Indian Dialectics Methods of Philosophical Discussion Volume II E Solomon Ahmedabad 1978 600dpi Lossy

7/22/2019 Indian Dialectics Methods of Philosophical Discussion Volume II E Solomon Ahmedabad 1978 600dpi Lossy

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Research Series, No. 74Sheth Bholabhai Jeshingbhai Institute of Learning and Research

A N D I A L E C T I C SM e t h o d s o f P h i l o s o p h i c a l D i s c u s s i o n

V o l u m e I I

Es th e r A . So lo mo n ,M.A., Ph.D. (Bombay)Professor of SanskritSchool of LanguagesGujarat UniversityAHMEDABAD-9

Samgacchadhvam sam vadadhvam,sam vo * manm hsi janatam.RV. 10.191.2

B J . Ins t i tu te of L ea rn ing an d R ese arc hG U J A R A T V I D Y A S A B H AAHMEDABAD


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Published byDr. H. G. ShastriDirectorB, J. Institute of Learning and ResearchR. C. Road, AHMEDABAD-380 009 (India)

First Edition : V. S. 2034A.D. 1978

Copies : 500

8 0Price R$.j#-QQ

Printed byK. Bhikhalal BhavsarProprietorShri Swaminarayan Mudran Mandir612/21, Purushottamnagar, Nava VadajAhmedabad-380013


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C O N T E N T SP a r t I I - c o n t i n u e d

Ch ap te r 13Is Know ledge Pos s ib le ?A i m o f d i a le c ti c a l c r i t i c i s m - p r o b l e m o f T r u t h a n d R e a l i t y -scep t i ca l t en d eo cy r - S cep t ic s an d A b so l u t i s t s in I n d i a Ja y a r s iB h a t t a - M d h y a m i k a s - S r h a r s a a n d o t h e r s - r e p u d i a t i o n o f t h eco nc ep t o f va l id i ty , an d o f th e va l id i ty o f the r ecog n i seds o u r c e s o f k n o w l e d g e - i n N g r j u n a ' s Vigraha-vyavartanAnJ a y a r s i ' s Tattvopaplavasirhham S r h a r s a ' s Khandana-khanda-khaqlya different d e f i n i t i o n s o f v a l i d it y r ep u d i a t e d Ja y a r s i ' sr e p u d i a t i o n o f i n f e re n c e S r i h a r sa ' s r e p u d i a t i o n o f i n f e r e n c e -I s k n o wl ed g e o f vyapti p o s s i b l e ? d e f i n i t i o n s o f vyapti c r i t i c i s e d -paksa, paksa-dharmata, e t c . r e p u d i a t e d r e p u d i a t i o n o f a ll

co n cep t s an d ca t eg o r i e s - I s d e b a t e o r d i a l ec t i ca l c r it ic i smp o ss i b le ev ea w i t h o u t a i n a i t t i a g t h e v a l id i t y o f k n o w l ed g e ? -r e m a r k s N o t e s . . .. p p . 5 1 9 -6 2 7C h a p t e r 1 4 - P r o b l e m of T r u t h

R e c o g n i t i o n o f pramanas-thsir r e p u d i a t i o n b y t h e S c e p t i c sa n d t h e A b s o l u t i s t s - T h e o r i e s o f t r u t h o f t h e N y y a , P u r v a -m n r h s , B u d d h i s t, J a in a , K ^ v a l i v a i t a s c h o o l s t r u t h a n dv a l i d i t y a r e pramanya a n d apramanya i n t r i n s i c (svatah) o rex t r i n s i c (paratah) in r es pe c t o f utpatti> jndpti a n d karya ? -v ie w s o f t h e d i f fe r e n t s c h o o l s - a r g u m e n t s o f K u m r i l a a n dU d a y a n a s t a t ed a t l eng th so as to c l a r ify the i s sues invo lve da n d t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e d i a l e c t i c a l m a d e o f e x p o s i t i o n - r e m a r k s -N o t e s . . .. 62 8 - 6 67PART IIIC h a p t e r 15G row th of D ialect ic a l C r i t ic i s m as no t iced inP h i l o s o p h i c a l W o r k s

In Vedas-Brhmanas-Upanisads-Buddhlst C a n o n i c a ll i t e r a t u r e - J a i n i s c r i p t u r e s E e l - W r i g g l e r s t h e i r i n f lu e n c e o n


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p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t E p i c s S u tr a s Yoga~~satra V aisesika-straPrva-mimms-straB rahma-stra Nyaya-sutraremarksSamkhya-karika Q^rlyc o m m e n t a t o r s o n t he Sutras-V t s y y a n a, U d d y o t a k a r a , V c a s p a t i , U d a y a n a P r a s a s t a p d a S a h a r a , K u m r i l a , P r a b h k a r a V y s a , t he c o m m e n t a t o r of t h eYoga-sutra~Mth2LT2LYuktidipikTattvakaumudl G a u d a -p d a S a r i k a r c r y a - J a y a r s i B h a t t a d ia le c tic a l t h o u g h t inPost-Pitaka B u d d h i s t w o r k s Prajna-paramita sutras Lanka*vatara-satra N g r j u n a ' s w o rk s-- A r y a d e v a B u d d h a p l i ta a n dB h v a v i v e k a C a n d r a k r t i - S n t a r a k s i t a a n d K a m a l a s i l a d i a l e c -t i ca l m o d e s a d o p t e d b y th e M d h y a m i k a s V i j n n a v d i n s V a s u b a n d h u D i r i n g a - D h a r m a k r t i - S a r v s t i v d a l i t e r a t u r e ,i n t e l l ec t u a l s t r u g g l e b e t ween t h e V a i b h s i k a s an d * t h e .S a u t r n t i k a s A b h i d h a r m a k o i a an d i t s Bhasya- Abhidharm tfdipaAtthasalim c o m m e n t a ry P o s t - A g a m i c J a in a w o r k s K u n d a -k u n d a U m s v t i S i d d h a s e n a - J i n a b h a d r a - S a m a n t a b b a d r a - 'A k a l a r i k a - V i d y n a n d a - V d i - D e v a s r i H e m a c a n d r a r e m a r k s -N o t e s . . .. p p . 6 7 1 - 7 5 8Chapter 16 M e t h o d o l o g y o f M a v y a - N y y a

S ta g e s o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of th e N y y a - s c h o o l - U d a y a n a -G a r i g e s a - h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n - N a v y a - N y y a a s u re p r o p a e d e u t i cf or p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c c u r a c y t e c h n i q u e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n t h ep r e c i s e n e s s o f d e f i n i t i o n s t e c h n i c a l t e r m i n o l o g y a y a e c h i n n a -avacchedaka nirapita-nirupakaadharaadheyata pratiybgUanuyogi abhayiya-pratiyogi-anuyogi visesya-yisesana] prakaraati> upadhisvarpa-sambandha'dQinitions o f vyapti, , a si l l u s t ra t in g N a v y a - N y y a t e c h n i q u e C o m m e n t a t o r s m o d i fi edt h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s t o m a k e t h e m i m p r e g n a b l e t h e p r o c e d u r ei l l u s t r a t e d s o m e o t h e r r e l a t i o n s - z r a r y a / ? / / a n d visista-nirupit-dharata sambandha vyasaj'ya-vrtti dharma -kalika sambandhaavyapya-vrtti r e l a t i o n s i n f l u e n c e o f N a v y a - N y y a o n o t h e rs c h o o l s a n d ^ s t r a s - d i a l e c t i c in t h e w o r k s o f t h e N a v y a - N y y as c h o o l N o t e s . . . . p p . 7 5 9 - 7 9 0 'Chapter 17Dialectical Crit ic ism in other Vidyas

D i a l e c t i c i n w o r k s o n D h a r m a s s t r a a n d A r t h a s s t r a


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rthasstraworks o n V y k a r a n a - s s t r a N i r u k t a A s t d h y a y i Yarikas o f Katyyana-Mahabhsya-Vkyapadya-ph'\\osophy\o f g r a m m a r i n f l u e n c e o f g r a m m a r o n o t h e r s c h o o l s i n f lu e n c eo f o t h e r s c h o o l s w o r k s o n K v y a s s t r a i m p o r t a n t p r o b l e m s B h m a h a a n d o t h e r s - n a n d a v a r d h a n a - p r o b l e m o f i n d e p e n d e n tex i s ten ce of th e su g g es t ed m ea n i n g f r o m t h e ex p r e s sed m ea n i n g J a g a n n t h a - - d e f i n i d o n o f p o etr y d if fe re n t d e f in i t i o n s q u o t e da n d r e p u d i a t e d - A p p a y y a D k s i t a - N g e s a kavyado$as c o m p a r -ab le to mgrahasfhanaszvzry b r a n c h o f l ea r n i n g h a s i ts o w nm e t h o d o l o g y K a m a s a t r a d i a l ec t i ca l m o d e e s sen t i a l t o t h ed e v e l o p m e n t o f a l l Vidyas-Notes. . . . p p . 79 1 -8 32C h a p t e r 1 8 A c t u a l D e b a t e s a n d C o n t r o v e r s i e s P h i l o s o p h i c a l ,Re l i g i o u s , S o c i a l

S o ci al s i g n if i c a n c e o f d e b a t e s a c c o u n t s o f a c t u a l d e b a t e s b e tw e e n S a r ik a r a a n d M a n d a n a M i s r a d e b a t e s p r e s e n t e din dgamadambara accoun t s in the PrabhavakacaritaValabh,An ah i l l ap u r a , Dh r , cen t r e s o f i n t e l l ec t u a l ac t i v i t y i n t e l l ec t u a lr iv a l ry b e tw e e n A n a h i l l a p u r a a n d Dhv-^tarka, sahitya, a n dlaksana, m a i n s u b je c ts o f s t u d y S r a c r y a - S n t y c r y a V r c r y a V d i -D e v a s u r i a n d K u m u d a c a n d r a t h e i r i n t e ll e c tu a lcon tes t r e l a t ed in Mudritakumudacandraaccount in Jalpa-kalpalatdialec tical du e l s a t co u r t s , in t em ples an d m on as te r i e sp o e ti ca l c o n t e s t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d o t h e r c o n t e s t s e n i g m a s -brahmodyas as re la t ed in the Bmhmanascontroversies andd i scu s s i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o so c i a l p r o b l em s l i k e m ar r i ag e , d i v o r ce ,a n d o t h e r p r o b l e m s l e g a l d i s p u t e c o u r t - s c e n e in Mrcchakatika-o r d e a l s d i s p u t e b e t w e e n U d a y a n a a n d a B u d d h i s t c r ya - p la c eo f d eb a t e s i n t h e cu l t u r a l life o f I n d i a i n f l u en ce o n th e f u t u r e

career o f a per son o r the h i s to ry o f a sec t o r schoo l o f though tN o t e s . . . . p p . 8 3 3 - 8 7 5R s u m T he m ys t i ca l o r sp i r i tua l a n d the in t e l l ec tua l s ides o f

Ind ian cu l tu re inqu i ry in to tfcia r e l a t io n o f w ord an d m i n i n g ,


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a n d t h e p r a c t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e o f m e d i c a l a a d j u r i d i c a l p r o b l e m sc o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e g r o w t h a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f d i a l e c t i c science ar ises to sa t i s fy a v i ta l need j a t i s de tec t ion o f log ica lf a ll a ci e s a n d a b e r r a t i o n s o th e r t h a n l o g i c a li t s n e c e s s i t y g a v er ise to a sy s te m at i c an d sc ien t i f ic s tudy o f log ic lo? ic in the ea r lys t a g e s p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i th d e b a t e g r o w i n g i m p o r t a n c eof pramanase p is t e mo lo g i c a l p ro b l e ms N a v y a -N > y a s u b t l ea n d e v en h a i r - s p l i t t i n g a r g u m e n t s m a n ' s v an i ty e x p r e s s i n g i ts el fin h a i r - s p l i t t i n g s u b t l e t ie s s c e p t i c s a n d a b s o lu t i s t s r e s o r t toreason to show i t s l imi ta t ion I pramanas o f I n d i a n l o g i c s o m es p e c i a l i t i e s o f In d Ln lo g i c s c r ip tu ra l t e s t imo n y a s a pramanap h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d o t h e r p r o b l e m s t r e a t e d d i a le c t ic a l ly e v e npramanas s u b m i t t e d t o a d i al ec ti ca l e x a m i n a t i o n h o p e o f am o r e e f f ic i e n t ' o r g a n o f k n o w le d g e ' . . .. p p 8 7 6 - 8 8 6

Append ix 1 Sas lra-v inoda in S o m e s v a r a ' s Manasollasa. . . pp . 887-890A p p e n d ix 2 D ia l e c t i c a l Ex a min a t i o n o f t h e P ro b l e m : ' I sva l id i ty in t r in s ic in Know ledge or i s i t ex t r ins ic ? ' i nA b b a y a d e v a ' s Tatlvabodhavidhayim o n S i d d h a s e n a D i v k a r a ' sSanmatitarkaprakarana .. p p . 89 1-9 41E rr a t a . .. p . 942In d ic es ... 94 3 ff.


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ABBREVIATIONSAdS Advaita-siddhi of Madhusdana SarasvatiAYD AnuyogadvrastraAK Abhidharmakoa of VasubandhuAKV Abhidharmakosa-vykhy of YasomitraATV tm atattvaviveka of UdayanaUtd.S Uttarsdhyayana-straUH UpayahrdayaAit. Br. Aitareya Brhma^aKhKh Kh andan a-khand a-khady a of SriharsaCS Caraka-samhitTC Ta ttva-cintm ani of Gangea UpadhyyaTvS Tattva -sangraha of SntaraksitaTSIv Tattv rth a-s lok a-v rttika of V-idynandaTPS Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarasi BhattaTT Tark a-t nd av a of VysatrthaTS Tarka-sstraTS Tarka-sangraha with Dpika of Annam bhattaTR Ts rkika-rak s of VaradarjaDM S Dasaslok-Mhvidy-satra of Kulrka Pand itaDN Digha NikyaNK Nyyakandah of SndharaNK C Nyyakumudacandra of PrabhcandraNK u Nysya-kusum njali of UdayanaNK uP Nyayakusumnjali-Praksa of VardbamnaNP NySya-parisuddhi of VenkatanSthaNyP Ny5ya~pravesa of SankarasvminNyB Nyyabindu of DharmakTrtiNyBT Nyyabindu-ika of Dharmo ttaraNB Nyaya-bhsya of VatsyayanaNM Nyayamanjan of JayantaNV Ny aya-vrttika of Uddyotakara1SVTT Nyya-v rttika -ttparyatka of VacaspatiNVTTP NySya-vrttika-ttparyattk-parisuddhi of UdayanaNyV Nyya-viniscaya with Vrtti of AkalankaNS NySya-stra of GautamaNSV Nyaya-stra -vrtti of VisvanatbaNyA Nyyavatra of Siddhasena Divkara


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PMS Panksmukhastra of M nikyanandinPNTL Pram ^na-naya-tattvlokiankra of Vdi-Devas riPP ?ram na -pad dha ti of JayatrthaPM Pram na-m mms of HemacandraPV Pram na-vrttika of DhannakirtiPKM Prameya-kam ala-mrtanda of PrabhcandraPB Prasastapda-BhsyaBS Bodha-siddhi or Nyya-parisista of UdayanaBP Bhs-pariccheda of VisvanthaMBH MahabhrataMVV Mahvidya-dasa-slok-vivaranaMVVT Mahvidy-dasa-slokl-vivarana-tippana of BhuvanasundaraMVVi MahavidyS-vidarabana of VdndraMVViVD M ahavidya-vidam bana-vygkhysna-dipika of BhuvanasundaraMK M dhyam ika-Krik of NagarjunaMKV M dhyam ika-Karika-Vrtti of CandrakirtiYS Yoga-stra of PatafijaliLA Lankavatra-sotraYN . Vdanyya of Dharraaku tiYV Vdivinoda of Sankara MisraViBfa Visesvasyakabhsya of JinabhadraViV Yigrahavyvartani of NSgrjunaVS Vaisesika-satra of KanadaSata Br Satapatha BrhmanaSD Sastradpik of Prthasrathi MisraSlv Slokavrttika of KuuarilaSTT Sanm ati-tarka-tk of AbhayadevaSDS Sarvadarsana-sangraha of MdhavaSK Samkhya Krik of varakrsnaSM Siddhnta-muktval of VisvanthaSV Siddhiviniscaya with Vrtti of AkalankaSth.Su. Sthananga-sutraSVR Syadvadaratnakara of Vdi-DevasariHIL A History of Indian LogicVidybhsanaHIP A History of Indian PhilosophyS. N . DasguptaMaterials...Materials for the Study of NavyaNyya LogicIngalls


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CHAPTER 13I S K N O W L E D G E P O S S I B L E ?

Dia lec t i ca l c r i t i c ism m ay en d in the co m ple te re jec t ioa o fa v iew or a th eo ry o r l ead to a n o th e r sugg es t ion wh ich , i f thee x a m i n a t io n h a s b e e n p r o p e r l y c o n d u c t e d , o u g h t t o a p p r o a c hn e a re r t h e t ru th .T he co nc ep ts of t r u th seem to va ry in th e d i f ferent sys tem sof th ou gh t ; so we m ay say th a t d ia lec t i c he lps th inke rs toa p p ro a c h t h e p r o b l e m o f t r u th a n d r e a li ty w i th a n o p e n m in d ,wi th sym pa th y an d du e co ns id e r a t io n fo r a ll poss ib le v iews ,espec ia lly w hen they a re co nc e r ne d wi th the u l t im a te rea li ty

o f t h in g s . M o s t o f t h e In d i a n p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m s * a r eidea l i s t ic in th e sense th a t they d o n ot reg ard the wo rld as it isperceive d by th e ph ys ica l eye as real u nl es s i t be re la ted afterde ep inq uiry to so m e hig he r lea l i ty (e .g . the Prakrit of theS rh k h y a -Y o g a ) o r th e u l t im a t e r e a l it y (G o d o r t h e A b s o lu t eP r i n c ip l e ) . C o n s e q u e n t l y , p e r c e p t i o n a n d t h e o t h e r praninasa re no t whol ly t rus ted a s g iv ing fu l l knowledge o f th ings . B atthey a re reg a rd ed as re l i ab le in the sense t ha t the i r kno w ledgeis no t found to be co n t rad ic t ed in em pi r i ca l exper ienc e and theyh e lp u s t o c o -o rd in a t e o u r e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e w i th o u rp h i l o s o p h i c a l o r m e ta p h y s i c a l b e l ie f s. B u t e x c e p t i n g t h e e x t r e m ei d e a li s ts ( V i j n n a v d i n s a n d K e v a l d v a i t i n s ) a n d t h e s ce p ti c sa n d t h e M d h y a m ik a s , t h e d i ff e re n t s c h o o l s d o a c c e p t t h epraninas a s g iv ing kn ow led ge w hic h is neve r comp le te ly sub la ted ,even though i t may be co-ord ina ted wi th o r merged in the know-ledge o f the H ighe s t R ea l i ty to p re se n t the w ho le o f Rea l i tya s i t i s . Th e s c e p t i c s , t h e V i jn n a v d in s , t h e K e v a l d v a i t i n s , a n d

* The Lokayata, and to a great extent the Nyya-Vaiesika may beregarded as exceptions.1-66


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520 Indian Dialecticsthe Mdhyamikas , on the o the r hand , rega rd knowledge de r ivedfrom the differe nt sou rces as valid only in em pi ric al ex pe rien cean d den y an y ul t im ate val idity to i t. Even am on g these, thescept ics and the Mdhyamikas and the ( la te r ) Kevaldvdi t ins(who be l ieving in the real ity of B rah m an alon e are interes tedin r ep ud iat i ng the real i ty of everything eise -) are very ins is tenton the point that the different pramanas (sources of kno wledg e)can und er no circum stances be relied up on as yielding t ruth ,because the very con cep t of pram an a and its ob jec t is anindef inable on e . One can no t be sure of any know ledge .

Dia lec t ic w ould ordinar i ly proceed on the assu m pt ion tha tt rue knowledge can be acquired. But some schools of phi lo-sophical thought do not a t a i l admit the possibi l i ty of the val idkno w ledge of th in gs . T hu s d ia lec tic exam ining o the r cognisablesturned upon i t se l f and ransacked i t s very fundamenta ls .In India ab ou t the end of the U pa nisa dic per iod ( - th ou gh

the scept ical tendency is evident even earl ier-) with the upsurgeof phi losoph ica l an d cr it ica l tho ug ht there a rose th n k e r sw ho were sce pti ca l tho ug h no t necessarily so in actu al l ifeabout v i r tue and v ice (P rana Kassapa and o the rs ) andthe at t a i nm en t of know ledge or the possibi li ty of the descrip -t ion of rea l i ty in w ords ( -Sanjaya Be la t thap ut ta K Th ei r ow nworks are not extant so we do not have a detai led idea oftheir l ine of ar gu m en t or their scept ical views. N ever thelesswe f ind some of their views recorded in the Buddhis t and theJain a ca no nic al l i ter atu re and we can say that they werethinkers whose paral le ls may be found in the sophis ts and thecynics an d the scept ics of Greece . B ud dh a d id no t en co ur ag ethis l ine of thinking as i t was l ikely to prove morally futi le.B ut the m eth od of c r it ic ism and refu ta tion con t inued to bead op ted by the theo ris ts of Bu dd hism expecially by theMdhyamikas ; and la te r d ia lec t ica l phi losophers developed whatis kn ow n as the prasangika m e thod , the m e thod o f exam in ingal l poss ib le a l te rna t ive in te rpre ta t ions of the op po ne nt ' s p ro po s i -t io n , sho w ing the ab sur di ty of the respect ive conse que ncesand chus refut ing i t .


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Is Knowledge Possible ? , 521Some scept ical th in ke rs of India deny that they haveany phi losopnical doctr ine at al l and hold that the funct ionof phi losophical reasoning is cr i t icalsolely to destroy false

phi losophies. I t i s s t range that some others who bel ieve inreaching t ruth by intui t ive experience (anubhavd) or realisation(saksakara) are also cr i t ical of em pir ical know ledge and rep ud iatethe va ' id i ry of i ts sou rces A thin ke r of the first type wo uld say,in the w ords of Co l l ingw ood , " I do no t kno w wh at ther ight .mswer to any ph i loso ph ica l que st ion is ; but I th inkthere s w ork to be, do ne in s ho w ing tha t the answe rs usual lygiven are w rong . A nd I can pro ve th at on e answ er is w rongwithout claiming to know that another is r ight , for my methodis to exam ine the ans w ers given by o the r pe ople and to showthat they are se l f -cont rad ic tory . What i s se l f -cont rad ic tory i s ,p rope r ly speaking , m eaning less ; w hat is meaningless ca nn otme an the t r u th , and ther efo re by this m eth od I can prese rvea purely cr i tica l a t t i tu de tow ard s the ph i losophy of o the rs ,w i thout hav ing any ph i loso phy of my ow n. As to that , Ineithe" assert nor deny i ts possibil i ty: I merely for the present,suspend judgmen t and con t inue rny work of cr i t ic i s m / ' *

T i i s is exactly the pos i t ion of Jay ars i Bh at ta , the au tho rof the TatlvopaplavasimhaThe second form of scept icismwhich may bet ter be cal ledA bsolut ism agrees with the f i rs t in hold ing thaf phi losophica lreasoning cannot es tab l i sh any posi t ive or const ruct ive pos i t ion .But i t hold s th at w e ar e n o t on th at ac co un t necessari ly cheated"of t ruth . I t comes to us direct ly from intui t ive experience orthe Supreme In te l l igence {prajn). T h e M d h y am i k as an d t h eK evaldva i t ins belong to th is c a tego ry . N g r ju na (second

century A.D.) and a l l the o th er M d hy am ika th inkers accept ingthe doctr ine of snyata (void) re pu di at ed the efficiency o f al lsources of know ledge and con seq uen t ly the reali ty o f theci tegories der ived from them. St i l l th is scept icism of theirs wasn o t a t h o r o u g h - g o i n g o n e . U n l i k e t he T a t t v o p ap l av av d i n s*An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 138R. G. Collingwood(Clarendon Press, Oxford).


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522 Iniiaa Dialecticswho were extre-ne scept ics , the Mdhyamikas looked to a supra-cogni t ive supreme real i ty Sunya or Tat hata. Tbvy admit tedthe op era tion of the pramanas in the em pirical f eld, bu tco nte nd ed th at they .were inefficacious in the a tt a ir .m e u or theknow ledge of the Ult im ate R eal i ty , which t ransc enJ s Mem andcan be realised not by discu rsive tho ug ht bu t oy he PureIntell igence (Prajna) alo ne . N g r ju na is the f irst we kno w nex po ne nt of this view, th ou gh no t i ts found er. Lie/neacy ofpramana (source of kno w ledg e) in the es tab lishn ien . oi thedoct r ine of snyata is the m ain them e of his Vigrahuvy avartan.In his Madhyamika-karika, he has sho w n the hollow ness of theconcepts of causal i ty (pmtyaya), go ing and coming (gatagata),sense-o rgans , agg rega tes (skandha), e l emen t s (dhtii), passionsand the persons under their inf luence (rga-rakta), compos i t eenti t ies (samskrta), act ion an d i ts per form er (karma-kraka),. . . pain (duhkha). . . essent ial na ture (svabhav), bondage andem anc ipat ion , f ru it o f ac t ion (karma-phala), self (r"-,.v?);. t ime(kala), causal aggregate (samagn),... Ta thg a ta , e r ro r(viparycisa)*No b l e T r u t h s {aryasatya),... Nirvana and even Sunyata. A m o n gthe followers of N g r ju n a, B ud dh ap l i ta ( 6th cent , ) -eeksto prove that the k now ledg e of Vijnanadvaita (idealisticmonism) cannot be at tained by any logical argument as al llogic is futi le an d inco nsis ten t , w hereas Bh avya or Bh va^ iveka(6th cent . ) t r ies to establ ish his ideal is t ic monism by argumentsof his ow n. C a nd ra k r t i (8th cent . ) f inally sup ports Bu ddha -p l i ta 's s tand as against tha t of B hv aviv ska , wnich he rega rdsas equ iva len t to r enoun c ing the M dh yam ika pos it ion tha tph i losop hical rea son ing ca nn ot pos it ively prov e anyth ing , i tcan only destroy false views.

Am ong the Kev a ldva i t in s , r har s3 (115 0 A .D . \ a n dC itsuk ha (1220 A .D.) reso rted to a l ine of arg um en t s imilarto tha t o f Ngr juna . 2 Like Ngr juaa , Sr harsa a l so i s no tinteres ted in giving any rat ion al ex plan at ion of ou - w orld -experienc e; they are agreed in disre gar ding the val idity o fwo r ld exper ience. Th ou gh C and rak r t i exp la ins that N g r ju naha s faith in the efficacy of the sup er-in tell ige nce to grasp the


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s Knowledge Possible ? 523ult imate nature of Real i ty Ta tha ta , Ngrjuna has not in hisown wo rks es tabl ished any thesis of his own On the oth er ha nd ,SribarSd has in his ow n w ork es tablish ed the reali ty of B rahm an[Tad evarh bheda-prapanco'nirvacaniyah, brahm aiva tu param a'-rtha-sad advitiyam iti sthitam. KhKh., p. 82). He do es n o tseem to have app lied his own dia lectic to his ow n the sis . H isown descrip t ion of B rahm an also could not have s tood the;test of his r igorou s dialect ical ex am ina t io n. N g rju na , on the:o ther hand, has shown the hol lowness of even the conceptsof Tathagata, Nirvana, Snyata. Ag ain , while N g r ju na mainlya t tacks the accepted B ud dh is t ca tegor ies and o th er re levantca tegor ies connected wi th the m , Sr iharsa a t tack s m ainly thedef in i t ions of the Ny ya sc ho ol 3 and com es to the can elusionthat as the N y ya ca nn ot defin e i ts categ ories , these arein tr ins ica l ly indef inab le an d the w or ld- ap pe ara nc e m easuredand scanned in terms of these categories is fa lse . 4 B u t t h o u g hhis chief p olem ic is ag ain st the N y y a, since his crit icism s ar eof a destruct ive nature , they can with modificat ions be usedeffectively again st any oth er syste m . D efin i t ion s oth er thanthose refuted bv S rih ars a can be refuted by a jud icio usm an ipu lat io n of the ar gu m en ts foun d in different places inSn ha rsa ' s work o r by u rg ing s imi la r o r o the r a rg um ents .Thus an intel l igent man can repudiate the categories recognisedand expound ed by o t he rs . 5 T ho se w ho cri t ic ise w ith the objectof es tabl ishing posi t ive def ini t io ns w ou ld ob ject to certa indef in i t ions or theor ies of o ther schools ; but the Mdhyamikas ,the Ta t tvop ap lav av d ins and K eva ldv a i t ins like Sr iha rsa a reintere sted in the refu tatio n of all de fin it io ns as such an d sotheir dialectic w ould be effective ag ain st all de fin it io ns andtheor ie s o f o the r s choo ls o f ph i losop h ica l thoug h t N g r ju na ' sm etho ds differ from those of Jaya rs i a nd Sr iha rsa in thatthe con cepts which he cri t ic ises are m o st 'y jus t show n by himto be intrin sically based on co nc ep ts which hav e no essen tialnature of their own but are unders tood oniy in re la t ion to others .N o con cept reveals any intr in s ic na tur e of i ts ow n and onecan un der s tand a con cept only thr ou gh ano th er and tha t againthrough the former or th ro ug h an ot he r , an d so on .G Jaya rs i


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524 Indian Dialecticsand rhar sa em ploy ot he r arg um en ts a lso to refute the con cep tsby br inging out the absurdi t ies involved.

We shal l now consider how these phi losophers haverep ud iated the val idi ty of the recognised sources of kn ow ledg e{pramn). N g r j un a ' s a rgu m ent aga ins t those who main ta inthe reali ty of th ing s on the gr ou nd thai: they can be kn ow n bythe pramanas is th at if you m aintain that a pranina candemonstrate the exis tence of things and those things are provedwhen the re is a pramna, then you m ust s ta te where such apramna cou ld be found as could de m on stra te these pramanas.Were the pramanas dem ons t ra ted wi thou t having recourse toa n o th e rpraniana>then thepramanas be ing themselves und em ons-tra ted could n ot pr ov e the exis tence of oth er objects (Vigraha-vyavartani, 31) If, on the other hand, the pramanas be said to bedemons t ra ted by ano the r pramana and this by sti l l another, therewould be the fault of anavastha (vicious infinite series) (32).A nd if you say t ha t the pramana does not requ ire to bede m on s t ra te d then you g ive up your s tand tha t th ings a redemons t ra ted bypramanas; and you m ust a lso acco un t for thispreferent ia l t rea tment accorded to pramana as to why it is notrequi red to be de m on s t ra te d by a pramana when o th er th ingsa re requ i red to be thus dem ons t ra ted ( 3 3 K 7 It is m istake nto say th at ju s t as f i re can i l lum inate i tself and oth er ob jec tsso the pramna can at the sam e time estab lish i tself and ot h erthin gs. As a m at te r of fact, fire d oes no t i l lum ine itself for i twould then have to be previously unperceived in darkness l ike aja r in da rk ne ss which is later i l lum ined by fire . T h at is tosay, if fire is lum ino us from the very be gin nin g, i t is n o tpossible to say th at fire can il lum ine itself M or eo ve r, if i tis maintained that f i re can i l lumine i tself and other objects ,then since fire can bu rn oth er ob jec ts, how is i t th at i tdoes n ot b u m i tself? (34 -36 . An d if f i re can i l lum ine i tself aswell as o th er ob jec ts da rk ne ss m ust sim ilarly co ver i tself as w ellas other objects (37).

I t may be urge d tha t a pramna is self-proved (svatah-siddha); a pramana can be es tabl ished w itho ut gelat ion to


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Is Knowledge Possible ? 525other things . Ifa.pramana has sole re la tion with oth er thingsthen it would not be self-proved; apramana ca n be self-provedonly wh en it does no t dep end on oth er thing s . Th e answ erto this is that if the pramana could be es tabl ish ed and couldprove without any relat ion with the object to be proved, thennobody would use the pramanas in ord er to app rehen d theseobje cts If the pramanas are said to be established inas m uchas they are related to the things to be kn o w n , then thepramanas are dep end ent on som ethin g which is a lready prov edfor if the things are no t yet pro ve d they ca nn ot be recipro -cally re la ted. If on the oth er ha nd , things are a lready pro ved ,there is no necessity of assuming a reciprocal relation betweenthem . If the things which are to be app rehe nd ed are prov ed onaccount of their re la t ion with the pramanas, then the things tobe app reh end ed are subseque ntly proved in re la t ion to the pramanaand could not be recipro cally related (4 1-44 ). If things are estab-lished without a pramana then they hav e no relation w ith thepramana. W hy then does one em ploy apramana to es tabli sh th em ?W ha t, as a m atte r of fact , cuu ld be prov ed by apramana ? (45)If i t is m ain tain ed th at the validity of the pramana is provedas having relat ion to the object to be ascerta ined, then s incethe th ing to be apprehended es tabl i shes the pramana it wouldbecome the pramana and the pramana would become the thingto be ap pr eh en de d as i t is establishe d by the thin g to beapprehended (46) .8 If they are said to estab lish each oth erthen both remain unes tabl i shed. One may suppose tha t thefather can give b irth to the son or tha t the son can give birthto the fathe r, bu t in tha t case w ho is i t th at gives birth an dwho is i t that is born ? (47-51)

Th u s a pramana cannot es tabl i sh itself; it is similarly notes tabl i shed by another pramana of th e sam e type , no r by adifferent pramana, no r is i t es tabl ish ed by an ot he r thin g. I t isnot es tabl ished w itho ut a cause , or by i ts ow n objects and bythe objects of another severally or collectively (52). Thereforeit is w ro ng to say tha t the existence of thing s is establishedby pramanas o r tha t the re are pramanas es tab l ishin g the things


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526 Indian Dialecticstobe apprehended (53) 9 Thus the pramanas can no t be regardedas sources of val id knowledge.

N g r ju n a ' s m ain l ine of a t ta ck is tha t no conc ept ,wh ether of kno wled ge or of the m ean s of know ledge or ofan yth ing else can be defined intr ins ical ly w ithou t de pen din gon an ot he r and this la t ter again is no t inde pen den t of theform er or an oth er . This dep end ence shows that there is noessent ia l t ru th m the defini t ions an d co nse qu ently in the ircontent, and it is not possible to affirm the validity of empiricalknowledge and the reali ty of the things cognised by itJa ya r si Bh at ta of the Lo k ya ta school is the onlyoutr ight scept ic among the Indian phi losophers known to us .In his Tattvopaplavasimha, he sets ou t to re pu dia te the validityof the pramanas as they are ex po un ded by the different schoo ls .In the course of his dialectical iefutation of these pramanashe refutes the co nc ep ts of jati ( c lass -ch arac ter , universal ),samavaya (in he ien ce ), soul and so for th; th at is to say, he isnot ready to accept the val idi ty of any proposi t ion. He s tr ikesat the very root of a l l thoughtthe pramanas, and it is the neasy to- arr iv e at the con sequ ent inval idi ty o f every pro po si t ion .He show s the incorrectness of the de fini t io ns of thepramanas asform ulated by the different schools an d com es to the conclusiontha t all princ iples being thus upset all pr op os itio ns arecharming so long as they are not inves t iga ted in to . 1 0

The criteria of the truth of knowledge as recognised by thedifferent schoo ls of phi loso phy a re avyabhicarhva (absence ofd i sc repancy) , abadhitatva (absence of cont radic t ion) , avisamvada(absence of incoherence), yatharthya (correspondence) andvyavasaytmakatva (certa inty or defini teness) . Jay ar si repu diate sthese co nc ep ts by ant ic ip at ing al l po ssible inter pre tat io ns ofthese te rm s an d show ing them to be faul ty and una cceptable . F o rexample , Wha t i s mean t by knowledge 'be ing-uncon t rad ic ted ' ?Does i t mean tha t cont radic t ion to th is knowledge does notarise ? A nd if so, doe s this co ntr ad ict i on not ar ise becausethe kn ow ledg e cognises the ob ject correc t ly ( i .e . there iscorresp ond ence be tween the kno wled ge and the objec t ) or


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Is Knowledge Possible ? 527because the agg reg ate of causal factors giving rise to thecontradic t ing knowledge (badhaka-jnna ) is inco m plete ? I tis observed that in the absence of the com plete ap p ar at u sor ig ina t ing the cont radic t ing knowledge , the previous knowledgeis not co ntr ad icte d; for ins tan ce, no co ntra dic t ion arises whenwe cognise a m ass of rays of the sun (mancUnicaya) a t adis tance as water , wh ereas th is cog nit ion is con trad icted wh enthe place is a familiar on e, whe n the necessary causes for theproduct ion of the cont radic t ing cogni t ion are present . Again ,this con trad ict io n ma y no t ar ise im m ediately bu t m ay r iseafter a year or so, or may not arise at all if the factors producingthe con t radic t ing know ledge are not present in a com ple teagg reg ate. C an it be said tha t the cog nition is tru e, s implybecause no co ntra dic t ion has ar isen ? Mo reo ve r, does thisabsence of co ntra dic t ion hold goo d w ith reference to a ll person sor with reference to the cog niser ? W e can nev er kn ow th atcontradict ion to this cognit ion has never ar isen in the case ofeach an d every perso n for then we w ou ld be om nisc ient. And ifi t is said that a cog nit ion is n on -disc rep an t because thecogniser does not have a contradict ing cognit ion, that is notprop er ; for even tho ug h a c on t radic t ing cogn i t ion may no tarise in the case of the kn ow er ow ing to his go ing to adifferent place or his death and the l ike reasons, yet the cognitionof jew el (where the re are only rays) and of m irage andthe l ike are known to be false. Or the false cognition has, onacc ou nt of the na tu re of i ts caus al a gg reg ate, arisen in such afashion as to prev ent the co ntr ad ict in g co gn it ion from aris ing,and it is beca use of this th at i t is u nc on tra di ct ed , l ike acogni t ion recognised to be r ight . Th us know ledge can no t beregarded as t rue (non-discrepant , avyabhicari) s imply becausei t i s not cont radic ted . 1 1

Some reckon truth by the efficiency of knowledge (pravrtti


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528 Indian DialecticsIf i t be no t kn ow n, ho w cou ld it be k now n to exist ,and if i t be kno wn ho w could you be certa in of the t r u thof this kno w ledge ? I t is further co nte nd ed tha t th e t ru thof the prev iously produ ced cog nit ion of water is ascerta in edby reach ing an d ob tainin g w ater . Is the wa ter thu s ob tain edidentical with the water ap pr eh en de d by the cog bit ion , or ofthe same class or of the same family ? It cannot be identicalw ith the w ater revealed by cog nition for i t is qu ite po ssibleth at this w ater has ceased to exist ow ing to the ch ang espr od uc ed in i ts p ar ts by the circling of fishes an d t he splash -ing of b uffaloes an d the like cau ses . If it is said to be w aterof the sam e class, i t h app en s at t imes that m an m ay hav efalse kno w ledg e of w ater and yet accidental ly reac h (real)water and then this knowledge should according to this viewbe regarded as t rue w hich is abs urd . I t may be urg ed tha tw rong kno wled ge never takes a person to w ater con nectedwith the sam e place and tim e, wh ereas t rue kno w ledge doe sso and i t is by reason of this that i t is t rue or non-discrepant(avyabhicri). If this be so, then kno wled ge of an ob ject ab o u tto per ish or knowledge of moon, sun , e tc . (which we cannotreach) w ould no t be t rue . M ore ov er, cogn it ion can no t possiblyenab le us to reach w ater of the sam e place , for p lace to o can ,l ike wa ter , cease to exist (owing to e arth-q uak e, eru pt io n,e tc . ) .1 9 Th e water reached also ca nn ot hav e tbe same jati (class-ch ara cter ) as the wa ter tha t was revealed in co gn it io n, forthere is nothing l ike j3tf.15 If the w ater re ach ed is said tobe of the sam e family or co nt in uu m , this is no t acce ptable asthe las t composi te ent i ty is devoid of the generat ive power; andthe w ate r- in div idu als ca nn ot be m any (-See the refu tat ion offail, TP S , p p . 4 -8 ) .

M ore ov er, does the eff ic iency of k no w ledge acq ua intus with i ts t r ut h by being i ts m ark (linga) or by beingi ts m eans of perc ept io n ? I t ca nn ot be i ts m ar k (linga)or pr ob an s as the re la t ion be tween the two is no t kn ow n,becau se if the re la t ion were kn ow n, t ru th i tself wo uld bekn ow n an d i t w ould no t th en be necessary to ut i l ise th e m ark


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Is Knowledge Possible ? 529of inference, viz. efficiency.1 4 I t ca nn ot a lso be i ts m eansof per cep tion , becau se fhere can be no co nt ac t with i t wh icharose previously and then pe rishe d. Know ledge of i t is notthe result of perception, as i t is objectless, l ike the cognitionof kesonduka (wo olly m ass seen by pressing the eye with thefinger; this kn ow ledg e ha s as a m att er of fact no ob jec t) .N either the n eg at io n of cogn it ion no r i ts presence is revealedas i tself is no t the re. H o w can a no n-e xiste nt th in g be saidto be an objec t ? D ue to i ts im pre ss ing its shap e, or beingendowed with the large (hence percept ible) s ize (mahattva) a n dthe l ike ch arac ters ; or m ere presence , o r be ing pro duc edsimu ltaneously (with co gn it ion ) ? W hen all these hav e beenrefuted, how could i t be an object ? And if i t be sti l l regardedas an objec t, the n the cau se of i l lusion w ou ld hav e to beinvestigated in the case of the cognitions of the kesonduka,etc. (for they also co uld be said to have an ob jec t an d socould no t be regard ed as i l lusory by reason of ihe ir beingobje ctless; . If i t were false by virtue of i ts m ere existence ,then everything w ould com e to be false an d there wo uld be' the upset t ing of a l l pr inciples ' (tattvopaplava).15

If i t is said that truth (avyabhicaritva, non-discrepancy) iscogoised different ly, tha t cog nit ion pro du ced by the con tactof soul an d m in d is revea led as qu alified by avyabhicarita,that is not proper. Is this avyabhicaritva i ts a t t r ibu te or i tsvery na tur e ? If i t is i ts at tr ib u te , is it eter na l o r no n-e tern al ?If i t be e tern al it sho uld be look ed upo n as rep ud iate d onaccount of the same faults as are present in the case of jati(-bein g eternal it w ould ei th er give r ise to co gn it ion alwaysor ne ve r-T P S , p 6) . I f it be no n-e tern a l , is i t p ro du ced beforeit or sim ulta ne ou sly with i t o r after i t ? If i t be pr od uc ed p rio rto i t (cognit ion), wh ose at t r i bu te could it be ? A n at t r i bu tecan no t exis t w itho ut a su bs tra tum . If i t is said to be pro du cedsimultaneously with i t , then the re la t ion between the two assignified by the genitive case in 'the avyabhicarit of i t ' remainsto be specified, as i t ca n n o t, be ide ntity ( because the twoare different ), causal i ty ( because the two are s im ulta ne ou s-)


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530 Indian Dialecticsor samavaya (which has been re pu di ate d- T P S , pp . 7 ~ 8 \ If i t issaid th at i t is pro du ced sub seq ue ntly , then it follows that th ekno wled ge was previously vyabhicari (discrepant , fa lse) . Thereis no personal a t t r ibute of the form ofavyabhicaritva as dis t inc tfrom plea sur e etc. s ince on acco unt of the imp ossibili ty of i tsapprehension it is not recognised as such even by the other party( Na iyyika in this case1 . If a t t r i bu tes l ike no n-d iscrep anc y{avyabhicara), etc. are recog nised as distinct entit ie s, an d cog-ni t ion dete rm ined by them is s ta ted to be the asce rta inin gfactor of the causal a pp ara tus , th at is no t pr op er, s inceeach of th em w ill no t rem ain up to the t im e of theapp rehe ns ion of the cogni t ion as de term ined by a nu m be rof a t t r ib ut es , and in the absence of ( the s im ultan eou s exis tenceof) that which is to be made known (viz . apparatus) and thatwhich makes known (viz . avyabhicara, etc.) , cognition will beassociated with the agen t a lone (T PS , pp . 9- I0 ) . T h at is tosay, there will be the ag en t alon e with ce rtain stray pieces ofkno wled ge , bu t no t the re la t ion of jnapya (that which isknown) and jnapaka ( tha t which m akes kn ow n) .

Ifavyabhicaritva is reg ard ed as the very na tur e of kn ow -ledge, then is it so by virtu e of i ts own existence or by vi rtu eof the existen ce of an ot he r th ing ? If i t be said to beavyabhicari m erely by vir tue of i ts exis tence, then al l co gn it io nsinc luding tha t of kesonduka should be avyabhicari (n o n -dis cre pa nt) . B ut kno w ledge is no t said to be vyabhicari o ravyabhicari by virtu e of i ts m ere existence. If c og niti on issaid to be avyabhicari by virtue of the existence of an o th erthing, is this other thing helping (conducive to non-discrepantknowledge , upakaraka) or non-h elping ? If i t be no n- he lpin g,then the cogni t ions of kesonduka an d two m oon s shou ld beavyabhicari. If the ot he r thin g is said to be a help ing on e, is i tone th at is k n o w r or un kn ow n ? If it be said to be on e th a tis kn ow n, the n past and future inferent ia l co gn it ion s , yo gi cperce pt ion , an d cog nit ion generated by injuncto ry s ta tements-(codanvacana) could not be avyabhicari as th er e is absence^in th eir case of th e hel pin g factor th at is kn ow n, a nd if the re;


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s Knowledge Possible ? 531be presence of i t there would be the extinction of the processof sacrificing (beca use then it wo uld no t be gi rd ed by Snitiand italone).If i t be no t kn ow n th en the cogn ition of kesondukaand two moons should be correct . So (his assumption is notacceptable (TPS, p. 10).

M oreo ver, is the co gn it ion which acqu aints us with th eappara tus known to be avyabhlcari or not so kno wn 1If itis kn ow n as such , is this co gn ition of the na tur e of self-appre hens io n or is i t kn ow n by an oth er cogn i t ion ? I t cannot beof the form of self-ap preh ensio n because the N aiyy ika h imselfdoes not recogn ise self-apprehension of kno w ledge and if hewere to ad m it this he w ou ld be co ntr ad ict in g his own do ctr ine(- the nigrahasthana called apasiddhanta). If it be said to beknown as avyabhicari by an ot he r cogn i t ion , then the reasonfor the difference betw een the two co gn ition s m ust be inq uir edinto Co gn it ion is dis t in gu ishe d from no n-co gnit ion by vir tueof i ts na tur e of co gn it ion , bu t how could i t be dis t inguishedfrom another cognit ion ? By i ts nature of cognit ion or by anotherchara cter ? If it be dis t in gu ishe d by vir tue of the na ture ofcognit ion, then the other would cease to be of the nature ofcognition, l ike water, etc. If i t be said to be distinguished byvir tue of an ot h er ch ara cte r , the n i t would be devoid of th echarac ter of cogni t ion , because the two charac ters could notbe iden tical, an d if the y be iden tical, ther e should beone th ing cogn i t ion or no n-c og ni t io n I f i t be cogni t ion , i tcould not be sa id to be 'd is t ing uish ed due to ano ther ch arac terbut only due to i t s na ture of cogni t ion , and the o ther wouldcome to be of the nature of non-cognit ion. If i t be non-cognit ionthen what the Tat tvopaplavavdin des i red i s proved. I f jnanaiva(c lass -cha racte r of co gn it io n) is said to be the dis t ingu ishingfactor, by w ha t do es i t dis tigu ish , an d so on as stated before;the l ine of a rgument s ta ted above should be pursued. I t cannotalso possibly be co gn ised by a n o th e r co gn ition . If i t is said tobe not kn ow n, ho w do you kn o w that i t exis ts ? Fol low ing thisline of ar g um en t on e has to acce pt the futil i ty of the divisionof kn ow led ge as tru e an d false (T P S , p . 11).


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532 Indian DialecticsJayarsi now takes up the bel ief that t rue knowledge revealsthat thing which is actually present and is in contact with these ns e- or ga n, w he rea s false kno w ledg e reveals a different thing*'Avyabhicar may be taken to mean tha t the knowledgeis of a th ing w ith which the sense is actually in co nta ct;in the case of vyabhicari (wrong or d iscrepa nt ) know ledge , onthe o ther hand, the suppor t or base (alambana) (the objec tbefore th e sense) is differen t from th e th in g revea led in -know*ledge (anyad alambanam anyac ca pratibkti TPS, p. 12). W eask, what is signified by alambana ? D o es it signify th at itis the pr od uc er of cog nit io n, or tha t i t im presses i ts sha pe,or that i t is the substrate of cognition, or that i t is revealedby cognit ion ? [f alambana s ignif ies being the pro du cer ofkno w ledg e, then t he eyes and l ight shou ld be alambanas.Alambana cannot properly s ignify being the impressor ofsha pe, s ince this is no t accep table to the N aiy yik as . C ogn it ion

ca nn ot rea so na bly hav e the shap e of the object (-as is shownla ter by Jayars i ) . Alambana ca nn ot signify tha t i t is the su b-s tra te of cog nit io n s ince cog nit io n does not ar ise as asso ciatedw ith the circle of ray s, bu t arises as i nh ere nt in the so ul.Lastly, if alambana signifies that i t is revealed by co gn itio n,this is not proper as i t is water that is revealed in the cognitionof w ater an d no t rays . If the rays them selves are kno w n in theshape of water, is the shape of water different from the raysor non-di f fe rent \ If i t is no n- di ffe re nt , is i t real or u nre al ?If real how could i ts cognition be false \ If i t be un re al, thenthe rays a lso would come to be unreal . There being ident i tywith unre al w ater, the co gn ition of w ater is false. W ha t ism ean t by th is ? I t am ou nt s to th is tha t the cogni t io n of raysis fa lse . A nd when the on e shap e of wa ter is kn ow n, who te l lsthe fool of a N aiy y ik a th at the rays are revealed ? If rhe shap eof w ater is said to be different from the rays, then it sh ou ldno t be said th at ra ys are cog nised in the sha pe of w ater. Wea sk : W ha t is revealed in the co gnit ion of kesonduka, an dwhat is its lambona ? T he very sam e kesonduka serves asthe alambana and is a lso cognised; s imilarly water a lone car ,


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is Knowledge Possible ? 533be the alambana and also be kn ow n, an d it is not necessaryto pos tu la t e ano ther alambana. A nd co gn ition of w ater is falsenot because i t has another alambana tha n w hat is cognised ,but beca use i t (wa ter) as a m a tte r of fact, doe s no t exist ;o therwise the cogni t ion oikesonduka will no t be false bec aus eit does not have a different alambana.

I t i s co nte nd ed tha t s ince the co gn i t ion take s the cogniserto the place of the rays, the rays are the 'alambana. The answerto this is tha t id this way th e plac e also w ould reas ona bly bean alambana. A nd the cogn i t ion of w ater could no t havebeen pro du ce d by co nta ct w ith a th ing different f rom thew ater tha t is rev ea led, as this is not seen in the case of th ecogni t ion of real water ; o therwise even the inferent ial cogni t ionof the water could be said to be produced by the contact ofsense-orga n an d objec t , as i t i s pr od uc ed by the co nta ct ofthe soul and the mind. I f i t be urged that the mind has norelat ion w ith the f i re tha t is cog nise d, then here also the eyehas no relat ion w ith the wa ter tha t is co gn ise d. 1 6I t is urged tha t false kn ow led ge has a non -ex istent obje ctwhereas t rue knowledge has an ex is ten t ob ject . Jayars i nowshows the futi li ty of th is d i st in ct i on . I f th e false cog ni t ion ofw ater is said to hav e non -existe nt w ate r as i ts obje ct , w hatis m ean t by i ts being an ob ject ? W ha t is said abo ve hold sgo od her e als o. If w ate r is reve aled in i t , how does i t no texist ? Y es, i t m ay be arg ue d, i t is revea led bu t w rongly. W ha tis meant by wrongness (atathyata) absenc e of wh at is a pp re-hen ded , o r the absence tha t is ap pre he nd ed ? If i t mean s absenceof wh at is app rehe nd ed , i s th i s t rue on ly then or a t an o th ert ime i I f on ly then , is i t k no w n or no t kn ow n \ I f known, bywh at is it know n by the cog ni t ion of w ater o r by ano the rcogn i t ion ? I t (absence of w ater) ca n no t be kno w n by thecogni t ion of water , as th is lat ter has water as i ts object . Orif i t have that (absence) as i ts object the real isat ion that cogni-t ion of w ater is i l lusory w ou ld no t be poss ible because theo bj e ct viz . ' absen ce ' is an ex is ten t on e. An d the negat ionof water cannot be revealed in cogni t ion apprehending water


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5 3 4 Indian Dialecticsfor then anything could be revealed in any cognit ion, whichis absurd; i t involves atiprasaiiga (absurd over-extension). Ifi t is said to be revealed by an o th er co gn ition , th at is no tproper , because two cogni t ions cannot be s imul taneous . Andif absence or ne ga t ion be es tabl ished by the co gn it ion ofnega t ion an d exis tence by the cog nit ion of exis tence, then theexis tence a nd the non-ex is tence of w ater would be co-exis tent .I t wou ld be arb i t ra ry to say that the cog nit ion of exis tencedoe s no t es tabl ish exis tence, whereas the cog nit ion of negat iondo es es tabl ish neg at ion . A nd if the cog nit ion of exis tenc ewere no t to es tabl ish exis tence, peo ple w ould be susp iciousab ou t all thin gs , and in the event of that con tinge ncy the rewould be no l imit to negat ion and consequently there wouldb e taitvopaplava (up se t t in g of a ll pr inc ip le s ) . On the o therh an d , if it is no t kno w n how do you know that i t ex is ts?A nd if th ere is the absenc e of w hat is kno w n at an oth er t im e,then nothing is contradicted, for i t is qui te possible that evenreal water is absent a t another t ime.

I f wrongness {aiathyata)> m eans the negat ion or absencetba t is app reh end ed, how could know ledge hav ing tha t asits objects be poss ibly false, as only nega tion wh ich iscognised is ten able ? M or eo ve r, posi t ing absence when apos itive ch ara cte r is cognised is no t pr op er , as it invo lvesati-prasanga (absu rd over-e xension ); otherw ise, one cou ld posi tt as te , e tc . when colour, e tc are apprehended. But this is notw ha t is do ne . Sim ilarly here a lso w ater is ap pre he nd ed . I t m aybe urged that i t is apprehended but i t is unreal . The answerto this is th at in th at case this is b u t a des crip tion of w aterju s t as i o n g (patch of) w ater ' , ' sweet w ater ' and the like are .I t may be argued that in the case of the la t ter descript ions ,w ater is ap pr eh en de d, an d so water is posi ted in the m . T heans w er to this is th at if this be so, then even he re in bo ththe cases water is cognisedreal water and unreal water . In thecog nition of real w ater it is real w ater tha t is revealed an dnot unreal water or non-water . Similarly, in the cognit ion ofun rea l water , i t is un real w ater that is revealed and no t r e i i


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Is Knowledge Possible 535water or non^water , because ap pr eh en s io ns co ns is t in thedeterminat ion of the i r own objec ts (TPS, pp , 12-14) .

A cog nit ion is said to be w ron g wh en i t is co ntra dic ted byano ther cog ni t ion . J ya r s i asks w hat i t is th a t i s con t radic tedthe objec t (artha), cog ni t ion or bo th , an d by w hat it isc o n t r a d i c t e d .1 7 If i t is said that th e thin g is co ntr ad icte d, bywh at is i t co nt rad ict ed ? D o es i t co nt ra di ct i tse lf or is i tcont radic ted by another th ing or by knowledge ? If i t contradictsitself, is the con t radic t ion caused or o r ig ina ted by i t or m adek n o w n ? If it is cau sed , is i t different o r no n-d iffer en t ? If iti s non-di f fe rent then 'cont radic t ion i s caused ' means ' i t s ownself is originated by it1 which is n o t co ns is ten t , as a thingcannot opera te on i t se l f ( -opera t ion on i t se l f involves cont radic-on-vyaghata). If i t is ca use d as di stin ct ( fro m the thin g )even then w hat is ex is tent be co m es the ag en t , but wh at isapp rehe nd ed is no t rep udia ted . I f the co nt r ad ic t io n i s said tobe m ade kn ow n (by the th ing ) is it non-di f fe rent or d i f f e re nt?If i t is non-different , then ' co nt ra di ct i on is m ad e kno w n byi t ' is equiva lent to 'w ate r is m ad e kn o w n' . I f i t is different ,then w hat is exis tent is pro ved to be th e jnapaka, wh a t makesknown, and the exis tence of what i s apprehended is proved.

If the thin g is said to be co nt ra di cte d by an ot h er , theni t follows th at b o th are real ; on ly tw o ex is ten t thin gs , l ike twokings , can s tand in the re la t ion of badhya (con t rad ic ted , wha tis set aside) and badhaka (co ntr ad ict in g, th at wh ich sets aside);one and the same th ing canno t be bo th the badhya and thebadhaka. M ore ov er , is the co nt r ad ic t io n by i t of w hat isap pre he nd ed , caused by it o r m ad e k n o w n ? I f i t is caused ,is i t (c o nt ra di c t io n ) non-di f fe rent o r d i f fe rent ( f rom thecon tradic ted ) . I f i t be non -different , the n 'non-different con-t radic t ion is cause d ' wou ld me an 'wate r i s cau sed ' ; and if i t(water) be caused or orig inate d, i ts cog nit ion wo uld no t befalse . If contradict ion which is different (from the contradicted)be said to be orig inate d, even the n the re m us t be w ater asi t (contradict ion) is cognised as re la ted to water . If Devadat ta1-68


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536 Indian Dialecticswe re no t to exist , on e co uld no t spe ak of His eye; sim ilarlya th ing m ust exist in or de r tha t con trad ict io n sho uld berelated to i t . I f con tra dic t ion is said to be m ad e kn ow n,is i t non -differen t or d ifferen t ( from ^ a t e r ) ? If i t wh ich isnon-different is m ad e kn ow n, then w hat is m ea nt by co ntra -d ic t ion is m ade kn ow n ' is 'wa ter is m ad e kn ow n ' . I f bein gdifferent i t is m ad e kn ow n, even the n when we say, T h i s isthe co ntra dic t ion of w ater ' , i t is revealed as de pe nd en t onan oth er ( i .e . on w ater ), and so the re c an no t be the ab solu teneg at ion of i t ( i.e. w ater) . Th erefo re, co ntra dic t ion by an ot he rthing also is not possible.if it is said to be co nt ra di ct ed by kn ow led ge , is i tcon t rad ic ted by knowledge having that as i t s ob ject o ran oth er th ing as i ts ob ject , o r by kno w ledge that i sob ject less ? I f the con t rad ic t ing know ledge has tha t ( thethin g con trad icte d ) as its objec t , the n i t aff i rms i tsnature, does not falsify i t3 bec au se i t is of the form of thedete rm inat io n of tha t chara cter . I f the cont rad ic t ing cogn i t ionha s an oth er th ing as i t s ob ject , th at a l so is no t p ro pe r ; acogni t ion penain ing to an ob ject can af f i rm the ex is tence ofonly tha t , bu t i t ca nn ot af i rm or deny an yth ing else, s incecog ni t ion s are rest r ic ted to their ow n ob ject . I f i t is saidto be con t rad ic ted by an ob ject less cog ni t ion , the answ er i s th a tthis lat ter does not aff i rm or deny anything, even because i ti s ob ject less (TPS, pp . 14-16) . 1 8If co gn i t ion is said to be co ntr ad icte d, w ha t is i tscon tradic t ion ? D oe s i t ha ve the form of the exclusion ofsvarupa (na ture ) , or den ial of svarupa, or o f depr iv ingit of i ts object \ If i t has the form of exclusion of i ts n at ur e,then every th ing wo uld be con t rad ic te d , because one cog ni -

t ion w ould be tur ne d off (or des troye d) by an oth er . I f i t i sof the form of den ial of i ts ow n na tur e, tha t is no t pr op er ,bec aus e even th e co gn i t ion of false w ater is expe rienced . I tis also no t true to say tha t it is of the form of de pr ivi ng i tof i ts obje ct . I t has b een show n ab ov e tha t a kno w ledgeca nn ot be depr ived of it s ob ject (even cogn i t ion of unre alwa te r has i ts ob jec t ) . T hu s con t rad ic t ion can no t be exp la ined .


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(s Knowledge Possible ? 537It m ay be asked tha t if the ob jec t is not c on tra dic ted ,ho w it is that i t has n ot g ot effic iency (does n o t b rin g abo utartha-kriya o r successful actio n) ? W ha t is this arthakriya

wh ich it do es n ot br ing a b o u t for pe op le ? Is it of the fo rmof con sciou sness , or of act ivi ty , or of a t ta in m en t , or of thepro du ct io n and en joy m en t of ple asu re and pa in ? If it is saidtha t the objec t does not br ing about arthakriya of the formof con sciou sness , th at is no t t ru e because w ater does brin gabout the arthakriya o r the form o f con sciou snes s ( i.e. doesgive rise to the co gn ition of w ater). It is als o no t t ru e to sayt h a t it does not br ing about artha-kriy of the form of activity,s ince act ivity is de pe nd en t on the will of m an , an d does n otfol low the being or non-being of the nature of a thing. A manm ay or m ay no t act acc ord ing to his desire , b ut this a lo nedo es n ot pr ov e its abse nce . If i t is said to be no n-ex istentbecause i t does no t br ing ab ou t arthakriya of th e form ofa t ta in m ent , th a t is not a pro pe r c r i te r ion , b ecause , m oon , sun ,p lane ts , etc. can exis t even tho ug h they ca nn ot be reache d. Ifit is said no t to br in g ab o u t arthakriya of the form ofpleasu re or pa in, we ask, ' D oe s this m ea n th at i t do es notbr ing abo ut p leasure or ig ina t ing f rom per cep t ion or f romcon tact w ith bo dy ?' I t does brin g ab o u t plea sure resul t ingfrom p erc ep tio n. If i t is said th at i t do es n o t give rise topleasure a r i s ing out of phys ica l contac t , then th is would nothold good in the case of moon, sun, e tc . , which do not giverise to plea sure ar is ing ou t of phy sical c on ta ct an d yet are( re ga id ed as ) rea l o r ex is ten t. A nd th ings ca nn o t be rega rdedas nc n-e xis te nt s imply because the y d o no t give r ise toarthakriya (successful actio n) bec aus e th e or ig in ati on of all knowledge as such occurs only from i ts respect ive causal aggre-gate , and it may no t br ing ab ou t arthakriya in the absenc eof accessory factors M oreo ver, wh en i t is s ta te d th at i t doesno t b r ing abou t arthakriya, is this s tate d w ith reference toone kn ow er or to a ll know ers \ If it is said to be un re albec aus e it do es n ot give rise to arthakriya in th e ease of o neknow er , then th is would no t hold go od in the case of m oo n,


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538 Indian Dialecticssu n, pl an ets , e tc. , and in the case of an obje ct ab ou t toperish. If it is said to be unreal since it does not give rise toarthakriya w ith reference to all kn ow er s, in t ha t case therew ould be the cont ingen cy of the non-e xistence of al l th in gs .Ail th ing s do no t br in g ab ou t the desired end s of al l m en,an d a m an wi th a l imi ted v is ion ca nn ot kno w tha t a th ingdoes no t b r ing about arthakriya in the case of al l m en . T hu savyabhicritva ca nn ot be defined an d so i t i s no t pr op er toregard avyabhicaritva, absence of d iscre pan cy, as a cr i te r ion ofthe val idi ty of knowledge (TPS, pp. 16-17) .Vyavasayatmakatva (cer tainty or def ini teness) is an oth eraccepted cr i ter ion of val idi ty . But no knowledge can be excludedby this . I t m ay be urged th at do ub tful c og ni t ion (sandeha-jnana)arises w hen in the case of an ob ject l ike a t ru nk or a pi l lar ,owing to the contact o f sense-organ and ob ject there i s thepe rce p t ion of me rely the co m m on , an d no t o f the speci f ic ,feature s of the obje ct , and this dou btful co gn i t ion is no treg arde d as val id because i t is no t def in i te . W e ask : Is an yth in grevealed in th is dou btful cog ni t ion or no t ? A nd if so m eth ingis reve aled, is i t a substanc e o r an a t t r i bu te ? If a sub stan ceis said to be re vea led is it rea l o r n o t \ If i t is rea l , co gn i-t ion ha vin g th at as i ts object m us t be reg ard ed as val id .If i t i s un re al , then the co nd i t ion of avyabhicaritva issufficient to exclude i ts cognit ion and i t is not necessary toregard def in i teness as an add i t ional co ndi t io n . If an a t t r ib u teis said to be revealed in doubtful co gn i t ion , is i t 'p i l la rn es s '( c lass cha rac te r o f p il la r ) o r W an ne ss ' o r bo th . If i t be 'p i l l a rn es s 'or 'manness ' that is revealed, is i t real or unreal \ If it be real,i ts cog ni t ion cou ld no t be of the na tur e of do ub t , beca usebeing the co gn i t ion of a real ent i ty i t i s l ike the ap pr eh en sio nof real w ate r . I f i t is unreal , then a s said ab ov e, it is enou gh t osay that val id knowledge is that knowledge which is avyabhicrin(non-discrepant) ; i t i s not necessary to say in addi t ion that i tis 'cer tain '. . I f bo th (pi l larness a n d ma nnes s) are said to bereveaied, are bo th real or b ot h un re al o r is on e real a nd th eot he r un rea l ? I f both be real , the n the ir co gn i t ion sho uld


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s Knowledge Possible ? 53^be tr ue on ly, an d not of the na tu re of do ub t; and if b o th beunreal, then their cogfrit ion should be of the nature of error andnot d ou bt . I f one be real and the oth er un rea l , then on e a n dthe sam e kn ow ledg e shou ld be both#v;/tf/>/z/rm(non-discrepan t ,true) and vyabhicarin (discr epa nt , false) ina sm uc h as i t cognisesa real and an unreal entity. T his also exp lains the c og nitio n oftwo m oon s; there the shape of sub stanc e is revealed and no ttha t of a t t r ibute .I t may be urged that *dou btful cog nit ion is tha t whichreveals the sha pe of a do ub tful ob ject . We ask : D o es thisdo ub tful object exis t or not ? If i t exis ts , i ts co gn it ion c an no tbe of the na ture of do ub t , because l ike the app reh en s ion ofreal water it wo uld be of the form of an ap pre hen sion of anuncontradicted object . I f i t does not exis t , then the cri ter ionof av) abhicantva is suff ic ient to exclude such co gn it ion s andvalid kn ow led ge need no t be furth er defin ed as 'certain*. Ifi t be urged thc.t no th in g is reve aled in do ub tful co gn itio n,then i t could not be the resul t of contact of sense-organ andobject , l ike the cognit ion of i l lusory water . Thus val id know-ledge ca nn ot be defined as certa in or defini te kn ow ledg e(TPS, pp . 19-20) .

Simi lar ly , va l id knowledge cannot be def ined as knowledgewhich is non -inco here nt ( i.e . co he ren t) (avisarhvdi jnanam -Pramana Varttika 2 .1 ). W ha t is m ean t by non - inco here nce(avisamvada) ? D oe s i t s ignify 'be ing ihe co gn itio n of a th ingas i t is ' , or 'being free from contradict ion ' , or 'being producedby the th in g tha t is cogn ised ' , o r 'be ing the s t im ula torin respect of the thing that is cognised ' , or 'being thatwhich takes us to the thing' ? 8 1 If i t s ignifies 'being the cogni-tion ot a th in g as it is ' , this will n o t ho ld go od in the case ofinferent ia l cog nit ion (which as a m att er of fact cogn ises on lythe gene ral i ty of a thing , and no t i ts pa rt ic ula r features) . N o rcan 'be ing free from con tradict io n" a pp ly to inferent ia l cogni-t ion. If i t is said to mean 'being produced by the thin^that iscogn ised ' , this a lso ca nn ot be p ro pe r in the case of inferent ia lcognit ion, because the samanya (cognised by i t) can no t


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540 " Indian Dialecticsbe regard ed as p ro d u ci n g (cognit ion) (as i t is unr eal) Sim ilarly,th e sens at ion s of love, e tc . could no t be pro du ced by thethi ng th at is rev eal ed , becau se they ar e dev oid of the efficiencyto pro du ce themselves . A nd yogic perc ept io n a lso is no tp ro d u ce d by th e thing tha t is cognised, as past and futureobjects ^cognised by i t ; could not possibly be producers , foroth erw ise they co uld , no t be pas t and future respect ively. Ifno n- inc oh ere nc e be take n to m ean 'be ing the s t im ula to r inrespect of the object that is known' this is found to be t rueof er ro ne ou s cog nit io n also as i t a lso s t im ula tes act ivi ty inrespect of i ts object . A man who has a wrong cognit ion of wateris ind uc ed to act and yet his cogn it ion is no t non -in co he ren t .And i t is qui te possible that a person may for some reasonno t act even th o ug h he has knowled ge of real w ater , butac co rd ing to this defini t ion this know ledge also shou ld bein c o h e re n t w h ic h is a b s u rd .

If non -inc oh eren ce were to m ean ' being tha t which takesus to the ob jec t ' , w ould this mean 'bein g th at wh ich takesus to ju st any ob jec t, or to the ob ject th at is revealed inknowledge, or to a thing e .g. watei ; of the same genus, orto the ob ject that h as prod uc ed i t (cohe rent kno w ledge) ? ' Ordo es no n-inc ohe renc e s ignify the unfai l ing or invariab leexistence of the causa l factors tha t gave rise to i t ? 2 2 If itm eans ' t a k in g us to jus t an y th in g ' , then the cogn i t ion o fkesonduka (wo olly m ass seen by pre ssin g the eyes with thefingers) or of two m oo ns also should hav e to be regarde das no n-in co he ren t . I f i t be said to m ean ' tak in g us to theob ject t ha t is reve aled ' , then inferent ia l cogn it ion cou ld neverbe said be no n-in co he ren t , as i t does n o t take us to theob ject th at is reve aled W ha t is revealed in inferen tial cog nitio nis the shape of the samanya (universal) an d i t being un real( in the Bu dd his t view) co uld nev er be reach ed. Sim ilarly, yogicpercept ion produced in respec t of pas t or fu ture objec ts can-not take us to the objects revealed (and so should be incoherentacco rding to th is def in i t ion ) . A nd even tho ug h there is theapp reh ens io n of love , e tc . i t d oes n ot take the ap pr h en de r


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Is Knowledge Possiblet 541to lov e, etc. tha t are revealed. A s a m at t er of fact , even inpercep tual cogni t ion , the ob ject that i s revealed i s no t reachedor a t ta ine d , fo r bein g m om en tary i t per i shes im m ediate ly .N on- inco heren ce can no t a l so mea n ' be ing tha t wh ich t akesus to a thin g, e.g. w ater, of the sam e ge nu s {jti) as thethin g th at is revea led in the co gn i t ion ' , becau se the re is n osuch th ing as the w ater -un iversal . Fu r the r , if n oa- inc ohe renc es ign i fies ' t ak ing the kno w er to the th ing that p ro du ce d thecogni t ion ' , that is not proper , because eyes, l ight , at tent ion( ac t ive consciousc iousness ) which p roduc e kno w ledge per i shimmediately and so cannot be reached. I t may f inal ly be urgedthat non-incoherence signif ies the invariable existence of thecauses that produced i t (coherent knowledge) as in their absencethere cou ld be no no n-in co he ren ce . I f th is be so , even thecogni t ion of kesonduka sho uld be non -inco he rent in view ofthe cer tain existence of i ts causes, because othe rw ise i t w ouldbe accidental . This def ini t ion of pramana (val id kno w ledg e) asnon- incoheren t o r coheren t (avisamvadi) know ledge no t be inges tab li shed , the s t a t em en t (o f the B udd h i s t s ) tha t one wh oacts af ter cognising an object by means of these two sourcesof kn ow led ge (viz. pe rce pt io n an d inference) is nev er fo un dto fail in resp ect of successful ac tion is childish a n d si lly(TPS, p p . 2 8 - 2 9 ) . f 3

T he B ud dh is t s , the M mr i i sakas and o th ers ho ld as afur the r con di t ion or qual i f ica tion of valid kno w ledg e tha ti t sho uld be know ledg e of a th ing no t cognised before{anadhigatarthagantr). J ay a r s i ' s co n t en t i o n i s t h a t t h i s ispo in t less in the case of the Bu ddh is t s w ho recognise u n iq uepar t icu la rs a lo ne . N o tw o cog ni t ions of two d i fferen t t imespr io r and pos te r io rhave one and the same ob jec t , t hey canno thave one u n iq ue p ar t i cu la r ob jec t o r one an d the sam euniversal (samanya) as the i r com m on ob jec t . T h e un iquepa r t icu lar wh ich ha s o n e un i tary ( non-d i f feren t ) na tur e ha snot the po tency to g ive r i se to a number of cogni t ions oneaf ter another . (And smanya being non-existent ca nn ot giver i se to any cogn i t ion ) . 3 *


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542 Indian DialecticsI t may be urged tha t the qual i f ica t ion 'making known athing no t a lrea dy kno w n' is inserted in the de fini t ion of val idknowledge to exc lude a number of cogni t ions produced

sim ultane ou sly by one object . T his is no t pr o pe r, as in tha tcase the cogn it ion s a nu m be r of m en hav e in respect of one(li t, pro du ced by one) object would co m e to be inval id. I tcann ot a lso be me ant to exc lude a nu m ber of cog ni t ionshav ing one samnya (univ ersal) as i ts ob ject, because samanyai tse lf being an unrea l i ty , there can be nei th er on e cog nit ionnor a number of cognit ions in respect of i t . Moreover, supposingthere a re tw o co gn itio ns in respect of o ne ob jec t, is on e lack-ing in val idi ty or is i t not-an other-v al id-cog nit ion \ If oneof them is said to be invalid th at is n o t pr op er , becauseinasm uch as they are a l ike of the form o f the app rehe nsionof one a nd the sa m e object , both cog nit ions m ust be valid orbo th invalid as there is n ot the po ssibili ty of the alte rna tive(tha t on e is valid and the oth er inva lid); if this last alter-nat ive be po ssib le , then there wo uld be the contin genc y ofdifference in the cog nit ion s of a nu m be r of men pe rta in in gto one ob ject ( some men would have valid cog nit ion an dothers inval id) , especial ly when these cognit ions are meant tosub la te a p rev ious co gn i t ion . 2 5 If i t be said that i t is not-another-val id-cognit ion, tha t a lso is no t pro per . Is nu m erica l differenceiyyakti-nanatvci) of the m any pieces of kno wled ge (percep tualand the l ike) produced by one object not possible , or is theirqual i ta t ive difference {kara-nanatva) n o t po ssible ? If i t besaid that their numerical difference is not possible that is nott rue , beca use nu m eric al difference is f ou nd in the case ofthe m any co gn it ion s of blue pro du ced by on e blue. I t is a lsono t t rue to say th at qua l i ta t ive difference is not possiblesince co gn itio ns of blue a re foun d to be qu alitativ ely different.A nd ther e is no t a ple tho ra of blues pro du cin g i t, becausethe Bu ddh is ts themselves do not accept them as 'un i -na tured '( according to them , m any th ings can no t have on e na ture ) .I t may be urged that cognit ions having one object cannot bete rmed pe rcep t ion (praiyaksa) or inference (anumana). B ut


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Js Knowledge Possible ? 543this is no t t rue, s ince a different n om en cl at u re is quite possibleon ac co un t of their being effects of different cause s . F orins tance , the many cogn i t ions tha t manyDevada t ta and thel ike have as pro du ced by on e blue ob jec t have a differentnom enc la tu re such as D ev ad a t t a ' s k now ledge and the l ike(Y ajn ad at ta 's k no w led ge, e tc ) because of their being the effectsof different cau ses du e to the ir being acq uir ed by differentagents . So here a lso (TPS . pp . 27-2 8) .

The M m m sak asa l so canno t reasonab ly def ine va ild know-ledge as kn ow ledg e o f a thing no t kn ow n before . Th ere is no ;cr i te r ion to de termine tha t of cogni t ions of one objec t producedby different causal factors , the cognit ion produced f i rs t is val idand the succeeding on es are non-va l id, even.w hen they are a l lalike 'cog nitio n of the ob ject as i t is ' . A n d if i t be sti ll soaccepted then in the same way, the f i rs t cognit ion should benon -val id as i t has this in co m m on w ith the oth er s that i tcognises an ob ject that is cognised (by ot he r cog nit ions) . As thecha racte r of being the cog nit ion of on e blu e ob ject does n otdiffer in the case of the m any co gn itio ns of the blu e ob jectproduced s imul taneous ly and manifes t ing one unique par t icu lar(svalaksanavabhasi), so the cog ni t ions prod uce d ear l ie r an d la te ralso ca nn ot bu t be cog nit ions of a thin g tha t is co gn ise d. 8 6

I t m ay be urged that the earl ier and the la ter cog nit ion shave their own specif ic objects inasmuch as the cognit ion pro-duce d first is acc epte d as receiving the sh ap e of an ob jec t th atis no t cogn ised, w hereas the succee ding on e arises as hav ingfor i ts ob ject the shap e of a th in g th at is cognised. B utthis is self-contradictory. If the latter has for i ts object a thingth at is co gn ised , ho w co uld it be said to ha ve its ow n specificobje ct, an d if i t ha s a specific o b je ct , ho w cou ld i t be thecogn it ion of a thin g tha t is cogn ised ? H av in g i ts ow n specif icobject and being the cognit ion of a cognised object are opposedJ o each other . A n d if they h ave specif ic ob jects , b o th w ouldbe val id as both would cognise an uncognised thing. On theothe r ha nd if they h a \e one ob ject , both w ou ld be val id1-69


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544 Indian Dialecticsor both non-val id as they have this in common that they cognisew hat is cogn ised . Th e M m rh sak as thus can not escape the1gadupravesa'ksitrakavinirgama-nyaya >ca stin g off fhe w holeeye when a mote has fal len in i t instead of removing i t . Theyw ould ha ve to reg ard al l kn ow led ge as non-val id if theydef ine val id kno w ledg e as know ledge of a th ing tha t i sno t cogn i sed .

I t ma y be urg ed tha t i f a cogn i t ion is reg ard ed as val ideven when i t has a cognised thing as i ts object , memory (smrti)also would be a pramana or the resu lt of a pramana. T h i scon t ingency ca nn o t be avo ided . Do es the mem ory a r i s ing herehave for i t s ob ject the sha pe of the th ing m ade kn ow n bythe in i t ial apprehension, or has i t another object or is i t object-less \ If i t has for i ts object the shape of a th ing made knownby an apprehension prev iously ar i sen , then i t cannot bu t bethe fruit of a pramana on ac co un t of i ts being, as said before ,a l ike the co gn i t ion of a cogn ised th ing . And the M m rh sak aswould then have to accept a seventh pramana ca lled M em ory(smrti). (I t m ay be no ted th at v iolat ion of a specif ic po stu lat i onof nu m be r is reg ard ed as a looseness in dialect ical cr i t icism asit sho w s th at t he system is no t well de fine d). If i t is said tohave as i ts object a th ing not cognised by a previous cogni t ion,i t ca nn ot bu t be the resu l t of pramana. A nd l ike the init ialcog ni t ion i t cou ld no t be of the na tur e of m em ory , s incememory has for i ts object a th ing seen or heard of before,an d n o t a th in g not cog nised If i t i s rega rded as object lessthen m em ory sho uld no t be regarded as no t -val id on acco untof i ts cog nisin g a cog nised thing , but on acc co unt of i ts beingobject less , as the cogni t ion of kesonduka is non -valid du e to itsbeing obje ct les s . M or eo ve r , if i t be objec t less , how cou ld i tU said to cog nise a cogn ised th ing ? On the oth er han d i f i t i sregarded as cognis ing a cognised th ing , i t cannot be sa id tobe obje ct less . A nd m em ory is cer tainly no t objec t less . Suchm em or ies as ' I se rved my p a re n t s ' , ' I had f ive se rva n t s 'co m pre he nd the sha pe of the ob ject m ade know n by prev iousexper ience, as m em ory -co gn i t ion reveals the shape of an ob ject


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is Knowledge Possible S4smade known by previous experience. I t may be argued that thething which was cognised by the previous cognit ion has ceasedto exis t a t the t ime of m em ory -co gn i t io n , so tha t can no tbe its objec t. Bu t in tha t case, m em or y wo uld be not-v alid onacco un t of i ts being ob jectless and no t, as said befo re, onaccount of cognis ing what is cognised.

And if a pramana w hich ha s for i ts o bjec t a co gn isedthing bs thus rendered apramana, then inferent ia l cog nit io nalso would com e to be not-val id. T o wit , do es a pe rso nknow by inference that very fire-universal which was knownas invariably present where the linga (pro ban s) exis ted at thet ime of cognis ing the re la t ion of invaria ble co nc om itan ce bypercept ion , or does he kn ow the na tur e (svartipa) of fire,or th e r elatio n of pos session (i.e. poss ession by the su bs tra tu mof smo ke of fire, -'Mou ntain h as fire ') or the presen ce of fires imul taneous wi th the opera t ion of the linga, or the subordina-tion to the linga of f i re -un ivers a l , or the depen dence of f i re -universal on f i re-part icular ? If inference is regarded as havingfor i ts object the universal previously cognised then it cannever atta in validity (the s ta tus of a pramna), a s J i k em em ory it co gnises a cog nised th ing . A nd if i t be not~valid> itwould not be p ossible to de ter m in e the possess ion of f i re , andin the event of this im possib i l i ty , the f i re- in div idu al c ouldnot be prov ed by arthapatti ( pre sum pt io n or imp l ica t ion )(viz . there must be f i re- individual , because f i re-universal couldno t remain w i thout f i re - in div idu al ) . And th is wou ld m eanthe end of a ll po pu lar express ions l ike ' T her e i s f ire t h e r e ' ,1Br ing fire \ A nd if in or de r to av oid thi s , infere nce beaccep ted as valid in respect of a co gnised thi ng , th en the

qual i f ica t ion 'cognis ing a non-cog nised th in g ' would becom em eaningless for the M m m sa ka s ( i.e . in the defin i t ion ofpramana as given by the M lm r h sa ka s ). If yo u infer thesvarpa of f i re , we ask : Was i t formerly known as invariablyexist ing where sm oke is prese nt , or was i t no t so kn ow n ?If i t was form erly k n o w n as such , inference co m es to ha vea cognised thing as i ts object. If i t was not so known, then


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546 Indian Dialecticsit com es to this tha t fi re no t invariably acc om pa ny ing sm oke isknown from inference and if this be accepted then this inferencecould have as i ts ob ject grass , w ater , e tc . (which also are no tinvariably fou nd with sm ok e). Th is is t rue of the cog nit ionof possessio n (of fire) by infer enc e, in wh ich case also it canbe asked w heth er th is possess ion was form erly kno w n or not ,and the mat te r can be pursued as above

If the exis tence of the f i re -u niv ersa l s im ul tane ous wi ththe opera t ion of the linga be said to be inf err ed , is thisexis tence s imul taneous wi th t re opera t ion of the linga differentfrom fir e- un iv er sa l or is i t non-d ifferent ? If i t be non-differentthen inference w ou ld ha ve as i ts ob jec t only the existenceformerly cognised and the epi the t 'cognis ing a th ing not cognised 'w ould be co m e me an ing les s If i t be different, w as i t form erlycognised or not? If i t was formerly cognised, inference withth at as i ts ob jec t co uld n o t be said to be 'cog nisin g a thi ngn

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Indian Dialectics Methods of Philosophical Discussion Volume II E Solomon Ahmedabad 1978 600dpi Lossy