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Dr. Jonah Busch, Climate and Forest Economist from Conservation International, gave this presentation on 29 November 2012 at the World Resources Institute UNFCCC COP18 side-event in Doha, Qatar.
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How much would Indonesia’s moratorium on forest concessions have reduced emissions
from deforestation from 2000-2010?
J Busch – R Lubowski – E Ashkenazi – K Austin – F Boltz – M Hansen – B Margono – M Steininger–F Stolle– A Baccini
Jonah Busch, Ph.D. (Conservation International) World Resources Institute Side Event, UNFCCC COP 18
Millennium Hotel, Doha, Qatar Thursday, November 29, 2012
1. How much of Indonesia’s 2000-2010 emissions from deforestation occurred within oil palm concessions (kebun) and timber concessions (HTI)?
2. How much did the designation of a concession between 2000-2010
increase the annual deforestation rate at a particular site, relative to if that site hadn’t been designated a concession?
3. How much would Indonesia’s moratorium on new concessions have reduced emissions if applied from 2000-2010? 4. What carbon price would have achieved an equivalent reduction?
1. How much of Indonesia’s 2000-2010 emissions from deforestation occurred within oil palm concessions (kebun) and timber concessions (HTI)?
19% in oil palm concessions; 26% in timber concessions 2. How much did the designation of a concession between 2000-2010
increase the annual deforestation rate at a particular site, relative to if that site hadn’t been designated a concession?
on average, oil palm concessions increased deforestation by 60%, and timber concessions increased deforestation by 110%, controlling for year- and site- specific effects 3. How much would Indonesia’s moratorium on new concessions have reduced emissions if applied from 2000-2010? by 578 MtCO2e/10 yrs (8.3%) assuming no leakage, extrapolating
rates from dated to undated concessions 4. What carbon price would have achieved an equivalent reduction? a carbon price of $2.05 (mandatory) or $9.40 (voluntary)
1. How much of Indonesia’s 2000-2010 emissions from deforestation occurred within oil palm concessions (kebun) and timber concessions (HTI)?
2. How much did the designation of a concession between 2000-2010
increase the annual deforestation rate at a particular site, relative to if that site hadn’t been designated a concession?
3. How much would Indonesia’s moratorium on new concessions have reduced emissions if applied from 2000-2010? 4. What carbon price would have achieved an equivalent reduction?
1,442,462
566,778
1,859,364
190,202
4,718,690
Deforestation (ha), 2000-2010 Total: 8.78 million ha
7,835,348
10,830,952
6,509,198
7,207,299 61,859,374
Forest (ha), 2000 Total: 94.24 million ha
Oil palm concession
Logging concession
Timber concession
Protected area
Unprotected, non-concession
341,097
27,609
135,348
10,793
768,365
Palm oil conversion (ha), 2000-2010 Total: 1.28 million ha
1,691,808,273
414,866,793
2,280,133,378
132,747,802
4,187,169,312
Emissions (tCO2e), 2000-2010 Total: 8.71 billion tCO2e
1. How much of Indonesia’s 2000-2010 emissions from deforestation occurred within oil palm concessions (kebun) and timber concessions (HTI)?
2. How much did the designation of a concession between 2000-2010
increase the annual deforestation rate at a particular site, relative to if that site hadn’t been designated a concession?
3. How much would Indonesia’s moratorium on new concessions have reduced emissions if applied from 2000-2010? 4. What carbon price would have achieved an equivalent reduction?
2.2x (3.4x) more deforestation INSIDE oil palm (timber) concessions than OUTSIDE concessions…
-
20,000,000
40,000,000
60,000,000
80,000,000
100,000,000
120,000,000
140,000,000
160,000,000
180,000,000
2000
20
01
2002
20
03
2004
20
05
2006
20
07
2008
20
09
2010
Are
a (h
a)
Year
Indonesia forest loss, 2000-2010
Non-forest (+13%) Other forest (-8%) Timber (-27%) Logging (-5%) Oil palm (-17%) Protected (-3%)
2.2x (3.4x) more deforestation INSIDE oil palm (timber) concessions than OUTSIDE concessions…
…but concession land is geographically different
-
20,000,000
40,000,000
60,000,000
80,000,000
100,000,000
120,000,000
140,000,000
160,000,000
180,000,000
2000
20
01
2002
20
03
2004
20
05
2006
20
07
2008
20
09
2010
Are
a (h
a)
Year
Indonesia forest loss, 2000-2010
Non-forest (+13%) Other forest (-8%) Timber (-27%) Logging (-5%) Oil palm (-17%) Protected (-3%)
Unprotected Non-concession
(n=136,963)
Oil palm Concession (n=22,285)
Timber Concession (n=16,076)
Slope (%) 7.2
6.3 5.7
Elevation (m) 340
286 272 Distance to nearest highway (km) 65
56 46
Distance to nearest provincial capital (km) 226
239 211
Potential agricultural revenue ($/ha/yr) $245 $212 $259 Above and below ground biomass (tC/ha) 148
149 160
Peat extent (%) 15%
22% 66%
Forest cover, 2000 (%) 52%
48% 59%
Forest cover, 2010 (%) 48% 41% 45%
Deforestation (%/10 yr) 7.8% 17% 24%
Palm oil cover, 2010 (%) 2.9% 9.0% 2.9%
2000-2010 Before
concession After
concession
Oil palm, undated -1.62%
Oil palm, dated -2.35% -1.1% -2.5%
Logging, undated -
Logging, dated -0.47% -0.38% -0.51%
Timber, undated -0.28%
Timber, dated -2.98% -2.6% -3.5%
Protected, undated +1.46%
Protected, dated -0.40% -1.4% -0.37%
Other forest -0.77%
Total forest -0.94%
Non-forest +1.25%
2.3x (1.3x) more deforestation AFTER oil palm (timber) concessions than BEFORE concessions…
Average annual deforestation rate (%/yr)
2000-2010 Before
concession After
concession
Oil palm, undated -1.62%
Oil palm, dated -2.35% -1.1% -2.5%
Logging, undated -
Logging, dated -0.47% -0.38% -0.51%
Timber, undated -0.28%
Timber, dated -2.98% -2.6% -3.5%
Protected, undated +1.46%
Protected, dated -0.40% -1.4% -0.37%
Other forest -0.77%
Total forest -0.94%
Non-forest +1.25%
2.3x (1.3x) more deforestation AFTER oil palm (timber) concessions than BEFORE concessions…
…but deforestation was increasing nationwide
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
Def
ores
tatio
n ra
te (%
/yr)
Year
Average annual deforestation rate (%/yr)
To attribute deforestation to the designation of oil palm concessions, we need fixed effects regression to… -control for year-specific effects -control for site-specific effects matching methods? -not necessary due to panel data
Designation Average effect of concession designation on deforestation (ha/yr), controlling for year fixed-effects and site fixed-effects
Timber concession +110% (109-111%)
Oil palm concession +60% (57-64%)
Logging concession +61% (59-63%)
Protected area - 4.4% (1.2-7.5%)
Poisson regression; number of 3km x 3km site-years = 1,268,690
1. How much of Indonesia’s 2000-2010 emissions from deforestation occurred within oil palm concessions (kebun) and timber concessions (HTI)?
2. How much did the designation of a concession between 2000-2010
increase the annual deforestation rate at a particular site, relative to if that site hadn’t been designated a concession?
3. How much would Indonesia’s moratorium on new concessions have reduced emissions if applied from 2000-2010? 4. What carbon price would have achieved an equivalent reduction?
Oil Palm Concessions Total: 10.6 mha
post-2000
pre-2000
undated
Timber Concessions Total: 8.6 mha
Logging Concessions Total: 13.2 mha
Protected Areas Total: 14.8 mha
Aggregating impact to national level Scope of moratorium Reduction in
deforestation Reduction in
emissions from deforestation
New oil palm concessions in high-carbon forests (>150tC/ha) and peat lands
117,000 ha/10yrs (-1.3%)
153 MT/10yrs (-2.2%)
New oil palm + timber concessions in high-carbon forests (>150tC/ha) and peat lands
414,000 ha/10yrs (-4.7%)
578 MT/10yrs (-8.3%)
New oil palm + timber concessions in all forest
550,000 ha/10yrs (-6.3%)
628 MT/10yrs (-9.0%)
New oil palm + timber + logging concessions in all forest
628,000 ha/10yrs (-7.2%)
676 MT/10yrs (-9.6%)
New + existing oil palm + timber + logging concessions in all forest
1,486,000 ha/10yrs (-16.9%)
1367 MT/10yrs (-19.5%)
Uninformed extrapolation of concession dates to undated concessions; no leakage Caveats: No exemptions; no temporal shifting
1. How much of Indonesia’s 2000-2010 emissions from deforestation occurred within oil palm concessions (kebun) and timber concessions (HTI)?
2. How much did the designation of a concession between 2000-2010
increase the annual deforestation rate at a particular site, relative to if that site hadn’t been designated a concession?
3. How much would Indonesia’s moratorium on concessions have
reduced emissions if applied from 2000-2010? 4. What carbon price would have achieved an equivalent reduction?
Comparing incentive structures for
REDD+ using OSIRIS-Indonesia (Busch et al, PNAS, 2012)
Click-of-a-button decision support tool to
estimate and map the impacts of alternative REDD+ policy decisions on: -deforestation (ha/yr) -emission reductions (tCO2e/yr) -national and local revenue ($/yr) Benefits: -free -MS Excel interface -transparent -open-source -peer-reviewed, published, scientific -online: http://www.conservation.org/osiris
1. OBSERVED DEFORESTATION, 2000-2005 (Hansen, 2008)
Deforestation: 687,000 ha/yr Emissions: 860 million tCO2e/yr
2. LIKELY DEFORESTATION WITHOUT RED (unofficial “reference scenario”)
Deforestation: 693,000 ha/yr Emissions: 803 million tCO2e/yr
KALIMANTAN
JAVA
SUMATRA SULAWESI PAPUA
KALIMANTAN
JAVA
SUMATRA SULAWESI
PAPUA
3. LIKELY DEFORESTATION WITH RED ($10/tCO2e) Deforestation: 557,000 ha/yr
Emissions: 581 million tCO2e/yr Revenue: $2.2 billion.yr
KALIMANTAN
JAVA
SUMATRA
SULAWESI
PAPUA
SUMATRA
KALIMANTAN
JAVA
SULAWESI
SULAWESI
PAPUA
Carbon price needed for equivalent reduction
Scope of moratorium Reduction in emissions from deforestation
Voluntary incentives (simple)
Voluntary incentives (improved)
Mandatory incentives (e.g. cap-and-trade)
New oil palm concessions in high-carbon forests (>150tC/ha) and peat lands
153 MT/10yrs (-2.2%)
$2.60/tCO2e $1.10/tCO2e $0.50/tCO2e
New oil palm + timber concessions in high-carbon forests (>150tC/ha) and peat lands
578 MT/10yrs (-8.3%)
$9.40/tCO2e $2.75/tCO2e $2.05/tCO2e
New oil palm + timber concessions in all forest
628 MT/10yrs (-9.0%)
$10.20/tCO2e $2.95/tCO2e $2.25/tCO2e
New oil palm + timber + logging concessions in all forest
676 MT/10yrs (-9.6%)
$11.00/tCO2e $3.15/tCO2e $2.45/tCO2e
New + existing oil palm + timber + logging concessions in all forest
1367 MT/10yrs (-19.5%)
$24.40/tCO2e $7.05/tCO2e $5.60/tCO2e
(OSIRIS v1.5; Busch et al, PNAS, 2012)
1. How much of Indonesia’s 2000-2010 emissions from deforestation occurred within oil palm concessions (kebun) and timber concessions (HTI)?
19% in oil palm concessions; 26% in timber concessions 2. How much did the designation of a concession between 2000-2010
increase the annual deforestation rate at a particular site, relative to if that site hadn’t been designated a concession?
on average, oil palm concessions increased deforestation by 60%, and timber concessions increased deforestation by 110%, controlling for year- and site- specific effects
3. How much would Indonesia’s moratorium on new concessions have reduced emissions if applied from 2000-2010? by 578 MtCO2e/10 yrs (8.3%) assuming no leakage, extrapolating
rates from dated to undated concessions 4. What carbon price would have achieved an equivalent reduction? a carbon price of $2.05 (mandatory) or $9.40 (voluntary)
A moratorium on new oil palm concessions and timber concessions in high-carbon forests (>150 tC/ha) and peat lands would have had a substantial impact on reducing emissions from deforestation:
578 MtCO2e/10yrs (8.3%) Modest carbon gains could have been achieved by
expanding the scope of the moratorium to include secondary forests and new logging concessions
For Indonesia to achieve its 26-41% emission reduction
target, it would have had to expand the scope of the moratorium to address conversion within existing concessions or non-concession areas, or have put price-based instruments in place
Conclusion:
Terima kasih! Thank you!
Thanks to:
World Resources Institute Woods Hole Research Center
David and Lucile Packard Foundation
Comments and feedback welcome: http://www.conservation.org/osiris
REDD+: an overview
Payments ($) Developed countries provide finance
through funds or markets
Emission reductions (tCO2e/yr) •Developing countries reduce 15% of global GHG emissions from deforestation, etc •Co-benefits: biodiversity, clean water…
•UNFCCC sets basic rules •Timeline: agreement by 2015; implementation by 2020 •Forest countries decide how to achieve reductions •Price-based mechanisms or place-based policies
Palm oil in stove Palm oil in food Palm oil in car
Source: World Resources Institute
Data (~200,000 3km x 3km cells) Dependent variables: • Forest cover, 2000, 60m Landsat (Margono, Hansen et al, in prep) • Annual deforestation, 2000-2010, 60m Landsat (Margono, Hansen et al, in prep.) • Oil palm distribution, 2010, 250m Modis (Miettenen et al, 2011)
Explanatory variables: • Oil palm concession boundaries and dates (Ministry of Forestry, WRI, 2009/2010) • Timber concession boundaries and dates (Ministry of Forestry, WRI, 2009/2010) • Logging concession boundaries and dates (Ministry of Forestry, WRI, 2009/2010) • Protected area boundaries (WRI) and dates (various) Emission factors: • Forest biomass, 463m (Baccini et al, 2012) • Soil carbon (FAO, 2008) • Peat distribution and emissions (Wetlands International; Hooijer, 2010)
(1) Basic PES-style voluntary incentives
Site-scale accounting; historical reference levels
(2) District-scale accounting; historical reference levels
(3) District-scale accounting; projected reference levels
(4) District-scale accounting; projected reference levels +20% revenue sharing
(5) Well-structured voluntary incentives District-scale accounting; projected reference levels +20% revenue sharing
+20% responsibility sharing (6) District-scale accounting projected reference levels minus 10% +20% revenue sharing +20% responsibility sharing (7) Mandatory incentives, e.g. Cap & Trade
District-scale accounting; projected reference levels minus 10% 0% revenue sharing 100% responsibility sharing
(8) District-scale accounting; projected reference levels minus 26% 0% revenue sharing 100% responsibility sharing
PES CAT Well-structured Voluntary Well-structured voluntary REDD+
nearly as effective as cap-and-trade
Shortfall Surplus
Geographically prioritizing pilot programs: Expected abatement under REDD+ at $10/tCO2e
KALIMANTAN
JAVA
SUMATRA
SULAWESI
PAPUA
Where is forest carbon, AND where can money change behavior?
Sensitivities • Functional form • Included variables • Policy decisions • Model parameters -Carbon price -Price elasticity of demand for frontier agriculture (intranational leakage) -Exogenous agricultural price increase (international leakage) -Peat emission factor -Carbon data set -Social preference for agricultural revenue -National reference level -District level start-up costs -Per-hectare transaction costs
Economic incentives are just one
important component of a national
REDD+ strategy
The road ahead • Analysis in other regions: Peru, Madagascar, Bolivia, Mexico
• IDRISI GIS interface (w/ Clark Labs)
• Agricultural concessions and policies
• Degradation and reforestation
• Safeguards for REDD+
• Market integrity mechanisms: risk buffers, offset trade ratios,
conservative accounting • Matching payments for biodiversity,
water and other ecosystem services
• Community conservation contracts and green economic development