IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR …media.al.com/wire/other/scarlet letter response.pdf · Letter from Thomas Homan, ... They allege that they fear the statute’s enforcement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JOHN DOE ) #1; and JOHN DOE #2, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) RICH HOBSON, in his official capacity as ) Civil Action No. Administrative Director of Courts; and ) 2:13-cv-00079-WKW-CSC ) SPENCER COLLIER, in his official capacity ) as Director of the Alabama Department of ) Homeland Security, ) ) Defendants. )

STATE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendants,

Rich Hobson and Spencer Collier, sued in their official capacities as Administrative Director of

Courts for the State of Alabama and Director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security,

move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Because the

Defendants will not enforce the challenged law, Plaintiffs lack any injury sufficient to establish

standing.

I. Statement of the Facts

In 2012, the Alabama Legislature passed H.B. 658 (codified at Ala. Code § 31-13-32) to

expound upon the provisions of H.B. 56, the State’s primary immigration law. Among other

things, H.B. 658 contains measures for reporting and compiling data on “unlawfully present

aliens” who have been detained by law enforcement on suspicion of criminal activity. Section 5

of the bill requires the Administrative Office of Courts (AOC) to provide quarterly reports to the

Case 2:13-cv-00079-WKW-CSC Document 20 Filed 02/26/13 Page 1 of 9

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Alabama Department of Homeland Security (ADHS) of any unlawfully present alien brought

before a court for violating state law. ADHS would then publish that information on its website,

making it available to the general public. See generally H.B. 658 § 5 (2012), Ala. Code § 31-13-

32. Although the bill was passed last year, ADHS has taken no steps to implement Section 5’s

provisions for publication of such information. Collier Aff. at ¶3.

In early January 2013, ADHS consulted with U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) to discuss whether use of federal immigration information for Section 5’s

purposes was permitted. See Collier Aff. at ¶5. ICE responded that it considered public

dissemination of federal information for Section 5’s purposes an “improper use.” See id. at ¶6,

Letter from Thomas Homan, Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, to Spencer Collier, Director, Alabama Department of Homeland Security

(Feb. 4, 2013) (on file with Alabama Att’y Gen. and attached to Collier Aff.).

Taking the ICE Letter under consideration, the Director of ADHS informed the Attorney

General that ADHS would not enforce Section 5 by publishing information ICE had deemed

confidential; to do so would risk the revocation of the State’s access to federal information. Id.

at ¶7. While AOC would continue to collect data on the individuals covered by Section 5, it also

confirmed that it would treat federal immigration data as confidential, distributing it solely for

law enforcement purposes. Hobson Aff. at 3. Consequently, the public disclosure provisions of

Section 5 will not be enforced, and no personally identifying information will be published

online or otherwise by either agency.

Plaintiffs in the instant case are four individuals who were arrested and charged with

“fishing without a license” in Elmore County. Doc. 1 at ¶46. Of the four, three were quickly

released from custody. Id. at ¶47. The fourth, Jane Doe #1, was held for two days while her


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immigration status was verified, and was then released as well. Id. at ¶48-49. The complaint

alleges that the four Plaintiffs are due in court sometime in mid-February to address those

charges. Id. at ¶50. They allege that they fear the statute’s enforcement against them, and also a

potentially hostile public reaction toward themselves and all other individuals listed on the

registry. Id. at ¶57.

II. Standard of Review

A. Motion to Dismiss

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 677, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). “‘[L]abels and conclusions’ or a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal at 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555 (2007)). Plaintiffs must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” American

Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). An accusation of harm that is anticipated, not actual, is

insufficient to carry a claim forward.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Where parties to a suit present evidence outside of the pleadings, and the District Court

considers that evidence, a motion to dismiss is converted into a motion for summary judgment.

Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 9(1972). A motion for summary judgment is appropriate

where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “The moving


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party always bears the initial burden of proof, and the Court reviews the evidence presented in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Buckhanon v. Huff & Assocs. Const. Co., 506

F. Supp. 2d 958, 963 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986)). “The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute

of material fact, or by showing the non-moving party has failed to present evidence in support of

some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof.” Id. When the moving

party has met its burden, though, the responding party cannot “rest upon the pleadings. Instead,

Rule 56(e) requires the party opposing summary judgment to go beyond the pleadings, and to

demonstrate by affidavit or other appropriate means that there is a genuine issue of material fact

for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Cattret, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

III. Argument

The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing has three elements: (1) an injury in

fact; (2) a causal connection between that injury and the actions of the defendant; and (3) the

injury will “likely” be redressed by a favorable ruling from the court. Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Plaintiffs’ claims here fail because they do not satisfy the

crucial first element of demonstrating an injury in fact. They have not yet suffered any injury at

the hands of the law in question, Section 5 of H.B. 658, and nor will they suffer any in the future

because the State has no plans to enforce its provisions. Without an injury, Plaintiffs have no

standing to bring their claims, nor does the Court have jurisdiction to hear them.

A. Plaintiffs lack standing because their claims are not ripe.

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Section 5, but have not yet come within the

purview of its terms. As the Complaint states, they have not yet been to court on the charges of

“fishing without a license” pending against them. Doc. 1 at ¶¶46, 50.


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“[The] ‘basic rationale’ of the ripeness doctrine is ‘to protect [] agencies from judicial

interference until a [] decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.’” Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir.

1997). Plaintiffs’ claims will not become ripe unless and until a final decision has been made

regarding application of the law in question to their particular circumstances. See, e.g.

Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573-1574 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a

property owner’s claims would not become ripe until the application of the contested zoning

regulations to his land was “finally decided”). This is particularly true where a plaintiff is

challenging a government action: “When a plaintiff is challenging a governmental act, the issues

are ripe for judicial review if ‘a plaintiff . . . show[s] he has sustained, or is in immediate danger

of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that act.’” Nat’l Advert. Co. v. City of Miami, 402

F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Hallandale Prof. Fire Fighters Local 2238 v. City of

Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 760 (11th Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added).

Because Plaintiffs here have yet to make a court appearance for the criminal charges

against them, there has not been a “final decision . . . regarding application of the law in question

to [their] particular circumstances.” Greenbriar at 1573-1574. Even if they do go to court,

Plaintiffs have no way of knowing what information the federal government might give in

response to an inquiry about their immigration status. That is, any inquiry with the federal

government may not lead to the publication of their information, even if the statute were

enforced. As a result, their claims are not ripe for adjudication.

B. Plaintiffs lack standing because they have suffered no injury-in-fact.

Standing exists only when “the plaintiff [has] suffered an “injury in fact”-an invasion of a

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not


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‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)

(internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ allegations have demonstrated nothing more than a

general fear of Section 5’s enforcement, which certainly does not establish any type of “concrete

and particularized” injury-in-fact that would give them standing here.

The harms Plaintiffs allege here are both conjectural and speculative. Prior to the actual

posting of Section 5’s list, they cannot know how the public at large will react to it. They can

present no evidence of any harm beyond what they assume will come to pass should the list ever

be made public:

If the Named Plaintiffs are classified and registered [sic] the AOC as “unlawfully present alien[s],” and/or listed on the ADHS’s public website as such, they face a heightened risk, now and into the future, of [. . .] losing employment opportunities, as employers will prefer not to employ [them], [. . .] being subjected to private harassment, discrimination, or even vigilantism by individuals who view the public list, [. . . and] being subject to a host of other civil disabilities and criminal penalties . . .

Doc. 1 at ¶57. Such sweeping assumptions are insufficient to constitute any injury in fact that

would establish standing before this Court. See Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir.

2003) (“Speculation is not enough to base standing upon.”) (citing Lujan, supra).

C. Plaintiffs lack standing because the State has no plans to enforce Section Five.

The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that where the Attorney General has given written

assurance that a statute will not be enforced, the complainant’s claims collapse for lack of

standing. See, e.g., Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d 1282, 1287-1288 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Because there is

no credible threat of enforcement . . . the plaintiffs have no standing to challenge that statute.”).

In Doe v. Pryor, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Alabama’s anti-sodomy statute.

After the challenge had been filed, the Supreme Court struck down an anti-sodomy statute in

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), finding it unconstitutional. Pursuant to the Court’s

holding, the Attorney General explicitly stated in Doe supplemental pleading that the Alabama


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anti-sodomy statute would no longer be enforced. The Eleventh Circuit then held that such an

affirmative statement from the Attorney General negated plaintiffs’ standing because there was

no threat of the occurrence of the potential injury in fact they alleged. Doe at 1285, 1287-1288.

The Defendants are those who would enforce Section 5, and they are represented here by

the Alabama Attorney General. Both have confirmed that they have no intention of enforcing

the public disclosure provisions of Section 5. See Collier Aff. at ¶3, Hobson Aff. at 2. And

indeed, even without such a guarantee, pre-existing Alabama public policy protects the

confidentiality of law-enforcement information obtained by ADHS. See Ala. Code § 31-9A-14

(“Records and information under this chapter are protected from disclosure by applicable state

and federal laws. Further exemptions may specifically be granted by administrative rules

promulgated under this chapter.”)

Without the potential for the public dissemination of individually identifying information,

none of the privacy concerns expressed in the Complaint, and specifically none of the alleged

potential harms to Plaintiffs, will come to fruition. Plaintiffs therefore also lack standing because

they are not threatened with any injury in fact at the hands of Section 5.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims, and their

complaint is due to be dismissed. In the alternative, there is no genuine dispute of material fact

and the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.


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Respectfully submitted, LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General BY: s/James W. Davis_________ Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) William G. Parker (ASB-5142-I72P) Laura E. Howell (ASB-0551-A41H) Assistant Attorneys General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

Attorneys for the State Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of February, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following (or by United States mail to the non-CM/ECF participants): Samuel Brooke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 4100 Washington Ave. Montgomery, AL 36104 (334) 956-8200 [email protected]

Kristi L. Graunke SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St. NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 521-6700 [email protected]


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Cecillia D. Wang AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 343-0775 [email protected] Omar C. Jadwat AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 (212) 549-2660 [email protected] Justin B. Cox AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 230 Peachtree Street, NW, Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303-2721 (404) 523-2721 [email protected]

Linton Joaquin Karen C. Tum1in Nora Preciado NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 (213) 674-2909 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Freddy Rubio Cooperating Attorney, ACLU OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION Rubio Law Firm, P.C. 438 Can Avenue, Suite 1 Birmingham, AL 35209 (205) 443-7858 [email protected]

s/James W. Davis_____________ James W. Davis Assistant Attorney General Email: [email protected]


JANE DOE #1, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

RICH HOBSON, in his official capacity asAdministrative Director of Courts, el al,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTMIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAN{A

NORTHERN DIVISION

Case No. 2: l3-CV-79-WHA

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF SPENCER COLLIE&DIRECTOR" ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HONIELAND SECURITY

STATEOFALABAMA )

MONTGOMERY COLINTY )

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority and Notary Public in and for said County and

State at large, personally appeared Spencer Collier, who being known to me and being by me

first duly srvom on oath deposes and says as follows:

1. My name is Spencer Collier and I am the Director of the Alabama Department of

Homeland Security ("ADHS"). I am qualified to give this affidavit and have personal

knowledge of the facts discussed herein.

2. I have served as the Director of ADHS since January I 7, 201 1. In that position, it

is evident to me that cooperation with federal law enforcement is critical to ADHS's ability to

Case 2:13-cv-00079-WKW-CSC Document 20-1 Filed 02/26/13 Page 1 of 5

AlJidavit of Spencer CollierPage 2 of4

fulfill its statutory duties. The information contained in federal databases often aids ADHS in

criminal investigations and other activities conducted in the interest ofpublic safety.

3. I am familiar with Section 5 of HB 658 passed by the Alabama Legislature. That

provision requires the Administrative Offrce of Courts to submit quaderly reports conceming

cases in Alabama state courts that involve unlawful1y present aliens, including the identity of

unlawfully present aliens. The statute further requires that ADHS publish such information on

its web site. ADHS has not published any such information to date, and as discussed below,

ADHS has no intention of publishing such information.

4. It is my understanding that Alabama officials will not, and cannot, determine

whether a person is lawfully present. Instead, that determination will be made by U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement C'ICE'), tkough consultation rvith its Law Enforcement

Support Center ("LESC').

5. I consulted with ICE officials about the federal government's position conceming

whether information received from ICE, by Alabama 1aw enforcement officials, may be

disclosed to the public.

6. Thomas Homan, Deputy Executive Associate Director of ICE, informed me rn

writing that the information ICE provides to state agencies is provided for law enforcement

puposes only, and that "ICE views the systematic public disclosure ofthe data received ffom the

LESC, including the personally identifiable infonnation of the individuals identified, to be an

improper use of the information." (See Homan letter dated Feb. 4, 2013, attached as Exhibit A).

7. If ADHS uses information provided by ICE in a way that is, in ICE's view, an

improper use ofthe information, there is a risk of several consequences. For example, state


Affidavit oJ Spencer CollierPage 3 oJ 4

agencies may lose access to LESC and the information it provides, and the person responsible for

misuse of infomation may be at risk of prosecution.

8. In addition, as a result of agreements I have executed with the federal

government, I would likely lose security clearances. This fact, and the loss of state access to

federal databases in general, would likely disqualify me from setwing as Director of ADHS (and

any subsequent Director would likewise be disqualified). For example, without security

clearances and a free exchange of infonnation with the federal govemment, I could not fulfill my

statutory duties under A1a. Code $ 31-9A-5(cX1) and (+), which respectively require that the

Director:

( I ) Receive intelligence information from federal authoritiesrelating to homeland security and ensure that, to the extent allowedby law, all appropriate and necessary intelligence and lawenforcement information regarding homeland security isdisserninated to and exchanged among appropriate executivedepartments responsible for homeland security, and rvhereappropriate, promote the exchange of such information withcounty and local govemments and private entities, [and]

* * *

(4) Engage in the exchange of information with the federalgovemment relating to immigration and efforts to improve thesecurity of the bordels, territorial waters" and ports of the UnitedStates.

Ala. Code $ 31-9A-5(c).

9. It is my view that if these consequences come to pass, ADHS cannot be

successful in its mission of protecting the public. Therefore, after consultation with the Office of

the Govemor and the Office of the Alabama Attorney General, ADHS will not publish the

information in question on its website, or otherwise make public disclosure thereof, unless a


Affidavit oJ Spencer CollierPage 4 of 4

court of competent jurisdiction issues ajudgnent that such public disclosure is perrnissittle under

all anplicable state and federal 1aw.

Further affiant sayeth not.

SwoRN To and SUBSCRIBED before m "166Zlcld,ay

of February 2013.

NOTARYPUBLIC

My Commission Expires:


Enfotcenem and Retnolzl Operc!|iont

ll3',lf !1lI'Ji," " om'b rd se{ uritrW&shington, DC 20536

ffiU.S.Immigrationand CustofrrsEnforcement

Februruy 4, 2013

Spencer CollierDirectorAlabama Homeland SecurityP.O. Box 304115Montgomery, AL 36130-41 15

Dear Director Collier:

A request has been made for u.s. customs and Immigration and Enforcement's (lcE) views onwhe*rer information Alabama larv enforcement agencies receive frora ICE related to theimmigration status of individuals rvithin their custody, including their identity, may be publiclydisclosed.

ICE provides this information to Alabama state and local agencies via the Law Enforcementsupport center (LESC) for law enforcement purposes only. As such, tcE views the systematicpublic disclosure of the data received from the LESC, including the personally identifiableinformation of the individuals identified, to be an improper use of the information.

Please let us know ifyou have any questions.

Executive Associate Directorent and Removal Operations

Immigration and Customs Enforcemenr


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTMIDDLA DISTRICT OF' ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JANE DOE #I, JANE DOE #2, JOHN DOE #1, JOHNDOE #2. et al.. on behalf of themselves and all otherssimilarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

RICH HOBSON, in his offrcial capacrty as AdministrativeDirector of Courts; and

SPENCER COLLIE& in his offrcial capacity as DirectorOf the Alabama Departnent of Homeland Security,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:13-CV-79-WHA

AFFIDAVIT OF RICH HOBSON.

ALABAMA AqMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF COURTS

STATEOFALABAMA )

MONTGOMERYCOUNTY )

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority and Notary Public in and for said County andState at large, personally appeared Rich Hobson, who being known to me and being by me firstduly swom on oath deposes and says as follows:

"My name is Rich Hobson and I am the Administative Director of Courts for the

Alabama Unified Judicial System. As Director of the Alabama Administrative Office of

Courts I have duties and responsibilities assigned by the ChiefJustice ofthe Alabama Supreme

Court, as well as certain statutory duties, listed in $12-5-10, Code of Alabama (1975). Those

statutory duties include requiring the 'filing ofreports, the collection and compilation of


statistical data and other information on the judicial and financial operaflon of the courts and on

the operation of other offices directly related to and serving the courts.'

Ala. Code 197s, $12-s-10(1).

In 2012, the Alabama Legislatue passed amendments to its immigration law.

Included in those amendments was $31-13-32(a), Alabama Code (1975), which required the

following report to be submitted by my offrce:

'(a) The Administuative Office of Courts shall submit a quarterly report, organized by

oounty, to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security summarizing the number of

cases in which an unlawfully present alien was detained by law enforcement and

appeared in court for any violation of state law and shall include all of the following

information in the report:

(1) The name ofthe unlaufirlly present alien.(2) The violation or charge alleged to have been committed by the unlaufiillypresent alien.(3) The name ofthejudge presiding over the case.(4) The final disposition oftle case, including whether the unlawfirlly present

alien was released from custody, remained in detention, or was transferred to thecustody of the appropriate federal immigration authorities.'

Insofar as I only assumed the position of Administative Director of Courts on January 15,2013,

my first quarterly report, covering the period January 1 through March 31, 2013, is not

due to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security until April, 201 3.

The law requires the quarterly reports to be submitted directly to the Alabama

Departrnent of Homeland Security. The law places no other duty on the Administrative Office of

Courts with respect to the submission or release of the reports required by $31-13-32(a),

Code of Alabama (1975), as cited above. Therefore, I consider my duties under that statute

completo upon submitting the quarterly report to the Alabama Departrnent of Homeland


Security.

On Februmy ll,20l3,my office was contacted by the Alabama Attomey General's

Office regarding communication that had been received from the United States govemment

regarding the 'confidential, law enforcement sensitive' nature of information about unlar+6-rlly

present aliens registered in the United States govemment's database being disclosed 1o the

public.

Discussions with the Director of Alabama's Departrnent of Homeland Security, on

February 74,2013, revealed that he had, in fact, received a letter from Thomas Homan, of the

United States Department of Homeland Security outlining his opinion regarding the impropriety

ofpublic disclosure of federal database information relating to unlawfully plesent aliens, and

further indicating his intention not to publish any information provided by the Courts on the

state Department of Homeland Security's website. As a result, I directed my legal staff to draft a

preventive message to be sent to courts statewide. Even though the law states nothing about an

Alabama trial court's releasing information required by the law to anyone other than the

Administrative Office of Courts, out ofan abundance of caution I sent out a memorandum

intended to prevent an accidental release of information to another person or entity.

On February 15,2013, the Director of the Administrative Offrce of Courts' Legal

Division, with my approval, sent out, by elechonic mail, the attached memorandum (see

'EXHIBIT') regarding the confidential, law enforcement sensitive nature of the required reports

to all judges and court clerks, statewide. My initials are next to my name on the memorandum,


indicating my approval of the message.

I swear, to the best of my present knowledge and information, that the above statements

are true, that I am competent to make this affrdavit, and that the above statements are made by

drawing from my personal knowledge of the situation."

Further affiant sayeth not.

. -,-1

't"/" L - :

rucnHossoffi(.

SWORN TO and SUBSCRIBED before me this lQ day of February 2013. -. ".

EI r wurq*r -"*-.i" Etoir" B*o.

NOTARY PUBLIC tltorc, u"i"- S.-'--

MyCommissionExpires: Marh tt, aott{


, " ' ; ' ; , t , , ,/T\"l + l - )t ^ i. t^r .-.

' t ' ; ; , ' l

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF COURTS300 Dexter Avenue

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-37 41(334) 954-5000Roy S. Moore

ChiefJustice

MEMORANDUM

Rich HobsonAdministrative Director of Courts

TO: Circuit JudgesDistrict JudgesCircuit ClerksDistrictClerkf ..)

RichHobson laAFebruary 15,2013

FROM:

DATE:

RE: Registry of "Unlawfully Present Aliens"

A civil action was recently filed in t}le United States District Court for the Middle District of

Alabama by the Southem Poverty Law Center (SPLC) in opposition to the registry of "unlawfiilly present

aliens" created by $31-13-32, Code of Alabama (1975). The SPLC action is a class action seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief from the institution ofthis registry. Insofar as $31-13-32, Code of

Alabama (1975) remains in full force and effect there is no change to the Administrative Office ofCourts'

duty to report information regarding "unlawfully present aliens" to the Alabama Department of Homeland

Security.

Until this pending litigation is concluded or our duties are further clarified by the court or the

Alabama Legislature please ensure that any information collected regarding "unlawfully present aliens"

who appear in your courts is strictly treated as "CONFiDENTIAU LAW ENFORCEMENT

SENSITIVE" information. This information is not intended for dissemination to any outside agency or

individual. i have been informed that even an inadvertent release or publication ofthis confidential

information could subject the source ofrelease to criminal liabilitv under State and Federal privaqy laws.

Also, until further notice, please submit all confidentiaVlaw enforcement sensitive "unla\ dllly

present aliens" information required by statute directly to the undersigned, only. Additional information

regarding the content and deadline for the ned quarter\ report will be forthcoming.

EXHIBIT


Win Johnson

To:Cc:Subject:Atta€hments:

Importance:

Circuit Judges; District Judges; Circuit ClerksRich Hobson; Scott HoyemImmigration Status NoticeADC Hobson Memo 15 Feb 2013.pdf

High

All Judges, Clerks,

See attached Memo from ADC Rich Hobson regarding pending litigation and the importance of notdisclosing publicly the immigration status of individuals appearing in court.

The attached memo does not alter the requirement under Alabama law that judges fill outimmigration status reports on "unlawfully present aliens" and send them to the ADC. The litigationdoes not implicate that requirement, only public disclosure beyond informing the ADC.

Winthrop (Win) E. JohnsonDir, Legal DivisionAdministrative Office of Couns3oo Dexter AvenueMontgomery, AL 36ro4Office: 334-954-5o52Fax: 334-954-3t34

EXHIBIT


Documents

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR …media.al.com/wire/other/scarlet letter response.pdf · Letter from Thomas Homan, ... They allege that they fear the statute’s enforcement