Despite the impatient insistence onspeed of advance by the X Corpscommander, Major GeneralEdward S. "Ned" Almond, USA,Smith knew he led a two-regimentdivision against an unknownenemy defending an enormousurban center.

On one hand, the pace of theallied build-up encouraged Smith.

Two new Marine fighter squadronshad commenced flying into KimpoAirfield since the 5th Marines cap-tured it intact on the 18th, and theywould launch their first VoughtF4U Corsair strikes in support ofthe X Corps advance the morningof the 20th. The 32d InfantryRegiment of Major General DavidG. Barr's 7th Infantry Division had

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National Archives Photo (USA) 11 1-Sc348519

MajGen Oliver P Smith, a veteran ofthe Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, andOkinawa campaigns in the Pacificduring World War II, commanded the1st Marine Division throughout theInch on-Seoul-Chosin campaigns.

landed at Inchon and movedrapidly to cover the exposed rightflank of Smith's approach to Seoul,south of Chesty Puller's 1stMarines. The 7th Marines' long,global journey to Inchon wasabout to end. Meanwhile, GeneralAlmond had strengthened Smith'slight division by attaching two bat-talions of the 1st Republic of Korea(ROK) Marine Regiment, green butspirited sea soldiers.

Against these positive develop-ments, 0. P. Smith worried abouthis lack of a significant reserve, theabsence of bridging materialthroughout X Corps, the morning'srequirement to split his division onboth sides of a tidal river, and therealization that the landing forcewould henceforth pass beyond theeffective range of the guns of thefleet. He could also sense thatNorth Korean resistance was stiff-ening and the quality of the oppo-sition was improving. All signspointed to a major clash in theweek ahead.

Intelligence analysts on bothdivision and corps staffs had diffi-

Principal Commanders,1 St Marine Division, Seoul

1St Marine DivisionCommanding General: Major General Oliver P. SmithAssistant Division Commander: Brigadier General Edward A. CraigG-3: Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, Jr.

1st MarinesCommanding Officer: Colonel Lewis B. Puller1st Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins2d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Alan Sutter3d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge

5th MarinesCommanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray1st Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton2d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise3d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett

7th MarinesCommanding Officer: Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr.1st Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis2d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Thornton M. Hinkle (Wounded in Action-Evacuated, September 28)Major Webb D. Sawyer (from September 28)3d Battalion: Major Maurice E. Roach

11th MarinesCommanding Officer: Colonel James H. Brower1st Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Ransom M. Wood2d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Adelman3d Battalion: Major Francis F. Parry4th Battalion: Major William McReynolds

Other Division UnitsCommanding Officer, 1st Shore Party Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Henry

P. CroweCommanding Officer, 1st Engineer Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel John H.

PartridgeCommanding Officer, 1st Tank Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Harry T.

MimeCommanding Officer, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel

Erwin F. Wann, Jr.Commanding Officer, VMO-6: Major Vincent J. GottschalkCommanding Officer, 1st Service Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Charles L.

BanksCommanding Officer, 1st Ordnance Battalion: Major Lloyd 0. WilliamsCommanding Officer, 1st Motor Transport Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel

Olin L. BeallCommanding Officer, 1st Medical Battalion: Commander H. B. Johnson, Jr.,

USN

Commanding Officer, 1st Signal Battalion: Major Robert L. SchreierCommanding Officer, Reconnaissance Company: Captain Kenneth J.

Houghton

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culty defining an enemy order ofbattle after the Inchon landingbecause of the chaos the landingcreated in the headquarters of theNKPA in Pyongyang, the NorthKorean capital. Ignoring dozens oftelltale indicators, the NKPAseemed astonished that theCommander in Chief, Far East,General of the Army DouglasMacArthur, could have landed sucha large force amid Inchon's narrowchannels and formidable mudflats.The Marines' quick seizure of theport, Ascom City, and KimpoAirfield further disoriented theNorth Koreans.

By the night of the l9th-2Oth,however, the North Korean highcommand finally had major troopunits on the move to defend theSouth Korean capital. They turnedaround the untested 18th NKPADivision, bound from Seoul to thePusan Perimeter, and recalled aveteran regiment of the 9th NKPADivision from the southwest cor-ner of the Naktong River. Most ofthese troops would defend theindustrial suburb of Yongdungpo,directly south of the Han from cen-tral Seoul, against the 1st Marines.

On 20 September, whileLieutenant Colonel Raymond L.Murray led his 5th Marines acrossthe Han River, two significantenemy units reached Seoul fromassembly areas in North Korea toman the northwest defensesagainst this new American threatabove the Han. From Sariwoncame Colonel Pak Han Lin at thehead of his 78th IndependentInfantry Regiment, some 1,500-2,000 untested troops in threeinfantry battalions. From nearbyChorwon came Colonel Wol KiChan's 25th NKPA Brigade, morethan 4,000 strong. Colonel Wolhad received "postgraduate" tacti-cal training in the Soviet Union andhad trained his green troops well.His newly formed brigade con-

tamed an unusual concentration ofcrew-served weapons, includingfour heavy weapons battalionsproviding a proliferation of anti-tank and antiaircraft guns, plusheavy machine guns. Wol led thetwo units west of town to preparelast-ditch defenses along the samejumbled ridges where the Japanesehad formerly conducted infantry-training exercises. General Smith'sintuition had been correct. HisNorth Korean enemy would short-ly change from delaying tactics tohard-nosed, stand-and-deliver de-fense to the death.

Two Rough Roads To Seoul

Few things could fazeLieutenant Colonel Murray, the 5thMarines' commander, after hismonth-long experience as theEighth Army's "Fire Brigade" in thePusan Perimeter, but preparing hisveteran regiment for an opposedcrossing of the Han River on 20September proved a daunting task.To begin with, Murray found his

LtCol Raymond L. Murray, a tallTexan who had earned a Silver Staron Guadalcanal, a second Silver Staron Tawara, and a Navy Cross onSaipan, commanded the 5th Marines.Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5850

command post crowded with high-ranking observers and correspon-dents. Each wondered howMurray would execute a crossingof such a broad river withoutheavy bridging material; all offeredfree advice. Murray abided thesekibitzers for awhile, then cast themout.

A second situation proved moretroublesome. While Murray feltconfident the 1st AmphibianTractor Battalion could shuttle hisriflemen across in their trackedlanding vehicles (LVTs then, AAVsnow), and while he was reason-ably sure Lieutenant Colonel JohnH. Partridge, the division engineer,could ferry his attached tanksacross by using 50-foot pontoon

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sections, he still knew nothing ofthe river—its current, shorelinegradients, exit points. Nor didMurray know anything of theenemy's strength and capabilitiesin the vicinity of the abandonedferry site at Haengju. Mile-longHill 125 on the north bank domi-nated the crossing. Six years earli-er Murray had led his 2d Battalion,6th Marines, ashore at Saipanunder direct fire from Japaneseguns occupying the coastal hills,and he had no intention of repeat-ing that experience here.

Murray asked General Smith toassign Captain Kenneth R.

Houghton's division Reconnais-sance Company to the crossingoperation. Murray wanted an

North Korean Order Of Battle:Seoul/Wonsan Campaign

Defending the Northwest Approaches (Hill 296 Complex and beyond):

25th Brigade: Colonel Wol Ki Chan78th Independent Infantry Regiment: Colonel Pak Han LinSeoul City Regiment

Defending Yongdungpo:

Elements of 3d Regiment, 9th DivisionElements of 18th and 87th Divisions

Defending Seoul:

Surviving components of the above forces17th Rifle Division43d Tank Regiment19th Antiaircraft Regiment513th Artillery Regiment10th Railroad Regiment

Defending Uijongbu:

31st Regiment, 31st Division75th Independent Regiment

Opposing 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, at Kojo:

10th Regiment, 5th Division: Colonel Cho Ii Kwon

Opposing 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Majon-ni:

Elements of 15th Division: Major General Pak Sun Chol

advance party of reconnaissanceMarines to swim the Han after darkon 19 September, stealthily deter-mine any enemy presence, andthen signal the remainder of thecompany to cross in LVTs. Murraythen expected the company to

Mary craddock Hoffman

man a defensive perimeter tocover the predawn crossing ofLieutenant Colonel Robert D.Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines.

Taplett considered the plan tooambitious. The ReconnaissanceCompany had the heart, he

believed, but not the numbers (127strong) to cover the sprawling highground along the river. No oneknew anything in advance aboutthe possibility of enemy presencein strength along the far bank.Taplett quietly ordered his staff todraw up contingency plans for thecrossing.

The North Koreans had notignored the former ferry site.Aware that the Marines would like-ly cross the Han soon, the NKPAdeployed an infantry battalion inthe underbrush along Hill 125.Their camouflage disciplineproved excellent. The Marines didnot detect their presence through-out the afternoon and evening ofthe 19th.

After dark, Captain Houghtonled 14 swimmers across the 400-yard-wide river. An ill-timedartillery mission set fire to a housein Haengju village, exposing the

Marine Corps amphibian tractors and DUKW5ft'rry troops across the Han River after the assault waves.Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

147

men in their final approach to thenorth bank. Technical SergeantErnest L. Defazio complained theblaze "lit up the place like aChristmas tree," but nothingstirred. Houghton dispatched fourmen to check for signs of theenemy on Hill 125, then sent anexultant but premature message toMurray: "The Marines have landedand the situation is well in hand."Houghton also radioed his execu-tive officer to launch the balanceof the company in its nine LYTs.

So far, so good. But few soundsattract more attention on a quietnight than the sudden revving upof nine pairs of Cadillac V-8Amtrac engines. The noiseseemed enough to wake the dead,and abruptly the NKPA battalionon Hill 125 opened a vicious fireagainst the approaching LVTs andHoughton's small group, now dan-gerously backlit by the burningbuilding.

Second Lieutenant Philip D.Shutler commanded the secondplatoon of the ReconnaissanceCompany, his men dividedbetween two LVTs that nosed intothe river in column. Young as hewas, Shutler had already been in

tight spots. He had spent themonth of August making nightraids from USS Horace A. Bass(APD 124) in the Sea of Japanagainst the North Korean coastline,his Marines teamed withUnderwater Demolition Team 1.Crossing the Han was a dissimilar

experience, he later recounted."Amphibian tractors were hardlystealthy vehicles," Shutler recalled."We received enemy fire as soon asthe vehicles entered the water.You could hear machine gunrounds plinking against thearmored cab. Mortar rounds, pos-sibly from our own 'four-deuce'tubes, were exploding in the river."

In the chaos some LVTs becamestuck in the mud near the farshore, others veered away.Captain Houghton sprang into theriver to rally the vehicles towardthe landing site. Mortar roundslanded in the water near him; theconcussion from one near missknocked him out.

Lieutenant Shutler could seenone of this from the crowdedtroop compartment of his lurchingLVT. He scrambled topside, dis-covered to his horror that the vehi-cle had turned upstream, broad-side to the NKPA gunners on Hill125. He whacked the driver,

HAN RIVER CROSSING& SEIZURE OF HILL 125

5 tli MARiNES - 20 SEPSoc coo 0000

An LVT-3C of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion takes offfrom the south bankof the Han with a load of American and Korean Marines, while Marine engi-neers prepare a pontoon bridge to cany equipment.

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

148

jumped into the waist-deep water,and attempted to guide the vehicledirectly ashore. He saw no sign ofthe advance swimmers.

At this point someone passedthe word to abort the mission andreturn to the south bank. FiveLVTs returned, leaving four stuckin the mud along the far shore.One of these contained CaptainHoughton's unconscious body.Other Marines were missing.Shutler found one of his troopshad died of wounds in the con-fused melee. The crossing hadfailed.

When Technical Sergeant ErnieDeFazio discovered his captainmissing he promptly led a swim-mer team back across the river.They rescued Houghton and hisradio operator, retrieved two of thestuck vehicles and restored morethan a bit of the company's honor.

But the night was nearly spent,the enemy occupied the crossingsite in considerable strength, andevery VIP in the theater—includingGeneral Douglas MacArthur—hadannounced their intentions ofobserving the morning crossing.As assistant division commander,Brigadier General Edward A. Craigfrankly observed: "The eyes of theworld were upon us. It wouldhave looked bad for the Marines,of all people, to reach a river andnot he able to cross."

The 5th Marines calmly decidedto approach the crossing as anamphibious assault mission—tight-ly coordinated preliminary fires onthe objective, an intermediate andfinal objective assigned, and troopsorganized into boat teams config-ured to each LVT. Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, would leadthe landing in assault waves, fol-lowed by Lieutenant ColonelHarold S. Roise's 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, to expand the beachhead;the entire regiment with itsattached tank company to cross

before dark. Marine Corsairswould arrive soon after sunrise topound Hill 125 and scorch theSeoul-Kaesong highway to dis-courage any NKPA reinforcements.

Only a veteran force like the 5thMarines could have made suchlast-minute adaptations and passedthe word to all hands in theremaining minutes before dawn.Taplett's original skepticism aboutthe Reconnaissance Company'sability to hold an opposed bridge-head had served 3d Battalion, 5thMarines well; the battalion hadalready prepared worst-case alter-native plans. By the time GeneralAlmond, Vice Admiral Arthur D.Struble, USN (Commander,Seventh Fleet), and LieutenantGeneral Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,USMC (Commanding General,Fleet Marine Force, Pacific) arrivedthey found Lieutenant ColonelMurray as unflappable as ever andthe crossing well underway.Lieutenant Colonel Ransom M.Wood's 1st Battalion, 11th Marines,pounded the far bank with 105mmhowitzers; Murray's own 81mmand 4.2-inch mortars joined thechorus. Taplett's first wave of sixLVTs chugged resolutely on linetowards the far bank.

At this point the NKPA battalionon Hill 125 opened a disciplinedfire on the LVTs, scoring more than200 hits on the vehicles as theytrundled ashore. Fortunately theirone antitank gun proved less accu-rate than their small arms fire.Taplett pressed on. His LVTs dis-charged Captain Robert A.

McMullen's Company I, thenpulled away for the return transit.McMullen quickly deployed hisplatoons up the open slopes of Hill125 in a double envelopment. Thefighting became point-blank anddeadly.

With most NKPA gunners nowtaking aim at McMullen's Marines,the remaining companies of 3d

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Battalion, 5th Marines, crossed theriver with relative ease. CorporalLarry V. Brom, a Company Hsquad leader, worried more aboutthe claustrophobia his men experi-enced in their LVT's cramped troopcompartment than "the occasionalsplat of bullets against the armorplate." Company H's LVTs lurchedout of the river and continuedrolling north, crossing the railroadand highway to secure distant Hill51. Corporal Brom led his men ina mad dash up the rise as soon asthe rear ramp dropped, vastlyrelieved to discover the crest unde-fended.

By contrast, Company I had itshands full taking Hill 125. Thelower approaches contained scantcover. Well-sited NKPA gunnersscythed down Captain McMullen'sexposed 60mm mortar section andtwo sections of light machine guns.

The situation improved dramati-cally with the appearance over-head of four Corsairs fromLieutenant Colonel Walter E.

Lischeid's Marine Fighter Squadron214 (VMF-214). The Black Sheeppilots launched at 0551 from theescort carrier USS Sicily (CVE 118)in the Yellow Sea, southwest ofInchon, arriving over the river justin time to even the odds againstCompany I's arduous assault witha series of ear-splitting rocket andnapalm attacks against the NorthKoreans defending the highground. McMullen spurred hismen forward, upward amid thebedlam. Their difficult doubleenvelopment converged on thecrest, culminating in a vicious flur-ry of hand-to-hand combat. Anabrupt silence followed, brokenonly by the Marines gasping forbreath.

Taking Hill 125 cost Company I43 casualties; it inflicted at least200 upon the enemy. It had beena beautifully executed tacticalassault, highlighted by the high-

recently destroyed in an ambush.

speed, low-level strikes of theCorsairs. General Almond, observ-ing this conflict from barely 500yards away, admitted it was 'oneof the finest small-unit actions I'veever witnessed."

The forcible taking of Hill 125meant the remainder of the 5thMarines could cross the river unim-peded. By the time GeneralMacArthur arrived the crossingseemed routine. "You've done aperfect job," he told LieutenantColonel Murray, unaware of theall-night flail that preceded theperfection. Murray by then had hiseye on the main objective, and hepointed upstream to the convolut-ed ridges that protected theapproaches to Seoul from thenorthwest, the regimental route ofadvance. "They'll all evaporatevery shortly," MacArthur assuredMurray.

At a glance from long distance itseemed that the Supreme AlliedCommander might have beenright. Only eight miles separatedHill 125 at the Haengju crossingsite from downtown Seoul.Murray's advance elements cov-ered half that distance on the after-noon of the 20th, raising false

hopes. Then NKPA resistance stiff-ened abruptly. It would take the5th Marines a full week of desper-ate fighting to advance the finalfour miles into Seoul.

The 20th of September alsobegan very early for Chesty Puller's1st Marines on their final approachto Yongdungpo. The 87th NKPARegiment launched two predawnspoiling attacks against bothflanks. The southern attack, led byfive T-34 tanks, posed the greatestthreat. The veteran NKPA troopsendeavored to repeat their high-speed, straight-down-the-highwayarmored tactics that had provenwildly successful in the initial inva-sion, but their tanks had now losttheir invulnerability. The armoredcolumn barreled blindly into alethal L-shaped ambush set byLieutenant Colonel Alan Sutter's 2dBattalion, 1st Marines. Short-rangefire from Marine 3.5-inch bazookasknocked out the first two enemytanks; a storm of direct and indi-rect fire cut down the supportinginfantry, killing 300 men. The sur-viving North Koreans withdrew totheir prepared defenses withinYongdungpo.

Puller pressed the advance, his

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2d Battalion still astride theInchon-Seoul highway, the 1stBattalion attacking through thehilly countryside below the Han.Sutter's lop-sided success inthwarting the NKPA tank attackpleased Puller, but the initial viewof sprawling Yongdungpo from hisobservation post brought forthPuller's trademark scowl. Theprospect of forcing a crossing ofthe high-banked Kalchon Canal,then fighting door-to-door throughthis large industrial suburb did notappeal to the veteran jungle fight-er. When General Almond ap-peared from observing Murray'sriver crossing, Puller asked him forauthorization to employ unrestrict-ed firepower in taking the city.The corps commander agreed.Puller unleashed two battalions ofsupporting artillery (LieutenantColonel Merritt Adelman's 2dBattalion, 11th Marines, in directsupport, and Major WilliamMcReynolds' 4th Battalion, 11thMarines, in general support) plusair strikes by Marine Corsairs. TheSicily-based Black Sheep followedtheir early-morning assistance tothe 5th Marines with two dozensorties against Yongdungpo, drop-ping 500-pound bombs and straf-ing with 20mm cannon and rock-ets. The city began to burn.

The 1st Marines commenced itsmain assault on Yongdungpo at0630 the next morning. NeitherSutter's 2d Battalion or LieutenantColonel Jack Hawkins' 1stBattalion could sustain much head-way. Crossing the Kalchon waslike crossing a medieval castlemoat; clambering over the dikeswas akin to "going over the top" inthe trenches of World War I.

Sutter's outfit in particular tookheavy casualties. The division'sSpecial Action Report recorded theloss of 17 officers and 200 men bythe 2d Battalion along the canal-like river by 21 September.

Department of Defense I'hoto (U5MC) A409336

Advancing Marines examine the smoking ruin of a North Korean T-34 tank

Puller committed elements ofLieutenant Colonel Thomas L.

Ridge's 3d Battalion in the center,hut a half dozen NKPA Maximheavy machine guns took a grimtoll of every attempt to cross thewater gate sector of the Kalchon.

Ridge ordered Major Edwin H.Simmons, his Weapons Companycommander, to suppress the fire.With his 81mm mortars temporari-

artillery support immediately avail-able, Simmons chose his BrowningM1917A1 watercooled .30-caliberheavy machine guns for the mis-sion. Proven veterans of the WorldWar, the heavy Brownings wereunsurpassed in providing rock-steady, sustained fire at a rate of450-600 rounds per minute.Simmons massed these weaponswith their barrels "just clearing thetop of the dike." A fierce duel

ensued—"heavies against heav-ies"—at an interval no greater thanhalf a football field. The exchangewas deafening, but Simmons' stur-dy Brownings prevailed, allowing3d Battalion, 1st Marines, to crossthe Kalchon intact.

The Kalchon proved a barrier tothe entire regiment on 21September—with one memorableexception. While the battle ragedon both sides—and shortly beforeMajor Simmons' machine gunduel—Captain Robert H. Barrow,the future 27th Commandant, ledhis Company A, 1st Marines,through a rice field towards anuncommonly quiet sector of theYongdungpo defenses. The NorthKoreans may have vacated thissector in order to more effectivelycontest the adjacent water gatefronting the 3d Battalion, an obvi-ous crossing site. Barrow, howev-er, expected to be hit at anymoment. Simmons watched ap-provingly as Company A, 1stMarines, advanced past his imme-diate left flank, each platoon online. "They were beautifullydeployed," said Simmons. "As

they came through the dry ricepaddy I thought of the Marinescoming through the wheat fields atBelleau Wood in 1918."

Private First Class MorganBrainard of Barrow's company,though apprehensive about thespooky quiet, experienced similarthoughts as he crossed through thewaist-high rice stalks. As he laterdescribed the advance:

151

Somewhere off to our left,beyond the road and out ofsight, beyond a line of treeswe could hear the rattle ofrifle and machine gun firewhere Baker Company wasgoing in. . . . To our immedi-ate front, however, there wasnothing but silence, as wecontinued to move forward

ly out of ammunition and no

through the field in perfectorder. It was a classic-typeinfantry advance . . . but mymind kept racing back towardthe stories I had read as a boyof the Marines attackingthrough the wheat fields of

Belleau Wood . . . and I ex-pected our peaceful scenewould be shattered in a simi-lar manner at any moment.

Captain Barrow acknowledgedhis serendipity. "We just happened

to experience one of those rarefortunes of war . . . a momentaryopportunity."

"We passed over the top of thedike quickly, slithered down theother side," recalled Brainard,"then inexplicably and stupidly

facing a stream [theI mean the whole line

stopped." The company gunnerysergeant quickly ended their hesi-tation: "Get in that goddamnedwater!"

Company A found itself enteringthe main street of Yongdungpototally unopposed. "It was eerie,"said Barrow. "We simply slitheredinto town undetected."

The 87th NKPA Regiment, des-perately attempting to patchtogether a defense in depth, hadaccidentally left this criticalapproach unguarded, and Barrowtook full advantage of the opening.His 200-man company flowedrapidly into the heart of the city,

stoppedKalchon].

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A3200

A column of M-26 Pershings and a bulldozer-configured M-4 Sherman advancetowards Yongdungpo. The threat comes from the right flank and firing hasalready been vigorous, judging from the spent 90mm shell casings alongside theroad.

sweeping up surprised bands of

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the enemy in the process.Before dark they had cut the city

in two. Barrow selected a sausage-shaped dike, 30 feet high and 150yards long, as the place to make astand for the night. "We immedi-ately recognized that we had avaluable piece of real estate," hesaid. From the dike his Marinescould interdict the intersection ofthe highways from Inchon andKimpo.

Through this intersection at onepoint marched a large formation ofunsuspecting NKPA infantry,singing political songs as they hur-ried to reinforce Yongdungpo's

northwestern defenses. Barrow'sinterlocking machine guns and60mm mortars cut down many andscattered the rest.

As darkness fell, LieutenantColonel Hawkins knew Barrowhad executed a major penetration,but he could not reinforce thisunexpected success. Barrow andCompany A would be on theirown—which was fine withBarrow. "We felt strong," he said."We were not 'The Lost Company.""What followed," observed histori-an Jon T. Hoffman, "wouldbecome one of the great small-unitepics in the history of the Corps, to

rank with Hunt's Point and Pope'sRidge [at Peleliul."

The NKPA attacked Company Ashortly after dark with five Soviet-built T-34 tanks. The rattle androar of their tracks as theyapproached almost unnerved Pri-vate First Class Morgan Brainard."The squeaking and engine hum-ming was drawing much closer,and as I crouched in my hole, I feltthe ice-like shiver of pure fear."The tanks reached the intersection,then proceeded in column along aroad parallel and extremely closeto the Marines' positions dug intothe side of the dike. The leadvehicle appeared enormous toBrainard: "In the moonlight I

could see its turret with the longgun on it slowly circling back andforth, like some prehistoric, steel-backed monster sniffing for prey. I

pressed tightly against the side ofmy hole, and waited for the flashand fire of its gun."

The tanks made five deliberatepasses along that parallel track, fir-ing their 85mm guns directly intothe crowded dike from an ungodlyshort range of 25 yards. This wasa terrifying experience for theMarines on the receiving end, butthe dike's soft sand absorbed thebase-detonated, armor-piercingshells, and there were few casual-ties. Meanwhile, Barrow's 3.5-inchrocket launcher teams stung thetanks repeatedly. "One of themost courageous acts that I everwitnessed was those brave youngMarines with the 3.5s," he said.The first bazooka round CorporalFrancis Devine ever fired in angerblasted a T-34 turret off its ring.Other gunners knocked Out a sec-ond tank and damaged two more.The attached heavy machine gunsection kept the vehicles buttonedup and peppered their visionblocks and periscopes. The sur-viving vehicles withdrew in disar-ray.

Navy surgeon and corpsmen attached to the 1st Marine Division treat a badlyinjured two-year-old boy on the outskirts of Seoul.

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

153

The enemy tanks may havebeen more successful had infantryaccompanied them, but the NKPAriflemen did not appear until 0100.Four separate ground assaults fol-lowed, each beaten back by disci-plined fire. "I expected to have alot of promiscuous firing," saidBarrow, but "my people didn't losetheir fire discipline and go bananasand shoot randomly."

The enemy assembly area wasso close to the Marines' defensiveposition that they could hear thevoice of the local commander,unmistakably haranguing histroops into launching anotherattack. Corporal Billy D. Webb, anOklahoma reservist "with fire in hiseye," decided to even the odds.Slipping out of his foxhole—"forGod's sake don't shoot me when Icome back!"—Webb dashedthrough the adjoining maze ofbuildings, spotted an extremelyanimated officer trying to rally histroops for yet another attack, tookcareful aim, and shot him dead.Webb escaped in the resultant con-fusion, and the night assaults

ceased before the Marines ran outof ammunition.

At dawn, Barrow counted 210dead North Koreans around hisbeleaguered dike. "Yongdungpodid for A Company," said Barrow,"what no other thing could havedone in terms of unifying it andgiving it its own spirit, a spirit thatsaid 'We can do anything."

If Barrow's company had "slith-ered" into Yongdungpo on the21st, it was now the turn of the87th NKPA Regiment, having failedto oust the Marines throughout thenight, to slither out of town thenext morning. Barrow hadskinned the cat, helping Pullercapture a very difficult intermedi-ate objective in two days of fight-ing. The road to Seoul for the 1stMarines now lay open, once the5th Marines could advance east-ward enough to cover their tacticalcrossing of the Han.

Back at Inchon, now well to thewest of Puller's regiment atYongdungpo, the offloading offresh troops and combat cargocontinued around the clock. By

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D+6, 21 September, 50,000 troopshad landed, including ColonelHomer L. Litzenberg, Jr.'s 7thMarines, supported by LieutenantColonel Francis F. Parry's 3dBattalion, 11th Marines, a 105mmhowitzer outfit.

The 7th Marines initiallyassumed security duties in theInchon vicinity. General 0. p.

Smith critically needed them forthe recapture of Seoul, but thenewly formed outfit first required aday or two to shake itself downfrom the long deployment by sea.This did not take long. LieutenantColonel Raymond G. Davis' 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, for exam-ple, had conducted field firingfrom the fantail of their attacktransport each day enroute. "We

fired machine guns, rifles, mortars,and bullets, rocket launchers, andthrew hand grenades at everypiece of trash, orange crates, orwhatever the ship's crew wouldtoss overboard for us," said Davis.Within 48 hours the regimentmoved Out tactically, crossed theHan River, and began its own pathtowards Seoul's northern suburbs,somewhat northwest of the routeof the 5th Marines. On the thirdday Parry's gunners fired their firstrounds down range.

By the fortunes of war, the 5thMarines would pay the stiffestprice of admission to enter Seoul.General MacArthur's beguilingassurance to Lieutenant ColonelMurray that the hills guarding thenorthwestern approaches to thecapital "would all evaporate"proved famously false. The regi-ment would suffer a casualty ratemore reflective of its recent historyat Peleliu and Okinawa than theKorean peninsula.

Part of the difficulty came fromthe convoluted terrain, a sprawlingseries of hill masses, ridges, anddraws extending from theKaesong-Seoul highway in the

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC348715

Elements 0/the 5th Marines advance through a burning village after crossing theHan River. The days of high mobility ended as the Marines reached the enemymain line of resistance in the high ridges on the outskirts of Seoul.

north to the Han River in thesouth. "As an exercise in mapreading," observed Marine histori-an Colonel Robert I). Hem!, Jr.,"this ground is confusing anddeceptive; for the tactician, it is anightmare." Massive Hill 296 dom-inated the landscape; indeed,many of the other numbered peaksand knobs were in reality onlyprotuherances of the hill's bonyfingers extending to the Han andeastward into downtown Seoulitself. Confusingly, there werethree Hill 105s in this complex (justas there had been three Hill 362s atIwo Jima). Regimental plannersnicknamed them for their linearsequence—Hills 105 North, Center,and South. All three would proveprickly objectives to seize andhold.

The North Koreans found thejumbled terrain around the Hill 296complex to be ideal defensive

ground. The fact that the Japanesehad long used the same ridges fortactical training meant the preexist-ing availability of firing positions,command posts, and observationsites. Colonel Wol Ki Chanreached this preferred ground withhis 25th NKPA Brigade andColonel Pak Han Lin's 78thIndependent Infantry Regiment justin time. Had the North Koreansbeen held up one more day pass-ing through Seoul, the Marinesmight have seized Hill 296 and allof its deadly fingers with hardly afight.

Colonels Wol and Pak deployedat least 6,000 troops into the hillcomplex. While yet to he tested inbattle, the combined force wasboth well-led and well-trained.Wol's brigade also contained anabundance of heavy weaponsunits. Their crews spent the 20thand 21st digging in their weapons

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and registering their fire along theMarines' likely avenues ofapproach. Additional troops inodd-lot specialty organizationsreinforced Wol during the battle forthe hills, increasing his total forceto nearly 10,000 men. The 5thMarines, even reinforced by theirattachments and the ROK Marinebattalion, could not match thosenumbers.

The 5th Marines had foughtagainst highly experienced NKPAregiments in the Pusan Perimeter,units whose officers and non-com-missioned officers had years ofcombat experience in China. TheNorth Koreans they now facedlacked that background but madeup for it with tenacity and fire-power, including well-served high-velocity 76mm guns and 120mmheavy mortars. "Their mortar firewas very accurate," said veterancompany commander Captain

Francis I. "Ike" Fenton, Jr. "Theycould really drop it in your lap."

Lieutenant Colonel RaymondMurray began the 22d ofSeptember with three of his fourbattalions on line: Taplett's 3dBattalion on the left, facing themain crest of Hill 296; Major Ko's1st ROK Marine Battalion in thecenter, facing an exposed slopetowards its objective, Hill 56; andLieutenant Colonel George R.

Newton's 1st Battalion on the right,aimed towards Hill 105-South.Lieutenant Colonel Harold S.

Roise's 2d Battalion remained inreserve.

The battle for the hills got off toa bad start for Murray. During thenight a North Korean shell explod-ed in his command post, causingmany casualties. Murray survived

with a small cut, but LieutenantColonel Lawrence C. Hays, hisexecutive officer and fellowTarawa veteran (1st Battalion, 8thMarines commanding officer atRed Beach Two), was badly hitand required emergency evacua-tion.

Murray nevertheless kicked offhis regimental attack at 0700 onthe 22d as planned. Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, clawed itsway steadily towards the steepcrest of Hill 296, shaking off plung-ing fire from Communist positionsnorth of the Kaesong Highway (the7th Marines would not drawabreast to clear these positionsalong the left flank for anotherthree days). Taplett's Marinesmaintained a steady rate ofadvance, the most promising of the

156

week, halting only to resist compa-ny-sized counterattacks that boiledout of the draws and defiles alongthe shoulders of the hill mass.

Company H, 5th Marines,reached the hill's geographic crestby the end of the day. CorporalLarry Brom's platoon commanderdirected him to deploy his squadin a defensive sector along a groveof pine trees, and Brom supervisedhis men as they dug night posi-tions and selected interlockingfields of fire. Satisfied with theirpreparations, he took off his packand unfolded his e-tool (entrench-ing tool) to dig his own hole forthe night. The squad had beenuncommonly fortunate, Bromreflected, having lost only one manto enemy fire throughout the fight-ing along the Naktong, at Wolmi-

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A3860

Capt Francis I. "Ike" Fenton, Jr., center, enjoys a lighter Fenton's company experienced unremitting fire taking andmoment with the Commandant, Gen Clifton B. Cates. holding Hill 105-South just outside the city limits.

do Island, and the advance east ofInchon. Here on Hill 296 theirluck abruptly soured. A NorthKorean sniper shot Brom throughthe foot just after he knelt tounsling his pack. More firesprayed the ridge crest. A gray-headed Korean "papa-san" scur-ried to Brom's side, scooped himup, and carried him piggybackdown the reverse slope underintermittent fire to the battalion aidstation. Brom gave him a freshpack of cigarettes, all he possessedat the time. The old man bowed ingratitude, then returned back upthe hill. For Corporal Brom, a two-year veteran of the 5th Marines, thewar was over.

The incident of a Marine squadleader being picked off from longrange at dusk by a North Koreansniper signified two developments.The NKPA had deployed front-linetroops west of Seoul. Secondly,although the Marines had seizedthe crest of Hill 296, the NorthKoreans occupied defenses indepth throughout its massive fin-gers descending to the east andsouth.

The situation south of 3dBattalion, 5th Marines' advancevalidated these serious develop-ments. On the 22d, the KoreanMarine battalion encountered afurious fire from masked guns inevery adjoining declivity each timeit mounted an attack. Its objectivewas deceptive. Captain Fenton,operating on the Koreans' rightflank, described Hill 56 as "a veryinsignificant looking low ridge thatextended from 296 to 105-South."But the Koreans were advancingfrom low ground, through ricefields, exposed every step of theway to unrelenting artillery andmortar fire.

Murray directed LieutenantColonel Ransom M. Wood's sup-porting 1st Battalion, 11th Marines,to give the Koreans priority of

fires. He also asked General Smithfor more air support. This wasforthcoming—the 1st Marines weremopping up Yongdungpo and the7th Marines were not yet engaged.Major Arnold A. Lund led hisDeath Rattlers of VMF-323 off theescort carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE116), which the aviators lovinglynicknamed "The Bing-Ding," in 42sorties in support of the 5thMarines, the heaviest operationalrate since D-Day at Inchon.Lieutenant Colonel Norman J.Anderson, the airborne tactical aircontroller for Marine AircraftGroup 33 (MAG-33), directed thestrikes, then led one himself, a

spectacular direct hit on Hill 72 (bynow "Nellie's Tit" to the 5thMarines) that knocked out one ofColonel Wol's few tanks.Additional air strikes came fromthe newly arrived, Kimpo-basedLancers of VMF-212, commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Richard W.Wyczawski and Lieutenant ColonelMax J. Volcansek, Jr.'s night-fight-ing Tigers of VMF(N)-542.

This was spectacular close airsupport—unerringly directed anddelivered—and many NorthKoreans met their deaths from theskies, but their withering crossfirenever ceased. The Korean Marineswere literally stopped in theirtracks. The advance of Newton's1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on theright flank fared better, but only inrelative terms. Attacking across2,000 yards of open terrain costCompanies A and C dearly. TheMarines found that one particularlydeadly NKPA outpost contained aU.S. Browning .50-caliber heavymachine gun, captured during thefirst week of the war. Company Alost its last two officer platooncommanders in the assault. Thecost was endemic with the 5thMarines. Seventeen of the regi-ment's original 18 platoon com-manders had been killed or

157

wounded in the first 50 days ofcombat in Korea, along with five ofthe six company commanders.Experienced non-commissionedofficers took command of the pla-toons in Company A and contin-ued the attack on Hill 105-South.

Captain "Ike" Fenton ledCompany B through Company Alate in the day, then, leaning into afurious barrage from 1st Battalion,11th Marines, joined Company C'sdash for the crest of 105-South. Itwas a hollow victory. The battal-ion had suffered more than 40casualties, and the enemy hadmysteriously disappeared—"therewere no bodies, not even any car-tridge cases lying around," report-ed Fenton. Only later would theMarines discover the existence of alarge cave on the hill's reverseslope, now a sanctuary for the for-mer defenders, living and dead. Inthe meantime, punishing fire fromthe hills to the northeast began torake the Marines exposed on thecrest. As Heini described Hill 105-South:

[The hilli was no vacationspot. Before the sun set,enemy heavy machine gunsbegan to scythe back andforth over the hilltop, whileantitank guns, accurate as asniper's rifle and a lot dead-lier, flash-banged in withhigh-velocity rounds that leftno time for a man to duck.

This was an unwelcome devel-opment to Fenton, who had lostonly one killed and six woundedin his assault on the hill. Now,despite digging new foxholesalong the military crest, his menwould suffer stiff casualties fromtheir hostile neighbors. "We werepinned down by day and counter-attacked by night," he said. Tomake matters worse, the KoreanMarines' lack of progress left 1st

"I' clie\' the modern 'Marine Air- round Team'trul~' take, ,its ~Ieparture from t1~e Cll.l i~1 of theKOlean '\ aI', reflected reured Lieutenant

General Rob rt P. Keller, 'MC, in a recent inten ie\~.

Keller t ok command of the If-21'-l Black heep afterorth Korean antiaircraft gunner' 'hot down Lieutenantolone! \1 alt I' E. Lischeid over eoul on 25 e[nemoer

1950. omparing this experi nee with hi '\ arid \1' ar II'en'ice as a righter pilot and squadron commander inthe northern olomons, Keller painted to the emergenceof close air support in the Korean War-"by Marin s, forMarines"-as the principal differ·nce. While groundMarines had enjoyed Marine air support at Peleliu, 1\ 0

Jima, and kinawa, it was never deli ered more close­ly, nor more re ponsively than that provided oy the F+, or, airs of the 1st [arine ircraft Wing throughout

the rinal four months of 1950, from the Pu 'an Perimeterthrough lnchon- eoul to the hosin Reservoir.

~Iajor General. 'orman J. nd I' on credited the '>u ­ces of thi' air support coordination to the hard \\orkp rformed by Marine air and ground offi er in the shortinr rwar period. "The larine Corp', having learned\'aluable Ie on late in World \1 ar n, went to extrem .in the Late '40' to 'chool iLs air and ground offi erstogether and to tructure its deployments a' air-gr undteams under a Single command," he said. "This new

Marine Close Air upportin the Recapture of Seoul

structure sen'ed u· \yell, then and e\l~r since, beginningwith the air-ground compo'>ition of the I'>t Prm'isionalt\larine Brigade."

Of the four Marine righter .quadrons and t\\ a nightfighter squadrons upporting the 1st tl.larine Dh'isionduring the 33-day period from - 'eptemher to 9

ctoher, the Death Rattlers of VMF-323, commanded bylajor Arnold . Lund, saw more days in action and Ile\\

the most combat sorties (78 I, ac 'ording to the officialMarine orps history of the :coul campaign). Therecord comes with a bittersweet irony. The squadronhad been in the pro ess of a mandated deactivationwhen the war erupted, its pilots rea'>signed, iL'i planestransferred for pre en·ation. :aved at the last momel1lfrom the draconian cutbacks of the Truman

dmini tration, the Death Rattlers reassembled in recordtim. During the, eoul campaign they launched fromthe e Tort carrier Badoellf!, • Imil ( 'VE 116) in the :ca ofjapan on missions ranging from rec nnaissance to pro­paganda leallet drops, but their m st frequent missionb ' an order of magnitude \\'a,> dose air support.

The Bla k :heep pilot. of V~lf-21 Ilew ofT the e,>cortGln'ier ici~)' (CVE 1un, command d hy the legendarynaval a\'iator aptain john:. Thach, L' ,a \'\.'orld WarII ace \\'ho in 19 I] im ·nted the "Thach Wea\" .. tocounter the japanee Zero's technical uperiority over

....---.- -:- Photo 'oune,,} of LlCol Leo J Ihll, t·"\1( Cllel)

158

ircraft Wing7th Jnfanrryorp'during

the F F ~ iI Ieats. Thach became an enthusiastic adv ­cat f larin do' air supp rt. "Ir' like havingaltillery right over your houlder!" he said. During rhe• eoul ampaign, Tha h would often I a e rhe bridge roattend rh Black'h p po. t-mis i n debriefing. -The}took their work seriously. They really were rhe top pro!'.in the busine s, I think. in the whole world. I hadu'emendous admiration for them."

did the commanding gen ral of the 1:t MarineOi\ i. ion. ''The effectivenes of the Jarine air-groundteam and cl e air 'upp rt d ctrine were reaffirmedwith our tanding'u c.s," \\ r re Major General Oli\er P.Smith after the lih ration of :' uL

For the troop!'. on the ground, Mruggling to pn.'\'ailagain t a well-armed enemy they could rarely see in theopen, the firepower delivered b their fellmv JVlarinesoverh ad seemed awe 'ome. Lieutenant .10. eph R.

wen, the m rtar plat on command r in ompany B,1 t Battalion, rh larine., d •eril ed his rlfst experiencewith a cl s air strike during the hattalion' battl for aridge south I' 'ijongbu:

The first f the gull-'\ving d, dark hlue orsairspeeled from rhe ircle and d n: at the ,,'hitesmoke. I{ed tra' rs from its guns poured from thefor\' ard edg 's of the wings. The plane leveled offonly yards above the ridgeline. We c uld thepilot in th' cockpit and th big, \\. hite Jarine

orps emblem on the fuselage.... Then th [next]plane came in, this one dropping a pod of napalm.The black, coffin- haped ani ter hit the ground,kipped a few fe~t abme the urface, and expl d­

ed into a \\ all of flame that extended the length fthe . rth K reans' po 'ilion. Two hundred yartbbelow, ",e felt the ho k f its e 'pl 'ion and awave f searing hear.

, bile quail appreciative of the aviators' precisionand valor, veteran infantry ffi er aptain Fran i,; l."Ike- Fenron, Jr., commanding ompany B, 1 't Baltali )11.

5th Marine, .,ugge';ted even d adlier aerial firep werthat could upro t orth Kor ans who tookbelter incave' r railroad runnels. as the "ith Marine experiencedin rhe e tend 'd battle for I Jill 105-:outh. "The cl s airsupport in Korea by the Marine orps wa outstanding,"Fenton said, "J low v r, 1 w ukl lik to se Marine avia­tion come up with a ro ket with a napalm head. Thisro 'ket auld b great for g rling into tunnels, or intoca\ e- The K rean. shm ed great fear ~ r fireb mb .1 belie\' > a big rocket, maybe a Tin} Tim, tharcould carry a fair! good quantity f napalm, \"I:ould ban excellent wcapon,"

(aj r eneral Field rlarri:' 1st Marineai' provided close air 'upp 11 t thDivision, the th r major c mp nenr in X

the ,eoul campaign. 'uperhly a,;~i';ted by MarinCaptain harle -. rew'" Far Ea't Detachment Air andlaval unfire Liaion ompany, flcet Marine force.Pacific, the 1. t Marine ircraft Wing flew 1,02<1 sorties in'upp 11 r the Army di\ i ion in 5 cia "ith ut ainglecasualty to front-line friendl troops. despite bombingand trafing run as close a 200 yards. BrigadierGeneral Ilomer W. Kiefer, U: , commanding the 7thDivision'., al1illery. "r te an appreciati\'e leller to the

ommandant. stating: "The .\Iarine sy"tem of ( ntroL inm} estimation. appr ache!'. the ideal. and I firmly I elie\ethat aimilary tem sh uld be adopted as .,tand.lrd forArmy Oi\ isions.··

The Korean '\ ar a' a '" hole "'ould advance milital)aviarion fully into the Jet ge, and soon th L .S. irFor e would wag epi air-to-air battl 'too b tween its F-6 abers and the 'oviet-built (and often S()\'iet-flown)

MIG-r fighrers. E\'entually the larine., \Yould intro­duce in the ,;kies O'er Korea their own j t fight r, theGrumman F9F-2 Panther, \Yell armed for b th air-to-airand air-to-ground missions. It \\'a. al a the da\\. n of rheHeli opter ge, and V I -6 made military aviarion his­tory \\'hen it deployed ro PU. an with the 1st JarineBrigade in ugust 1950 "ith four ikorsky rr 3. -1 heli­copt rs.

By contrast the propdler-dri en orsair \: as n \"considered Id and slow, hampered b a light payloadcapa ity and too 'mall a fuel tank. Landing the high-rise"l'-birds- on the pit hing de k of an escort catTierremained "adventurous," e"pecially \\ ith the ship ';team­ing ""est r1y into a ,;elling ,;un. -That bright red balleemed to b silting right on the fan-tail." eneral Keller

recalled, "an I ir ",a' difficult to make our the Landingignal fficer, hi 'ignab, or even the de k. - neralnder n ited another common hazard \\ hen trying to

land an F I inro a etring sun: -The orsair frequentlymanaged to splatter the \\. indshield "ilh oiP"

Yet the or air in good hand,; prO\ ed highly reliableand durable for iL'> age and the operating conditions.The hard-working maintenance crews of V.\lf-21':lomeh \" averaged 95 percent availabilit} of the Black'heep r. air. throughout the Pusan-Inchon-. oul cam­paigns. nd in the absence of a jer-propelled nem}' airrhr ar during those r\\'o m nth ,the orsJir pro\"Cd aninvaluable contributor to th allied victories.

crtainly th ground 1arine. fighting towards Seoulor Uijongbu in the autumn of 1950 were very comfort­able \"\ ith the presen c verhead I' their protccti\'e

oro.;air, rheir familiar old -bent-\\.ing wid ",-maker," rhealta k aircraft the Japan., in the previou,; war alleged­ly nicknamed "The '\ hisrling D ath.- There is no re ordof what ni kname the '\;ol1h Koreans may ha\e used,bur judging from the e\er-increasing inren.,ity of theirground fire the mom nt the F Il s\yept into \ ie\\, it waspr bable the or airs h 'Id their highest respect, as well.

159

Battalion, 5th Marines' left flankfully exposed. Newton had to peela company back to the startingposition, and the day ended onthat sour note.

Lieutenant Colonel Murrayordered the Korean Marines toresume their assault on Hill 56 themorning of 23 September, but tryas they might the ROK troops werestopped cold by heavy fire. Noone then realized that Colonel Wolhad established his main line ofresistance along the low ridge that

passed through Hill 56. Theinsignificant-looking rise wouldbecome known as Smith's Ridgethe following day.

Murray committed his reserve,ordering Lieutenant Colonel Roiseto pass through the Koreans with2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and con-tinue the attack. Roise deployedCaptain Uel D. Peters' Company Fon the right and First Lieutenant H.J. "Hog Jaw" Smith's Company Don the left. Hugging the terrainand advancing by squad rushes,

160

both companies were able in timeto approach the higher groundwith acceptable casualties, yetboth suffered heavily in the close-in fighting that followed. This tookthe balance of the afternoon.

George Newton's 1st Battalion,5th Marines, had all it could handlethat day and night just maintainingits exposed forward position onHill 105-South. In two days spentclinging to the hill's fire-sweptcrest, Companies B and C suffered24 casualties. "All these men werehit in their foxholes," said CaptainFenton. "There was no way tokeep the enemy from deliveringplunging fire right in on top of us."

Robert Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, also had its hands fullthroughout the 23d in repellingNKPA counterattacks against thecrest of Hill 296 and trying toestablish fire superiority against theenemy on a half-dozen circlinghills. Clearly visible at one of theseCommunist strongpoints was a tall,fair-skinned officer with a charmedlife, "Fireproof Phil." He may havebeen a Soviet military advisor, butwhoever he was, Fireproof Philexhibited unflagging disdain forMarine marksmanship. When rifle-men, mortarmen, and artillerymenfailed to knock him down, Taplettordered up an M-26 Pershing tank.Sniping at Phil with a 90mm gunproved equally futile. The mandodged every round and keptexhorting his gunners to return fireuntil darkness shrouded the scene.The Marines never saw him again.

The 2d Battalion held Hill 56throughout the night, but only byits collective fingernails. Theassault companies were scatteredand vulnerable. Lieutenant Colo-nel Max Volcansek's faithful nightfighters circling overhead helpedeven the odds, but Marine artilleryprovided the greatest assistance.Wood's 1st Battalion, 11th Marines,fired all night long, illuminating the

scorched battlefield and interdict-ing potential NKPA assembly areas."I can't say enough about theartillery support we received thatnight," said Second LieutenantTilton A. Anderson, whose platoonhad been reduced to seven men inthe afternoon's fighting. "It wasmagnificent."

Major General Almond, the XCorps commander, grew impatientwith the 1st Marine Division's slowprogress north of the Han.Pressured by MacArthur to recap-ture Seoul by the third-monthanniversary of the invasion, andmindful that the North Koreanswould be fortifying the capital to agreater extent each day, Almondurged 0. P. Smith to deploy the 1stMarines well beyond Yongdungpoto attack Seoul from the southeast.Almond's operations officer reflect-ed his commander's impatience,saying: "The Marines were exas-peratingly deliberate at a timewhen rapid maneuver was impera-tive."

Smith disagreed. Seizing Inchonagainst rear-echelon troops hadbeen a relative cakewalk. Thingshad changed. The tenacity andfirepower of the North Koreansbattling the 5th Marines remindedSmith more of the Japanese atPeleliu or Okinawa. Seizing Seoulwould therefore not be quick andeasy, Smith argued, and the lastthing he wanted was to wage thatbattle with his major componentsdivided by the Han and attackingtowards each other. Almondacquiesced to this logic, but healso decided to bring in ColonelCharles E. Beauchamp's 32dInfantry of the Army's 7th InfantryDivision to attack the city from thesoutheast. Seoul would no longerbe the sole province of the 1stMarine Division. Smith agreed tomove Puller's 1st Marines acrossthe Han the next morning, thenloan the 1st Amphibian Tractor

Battalion to X Corps to transportthe 32d Infantry and the 17th R0KRegiment across the tidal river thefollowing day.

Smith knew that Almond on hisdaily visits to the front-line regi-ments had taken to giving opera-tional orders directly to Murray andChesty Puller. In a heated privatesession, Smith asked Almond toknock it off. "If you'll give yourorders to me," Smith said icily, "I'llsee that they are carried out."Neither of Almond's division com-manders, however, would success-fully cure the commanding generalof his impetuosity.

General Smith directed Puller tomake his crossing slightly west ofYongdungpo, turn right, enter thecity along the north bank, thenexecute a difficult pivot move-ment, wheeling the regimentnorth. Smith planned for Murray's5th Marines to fight their way intothe northwest sector of the city

161

while Litzenberg's 7th Marinessealed off the NKPA access routesalong the entire northern bound-ary. It was an ambitious and com-plicated plan. But the first order ofbusiness remained the destructionof the 25th NKPA Brigade in thefortified barrier ridges to the north-west.

The battle for these ridgesreached its climax on 24September. The day broke with alow-lying mist, as Companies Dand F arrayed themselves for theassault. Artillery preparationsbegan at 0610. Company Fjumped off 20 minutes later, seizedthe eastern end of the troublesomerailroad tunnel, paused to allow aCorsair strike by the Lancers ofVMF-212 (who would establish a1st Marine Aircraft Wing record of46 sorties this date), then dashedacross the low ground to capturethe heavily fortified eastern finger.This represented an encouraging

Sketch by John DeGrasseThe 5th Marines learned tank-infantry coordination under intense pressure inthe Pusan Perimeter. Here, attacking North Korean positions along the ridgesoutside Seoul, afire team keeps up with its assigned Pershing tank.

start, but Company F was spent,having suffered more than a hun-dred casualties around the southedge of Hill 56 in the past 24hours. Among the dead wasCorporal Welden D. Harris, whohad killed three North Korean sol-diers in hand-to-hand fighting andbeen twice wounded the daybefore. Company F had given itsall. Now it was all up to "Hog Jaw"Smith and Company D.

The recapture of Seoul wouldobviously require a team effort—Marines and Army, ground forcesand air squadrons. But the keys toSeoul's access really came fromtwo Marine rifle companies,Captain Robert Barrow's CompanyA, 1st Marines, at Yongdungpoduring 21-22 September, andCaptain H. J. Smith's Company D,2d Battalion, 5th Marines, duringthe 23d-24th.

Company D faced the greaterchallenge. Captain Smith had toattack about 750 yards to the

northeast across an open saddle,seize an extremely well-defendedknoll, and continue beyond alongan increasingly wooded ridge.This contested real estate becameSmith's Ridge. Easily a thousandNKPA troops defended this terrain,well covered by the same sharp-shooting gunners who had beenmaking life so miserable for the 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, on Hill 105-South.

Smith began the day with agood-sized rifle company, but themission required a battalion.Lieutenant Colonel Roise—whowould join the ranks of thewounded this day but refuse evac-uation—withheld Captain SamuelJaskilka's Company E to exploitSmith's expected breakthroughand roll up the last hills to the east.

Captain Smith sensed what hefaced and relied heavily on sup-porting arms, adding to theartillery fire missions and air strikeshis own machine guns, mortars,

and rocket launchers. Twice hepunched ahead; twice he had towithdraw with heavy casualties.Nor did a flank attack succeed. An11-man squad worked east thenattacked north. The North Koreansshot them down to a man.Abruptly Smith's company wasdown to 44 Marines, including the60mm mortar section, now out ofammunition and doubling as rifle-men.

By this time, the 11th Marineshad been bombarding the ridge-lines and reverse slopes of theobjective for more than 24 hours.Ten Marine Corsairs from theDeath Rattlers had rotated on sta-tion since sunrise, bombing, straf-ing, and dropping napalm canis-ters along the objective. YetColonel Wol's antiaircraft gunnershad taken a toll: five of theCorsairs received extensive dam-age. Smith knew he was down tohis final opportunity.

Smith called for a four-plane fir-ing run, asking that the fourthCorsair execute a low but dummypass to keep the enemy in theirholes until the last possiblemoment. Major Lund's Corsairpilots flew this mission beautifully.As the third plane roared overheadSmith leapt to his feet screaming"follow me!" His Marines sweptforward just beneath the lastCorsair's low-level, ear-splittingrun.

"Over they went," describedCaptain Nicholas A. Canzona ofthe engineer battalion in a 1956Marine Corps Gazette account,"yelling wildly and firing theirrifles, carbines, and BARs[Browning automatic rifles]. Theyentered upon a scene of carnagestretching out in every direction.Driving forward through thehuman wreckage, they shot andbayoneted anything that moved."

"Hog Jaw" Smith died at the bit-ter end, becoming Company D's

All it took was one North Korean prisoner 0/war to whip a pistol or grenade fromunder his loose clothing and attack his captor. Thereqfter the Marines took nochances. Naked prisoners proceed under armed guard past a destroyed T-34tank to a prison camp.

National Archives Photo (USA) 1 i1-SC349027

162

36th fatality of the assault. SeizingSmith's Ridge in fact cost the com-pany 178 casualties of the 206 menwho had advanced across the val-ley the previous day. But thereverse slopes of the complexlooked like a charnel house. Thesurviving Marines began to countthe windrows of NKPA bodies,most blasted hideously by Marine105mm howitzers, Corsairs, andmortars. They reached 1,500 andhad to stop counting; the task wastoo gruesome.

Company D had knocked downthe center door to the 25th NKPABrigade's defenses, but more sav-age fighting remained to clear thefinal path to Seoul. CaptainJaskilka's fresh Company E movedthrough the gap between the rem-nants of Companies D and F, butencountered an extensive mine-field and stubborn resistance onNelly's Tit and Hill 105-Centralbeyond. The division engineerscleared the mines, but ridding thelast hills of their die-hard defend-ers took Jaskilka another 24 hours.Lieutenant Colonel Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, had a corre-spondingly difficult time snuffingout Hill 105-North. In close com-bat reminiscent of the CentralPacific in World War II, most of theenemy chose to die in place.Colonel Wol's fate remainedunknown, presumed dead.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,managed to maintain its precarioushold on the crest of 105-Southwhile at the same time dispatchinga large combat patrol down to theriver to cover the crossing ofPuller's 1st Marines. The nefarioushill would still represent a hornet'snest to all would-be occupants. Itwould take a combined assault bythe 1st and 5th Marines and anarmored column to close the caveand cut down the final defenderslater that day.

The 5th Marines' three-day bat-

tle for the northwestern ridgesmade possible a surprisinglyuneventful tactical crossing of theHan by the 1st Marines. The 2dand 3d Battalions crossed by LVT5;the 1st Battalion and Puller's com-mand group made the crossing inDUKW amphibious trucks. NKPAopposition proved negligible.Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. "Jim"Crowe, who had created order outof chaos seven years earlier onTarawa's Red Beach Three, swiftlydeployed his 1st Shore PartyBattalion along the landing site tokeep troops and cargo movinginland, avoiding a dangerous bot-tleneck. Puller hustled his battal-

163

ions eastward into the city, growl-ing at the long time it would takehis Pershing tanks to cross at theHaengju ferry further downstreamand work their way back along thenorth bank.

General Smith finally had allthree of his infantry regimentsnorth of the Han and roughly inline. This same day, LieutenantColonel Litzenberg's 7th Marinesexperienced its first significantcombat against an NKPA outpost tothe northwest of Seoul. ForSecond Lieutenant Joseph R.

Owen, commanding the 60mmmortar section in Company B, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, the moment

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC349090

A wounded Marine is carried down from the front lines on the ridges northwestof Seoul. The 5th Marines' three-day battle for the ridges made the uneventfulcrossing of the Han by the 1st Marines possible.

Marine Combat Vehicles in the Seoul Campaign

The Marines mostly fought the first months of theKorean War with hand-me-down weapons andequipment from World War II stockpiles. In the

case of combat vehicles, however, the Corps invested intwo critical upgrades that provided a tactical edge in therecapture of Seoul: the M-26 Pershing medium tank andthe LVT-3C amphibian tractor.

The sturdy M-4 Sherman tank had served the Marineswell in the Pacific War from Tarawa through Okinawa,and by 1950 the tank battalions in the Fleet Marine Forcewere still equipped with the M-4A3-E8 "Easy Eight" ver-sion, featuring a 105mm gun. Yet the Sherman's successin the Pacific War was deceptive. Japanese tanks hadprovided no particular threat, the vehicle's narrow trackwidth and high ground pressure had posed mobilityproblems in marginal terrain, and the Sherman's notori-ously thin side and rear armor protection had proveninadequate against the enemy's 47mm antitank guns.The Sherman's prospects did not look favorable againstthe battle-proven T-34 medium tanks that the SovietUnion exported to client states like North Korea at theonset of the Cold War.

The Marines had foresightedly invested in the Army'sacquisition of the M-26 Pershing 90mm-gun tank late inWorld War II. Their vehicles did not arrive in time forcombat validation in Okinawa; nor could the postwarCorps afford to place them into operation, so thePershings sat for several years in contingency reserve atthe Marine supply base in Barstow, California.

When the Korean War erupted, the Commandant

ordered the 1st Tank Battalion to deploy with the newPershings in lieu of its Sherman "Easy Eights." The hastytransition was not pretty, especially in the case of thereinforced company assigned to the 1st Brigade for itsearly-July deployment. Few tankers had the opportuni-ty for hands-on operation and maintenance training.The gunners were lucky to be able to fire two roundseach—and they had to use the more abundantly avail-able 90mm antiaircraft rounds instead of the new butscarce high-velocity armor-piercing munitions. Andsince none of the new Marine Pershings were config-ured as flamethrowers or dozer-blade variants, the bat-talion sailed with an awkward mixture of old Shermansalong with the M-26s, the making of a logistical night-mare.

The ragged transition made for an inauspicious com-bat debut for the Marine M-26s in Korea. Operating inthe Pusan Perimeter southwest corner, one Pershingbroke through the planking of a critical bridge, height-ening fears that its 46-ton weight would prove too heavyfor Korea's road network. A second vehicle threw atrack while fording a stream, blocking the crossing.Things improved. The Marine Pershings establishedtheir dominance in a head-to-head engagement againstT-34s in the first battle of the Naktong Bulge, then con-tinued to sweep the field as the 1st Marine Divisionadvanced on Seoul. The Sherman blade and flame vari-ants also contributed materially, especially in the closeengagement waged by Baker Company's tanks againstcave-infested Hill 105-South on 25 September.

A Marine LVT-3C Bushmaster from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion transfers troops to an LCVP.Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A162956

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National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC348713

In the battle of downtown Seoul, the Pershings ofLieutenant Colonel Harry T. Mime's 1st Tank Battalionprovided the crucial edge, time and again crashingthrough the North Korean barricades despite intense firefrom the enemy's ubiquitous 45mm antitank guns. Thebattalion's War Diary for September reported thedestruction of 13 NKPA tanks (which may have includ-ed several 76mm self-propelled guns) and 56 antitankguns or antiaircraft guns being fired horizontally at theapproaching Pershings. The battalion lost five Pershingsand one each of the flame and dozer Shermans in therecapture of Seoul.

The L\'T-3C Bushmaster proved to be another smartinvestment for the Marines. Borg Warner's original LVT-3 had developed slowly during World War II, reachingthe Fleet Marine Force out of numerical sequence andmore than a year behind rival Food MachineryCorporation's LVT-4. Borg Warner built nearly 3,000Bushmasters for the Marine Corps. The first vehiclesarrived in time for the Okinawa invasion in the spring of1945.

The Bushmaster was a welcome addition to theMarines' ship-to-shore team. Like its FMC predecessor,the Bushmaster came with a hinged rear ramp and suf-ficient cargo space to accommodate either a jeep or a105mm howitzer. By mounting its twin Cadillac V-8engines along the sides of both hulls, the Borg Warnerengineers provided the Bushmaster with a cargo capac-ity that exceeded the LVT-4's by 3,000 pounds.

Faced with the need to upgrade their amphibian trac-tor fleet during the austere late 1940s, the Marines optedto modernize 1,200 low-mileage LVT-3s by raising thesides, installing aluminum covers over the troop/cargocompartment, and installing a small machine gun turret

atop the cab. The Marines designated their newly mod-ified vehicle the LVT-3C, and it proved remarkably wellsuited for both salt-water and fresh-water operationsthroughout the Korean peninsula. (The Republic ofChina Marine Corps employed American-built LVT-3Cson Taiwan for a quarter of a century after the KoreanWar).

The Bushmasters of Lieutenant Colonel Erwin F.Wann, Jr.'s 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion deliveredMarines ashore at Inchon, transported each regimentplus the Army and ROK regiments across the Han underfire, and served as armored personnel carriers and cargovehicles overland.

The 1st Marine Division was similarly well-supportedby the versatile DUKWs of the 1st Amphibian TruckCompany, an element of Lieutenant Colonel Olin L.Beall's 1st Motor Transport Battalion. (DUKW is not anacronym but an arcane industrial code used in WorldWar II meaning an all-wheel-drive utility vehicle withtwin rear wheel axles manufactured in 1942—DUCKS"to Marines!)

Unfortunately the Marines fought the Inchon-Seoulcampaign without the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion.General Smith left the battalion with the division's rearechelon in Kobe as a temporary repository for the 500-plus, 17-year-olds ruled ineligible for combat by theSecretary of the Navy on the eve of the Inchon landing.The X Corps commander partially offset this lost capa-bility by attaching the Army's Company A, 56thAmphibian Tractor Battalion, to the Marines. The Armycompany's 18 LVTA-5s equipped with snub-nosed 75mmhowitzers spearheaded each river crossing, thereby prov-ing themselves worthy recipients of the Presidential UnitCitation subsequently awarded the 1st Marine Division.

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several hundred thousand civilian

was unforgettable:

The North Korean mortarscame. Spouts of earth andblack smoke leaped about us,laced with flame and scream-ing shrapnel. The leavesfrom the bean plants spun influrries, and the groundshook. I was suddenly in themidst of a frenzied storm ofnoise.

By the nature of their northernmission the 7th Marines wouldhave scant contact with the otherelements of the 1st Marine Divisionin the fight for Seoul. The othertwo regiments, however, wouldexperience a dangerous interface,the 1st Marines attacking norththrough the heart of the city, the5th Marines coming in from thenorthwest.

Concerned with the inherentrisks facing these convergingforces, Lieutenant ColonelRaymond Murray boarded a heli-copter late in the afternoon of 24

September and flew to ChestyPuller's command post to coordi-nate the final assault. It was thefirst time the two commanders hadever met. Characteristically, Pullerinquired of Murray the extent ofthe casualties he had sustainedfighting for the northwest ridges."He determined how good a fight-er you were by how many casual-ties you had," Murray recalled.Murray's grim accounting of the5th Marines' losses during the pre-ceding three days made evenChesty Puller blink. The men thengot down to work.

This was the time and settingwhen Captain Robert Barrow'sCompany A, 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, seized Hill 79 and raisedthe first flag in Seoul proper. The1st Marine Division had enteredthe capital.

The Fight for Seoul

Seoul in 1950 was home to morethan a million people, the fifthlargest city in the Orient. While

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residents had fled the capital at theoutbreak of the North Korean inva-sion, tens of thousands remained.Chesty Puller had ruefully predict-ed to a news correspondent thatthe North Koreans would defendthe city in such a manner as toforce the attacking Marines todestroy it. The ensuing three dayswould validate Puller's prediction.British correspondent ReginaldThompson would write despairing-ly: "Few people can have sufferedso terrible a liberation."

X Corps launched its assault onSeoul proper the morning of 25September. Lieutenant ColonelEtwin F. Wann, Jr.'s 1st AmphibianTractor Battalion displaced duringthe night to Sansa-ri, a former ferrycrossing 5,000 yards east ofYongdungpo. There, reinforced byArmy LVTs of Company A, 56thAmphibian Tractor Battalion, theMarines embarked the 2dBattalion, 32d Infantry. Followinga brief artillery and mortar barrage,the Amtracs plunged into the Han,shook off a few 76mm rounds, andat 0630 disembarked the soldierson the far bank. Four Corsairsfrom Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid'sVMF-214 Black Sheep squadron offthe Sicily worked just ahead of thebeachhead, coordinated by Marinetactical air control parties providedthe 7th Division for the occasion.

The Army regiment completedthe crossing by mid-afternoon andseized South Mountain, the 900-foot eminence (the Koreans callNam-san) dominating southeasternSeoul. Late in the day, the 1stAmphibian Tractor Battalion deliv-ered the 17th ROK Infantry acrossin trace, an exposed crossing thatattracted considerably more NKPAlong-range fires. Yet by nightfallall of General Almond's maneuverelements were in place north ofthe river.

General 0. P. Smith worried that

Painting by Go! Ghar!es H. Waterhouse, USMCR (Ret

"First Firefight Above Seoul, B/1/7" portrays the intensity of night action thatgreeted the 7th Marines as they advanced to cut the roads leading north fromSeoul.

the presence of the two additionalregiments on his right flank wouldcreate dangerous crossfires andaccidental meeting engagements,hut the Army units maintainedtheir positions on and aroundNam-san, defending against majorcounterattacks, and later assaultedtowards the east, well clear of theMarines' zone of action. No signif-icant control problems developed.

At 0700 on the 25th, the 1stMarine Division kicked off itsassault on Seoul. The plan ofattack developed by Smith and hisoperations officer, Colonel AlphaL. Bowser, Jr., placed the biggestburden on the 1st Marines. Puller'sregiment would attack to the norththrough the heart of the city on amile-and-a-half front, bordered byNam-san on the right and the Duk

Soo Palace of the ancient rulers ofKorea, on the left. Smith assignedthe 1st Marines Objective Able, thehigh ground just beyond the city'snortheastern limit, about six milesfrom Captain Barrow's forwardposition on Hill 79. Murray's 5thMarines would attack the north-west section of the capital, like-wise on a mile-and-a-half front,seize Government House andObjective Baker, the high groundoverlooking the Seoul-Uijongburoad from their dearly won posi-tions along the Hill 296 complex.Litzenberg's 7th Marines wouldseize Objective Charlie, the highground along the Seoul-Kaesongroad six miles outside the city cen-ter. Smith continued his reinforce-ment of the 1st and 5th Marineswith one battalion each of Korean

Marines and assigned the balanceof the Korean regiment as divisionreserve. Smith also attached thedivision Reconnaissance Companyto the 5th Marines to screen thehigh ground along its left flank.The 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne,under the operational control ofthe 1st Marine Division, wouldprotect the Marines' western flankbelow the Han.

Colonel James H. Brower con-centrated most of the howitzers ofhis 11th Marines in firing positionson the south bank of the Han nearYongdungpo. The big 155mmhowitzers of the Army's 96th FieldArtillery deployed nearby, ready tosupport either the Marines or theArmy, as needed.

The action for the 5th Marineson 25 September was largely deja

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated PressThe Marines fought two enemies in downtown Seoul—those ingly hidden in every other window.who defended behind the barricades and the snipers seem-

167

vu, the unfinished and still costlybusiness of eliminating the residualpositions of the 25th NKPABrigade along the eastern fingersof Hill 296 as described earlier.Here on two adjoining knobs,Company E, 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, and Companies H and Iof 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,engaged the North Koreans inbloody close combat, again most

ably supported by Marine Corsairs.By now the 19th NKPA

Antiaircraft Artilleiy Regiment hadlearned how to deal with the terri-fying strafing runs by MarineCorsairs. Increasingly, those anti-aircraft gunners who survived thenorthwest ridge battles would turnSeoul into a "flak trap." September25th reflected this new lethality, aparticularly costly day for Marine

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Corsair squadron commanders.With the escort carrier Sicily and itsembarked VMF-214 Black Sheepscheduled to rotate back to Inchonfor repairs and resupply that after-noon, Lieutenant Colonel WalterLischeid led the final sorties in sup-port of the Army's river crossings.A North Korean gunner hit hisCorsair over Seoul. Lischeid triedto nurse his crippled plane toKimpo field but crashed in flamestwo miles shy of the airstrip.

In other aerial action on the25th, Lieutenant Colonel RichardWyczawski, commanding theLancers of VMF-212, was woundedand shot down by hostile fire. So

was Lieutenant Colonel MaxVolcansek, commanding the night-fighting Tigers of VMF(N)-542,who barely bailed out before hisplane crashed near Kimpo.Marines flying Sikorsky H035-1helicopters from MarineObservation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)rescued both officers—Volcansek'srescue helicopter pulled him out ofa rice paddy in a record six min-utes elapsed time following notifi-cation—but all hands regretted thedeath of Lieutenant ColonelLischeid.

Major Robert P. Keller, who hadcommanded three squadrons inthe Pacific War, took over theBlack Sheep. When a fellow avia-tor remarked, "Now you are theacting commanding officer," Kellerretorted, "Acting, hell—I'm seri-ous." Keller maintained the VMF-214 commitment to launching five-plane strikes every two hours. TheBlack Sheep pilots first plasteredthe ridge from which the antiair-craft battery had fired on Lischeid,then spent the remainder of theday delivering ordnance againsttargets ranging from railroad yardsin the North Korean capital ofPyongyang to enemy troop con-centrations in downtown Seoul,the other capital.

The nature of Marine close airsupport changed as the campaignentered the streets of Seoul. AsLieutenant Colonel NormanAnderson subsequently noted:"Bombing by its very nature gaveway to the more easily accuratetechniques of rocketing and straf-ing. . . . I feel we became increas-ingly aware of the need to avoidwhat we now call collateral dam-age." The Corsair's 20mm cannoncould deliver a hellacious strafingrun, but the "bent-wing U-Birds"could only carry 800 rounds, limit-ing the extent of this application.Anderson wistfully recalled hisdays of flying Marine Corps B-25sin the Philippines late in WorldWar II, "a memorable strafer with14 forward-firing, .50-calibermachine guns. Many's the time wemight have put them to good usesupporting Marines in the streets ofYongdungpo and Seoul. Alas, theywere not carrier suitable."

On the ground in Seoul on 25September progress came grudg-ingly to the 1st Marines despite its

early start. Puller passed Ridge's3d Battalion, 1st Marines, throughSutter's 2d Battalion, while, toRidge's right, Hawkins adjusted the1st Battalion's positions along Hill79 to accommodate the 90-degreepivot to the northeast. This done,the regiment advanced methodi-cally, Ridge and Hawkins abreast,Sutter in close reserve. The NorthKoreans resisted savagely, andPuller looked often for his miss.ingtanks, still completing their longrun east from the Haengju ferrycrossing the previous afternoon.

Fresh minefields and suddenambushes slowed Captain Bruce F.Williams' tank company, rein-forced by a platoon each ofinfantry and combat engineers,once they crossed the river. As thearmored column approachedSeoul they drew fire from thesoutheast corner of Hill 105-South,still unconquered despite CaptainFenton's seizure of the crest threedays earlier. This time, finally, theMarines had a force on the groundwith the firepower, mobility, and

shock action to finish the job. Thetankers and engineers blew away aline of shacks blocking the base ofthe hill, thereby discovering thehidden cave mouth, and moved aflame tank up to the opening.Sensibly, the North Koreans beganto surrender, one or two at first,then more than 100, outnumberingtheir captors.

The Marines to this point rou-tinely made each prisoner of warstrip buck naked, but they wereshocked to find two womenamong this crew. Someone help-fully provided two pairs of longjohns for the occasion, but theAmerican press had a field daywith the matter later, once thewomen got to the rear and com-plained. But it was a no-win situ-ation for the Marines. The NKPAoccupants of that cave had killedMarines from five different battal-ions; they were quite fortunate toescape the flame tank's horrors.As it was, other NKPA troops near-by had no intention of surrender-ing to the Marines. As StaffSergeant Arthur Farrington report-ed:

The enemy wounded werehoisted on board the tanks,129 bare asses were lined upthree abreast [between thevehicles] . . . when about 40-50 [North] Koreans jumped upto the left of the railroadtracks. They had been lyingtheir doggo behind us all thetime. We killed them withrifle, machine gun, and 90mmfire as they went across thepaddies.

Captain Williams was under-standably exultant as he led hiscolumn with its rich prizes intoSeoul, but when he tried torecount the unit's success at 105-South to Chesty Puller, the colonelcut him short, saying, "I'm not

A Corsair Jlight on a close air support mission against targets in North Korea andaround the South Korean capital.

Photo courtesy of LtCol Leo J. IhIi, USMC (Ret)

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A3380

Marine riflemen and tanks advance north under/Ire along Seoul's princi pal boulevard.

interested in your sea storiesyoung man. You're late. We'vegot fish to fry."

Puller sorely needed the tanks.The North Koreans defendingSeoul lacked the numbers to occu-py every building or side street, sothey concentrated instead on themajor avenues and thoroughfares.By now each significant intersec-tion in the city featured an impro-vised barricade, typically protectedby rice bags filled with sand orrubble, piled eight feet high by fivefeet wide, and defended by anti-tank guns, heavy machine guns,and mines. Marine historian Colo-nel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., likened thescene to 19th century France:"Every intersection was barricadedafter the fashion of the ParisCommune: carts, earth-filled ricebags . . . furniture, and rubble."The Soviet Union's official newspa-per Pravda compared the situationin Seoul to the Russian defense of

Stalingrad in World War II: "Thereis firing behind every stone."

The axis of advance ofLieutenant Colonel Ridge's 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, was directlyup Ma Po Boulevard towards theembassies and principal govern-ment buildings. Major EdwinSimmons later compared his com-pany's advance to "attacking upPennsylvania Avenue towards theCapitol in Washington, D.C." Theboulevard was straight and wide—"once a busy, pleasant avenuelined with sycamores, groceries,wine and tea shops," according toHeinl. Trolley car tracks ran downthe middle. Now NKPA barricadesmushroomed at each intersection.Enemy snipers fired from blownout windows. Other NKPA troopslobbed Molotov cocktails from therooftops onto the Marine tanks inthe street below. And throughoutall this mayhem fled thousandsand thousands of terrified Korean

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refugees. Mines accounted forappalling casualties among them.

At one point Captain RobertBarrow halted his company alonga particularly advantageous rise ofground overlooking the railroadyards and passenger station. Foronce he could clearly see theenemy troops moving into newpositions, building fresh barri-cades, and preparing futureambushes. He called in artilleryand mortar fire, employed hismachine guns and rocket launch-ers, enjoying his dominant posi-tion. Strangely, he said, LieutenantColonel Hawkins kept urging himto advance. "We thought we werehaving a turkey shoot," Barrowrecalled. "Nobody getting hurt and[usi knocking the hell out of them,"but Hawkins said, "What's holdingyou up—move out!" WhenBarrow tried to explain his favor-able position, Hawkins repliedbluntly: "Unless you want a new

Street Fighting, 1950

Marines bauling their \ a through the cant stedboulevards and back all ys of eoul ineptember 1 5 did so without benefit of the

mod rn-da' doctrine and training for "military opera­tion' in urban terrain. ,. treet fighting at that time wa~ anun ammon (arine experien 'e. There had been ablood} two-day fight in downtown Vera Cruz, Mexico.in 191'1, where ~Iaj I' 'medle D. Butler and LieutenantColonel Wendell . "Whi~pering Bu k" e ille led theirmen with a. es and bayonet~ in attacking through thewalls of the row-hou es. Thirty ye~lr' later, a differentgen ration f larines fought the Japane e through theburning streets of Garapan, 'aipan, and again on a larg­er scale in the spring of 19q5 amid the rubble of aha,Okinawa.

But Seoul dwarfed Vera nJZ, Garapan. and 'ahacombined. n enormous, sprdw ling city dominated bysteep hill~, awash with terrified refugees, and 'tautlydefended b more than 20,000 'orth Kore:ln, eoulcan. tituted the I:lrge~t, . ingle objective ever a~signed the

{\farine~. lIue City in 196H \\ ould take the !\(arine~

longer [() recapture, but the c:l~ualties incurred at Ifu ..bad as the~ were, \YOlIid not total half lho.'e sustainedby the I~t larine Di\'ision at. e ul.

'tre t fighting in : oul involved for ibly uprootingthe \'KP troops from either their roadl lock barric:ldesor th ir isolated strongpoints \"ithin or atop th build­ings. Both required te:lmwork: ngin er~, tank, andinfantry for the barri 'ades (often .,uppOI1 d by artilleryor orsair strikes), and rifle squads supported hy rocketlaunchers and scout-sniper teams against the strong­poinr~.

Door-to-door fighting prO\ed to be as ten'e and" hausting in 1950 as it had be'n in Vera Cruz in 191,1.s Private First las. Morgan Brainard of the 1st ,\1arines

recalled the action: "The ten~ion from these little forays\\ hittled u~ pI' rry keen .... I think if one'~ oW'n moth­er had suddenly leapt out in front of us sh would havebeen cut down immediately, and we all \\'ould probablyhave che red w'ith the break in ten. ion." Brainard'scompany ommander, aptain Robert H. Barrow', laid alleadquarter~ l\larin orps tactics re\ ie\" board in ]951

that he quickly came to valu' the 3. ';-inch 1'0 ket1:Iuncher in application~ other than antitank defen. e."We employed it in a "ery effectiv manner inYongdungpo and in 'eoul in the destruction of houseslhat had enemy in them. In many instanc's [our] .1,';[gunn rsJ ~imply :o.hot at . orne of these fragile hou.,e.,killing all the occupants."

The pI' ~ence of s) many 'i' ilian refugees in thestreets and rubble vastly complicated the battle andnecessitated extraordinary measures to ensure targetidentification and limit indiscriminate firing. \X1henewrtroops SLOpped to reorganize" hildren appeared amongthem," observed the L(fe magazine photographer DavidDouglas Duncan. " hildren gentle and tiny and w ide­eyed as they fa"tened lhemselves [0 th men who firstign red them ... then dug them their 0\\ n little fox.hole~

and ,p '111 adapted helmet., to fit their baby head~."

Enemy snipers, mines, and long-range. heavy caliberantitank rilles took a LOll among larines and iviliansalike. The ancient city becam a ghastly killing ground.

battalion commander, you willattack at once." Barrow managedto convince Hawkins to come andsee the situation for himself.Hawkins marveled at the abun­dance of targets under directobservation: "Get more mortars inthere-get more artillery."

Yet Hawkins remained agitated,

and Barrow soon saddled up hisgunners and forward observersand plunged fOlward downhill intothe maze of streets and railroadtracks Od Battalion, 1st Marines,had Ma Po Boulevard; 1stBattalion, 1st Marines' axis ofadvance was less straightforward).Barrow and other junior officers in

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the 1st Marines later concludedthat the pressure to advance hadcome down several echelons, pos­sibly from the Tokyo headquartersof General MacArthur in his desireto recapture the capital by thesymbolic third-month anniversaryof its loss. "Who knows?" Barrowasked rhetorically. "Puller was

The front lines were jagged; theNorth Koreans occupied severalworrisome salients in close prox-imity.

Ridge directed Major Edwin H.Simmons, commanding WeaponsCompany, to coordinate the battal-ion's forward defenses. Simmonsfortified the roadblock with tworifle squads, a section of his

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

The North Koreans built their barricades with burlap bags filled with dirt, rubble,or rice. Each position took the Marines an average of 45 to 60 minutes to over-come. Here a Marine rifleman scampers through a recently abandoned barri-cade during heavy fighting in Seoul's downtown business district.

Browning heavy machine guns, arocket squad, and a 75mm recoil-less rifle section borrowed fromthe regimental antitank company.After supervising his attached engi-neers as they laid a series of anti-tank mines on the bridge,Simmons established his observa-tion post (OP) in the cellar of anabandoned house on a rise to theleft rear of the roadblock, protect-ed by four additional heavymachine guns. His 81mm mortarplatoon occupied uncommonlyclose firing positions 150 yardsrearward, connected by phone

being pushed by somebody in Under the watchful gaze of Joseph Stalin and Kim Il Sung, Marines crouchdivision. The division was being behind a barricade as enemy snipers resist their advance.

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck Magazinepushed by someone in TenthCorps, and the corps was beingpushed by the man himself, orsomeone speaking for him, back inTokyo."

Top-level pressure notwith-standing, the two lead battalions ofthe 1st Marines could advance only2,000 yards on the 25th. "Ouradvance this day was a foot-by-foot basis," said Lieutenant ColonelRidge. North Korean minesknocked out two of CaptainWilliams' Pershing tanks; othervehicles sustained multiple hitsfrom direct fire weapons. Ridgehunkered in for the night alongHill 97; Hawkins occupied Hill 82to Ridge's immediate right rear.Company G and WeaponsCompany of 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, occupied the forwardposition, a roadblock protecting akey bridge on Ma Po Boulevard.

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wire to the OP. These were rea-sonable precautions given thevolatile nature of the street fightingduring the day and the nearby re-entrants occupied by the NorthKoreans. Parts of the city stillburned from the day's fighting, butthe streets seemed quiet.

Then, shortly after 2000, a flashmessage from X Corps arrived inthe division command post. Aerialobservers had just reported

"enemy fleeing city of Seoul onroad north of Uijongbu." GeneralAlmond, sensing a great opportu-nity to crush the North Koreans,ordered an immediate advance bythe 1st Marine Division, stating:"You will push attack now to thelimit of your objectives in order toinsure maximum destruction ofenemy forces. Signed Almond."

The flash message stunnedColonel Bowser. The order was

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rife with unanswered questions—did Almond envision a five-milenight attack through the heart ofthe city by converging regimentsout of direct contact with eachother? And, by the way, howcould an aerial observer distin-guish at night between a columnof retreating troops and a columnof fleeing refugees? Bowser calledhis counterpart at X Corps withthese questions but got nowhere.Neither did General Smith amoment later in a call to Almond'schief of staff. Smith shook hishead and ordered his regimentalcommanders to comply—carefully.Throughout their smoking third ofthe city, the 1st Marine Divisionstirred and bitched. As one com-pany commander queried: "A nightattack without a reconnaissance orrehearsal? What are our objec-tives?" Private First Class MorganBrainard recalled the grousing inthe ranks that night: "We were allrousted out and mustered downon the darkened street by pla-toons. Scuttlebutt said we weregoing into the heart of Seoul in asurprise night attack."

After allowing his regimentalcommanders plenty of time tocoordinate their plans, GeneralSmith ordered the advance to kickoff at 0145 following a 15-minuteartillery preparation. The enemymoved first. Before midnight a siz-able NKPA force hit LieutenantColonel Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, on Hill 105-North.Lieutenant Colonel Murray and hisexecutive officer attempted tomake sense of the situation: "I'm

afraid we'll have to delay pursuit ofthe 'fleeing enemy' until we see ifTap can beat off the counterat-tack."

As Major Simmons listeneduneasily to the sounds of Taplett'sfirefight, less than 1,000 yardswest, he received a call from

Lieutenant Colonel Ridge ordering

crowded city.

him to dispatch a patrol to linkwith a similar patrol from the 5thMarines to facilitate the forthcom-ing night attack. Simmons protest-ed the order. From the volume offire to the west, a considerableNKPA force had moved betweenthe two regiments. "I doubted apatrol could get through," saidSimmons. Ridge repeated theorder. Simmons assembled apatrol of Company G riflemen, ledby Corporal Charles E. Collins.They departed about 1245. "I feltlike I was kissing them goodbye,"

Simmons admitted.The onset of the artillery

preparatory fires heightenedSimmons' concern for his patrol.Colonel Puller worried that the firewas inadequate for a generalassault. At 0138, he asked Smithfor a second fire mission, delayingthe jump-off time to 0200. Fifteenminutes later the whole issuebecame moot.

Major Simmons first heardsounds of a nearby firefight andrealized Collins' patrol had beenintercepted. A moment later, at

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0153, he heard the unmistakablesounds of tracked vehiclesapproaching the roadblock fromthe north, along with an almostinstantaneous crack! of a Soviet T-34 85mm tank gun. The shellmissed Simmons by inches andkilled his radio operator at his side.Shaken, Simmons sounded thealarm. Far from fleeing the city,the enemy—at least this particularbattalion of the 25th NKPABrigade—was charging due southdown Ma Po Boulevard with six to12 tanks and self-propelled guns,accompanied by infantry. As hisroadblock defenders cut loose onthe enemy tanks, Simmons calledfor artillery and 81mm mortar con-centrations along the bridge, andthe battle raged. General Smith,sobered by the ferocity of theNKPA assaults, postponed the divi-sion's night attack indefinitely.

The Marines would soon call thenorthwestern nose of Hill 97"Slaughterhouse Hill," and from itsslopes this night they inflicted akilling zone of epic proportionsagainst the attacking armored col-umn. Three battalions of the 11thMarines fired incessantly the next90 minutes. At that point the tubesbecame so hot the howitzers hadto ceasefire until they could cooldown. In the lull, the NKPA tankssurged forward again. Simmonsunleashed his beloved heavyBrowning machine guns. "In thelight of the burning buildings," hesaid, "I could see three {tanks}clearly, rolling forward on [the]boulevard about 500 yards to myfront." Simmons saw the tracersfrom the Brownings whanging offthe faceplates of the tanks. Heasked for 155mm howitzer firefrom the Army. The 31st FieldArtillery Battalion responded withawesome firepower—360 roundsalong 3d Battalion, 1st Marines'direct front.

Chesty Puller did not recognize

Sketch by Col charles H. Waterhouse, USMCR (Ret)

A Marine artillery forward observer team adjusts supporting Jires on enemy bar-ricades in downtown Seoul. The firing batteries were south of the Han River.Forward observer teams had to adjust their fire with utmost precision in the

the radio call sign of the Armyartillery liaison officer coordinatingthe 155mm howitzer missions thatnight, hut he knew first-class firesupport when he saw it. "This isBlade," he growled into his hand-set, "I don't know who in the hellyou are, hut thank God! Out."

The Army fire mission destroyedor disabled the last of the NKPAtanks threatening the 3d Battalion'sroadblock, hut several immobi-lized vehicles maintained a stub-born fire. One self-propelled guncontinued to fire at Simmons'observation post, each shellscreeching overhead barely adegree in elevation too high.Simmons feared the coming dawnwould make his position terriblyexposed, so he moved one of the75mm recoilless rifles from theroadblock to the rubble-strewnfront yard of the abandonedhouse. The crew stared anxiouslyinto the darkness just north of thebridge, hoping to get off the firstshot at dawn. Finally, in the grayhalf-light, the gunner spotted theenemy vehicle and squeezed histrigger. The round was a pin-

wheel hit—the self-propelled gunburst into flames. But the Marineshad forgotten to consider the backblast of the recoilless rifle. "Itbounced off the mud-and-wattleside of the house behind us andknocked us head-over-heels,"Simmons said, adding "we thoughtit very funny at the time."

Sunrise brought Simmons morewelcome news. Corporal Collins,having ordered the rest of hispatrol hack to the roadblock attheir first encounter with theapproaching NKPA armored col-umn, covered its retreat with riflefire, and then took refuge for thenight in a cellar. Somehow hefound a set of white robes com-monly worn by the Korean civil-ians. Thus attired, he made hisway through the still-dangerousstreets to the 3d Battalion, 1stMarines' lines and safety.

The North Koreans executed athird major spoiling attack at 0500,launching a reinforced battalionagainst the 32d Infantry's positionson Nam-san. The Army regimentstood its ground and did not getrattled when one company was

overrun. Making good use of hissupporting arms, Colonel CharlesBeauchamp organized a counterat-tack that drove the enemy out ofthe position and inflicted severalhundred casualties.

At daybreak, Colonel Pullerarrived at Lieutenant ColonelRidge's position. "You had bettershow me some results of thisalleged battle you had last night,"he warned. Ridge was unper-turbed. He showed Puller thewreckage of the NKPA vehiclesnorth of the bridge, the ruins ofseven tanks, two self-propelledguns, and eight 45mm antitankguns. At least 250 dead NorthKoreans lay in clots along theboulevard (the official figure of475 may have included those slainby Lieutenant Colonel Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, that samenight), and there were more than80 prisoners in hand. The Marines'side of the battlefield seemed cov-ered with a river of spent brassshell casings. Major Simmons' 10Browning heavy machine gunshad fired a phenomenal 120 boxesof ammunition during the night-—30,000 rounds, a feat that even sur-passed the volume fired by the leg-endary Sergeant "Manila John"Basilone at Guadalcanal in 1942 inPuller's old battalion. ColonelPuller flashed a rare grin.

Time magazine's combat corre-spondent Dwight Martin describedthe battlefield the morning of the26th, as Sutter's 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, passed through Ridge's1st Battalion:

This morning Ma-Po worea different look. The burnedand blackened remains of theboulevard's shops and homessent clouds of acrid smokebillowing over the city.Buildings still ablaze show-ered sparks and ashes highinto the air to cascade down

Marine riflemen evacuate their wounded buddy under heavy enemy fire.Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC35 1385

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This page and the next, str''t fighting in Seoul as captured by Life magazine photographer David Douglas Duncan.

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