India in 1975: Democracy in EclipseAuthor(s): Norman D. PalmerReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1975: Part II (Feb., 1976), pp. 95-110Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643138 .Accessed: 21/09/2012 08:30

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INDIA IN 1975: DEMOCRACY IN ECLIPSE

Norman D. Palmer

IN 19/5 INDIA experienced its greatest political crisis since independence. During the first six months the political situation, which had been deteriorating for the past two years, went from bad to worse, while the economic situation, which had also been deteriorating for more than two years, began to improve appreciably. While the eco- nomic improvement was underway, the political deterioration was ar- rested abruptly with the proclamation of a national emergency on June 26. This is certainly the watershed date in India in 1975, and perhaps in the history of independent India, for on that day the democratic system that had functioned with considerable success for more than a quarter of a century-thus constituting the major deviant case in the developing world-went into eclipse.

India went through two political crises of unprecedented magni- tude in 1975: a crisis of deterioration, and a crisis of democracy. The first crisis was arrested, at least temporarily, by the actions that preci- pitated the second. The second crisis will doubtless have profound ef- fects on the future of the Indian lpolitical system.

Political Deterioration and Political Opposition

In January 1975, India commemorated the 25th anniversary of the Indian Republic, and Mrs. Indira Gandhi began her 10th year as Prime Minister. The new year was ushered in with a wave of violence that had become an increasingly characteristic feature of the Indian scene. The most illustrious victim was the Railway Minister, L. N. Mishra, who died on January 3 as a result of injuries sustained on the previous day when a bomb exploded on a platform in Samastipur, Bihar, where he was making a speech (he was the first Indian cabinet member to be as- sassinated). In the succeeding months serious acts of violence occurred almost daily. They indicated not only that there was a breakdown of law and order, but also that political opponents of the existing regime were resorting increasingly to extra-constitutional methods. These were

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96 NORMAN D. PALMER

the conditions that Mrs. Gandhi must have had in mind when, in her broadcast to the nation on June 26 immediately following the procla- mation of a national emergency, she charged that "forces of disintegra- tion are in full play and communal passions are being aroused, threat- ening our unity."

The first half of 1975 provided many evidences of Mrs. Gandhi's fading charisma and the mounting opposition to her government and her party. This trend was indicated by Congress reverses in several by- elections in a number of Indian states and notably in severe reverses in the elections to the Legislative Assembly in Gujarat in June-an elec- tion which Mrs. Gandhi had not planned to hold at this time, but which she agreed to only because of a "fast unto death" on the issue by Morarji Desai in April. In early March a prominent Indian journalist, Dilip Mukerjee, reported that "the climate of opinion today is vastly different from that in 1971. There is an upsurge of anti-Congress feel- ing in large parts of the country."1

Even Mrs. Gandhi was not immune from criticism. In 1975 the prolonged court proceedings, which involved charges against her of numerous "corrupt electoral practices" in her campaign for election to Parliament from the Rae Bareilly constituency in Uttar Pradesh in 1971 filed by her defeated opponent, Raj Narain of the Samyukta So- cialist Party, reached a climax. On March 18-19, in an unprecedented move, Mrs. Gandhi testified for two days before Justice Jag Mohan Lal Sinha of the Allahabad High Court, the presiding judge in the case. And on June 12, in a ruling that startled the nation and threatened to drive Mrs. Gandhi from office, Justice Sinha found Mrs. Gandhi guilty of two rather minor charges, which nevertheless, according to the Rep- resentation of the People Act of 1951, were "corrupt electoral prac- tices."

The J.P. Movement: Tlhe most effective opposition to Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress Party came from the so-called J.P. movement, which provided an umbrella for the most disparate opposition elements, rang- ing from Hindu conservative (R.S.S., Jana Sangh, Anand Marg) to extreme left-wing groups (CPI-M, and various brands of Naxalites), and which also provided a leader in the person of Jayaprakash Narayan. J.P., as he is generally known, is a veteran Gandhian apostle of non- violence who enjoys perhaps the highest reputation of any prominent Indian for absolute integrity and selflessness. After several years of self-imposed non-involvement in politics, he re-emerged into the politi- cal arena in early 1974 as a champion of student-initiated protest move- ments in Bihar. Although he advocates a "partyless democracy" and has no faith in the existing parliamentary system, he put aside his more sweeping political goals and challenged Mrs. Gandhi to test the popu-

1 Dilip Mukerjee, "Mr. Dharia's Dismissal: A Riposte to Mr. Narayan," The Times of India, March 8, 1975.

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larity of her party and her "corrupt" government in Bihar through the electoral process.

Bihar, J.P.'s home state, remained the base of his new movement, but it soon spread to many other parts of the country and was embraced by various opposition groups and parties whose political fortunes were generally at a low ebb, as well as by groups and individuals not nor- mally active in politics. Gradually his attacks on the Congress party and government, and even on Mrs. Gandhi, became more pointed and more frequent. He insisted, however, that lie was not attacking any particular leaders or parties, but was calling for a "total revolution" in Indian political and social life. Within the framework of such amorphous and nebulous goals he focussed on demands for the elimination of corrup- tion, which he charged had become "the new god" in India, and for electoral2 and educational reforms.

Mrs. Gandhi and other Congress leaders tried to denigrate the J.P. movement as a strange assemblage of disorganized and frustrated parties and groups of various hues, with no real popular following or support. They also criticized J.P. for lending his name to such dubious groups, which they charged were trying to use the well-meaning but naive Gandhian leader for their own purposes. They insisted that even in Bihar they had far more support than J.P., and that outside of Bihar the J.P. movement had little strength.

It did indeed seem hard to believe that an aged and unwell Gand- hian, so long out of political life and so vague in his appeals and de- mands, could be the spearhead of any significant opposition movement. Yet in spite of Congress denigration, the J.P. movement did not die out. Instead, by late 1974 and early 1975 it had developed into a significant new political phenomenon.

The J.P. movement faced Mrs. Gandhi with both a constitutional and an extra-constitutional challenge that she found hard to meet. Since J.P. had been a friend and associate of her father, and had known her since her childhood, and since both she and J.P. agreed on basic goals, it seemed to many Indians that their differences were reconcil- able. But an ill-fated meeting in November 1974 apparently only ac- centuated the differences and the personal bitterness between them. Thereafter Mrs. Gandhi and other Congress spokesmen became more vehement and more outspoken in their attempts to discredit the J.P. movement, and J.P. personally, and J.P. became increasingly critical of the government, the ruling party, and Mrs. Gandhi.

2 In order to give some substance to his demands for electoral reforms, J. P. ap- pointed an Electoral Reforms Committee, headed by V. M. Tarkunde, with E. P. W. da Costa as convenor. This Committee held several meetings and hearings, and con- sidered numerous proposals. Its report, submitted in February 1975, did not suggest an alternative system of elections, but it did make a large number of specific recom- mendations, mainly relating to the composition and role of the Election Commis- sion, election expenses, corrupt electoral practices, the use of radio and television, and election petitions. Even more specific recommendations were submitted to the Government in April by eight non-Communist opposition parties.

98 NORMAN D. PALMER

As J.P. moved about the country with incredible energy for a man of 72 in poor health, he was greeted by tremendous crowds, but ones that did not always indicate solid support. On March 6 he led some 100,000 people through the heart of New Delhi to Parliament House, and presented a "charter of demands" to the Parliament. This meeting, which had been scheduled weeks in advance and which attracted na- tionwide attention, was described as the largest demonstration ever staged against Mrs. Gandhi's government.

Two Weeks in June: The developments of the first five months of 1975, and indeed of at least two years previously, form the backdrop for the dramatic events of June, which ended one kind of political crisis and ushered in another. The immediate background of the proc- lamation of emergency of June 26 was provided by the events of the previous two weeks.

June 12 and 13 were traumatic days for Indira Gandhi and for India. On the 12th Justice Sinha handed down his ruling finding Mrs. Gandhi guilty of "corrupt electoral practices" on two relatively minor counts, namely using her private secretary in her election campaign (he resigned his government post before he became active in the campaign), and using state and local government officials in support of her own campaigning. While he dismissed all other charges, including bribery and intimidation, Justice Sinha ruled that Mrs. Gandhi's election was invalid. Under the Representation of the People Act of 1951 this meant that, unless the ruling was reversed, Mrs. Gandhi would lose her seat in Parliament and be forced to resign as Prime Minister, and would be barred from political activity for six years. Justice Sinha, however, granted a stay of judgment for 20 days to give Mrs. Gandhi time to con- sider an appeal to the Supreme Court or other moves to avoid removal from public life.

On the following day Mrs. Gandhi received another shock when the results of the state assembly elections in Gujarat, held on June 8 and 11, became known. Mrs. Gandhi had put her own prestige on the line in Gujarat, and had campaigned vigorously in that state. But her indefatigable campaigning was not enough to overcome the anti-Con- gress feeling in Gujarat, the ineptness of the state Congress leaders and organization, and the remarkable success of the opposition parties in uniting against the Congress party, whose strength in the state assembly fell from 140 to 75, whereas the Janata Front won 87 seats, and soon afterward formed a ministry headed by Babubhai Patel as Chief Minis- ter.

The dual shocks of June 12 and 13 weakened Mrs. Gandhi's al- ready declining personal and political position. The question of the extent to which her moves in the following weeks were designed to preserve and strengthen her own position and power and the extent to which they were designed to reverse the trends toward disintegration and disunity is still a controversial one. Quite naturally the opposition

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seized upon her reverses to demand that she resign. Some members of her own party also shared this view, although they could not express such heretical opinions openly. Several Indian newspapers suggested that Mrs. Gandhi should resign as Prime Minister, at least temporarily, until the results of her appeal from Justice Sinha's ruling were known. Apparently Mrs. Gandhi herself considered this step, but rejected it after consulting members of her cabinet, some legal experts, and others. One difficulty seemed to be that the Congress government was so heavily dependent on her continued leadership, and that no successor could be agreed upon, especially after Jagjivan Ram, the senior-most member of the cabinet, came out in support of her continuance in office. Legal justification for this course was provided by a ruling of Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, the "vacation judge" of the Supreme Court, on June 24. Although he turned down Mrs. Gandhi's request for a "complete and absolute" stay of Justice Sinha's judgment until the Su- preme Court could consider her appeal, he did grant a "conditional" stay, enabling her to continue as Prime Minister and to speak in either house of Parliament, but not to take part in Parliamentary proceedings, vote, or draw pay as a member of the Lok Sabha.

Once she had determined on a course of action to attempt to im- prove her political position, Mrs. Gandhi moved swiftly; and once again the opposition played into her hands. On June 25 speakers at a major rally in New Delhi organized by opposition groups led by J.P. were particularly vehement in denouncing Mrs. Gandhi and her gov- ernment. As he had done several times before, possibly in a somewhat less direct way, J.P. appealed to the military, the police, and the civil service to put loyalty to the Constitution above loyalty to the "corrupt" government. This was interpreted by Mrs. Gandhi as "inciting our armed forces to mutiny and our police to rebel."

The Emergency and After On the same night Mrs. Gandhi set in motion a series of lightning

moves that had fateful consequences for herself and for India. In the early morning hours she asked President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed to sign a proclamation of national emergency, and members of the cabi- net to "consult" with her and approve the proposed proclamation (she has steadfastly maintained that all important decisions are made only after consultation with cabinet colleagues and other key organs and persons). Invoking powers bestowed on the government under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act of 1971 (the notorious MISA), the Defence of India Rules, and other emergency measures, she ordered the arrest of several score opposition leaders, including J.P., Morarji Desai, Asoka Mehta, Raj Narain, Piloo Mody, and Jyotirmoy Basu. She also imposed a strict censorship of the press and of foreign corres- pondents.

Early in the morning of the 26th Mrs. Gandhi announced and ex-

100 NORMAN D. PALMER

plained her actions in a radio broadcast to a startled nation:

The President has proclaimed an emergency. This is nothing to panic about. I am sure you are conscious of the deep and widespread conspiracy which has been brewing ever since I began to introduce cer- tain progressive measures of benefit to the common man and woman of India. In the name of democracy it has been sought to negate the very functioning of democracy. . . . How can any government worth the name stand by and allow the country's stability to be imperilled?

Mrs. Gandhi gave assurances "that the new emergency will in no way affect the rights of law-abiding citizens," and she expressed the belief "that internal conditions will speedily improve to enable us to dispense with this proclamation as soon as possible.'

With the proclamation of a national emergency, Indian democracy entered into a state of eclipse.4 The events that followed confirmed some of the worst fears of those who felt that India had permanently joined the vast majority of those states of the developing world where the ero- sion of democracy had set in much earlier. They also gave hope to those who believed that India needed the kind of shock treatment that Mrs. Gandhi had administered. Apparently these included the major- ity of the people of India, to the extent that they had any feelings on such issues. These people were more interested in such concrete bene- fits of the emergency as greater discipline, the restoration of law and order, more considerate public servants, more emphasis on economic reforms, and lower prices for basic commodities, than they were in the suspension of basic freedoms, which had little meaning for them.

Economic Improvement: Undoubtedly economic conditions improved considerably in 1975. This trend was apparent before the proclamation of emergency, and continued during the rest of the year. It was perhaps due as much to external factors and a good monsoon as to more effec- tive government. Inflation, which had skyrocketed to the alarming rate of 31% in September 1974, was brought under control-a major achievement that few other countries have equalled, although the claims of a negative rate of inflation by mid-1975 may be exaggerated. Prices of some basic commodities were reduced immediately after the proclama- tion of emergency, and more of these commodities were available in regular markets. Measures against smugglers, black marketeers, and moneylenders were quite effective. Mrs. Gandhi's 20-point program of economic and social reforms, announced on July 1, was a popular and widely appreciated move, even though most of the reforms had been

3 The text of this broadcast is given in India News, XIV (July 4, 1975). 4 For analyses of the emergency and its implications, see W. H. Morris-Jones,

"Whose Emergency-India's or Indira's?," The World Today, XXXI (November 1975); Norman D. Palmer, "The Crisis of Democracy in India," Orbis, XIX (Summer 1975); Richard L. Park, "Political Crisis in India, 1975," Asian Survey, XV (November 1975); and S. P. Seth, "Political Crisis in India," Pacific Community, VII (January 1976).

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promised often in the past without much progress in implementation. Prospects that India would at last get off the no-growth rate of the past two or three years seemed to be bright. In fact, the Reserve Bank of India, in its annual report released in September, stated that a growth rate of between 5%J0 and 6% in 1975-76 should be possible.5

While the temporary improvement in the economic picture seemed to be real, if not so spectacular as government spokesmen claimed, most of the promised economic and social reforms still remain to be imple- mented and the predicted increase in rate of growth may turn out to be over-optimistic. India is still handicapped by a desperately poor people, a relatively unproductive economy, vast inequality, limited na- tional income and savings, and budget deficits at the national level and in most of the states. It is also faced with large foreign exchange and trade deficits, and a huge external debt, somewhat eased by foreign aid, postponement of debt servicing, and foreign credits of a unilateral and multilateral nature. All of these have been worsened by the vast in- creases in the prices of essential raw materials and energy sources, mainly oil.

Three aspects of the emergency have been particularly conspicu- ous and particularly controversial. They are (1) the widespread arrests and detention of many persons without legal remedies; (2) the press censorship; and (3) the constitutional and legal aspects, especially the retroactive amendments and the use of the law and the Constitution to support the draconian measures that have been taken.

Arrests and Detention Without Trial: Estimates of the number of per- sons who have been arrested since the proclamation of emergency vary greatly, ranging from around 10,000 (a figure sometimes mentioned by government spokesmen) to more than 50,000. It is also uncertain how many of those arrested could be accurately described as political pris- oners, and how many are "undesirable elements." Among the former group are many leaders of opposition parties and groups, including some 30 members of Parliament (including a few members of the Con- gress party). They have been detained without trial, which government spokesmen have defended on emergency grounds.

On June 30 MISA was amended through a Presidential ordinance to enable the Government to detain anyone without assigning grounds for a maximum period of one year. The Government's authority was further extended by another amendment to MISA, passed by Parlia- ment during the special three-week session in late July and early Au-

5 A World Bank study, entitled "Prospects for Developing Countries, 1976-80" and issued in the summer of 1975, envisaged a growth rate of 5% for developing countries during the second half of this decade, but it projected an average growth rate of not more than 3% for India. For a summary of this study, as it applies to India, see "India's GDP Rate Won't Cross 3 p.c. Till 1980," The Times of India, Au- gust 11, 1975. For a gloomy long-range forecast of India's economic prospects, see Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome (New York: E. P. Dutton/Reader's Digest Press, 1974).

102 NORMAN D. PALMER

gust, which took away natural law or common law rights of persons de- tained under the Act. But on September 15 the Delhi High Court ruled that the detention of Kuldip Nayar, the best-known Indian journalist to be arrested under MISA, had been illegal because specific charges had not been brought against him. And the Government's authority was further challenged in a series of legal actions in lower courts in dif- ferent parts of the country, brought by about a dozen detained oppo- sition leaders. These cases-were being argued before the Supreme Court at the end of the year.

Censorship: With the imposition of strict censorship immediately following the proclamation of emergency, the nation's press was effec- tively silenced, except for the versions of events that the authorities wanted people at home and abroad to hear. Newspapers and other media sedulously avoided controversial issues and criticism of govern- mental policies. Occasional deviators were warned, and sometimes punished in various ways. Foreign correspondents were also subjected to the censorship, and a few were ordered to leave the country. On July 22 the Government issued "Guidelines for the Press,"6 which were perhaps the most restrictive in any democratic state. Until they were somewhat modified by more liberal interpretation, these guidelines presented a grave dilemma for foreign news media and their represen- tatives in India, who were compelled to agree to adhere to the guide- lines as the price of continued reporting from India.

Although they were administered with varying degrees of severity, the guidelines were not relaxed throughout the remainder of the year. In fact, from time to time they were further strengthened. Finally on December 10, by a Presidential decree aimed at "the prevention of publication of objectionable matter," some of the censorship regula- tions were given the force of permanent law. The decree empowered the Government to ban the publication of news about "any activity pre- judicial to the . . . sovereignty and integrity of India and the security of the state."7

Constitutional and Legal Aspects of the Emergency: One of the intrigu- ing questions that has often been raised since the emergency was pro- claimed is why Mrs. Gandhi resorted to such drastic action when, ac- cording to this line of thinking, she already possessed more than suffi- cient legal and constitutional authority to deal with any conceivable crisis situation. This authority was derived from the Constitution it- self, especially from its emergency provisions, and from MISA, the De- fence of India Rules, and other extraordinary legislation. If she needed any additional authority, she could seek further amendments to the

6 The full text of these guidelines was published in The New York Times, July 22, 1975.

7 In an editorial in its issue of December 11, 1975, The Times of India, in a rare criticism of a governmental act, criticized the ordinance as "too sweeping."

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Constitution, amendments to existing legislation, or new legislation- which she could easily get since she controlled more than two-thirds of the members of Parliament and the governments of all but three of the major states. Why, then, was it necessary to proclaim a national emer- gency and to suspend so many of the basic democratic freedoms?

Mrs. Gandhi's own answer is that the proclamation of emergency was necessary to arrest the "forces of disintegration" and to safeguard the country's unity and stability. Some observers have suggested that she felt the nation needed this kind of shock treatment. Others have been less charitable, and have charged that she was more concerned about her own deteriorating power and position than about the wel- fare of the country. A few have intimated that she was deliberately suspending normal democratic freedoms as a first step toward impos- ing her own brand of authoritarianism on India.

Mrs. Gandhi has steadfastly maintained that all of her actions have 'been legal and constitutional, and that she has been using constitutional means to meet an extra-constitutional challenge. Some critics have de- nied this claim absolutely. Some have charged that Mrs. Gandhi has acted within the letter of the law and the Constitution, as amended by her pliant majorities, but that she has in fact violated its spirit. Some have admitted that her actions may have been legal, but have expressed doubts that they have been constitutional. Some have conceded her claims to constitutionality, but have added, in the words of one Amer- ican critic, that "the fact that all this has occurred constitutionally gives us cause to take seriously the written words of purportedly democratic constitutions.'" There is considerable food for thought, and much lati- tude for varying conclusions, in all of these interpretations. Perhaps a general conclusion could be that while the constitutional formalities have been observed, the constitutional safeguards have to some extent been abandoned, or at least put aside. Certainly Mrs. Gandhi has shown a willingness to use all the powers at her disposal, whatever the con- sequences for the democratic system. One wonders what her father would have thought of such behavior.

Since this is India's first experience under a national emergency proclaimed for reasons of threats to internal stability rather than ex- ternal threats (as in 1962 and 1971), the whole situation is unprece- dented. The emergency was proclaimed under the authority provided in Article 352 of the Constitution, and was approved by Parliament within a period of two months, as stipulated in Article 352. But several actions of Mrs. Gandhi and her government have been cited as evi-

8"The moves she [Mrs. Gandhi] has fostered appear to be legal; but it is ques- tionable that they have been constitutional. The difference between what is 'legal' and what is 'constitutional' can be a matter of opinion, but in the end the difference is what the Supreme Court says it is. This is a most frustrating fact that concerns members of the existing Government, and serious scholars . . . as well." Park, op. cit., p. 1011 (italics in original).

9 Raymond D. Gastil, "Freedom in India," Freedomn at Issue, No. 33 (Novem- ber-December 1975), p. 13.

104 NORMAN D. PALMER

dences of a determination to stretch their constitutional and legal au- thority to the outer limits, and perhaps beyond.

One such action is the frequent resort to Presidential ordinances to make significant changes in existing legislation, a practice that has been followed to a lesser degree for some time and that in the past has been the object of widespread criticism. As has been noted, Presidential ordinances were the vehicle for making major changes in the laws of detention and for transforming censorship regulations, imposed because of the emergency, into permanent law. Another device, which is gen- erally frowned upon and regarded as of dubious legality in most demo- cratic states, is to give retroactive effect to amendments to legislation and even to Constitutional amendments. This device was resorted to by the Indian Parliament, at the request of the Government, in its special session in late July and early August, when it amended both the basic electoral law and the Constitution to invalidate retroactively any court judgment declaring the election of a Prime Minister to be void-an action that was taken while Mrs. Gandhi's appeal from Judge Sinha's ruling was being considered by the Supreme Court.

Another matter of concern is the effort of the Government to get the Supreme Court to review-and hopefully, from the Government's point of view, to reverse-the historic decision of the Court in the so- called Fundamental Rights Case in 197310 when the Court, by a ma- jority of one, held that while the Parliament could amend any part of the Constitution, including the section on Fundamental Rights, it could not alter "the basic structure" of the Constitution. A full bench of the Supreme Court, which was set up to consider this request, was abruptly dissolved by the Chief Justice, but a number of cases involv- ing a challenge to the Fundamental Rights decision are pending be- fore the Court, and the issue is therefore still a moot one.

From time to time Mrs. Gandhi, the Law Minister, or some other officials refer to the need for rather basic reforms in the legal system, and sometimes for a hard look at the Constitution itself. Some observ- ers interpret these comments as evidences that Mrs. Gandhi is deter- mined to scrap the legal and constitutional system that India has had since independence, and establish a new and more authoritarian poli- tical order. Support for this interpretation was provided by a resolution of the Congress party, adopted at its annual session on December 29, calling for changes in the Constitution to make it more responsive "to the current needs of the people and the demands of the present." Mrs. Gandhi, however, insists that she wants to reform and not scrap the existing system. In particular, she has often stated that she sees no need for a new Constitution, that the present Constitution is adequate if it is occasionally amended to meet changing conditions and needs and to remove any obstacles that the Courts may place in the way of needed economic and social reforms. Since the Constitution has been amended

10 Kesavananda v. State of Kerala, A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 1461.

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39 times in 25 years, it has obviously been a changing document. It has been amended several times since the emergency was proclaimed, al- ways to give more authority to the central government. Again one won- ders how flexible a basic Constitutional document can be and still re- tain its basic character.

A "Temporary" Emergency Becomes Permanent: Perhaps the most sig- nificant and revealing portent of things to come was provided by three momentous resolutions passed unanimously by delegates to the 71st an- nual session of the Congress party in Chandigarh at the end of the year. One resolution, which has already been mentioned, called for major changes in the Constitution. The other two revealed for the first time the long-awaited decision on two vital issues. One was to continue the state of emergency indefinitely until "the dangers of internal and ex- ternal subversion have been fully surmounted." The other was to post- pone the sixth general elections, scheduled to be held by March 1976, for a year. All of these resolutions, shortly approved by the Indian Parliament, and the prolongation of the present Parliament beyond its otherwise maximum term of five years, are authorized under the Gov- ernment's emergency powers, but they raise grave questions in the minds of all who are concerned with the future of democracy in India. As the South Asian correspondent of The New York Times reported from Chandigarh on December 30, with particular reference to the resolutions of the Congress party: "Together, the . . . developments moved India into a new phase, giving an aspect of permanence to what had been posited as a temporary state of affairs."11

Other Political Developments

In making the many momentous decisions that will inevitably af- fect her own future, and also the future of India, Mrs. Gandhi appar- ently consulted in any meaningful way only a handful of advisers. Among those whose names are frequently mentioned is her own 29- year-old son, Sanjay. There is a great deal of speculation on the extent of Sanjay's influence on his mother, and on the nature of that influ- ence. He and his wife live in his mother's residence, and apparently he often serves as an intermediary between his mother and key people in Indian public life, including some of the most powerful. Outside of New Delhi few people seem to have much influence on the Prime Minister. Possible exceptions are S. S. Ray, Chief Minister of West Bengal, and Rajni Patel, President of the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee.

Most of the Chief Ministers seem to be dependent on Mrs. Gan- dhi's support. In December she brought two of them into her cabinet:

11 William Borders, "India to Postpone Elections a Year," The New York Times, December 30, 1975.

106 NORMAN D. PALMER

Bansi Lal, Chief Minister of Haryana, first as Minister without Port- folio and then as Defence Minister, and P. C. Sethi, Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, as Minister for Chemicals and Fertilizers. These moves may have been prompted more by a desire to find other roles for two chief ministers who were experiencing difficulties in their states than by a desire to strengthen the central cabinet. It is hard to see how Bansi Lal could be a more effective Defence Minister than the veteran Swaran Singh, who was relieved of his post in December, after serving as a member of the cabinet in various positions since 1952. Some chief ministers were eased out, obviously with the approval of Mrs. Gandhi. Among these were V. P. Naik, who was suddenly replaced as Chief Minister of Maharashtra by S. B. Chavan in February, and H. N. Bahaguna, who was forced to resign as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in December.

With obvious Indian orchestration the status of Sikkim was changed in 1975 from that of a protectorate to that of the 22nd state in the Indian Union. This was technically made possible by a vote in Sikkim in April to abolish the post of Chogyal (King) and to merge with India, and by a vote of the Indian Parliament in May to admit Sikkim as an Indian state. The official Indian view was that this change gave Sikkim a position of greater freedom and importance, but many critics at home and abroad-especially Nepalis and Chinese-de- nounced the new arrangement.

Diplomatic rather than strong-arm methods led to significant changes in two other states. On February 25, after lengthy and delicate negotiations, Sheikh Abdullah was installed as Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, a post from which he had been ousted 22 years previously. Sheikh Abdullah refused to join the Congress party and instead, contrary to Mrs. Gandhi's advice, affiliated with the revived National Conference; but he agreed to work within the framework of the Indian Union, thus abandoning, or at least shelving, his more ex- tremist demands. On November 11 the Indian Government signed an agreement with leaders of the underground movement in Nagaland, which had been under President's Rule since March 22, presumably ending the rebellion in that sensitive border state that had been sim- mering for many years.

Foreign Policy

Even more than developments in the Indian states, foreign policy was overshadowed by the twin crises of political deterioration and na- tional emergency. The official interpretation was that the emergency had no impact whatever on the course of Indias foreign policy; but, as any student of political science is well aware, significant changes in the internal politics of a nation are bound to have important effects on external behavior. All other states were compelled to reassess their re- lations with India in the light of the major political changes in that

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country, and some -also had to consider the impact of these changes on their own internal situation. This was particularly true of India's near neighbors.

Foreign Reactions to the Emergency: In all of India's near neighbors countries criticism of the eclipse of democracy in India was muted, and in some ruling circles, including those in Pakistan and Nepal, there seemed to be a tendency to welcome the trends in their giant neighbor. India might henceforth be a less attractive alternative model to their own versions of authoritarianism, and Indian criticisms of their politi- cal systems would be less freely expressed. In the neighboring coun- tries, however, there were increased apprehensions of the consequences for them of the emergence of a more disciplined and controlled politi- cal order in India.

The coup in Bangladesh in mid-August, and the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, aroused grave apprehensions in India. 0ffi- cially Mrs. Gandhi and other Indian spokesmen deplored the assassina- tion of the man who had been a champion of friendly relations with India and whose personal relations with Mrs. Gandhi were excellent. But they confined themselves mostly to expressions of regret, and not of denunciation; and the Indian press and other media were instructed to follow the same line. Doubtless the murder of the man who had been the unquestioned leader of the new state caused many Indians, including Mrs. Gandhi, to ponder on the political and personal sur- vivability of even the most powerful rulers, and to reflect on the dan- gers of political assassination in India. Indian leaders viewed with deep concern the many changes in Bangladesh after the August coup, espe- cially since these evidenced a basic instability in the neighboring state that could create problems for India and since the new leaders who were in at least temporary command in Bangladesh at the end of the year were generally regarded as anti-Indian.

In most other Third World countries the developments in India were greeted without surprise, and with general approbation. As one observer has pointed out, "The Third World interpretation of recent developments in India. . . has a significance beyond the immediate is- sues involved or their bilateral relations with India. It is apparent ... that the almost universal response in these countries has been to inter- pret the Emergency as a movement away from an essentially demo- cratic to a modified command system, as a further proof that demo- cratic development models are inappropriate for the so-called emerg- ing nations.""

The Soviet Union and other Communist countries following the Soviet line strongly approved the Indian swing toward a more con- trolled and authoritarian system. It would be interesting to know to

12 Leo E. Rose, "The Emergency and India's External Relations" (unpublished pa- per prepared for a Symposium on India at California State University, Northridge, November 21, 1975), p. 2.

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what extent this swing was influenced, directly or indirectly, by Soviet advice and pressures, and to what extent Mrs. Gandhi consulted Soviet advisers before and after the proclamation of emergency. It may be significant that the pro-Soviet CPR, which is allied with the Congress party at the national level, is the strongest supporter of Mrs. Gandhi's moves of any political party other than the Congress (in fact, in some respects it was a more unified supporter of these moves than Mrs. Gan- dhi's own party). But it does not follow that Mrs. Gandhi is now more influenced by the Soviets than ever before.13 One could argue that since she is now in firml command of her own country, after a period of poli- tical uncertainty and decreasing support, she can follow her natural impulses by taking an even more independent position in foreign af- fairs, whether the Soviets approve or not. There is some evidence that the Soviets are aware that the changed situation in India may not re- dound wholly to their advantage, although they still give it their vocal approval.

In the other major Communist state, the People's Republic of China, events in India in 1975 were greeted with criticism and often with scorn, reflecting China's long-standing efforts to denigrate India and to lessen Indian influence in Asia and the Third World. The strong Chinese denunciation of the merger of Sikkim into the Indian Union and the Chinese actions that precipitated the most serous border clash since 1965 (in Arunachal Pradesh on October 90) may be primarily a reflection of current difficulties that the Chinese are having in Tibet and a suspicion that India may in some way try to aggravate these dif- ficulties. For some time, however, China has been following a hard line toward India, and in spite of repeated hints from India has shown no interest in a "normalization" of relations. This line has become even harder since the emergency was proclaimed in India.

The Indian Government was quite appreciative of the decision of most Western states to refrain from any strong official criticism of developments in India; but it reacted with considerable indignation to the strong criticisms in the Western press and by many private citizens and groups, particularly in Britain and the United States.

Indo-American Relations: On the whole, 1975 was not a good year for Indo-American relations. When Daniel Patrick Moynihan left India in early January, after service for two years as U.S. Ambassador, he ex- pressed regret that these relations were so "thin" and "fragile." His successor, William Saxbe, who arrived several weeks later, has followed a very low-key posture, obviously on instructions from Washington.

The most serious set-back to Indo-American relations in recent months was the decision of the American Government, announced on February 24, to lift the 19-year-old embargo on arms sales to India and

13 See Girilal Jain, "A Balanced Foreign Policy: Coping with New Realities," TIhe Times of India, August 13, 1975.

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Pakistan, a decision that was welcomed in Pakistan and sharply criti- cized in India. Indians were also indignant over non-official reactions in the U.S. to the emergency proclamation and subsequent events, the cancellation of President Ford's plans to visit India, and a statement by the American President that was regarded as unduly critical of events in India. Toward the end of the year relations seemed to take an upward turn. Y. B. Chavan made a successful visit to the United States in October, during which he co-chaired the postponed first meet- ing of the Indo-U.S. Joint Commission and had a lengthy talk with President Ford.

India in International Diplomacy: Throughout the year India was par- ticularly active in international diplomacy, in spite of its preoccupations with internal affairs. In January Mrs. Gandhi made official visits to the Maldive Republic and Iraq, and in late April arid early May she par- ticipated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Ja- maica. President Fakhruddin Ali made official visits to Hungary and Yugoslavia in late September and early October, and to Egypt and the Sudan in December. In addition to visits to the U.S. and to several countries in Latin America and West and South Asia, Foreign Min- ister Chavan participated in the meeting of the nonaligned coordinat- ing bureau in Havana, the nonaligned foreign ministers' conference in Lima, and the special and regular sessions of the UN in New York. India gave special attention to its relations with the OPEC countries and with the nonaligned countries generally. It continued to press for acceptance of the resolution of the UN General Assembly of December 1971 declaring the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace and requesting the great powers to take action to remove their military presence from the area. It expressed particular apprehension over U.S. plans to ex- pand the facilities on the Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia. But it continued to oppose a UN General Assembly resolution of 1974, spon- sored by Pakistan, for the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia.

Whither India?

The main questions relating to India in 1974 did not concern the direction of its external relations, but rather the course of its po- litical and economic evolution, and particularly the questions of eco- nomic and political development. "Every problem," said Mrs. Gandhi in inaugurating the 56th session of the General Council of the Indian National Trade Union Conference in New Delhi on November 15, "has to be seen in a larger perspective. What do we want to see for our country? What sort of a country do we want?" She pointed out that "democracy has been a changing concept," and that in the modern age it had to accommodate "the concept of greater participation." "While we were struggling for political freedom," she observed, "we were con-

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scious that political freedom was not the end. Our leaders were fully aware that freedom could be real only if it brought a better deal to those who had been most underprivileged, most oppressed. This needed a vast social and economic transformation of our society." She had concluded that "the whole pattern of development undertaken by most of the world is the wrong pattern of development for India." She gave no clear idea of the kind of Indian model of development that she preferred, but she did insist that it must be one that could "reach out to the poorest in the land."'4 Such a model has not yet emerged, either during the more than a quarter of a century of democratic government, or during the few months of emergency rule. This raises questions and suggests goals much more basic than the preservation of any particular kind of political system.

14 Extracts from Mrs. Gandhi's speech were printed in India News, XIV (De- cember 5, 1975).

NORMAN D. PALMER is Professor of Political Science at the University of Penn- sylvania.