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Independent self-construal, self-reflection, and self-rumination: A pathmodel for predicting happiness
IRINA ELLIOTT1 & SUZANNE COKER2
1Queensland Police Service, Central Region Office, Rockhampton, and 2Central Queensland University, School of Psychology
and Sociology, Rockhampton, Queensland, Australia
AbstractA construal theory of happiness emphasises the mediating impact of cognitive and motivational processes on the individual’sperceptions of their happiness. This study investigated a path model with the two cognitive variables, self-reflection and self-rumination as mediating factors between an independent self-construal and subjective happiness. One hundred and twentythree participants completed a questionnaire designed to measure subjective happiness, independent self-construal, self-reflection, and self-rumination. Individuals’ propensity to self-reflect and self-ruminate was not found to be affected by anindependent self-construal. A higher independent self-construal was associated with greater happiness. The results alsoindicated that self-reflection has the potential to both increase and decrease (when mediated by self-rumination) subjectivehappiness. This study suggests that although meaningful self-reflection may be beneficial for individuals who do not enjoyhigh levels of happiness, the perils of self-reflection are that it may trigger self-rumination which has detrimentalconsequences for happiness.
The pursuit of happiness is inherent to human
existence. Recently, research on happiness has been
revitalised by the emergence of positive psychology
with its focus on the resilience of human nature
(Sheldon & King, 2001). The general consensus is
that although to some degree objective situational
factors (such as income, health, age, and marital
status) influence people’s perceptions of their happi-
ness, ultimately, happiness is a subjective phenom-
enon, with subjective feelings, thoughts, perceptions,
and evaluations of the situation even more important
than the situation itself (Argyle, 2001; Diener, Suh,
Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Heller, Watson, & Ilies, 2004;
Myers, 2000).
A construal theory of happiness
The subjective perspective on happiness is reflected
in one of the recent developments in research on
happiness, a construal theory. According to a
construal theory, happiness is determined by what
people make of their experiences; that is, the way
they construe and interpret the world around them
(Lyubomirsky, 2001). In this respect, a construal
theory of happiness emphasises the role of hedoni-
cally relevant cognitive and motivational processes as
mediating the effects of person and situation factors
on the perception of happiness.
Hedonically relevant cognitive and motivational
processes (e.g., social comparison, dissonance
reduction, self-reflection, and self-rumination) are
those which lead to hedonic consequences; that is,
they have the potential to either promote or
undermine a positive view of the self. For example,
the positive association between self-rumination
(dwelling on the negative in relation to the self)
and depressed mood is a well-documented phe-
nomenon (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson,
1997; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). From the
perspective of a construal theory, self-rumination
may be detrimental to happiness as focusing on the
negative in relation to the self may detract from a
positive view of the self, which, in turn, may
undermine the individual’s perceptions of their
happiness.
Correspondence: Irina Elliott, Queensland Police Service, Central Region Office, Rockhampton, Queensland, Australia.
E-mail: [email protected]
Australian Journal of Psychology, Vol. 60, No. 3, December 2008, pp. 127–134.
ISSN 0004-9530 print/ISSN 1742-9536 online ª The Australian Psychological Society Ltd
Published by Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/00049530701447368
Similarly, happy individuals have been found to be
less prone to engage in self-reflection, or to think
about and analyse one’s thoughts, feelings, and
outcomes of their actions (Lyubomirsky, 2001).
Moreover, in experimental studies involving indivi-
duals who display extremely high or extremely low
levels of happiness, Lyubomirsky and Ross (1999)
demonstrated that when happy people were induced
to self-reflect, their behaviour matched the behaviour
of unhappy individuals, whereas when unhappy
individuals were prevented from engaging in self-
reflection, their behaviour matched the behaviour of
happy people. This suggests that similar to the
hedonic consequences of self-rumination mentioned
above, the hedonic consequences of self-reflection
may be detrimental to the individual’s perceptions of
their happiness.
The question raised in this study is which
personality characteristics may predispose people to
self-reflect or self-ruminate. The answer to this
question may reside in differences between indivi-
duals in terms of how they see themselves (indepen-
dent from others or connected to others). These
differences are referred to as the distinction between
independent and interdependent self-construals
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Independent versus interdependent self-construals
According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), those
with an independent self-construal define themselves
in terms of internal attributes such as traits, abilities,
values, and preferences. In contrast, those with an
interdependent self-construal define themselves in
terms of their relationships with others. Markus and
Kitayama argued that differences between indepen-
dent and interdependent self-concepts lead to differ-
ent consequences for a number of cognitive and
motivational processes. Subsequent research not only
supported this assumption (Choi, Nisbett, &
Norenzayan, 1999; Kurman, 2002; Poasa,
Mallinckrodt, & Suzuki, 2000) but also indicated that
these differences in cognitive and motivational
processes may be related to subjective well-being
(Cross, Gore, & Morris, 2003; Kwan & Bond, 1997).
This suggests that the distinction between inde-
pendent and interdependent self-construals can be a
source of individual differences in cognitive and
motivational processes, which, in turn, may influence
individual differences in happiness. From the per-
spective of a construal theory, the mediating impact
of cognitive and motivational processes on happiness
is related to the hedonic consequences of these
processes for the individual’s self-esteem.
In this respect, the present study was designed to
investigate the negative hedonic consequences asso-
ciated with the two cognitive variables, self-reflection
and self-rumination as mediating factors between an
independent self-construal and happiness. Another
aim of this study was to assess the direct and indirect
influences of self-reflection on subjective happiness.
For these purposes a path model as presented in
Figure 1 was constructed.
Path model and hypotheses
Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that although
independent and interdependent self-construals are
predominant in individualistic and collectivistic
cultures, respectively, individuals within a given
society can be less or more independent or inter-
dependent. (The distinction between individualistic
and collectivistic societies refers to the extent to
which the value of the individual takes precedence
over, or is sacrificed to the needs of others.)
Moreover, Hackman, Ellis, Johnson, and Staley
(1999) demonstrated that independent and inter-
dependent self-construal orientations are two sepa-
rate constructs and suggested that the predictive
capacities of these two variables should be investi-
gated separately.
Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that for those
with an independent self-construal knowledge about
the self is more important and elaborated than
knowledge about the other; one’s internal abilities,
feelings, and thoughts are therefore highly accessible
in memory. Moreover, for those with an independent
self-construal, in comparison to those with an
interdependent self-construal, self-esteem is based
on internal attributes, which facilitates motivation to
obtain more self-knowledge. This suggests that
individuals with a highly developed independent
self-construal may be more prone to focus on
themselves when reflecting on their life. For exam-
ple, in Batson, Fultz, Schoenrade, and Paduano’s
(1987) study, the shift in perception of pro-social
behaviour as less altruistic as a result of self-reflection
was greater for individuals who emphasised the
importance of self-knowledge over relationships with
others. Therefore, a higher level of an independent
self-construal as an individual variable may lead to
greater self-reflection.
Markus and Kitayama (1991) point out
that although people with both self-construals are
Figure 1. Path model predicting subjective happiness
128 I. Elliott & S. Coker
motivated to maintain a positive view of the self, they
employ different strategies to do so. For those with
an independent construal a positive view of the self
involves seeking information that enhances internal
attributes as their self-esteem is based on an ability to
express inner qualities. In contrast, having self-
attributes that are more positive should be less
central to the interdependent self, as the self-esteem
of those with the interdependent self is based on the
ability to fit in and to maintain harmony in relation-
ships with others. This suggests that individuals with
a highly developed independent self-construal will be
motivated to avoid dwelling on the negative in
relation to the self. Therefore, a higher level of an
independent self-construal as an individual variable
may lead to less self-rumination.
The role of the self-attentive process (the propen-
sity to attend to one’s thoughts and feelings) in
psychological well-being appears to be controversial
in research literature (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
On the one hand, studies indicate that the self-
attentive process promotes greater self-awareness
and more accurate self-knowledge (Hixon & Swann,
1993), which is considered essential for psychologi-
cal growth. On the other hand, the self-attentive
process has been found to be associated with greater
levels of depression, anxiety, and neuroticism
(Joireman, 2004). Trapnell and Campbell (1999)
labelled these contradictory findings as the ‘‘self-
absorption paradox’’ (p. 286). According to Trapnell
and Campbell, the self-absorption paradox can
be resolved by attributing negative and positive
outcomes of the self-attentive process to two
independent factors within the self-attentive process,
rumination and reflection, respectively.
Attributing clear-cut positive outcomes to self-
reflection, however, contradicts the findings of
experimental studies on happiness mentioned above.
In addition, Batson et al. (1987) demonstrated that
self-reflection can undermine altruistic behaviour.
Moreover, the clear-cut independence of reflective
and ruminative processes appears to be questionable
considering that in a number of experimental studies
connecting rumination and psychological well-being,
self-rumination was induced through generic self-
reflection (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1993). In a similar vein, a study reported by Nolen-
Hoeksema et al. (1997) suggests a possible causal
link between self-reflection, self-rumination, and
psychological well-being, with self-reflection leading
to self-rumination over time and as a result to greater
depressed mood. Therefore, greater self-reflection
may be associated with greater self-rumination.
Thus, based on the distinction between inde-
pendent and interdependent self-construals and
previous research associating self-reflection and self-
rumination with subjective happiness and well-being,
it was hypothesised that: (a) a higher independent
self-construal would be associated with greater self-
reflection and less self-rumination, (b) greater
self-reflection would be associated with greater self-
rumination and less happiness, and (c) greater self-
rumination would lead to less happiness.
Method
Participants
Participants were 123 residents of Rockhampton in
Central Queensland (female, n¼ 87; male, n¼ 34;
missing, n¼ 2). Participants ranged in age from 18 –
82 years (M¼ 38.50, SD¼ 15.31). Table I presents
the age group, education level attained, marital
status, and income level of the participants.
Materials
The Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky &
Lepper, 1999) assesses the extent to which indivi-
duals consider themselves happy and consists of four
items with 7-point Likert type response formats.
Table I. Demographic data of participants
Demographic variable % n
Age
18 – 24 years 24.4 30
25 – 44 years 35.0 43
45 – 64 years 35.8 44
65 years and over 3.3 4
Missing 1.6 2
Gender
Males 27.7 34
Females 70.7 87
Missing 1.6 2
Education
Primary school 2.4 3
1 – 2 years secondary school 5.7 7
3 – 4 years secondary school 22.8 28
5 – 6 years secondary school 19.5 24
Technical/trade 13.0 16
Tertiary 34.1 42
Missing 2.4 3
Marital status
Single 32.5 40
Married 39.0 48
De facto 8.1 10
Separated 4.9 6
Divorced 13.8 17
Widowed 1.6 2
Income(per year)
Less than $10,000 22.0 27
$10,001 – $20,000 19.5 24
$20,001 – $30,000 15.4 19
$30,001 – $40,000 15.4 19
$40,001 – $50,000 4.1 5
$50,001 – $60,000 4.9 6
More than $60,000 17.9 22
Missing 0.8 1
Self-construal and happiness 129
Lyubomirsky (2001) has reported good to excellent
psychometric properties of the SHS across 14 studies.
For example, the SHS has been found to have high
internal consistency with Cronbach’s alphas ranging
from .85 to .95 in eight studies. High test-retest
reliability has been shown over a four-week period
(Pearson’s r¼ .90) and over a three-month period
(Pearson’s r¼ .71). Convergent validity has been
demonstrated between the SHS and widely used
measures of subjective well-being, including Brad-
burn’s (1969) Affect-Balance Scale (rs range from .49
to .64); Diener, Emmons, Larson, and Griffin’s
(1985) Satisfaction with Life Scale (rs range from .61
to .69); and Andrews and Withey’s (1976) Terrible-
Delighted Scale (rs range from .59 to .71). Discrimi-
nant validity has been demonstrated between the SHS
and unrelated constructs such as academic ability and
demographic variables (Lyubomirsky). In the present
study, Cronbach’s alpha was .80.
The Refined Independent Self-Construal Scale
(Hackman et al., 1999) was introduced by Hackman
et al. as a result of a validation study conducted on
two instruments which measure self-construal or-
ientation: the Independent and Interdependent Self-
Construal Scales (Gudykunst et al., 1994). The
instruments developed by Gudykunst et al. were
based on a conceptualisation of the self-construal
construct as consisting of the two orthogonal factors
of independence and interdependence. Results of
confirmatory factor analysis in Hackman et al.’s
study indicated that independent and interdepen-
dent self-construals were two separate one-factor
dimensions of the self-construal construct. These
findings provided support for the separate use of the
two self-construal orientations as predictor variables
in future research.
The Refined Independent Self-Construal Scale
(Hackman et al., 1999) assesses the independent
self-construal orientation, which is the extent to
which an individual sees himself or herself as a
unique and independent person. The Scale consists
of 11 items with 6-point Likert type response
formats. Hackman et al. reported Cronbach’s alpha
of the scale as .89 for a North American sample (high
individualism), .88 for a New Zealand sample
(moderate individualism/moderate collectivism),
.77 for a Kyrgyzstan sample (high collectivism),
and .85 for the overall sample. In the present study,
Cronbach’s alpha was .77.
The Self-Reflection Scale (SReS) and the Self-
Rumination Scale (SRuS) were developed based on
previous research specifically for this study to
measure self-reflection and self-rumination, respec-
tively. The scales are presented in the Appendix.
Although the bulk of the items of both scales were
derived from the Rumination-Reflection Question-
naire (RRQ) developed by Trapnell and Campbell
(1999), the RRQ does not address explicitly either
self-reflection or self-rumination, lacks consistency
in distinguishing reflection and rumination, and
includes emotionally laden items.
The Self-Reflection Scale consists of 12 items with
6-point Likert type response formats. The items
reflect a conceptualisation of self-reflection as con-
sisting of thinking about and analysing one’s
thoughts, feelings, and actions (Lyubomirsky,
2001). Two of the items (5 and 9), which reflect
the conceptualisation of self-reflection employed in
the present study, were taken from the RRQ without
making changes. Another six items from the RRQ
(2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10), which are laden with positive
emotionality, were modified to render them neutral.
Three of the items (6, 11, and 12) were developed
on the basis of tasks that were given to participants
in experimental studies to engage them in the
self-reflective process (e.g., Lyubomirsky &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Lyubomirsky & Ross,
1999). Item 1 was written specifically for this research
based on the connection between self-reflection and
self-knowledge identified in the research literature
(e.g., Hixon & Swann, 1993; Trapnell & Campbell,
1999). The items are scored in a positive direction
(except items 5, 7, and 9, which are reverse-scored),
with higher scores indicating greater self-reflection.
The possible range of scores is from 12 to 72. In the
present study, Cronbach’s alpha was .86.
The Self-Rumination Scale (SRuS) consists of 10
items with 6-point Likert type response formats. The
items reflect a conceptualisation of self-rumination
as self-focused dwelling in response to negative
events. Four of these items (1, 2, 3, and 5), which
reflect the conceptualisation of self-rumination em-
ployed in the present study, were taken without
making changes. Another four items from the RRQ
(4, 6, 8, and 10), which direct the self-reflective
process away from negative events, were modified to
fit the definition of self-rumination employed in the
present study. Item 7 and item 9 were written
specifically for this study, based on the tasks used to
induce self-rumination that were employed in
previous studies (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993).
The items are scored in a positive direction (except
for item 1 which is reverse-scored), with higher
scores indicating greater self-rumination. The possi-
ble range of scores is from 10 to 60. In the present
study, Cronbach’s alpha was .91.
Procedure
Data collection for the study was conducted using
a snow-balling technique with contacts in the
community. Individuals were approached and asked
if they would be willing to be voluntary participants
130 I. Elliott & S. Coker
themselves, and also to ask their associates to
participate in the study. The overall return rate for
the 200 questionnaires distributed was 65%, with
123 questionnaires (94.62%) out of the total 130
questionnaires returned being employed in the
analysis. (The data of seven respondents were not
included in the analysis due to a large number of
missing values.)
Results
Preliminary analyses
Means and standard deviations of the four research
variables are presented in Table II. The mean
of subjective happiness (M¼ 4.90, SD¼ 0.99) in this
sample is lower than the mean reported by
Lyubomirsky and Ross (1999) in a US high school
sample (M¼ 6.11, SD¼ 0.78) for individuals who
were classified as extremely happy individuals.
Participants’ gender, level of income, marital status,
educational level, and age group had no significant
effect on subjective happiness. The results of the
reliability analyses indicated that all four measures
had acceptable levels of internal consistency (See
Materials subsection for Cronbach’s alphas).
Intercorrelations among the four research variables
were analysed to safeguard the validity of regression
analysis in case of multicollinearity, that is, highly
correlated independent variables. The results from
the correlational analyses are presented in Table III.
In terms of the three independent variables, the
results showed only one significant low bivariate
correlation: self-reflection/self-rumination¼ .31, in-
dicating that these variables may be somewhat
interrelated but still represent distinct constructs.
In addition, significant low correlations were
found among subjective happiness/independent self-
construal¼ .23 and subjective happiness/self-
rumination¼7.31.
Path analysis
As preliminary analyses indicated a significant
correlation between independent self-construal and
subjective happiness, a path connecting independent
self-construal and subjective happiness was added
to the hypothesised model presented in Figure 1.
In order to investigate whether independent self-
construal correlates with subjective happiness be-
cause of the influence of the cognitive variables
self-reflection and self-rumination, or whether
independent self-construal, self-reflection, and self-
rumination have an independent influence on sub-
jective happiness, a path analysis was conducted.
Path analysis is a method in which a causal theory
and the statistical technique of multiple regression
combine to assess direct and indirect influences
between the variables of interest (Ho, 2006). To
estimate the direction and magnitude of the paths in
the model presented in Figure 1 and to test the three
research hypotheses, a series of three regression
analyses were carried out. Figure 2 presents the path
model with the estimated regression coefficients
(Beta values) associated with the hypothesised paths.
The results showed that independent self-con-
strual had only a direct effect on subjective happiness
(b¼ .21). Self-reflection had a direct effect on
subjective happiness (b¼ .25) and an indirect effect
through self-rumination (path¼ .3167.38). To
estimate whether the indirect effect was significant,
an online application of the Sobel test developed by
Preacher and Leonardelli (2001) was used. The
results indicated the significant mediating role of
self-rumination in the relation between self-reflection
and subjective happiness (Sobel test statistic¼72.75, p5 .01). The three predictor variables
accounted for 19.80% of the variance in subjective
happiness (p5 .05), with self-rumination being
the strongest predictor of subjective happiness
accounting for 9.60% of the total variance
(p5 .001). Self-reflection was a significant predictor
of self-rumination accounting for 9.40% of the
variance (p5 .01).
Table II. Means and standard deviations of research variables
Variable Mean SD
Subjective happiness 4.90 0.99
Independent self-construal 4.97 0.55
Self-reflection 4.25 0.75
Self-rumination 3.48 1.04
Table III. Intercorrelations between research variables
Variable 1 2 3 4
1. Independent self-construal –
2. Subjective happiness .23* –
3. Self-reflection .00 .14 –
4. Self-rumination 7.06 7.31*** .31** –
*p5 .05, **p5 .01, ***p5 .001.
Figure 2. Standardised regression coefficients for the path model
predicting subjective happiness
Self-construal and happiness 131
Discussion
The results of the study showed that independent
self-construal had only a direct influence on sub-
jective happiness, such that a higher level of indepen-
dent self-construal was associated with greater
happiness. The results also showed that self-reflection
had a direct influence on subjective happiness, such
that greater self-reflection was associated with greater
happiness. In addition, self-reflection had an indirect
influence on subjective happiness, being mediated
by self-rumination, such that greater self-reflection
led to greater self-rumination; this, in turn, was
associated with less happiness.
The findings that independent self-construal did
not account for any significant variance in self-
reflection or self-rumination indicate that the way
participants saw themselves (independent from
others or connected to others) did not influence
their tendency to self-reflect or self-ruminate. The
possible explanation for the finding that a higher level
of independent self-construal was associated with
greater happiness is that people who see themselves
as independent from others may have greater
perceptions of personal control over their lives. The
extent of perceived personal control over one’s life
has been found to be one of the significant positive
correlates of happiness (Argyle, 2001).
The finding that greater self-reflection was asso-
ciated with greater self-rumination casts doubts on
the clear-cut independence of reflective and rumina-
tive processes suggested in previous literature
(Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). It appears that self-
rumination may be a by-product of self-reflection. It
may be that people who have a tendency to self-
reflect find it difficult to disengage from this process
in the face of adverse circumstances, unfavourable
outcomes, and negative events in their lives.
The finding that greater self-reflection was asso-
ciated with increased happiness contradicts findings
of experimental studies which suggested self-
reflection to have a negative effect on happiness
(Lyubomirsky, 2001; Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1999). In
these studies, however, the negative effect of self-
reflection was demonstrated for individuals who
were classified as extremely happy individuals (with
the mean score close to the highest point of SHS). In
the present study, the mean score for the sample was
close to the middle point of SHS. This suggests that
in contrast to extremely happy people, self-reflection
may be beneficial to individuals who do not exhibit
high levels of happiness. It may be that for these
individuals self-reflection facilitates identification of
meaningful goals which have been shown to be
strong predictors of happiness (Argyle, 2001).
An alternate explanation may be related to the
experimental nature of previous studies in which
happy participants were induced to self-reflect on
trivial situations, whereas in the present study, self-
reflection was measured in a non-manipulated
environment and in a broader context. Self-reflection
on meaningful as opposed to trivial events may
facilitate having meaningful goals. From the per-
spective of a construal theory, meaningful goals have
the potential to enhance a positive view of the self.
Self-reflection may be detrimental, however, to
maintaining acquired happiness. From the perspec-
tive of a construal theory, in this respect, self-
reflection may have potential to undermine a positive
view of the self, analogous to the situation when one
finds a flaw in a perfect picture after subjecting it to
close scrutiny. For example, in Batson et al.’s (1987)
study, self-reflection on participants’ altruistic ac-
tions led them to perceive their pro-social behaviour
as less altruistic, presumably by discoveries of their
ulterior, self-oriented motives as a result of self-
reflection. Thus, the same cognitive process, self-
reflection, may have different hedonic consequences
depending on where individuals stand on the
happiness continuum as well as on the context of
the situation. The implication for practice is that
cognitive and motivational strategies employed by
extremely happy individuals may not have the same
validity when employed by individuals who do not
enjoy high levels of happiness.
As with all studies, this study has several limita-
tions. They relate to the use of a non-random sample
and the self-report nature of the measurement
instruments. In addition, the results of this study
are based on correlational and cross-sectional data.
Also, it is possible that the findings of this study are
confined to an individualistic culture (such as
Australia) where independence is valued more then
interdependence.
Nevertheless, the findings of the present study
have important implications for future research. It is
suggested that future research should investigate
whether other hedonically relevant cognitive and
motivational processes (e.g., social comparison) may
play a mediating role between self-construal and
subjective happiness. It would be interesting to
investigate the relationship between happiness and
self-reflection in a broader context than was utilised
in previous experimental studies with individuals
who exhibit extremely high levels of happiness to
ascertain if meaningful self-reflection can lead to
increased happiness for these individuals. Also,
future research should continue to explore the
possibility that other personality dimensions will
have a direct or indirect impact on the individual’s
propensity to self-reflect or self-ruminate. Finally,
the findings of this study indicate that self-reflection
has the potential to both increase and decrease (when
mediated by self-rumination) subjective happiness.
132 I. Elliott & S. Coker
Thus, future research should explore the possibility
of mediating factors operating between self-reflection
and self-rumination.
Conclusion
This study provides empirical support for a construal
theory of happiness in that individual differences in
hedonically relevant cognitive processes of self-
reflection and self-rumination exert a significant
influence on the individual’s perception of subjective
happiness. The individual’s propensity to self-reflect
or self-ruminate, however, was not found to be
affected by an independent self-construal as had
been predicted based on the independent versus
interdependent self-construal theoretical framework.
The results of this study suggest that meaningful
self-reflection may be beneficial for people who do
not enjoy high levels of happiness. Although self-
reflection has the potential to increase happiness, this
study highlights the perils of self-reflection in that it
may trigger self-rumination with its detrimental con-
sequences for happiness. Finally, the discovery of the
direct influence of an independent self-construal on
subjective happiness provides fuel for future research-
ers and innovators in search of more comprehensive
structural models for predicting happiness.
Acknowledgements
This study was conducted by the first author under
the supervision of the co-author in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of a Bachelor of Psychology. The
first author wishes to thank Professor Kevin Ronan at
Central Queensland University for his support over
the period in which this article was written, Margaret
Kirkwood, Desley Stehbens, Julie Mann, and Bruce
Elliott for their contribution to data collection for
this study.
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Appendix
The Self-Reflection and the Self-Rumination Scales
The Self-Reflection Scale (SReS)
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by recording your
rating number on the space next to each statement.
Please note that:
1¼Strongly Disagree, 2¼Disagree, 3¼Barely Disagree, 4¼Barely Agree, 5¼Agree, 6¼Strongly Agree
1_______________2_____________3_____________4______________5______________6
Strongly Disagree Disagree Barely Disagree Barely Agree Agree Strongly Agree
1. Knowing myself is very important to me. ______
2. I am self-focused by nature. ______
3. My attitudes and feelings are the focus of my attention. ______
4. I often analyse why I do things. ______
5. I don’t care much for self-analysis. ______
6. I often think what my feelings might mean to me. ______
7. Contemplating myself is something I don’t do very often. ______
8. I often explore my ‘‘inner’’ self. ______
9. I don’t really care for introspective or self-reflective thinking. ______
10. When I contemplate things that happen to me, I often focus
on my ‘‘inner’’ thoughts and feelings. ______
11. I often contemplate my current moods. ______
12. I often reflect on outcomes of my actions. ______
The Self-Rumination Scale (SRuS)
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by recording your
rating number on the space next to each statement.
Please note that:
1¼Strongly Disagree, 2¼Disagree, 3¼Barely Disagree, 4¼Barely Agree, 5¼Agree, 6¼Strongly Agree
1______________2______________3______________4______________5______________6
Strongly Disagree Disagree Barely Disagree Barely Agree Agree Strongly Agree
1. It is easy for me to put unwanted thoughts out of mind. _____
2. I spend a great deal of time thinking back over my
embarrassing or disappointing moments. _____
3. My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish I’d stop thinking about. _____
4. I tend to dwell over unpleasant things that happen to me for
a long time afterwards. _____
5. Long after an argument or disagreement is over, my
thoughts keep going back to what happened. _____
6. Often I’m playing back over in my mind how I acted in an embarrassing situation. _____
7. I often analyse my mistakes. _____
8. Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about my faults. _____
9. I often reflect on unfavourable outcomes in my life. _____
10. I often find myself re-evaluating something I have done wrong. _____
134 I. Elliott & S. Coker
