INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Glass v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2020] ICQ 001

PARTIES: GERALDINE GLASS

(appellant)

v

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION REGULATOR

(respondent)

FILE NO: C/2019/10

PROCEEDING: Appeal

DELIVERED ON: 15 January 2020

HEARING DATE: 8 August 2019

MEMBER: Martin J, President

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO

COMPENSATION – EMPLOYMENT RELATED INJURY,

DISABILITY OR DISEASE – ARISING OUT OF

EMPLOYMENT – where the appellant was a teacher supervising an

overseas school trip – where the appellant voluntarily decided to

participate in a rope swing activity and injured herself doing so –

where the rope swing was not an authorised or approved activity for

either staff or students – whether the appellant’s injury arose out of,

or in the course of, her employment – whether the appellant’s injury

occurred during an “interval” in her employment – whether the

appellant’s use of the rope swing was incidental to her employment

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 32

CASES: Blackwood v Ziebarth [2016] ICQ 5, cited

Comcare v PVYW (2013) 250 CLR 246, cited

Glass v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 046,

related

Kavanagh v The Commonwealth (1959-1960) 103 CLR 547, cited

Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] 1 Qd R 519,

cited

Waugh v Blackwood (2015) 251 IR 126, cited

APPEARANCES: SA McLeod QC with RM O’Gorman for the appellant instructed

by Holding Redlich

2

PB O’Neill instructed by the Workers’ Compensation Regulator for

the respondent

[1] In November 2016 Geraldine Glass was employed as a teacher by Brisbane Catholic Education

(BCE) at the Xavier Catholic College (XCC).

[2] XCC had, for many years, conducted trips for students to Vanuatu to engage in marine studies

and cultural exchanges. Ms Glass was, with another teacher, the nominated Tour Leader/Tour

Coordinator for the trip conducted in November 2016. While on the trip she injured her shoulder.

[3] The question before the Commission was whether she had suffered an injury within the meaning

of that term in s 32 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003. At the relevant

time, s 32 defined “injury” in this way:

“(1) An injury is personal injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if

–

(a) for an injury other than a psychiatric or psychological disorder – the

employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury;

…”

[4] The deceptively simple words – “arising out of, or in the course of, employment” – are at the

heart of this case. Difficulties in applying these words have frequently been the subject of judicial

comment. For example, in Comcare v PVYW,1 the majority said:

“[12] Hatzimanolis was not the first occasion on which a general principle has

been stated as to how it might be determined whether an employee who

has suffered an injury has done so ‘in the course of’ the employee’s

employment. This is understandable. It has never been suggested that the

development of a statement of such a principle is an easy matter. Its

application can prove even more troublesome.”

[5] The application of the relevant principles proved troublesome in this case and led to the

Commission mischaracterising the circumstances surrounding the injury to Ms Glass. Before

embarking on a consideration of the relevant legal principles, I will briefly review the factual

background.

Factual background

[6] The trip to Vanuatu took place in the last week of November 2016. Although XCC had already

received preliminary approval for the overseas trip from the XCC College Leadership Team, the

tour organisers submitted a formal application to a body within the BCE called the International

Travel and Advisory Panel (ITAP). ITAP approved the trip subject to some conditions which

were satisfied and the group of five adults and 27 students departed Australia on 23 November

2016.

1 (2013) 250 CLR 246.

3

[7] On the second day of the trip, a decision was taken to alter the itinerary because the original

destination for that day was unsuitable and the group travelled to the Blue Lagoon. The changed

itinerary was not the subject of approval by ITAP.

[8] The Commissioner found that the decision to go to the Blue Lagoon was made following

discussions with staff at the island resort but did not accept that the decision was “a collaborative

and professional decision made by five teachers” as claimed by Ms Glass. The Commissioner

was “also not persuaded that any meaningful attempt was made by Ms Glass, Mr McQuaid or Ms

Freshwater to undertake a risk assessment of the Blue Lagoon, any related swimming activities

or the rope swing activity before arriving at the lagoon.”

[9] On arriving at the lagoon the teachers observed that there was a knotted rope which was attached

to a tree overhanging the lagoon. A person could climb onto an elevated platform, take hold of

the knotted rope, swing off the platform over the water, let go of the rope, and fall into the lagoon.

[10] The evidence relating to the injury was summarised by the Commissioner in her reasons2 in this

way:

“[66] Ms Glass explained she participated in the rope swing activity to develop

‘right relationships with students. It gives them confidence…. also

develops an inter-respect between the teachers and the students’.

[67] Ms Glass confirmed she was not required to participate in the rope swing

in order to adequately perform her obligations in respect of supervising the

students. Likewise, Mr McQuaid confirmed there was no condition

associated with the supervision of students that required him to swing on

the rope.

[68] Mr McQuaid confirmed the idea of accessing the rope swing was very

much student-driven, with several students actively encouraging him to

participate.

[69] When it was her turn to swing off the platform, Ms Glass said she held the

rope, placed her foot on the knot at the bottom of the rope and swung out.

At the point of maximum pendulum swing – about 45 degrees – she said

she dropped into the water like most other people would have, but she

thought she may have fallen a bit earlier, at which point she felt something

‘go’ in her shoulder.

[70] Ms Glass said she put her arm up to relieve the pain, swam over to the side

of the lagoon and eventually got out of the water. Upon returning to Erakor

Island Resort, she recalled putting ice on her shoulder and strapping it as

best she could. Over the next few days she took Nurofen and Panadol to

assist with the pain.”

[11] The Commissioner also found:

“[150] I accept Ms Glass voluntarily decided to participate in the rope swing

activity. It is clear she was not compelled, nor did she seek (or was granted)

2 [2019] QIRC 046.

4

permission to access the rope swing activity by Ms Freshwater, who was a

member of the school CLT, or any other representative of BCE.

[151] I also accept that participating in the rope swing activity did not form part

of Ms Glass’ work responsibilities or supervisory obligations while

travelling in Vanuatu. Moreover, it would have been very difficult, if not

impossible, for Ms Glass to both supervise students and participate in the

rope swing activity at the same time.

[152] On her own evidence, Ms Freshwater acknowledged she had no

involvement in the approval of the original application for the Vanuatu

travel at the CLT level, had no knowledge of the Guidelines and mandatory

procedures, had never travelled to Vanuatu before, had been provided with

limited (if any) direction in respect of the nature of her role while in

Vanuatu and did not directly or indirectly encourage Ms Glass to

participate in the rope swing activity.

[153] As touched on above, having considered all the evidence before the

Commission in respect of Ms Freshwater’s role and responsibilities on the

Vanuatu trip, I am not persuaded, also having regard to the key

responsibilities of individual teachers on the trip as set in Form 4, that Ms

Freshwater had any meaningful input into, or influence over, the decision

to travel to the Blue Lagoon or the decision made by Ms Glass to

participate in the rope swing activity.”

The case before the Commission

[12] Ms Glass contended that the injury arose squarely out of her employment as she was doing the

work she was employed to do or, at the very least, her use of the rope swing was incidental to that

work.

[13] The Regulator argued:

(a) her action in using the rope swing formed no part of her role as a teacher and, in doing so,

she was on a “frolic” of her own and, thus, outside the employment relationship; and

(b) her employment only provided a background or setting for her injury in circumstances

where BCE had not approved, authorised, induced or encouraged her to participate in the

rope swing activity.

The decision

[14] Most of the analysis of the issues thought to be relevant concentrated on the principles relating to

“interval” cases. These are the cases which generally concern an injury which occurs between

discrete periods of actual work. The principles which have been developed (as in cases such as

Hatzimanolis and PVYW) apply where an employee has suffered an injury “but not whilst engaged

in actual work”.3

3 PVYW at [38].

5

[15] In analysing the facts as she found them to be, the Commissioner appears to have proceeded on

the basis that the injury occurred in an “interval”. Reference was made by her to the paragraph in

PVYW where the majority said:

“[38] The starting point in applying what was said in Hatzimanolis, in order to

determine whether an injury was suffered in the course of employment, is

the factual finding that an employee suffered injury, but not whilst engaged

in actual work. The next enquiry is what the employee was doing when

injured. For the principle in Hatzimanolis to apply, the employee must have

been either engaged in an activity or present at a place when the injury

occurred. The essential enquiry is then: how was the injury brought about?

In some cases, the injury will have occurred at and by reference to the place.

More commonly, it will have occurred while the employee was engaged in

an activity. It is only if and when one of those circumstances is present that

the question arising from the Hatzimanolis principle becomes relevant.

When an activity was engaged in at the time of injury, the question is: did

the employer induce or encourage the employee to engage in that activity?

When injury occurs at and by reference to a place, the question is: did the

employer induce or encourage the employee to be there? If the answer to the

relevant question is affirmative, then the injury will have occurred in the

course of employment.”4

[16] The Commissioner then says that “the relevant activity to be considered is the rope swing activity

engaged in by Ms Glass, rather than her presence at the Blue Lagoon or in Vanuatu.” That is

followed by the statement that “the question to be considered by the Commission in this appeal

is whether BCE induced or encourage[d] Ms Glass to engage in the rope swinging activity. If the

answer to the question be ‘yes’, then the injury is within the course of employment. If it be ‘no’,

then it is outside the course of employment.”

[17] The Commissioner then went on to consider a number of matters including a finding that nobody

in any position of authority induced or encouraged Ms Glass to participate in the rope swing

activity. This finding was said to be based particularly with respect to evidence given by Dr Lee

and Mr Kearney. They gave evidence about the ITAP guidelines and the approval process. Two

of the matters upon which the Commissioner relied in that finding were that approval for the rope

swing activity would not have been given had it been sought and the risk assessment undertaken

in respect of the rope swing activity was deficient. I cannot, with respect, understand how either

of those matters (which are matters of opinion expressed after the event) are relevant to a finding

that BCE did not, in fact, induce or encourage participation in the activity. In any event, that is

not a vital part of the reasoning process.

[18] After referring to a number of considerations, the Commissioner found that she was “not satisfied

Ms Glass was induced or encouraged, either implicitly or explicitly, to undertake the rope swing

activity” and dismissed the application. There was no need to consider whether there was such

inducement or encouragement unless the Commission was proceeding on the basis that this was

an “interval” case.

[19] The Commissioner went on to consider the alternative argument should she be found to be wrong

in her view about the application of “interval” cases principles. She held that Ms Glass was not

4 The excerpt set out in the decision is inaccurate. It appears to have conflated the eighth and ninth sentences.

6

fulfilling her teaching role at the time she undertook the rope swing activity, or that the rope swing

activity was incidental to her work. This finding was made, the Commissioner said, in

circumstances where:

(a) the rope swing was not an authorised or approved activity for either staff or students;

(b) on her own evidence, Ms Glass made a voluntary choice to participate in the rope swing

activity;

(c) the rope swing activity was recreational in nature and it was not a requirement of Ms Glass’

employment that she participate; and

(d) it was physically impossible for Ms Glass to actively supervise students while also

participating in the rope swing activity.

[20] The Commissioner dismissed Ms Glass’ submission that her engaging in the rope swing activity

with the students was taken in furtherance of the role she was fulfilling in Vanuatu. It was argued

that that activity was consistent with the general practice on the trip of the teachers actively

participating with the students in their activities including, for example, participating in scuba

diving. This was distinguished by the Commissioner on the basis that activities such as scuba

diving were approved by ITAP.

[21] The Commissioner concluded by finding that Ms Glass made a personal and voluntary decision

to participate in a recreational activity that fell well outside the ambit of her teaching duties and

responsibilities. Further, she found that, whether or not it was appropriate, “it was not necessary

for Ms Glass to participate in the activity in order to supervise the students.”

[22] The Commissioner also found that there was no connection between Ms Glass’ employment and

her injury. This finding was based on:

(a) the trip to the Blue Lagoon and participation in the rope swing activity had not been

authorised by BCE, ITAP or a representative of XCC;

(b) permission was neither requested nor granted by ITAP or the leadership team; and

(c) participation in the rope swing activity did not form part of her duties as a teacher nor was

it incidental to those duties.

The Code of Conduct and associated policies

[23] The Commissioner referred in some detail to the Code of Conduct and other policies which

applied to this trip. The Code of Conduct, which applied to all teachers, deals broadly with a

number of issues and reinforces the requirement that employees have some responsibility for

contributing to the fulfilment of the BCE’s duty of care to its employees and students.

[24] The BCE “International Travel Guidelines and Mandatory Procedures” requires that the Code of

Conduct must be observed at all times by all staff engaging in international travel. The Guidelines

contain the requirements for the creation of risk management plans which are to be considered by

ITAP and approved with or without conditions or refused. The risk management plan created for

the trip to Vanuatu contained provisions with respect to scuba diving but not, of course, with

respect to the Blue Lagoon activities which were engaged in as a result of the planned activity not

being available.

7

[25] When the original plan could not be followed the change to the Blue Lagoon was undertaken but

without any of the approval processes required being undertaken or, it seems, considered. The

Commissioner found that three of the teachers had little, if any, knowledge of the ITAP Guidelines

and that the appellant, while having some understanding of them, had not read the mandatory

procedures within the Guidelines, nor understood its interaction with the Code and other relevant

policies.

[26] In her consideration of the actions of the teachers with respect to the Guidelines and the change

in plan, the Commissioner held that she could not accept Ms Glass’ claims that the decision to

travel to the Blue Lagoon was “a collaborative and professional decision made by five teachers”.

This action was inconsistent with the policies contained within the Code and the XCC Child and

Youth Risk Management Strategy (as adopted by the Guidelines) which reinforce the importance

of developing risk management strategies for medium and high risk activities outside school

grounds. The Commissioner also held that no meaningful attempt was made to undertake a risk

assessment before arriving at the Blue Lagoon.

Was this an “interval” case?

[27] The starting point for any consideration of whether an injury has been suffered during an

“interval” is that there must be facts sufficient to justify a finding that “an employee suffered

injury, but not whilst engaged in actual work”.

[28] It is only if the appellant was injured while not working that the principles in PVYW are strictly

applicable. The Regulator contends:

“In circumstances where the Appellant was in fact overseas for work purposes and

therefore in an overall period of work scenario including periods of work and non-

work periods, and both work activities and non-work activities supported the

Commissioner utilising the principles from the ‘interval’ cases in determining

whether the Appellant’s injury occurred in the course of her employment.”

[29] While it has been recognised that the decision in PVYW can be of assistance in cases which are

not “interval” cases, that is because of the extra consideration given in that decision to matters of

wider effect. In Waugh v Blackwood,5 for example, reference was made to PVYW because of the

consideration given to the expression “arising out of … the employee’s employment”. Waugh

was not an interval case.

[30] The respondent referred to a series of decisions in which reference had been made to PVYW. Each

of them, though, was concerned with a situation where there had been a clear cessation of work

by an employee and an injury was suffered before the next period of work started or was due to

start. A distinction can be drawn between cases where an employee finishes a period of work and

is injured and an employee who is on 24 hour call is injured at a period when the standard hours

of work have concluded. That was the situation in Blackwood v Ziebarth.6

[31] In oral argument the Regulator contended that there was an interval which commenced when Ms

Glass put her hand on the rope (with the intention of swinging on it) and which concluded,

5 (2015) 251 IR 126; [2015] ICQ 28.

6 [2016] ICQ 5.

8

presumably, when she returned to the shore of the lagoon. In other words, the length of the interval

was dictated by the activity. It could have been as short as five seconds.

[32] The Regulator argued that Ms Glass, during that period in which she engaged in the rope swing

activity, was no longer within the course of her employment. She was not undertaking her

employment duties and was, in fact, incapable of undertaking those duties.

[33] That is not an argument about whether the injury occurred during an interval in the traditional

sense. It is an argument that Ms Glass, during a period of work, ceased to undertake her duties.

This came about, it is argued, because she engaged in a recreational activity and so deliberately

put herself in a position where she could not supervise the students.

[34] The issue, on the respondent’s case, is one of characterisation of the activity. The respondent drew

a contrast with the activities engaged in on the day before the injury. On that day Ms Glass had,

with the other teachers and students, engaged in scuba diving and snorkelling. The respondent

argued that the difference between that scenario and what occurred on 24 November was that the

risk management strategy which had been created was designed to ensure that there would be a

teacher in the water with the students at the time the scuba diving was undertaken as it would be

appropriate for proper supervision to require a teacher actually being in the water with the

students. This, the Regulator said, shows that there was a distinction and that the distinction was

due, at least in part, to the risk mitigation strategy which had been created for the purposes of the

trip.

[35] Further, the Regulator argued that there was a difference between what Ms Glass had done and a

teacher who was organising physical education, for example, teaching football or similar activities

and which requires the teacher to demonstrate techniques. According to the Regulator’s argument,

when Ms Glass undertook the rope swing activity she was not engaged in any form of teaching

or supervision but was engaged in a purely recreational activity.

[36] None of that necessarily requires consideration of the principles relating to “interval” cases. It

should be observed that the principles which do apply to interval cases are not substitutes for the

requirements in s 32(1) but are the means by which those requirements can be examined.

[37] This is a case about characterisation and about whether or not the actions of the appellant fell

within the definition of injury in s 32 of the WCR Act.

Did the injury arise out of, or in the course of, employment?

[38] The case advanced by the appellant is that Ms Glass, by joining the students in the rope swing

activity, was performing her role as a supervising teacher on the school excursion. Further, it is

argued that “her actions in actively taking a turn on the rope swing were done in discharge of her

role in facilitating the students’ engagement in the activity and ensuring the students’ safety.”

[39] I was not directed to any evidence which would support the conclusion that by using the rope

swing Ms Glass was “ensuring the students’ safety”.

[40] The relevant principles to be applied with respect to the test in s 32(1) were considered in

Kavanagh v The Commonwealth.7 In that case, it was held that a personal injury caused by an

7 (1959-1960) 103 CLR 547.

9

accident which occurred to a Commonwealth employee whilst performing his or her duties, or

whilst doing something incidental thereto, arises “in the course of his employment” within the

meaning of the relevant Commonwealth statute notwithstanding that there was no causal

connection between the injury and the employment or its incidents.

[41] The legislation being considered in Kavanagh did not contain the same requirement as appears in

s 32 namely that “the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury”. I will deal

with that later in these reasons. Nevertheless, the reasoning is relevant with respect to the words

“arising … in the course of employment”.

[42] Fullagar J said:

“But what does emerge from a consideration of the cases is, I think, the significant

fact that the effect of requiring a causal connexion between employment and injury

is always attributed to the words ‘out of’ and not to the words ‘in the course of’.

(The words ... ‘out of’ do indeed import causation: the words ‘in the course of’ do

not.) The conclusion seems inevitable that the main object of the changing of the

conjunction was to eliminate the necessity of finding such a causal connexion. If

there was such a causal connexion, the injury was to be compensable even though

it did not occur while the worker was engaged in his employment or anything

incidental to his employment. If, on the other hand, the injury occurred in the

course of the employment, it was to be compensable even though no causal

connexion could be found between it and the employment. And it necessarily

follows, I think, that the words ‘arising in the course of his employment’ ought

not to be regarded as meaning anything more or less than ‘arising while the

worker is engaged in his employment’. For I can find no tenable half-way house

between this view and the view that the words in question have the same meaning

as the words ‘arising out of his employment’.”8 (emphasis added)

[43] Menzies J reviewed a number of authorities and said:

“My review of these cases leads to the conclusion that if a worker is injured while

doing something incidental to what he was employed to do, that is sufficient

and no other association between the injury and his work is necessary; he is

to be in the same position as if the injury arose while he was doing what he

was employed to do. So far then from these cases indicating any causal element

covered by the phrase ‘in the course of’, they seem to me to accept a temporal

relationship as sufficient, and to extend the time from working time to the time of

doing what is incidental to work. This clearly appears from what was said by Jordan

C.J. in Davidson v. Mould : ‘The initial question is whether it was open to the

Commission on the evidence to find that the injury arose in the course of

employment, that is to say, whether it was sustained whilst the worker was doing

the work which he was employed to do or something incidental to it. If, when he

sustained the injury, he was engaged in doing something which it was his duty to

do under his contract of employment, the case is clear. But it does not follow that

because he was not then so engaged it was not sustained in the course of

8 At 558-559.

10

employment. It is sufficient if it is shown that he was at the time doing something

incidental to his employment’.”9 (emphasis added)

[44] The import of Kavanagh was to identify the effect of the change in the legislation which had

previously required that the injury have arisen out of and in the course of employment to the

requirement in the alternative that the injury have arisen out of or in the course of employment.

[45] The requirement in s 32(1) that employment be a significant contributing factor to the injury

introduces an important element of causality with the result that, in the absence of that factor, an

injury caused incidentally to the employment will not be compensable.

[46] In her reasons for the decision the Commissioner engaged in an analysis of the requirements of s

32. In doing that she came to the conclusion that participation in the rope swing activity did not

form part of Ms Glass’ duties as a teacher. That finding was supported by the evidence concerning

the guidelines imposed by the employer on the management of risk. There was evidence to the

effect that participating in the rope swing activity was part of the educational aspect of the trip in

that it showed a teacher, in this case Ms Glass, as someone who was willing to engage in a way

which assisted the development of relationships with the students. While there can be no criticism

of that as a general proposition, it was open to the Commissioner to hold that in circumstances

where BCE had gone to some lengths to identify and manage risk, and to compel the observation

of plans designed to deal with risk, the use of the rope swing was outside the scope of employment.

[47] The finding made on this point was supported by other findings made, including that:

(a) the rope swing was not an authorised or approved activity for either staff or students;

(b) on her own evidence, Ms Glass made a voluntary choice to participate in the rope swing

activity;

(c) the rope swing activity was recreational in nature and it was not a requirement of Ms Glass’

employment that she participate; and

(d) it was physically impossible for Ms Glass to actively supervise students while also

participating in the rope swing activity.

[48] With respect to the issue of whether Ms Glass’ actions were incidental to her employment, the

appellant identified an error in [185] of the Commissioner’s reasons where she noted “that it was

not necessary for Ms Glass to participate in the activity in order to supervise the students.” That

is not the test. It is whether the activity was incidental not whether it was necessary. Nevertheless,

the Commissioner did go on to find that the rope swing activity was not incidental to Ms Glass’s

employment and the reasoning which supported that finding was obvious in the analysis

undertaken of the voluntariness of the action and the skirting of the risk management guidelines,

among other things.

Was employment a significant contributing factor?

[49] The appellant has not demonstrated that the Commissioner’s ultimate findings that the injury did

not arise out of or in the course of employment are incorrect. Even had she done that she would,

9 At 572.

11

in order to succeed, have had to demonstrate an error in the Commissioner’s finding that

employment was not a significant contributing factor. But that is not a ground of appeal. As such

the decision cannot be disturbed for, whatever view one takes of the reasoning process or whether

this was or not an interval case, this requirement remains and the finding is unchallenged.

[50] In any event, the Commissioner did not err in this respect. She referred to the decision in Newberry

v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd10 where Keane JA (with whom de Jersey CJ and Muir J agreed)

said:

“[27] It cannot be disputed that, when s 32 of the WCRA speaks of ‘employment’

contributing to the worker’s injury, it is referring to employment as a set of

circumstances, that is to the exigencies of the employment of the worker by

the employer. The legislation is referring to ‘what the worker in fact does

during the course of employment’. The requirement of s 32 of the WCRA

that the employment significantly contribute to the injury is apt to

require that the exigencies of the employment must contribute in some

significant way to the occurrence of the injury which the claimant

asserts was caused by the breach of duty of the person (not the employer)

against whom the claim is made.

…

[41] … I should also observe in passing that the fact that an injury has been

suffered arising out of employment, or in the course of employment, is

not sufficient to establish that the employment has been ‘a significant

contributing factor to the injury’. To read s 32 of the WCRA in that way

would be to read the latter words out of the section, and in my respectful

opinion to accord scant respect to the evident intention of the legislature to

require a more substantial connection between employment and injury than

is required by the phrases ‘arising out of employment’ or ‘in the course of

employment’.

[42] Further, there is no warrant in the language of s 32 of the WCRA for reading

the words ‘if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the

injury’ as lessening the stringency of the requirement that the injury ‘arise

out of the employment’, as was suggested in the course of argument on the

appeal. It is clear, as a matter of language, that the words ‘if the

employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury’ are

intended to be a requirement of connection between employment and

injury additional to each of the requirements that the injury occur in

the course of employment or arising out of the employment. It cannot, in

my respectful opinion, sensibly be read as lessening the stringency of the

latter or increasing the stringency of the former.” (emphasis added)

[51] The Commissioner correctly observed that the employment must be important or of consequence

so far as the injury is concerned and that there must be some connection between the two things.

There was nothing that required Ms Glass to use the rope swing. There was no urgency arising

out of her employment which led her to use the rope swing. It was something she decided to do

10 [2006] 1 Qd R 519.

12

and her employment was not a significant contributing factor to her injury. No error has been

demonstrated.

Conclusion

[52] The appeal is dismissed.