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Incentives and corruption in Chinese economicreformChengze, Simon FANLingnan University, Hong Kong, fansimon@ln.edu.hk

Herschel I. GrossmanBrown University, USA

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Recommended CitationFan, C. S., & Grossman, H. I. (2000). Incentives and corruption in Chinese economic reform (CPPS Working Papers Series no.103).Retrieved from Lingnan University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp/111

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No. 103 (6/00) CPPS

INCENTIVES AND CORRUPTION IN CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM

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Dr. Chengze Simon Fan and Professor Herschel I. Grossman

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lncentives and Corruption in Chinese Economic Reform

Dr. Chengze Simon Fan and Professor Herschel I. Grossman

June 2000

。 Chengze Simon Fan and Herschel 1. Grossman

Dr. Chengze Simon Fan is Assistant Professor of Department of

Economics, Lingnan University, Hong Kong.

Professor Herschel 1. Grossman is Professor of Economics , Department

of Economics, Brown University, USA.

Centre for Public Policy Studies

Lingnan University

Tuen Mun

Hong Kong

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commen t. Opinions expressed in them are the author's and should not be taken as

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be freely circulated but they are not to be quoted without the written pem1ission of the

author. Please address comments and suggestions to the author.

Incentives and Corruption in Chinese Economic Reform

C h e n gze Simon Fan

Lingnan University

H e r sch e l 1. Grossman

Brown University

Abstnαct

This Pαper α可ues th叫 ， given th e l egα cy of Chiηese communzsm αηd its political struc­ture , co付uption， together with the threαt of punishment for co付uptwn αnd th e selec tive enforcement of this threαt ， serves αsα method of compensαtion thαt both sαtisfies th e politi­cal obj ectives of the Communist Pαrty αnd provides αn effective inducement to locα1 officials to promote economic reform

KeY\'lords: Incentives , Corruption , Economic Reform , China , Communist Party JEL Classifìcation Numbers: D78 , P21

1月le thank Minseong Kim and two anonymous referees for helpful comments

Many observers have suggested that a large part of the success of the Chinese economic

reform is attributable to the transformation of the typical local government official from

being an unproductive political entrepreneur prior to reform to being a productive economic

entrepreneur after reform. As Weiyi時 Zhang and Gang Yi (1996) point out ,

Many reform programs have been initiated by locals and even by the grass-roots ,

and then recognized and adopted as national policies by the central government

Much of the planning system was dismantled by locals. Many locals have been

far ahead of their national leaders in reforming the economy.

Emphasiz呵 the initiatives of local officials , Kang Chen , G. Jefferson , and 1. Singh (1992)

characterize economic reform in China as being both a top-to-bottom and a bottom-to-top

process

At the same time , and apparently paradoxically, both Chinese and foreign observers re­

port that economic reform in China has been associated with an epidemic of corruption

among local government 0侃CJ悶als. Melan凹 Manion (1997 , page 34) observes that "of the

54 countries ranked by the Berlin-based public interest organization , Transparency Interna­

tional , according to the prevalence of corruption in 1996 , China ranked 50th: corruption was

judged more pervasive only in Bangladesh , Kenya , Pakistan , and Nigeria ."

Taken together these observations are puzzling. How can pervasively corrupt local of­

ficials be the key to the success of economic reform? Furthermore, why do the Chinese

authorities tolerate widespread corruption among those agents whose performance is essen­

tial to economic reform?

This paper attempts to answer these questions. We first elaborate on why the actions of

local officials have been critical in China's economic transition. Then we explore how local

officials have been motivated to promote economic reform and why the Chinese authorities

are willing to live with this way of motivating local 0伍cials. Our analysis wiU develop

the following hypothesis: Becαuse of the legαcy of σ12nese comr月untsm αnd its politicαl

structure, cor門tp tion ， together 凹的 lhe lhr -eal of punishment for corrupliοηαnd the selec live

en.f.ο rcement of this threat, serves αsα method of compensαtion thαt both satisfies the politicαJ

objectives of the Communist Party αnd provides αn ejJective inducement to locα l officials to

promote economic reform

In arguing that selective toleration of corruption “works'\ we a re not claiming ei ther that

all of the widespread corruption that we observe in China is instrumenta l or that corruption is

not to some extent incidental , in the sense of being a concomitant of economic reform that is

beyond the power of the authorities to prevent without incurring large costs . We also are not

claiming that selective toleration of corruption is an optimal method of compensation , eithel

from the perspective of the Chinese authorit ies of from the perspective of the average Chinese

person . But , we are claiming that , whether the adopt ion of the policy of selective toleration

of corrup t ion was active or passive , there a re good reasons for the Chinese authorities to live

wi th this policy.l

The idea t hat corruption can facili tate economic development is not new. 2 But , a lthough

t he literature discusses various positive effects of tolerating corruption , it does not a ddress

the question of why the authorities li ve wit h a policy of selectively tolerating corruptio丸

when feasible alternatives presumably exist. Writing about contemporary China , Howard

Davies (1 995 , page 165) points out that “oppo山川ies for corruption arise to a very great

extent because of t he administrative controls which st ill remain in the Chinese economy and

because the government of t he PRC has not yet established m echanisms for preventing the

abuse of these controls". Still , the question remains of why the Chinese authorities have not

lIn contrast to some literature - 5前， for example, Abhijit Banerjee ( 1997) 一 our analysis does not

assume that the authoriti臼 have limited ability to punish corruption . We rationali ze tolerance of corruption

without assuming that the authoriti郎， by imposing sufficiently severe penalties on enough corrupt local

officials, could not eliminate all or most corruption

2Samuel Hunti時don (1968) is a classic reference. Francis Lui (1985) provid臼 an example of a formal

model of the benefits from corruption

2

eliminuted the conditions that breed corruption among local officials

The Dual-Track Economy and the Role of Local Officials

Although recognition of the e伍ciency of a market economy relative to central planning

was an important motivation for the initiation of economic reform in China , the Chinese

have not as yet completely eliminated central planning as a coordination mechanism for

production and exchange. Instead , China has adopted a dual-track economy (Shuα句 Gui

Zhi) , which involves the coexistence of central planning with a market mechanism for the

allocation of resources. Olivier Blanchard and Michael Kremer (1997) argue convinci時ly

that the dual-track economy, preserving elements of central planning, has helped China

to maintain economic growth during the transition to a market economy. Blanchard and

Kremer sharply contrast China 's smooth transition to the “disorganization" and associated

collapse of production during the transition to a market economy in the states of the former

Soviet Union. Lawrence Lau , Yi時yi Qian , and Gérard Roland (2000) argue further that

the dual-track economy has provided a way to compensate potential losers from economic

reform in China

A criti callegacy of central planning in China , which remains important in the dual-track

economy, is Guanxi arrangements , whereby "personal connections刊 among government of-

ficials and firm managers control the allocation of resources. Under Guanxi firm managers

have to maintain good relations with relevant government 0伍cials and managers of other

firms to ensure the provision of supporting resources (e.g. electricity, water , etc.) and the

timely delivery of necessary raw materials and intermediate goods. Davies (1995) describes

how Guαnxi has evolved in China as a response , rooted in Chinese culture, to an underde-

veloped system of property rights and contract law

In this environment the transformation of local 0伍cials from unproductive political en­

trepreneurs to productive economic entrepreneurs has been critical to the success of Chinese

economic reform for two apparent reasons: First , because government 。但cials had the high-

3

est social and economic status prior to reform , they are likely to include some of the most

talented people in China. Second, in the dual-track economy, especially with the contin­

ued impo1'tance of Guαnxi ， local officials continue to play an critical 1'ole in coordinating

production and exchange

In post-refo1'm China local 0伍cials are often de facto managers. Fo1' example , Jean Oi

(1995 , 1998) thinks the role of local officials in the economy is so important that she terms

China 's current political-economic system "local state corporatism刊﹒ As Oi observes (1995 ,

page 1132) ,

The state responsible fo 1' much of this growth is locα1 governments that t 1'eat

enterprises within their administrative purview as one component of a large cor­

porate whole . Local officials act as the equivalent of a board of directors and

sometimes more directly as the chief executive officers

In anothe 1' p1'ovocative study entitled "Local Governments as Indust1'ial Firms ," Andrew

Walder (1995) argues that local officials in China 's dual-track economy and corpo叫e hier­

archies in a market economy play similar roles in coo1'dinating production and exchange

Oi claims further that , in response to the new incentives associated with Chinese economic

reform , local 。而cials not only imp1'oved thei 1' e伍ciency in coordinating production and

exchange , but they also began actively to play some new roles. 3 According to Oi (1995 ,

pages 1139-1140) ,

Within a local corporatist context local officials turn the administrative bureau­

cracy - of which they are part 一 into a free channel for information and re­

sources to facilitate market production ... Using information and contacts that

they develop beyond the locality through their routine conduct of administra­

tive work , local officials can provide an array of essential services to their local

3For other relevant studies of enterprise management in China, see Andrew Walder (1 998) , Jane Duckett

(1996) , and David Li (1996)

4

enterprises. This might include raw materials , but increasingly, it has become im­

portant for information about new products , technology and markets for fìnished

goods .. .Iρcal CadleS use their expansive connections and bureaucratic position

to secure information that wiU serve local economic growth

What is Corruption?

It is important to be clear about how we are defìning corruption. On our defìnition cor­

ruption is , in the words of Melanie Manion (1997) ,“the use of public office to pursue private

gain in ways that violate laws and other formal rules. 刊 We use this legalistic defìnition for

three reasons: First , this defìnition accords with everyday language. Second, this defìnition

is used in in the compilation of data and is implicit in quantitative observations about the

amount of corruption . Third , and most importantly, this defìnition does not prejudge the

economic consequences of corruption

Instead of our legalistic defìnition many authors implicitly adopt an economic defìnition

that equates corruption with purely unproductive rent-seeking activity.4 By abstracting from

the positive incentive effects that we emphasize , these authors presuppose that corruption

has only a negative effect on economic performance. In contrast , without denying that some

of the corruption that we observe iri China involves unproductive rent seeking, we want to

allow for the possibility that corruption also includes practices that enhance productivity

Our legalistic defìnition of corruption , which accords with everyday speech and with measures

of corruption , does not preclude the conclusion that tolerance of corruption can promote

economic reform and improved economic performance

Manion (1997) associates corruption in China with two general practices: One practice

involves local officials who exploit their positions to extract bribes or to arrange nepotisti c

favors . This practice is often referred to as tαnwu shouhui in Chinese. The other practice

4S間 ， for example, Dan Usher (1 992) , Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vish叮 (1993) ， and Isaac Ehrlich and

Francis Lui (1999)

5

involves local officials who misappropriate public property or public funds for personal ben­

efit. Examples include the use of public property or public funds to obtain lavish housing

and fancy cars or to travel abroad. This practice is often referred to as nuoyong goηgkuαn

in Chinese

Corruption as a Method of Compensation

What has motivated local 0伍cials to become efficient economic entrepreneurs? More

completely, what have been the incentives for local 。而cials to promote economic reform ,

and what has been the system of rewards and punishments through which these incentives

have been implemented?

Some recent literature argues out that a positive relation between the economic perfor­

mance of a region and local tax revenue provides local Chinese officials with incentives to

promote economic reform and growth. For example , Susan Shirk (1993) claims that "fiscal

decentralization is the ‘cornerstone ' of China 's economic reform . 刊 In an interesting compar-

ative study, Roger Gordon and David Li (1997) claim that local officials have much more

strongly supported new non-state firms in China than in Russia , because local governments

can obtain revenue from taxes on new entrants in China , but not in Russia

The existing literature, however, does not adequately address the critical question of ho \V

localo伍cials themselves benefit from the increased revenue in their administrative region

Although Oi , Walder , and other observers emphasize the role of local officials in coordinating

production and exchange and in providing information about new products , technology, and

markets , their writings do not explain how the Chinese local 0伍cials are compensated for

these essential services

As Jane D

formal employees of firms. Then how do the firms compensate these officials? Two practices

suggest themselves: the extraction of bribes or nepotistic favors (tαm山 sho的ui) and the

appropriation of public property or public funds for personal benefit (nuoyong gongkuαηj

6

Both of these practices are forms of corruption. In fact , fiscal decentralization facilit ates

both of these form s of cOLTuption , and the Chinese authorities have vigorously promoted

fiscal decentralizati on. Both of these observations are consistent with our view that much of

the corruption that we observe in China is instrumental

The Economic Function of Corruption

Does selective toleration of corruption provide an effective inducement to local 0伍cials to

promote economic reform? To motivate local 0伍cials ， who are its agents , the Chinese central

government , as principal , would like to reward behavior that contributes to good economic

results and to punish behavior that contributes to bad economic results. But , the central

government cannot perfectly monitor the efforts of local 0伍cials. Given their better access

to informa tion , loca l 。而cials often are able to conceal from the central government that a

good outcome resulted from good luck rather than from extra effort or that a bad outcome

resulted from poor e叮or t rather than from bad luck. Local officials naturally will exaggerate

both the importance of their e旺。rts in producing a good outcome and the importance of bad

luck in producing a bad outcome

As Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti (1996 , 1999) argue , the problems of incom­

plete information and asymmetric information between principal and agent , which compli­

cate many principal -agent relations , are probably even more severe in poor and developing

economies like China than in Western economies. The extensive literature on the principal­

agent problem generally concludes that , although incomplete and asymmetric information

compli cates the design of incentive schemes , Western economies have invented and imple­

mented methods of compensati on that work reasonably well to motivate agents. As this

li terature expla ins , incomplete and asymmetric information lead the principa l both to de­

centralize the de termination of compensation and to share the profits and losses of the

enterpri se with the agent. 5

5 Edward Lazear (1 995) provides a comprehensive su附y of this li terature

7

The important observation is that in China the use of corruption as a me t. hod of com­

pensation embodies a decentralized compensation scheme and a sharing of pro fì. ts and losses

in much the same way as methods of compensation implemented in \Vestern economies

Corruption , whether in the form of 的nW1L shou/wi or n1wyong gongk1L an, mitigates the prob­

lem of measuring and monitoring economic performance because those local 0伍cials who

make the largest economic contribution are likely to be able to extract the largest bribes or

nepotistic favors or to have the most valuable public property to appropriate. Also , the com­

pensation that local officials obtain through corruptio九 particularly in the form of bribery,

is paid directly by local firms , which have the best information on the performance of local

o伍cials

Importantly, the Chinese authorities have eschewed the explicit implementation of meth司

ods of compensation commonly used in Western economies to solve the problems of incom­

plete and asymmetric information. Nominally the incomes of local 。而cials are fixed and

unrelated to their performance. The fact that the Chinese authorities have not instituted

any alternative mechanism for providing appropriate incentives to local 0伍cials is consistent

with ourγiew that much of the corruption that we observe in China is instrumental

Political Advantages of Corruption as a Method of Compensation

That selective toleration of corruption is a workable solution to the problems of incom­

plete and asymmetric information by itself does not explain why the Chinese authorities are

willing to live with this policy. It is also important that political considerations mitigate

against the implementation in China of incentive schemes and associated methods of com­

pensation used in Western economies. G These political considerations are both a legacy of

the strategies adopted by the Chinese Communist Party in establishing its rule and a prod-

6In cOlltrast Daron Acemoglu and Th凹ry Ve山er (1998) suggest a purely economic rationale for the

existence of corruption in the presence of asymmetric information. In their model corruption is incidental ,

in the sense of being too costly for the authorities to prevent , rather than instrumental

8

lIct of the Party 's goal of maintaining its cohesiveness and absolllte political power , which

continlles to yield large benefits to Party members

Most importantly, lIsing selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensation

creates a sitllation in which the Party hierarchy always “has something刊 on most Party

members and local officials. As Susan Shirk observes (1993 , page 144) ,

Because an individual knows that higher-ups could charge him with corruption

at any time , lack of exposure is in effect special treatment for which the official

gratefully exchanges his political support

Using selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensation enhances the control

of the P arty hierarchy over Party members and local 。而cials and helps the Party hierarchy

to maintai n its political power while it is decentralizing economic decision making

Other political considerations also may be relevant. For example , Party propaganda has

always claimed that every member of the Chinese Communist Party is a sel fl.ess “public

servant of the people" . Even today the Party 's General Secretary, Jiang Zemin , admonishes

his compatriots “to learn from the sel fl.ess example of Lei Feng刊 An expli cit system of

material incentives and rewards for local officials , most of whom are Party members , would

be inconsistent with this propaganda and with the myth of the benevolent nature of the

Party

In addition , although many government officials and Party members play important eco­

nomic roles in China 's dllal-track economy, many others , including many of those connected

with the army, are responsible only for political , military, and other non-economic activities

An explicit system of material incentives and rewards for economic performance would un­

dermine the political and social standing of those government officials and Party members

who are not involved in economic activities. The Communist Party, like any political organi­

zation , is a potentially fragi le coalition , and jealousy and dis content , especially in the army,

would threaten its cohesiveness. The use of selective toleration of corruption as a method of

9

compensation , by avoiding exp1icit compensation of 10ca1 offi cia1s for good l'runomir perfur­

mance , helps to preserve the p01itica1 and socia1 standing of those government 。而cia1s and

Party members who are not contributing direct1y to the success of economir refolln

Punishment of Corruption

Manion (1997) provides a detai1ed description of the apparent e叮Orts uf th佇 Chinese

centra1 government to contr01 corruption. A1though Manion con fì. rms repor t.s of severe P\ In­

ishment , and even execution , of corrupt 。而cia1s ， she a1so con fì. rms the ob的 vation t. hat en-

for cement of anticorruption measures has been high1y se1ec t. ive . As Shirk pυmtsυ Ilt. (199 :1 ,

pages 143-144) , “Despite all the ta1k about corruption , Party and governmcnt 1eaders haw

punished few corrupt officia1s 刊

The threat of punishment for corruption together wi t. h th e se1ective enf()tTem f'l\ t of thi s

threat apparent1y serves two purposes . First , with 自sca1 decentra1ization and with ruttllp t. iotl

as a method of compensation 10ca1 officia1s proximate1y determine their 0\\'11 rompcnsa t. iυn

To make this system work e叮ective1y the Party authorities must deter 10ca1 (J fficia1s from be-

ing excessive1y corrupt 一- that is , from appropriating for themse1ves more t. han the amount

to which they are entitled. Second, in order for the use of corruption as a method of compen­

sation to enhance the Party 's hierarchica1 contr01 structure , the Party authorities must show

that they are willing to punish any corrupt 0伍cia1 whose p01itica1 allegiance has become

suspect

If se1ective t01eration of corruption is to provide appropriate incentives , t. hen it mus t. be

the case that the more effort that a 10ca1 officia1 makes to promote good economic resu1ts the

1ess 1ike1y he is to be punished for corruption. There are reasons to expect the administration

of punishment for corruption to work in this way. Most importantly, the more inrome t. hat

an efficient but corrupt 10ca1 officia1 generates for his region , the more va1uab1e he is to the

citizens of his region and to the central government , both of whom share il1 thisνrospert t.y ，

and the greater is the chance that any potentia1 rep1acement for this corrupt 1υca1 officia1 wiU

10

n υ t perfυ叫rm a臼s well. Th孔叫us丸， even if a local 0 侃c1 a叫l '冶s corrupt behav叫10r IS re叭1

l昀s t. he economi c 1νJe剖rfOl口mη1an ce 0叫f h圳11S r閃'egIOn九1川， the more likely t仙ha叫t the cent仇i九ral government will

aostain from pun ishing h im , beyond perhaps a slap on the hand. In contrast , cOrrllpt local

officials who seem easily replaceable , or , more generally, whose corrupt behavior is ou t of

proportion to their perceived value , are likely to be the hapless victims of crackdowns on

corruptIOn

In addition , the more income that an efficient but corrupt local official generates for hi s

region , the more he can appropriate for himself while sti ll leaving enough fruits of progress

for ordinnry people to assuage their natural jealousy of his privileged position. Accordingly>

t. he oetter the economi c performance of his region , the less likely are ordinary people to

sqlleal on a corrupt loca l offi cia l or to complain about him. In contrast , a corrupt local

υ而 rial \\'h ose region 's economic performance is poor is likely to encounter popular pressure

to Pllnish him . 1n SI I帆 although ， as Shirk notes (1993 , page 144) ,“Laxi ty toward official

COITllp tJ υ11 can be viewed as a side payment to officials to give them a personal stake in

refurm刊， selective punishment of corruption is essential to both the credibili ty and e伍c1 ency

of the use of corruption as a method of compensation

Future Prospects

Our analysis of selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensat ion in China

has focused on the strategic interactions between Party authorities , acting t hrough t he cen­

t ral govemment , and the local 0伍cials who , given the legacy of Chinese central planninιare

efft'r t. ivel!' responsib le fυr promoting economic reform. We have viewed the central govern­

ment as t he principal who determines the compensation scheme for local officia ls. The main

implicatiun of our analys is has been that corruption , together with the threat of punishment

for corrllpti on and t he select ive enforcement of th is t hreat , serves as a method of compe~­

sat ion tha t both sa t. isnes t he ν ol i t i ca l objectives of the Communist P arty and provides an

efft'rtive il1 ducemen t. to lucal officials to promote economic reform

11

As evidence for our claim that much of the corruption that we observe in China is ins t. rll­

mental rather than incidental, we have pointed to three other aspects of Chinese ('conomic

policy that complement and support the use of corruption as a method of ∞mpensatlOn

First , the Chinese authorities have actively promoted the fìscal decentralization t.hat cre­

ates the opportunity for corruption by local offìcials. Second , the Chinese allthorities have

not instituted any alternative mechanism for providing incentives to local offìcials. Third ,

the enforcement of anticorruption measures , including punishments for corrllption , has been

highly selective

What does our analysis imply for the future course of China's economic refonn? The

credibility and effectiveness of a compensation scheme that involves the t. hreat IIf pll l\ i 只 hmcnl

for corruption and the selective enforcement of this thrent Je jJC' nd cri tic[\ 1 hυn 1' \11 h the

central government 's reputation for reliability and its s llr v i\'只 1 probauility. If t.!w 叭叭'int!

prospects of the current central government were to becom C' \lI1 cC' rtain , ancl If loc l\ l oflìci[\1s

were to anticipate that regardless of their economic per fÚllllnnc C' they ha\ ' ，、[\ S川 1St nnt I 只 l

probability of being replaced as a result of political changes , then the thrent IJf pll l\ ishmcnt

would be unlikely to deter them from engaging in excessive co rrllpti on. This ouservation

suggests that the success of the Chinese model of economi c reform , a model that is itself a

product of the Communist Party 's goal of maintaining its rohesiveness and nlJsυ1111 1' Pυlitiral

power , has depended on the Party 's ab ility to ach ieve this gonl. lf t. he futulρlni ngs th rea ts

either to the stability of the Party 's hierarchy 0 1' to its monopoly of politiral po\\'凹， then

China will have to 且nd another way to support economi c incen t. ives and to maintain t'cυnOlnlC

growth during the transi tion to a market economy

In any event , there is widespread agreement that China 's current dual-trnrk economy is a

transitional state that will evolve in the future into a predominantly market ecυnom~'. B叭 ， as

we have observed , selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensat. iυn is associated

with the critical role played by local 0伍cials in the dual-track economy. J> 1l'sU Inl\lJ IYI the

evolution towards a market economy will imply a decrease in the impo r t.nnceυf (,'rumxi ,

12

an associated decrease in the economic importance of local officials , and a transition to

methods of compensation similar to those implemented in Western economies . China 's

prospective entry into the \月vorld Trade Organization is likely to accelerate these tendencies

How economi cally and JJoliti cally disruptive these changes will be remains to be seen

13

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Lau , Lawrence , Yingyi Qian , and Gérard Roland (2000) , "Reform witho叫 L肘此 An Inter­

pretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition ," Jour'7Lα 1 of Polilical eCono1凡Y，

14

108:120-143

Lazear , Edward (1995) , P ersonnel Economics, MIT Press : Cambridge , MA.

Li , David D. (1996) , “Costs and Benefits of Government Control During the Transition:

Theory and Evidence From China's State Enterprises ," University of Michigan , mimeo

Lui , Francis (1985) ,“An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Jourγ叫 of Political Ecoη­

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Ma叩m叩on丸， Melanie (1997) ，“"Co叮rrupμtion and Corruption Control: More of the Same in 1996 ,"

Chinα Revie叫 33-56

Oi , Jean (1995) , “The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy," The Chinα

Quα吋erly， 144: 1132-1149

Oi , Jean (1998) ,“The Evolution of Local State Corpo叫ism ，刊 Chapter 2 of Zo叩mg m

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15

Research Fellows

Centre for Asian Pacific Studies Ccntre for Public Policy Studics

Professor Kueh, Yak-yeow, Director Professor Ho , Lok-sang , Dircctor

Professor 8ridges, 8rian, Professor Dr. Chc，以'ai-kin 、 AEP

Dr. Chan, Che-po, A TP Dr. Fan‘C. S imon 、 ATP

Dr. Cheung, Kui-yin, AEP Dr. Law , Wing-k 川、 Kenneth. 八T I'

Dr. Fan, C. Simon, A TP Dr. Lcc ‘ Kcng-mun , Willialll. 八 EI'

Dr. Hiroyuki , 1m缸 ， AEP Dr. Lelln心 Kit-fll l1 ， 8eatricL'.八日，

Mr. K wok , Hong-kin, A TP Dr. Li , Pang-kwong , A TP

Dr. Lee , Keng-mun, William , AEP Dr. Lin ‘ PinιATP

Dr. Lei , Kai-cheong , ATP Dr. Siu , Oi -ling, A TP

Dr. Leung , Kit-fun, 8eatrice, AEP Dr. Yoon, Thomas , AEP

Dr. Li , Pang-kwong, A TP Dr.以le i 、 X iangdo ng, AEP

Dr. Ren , Yue, ATP

Dr. Yoo n, Thomas , AEP

Dr. W凹 ， Xiangdong, AEP

Dr. Wong , Yiu-chun皂， ATP

All the Research Fellows listed above are staff of Department of Economics , and Department of Politics and Sociology. Interested staff from othcr academic departmcnts of thc University and other institutions are welcome to join thc Ccntrcs as Research Fc \lows or Research Associates. Please contact Dr. Raymond Ng (Tc l. 2616 7427) for furthcr informatÎon

AEP = Associate Professor A TP = Assistant Professor

Working Papcr Scrics

No. Topic Author

45 (1/97) CA J>S China and the Prospects for Economic Integration Professor Y. Y. Kuch within APEC

46 (2/97) CAPS Export Competition Among China and ASEAN in the Dr. Thomas J. Voon and US Market: Application of Market Share Models Dr. Xiangdong Wei

的 (3月7) CAPS Hong Kong's Outward Processing Investment in China: Dr. Kui-yin Cheung Its Implications on Hong Kong Economy

48 (4/97) CAPS China - Taiwan's Trade and Investment Relations and Dr. K. C. Lei their Impact on Taiwan 's Income Distribution

49 (5月7) CAPS Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment in China: Dr. C. Simon Fan An Application ofthe Transaction Cost Approach

50 (6/97) CAPS Japancse FDI , Exports and Technology Transfer to Dr. Elspeth Thomson China

51 (7月7) CPPS Incomc Protcction and the 日出rly ﹒ Dr. Willialll Keng-mun Le巴An Examination of Social Security Policy in Singapore

52 (8月7) CAPS Old Ally Vers l1s New Friend: China's Economic Dr. 8rian 8ridges Relations with the Two Koreas

53 (9/97) CAPS Hong Kong as a Financial Centre ofGreater China Professor Y. C. Jao

54 (10月7) CAPS The Econo ll1 ic Link- l1 p ofHong Kong and Gl1angdong: Professor Sh l1-ki Tsang and Structural and Developmental Problems Dr. Yuk-shing Cheng

55 (11/97) CPPS Electoral Cleavages and the Post-1997 Hong Kong's Dr. Pang-kwong Li Political Dynamics

56 (12月7) CPPS A Study ofOccupational Stress, Job Satisfaction, and Ms. Oi-ling Si l1

Ql1 itting Intention in Hong Kong Firms: The Role of Locus of Control and Organizational Commitment

57 (13N7) CP I'S A Modcl of Human Nature and Personal Development Professor Lok-sang Ho

58 (14N7) CI'PS Wagc CO ll1 pcnsation for Job Risks: The Case ofHong Dr. W. S. Siebert and Kong Dr. Xiangdong Wei

59 (1 SN7) CI'I'S Positive Effects of Modernization on Later Life Dr. Kenneth W. K. Law

60 (16月7) CP I'S Filial Picty and Caregiving 8urden in Shanghai, Professor William T. Liu , J>eoplc's Rcpublic ofChina Professor Elena S. H. Yu ,

Professor Shang-Gong Sun and Professor Yin Kean

No. Topic Author

6 1 ( 1 7月 7) CPPS How to Help the Reh abilitated Drllg Abll se rs No l 10 l)r. Wai-kill (ï比Relapse to Drugs Again? A Success ful Case . Hong Kong

62 ( 18/97) CPPS The Yallle ofTime and the Interaction of the Q lIanlily & Dr. Chengze Simon Fan the Quality of Children

63 (19/97) CPPS Generational Dependency and Elderly Care: Dr. Ying-yi Ilong and A Psychological Interpretation ofCultural Norl1l s and Professor William T. Liu Exchange

64 (2 0/97) CPPS Living Arrangements and Elderly Care: The Casc of Profc ssor Rance P 1.. Lcc 、

Hong Kong Dr. Jik-J ocn Lce , Professor Llcna S. 11. YlI‘

Professor 只hang-Gong Sun alld Professor William l . Lill

65 (2 1/97) CPPS The Social Ori gin of Al zheimer's Di sease: A Palh Professor William T. Liu and Anal ys is Professor Shang-Gong SlI n

66 (22/97) CAPS Country of Origin Rules: Its Origin , Nature and Professor l.廿 \..- san g. 11 廿

Directions for Reform

67 (23月7) CAPS A Long Term Monetary Strategy for Hong Kong and Professor Lok-sang 11 0 China

68 (24/97) CPPS Are Union Jobs Worse? Are Governmenl Jobs Better') Pro fessor J 廿hn S. Ilcy叭'ood.

69 (25 /97) CP PS Restructurin g the Party/state Relations China's Political Structural Reform in the 1980s

70 (26月7) CPPS Estim ating British Workers' Demand for Safety

71 (2 7月7) CPPS Managerial Stress in Hong Kong and Taiwan : A Comparative Study

Professor \'丸 ， 只 . Sic h<、鬥 and

Dr. Xiangdong Wt'i

Dr. Yill-chllng W0n g.

Dr. Xi angdong Wei

Ms. Oi-ling Siu , Dr. Luo Lu and Professor Cary L. Cooper

72 (2 8月 7) CPPS Teaching Social Science in the East Asian Context Professor William T. Liu

73 ( 1/98) CPPS Interpreting the Basic Law with Chinese Characteri stics Professor James C. Hsiung

74 (2月8 ) CPPS Worker Participation and Firm Performance: Evidence Professor Jolm T. ^ddison. from Germany and Britain Professor W. Stanlcy Siebcrt 、

Professor Joachim Wagncr and Dr. Xiangdong Wci

75 (3月 8) CPPS The Nature of Optimal Public Policy Professor Lok-sang Ho

t'I~~ Topic

76 (4月8) CPPS Symbolic ßOllndaries and Middle Class Formation in Hong Kong

77 (5月8) CPPS Urbanization in Sha Tin and Tuen Mun - Problems and Coping Stratcgies

78 (6月8) CAPS Coping with Contagion: Europe and the Asian Economic Crisis

79 (7月8) CAPS New World Order and a New U.S. Policy Toward China

80 (8月8) CPPS Poverty Policy in Hong Kong: Western Models and CulturalDivergence

81 (9月8) CAPS The Paradox of Hong Kong as a Non-Sovereign International Actor

82 (1 0月8) CAPS Political Impacts ofCatholic Education in Decolonization : Hong Kong and Macau

83 (11/98) CAPS The Rise and Fall ofthe HK Economy

84 (12月8) CAPS 中國貿易保護代價的測算 方法、結論和意義

85 (13月8)CA叭 中國居民收入差距的擴大及其原因

86 (14198) C八I'S The Labor Incomc Tax Equivalent ofPrice Scissors in Pre-Rcform China

87 (15NK) CPPS Complcmcntarity、 1 nvestment 1 ncentives , and Evolution of Joint Ventllres

88 (16/98) CP J>S A Thcory of Ilealth and Health Policy

89 (1/99) Cpp只 Towards a Ncw Intcrnational Monetary Order: The World C lI rrcncy Unit and the Globallndexed Bond

90 (2月的 CPPS Age Differences in Work Adjustment: A Study ofMale and Female Managerial Stress, Coping Strategies and Locus of Control in Hong Kong

91 (3N~) CAI刑八 Comparative Study of Managerial Stress in Greater China: Thc Direct and Indirect Effects of Coping Strategies and Work Locus of Control

Author

Ms. Annie H. N. Chan

'。

1 ,“ KI ou wk kc nLA ---9U

L--叮

gg nHr-­O

刊

H

到

rev­MM

Dr. Brian Bridges

Professor James C. Hsiung

Dr. William Lee and Professor John Edwards

Professor James C. Hsiung

Dr. Beatrice Leung

Profi巴ssor Lok-sang Ho

張曙光教授

趙人偉教授 、 李寶教授

Dr. Hiroyuki Imai

Dr. Ping Lin and Dr. Kamal Saggi

Professor Lok-sang Ho

Professor Lok-sang Ho

Dr. Oi-ling Siu, Professor Paul E. Spector, Professor Cary L. Cooper, Dr. Kate Sparks and Dr. lan Donald

Dr. Oi-ling Siu , Professor Paul E. Spector, Professor Cary L. Cooper, Dr. Luo Lu and Dr. Shanfa Yu

No.τ~p~ AU!..' lO r

92 (4月的 CPPS Implementing Effïcient Allocations in a Modc l of Professor I:dward J. Cì rccn alld Financiallntermediation Dr. Ping Lin

93 (5/99) CPPS R & D Incenti ves in Vertically Related Indllstri cs Dr. Samiran 13ancrjcc and Dr. Ping Lin

94 (6月9) CAPS Testing for a Nonlinear Relationship among Dr. YlIe Ma and FlI ndamentals and Exchange Rates in the ERM Dr. Angelos Kanas

95 (7/99) CPPS Health Care Delivery and Financing: in Search of an Professor Lok-sang 1-1 0

Idea l Model - Reflections on the Harvard Report

96 (8月的 CPPS A Strllctllral Eqllation Model ofEnvironmental Attitllde Dr. Oi-ling Sill and and 8ehaviollr: The Hong Kong Experience Dr. KlI i-yin Cheung

97 (9/99) CAPS Hong Kong's Inflation lI nder the U.S. Dollar Peg: Thc Dr. Hiroyllki Im ai 8alassa-Samllelson Effect or the DlI tch Disease')

98 ( 1/00) CAPS Strllctural Transformation and Economic Growth in Dr. Hiroyllki Imai Hong Kong: Another Look at YOllng's “ A Tale ofTwo Cit i 巴s"

99 (2月0) CAPS Corporati sm and Civil Society in thc People ' s Rcp lI hlic Or . Wong 、 1 1I -chllll 位 and

of China: Ell1 pirical Evidence and Theoretical Dr. Chan ( hc-po 1m pl ications

100 (3 /00) CAPS Globalization and Sino-A ll1 erican Econo ll1 ic Rclatil) IlS Profcssor C I-'rcd Ikr).!st l' n

101 (4/00) CPPS Government Expenditures and Eqllilibrillm Rea1 汁。 fcssor f{ ρnald) Bah er且 all ， 1

Exchange Rates Dr . Jcffrey 11 . Bcr恨、trand

102 (5 /00) c rp s A Case Study of Economic Ecology: The Hong KOll g Profe ssor Lok- sang 1-/ 0

Economy' s Plunge into a Deep Recess ion in 1998

103 (6/00) CPPS Incentives and Corrllption in Chinese Economi c Dr. Chcng/c Simon Fan and Reform Professor IIcrschcl 1. GroSS l1l<l1l

A fll llli st ofwork ing papers titles is al so available at the Centre homepag肘: http ://www.ln .eduhkJcaps/ and h ttp ://\叭νw . ln .edll . hk/cpps/

香港屯門

嶺商大學

合共政策研究中心

Centre for Public Policy Stucli的Lingnan University

Tuen Mun, Hong I(ong

Tel: (852) 2616 7432 Fax: (852) 2591 0690