‘Indigenise, nationalise and spiritualise’ – an agenda for ...people.du.ac.in/~nandini/NWISSJ396P.pdfmoral or normative end 102 ... 230 and difference came temporally after questions

12

Nandini Sundar is an associate professorin sociology at the Institute of EconomicGrowth, Delhi. E-mail: [email protected]. She is currently working onquestions of citizenship and identity in ahistorical, ethnographic, and legal per-spective. Her publications include Subal-terns and Sovereigns (1997) and Branch-ing Out: Joint Forest Management inIndia (with Roger Jeffery and Neil Thin)(2001), as well as several articles.

17

1819

1

2

1234567891011121322232444

‘Indigenise, nationalise andspiritualise’ – an agenda foreducation?

45

49 Nandini Sundar50

51

52 This paper explores the relation between53 “indigenous knowledge” and “formal education”54 through the juxtaposition of two somewhat dif-55 ferent projects, both connected, however, with56 the current right wing Indian government’s57 agenda to “indigenise, nationalise and spiritual-58 ise” education.1 The first involves the introduc-59 tion of “Vedic” rituals and astrology into the60 university curriculum as forms of “indigenous61 knowledge”. The second relates to the typically62 assimilationist project of63 educating adivasis or64 “indigenous people” in65 ways that highlight cultural66 “deprivation”, and edu-67 cational “deficiency” and68 deny them a distinct ident-69 ity.2 In both cases, the val-70 orisation of a certain body71 of knowledge as “indigen-72 ous” and its incorporation73 into a formal system74 (which then certifies it as75 “legitimate knowledge”)76 depends on the status and77 power of the social group78 claiming “indigenous” status, rather than the79 substantive content of the knowledge. Indeed,80 the distinction between “indigenous” and “non-81 indigenous” is particularly invidious when it82 comes to knowledge, masking the imbrication83 of all forms of knowledge in particular regimes84 of truth and power.

1

2 ISSJ 173/2002 UNESCO 2002. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

1 ISSJ: international social science journal2 08-07-02 09:49:57 Rev 16.03x NWISSJ396P

3

85Indigenous knowledge and86formal education

87Some argue that indigenous knowledge (IK) is88by definition non-formal, intuitive, holistic,89local and contextual knowledge, unique to a90particular culture, passed down orally or91through practical demonstration, and largely92empirical or technical as against theoretical. As93such, it exists in opposition to – or outside – a94system of formal education95that aims to transmit “mod-96ern knowledge” which is97universalistic, codified,98standardised knowledge,99often compartmentalised100into different subjects, and101without any particular102moral or normative end103(see Agrawal 1995 and104Ellen and Harris 2000: 4–5105for a summary of106characteristics).107This distinction108between “indigenous” and109“western” knowledge has110been shown to be untenable for a variety of111reasons (Agrawal 1995, Ellen and Harris 2000).112To begin with, both “IK” and “Western” knowl-113edge are heterogeneous, and the circulation of114knowledge within a world system often makes115precise identification of origins difficult.116Second, since few societies in the world117today exist outside the penumbra of a formal118educational or developmental system (which119transmits knowledge through extension agents,120NGOs, etc.), “indigenous knowledge” is inevi-

1 3742 Nandini Sundar3

121 tably influenced by contact with “formal school122 knowledge”. In countries like India, especially,123 a literate “great” tradition has always served as124 a reference for “little” traditions, including, as125 I show later, scientific practices of astronomy126 which passed into “common sense” in attenu-127 ated form. Third, as Kuhn and others have128 shown, like indigenous knowledge, much129 “scientific” knowledge gained within labora-130 tories or universities is contextual and practice-131 based. Finally, critical educational theorists have132 long laid to rest the idea that curriculum133 involves an innocent transmission of “knowl-134 edge” that is not at the same time inflected by135 race, class, or gendered assumptions, or that136 pedagogy does not involve moral projects of137 transformation. Questions of schooling – fund-138 ing, organisation, curriculum – are so contested,139 precisely because they are at heart debates over140 national identity, and over who will define and141 control what is worth knowing (McCarthy and142 Crichlow 1993).

143 The politics of indigeneity

144 The claim to indigeneity or the possession of a145 specific kind of knowledge, however, in today’s146 context of globally circulating discourses on147 indigenous peoples (Li 2000) is arguably an148 attempt to validate the knowledge of certain149 kinds of people who were previously character-150 ised as ignorant or backward, thereby allowing151 them some agency in determining their own152 development. To the extent, then, that claims153 to “indigenous knowledge” as a distinct cate-154 gory are “political” rather than “knowledge”155 claims, it would be useful to focus on the polit-156 ical implications and outcomes of such claims.157 They may not always be enabling.3 As Li158 argues, albeit in an environmental context, “the159 distinctive feature of “indigenous environmental160 knowledge” is not its content but rather its161 location in particular agendas . . . The diversity162 of agendas surrounding the concept of indigen-163 ous environmental knowledge forms a field of164 power within which alliances may be formed,165 struggles waged, claims made and rights166 asserted (or denied)” (Li 2000: 121).167 This paper is a reading of the political168 possibilities thrown up by claims regarding169 indigenous knowledge and its relation to edu-

1

2 UNESCO 2002.


3

170cation, within a national arena where the defi-171nition of who and what is “indigenous” is essen-172tially contested. In the current political context173in India, although adivasi groups (officially174referred to as “Scheduled Tribes”) are increas-175ingly turning to international alliances of176“indigenous peoples” they have to contend with177the much stronger political formation of the178Hindu right, which is buttressed by a well-179developed organisational machinery, funds and180above all, control over the national government.181In many ways, it is the latter’s definition of182“indigenous”, which has become hegemonic.183The Hindu Right represented by the Rash-184triya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its associ-185ates, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which is186currently the ruling party in a coalition govern-187ment, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Vanvasi188Kalyan Ashram, the Swadeshi Jagran Manch,189and others (collectively known as the Sangh190Parivar) define “indigenous” to mean all those191whose religions were born on Indian soil. Mus-192lims and Christians are thus excluded, but193Buddhists, Jains, and adivasis included (see194Panikkar 1999:xv).4 Sanghis greet the idea that195adivasis (lit. first settler) are any more indigen-196ous than Hindus with consternation and indig-197nation, viewing them merely as “backward”198Hindus. Indeed, their preferred term for adivasi199is “vanvasi” or forest dweller, to distinguish200them from gaonvasis (village dweller) and201shahrvasis (urban dwellers). Never mind that202many “vanvasis” themselves find the term203objectionable with its connotation of savagery204or wildness.205“Indigenous knowledge”, for the Sangh206Parivar, is “Hindu knowledge” or more specifi-207cally, “Vedic knowledge”. Paradoxically, how-208ever, the Sangh sees no contradiction between209this and the extensive use of modern technology210(e.g. email networks of NRI Hindus to raise211funds) or support for nuclear bombs. Presum-212ably, these are equally indigenous since they213can be used to bolster “Hindu pride” (against214Muslim Pakistan) or make “Hindu” money. No215doubt, there are real contradictions within dif-216ferent branches of the Sangh – between sup-217porters of economic autarky like the Swadeshi218Jagran Manch, and BJP proponents of globalis-219ation – that reflect in part different social bases220(Hansen 1998). Yet, part of the undoubted221strength of the Sangh, as of fascist organisations

1 3752 ‘Indigenise, nationalise and spiritualise’ – an agenda for education?3

222 more broadly, is its ability to reconcile223 opposites and paper over contradictions in the224 service of creating a culturally homogeneous225 identity.226 Education, under such regimes, inevitably227 becomes a key site of struggle. In advanced228 capitalist countries, whereas sociological and229 educational debates over the politics of identity230 and difference came temporally after questions231 of access and equality of opportunity (Brown232 et al. 1997:13), in contemporary India, the two233 are closely related. One consequence of the fail-234 ure of state provision is the increase in the235 number of private schools. While many of these236 are purely commercial, two major players in237 the educational scene are the Catholic Church238 and the RSS. Thus the promise of a more mean-239 ingful common citizenship held out by higher240 literacy levels, is diminished by increasing class241 and sectarian differences.242 Quite apart from the Sangh’s views, in243 countries like India where colonial education244 encountered and displaced strong pre-colonial245 systems of learning, “indigenous knowledge” is246 almost invariably taken to connote the “great247 traditions” of Sanskritic and Islamic learning.248 The Orientalist–Anglicist controversy over the249 future of Indian education – the policy of graft-250 ing Western education on indigenous learning251 versus displacing the latter entirely – had mostly252 to do with higher education in these “great253 traditions”. Questions of vernacular school edu-254 cation came much later (Zastoupil and Moir255 1999). Zastoupil and Moir (1999) argue that256 Indian agency contributed to both sides of the257 debate and the evolution of colonial policy was258 considerably more complex than is suggested259 simply by the notion of an Anglicist victory.260 Yet there is little doubt that the policies engen-261 dered by Macaulay’s infamous memo of 1835,262 in which he derided Indian vernaculars as “poor263 and rude”, described Sanskrit and Arabic as264 “fruitful of monstrous superstitions”, and265 declared that “a single shelf of a good European266 library was worth the whole native literature of267 India and Arabia” (Zastoupil and Moir 1999:268 161–173) had a momentous impact on the269 Indian psyche. While newly independent India270 under Nehru consciously adopted a policy of271 secular, “modernizing” education (whose272 relation to colonial education is still being273 unpacked), elsewhere, decolonisation was met

1

2 UNESCO 2002.


3

274with what Said calls a “revaluation of the native275particularity . . . the denied or repressed native276essence emerged as the focus of, and even the277basis for, nationalist recovery.” (Said 1993:278309). Regardless, then, of whether one views279the current Hindu Right assertion as a “back-280lash” or as an offshoot of colonial policy (in its281essentialised reading of Hinduism), the current282debate on astrology in higher education must283be seen in the light of the colonial past to284understand the support for it. The Indological285assumption that India’s greatest contribution to286the world has been spiritual (an assumption on287which both the NCERT (2000) curriculum and288Vedic astrology are based) finds wide resonance289among sections of the educated elite.

290Vedic astrology

291In February 2001, the University Grants Com-292mission (UGC), the apex body for higher edu-293cation in India, decided to introduce courses294in “Vedic astrology” and “Karmakand” (Hindu295ritual) at the “graduate, post-graduate, and296research levels”. The UGC claimed this would297“rejuvenate the science of Vedic astrology in298India, to allow this scientific knowledge to reach299to the society at large and to provide opport-300unities to get this important science even301exported to the world” (sic.).5 The guidelines302circulated to universities further stated that:

303304“Vedic astrology is not only one of the main subjects of305our traditional and classical knowledge but this is the306discipline which lets us know the events happening in307human life and in universe on time scale. The dis-308tinguishing feature of this subject is that it makes us309familiar with time, its nature and feature and its effect310on human life and other events and that way it helps us311to manage and make optimal utilisation of time. It is a312common feature that despite best methods adapted for313estimation, the events happen in different way and add314to worries, tensions and frustrations in life. Here Vedic315Astrology can help to see the unforeseen, it being the316subject dealing with time. Starting of the courses in317Vedic Astrology in universities will not only impart the318knowledge of this subject to the people but will also319add a new dimension for research in the fields of Hindu-320Mathematics, Vastushastra, Meteorological Studies,321Agriculture Science, Space Science etc.” (Emphasis322added).

323324325

326The UGC promised 1.5 million rupees to327each university wishing to start courses in Vedic


861862

863

864

865 Members of the Science and Rationalists’ Association of India demonstrate against the creation of a University866 Honours Degree in Vedic Astrology, Calcutta, India, June 2001. D. Chowdhury/AFP

867

328 Astrology. Faculties are to consist of one Pro-329 fessor, two Associate Professors and one Assist-330 ant Professor, as well as a library, observatory,331 computer lab and “horoscope bank”. Thirty-five332 universities have apparently applied for the hon-333 our of running this course (Bhargava 2001:334 page C).335 While it is impossible not to blush at the336 illiteracy displayed by the UGC and its “com-337 mittee of experts”,6 several letters appeared in338 the national press supporting the decision. They339 claimed that “Vedic astrology” had not been340 studied enough to be conclusively disproved.341 Like other indigenous traditions (e.g.,342 Ayurveda) it had suffered gross neglect by343 English-oriented educators, and devoting official344 resources to it would help to restore the wrongs345 of the past (see e.g., Ganeshaiah 2001: 719–346 720). Comparing Vedic astrology to other forms347 of indigenous knowledge like Ayurveda, is an348 adept move, especially given the revival of349 interest in alternative medical systems across350 the world, and the location of much sought-

1

2 UNESCO 2002.


3

351after indigenous ethno-botanical knowledge352within seemingly pointless shamanistic healing353practices. The global commodification of Ayur-354veda through chains like the Body Shop or355natural health stores in the West and the only356dimly understood but hugely feared and fanta-357sised profits from patenting indigenous knowl-358edge have also fuelled the arguments that such359forms of indigenous knowledge should be sup-360ported. This market driven and technicist orien-361tation to education fits well with the demands362of an economy disadvantageously articulated to363global capitalism. Making education job-364oriented is ostensibly democratic, even though365when accompanied by higher university fees, it366is ultimately limited by parental ability to pay.7

367What makes pro-indigenous knowledge368arguments even more persuasive is the long369historical process through which astrology has370come to be part of “common sense”, understood371in Gramsci’s terms as something which is “con-372tinually transforming itself, enriching itself with373scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions


374 which have entered ordinary life. "Common375 sense" is the folklore of philosophy, and is376 always half-way between folklore properly377 speaking and the philosophy, science, and eco-378 nomics of the specialists.” (Gramsci 1971: 326)379 Astrology shares a core with astronomy which380 was a well-developed science spanning different381 regions in eighteenth and nineteenth century382 India. Astronomical centres like the five observ-383 atories set up by Maharaja Jai Singh represented384 the best of Indo-Islamic astronomy in the385 eighteenth century and Indian and Western386 astronomers adopted and adapted each other’s387 astronomical principles. For example, a group388 of Sehore pandits enlisted by Wilkinson, Assist-389 ant Resident in Bhopal State, taught “Newtonian390 science using Siddhantic principles” (Bayly391 1999: 257). In the second half of the nineteenth392 century, Indian astronomy and medicine became393 a subject of revivalist national pride – among394 other things, Indian astronomy had a much395 longer notion of time in contrast to the short396 time-span of Biblical creation, and fitted better397 with Darwin’s theory of evolution. As the398 Indian astronomical tradition gained legitimacy399 and importance, its popular application – astrol-400 ogy – expanded into the countryside, using new401 astronomical techniques, and was used to dictate402 sowing times, festivals, etc. This was assisted403 by the development of a print culture rep-404 resented by panchangs or almanacs (Bayly405 1999: 264).406 In the process of translation into local407 knowledge then, astronomy was mediated by a408 variety of rituals and interpretations that had409 little scientific import but were part of an every-410 day regulatory system for life. “Vedic astrol-411 ogy” would fit many of the other criteria pro-412 posed for “indigenous knowledge” – it is often413 intuitive, depends on the performance of parti-414 cular practitioners, is a system by which many415 people regulate their everyday lives, e.g., mar-416 riages, travel, new constructions, etc.; and has417 meaning in a particular social context. In short,418 the popular support for “Vedic astrology” as a419 university course lies in the combination420 afforded by the quite legitimate pride in the421 scientific achievements of pre-colonial Indian422 astronomy – especially in the face of colonial423 disdain – and the imbrication of astrology in424 everyday ritual and culture. No doubt, in the425 absence of a fundamentalist force creating a

1

2 UNESCO 2002.


3

426“demand” for astrology, public belief in427astrology would not translate into support for428university-level courses (Jayaraman 2001). Yet,429as Gramsci (1971) shows us, hegemony lies430precisely in articulating “common sense” to431one’s own political agenda and making it stick.432The UGC’s decision was fiercely433denounced by several leading members of the434country’s scientific and social science com-435munity. Three scientists filed a case against the436UGC in the Andhra Pradesh High Court plead-437ing that teaching astrology was “unconsti-438tutional, illegal, malafide, illogical, irrational439and against the public interest”. They pointed440particularly to the ridiculous claim that astrol-441ogy helps to “see the unforeseen”. While the442High Court’s dismissal of the plea was osten-443sibly founded on an unwillingness to interfere444with a policy decision made by a UGC445“Committee of Experts”, the judges also cited a446nineteenth century edition of the Encyclopaedia447Britannica (!) averring that astrology was a448science requiring further study. The scientists449then filed an appeal against this decision in the450Supreme Court, where it is currently pending.451Among other things, the petitioners argue452that introducing astrology into the university is453contrary to the Constitution (Article 51 A),454which enjoins citizens to “develop a scientific455temper, humanism and the spirit of enquiry and456reform” (Bhargava 2001: 11). If the state457becomes a purveyor of organised ignorance,458there is little hope for citizens. The plea also459notes the wastefulness of expenditure on an460untried subject when regular departments are461facing a shortage of funds (p. 12), and points462to the potential harm faced by astrology stu-463dents whose degree would have no validity in464a future, presumably more scientific, world.465However, the main burden of the plaint466(supported by a number of articles by scientists)467is that astrology is not a “science” or “vigyan”468in terms of “verifiability”, “falsifiability” and469“repeatability”. Some articles refute astrological470principles – e.g., by pointing out that astral471bodies are too far away for gravitational pull472to have any impact on human lives. Others rely473on statistical data. For instance, Carlson (1985:474425) concludes on the basis of a detailed test475that “astrology failed to perform at a level better476than chance. Their predicted connection477between the positions of the planets and other


478 astronomical objects as the time of birth and479 the personalities of test subjects did not exist.”480 “Vedic” astrology has further demonstrable481 absurdities such as the demonisation of Saturn482 as a maleficent spirit when scientists have483 proved that it is merely a ring of gases, or the484 astrological explanation of eclipses as due to485 the activities of Rahu and Ketu (two mythical486 serpents) swallowing the sun and moon487 (Puniyani 2001: Shetty 2001). Narlikar also488 notes that the astrology being touted is not489 “Vedic”, that the notion of occult influence of490 planets is of later European origin, and that491 ancient Indian astronomers like Aryabhatta had492 denounced astrology, as had religious leaders493 like Buddha and Vivekanand (Narlikar 2001:494 2214).495 While scientists are justifiably unwilling to496 call astrology a “science”, what is worrying is497 that none of them have pointed out that astrol-498 ogy is equally bad “social science”. In its499 emphasis on individual fate as determined by500 the stars or planets, astrologers allow no room501 for the Durkheimian determination of “social502 facts” as properties of social collectives, or for503 the idea that especially, but not only, in sharply504 stratified societies, individual fates are affected505 not by their stars but by their caste, class, or506 gender identities. Indian astrologers claim that507 they prevent marital disharmony by ensuring508 that horoscopes match (Vasudev 1989:3). Yet,509 no social science journal would accept a com-510 parative study of divorce rates across countries511 or over time which relied on astrological expla-512 nations of compatibility as against changes in513 family structure, gender expectations, etc.; or a514 study which argued that societies which regulate515 their lives on the basis of auspicious times and516 horoscopes do better at marriages than societies517 which don’t.518 The issue, as Parthasarathy and Robinson519 (2001) point out, is not the carrying over of520 private faith into public life as some scientists521 suggest. Indeed, many of them see no problems522 with suggesting that astrological horoscopes be523 replaced with genetic horoscopes (e.g., Shetty524 2001). In fact, however, Indian astrology is525 intermeshed with hierarchical structures, e.g.,526 matching horoscopes for marriages is “part of527 the idea of inter-generational continuity of privi-528 lege, status and ritually defined purity”529 (Parthasarathy and Robinson 2001: 3186). The

1

2 UNESCO 2002.


3

530implications for women particularly can be dee-531ply problematic – girls born under the “wrong”532or “inauspicious” star are held to be dangerous533to their husbands” well-being, and thus vulner-534able to in-law abuse.535In many ways, the controversy over Vedic536astrology parallels the longstanding debate over537evolutionism and creation science in the USA.538Although legal arguments in the USA on539creation science have centred mainly on the540separation of church and state, and not on the541question of “scientific temper” as in India, there542are several similarities in both debates over543what counts as science. Differences within a544field, e.g., evolution or astronomy, are high-545lighted by conservatives as casting doubt on the546field itself; the lack of proof for astrology or547creation science is argued to mean that it can’t548be disproved either. In both countries, the sup-549port for creationism comes from conservative550forces, seeking to certify religious belief as551knowledge. Webb argues that the breeding552ground for “pseudo-science” in the USA is the553widespread lack of scientific literacy (Webb5541994: xi, 254). In countries like India, the lack555of good primary education is compounded by556the lack of basic health care and social security557support. Where doctors and medicines are dif-558ficult to access, one may as well rely on the559local astrologer for a charm or a ritual to avoid560the evil portent of the stars. Yet this can scar-561cely be an argument for institutionalising rituals562and charms as subjects within a school or uni-563versity curriculum.564To summarise, astrology has become a part565of “common sense” for a large number of566people in India. Yet, that a form of knowledge567is valued by its practitioners in their daily life568or has been historically marginalised by “scien-569tific” knowledge does not necessarily make it570worth preserving. Nor can knowledge systems571be valued on the basis of the social categoris-572ation (indigenous/non-indigenous) of those who573profess that knowledge. What we need to exam-574ine is the social context in which a knowledge575system is embedded – its contribution to576reproducing particular hierarchies of power and577privilege or perpetuating particular cultural and578ideological practices. In the next section, I look579at how the Hindu right reads the notion of580“indigeneity” in the context of adivasi school-581ing, and the manner in which their schooling,


582 while claiming to “uplift” adivasis, reproduces583 traditional hierarchies between upper caste584 Hindus and others. But this must be read against585 the wider canvas of state schooling for adivasis,586 which performs similar functions.

587 “Indigenous” education for588 “indigenous people”

589 The Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA), the RSS590 wing devoted to adivasis, was set up in the591 1950s to counter Christian missionary organis-592 ations working in adivasi areas and prevent con-593 versions. The VKA, which now has branches594 all over the country, runs play-schools, primary595 and middle schools, hostels, and health centres,596 mainly because these are activities that Christian597 missions are well known for. VKA ideologues598 note that unlike the Ramakrishna Mission,599 another Hindu mission working among adivasis,600 or the Jesuits, many of whose graduates go on601 to well-paying jobs, their emphasis is not on602 education per se. As one VKA ideologue said,603 "Our real and ultimate objective is Dharm Jag-604 ran (religious awakening). Schools are merely605 an easy way to draw people into our fold."606 Indeed, some of them are clear that even teach-607 ing Hinduism is not the goal, "our main aim is608 to keep the Christians out."8 For the RSS, as609 for the Nazis, “education is never for its own610 sake; its content is never confined to training,611 culture, knowledge, the furtherance of human612 advancement through instruction. Instead it has613 sole reference, often enough with implication614 of violence, to the fixed idea of national pre-615 eminence and warlike preparedness.” (Mann616 1938:6).617 Intrinsic to the RSS notion of Dharm Jag-618 ran is that adivasis are basically Hindus, and619 that Christianity destroys their indigenous ident-620 ity. Hostel students are exposed to a rigorous621 discipline of morning and evening hymns to622 Hindu gods, as well as martial exercises623 (ostensibly for “self defence”, but equally handy624 when it comes to provoking communal riots).625 All this ensures that the version of “indigenous626 identity” students graduate with is a deeply627 Hindu one. The VKA, working through so-628 called “holy men” has organised “Ghar Vapsi”629 (home-coming) ceremonies in several areas, to630 bring back Christian converts into the “indigen-

1

2 UNESCO 2002.


3

631ous” (i.e., Hindu) fold. Several educated adivasi632leaders, however, dispute the idea that adivasis633are Hindu, and argue for a distinctive indigen-634ous religious status defined by animism and635a reverence for nature. Establishing a distinct636identity, however, is often difficult for educated637adivasis, since everyday state school practice,638implemented mostly by caste Hindu teachers, is639subtly Hindu. For instance, it is common for640adivasi children, who traditionally have no sur-641names, to have the names of Hindu gods like642Ram suffixed in school records.643In terms of language too, RSS ideologues644regard Sanskrit as the only indigenous knowl-645edge worth knowing. Unlike Jesuits, who learn646indigenous adivasi languages, if only to spread647the Gospel better, VKA rituals begin and end648with Sanskrit hymns and adivasi languages are649treated with contempt. However, RSS attitudes650are merely an enhanced version of state prac-651tices regarding adivasi languages.652Despite several policy documents and a653constitutional provision (350A) recognising that654linguistic minorities should be educated in their655mother tongue at primary level, there is practi-656cally no education in adivasi languages, even657those like Santhali, Bhili, Gondi, or Oraon658which are spoken by over a million people659(Nambissan 2000).9 Despite the re-organisation660of Indian states on a linguistic basis, none of661the major adivasi groups managed to claim662states for themselves. Consequently these663groups are distributed across state boundaries664and learn the official language of the state they665happen to live in. Coupled with the fact that666only 6% of primary teachers are from adivasi667communities, and few of the others bother to668learn adivasi languages – the general picture at669primary level in adivasi areas is often one of670mutual incomprehension for students and671teacher. On occasion, adivasi children have been672punished for talking in their own languages673(Kundu 1994: 31). Even outside the confines of674school, educated youth often speak to each other675in “school language”, perhaps also to mark676themselves off from their “uneducated peers”.677Quite apart from the pedagogic problems this678creates, the denigration of adivasi languages679amounts to a denigration of adivasi world views680and knowledge. Even where adivasis value their681own language, given the lack of state recog-682nition and job prospects for subaltern linguistic


683 groups, they do not necessarily want schools to684 teach in them. Indeed, for many adivasi parents,685 the main advantage of schooling is that it gives686 access to the regional languages, and enables687 people to deal with the bureaucracy and non-688 adivasis. One young girl working for the VKA689 was keen on learning Hindi and Sanskrit as690 these were “national languages”.10 RSS691 pedagogy, in the name of promoting indigenous692 culture, imposes upper caste (and Victorian)693 expectations on adivasi social relations.694 Although adivasi gender relations are compara-695 tively egalitarian and women’s contribution to696 the household economy is valued, RSS schools697 teach girls that their main contribution is as698 good mothers. However, the regular state cur-699 riculum is equally based on the experiences of700 urban middle class children. Kundu gives the701 example of children being trained in the art of702 letter writing through mock missives to the pol-703 ice asking them to take action on disturbance704 by loudspeakers during exams (Kundu 1994:705 61). Where the police are usually feared706 oppressors and electricity is erratic if at all707 available, enlisting police support in keeping708 noise decibels down is a most unlikely situ-709 ation.710 Adivasis rarely feature in textbooks and711 when they do, it is usually in servile positions712 to upper caste characters; or as “strange” and713 “backward” exotica (Kumar 1989: 71; Kundu714 1994). A second-grade textbook that Bonda715 children are made to learn has this to say:716 “Bonda life is very strange indeed. They live717 in tiny huts built of mud. The entrance to these718 huts is rather narrow. They enter the huts by719 bending forward . . . For the upliftment of the720 Bondas, the government has planned develop-721 ment programmes. Cash loans are being722 extended to the Bondas for the purpose of723 improved agriculture and animal husbandry.724 There is now a steady improvement in their725 condition. Hunting in the forest is no more their726 primary occupation. There are changes in their727 disposition and diet. Now they know how to728 count cash.” (State Board textbook quoted in729 Nanda 1994: 173). As Krishna Kumar points730 out, such texts place adivasi children in a cleft731 position. If children fail to answer questions732 about adivasi backwardness based on readings733 from the text, they are judged educationally734 backward. If they acknowledge that the texts

1

2 UNESCO 2002.


3

735are correct, they accept an external judgement736about their cultural backwardness. Either way,737“(t)here is no escaping the label of backward-738ness. As a social institution, the school has set739up a situation in which the tribal will acquire740responses that match his description in society741as a member of a “backward” community.”742(Kumar 1989: 68).743Learning among adivasi children is usually744intimately connected to the work process – chil-745dren learn the names and medicinal uses of746many plants and trees while accompanying their747parents on foraging trips in the forest748(Sarangapani 2001: 44). When children are749away at school, especially when they are sent to750residential schools (which are seen as especially751appropriate for adivasi areas because they752ensure food, clothing, and books and prevent753corruption by “culturally degenerate” parents),754they lose connection with this world of labour755and their capacity to learn from it. Nanda756describes a walk in the forest with Bonda chil-757dren in eastern India. While some children758wandered off to explore the forest and collect759edible items, those who had been to the residen-760tial school, kept to the path and were indifferent761to their surroundings (Nanda 1994: 177). Par-762ents are often reluctant to send their children763to school because they lose the capacity to764engage in agriculture (Nanda 1994: 173).765Given such a “demeaning educational766experience” in a set up which privileges the767“visions and meanings” of dominant groups in768society and teaches adivasis subservience769(Kumar 1989: 76), it is hardly surprising that770school attendance is much lower and drop-out771rates much higher among adivasi students com-772pared to others (Nambissan 2000). This is773coupled with a basic lack of educational774access – the absence of conveniently located775primary schools, teacher absenteeism, abysmal776infrastructure manifested in leaking roofs, non-777existent toilets, single classrooms for multiple778grades, lack of furniture, blackboards and edu-779cational materials such as textbooks, maps, etc.780(PROBE 1999).781But dismal as this picture sounds in terms782of adivasi identity and indigenous knowledge,783the consequences of schooling are often con-784siderably complex. Even as residential schooling785creates a certain educated adivasi identity that786makes it difficult for ashram school alumni to


242526

27 relate to the occupations of their parents avow (including the choice of language)28 (agriculture or the gathering of forest produce), depends on the politics and aspirations of this29 the interaction with children of other castes and platform.30 villages that residential schools make possible,

Conclusion31 allow new networks or “new epistemic com-32 munities” (Bayly 1999) to develop (see also

In this article, I have tried to show that the33 Bartels and Bartels 1995 for the developmentvalorisation and formal institutionalisation of a34 of a “Northern Identity” in the former USSR).body of knowledge as “indigenous knowledge”35 It is interesting, for example, that many of thedepends on the power of the social group claim-36 male youth activists of the Communist Party ining indigenous status, rather than on any sub-37 Central India came to know each other in thestantive content. Vedic astrology finds a place38 residential schools, and it is these networks thatin the Indian university curriculum because the39 have helped them to organise for land rightsgroup backing it, the Hindu right, has been40 and in defence of a particular adivasi identity.successful in claiming indigeneity, and they41 Christian missionary education, especially in thehave the political power to transmute their42 colonial period, resulted in a loss of adivasibeliefs into certified knowledge. On the other43 identity, culture, and religion. Yet it is often inhand, adivasis have not been able to assert44 the areas where such education has had a longthemselves politically as distinctly indigenous45 history that we now see the strongest move-people, and therefore their languages and sys-46 ments for tribal autonomy and identity (e.g., intems of knowledge remain marginal and in47 the North East or Jharkhand). Educated adivasisdanger of obliteration from the formal education48 take the lead in such movements, which in turnsystem. While claims to indigeneity are usually49 lead to a demand for the institutionalisation ofalso claims to authenticity, in practice, the con-50 tribal languages in schools (Nambissan 2000:tent of indigenous knowledge keeps changing.51 212–213; Devalle 1992: 175–176). Inevitably,A period of formal schooling often equips adiv-52 however, the language they seek to preserveasis with a wider reach to larger alliances of53 may not be the language as it is actually spoken,indigenous people and the means to preserve,54 but a more “civilised” version that follows thein however transformed a manner, indigenous55 structures and written codes of the dominantlanguages and cultural forms. The issue is not56 languages (Devalle 1992: 177). In short, formalso much what or how authentic “indigenous57 education may both destroy and weaken parti-knowledge” is, but the political or social agenda58 cular “indigenous” identities and forms ofin which particular knowledges are imbricated.59 knowledge as well as consolidate such identitiesUltimately then, “indigenous knowledge” is a60 on a larger pan-indigenous platform. The man-political and contextual category rather than one61 ner in which such “indigenous” identities arewith substantive content.62 understood and the kind of knowledge they98

99101

102 Notes103

104

105 1. The terms are taken from106 NCERT (2000).

107 2. Terms like legitimate108 knowledge, educational deficiency109 and cultural deprivation are110 standard in the literature on111 schooling among race and ethnic112 minorities. I have put them in113 quotes because of discomfort with114 these evidently derogatory terms as115 explanations. “Indigenous” remains

1

2 UNESCO 2002.

1 ISSJ3: international social science journal2 08-07-02 09:47:27 Rev 16.03x NWISSJ396R

3

in quotes wherever it is the centralterm being unpacked.

3. See for example, the discussionby Agrawal (1995: 432) of thedangers of ex situ preservation ofindigenous peoples” biotechnicalknowledge.

4. To counter the argument that theAryans themselves displacedadivasis and that Vedic Hinduism is

126as much a foreign import as any127other religion, much recent RSS128effort has been directed at trying to129prove that the Aryans originated in130India, and then migrated westwards,131and that the indigenous Harappan132language was a form of pre-Vedic133Sanskrit.

1345. Dr. Pankaj Mittal, Deputy135Secretary UGC to the Vice136Chancellors of all Universities


137 receiving financial assistance,138 23.2.2001.

139 6. On coming to power, the BJP has140 systematically packed all educational141 bodies (e.g. the UGC, Indian Council142 for Historical Research, Indian143 Council for Social Science Research)144 with RSS supporters, destroying145 much of their credibility.

160162

163 References164

165

166 Agrawal, A. 1995. “Dismantling167 the Divide Between Indigenous and168 Scientific Knowledge.”169 Development and Change 26: 413–170 439.

171 Bartels, D. A. & Bartels, A. L.172 1995. When the North was Red:173 Aboriginal Education in Siberia.174 Montreal: McGill-Queen’s175 University Press.

176 Bayly, C. 1999. Empire and177 Information. Cambridge: Cambridge178 University Press.

179 Bhargava, P. M. 2001. P. M.180 Bhargava and Ors vs. University181 Grants Commission and ANR.182 Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.183 14370 of 2001, Supreme Court of184 India.

185 Brown, P., Halsey, A. H.,186 Lauder H. & Wells, A. S. 1997.187 The transformation of education188 and society: an introduction, in189 Halsey et al. (eds) Education,190 Culture, Economy, Society. Oxford:191 Oxford University Press.

192 Carlson, S. 1985. “A double-blind193 test of astrology.” Nature 318, 5194 December 1985.

195 Devalle, S. 1992. Discourses of196 Ethnicity: Culture and Protest in197 Jharkhand. New Delhi: Sage198 Publications.

199 Ellen, R. & Harris, H. 2000.200 Introduction. In R. Ellen, H.201 Harris & P. Parkes (eds) Indigenous202 Environmental Knowledge and its

1

2 UNESCO 2002.


3

7. A less obvious advantage for theruling regime, is, of course, that itdiscourages critical thinking, andreproduces the class structure (seeGramsci 1971: 40).

8. Fieldnotes, October 2001.

9. Since there are about 400adivasi languages in India, clearly

transformations. London:Harwood.

Ganeshaiah. 2001. “Anunscientific way to bury astrology.”Current Science 80: 719–720.

Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections fromthe Prison Notebooks, Q. Hoare &G. Nowell Smith (eds). New York:International Publishers.

Hansen, T. B. 1998. The ethics ofHindutva and the spirit ofcapitalism, in T. B. Hansen & C.Jaffrelot (eds) The BJP and theCompulsions of Politics in India.Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Jayaraman, T. 2001. "Vedicastrology and all that." Frontline,May 25, 2001.

Kumar, K. 1989. The SocialCharacter of Learning. New Delhi:Sage Publications.

Kundu, M. 1994. TribalEducation: New Perspectives. NewDelhi: Gyan Publishing House.

Li, T. M. 2000. Locatingindigenous environmentalknowledge in Indonesia, in R.Ellen, P. Parkes & A. Bicker (eds)Indigenous EnvironmentalKnowledge and its Transformations.London: Harwood AcademicPublishers.

Mann, T. 1938. Introduction. In E.Mann (ed), School for Barbarians.New York: Modern Age Books.

McCarthy, C. & Crichlow, W.(eds) 1993. Race, Identity and

154education in each one of these is155not possible. However, there is little156attention even to preserving them in157other forms.

15810. Fieldnotes, October 2001. 159

240Representation in Education. New241York: Routledge.

242Nambissan, G. 2000. Identity,243exclusion and the education of244tribal communities, in R. Wazir245(ed) The Gender Gap in Basic246Education, pp. 175–224. New247Delhi: Sage Publications.

248Nanda, B. 1994. Contours of249Continuity and Change: The story250of the Bonda Highlanders. New251Delhi: Sage.

252Narlikar. 2001. “Vedic Astrology253or Jyotirvigyan.” Economic and254Political Weekly, June 16: 2113–2552115.

256NCERT. 2000. National257Curriculum Framework for School258Education. New Delhi: Publications259Division, National Council of260Educational Research and261Training.

262Panikkar, K. M. 1999.263Introduction, in K. M. Pannikar264(ed) A Concerned Citizen’s Guide265to Communalism. New Delhi:266Penguin.

267PROBE. Public Report on Basic268Education in India. New Delhi:269Oxford University Press.

270Puniyani, R. 2001. Unscientific271School of Thought. In Sunday272Midday, 10 April 2001.

273Parthasarathy, D. & Robinson,274R. 2001. “Science, astrology and275democratic society.” Economic and276Political Weekly, 36 (33): 3186–2773187.


278 Sarangapani, P. 2001. Childhood,279 Growing Up and Learning: the280 Baigas of northern Kawardha.281 Report Submitted to the Indira282 Gandhi National Centre for the283 Arts, September 2001.

284 Said, E. 1993. The politics of285 knowledge, in C. McCarthy & W.286 Crichlow (eds) Race, Identity and

1

2 UNESCO 2002.


3

Representation in Education,pp. 306–314. New York: Routledge.

Shetty, K. A. V. 2001. “VedicAstrology in Indian Universities”.The Hindu, 10 April 2001.

Vasudev, G. D. 1989. Astrologyand the Hoax of Scientific Temper.Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

295Webb, G. E. 1994. The Evolution296Controversy in America. Lexington:297The University Press of Kentucky.

298Zastoupil, L. & Moir, M. (eds)2991999. The Great Indian Education300Debate: Documents relating to the301Orientalist-Anglicist Controversy,3021781–1843. Surrey: Curzon Press.