onuniform rules and procedures. Thishas, especially in countries of theSouth, led to a subcontracting cul-ture in which NGO associationschannel funds to intermediate andlocal NGOs (Wegner 1994: 341-342).This gives rise, practically auto-matically, to control problems. Inother words, there is a real dangerhere that NGO associations maytake on hierarchical structures andbe controlled by a small number oforganizations or persons. Thiswould mean in effect that theiregalitarian structures would fallvictim to structures of dominance.Moreover – and in analogy to thestate level – transparency presentsmore of a problem, the more distantorganizations of a certain kind be-come from their memberships anda critical public. This is at times aparticularly striking feature ofglobally organized networks, whichare as a rule marked by an overtNorth-South differential as regardsinfluence, power, resources, staff,and the power to define issues (Ge-bauer 2001: 103-104; Roth 2001: 40-41).

Apart from creating networks andorganizations designed for the me-dium to long term, NGOs havealso, with considerable success,joined forces to launch campaignsgeared to highly specific goals of ashort- to medium-term nature. Suchcampaigns link public relations,education, mobilization, and lobby-ing work, bringing together underone keynote a great variety of ac-tors that, faced with issues of adifferent nature, would be unlikelyto reach consensus. At the sametime, NGOs are increasingly trans-

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nationally organized. They are inthis way responding to a need re-sulting from globalization, namelythe need involved in efforts to gainpolitical influence and to go beyondtheir own national government andaddress decision-makers and thepublic in other countries.

3.4 Legitimacy, transparency,and the key resource ofcredibility

This brings us to the fourth point ofcriticism: problematic legitimacy.The more influential they become,the greater the pressure faced byNGOs to justify their actions; thereason for this is of course that theexistence and influence of NGOs isnot legitimized by general elections(Klein 2002: 4). The only means thatNGOs have to compensate, at leastin part, for this deficit is internaldemocratic structures and strictadherence to principles like ac-countability, equality, and trans-parency (Edwards et al. 1999).These principles – precisely underthe conditions posed by transna-tional networking – are increas-ingly difficult to realize. In a grow-ingly globalized world NGOs arethus faced with problems similar tothose besetting supra- and interna-tional organizations or transna-tional corporations, which likewiseare marked by substantial deficitsin legitimacy (Klein 2002: 4; Alt-vater/Brunnengräber 2002: 12).NGOs do have one advantage,though: if they, in their role as sen-sors and voices of society, succeedin monitoring state actors and le-gitimized power-holders and/orproviding them with guidance incoming to decisions (Habermas2001: 356-357), they win a "bonus"in the eyes of the public. The fact

that state and multilateral actors areoften not flexible enough to re-spond adequately to new chal-lenges gives rise to unoccupiedspaces in which privately organizedworld politics may prove moreeffective and issue-oriented than aworld politics based solely on theclassic model of the nation-state.Private actors can, in other words –despite weaknesses in their internalmakeup – gain profile and legiti-macy by contributing, at the globallevel, to the realization of basicdemocratic norms and fair proce-dures (input legitimacy) and effec-tive and equitable provision of ser-vices (output legitimacy) (Scharpf1998).

They must, however, ensure thattheir own weaknesses do not serveto undercut their key resource of"credibility". This credibility is notto be had without a certain mini-mum level of transparency. Onefactor that is proving to be increas-ingly problematic is that this trans-parency cannot be seen as a generaltrademark of the work of NGOs.Some interesting pointers are pro-vided by a pilot study conductedby "One World Trust (OWT)"(2002/2003) which looked in to theaccountability of seven interna-tional NGOs (Kovach et al. 2003):amnesty international (ai), CAREinternational, the InternationalChamber of Commerce/ Interna-tionale Handelskammer (ICC), theInternational Confederation of FreeTrade Unions (ICFTU), the Interna-tional Federation of Red Cross andRed Crescent Societies (IFRC), Ox-fam International, and the WorldWide Fund for Nature (WWF).Only some of these organizationsare of interest in terms of the focusof the present report; still, the ten-


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dencies revealed by the study arequite instructive.

In the first place, OWT sought tomeasure the extent to which mem-bers of the NGOs under study areable to control their internal admin-istrative and power structures. Sec-ond, the study looked into the issueof access to information, restrictingits scope, though, to the online in-formation services provided bythese NGOs – a factor that, whilecertainly relevant, is limited in itsvalue as evidence (Kovach et al.2003). What are the most importantresults of the study? With the ex-ception of amnesty international,the NGOs under study made avail-able only very limited amounts ofinformation on internal decisionprocesses. As far as control ofmembership is concerned, amnestyinternational has the highest num-ber of points (100). On the otherhand, among the NGOs analyzed,CARE international has the lowestranking on “access to online infor-mation”. For instance, hardly anyinformation on CARE interna-tional’s programs can be found onthe Internet. Furthermore, theseorganizations were restrictive inmaking important informationavailable to the public – for instanceon the uses to which donations areput and the extent to which goalshave been achieved. The picturethat emerges is somewhat differen-tiated, though: while two organiza-tions – namely Oxfam Internationaland the IFRC – have provided, intheir annual reports, detailed in-

formation on their finances, theothers have not. Hardly any ofthem provide online information ontheir evaluations of programs andprojects; a positive exception in thisregard is the IFRC.

Neither lack of any real control andlimited transparency as regardsfinances and internal decisionstructures nor the success nor lackof success of an organization’swork are features that are restrictedto the NGOs mentioned here. Eber-lei (2002: 27) comes up with similarresults for German NGOs, at leastas far as their work abroad is con-cerned: "While large-scale NGOshave in the meantime developedevaluation instruments, they do notdivulge their problems or engage ina broad, transparent discussion ofthe chances and limits, the suc-cesses and failures, of NGO work."

Despite all need for reform, how-ever, one thing should not be ne-glected. Unlike governments,NGOs lack the power to take deci-sions binding on the public. Nor dothey – with some exceptions – havethe financial resources and the po-litical clout and lobbying poweravailable to large corporations.They are, instead, voices in thepolitical process. And they there-fore continue to need transparencyand legitimacy, even though thestandards used to gauge them can-not be the same as those used tomeasure e.g. governments.


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4. NGOs and the growing number ofhumanitarian disasters: challenges,dilemmas, and attempts to come upwith solution

There are few reliable sources onthe number and in particular thefinancial status of the NGOs in-volved in disaster relief (Reinhardt2002: 378-379), although there arefigures available that serve to cor-roborate evident trends. It is, forinstance, safe to assume that thenumber of humanitarian NGOsactive and their financial endow-ments have grown dramatically.While in the 1960s the UNHCR(United Nations High Commis-sioner for Refugees) had only someten to twenty non-state partners forits implementation work, the figurehad grown to several hundred inthe 1990s. The European Commu-nity Humanitarian Office (ECHO)alone currently has frameworkagreements with some 180 NGOs.The amount of subsidies providedby ECHO to European humanitar-ian relief NGOs is impressive. Inthe mid-1990s their subsidy shareas a percentage of total revenueswas 40%, in 2000 the figure hadincreased to roughly 64% (Randal/German 2002: 25; Brasset/ Ti-berghien 2002: 58).16 At the end ofthe 1990s bilateral donors pro-ceeded on the assumption that atleast one quarter of their humani-tarian funds were transacted via

16 For comparison: the share of other inter-national NGOs in EU humanitarian aidcontracts was only 3.5% in 1999, the share oflocal NGOs was no more than 0.3% (Brus-set/Tiberghien 2002: 58).

NGOs; and the figure was evenhigher in some countries, e.g. inDenmark, France, the US, and theUK (Randel/German 2002: 24-25).

This rapid numerical growthshould, however, not be allowed toobscure the fact that there are alimited number of dominant NGOs.UNHCR has noted in 1997, for in-stance, that roughly 75% of thepublic funds committed in emer-gency situations go to some 20European and North AmericanNGOs (Macrae 2002b: 15). The mostimportant players and networksinclude Doctors without Bor-ders/Médecins Sans Frontières(MSF), Médecins du Monde(MDM), Action Contre la Faim(ACF), and Oxfam. Another pieceof evidence: in 2000, in the US fiveorganizations accounted for 30% ofgovernment expenditures in thisarea; these were CARE, CatholicRelief Services (CRS), the Interna-tional Rescue Committee (IRC),Save the Children, and World Vi-sion (Stoddard 2002: 48). With theexception of World Vision and IRC,these organizations are dependenton government support for roughlyhalf of their revenues – a fact,which may of course not be withoutinfluence on their operational poli-cies, and the way they are per-ceived by the public (see Table 1).


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Table 1: US NGO funding sources (2000, US-$)

Total revenue/support

USgovernment

support*

US gov't sup-port as % of

total revenue

Othergovernments

and IOs

Privatecontributions,revenue and

in-kind

CARE 446.273.000 240.905.000 54% 121.486.000 83.499.000

CRS 382.865.000 237.227.000 62% 18.022.000 127.616.000

IRC 157.448.000 57.933.000 37% 61.727.000 37.788.000

SAVE 143.624.709 67.852.976 47% 8.673.635 67.098.098

WV 469.114.000 75.588.000 16% 11.330.000 382.196.000

Source: Stoddard 2002: 48, Table 3, based on USAID 2001 (VolAg Report 2000)Note: * Includes food donations and freight costs in the framework of Public Law 480 (PL

480), which covers a “Food for Peace Non-Emergency Program”

The nominal expenditures of theOECD countries for emergencyrelief increased tenfold from theearly 1980s to the early 1990s. In the1990s the amounts of humanitarianaid provided roughly doubled. Inits January 2003 report "UncertainPower: the Changing Role of Do-nors in Humanitarian Action," thehighly reputed Overseas Develop-ment Institute (ODI) assumed thatexpenditures in this area had in-creased from US-$ 2.1 billion, toUS-$ 5.9 billion (in 1999 prices)(Macrae 2002b: 11).17 The share ofhumanitarian aid as a percentage ofODA increased accordingly: "In1989, relief aid accounted for lessthan 5% of ODA. By 1999, this haddoubled, to 10.1% and stood at10.5% in 2000" (Macrae 2002b: 11).

The growing importance of hu-manitarian NGOs as well as of dis-aster relief, initially gave rise tocoordination problems and raised

17 On the whole, be it said, official devel-opment assistance (ODA) declined in the1990s. Between 1974 and 1992 aid fundinggrew constantly, finally reaching a level ofUS-$ 62 billion. By 2000, though, it had againdeclined by some 12% to US-$ 55 billion (seeMacrae 2002a: 11).

the question of codes of conduct. Ata more fundamental level, though,the traditional self-perception ofhumanitarian organizations hasbeen under discussion since the1980s: Is it still possible, under theconditions of persistent structuresmarked by violence and militaryintervention, to continue to adhereto the model of impartial and neu-tral aid?

4.1 Coordination and codesof conduct

Coordination among aid organiza-tions constitutes a structural prob-lem. This goes for governmental,multilateral, and nongovernmentalactors a well as the relations be-tween them. As a rule, approachesaimed at solving this problem focuson the one hand on intensified ver-tical coordination. This hierarchicapproach may boost efficiency inthe short term, but it entails a riskof impairing the motivation, flexi-bility, and independence of – inparticular – small actors. Moreover,there are approaches involvinghorizontal coordination that tend tobe popular among NGOs, thoughthey may of course pose problems


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as far as reliability and practicabil-ity are concerned. Improved coor-dination is without doubt essentialto the coherence and efficiency ofhumanitarian work, although it isalso important to consider, on acase-by-case basis, both what tasksshould be coordinated in view ofthe competence problems andtransaction costs involved and atwhat level it is most reasonable toseek to improve coordination. Arecommendation which Margaret J.Anstee developed for Angola, butwhich is more general in character,may serve as a pointer here: "Coor-dination should be decentralised asfar as possible from headquarters tofield and thence, if feasible, to thelocal level, with clear-cut defini-tions of responsibilities and limita-tions of authority at each level."(Anstee 1996: 175-176)

In view of numerous problemsencountered on the ground, hu-manitarian NGOs launched a greatnumber of initiatives aimed at de-fining codes of conduct. Of particu-lar significance in this context is aCode of Conduct in Disaster Relief,which was adopted in mid-1994 byeight nongovernmental humanitar-ian agencies (NGHAs), includingthe International Committee of theRed Cross/ Internationales Komiteevom Roten Kreuz (ICRC), for theirwork in the field of disaster relief.18

The "Code of Conduct in DisasterRelief for the International RedCross and Red Crescent Movementand NGOs" defines standards ofconduct aimed at ensuring the in-dependence and effectiveness of

18 ODI 1994; in July 2004 the Code of Con-duct was signed by 300 NGOs. The list ofthese NGOs can be found under: <http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_disaters.pl?codeconduct_signatories.pdf> (19 July 2004).

relief operations. The documentcontains ten codifications and threeannexes, which, however, are notsubject to any verification or en-forcement mechanisms (Bennett1996: 138-139). Its most importantprinciples may be summed up, theICRC's words, as follows:

- the humanitarian imperativecomes first; aid is given regard-less of the race, creed or nation-ality of the recipients and with-out adverse distinction of anykind;

- aid priorities are evaluated onthe basis of need alone; aid willnot be used to further a particu-lar political or religious stand-point;

- NGOs shall endeavour not toact as instrument of govern-ment foreign policy; NGOsshall respect culture and cus-tom;

- NGOs shall attempt to builddisaster response on local ca-pacities;

- ways shall be found to involveprogramme beneficiaries in themanagement of relief aid;

- relief aid must strive to reducefuture vulnerabilities to disas-ter as well as meeting basicneeds;

- NGOs shall be accountable toboth beneficiaries and donors.19

In Germany, furthermore, the For-eign Office's "Humanitarian AidCoordinating Committee" hasagreed on a set of basic rules for

19 See International Federation of RedCross and Red Crescent Societies (ed.), Codeof Conduct, available under: <http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/> (19 July2004).

http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_disaters.pl?codecondu

http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/


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humanitarian aid.20 The Coordinat-ing Committee – initially a discus-sion group – was set up on April 9,1992. Its realization that additionalcoordination was called for stemsfrom the experiences made in pro-viding humanitarian aid to theKurds in the northern Iraq after theSecond Gulf War. The wave of refu-gees from Rwanda in 1994 thenmade it clear that further coordina-tion and a certain level of formal-ization were called for; and this led,on October 25, 1994, to the formalestablishment of the HumanitarianAid Coordinating Committee. TheCommittee is not a central controlinstrument but a body designed toserve the purpose of coordination.Its members include 19 GermanNGOs, VENRO, the Foreign Office,and other relevant federal minis-tries (including the Ministry forEconomic Cooperation and Devel-opment [BMZ], the Federal Minis-try of the Interior [Bundesministe-rium des Innern, BMI], and theFederal Ministry of Defense[Bundesministerium der Verteidi-gung, BMVG]).

4.2 Dilemmas andpoliticization ofhumanitarian aid

Humanitarian disasters are not aspecific feature of the era followingthe end of the Cold War. However,the situation has changed qualita-tively, in particular in the past twodecades: people in emergencysituations have become more vul-nerable. This is bound up in par-

20 See Auswärtiges Amt, Die Zwölf Grund-regeln der Humanitären Hilfe, availableunder: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/humanitaere_hilfe/grundregeln_html> (22 July 2005).

ticular with the fact that today theinterplay between economic, eco-logical, and political crisis factors,the combination of famine, vio-lence, and expulsion has made dis-asters more complex and possiblereactions to them more difficult.The erosion of state structures innumerous countries of the Southand the growing tendency of thedonor community to privatize reliefwork has induced NGOs to take onnew tasks. Some NGOs, like CAREinternational, Oxfam, or Caritasinternational even have budgetsearmarked specifically for refugeerelief in war- and crisis-torn regionswhich, in this particular area, arelarger than those of UN organiza-tions (Reinhardt 2000: 784-785; Roth2001: 45). Faced with this back-ground, established NGOs havebeen forced to rethink and adapttheir operational procedures. In-deed, some new NGOs have evenbeen set up in response to thesespecific challenges (Edwards et al.1999).

Some of the advantages of NGOs indisaster relief may be sought in thefact that they have extensive ex-perience and expertise on theground. Furthermore, they are as arule more flexible than large inter-national organizations like theUnited Nations and able to inter-vene in crisis areas without beinghobbled by time-consuming inter-nal bureaucratic encumbrances(Karp 1998: 101-102, 106). Like na-tional and multilateral agencies,however, NGOs are also faced withsubstantial problems and dilem-mas: not only in the multi- andbilateral sector but for NGOs aswell, it is seldom possible to coor-dinate efforts with long-term de-velopment aims. There is a riskhere that disaster relief may in this

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way be reduced to the level of char-ity for the losers of globalization,who, thanks to political and eco-nomic development blockades, findthemselves on the margins of theworld system. In addition, reliefservices tend to become an integralcomponent of civil-war economies.They contribute to bringing aboutsubstantial changes in economicand currency relations, a situationfrom which, in particular, politi-cally and economically stronggroups of society tend to profit(Duffield 1994: 59-63; de Waal/Omaar 1996: 209-213). While mas-sive inflows of food as well as largegrain purchases in neighboringcountries often alleviate the need ofpeople in threatened regions, thesepractices likewise lead to markeddistortions of local power struc-tures. The outcome is speculativeprofits for dealers, commercialfarmers, and transportation com-panies. Those in political power areas a rule good at profiting fromoutside support. One example is“Operation Lifeline Sudan”, whichwas organized under the auspicesof UNICEF and the World FoodProgramme/ Welternährungspro-gramm (WFP) as a large-scale reliefaction for people affected by warand hunger. The warring partiesmanaged to instrumentalize part ofthis aid for their own purposes. In1989 the Sudanese government iseven reported to have fundedroughly half of its military budgetfrom the operation. This was facili-tated by an artificially undervaluedcurrency that made it possible toskim off substantial sums at anexchange rate that brought lossesfor the donors and gains for theSudanese government (Debiel1996).

Finally, it is often claimed that hu-manitarian aid organizations mis-use the media to boost their dona-tion revenues by generating a cer-tain compassion effect. This closelink between fundraising and re-porting in the media obviously hasthe effect of favouring spectacularor high profile projects. There isalso a risk here that the so-called"CNN effect" will direct public at-tention, in a more or less irrationalway, to certain regions, whileothers are simply "forgotten".21 TheWorld Disaster Report (2003) re-cently pointed to the ethical di-lemmas involved here. In present-ing the report, Eva von Oelreich,director of Disaster Preparednessand Policy with the InternationalFederation of Red Cross and RedCrescent Societies, pointed out thatUS-$ 1.7 billion was mobilized forhumanitarian relief measures with-in days after the war in Iraq cameto an end; at the same time, how-ever, the UN lacked US-$ 1 billionwhich it needed, and which it hadcalled for in detailed appeals, toalleviate the plight of 40 millionpeople in 22 African countries. Do-nors and relief agencies are quiteevidently turning their attention todisasters with a high political pro-file; chronic emergencies are largelyignored.22 One of the real dangersof this short-term focus on "glaringmisery" is that it may lead the pub-lic to ignore the deep-seated causesof war and underdevelopment and,in the end, simply to acquiesce in

21 See Roth 2001: 45-46; Gabbier 2001: 113-114; Cater 2002.

22 Another important factor here is thefight against transnational terrorism, whichis increasingly impacting on the way inwhich relief funds are channeled. See IRIN,18 July 2003 ("World Disaster Report high-lights ethical dilemma").


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the collapse of many societies in theimpoverished South. And this, be itsaid, stands in contradiction to animportant principle of the Code ofConduct. According to it, disastervictims must be acknowledged ininformation, public relations, andadvertising measures as "dignifiedhuman beings, not hopeless ob-jects".

4.3 Humanitarian aid and themilitary

Up to the 1980s the humanitarianaid provided by NGOs played amore or less subordinate role. Itwas often linked to programs con-ducted by a host country with bi-and multilateral support. Humani-tarian NGOs seldom risked a con-frontation with the government of ahost country. If they witnessedhuman rights violations, this was asa rule not made public. Alex deWaal and Rakiya Omaar once re-ferred to this as “humanitarianismin a straightjacket” (deWaal/Omaar1996: 205, 223). One important ex-ception was Doctors Without Bor-ders (MSF), a relief organizationfounded in 1968 by BernardKouchner. In view of the war inBiafra (war of secession in Nigeria,1967-70) MSF questioned the le-gitimacy and effectiveness of twobasic principles that were and areconstitutive for the world of theInternational Committee of the RedCross (ICRC) and at that time de-fined the work of just about allNGOs: the practice of conditioningthe supply of relief services on theconsent of the warring parties andrefraining from making any publicstatements on circumstances on theground. Some two years later thedebate was advanced another stepby the famines that took place in

Tigray in 1984/85 and in Eritrea in1987/88, and in which the Ethiopiangovernment played a major role. In1987 a group of prominent intellec-tuals and humanitarian workersaround Kouchner formulated awidely noted “right to interven-tion” (droit d’ingérence) that wasconceived as a means of being ableto provide humanitarian aid evenagainst the will of the governmentsconcerned (Minear/Weiss 1995: 98).The discussion over the ongoingshift in state sovereignty intensifiedin the first half of the 1990s. Thisshift was influenced by an intensi-fied “humanitarian intervention”on the part of NGOs and a drasti-cally altered intervention practiceon the part of multilateral and stateactors. The United Nations experi-enced a wave of new-type interven-tionism that de facto placed a ques-tion mark over the sovereignty ofindividual states, and whose frameof reference came more and more tobe violation of human rights andminimum humanitarian standards(Debiel/Nuscheler 1996).

We can look at it from whateverangle we like: humanitarian aid hasbecome "politicized": to begin with,humanitarian action has impacts onpower structures and violence-based economies in crisis regions –a side effect that can be mitigated,but not wholly prevented. Besides,again and again NGOs themselveshave called, in the name of the"humanitarian imperative", formilitary intervention. This was thecase in the early 1990s in Somaliaand Rwanda no less than it was inthe late 1990s in the events leadingup to the war in Kosovo. The casesof Somalia and Kosovo in particularled to a rift right through the NGOcommunity, and sometimes evenstraight through individualorganizations. The question at issue


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zations. The question at issue wasand is the traditional self-perception of humanitarian work.

The war in Iraq has once again re-kindled the debate over the dilem-mas of humanitarian aid and therelations between aid organizationsand the military. The first half ofthe 1990s had already experiencedan intensive scholarly controversyon this issue (Debiel/Nuscheler1996); the discussion subsequentlysubsided, in order then, after the1999 war in Kosovo, to flare upagain. At the NGO level in Ger-many, VENRO has since then ad-dressed itself intensively to thisissue complex, pointing at manymeetings as well as in numerouspublications and position papers tothe dangers that threaten the inde-pendence of humanitarian aid(VENRO 1999; 2000; 2003; Wenzel1999).

On the occasion of the Kosovo war,for instance, a VENRO discussionpaper entitled "Humanitarian aidfor reasons of state?" (1999: 2) notedcritically that the term "humanitar-ian" was being co-opted for militaryinterventions, calling into questionthe impartiality of humanitarianaid (see also Eberwein et al. 1999).Against this background VENROand other associations of NGOsreacted critically to the BrahimiReport (1999), which called for anintegration of humanitarian activi-ties with UN peace operations un-der the leadership of the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General. VENRO is also cautious inits assessment of some new con-cepts that were developed byNATO under the header of “Civil-Military Cooperation” (CIMIC) andhave since been concretized andfurther developed by the German

Bundeswehr (VENRO 2003: 8-9).CIMIC expands the military’s spec-trum of tasks into the civil and – inparticular – humanitarian sectorand also aims to tie non-state activi-ties more closely to operationalmilitary planning. One especiallyproblematic aspect of this is thathumanitarian aid is losing theautonomous role it once had andare gradually becoming an integralcomponent of military operations –not least as a means of boosting theacceptance of the military amongthe population on the ground.

Generally, NGO associations likeVENRO (but also many independ-ent observers) take a skeptical viewof the sustainability of humanitar-ian aid provided by military actors.For VENRO, the Bundeswehr's1993 Somalia mission "illustratesthat a medical station set up in amilitarily efficient manner or atechnologically perfect well has achance of surviving only as long asthere are troops there on theground" (VENRO 1999: 4). Simi-larly, the support provided by theBundeswehr in building refugeecamps in Macedonia in 1999 is ac-knowledged but regarded assuboptimal, since local organiza-tions could have done the samework together with NGOs andrefugees.

“As far as has been regularly re-ported, NGOs use armed protectionon a regular basis in just four of theapproximately 55 conflict-affectedcountries in which they are work-ing, namely northern Iraq, Somalia,Russia (Ingushetia/Chechnya) andnorthern Kenya. Armed forces mayalso be used on a case-by-case ba-sis, for example at border areas, forinstance in Rwanda. NGOs are notdrawing on protection from inter-


26

national peacekeepers where thereare mandated UN operations, suchas in East Timor, Ethiopia/Eritrea orSierra Leone. Nor are they usingprotection from NATO-led forces inthe Balkans. In some cases, NGOsare using private security compa-nies to provide protection. This hasbeen the case in Sierra Leone,where the state sub-contracted se-curity services to private compa-nies.” (Macrae 2002b: 9)

The US' policy in the war in Iraqhas further intensified the debateon the militarization and instru-mentalization of humanitarian aid.The reason is that in connectionwith "Operation Iraqi Freedom" theUS defense ministry has sought,"both in the combat and the post-combat phase, to 'embed' humani-tarian aid in the US military strat-egy" (VENRO 2003). And in Marchof 2002 medico international held aconference in Frankfurt/Main called"Power and powerlessness of aid"to discuss these issues. CorneliaFüllkrug-Weitzel, director of theSocial Service Agency of the EKD(Evangelical Church in Germany),speaking of the Code of Conductadopted in 1994, warned that hu-manitarian aid was increasingly indanger of becoming a hostage or aplaything of politics. Since the Bal-kan wars at the latest, she noted,the humanitarian argument hasserved as a justification for militaryintervention, with humanitarianorganizations serving to heal thewounds of war and indeed some-times even – as the US administra-tion recently bluntly demandedduring the war in Iraq – as a vehiclefor winning the sympathies of thepopulation for intervening or occu-pying troops. NGOs, she went on,may well be tempted in such casesto accede to such demands or blan-

dishments. On the one hand, shenoted, this could mean funds inabundance from governments andmultilateral organizations; and onthe other hand there is hardly ahumanitarian organization activetoday that can "afford" not to beinvolved in a high-profile crisisassociated with military interven-tion. After all, the aid market is ahighly competitive one, and aid isbecoming an instrument of closelyinterlinked business, media, andpolitical interests.

A study by Wolf-Dieter Eberweinand Peter Runge arrives at similarresults. The authors note that theindependence of humanitarian aidis increasingly faced with the threatof being instrumentalized by thestate (Eberwein/Runge 2002). Af-ghanistan is another recent exam-ple. Here aid supplies dropped inwere not targeted in accordancewith the dictates of needs-orientedefficiency; they served the purposeof polishing the image of an anti-terror coalition that had been tar-nished by massive bombing attacksand of winning the sympathies ofthe Afghan population by conduct-ing something on the order of anaïve “hearts-and-minds” opera-tion (VENRO 2003: 13; Macrae2002b: 8). Furthermore, Afghani-stan is currently being used as atestbed for experiments with a newconcept, which intertwines militaryobjectives with humanitarian con-siderations. "Provincial reconstruc-tions teams" (PRTs) made up ofmilitary and civilian personnel areworking there to rebuild infrastruc-ture (e.g. schools, wells, health cen-ters). The intention is to have thesePRTs serve as points of referencefor NGOs and internationalorganizations (VENRO 2003: 13).


27

Under such conditions NGOs arelikely to find themselves in thedilemma of either having to coop-erate in alleviating a crisis, even ifthis means compromising theirown impartiality, or remaining onthe sidelines. In the US in particularNGOs are faced with growing pres-sure to act in the capacity of in-struments of the administration.For instance, at a forum convened

by InterAction – a network of reliefand development NGOs (includingCARE and Oxfam America – An-drew Natsios, the head of USAID(US Agency for International De-velopment), is reported to haveexplicitly referred to NGOs andprivate contractors receiving USgovernment funds as an extendedarm of the US administration(Beattie 2003).

5. Crisis prevention and crisis resolution: newchallenges posed by war and state failure

In the past decade and a half NGOshave not only become increasinglyinvolved in disaster relief; thenumber of NGOs active in the fieldof crisis prevention and crisis reso-lution – so-called conflict-resolutionNGOs – has risen at the same time.Both of these developments can beseen in one context: most observershave come to the realization thatwars and violence threaten to de-stroy the fruits of years of success-ful development cooperation andthat preventive measures are there-fore called for (Terlinden 2002: 57).In view of the new world "disorder"that followed the end of the ColdWar, NGOs find themselves in-creasingly confronted with unpre-dictable violent conflicts and arethus more and more forced to geartheir work to crisis prevention(Edwards et al. 1999).

5.1 Conflict-resolution NGOs– a new area ofresponsibility in themidst of a worldwideboom

Beginning in the early 1990s, therehas been a massive expansion ofNGOs active in the field of con-structive conflict management, andmany of them have developedmarked profiles of their own. Thespectrum of their work extendsfrom training measures for socialmultipliers, dialogue forums andproblem-solving workshops aimedat middle-level social or leadershipcircles to good services, nondirec-tive facilitation activities, and directmediation at the political decision-making level. This developmenthas various religious and secular


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roots. The Quakers, for instance,who mediated in a great number ofconflicts after the Second WorldWar, played a pioneering role here(see Mawlawi 1993: 395). Theirwork was highly discreet, and itwas perceived only by a smallgroup of experts. More influentialin this regard was an upsurge inmediation activities in the US be-ginning in the 1960s that started outby addressing life world, commu-nal, and interethnic conflicts. InNorth America and Europe in par-ticular, there are at present count-less international organizationsactive, even in the field of 'highpolitics'.

Founded in 1985 and based in Lon-don, International Alert (IA) hasplayed a pioneering pilot role forthe rapid growth of conflict-resolution NGOs. The organizationis active in many areas of the worldand seeks, in its own words, closecontact to regional and local part-ners. The organization is involvedin developing training programsaimed at developing conflict-mediation capacities. Furthermore,it is involved in issue-related fieldsof action, including early warningand preventive diplomacy, minor-ity rights, network-building, andgrassroots peace work. Finally, IAtook on a direct role as a mediator.But it was precisely this field ofactivity that provoked criticism.And in the mid-1990s the Dutchforeign ministry commissioned anevaluation of International Alert’swork that closely scrutinized IA’sactivities in Burundi, Sierra Leone,and Sri Lanka. Aside from recogni-tion for numerous successful pro-grams, there were also markedreservations. The tenor of theevaluation was that IA lacked aclear and transparent strategy and

that the organization’s behaviorwas unpredictable. It was recom-mended that IA should concentrateless on mediation and focus moreon strengthening local peace con-stituencies and support them byproviding capacities, knowledge,and resources for long-term con-flict-resolution processes (Sørbø etal. 1997).

One organization that has provenparticularly successful in conflictmediation is the Roman lay com-munity Sant’Egidio, which is spe-cialized in facilitation and contrib-uted substantially to settling thecivil war in Mozambique. Begin-ning in the mid-1970s, this ex-tremely brutal conflict, accompa-nied by famine and drought,brought untold suffering over thecountry’s population. In this situa-tion internal social forces that, inthe 1980s, came out in favor of apolitical solution cleared the wayfor negotiations. Sant’Egidio tookthe initiative at the end of the 1980s.The lay community had been en-gaged in Mozambique since the1970s and enjoyed the confidence ofboth church and state authorities.Its substantive competence andcredibility made Sant’Egidio a near-ideal facilitator. The negotiationsbetween the parties involved in theMozambican civil war, which wereconducted in Rome from July 1990to October 1992, led to acceptanceby all parties of the so-called Italianformula – a new type of interplaybetween NGOs, warring parties,and international actors. The re-gional actors Kenya and Zimbabwealso contributed to the success ofthese efforts.

The distribution of roles was un-usual. In its role as facilitator, thelay community Sant’Egidio shaped


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the course of negotiations; the su-perpower USA focused on provid-ing flanking advisory support,though not without exerting pres-sure where it was needed; Lonrho,a transnational corporation, workedfor a regionalization of efforts tofind a solution – i.e. one that in-cluded the neighboring countries –and made some of its logisticalcapacities available. Lonrho notonly contributed to initiating talksand contacts with regional actors, italso provided financial resourcesand transportation services. In Oc-tober 1992 this multitrack diplo-macy succeeded in coming up withan agreement. While the UnitedNations were included in the proc-ess only at a late stage, it neverthe-less managed to define a convinc-ing role for itself: It not only pro-vided a framework and assumedthe role of a guarantor for the tran-sitional phase extending from thepeace agreements to elections, italso claimed for itself the leadingrole in this follow-up process (De-biel 2003: 107-129).

We can observe that as their pro-files grow – e.g. thanks to the in-volvement of prominent personali-ties – many of these conflict-resolution NGOs tend to movecloser to the state sphere. One par-ticularly clear example is the Inter-national Negotiation Network(INN), which was founded by for-mer US president Jimmy Carter andis coordinated by the Carter Center(Atlanta, Georgia). The Carter Cen-ter was founded in 1987; its objec-tive is to provide, in the role of athird party, background analyses,consulting services, and publicrelations work aimed at settlingconflicts by nonmilitary means. TheINN operates in a gray zone be-tween the private and state sectors.

Accordingly, the INN is in a posi-tion to provide 'eminent persons' asmediators and contact persons.Moreover, it has direct access topolitical decision-makers, and isalso in possession of sufficient re-sources to develop the infrastruc-ture and technical support neededfor negotiations.23 In contrast tomany other organizations, how-ever, the Carter Center shuns secretnegotiations, always informing thepublic when it acts (see Mawlawi1993: 404). The INN has sought tomediate in North Korea, the formerYugoslavia, Haiti, Sudan, Burundi,Rwanda, and Ethiopia. Aside fromconflict mediation, the INN is alsoactive in the key field of electionmonitoring – these two areas ofactivity are also linked, e.g. like inLiberia.

In Germany, an organizationknown as the Plattform Zivile Kon-fliktbearbeitung (Platform for CivilConflict Resolution), an associationof German NGOs, was founded inNovember of 1998 in Bad Honnef(www.konfliktbearbeitung.net).24

The Platform is a joint project ofpersons, organizations, and institu-tions from peace work, humanrights work, humanitarian aid,development cooperation, and ofscientists active in these fields. ThePlatform is an open network that

23 See Mawlawi 1993: 404-405. There is alsoan African organization, similar in makeupto INN, called the African Leadership Fo-rum; many regional mediators are recruitedfrom it (Amadou Toumani Touré, OlesegunObasanjo, the late Julius Nyerere, etc.).

24 The Platform sees its central activities inefforts to improve the exchange of informa-tion as well as in lobbying work. The Plat-forms also serves as a clearinghouse for theexchange of expertise. The organization’ssecretariat places requests for experts, or e.g.search queries, into the network, clarifies therequests and forwards them.

http://www.konfliktbearbeitung.net).


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includes more than 50 organiza-tions and over 100 persons.

A new supporting organizationactive in the field of conflict resolu-tion is the Forum Ziviler Friedens-dienst (ZFD/Forum for Peace Ser-vice). Under the current Red-GreenGerman government the Forum hasachieved its goal of founding "acivil peace service in the form of agovernment-supported service pro-vided by trained male and femaleexpert peace workers organized ona pluralistic social basis" (www.friedenbrauchtfachleute.de). It hasover 120 individual members and40 member organizations. Thus farit has provided professional train-ing for over 120 expert peace work-ers. Its zfd500 campaign aims, by2006, to train at least 500 additionalmen and women and to appointthem as peace workers25 (Luder-mann 2003).

A guide to "Konfliktbearbeitung inDeutschland" (Conflict Resolutionin Germany) (Fiebich 2001) demon-strates how diverse the spectrum ofrelevant organizations has nowbecome. In Germany the BerghofForschungszentrum für konstruk-tive Konfliktbearbeitung/ BerghofResearch Center for ConstructiveConflict Management has brokennew ground in providing training,dialogue workshops, and capacity-building, e.g. in Sri Lanka and inthe Georgia-Abchasia conflict.

25 Peace experts are active in crisis regionsthroughout the world for peace and devel-opment services or international organiza-tions like the OSCE. Prior to their missionsthey are given several months of training. Intheir mission areas they support local initia-tives such as women’s or human rightsgroups, mediate between conflict parties,provide for venues, and organize coopera-tion efforts.

New EU-wide structures have alsobeen created that have encouragedclose cooperation and exchange ofexpertise in the form of a "policynetwork". One clear example is theEuropean Platform for ConflictPrevention and Transformationfounded in February 1997 in Am-sterdam. Early in 1997 a number ofdifferent international organiza-tions, research institutions, andNGOs joined forces to found theForum for Early Warning and EarlyResponse (FEWER).26 In the au-tumn of 2002 roughly a dozen or-ganizations active in the field ofconflict resolution set up a Euro-pean Peacebuilding Liaison Office(EPLO), a independent subgroup ofthe European Platform. Its aim is toensure improved access for NGOsto the EU's activities in this issuearea, to fortify transparency and tofacilitate the information flows forNGOs. This cooperation with non-state actors, many of them in pos-session of vast knowledge and di-rect contacts with the grassroots incrisis regions, has been a contribut-ing factor in inducing the EU toaccord more attention to the socialand political causes of conflicts inits conception of development pol-icy (Debiel/Fischer 2000).

26 They include the European institutionsInternational Alert (UK), the PIOOM Foun-dation (NL), the Russian Academy of Sci-ences/Institute of Ethnology (Russia), butalso e.g. the Council on Foreign Relations(US), York University (Canada), and someUN agencies. Another organization closelyassociated with FEWER is e.g. the Schweize-rische Friedensstiftung/Swiss Peace Founda-tion) (SFS) in Bern which has developed aninformation system for early analysis oftensions and fact-finding (Früh-Analyse vonSpannungen und Tatsachenermittlung,FAST).


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Regions of the South have also ex-perienced an NGO boom.27 In Af-rica, for instance, conflict-resolutionNGOs are now quite widespread.In its publication "Searching forPeace in Africa" the European Plat-form for Conflict Prevention andTransformation presents profiles ofsome 100 Africa-based conflict-resolution NGOs; in addition, itcontains presentations of 23 inter-national NGOs active in this area.28

5.2 Instruments used toanchor crisis preventionin developmentcooperation andhumanitarian aid

It has been noted repeatedly sincethe end of the 1980s that externalsupport in crisis and conflict situa-tions can entail extreme alterationsto the political and economic situa-tion on the ground and unsettlelocal markets. Indeed, aid funds orgoods are sometimes diverted intogiven areas to supply troops andpurchase arms or to secure politicalsupport. Moreover, implicit mes-sages sent by external actors mayalso have subtle but far-reachingeffects: For instance, establishingcontacts with warlords – somethingthat relief organizations are oftenunable to avoid – may serveunintentionally to boost the

27 For an overview of all world regions, see<http://www.euconflict.org/>. The header"Conflict Prevention/Organisation" includesoverviews on conflict-resolution NGOsthroughout the world (listed by region,alphabetically, etc.).

28 See Monique Mekenkamp et al. 1999.With its regional focus, the overview ex-pands on the brief descriptions published ayear before by the European Platform (1998)in "Prevention and Management of ViolentConflicts: An International Directory".

tentionally to boost the formers’legitimacy.

This debate concerning the ambiva-lence of humanitarian aid gave riseto the “Do No Harm”29 principle(Anderson 1999). What this impera-tive implies is that those active inthe field should subject their workto critical self-reflection, and it atthe same time serves to sensitizethem to the impacts that their ownactions may have on conflict con-stellations. Collaborative for Devel-opment Action, Inc. (CDA)30 hasadvanced the approach and is con-cerned with seeing it implementedboth in humanitarian aid and indevelopment cooperation. The “Lo-cal Capacities for Peace Project(LCPP)” and the “Reflecting onPeace Project (RPP)”31 have ana-lyzed numerous case exampleswith a view to identifying negativeimpacts on conflicts and derivingfrom positive experiences scopesfor constructive action. The casesstem from nearly all regions of theworld, e.g. from the South Pacific(Fiji), Asia (Sri Lanka, Philippines,Afghanistan), Africa (South Africa,Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, South

29 The “Do No Harm” Principle is derivedfrom the Hippocratic Oath, according towhich medical treatment must not harm thepatient.

30 The activities of CDA, which wasfounded in 1985, are generally focused oneconomic and social development in Asia,Africa, Latin America, and central and east-ern Europe. As far as its measures and ac-tivities in the field of conflict prevention andresolution are concerned, CDA works topromote the role played by third parties inconflicts and post-conflict situations. See<http://www.cdainc.com/index.php>.

31 Since 1994 the LCPP has been carriedout jointly by numerous operational NGOsactive in crisis regions. The RPP is also ajoint initiative of more than 50 NGOs whosework often brings them face to face withviolent conflict.

http://www.euconflict.org/

http://www.cdainc.com/index.php


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Sudan), the Middle East (Palestineand Israel, Cyprus), Europe (theBasque country, Bosnia-Herzego-vina, the Crimea, Croatia, Georgia,and South Ossetia), and LatinAmerica (Columbia, Guatemala,Chiapas in Mexico).

Parallel to the “Do No Harm” ap-proach, various donor countries (inparticular Sweden, Canada, Nor-way, and the UK) and NGOs likeCARE, Oxfam, and Save the Chil-dren are working for a comprehen-sive integration of this problemcomplex into their efforts: “Theseefforts are geared more towardsmainstream peacebuilding withinthe more traditional mandates ofhumanitarian assistance, povertyalleviation and sustainable devel-opment. Increasingly, concepts,ideas and practices are migratingacross the once clear demarcationsbetween the traditional fields ofdevelopment, humanitarian assis-tance, conflict resolution andpeacebuilding.” (Hoffman 2001: 1)

One approach, which includesvarious strategies, mechanisms,and methods of conflict resolution,is "peace and conflict impact as-sessment" (PCIA) (see Austin et al.2003). Following Ken Bush, PCIAcan be defined as a “means ofevaluating (ex post facto) and an-ticipating (ex ante, as far as possi-ble) the impacts of proposed andcompleted development projectson: 1) those structures and proc-esses which strengthen the pros-pects for peaceful coexistence and

decrease the likelihood of the out-break, reoccurrence, or continua-tion of violent conflict, and; 2) thosestructures and processes that in-crease the likelihood that conflictwill be dealt with through violentmeans.” (Bush 1998: 7)

The call for peace and conflict as-sessment was and is closely boundup with the fact that cooperationand humanitarian aid must be seenas problematic or indeed as havingfailed in numerous crisis countriesin the South: “In Somalia, interna-tional aid organizations were inad-vertently drawn into rivalries be-tween clans. In order to gain accessto needy segments of the popula-tion, they paid protection moneyand tolerated hefty 'taxation' ofrelief supplies by the militias. As aresult, in the final analysis theywere effectively contributing to thefinancing and prolongation of theconflict. Similar patterns were alsoobserved in Ethiopia and southernSudan. In contrast, the genocide inRwanda, which until that time hadbeen considered a model country asfar as development cooperationwas concerned, raised the questionas to whether a mistaken develop-ment model had been promoted formany years – one which perpetu-ated the structures of social exclu-sion and discrimination (Uvin1998).” (Leonhardt 2001: 11)

.


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Table 2: NGO strategies and impacts

Direct intervention Capacity-building Advocacy

Fuellingconflict

Aid used to purchasearms

Providing support topolitical front organiza-tions

Advocacy which sup-ports one of the warringparties to the conflict

Holdingoperation

"Smart" distribution ofrelief so that it does notincrease underlyingtensions

Support for local organi-zations such as irrigationcouncils, church-basedgroups etc.

Protection of civiliansagainst human rightsabuses

Peacebuilding

Projects which bringdifferent ethnic groupsunder the same pro-grammatic umbrella

Support for civic peacegroups

Advocacy for peace,justice, and reconciliation

Source: Goodhand/Hulme 1997: 24, Table 3

NGOs active in crisis situations (seeTable 2) may aggravate a conflict,alleviate the suffering caused bycrisis situations (holding opera-tion), or – in the most favorablecase – provide a contribution topeacebuilding.

The situation is at present markedby a heightened sensitivity as re-gards the potential chances andrisks of development cooperation incrisis situations (see Table 3).

Against this background, numeroustheorists and practitioners of devel-opment cooperation have taken aclose look at PCIA and developedsome approaches and methods oftheir own. In some countries, e.g. inKenya and Guatemala32, variousPCIA approaches have been andcontinue to be used and tried out inpractice (Leonhardt et al. 2002).

32 The aim of the PCIA project in Kenyaand Guatemala (which has already beenconcluded) was to develop practical tech-niques and instruments for the planning,monitoring, and evaluation of developmentprojects and to strengthen conflict sensitiza-tion. These practical experiences have led,among other things, to the conclusion that acountry-specific PCIA approach is preferableto a universal PCIA methodology. A furtherconclusion is that conflict analysis should betied more closely into project planning andintegrated within a project cycle with anongoing monitoring process. See Leonhardtet al. 2002: 3 et seq., 30-33.


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Table 3: Opportunities and Risks of Development Cooperation in ConflictSituations

Conflict factor Risks Opportunities

Politics

Development cooperation (civil conflictmanagement is inadequately harmo-nized with diplomatic and militaryinitiatives and consequently has acounter-productive effect

Development cooperation indirectlystrengthens illegitimate and authoritar-ian political structures

Development cooperation weakens localforms of government by setting upunsustainable parallel structures

Various instruments of conflict man-agement are used in a coordinatedand sensitive manner

Development cooperation strengthenslegitimate formal and informal politi-cal structures

Development cooperation promotesparticipation and respects local owner

Development cooperation adopts acommitted but neutral attitude to theconflict

Economics

Development cooperation distorts localeconomic processes and strengthens wareconomies

Development cooperation amplifiesexisting regional or socio-economicinequalities and discrimination

Development cooperation promotes theunsustainable use of natural resources

Development cooperation consolidatesdisputed claims to natural resources

Development cooperation trains indi-viduals who later join armed groups

Development cooperation identifiesand strengthens legitimate local eco-nomic processes

Development cooperation promotesequality of opportunity, particularlyfor disadvantaged groups

Development cooperation promotescollaboration and cohesion throughjoint activities

Development cooperation promotessustainable and just systems of re-source utilization

Development cooperation supportseconomic alternatives to the use offorce

Socio-culturalfactors

Development cooperation neglects localsocial capital and institutional capacities,creates dependency

Development cooperation takes over andreinforces patterns of perception whichencourage conflict (e.g. ethnicity)

Development cooperation add fuel toexisting lines of conflict through well-meaning but poorly implemented peaceinitiatives

Development cooperation promotescommitted individuals ('human capi-tal') and peace initiatives at the locallevel

Development cooperation strengthenslocal coping strategies and thus re-duces vulnerability to the conflict

Development cooperation supportsconfidence-building and reconciliation

Security

Development cooperation ignores thehuman-rights and security situation inthe country

Development subsidizes warring groupsby accepting theft and 'taxation' of reliefsupplies

Development cooperation employsuncontrolled private security services,thus exacerbating miniaturization…

Development cooperation reports oninfringements of human rights, andbecause of the international presenceenhances the security of the popula-tion

Development cooperation avoidsbecoming instrumentalized by war-ring groups by following clear princi-ples

Development cooperation createssecurity structures in close collabora-tion with partners and target groups

Source: Leonhardt 2001: 17-18; based on: Anderson 2000; Hulme/Goodhand 2000; Klinge-biel 1999; Leonhardt 2000; Uvin 1998.


35

It is still too early to judge the qual-ity and effects of PCIA, since thetool is still in the developmentphase and has been in use in prac-tice only for a limited number ofyears. But it can be said that theapproaches that point ahead aremainly those that are organized incooperation between North andSouth NGOs and seek to ensurethat structures of dominance arenot replicated at the evaluationlevel.

5.3 Assessment of theconflict work of NGOs

The crisis prevention and conflict-resolution work of NGOs focuseson different levels. The spectrumextends from diplomacy at the po-litical decision-making level to ef-forts at the local level. In the plan-ning and implementation of pro-jects the possibility is given tominimize the potential for an esca-lation of violence, for instance byconstructively and cooperativelyinvolving persons at risk in projectwork (Terlinden 2002: 1-2, 4). Onesuccessful example of crisis preven-tion can be named in the field ofwater management in the northeastof Kenya. Here CARE internationalUK worked to strengthen the tech-nical and administrative capacitiesof water users associations (WUAs)as well as to support municipalitiesin developing expertise and meth-ods needed to constructively re-solve resource conflicts.

The – wholly welcome – growinglyimportant role played by conflict-resolution NGOs and the integra-tion of conflict resolution withindevelopment cooperation and hu-manitarian project work should,

however, not be permitted to ob-scure the fact that NGOs – muchlike governmental and multilateralactors – do not always have a pri-mary and undivided interest inconstructive intervention. The workof NGOs is all too often influencedby masked interests, intrinsic or-ganizational factors, or the pressureexerted by the media and the pub-lic, as was observed e.g. in the wakeof the genocide in Rwanda. More-over, approaches like PCIA areeasily misinterpreted as a socio-technological endeavor. Such ap-proaches may tend to underesti-mate the possible destructive im-pacts of external actors, while over-estimating the possibilities thatconflict resolution has to bringabout changes in persistent struc-tures of violence.

What is called for precisely in pro-longed and persistent conflicts ismodesty – i.e. the precept “BeModest” – an imperative of reasonand realistic self-appraisal. Hereboth conflict parties and externalactors usually find themselves in aconflict-prone environment thatmay well also be unstable and evenharbor marked self-destructivetendencies. Apart from state failureand the existence of economies ofviolence, another important factorin such situations that is especiallydetrimental to finding a solution isthat the conflict parties are oftenfragmented: In such cases thechances open to constructive influ-ence are limited.

In such constellations the manifoldengagement of external actors mayserve more to create confusion bydefining new lines of conflict, per-mitting conflict parties to instru-


36

mentalize external forums, andblurring the lines of responsibilityfor agreements on settling conflicts.The Burundi conflict is a case inpoint here: In the course of the1990s multilateral, governmental,and nongovernmental actorslaunched a good number of – some-times competing – mediation initia-tives. While these initiatives led toconstantly reshuffled rounds ofnegotiations, they failed to end theconflict (to say nothing of comingup with a sound political arrange-ment). The imperative of modestytherefore, also implies that externalactors should reflect critically ontheir contributions and seek to in-tegrate them, in the sense of a divi-sion of labor, into a course of con-certed action.

Another model may be seen in the“Do No Harm” principle men-tioned above. But at present thechallenge is to continue to factorcritical self-reflection not only intooperational action at the projectlevel but also, and comprehen-sively, into the overall complex oftrade, development, and securitypolicy. The field that has mademost progress here thus far – atleast at the conceptual level – isdevelopment policy. To cite anexample, at the end of the 1990s theWestern industrialized countriescommissioned, in the OECDframework, a landmark study,much along the lines of PCIA, on“The Influence of Aid in Situationsof Violent Conflict” (Uvin 1999).Some important insights were alsoprovided by a series of relevantcomparative studies commissionedby the BMZ; the studies looked intothe impacts of development coop-eration for the cases of northern

Mali, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Ethio-pia, Kenya, and Rwanda.33

One central challenge facing civilsociety forces is to critically accom-pany these evaluations, and to callfor transparency and public scru-tiny. Also, the “Do No Harm” prin-ciple can be developed politicallyinto a new imperative: “Don’t FuelViolence”, i.e. do anything to exac-erbate an ongoing conflict. TheNGOs assembled under the roof ofthe network Eurostep, for instance,are working toward this end whenthey call on the EU and its memberstates to pay more heed in theircrisis-prevention strategies to therole played by arms exports and thetrade in tropical timber, diamonds,or oil, a factor of key importance forwar economies. One further de-mand must be to restrict the vio-lence-promoting role that maysometimes be played by diasporacommunities.

NGO conflict-resolution workshould – this is the essential point –be neither all too harmony-mindednor blind the aspect of power. Thisgoes for their relationship to theirown government as well as to au-thorities abroad and internationalorganizations. In many cases stateactors may tend to aggravate aconflict or devote too little effort toovercoming conflict factors, be-cause they, in cases of doubt, areapt to give priority to power- andalliance-related considerations andeconomic interests over seriousefforts devoted to conflict preven-tion. But multilateral organizationsin many cases pursue approaches

33 The cross-sectional report was preparedby the Deutsche Institut für Entwicklungs-politik/German Development Institute (DIE)in Bonn; see Klingebiel 1999.


37

dictated by bureaucratic logics,particularist interests, or the block-ade policies of powerful memberstates. NGOs active in the field ofconflict resolution would thereforebe well advised not only to viewthemselves as moderators, commu-nication facilitators, trainers, orcapacity builders. In many casesNGOs can achieve more by actingin the capacity of watchdogs anddoing their best to gain a goodgrasp of complex situations and tocreate critical counterpublics. If

they are serious about their work aslobbyists and advocates of peacefulconflict resolution, NGOs activehere will be without the convenientoption of acquiescing in their roleof mere implementing or projectorganizations (in receipt of largestate subsidies). Only by assuminga critical stance toward the statewill they be able to do justice totheir original peace-oriented claimto be a vibrant element of civil soci-ety.

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Recently Published INEF Reports

Debiel, Tobias/Monika Sticht: Towards a New Profile? Development, Humanitarianand Conflict Resolution NGOs in the Age of Globalization. Duisburg (INEF Re-port, 79/2005), 44 pp.

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Böge, Volker: Neue Kriege und traditionale Konfliktbearbeitung. Duisburg (INEF-Report 74/2004), 69 S.

Fuchs, Martina/Michael Giese: Globale Arbeitsteilung - transnationale Kompetenzauf-teilung. Beispiele aus der Automobilzulieferindustrie. Duisburg (INEF-Report73/2003), 36 S.

Falk, Gertrud: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers - eine Chance zur Bekämpfung länd-licher Armut in Subsahara-Afrika. Duisburg (INEF-Report 72), 50 S.

Führmann, Bettina: Abkehr vom Washington Concensus? Die wirtschaftspolitischeStrategie der Weltbank zur Armutsbekämpfung. Duisburg (INEF-Report71/2003), 59 S.

Hippler, Jochen/Schade, Jeanette: US-Unilateralismus als Problem von internationalerPolitik und Global Governance. Duisburg (INEF-Report 70/2003), 66 S.

Single Copies can be ordered at:Institute for Development and Peace, Universität Duisburg-Essen, D-47048 Duisburg.

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