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Incentive Restaurant Owners and Managers Conflic ts

Incentive Conflicts

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Incentive conflicts in the workplace. Economics of Organizations and Corporate Governance

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Page 1: Incentive Conflicts

IncentiveRestaurant Owners and ManagersConflicts

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1.Discuss the incentive

conflicts that are likely to arise between owners and managers of a restaurant

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What causes

Incentive Conflict?

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Individuals tend to make decisions that benefit their

personalWell - Being

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Tend to have goals in line with their firm (restaurant)

OwnersManagers

- Whereas -May not share these same goal’s, as they are not entitled toThe excess return$

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5The textbook outlines

Root causesFor Owner – Manager Incentive conflicts

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Choice

Additional effort by a manager

Of ~Effort~

INCREASESthe value of the restaurant

But

DECREASESTheir utility of time (leisure)

No1.

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PerquisiteTaking. It is in the best interest of the owner to pay sufficient salaries to the managers to retain competent workers.

OWNERS ALSO DO NOT WISH

TO OVERPAY THEIR WORKERS.

REVENUE - COSTS = PROFIT

No2.

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PerquisiteTaking. (Continued) Not only do managers seek high salary's, but perquisites such as clubs, vacations, daycare and dental plans.. Etc

No2.

U = f(C,P)U = utility, C = compensation, P = perks!

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ExposureExposure

Differential

Managers may forgo expensive projects that they anticipate to be profitable simply because they do not want to bear the risk of failure..

RiskExposure

No3.

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Differential horizons ”Managers claims to the firm are limited by their tenure”

No4

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Differential horizonsTherefore, managers have limited incentive to care about the future of the firm.

No4.

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Managers can be reluctant to reduce the size of their firm. Even if it is the more profitable option.

Overinvestment

Manager bear a personal cost (disutility), when firing a colleague

No5.

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2.Do you anticipate that

the conflicts will be easier or harder to control at the new salt lake location?

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HARDER.

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Although there are many ways to monitor restaurants using technology, the physical distance between HQ and Salt Lake City puts the new location at aDISADVANTAGE.

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Staff members who develop close personal relationshipswith their coworkers are much more likely to stay with a Company.

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Without a strong owner-manager relationship there may be “differential horizons”.

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“When an employee knows they’re truly valued and that their boss has a genuine interest in them, they’re much more likely to perform well.” - Forbes magazine

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3.Should you offer the new

head manager at the Salt Lake location the same compensation contract that you are using for the five managers in Portland?

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Given the autonomous nature of the new head manager.

I would entice the manager with stock options or a larger bonus.

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As part of fringe benefits, I would add an annual paid trip to Portland so the manager

can see our headquarters.

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This would let manager develop a closer bond to the owner and overall brand.

In effect, incentivizing their work.

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Thanks for reading!