IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CHARLES WILLIAMS, pro se,Defendant/Petitioner,

CASE NO.: SC13- Iv. 4th DCA NO.: 4D11-4882

STATE OF FLORIDA,PlaintifflRespondent.

PETITIONER'S JURISDICTIONAL BRIEF

On Review from the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, State of Florida

Charles Williams, pro se #L15671SU, South Florida Reception Center13910 NW 41®' StreetDoral, Florida 33178-3014

TABLEOFCONTENTS

TABLEOF CITATIONS........................................... ii

STATEMENTOF THECASEANDFACTS............................ 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

JURISDICTIONALSTATEMENT.................................... 3

ARGUMENT..................................................... 3

THE ORDER OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT EXPRESSLYAND DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISION OF THEFIRST DISTRICT COURT IN LONG V. STA TE, 793 SO. 2D 1141(FLA. 1ST DCA 2001), THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT INJORDAN V. STA TE, 760 SO. 2D 973 (FLA. 2D DCA 2000); ANDTHE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN MORGAN V. STA TE, 983 SO. 2D1230 (FLA. 5TH DCA 2008) ON THE SAME QUESTION OF LAW

CONCLUSION................................................... 9

OATH........................................................... 10

CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE....................................... 10

CERTIFICATEOFCOMPLIANCE................................... 10

APPENDIXINDEX............................................... 11

-1-

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases:

Ford Motor Company v. Kikis, 401 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Jordan v. State, 760 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 6, 7, 8

Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 6, 7, 8

Morgan v. State, 983 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 6, 7, 8

Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .passim

Thomas v. State, 1 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Constitutional Provision:

Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Court Rules:

Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(a)(2) (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . .1Fla.R.Crim.P.3.800(2012)..........................................6,7Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 6, 7

Other Authority:

Philip J. Padovano, "Florida Appellate Practice" (2013 Edition) § 3:10 . . . . . . . . . .3

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STATEMENTOFTHECASEANDFACTS

The Fourth District Court of Appeal's "Order" (dated December 5, 2012) states,

"[A]ppellant has filed various untimely and successive postconviction motions." [Petitioner

will track the filing of his two (2) pro se motions, and (to maintain continuity) will point

out facts germaine to the contents and disposition of those motions. The motion-facts relate

to pertinent facts in the "Order," as will be discussed in the "Argument" (below)].

On May 5, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se bifurcated, Newly Discovered Evidence,

Postconviction Motion. The first, and primary, claim of said Motion was Fraud on the Court

(1.540, Fla. R. Civ. P.), and a second claim was predicated on defective Miranda warnings

(3.850, Fla. R. Crim. P.).

On August 12, 2008, both claims were summarily denied, allegedly for being

"conclusory and speculative." Rehearing was denied on September 2, 2008.

On September 29, 2008, Petitioner appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal

(4th DCA), which, on December 10, 2008, affirmed the lower court's decision, but ruled

solely on the Petitioner's secondary claim, concerning defective Miranda warnings.

(Rehearing denied on February 6, 2009, and Request for Review denied on October 2, 2009).

On March 14, 2011, Petitioner filed a second pro se, Newly Discovered Evidence,

Postconviction Motion. Said Motion was based solely on the original claim of Fraud on

the Court, in that the merits, thereof, had not been addressed by a_ny court.

On April 6, 2011, the lower court ordered the State to respond to Petitioner's Fraud

allegations; however, in its April 25, 2011 Response, the State neither addressed nor

denied said allegations.

1

On May 12, 2011, the lower court "agreed with the State's response," and

(in an identical manner) never addressed, nor denied, those allegations, but (instead)

immediately dismissed Petitioner's Postconviction Motion, whereby ordering Petitioner

[in accordance with State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999)] to "show cause" why

Petitioner should not be prohibited from filing further pro se motions.

On 6/8/l1, Petitioner responded to the Show Cause Order, and on November 10, 2011,

the lower court "Ordered and Adjudged that the Petitioner is prohibited from filing any

further pro se postconviction motions or petitions, with this [lower] court, attacking or

challenging the convictions or sentences imposed on this case." On January 19, 2012,

Petitioner appealed to the 4th DCA, and Petitioner appealed only the Spencer Sanction Order.

On December 5, 2012, the Fourth DCA Per Curiam Affirmed, with an attached

Court Order. Rehearing was denied on January 4, 2013, and Petitioner's Notice to

Invoke [this Court's] Discretionary Jurisdiction was timely filed on February 4, 2013.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Fourth DCA applied the Spencer rule of law to deny relief in Petitioner's

appeal of the lower court's Spencer Sanction Order. Decisions in the First, Second,

and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, applied the Spencer rule of law to grant relief in

cases with substantially the same facts as in the Petitioner's case, and Petitioner

contends that the 4th DCA's Order expressly and directly conflicts with the previous

decisions of the First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal.

2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Florida Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review a decision of

a District Court of Appeal (DCA) that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of

another DCA, or with a Florida Supreme Court decision, on the same question of law.

Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. (1980); 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv), Fla. R. App. P. (2012).

ARGUMENT

THE ORDER OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT EXPRESSLYAND DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISION OF THEFIRST DISTRICT COURT IN LONG V. STA TE, 793 SO. 2D 1141(FLA. 1ST DCA 2001), THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT INJORDAN V. STA TE, 760 SO. 2D 973 (FLA. 2D DCA 2000); ANDTHE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN MORGAN V. STA TE, 983 SO. 2D1230 (FLA. 5TH DCA 2008) ON THE SAME QUESTION OF LAW

On December 5, 2012, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (4th DCA) issued a Per

Curiam Affirmed decision, with an attached Court Order (of the same date). Petitioner

respectfully submits that said attached Court Order is an explanation of the principles the

DCA used to support their decision, and, as such, it should be reviewable by this Court.

In Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974, 978 (Fla. 2002), this Court held that per curiam

denials of relief, issued with an "explanation . . . by way of an unpublished order," are

reviewable by this Court. That same principle should apply to Petitioner's Per Curiam

Affirmed denial of relief, issued with an explanation by way of an unpublished order.

In Appellate Judge Philip J. Padovano's, "Florida Appellate Practice" (2013 Edition),

§ 3:10, the author states, "[A]n unpublished order that expressly and directly conflicts with a

decision . . . by another district court of appeal is now . . . an order that is reviewable by the

Supreme Court." (FN17).

3

Petitioner will demonstrate that the Fourth District Court of Appeal's Order

should be considered an explanation of the decision by that court, and that it expressly

and directly conflicts with the decisions of three (3) other District Courts of Appeal.

The Fourth DCA's Order refers to the Petitioner's instant appeal (to that court)

as "this appeal." The Statement of the Case and Facts, herein, confirms that Petitioner

filed said "appeal" as an appeal of the trial court's State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47

(Fla. 1999) Sanction Order. The referred to, "this appeal," is concisely described below:

The cover page of said appeal reads (in part):

"APPELLANT'S INITIAL BRIEF"

"On Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth JudicialCircuit, in and for Broward County, Florida, on an Order ProhibitingDefendant From Filing Any Further Pro Se Postconviction Motions"

The "Argument" of the appeal reads:

"TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED A SPENCERSANCTION ORDER AGAINST DEFENDANT WITHOUTFIRST ADDRESSING THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'SCLAIM OF FRAUD ON THE COURT, THEREBYVIOLATING DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS"

Page 7 of the appeal reads (in part):

"The crux of this appeal is: . . . that the trial court must first addressthe merits of the claim before pursuing the Spencer sanctions."

Thus, "this appeal" (identified in the instant Statement of the Case and Facts) is

within the four corners of the Fourth District Court of Appeal's Order, and was the sole

instant "appeal" before the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Further, "this appeal"

does not relate to the "rejected 2008 defective warning claim" cited in said Order.

4

Additional support for this Petition is the following statement (from the DCA's Order):

"Appellant appears to have brought false information before the courts as his allegations of

fraud in his 1998 trial are unfounded." [Above (and below) underlining, added for emphasis].

The Fourth DCA presents: ". . . his allegations of fraud . . . are unfounded," as if factual;

however, the preliminary words, "Appellant appears to have . . .", clearly show that this

supposed fact is not a result of the trial court's ruling. Thus, the trial court did not address

and rule on the merits of the "allegations of fraud," nor rule the same to be "unfounded."

The Fourth DCA reviewed Petitioner's appeal of the lower court's Spencer sanction

Order, wherein said sanction consisted of:

"Prohibiting Defendant From Filing Any Further Pro Se Postconviction Motions."

The Fourth DCA's Order (now before this Court) announces and applies the Spencer

rule of law, by way of discussing the legal principlesl' of the Spencer sanction, and thus,

they apply to this Petition for review of conflict with opinions of the other DCA's.

The Fourth DCA's Order deems the Petitioner's underlying-motion-allegations to be:

"untimely and successive," "wholly frivolous," "repetitive,""false information," and "unfounded,"

which are all reasons for sanctions to be imposed (through the Spencer rule of law), but

only after the merits have been addressed by the trial court. The Fourth DCA judged the

Fraud allegations, without the trial court (as the trier of fact) ever having addressed the

allegations, or determining said allegations to be frivolous, which is contrary to Spencer.

In the conclusion of the DCA's Order, the DCA repeats said judgments of Petitioner's

1/ Ford Motor Company v. Kikis, 401 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 1981), a "discussion of the legal principleswhich the [district) court applied supplies a sufficient basis for a petition for conflict review."

5

allegations, citing to Spencer, and cautions Petitioner with the exact same Spencer sanction

that was unjustifiably imposed by the trial court.

Petitioner has shown that the 4th DCA, after having reviewed Petitioner's appeal of

the trial court's Spencer Sanction Order, did issue the instant Order, to explain why they

Affirmed the trial court's refusal to address the merits of Petitioner's claim (before the

Spencer Sanction Order was imposed), and then went on to caution Petitioner with the same

sanction that they had just reviewed. It appears the 4th DCA overlooked that under Spencer,

and its progeny, addressing the merits is mandatory, and not discretionary. The 4th DCA

Affirmed the trial court's decision NOT to address the merits (prior to imposition of the

Spencer sanction), and then (surprisingly) denied relief, by applying the Spencer rule of law.

In the cases of Long, Jordan, and Morgan, the courts announced and applied the

Spencer rule of law to grant relief, because the merits of a defendant's claim must be

addressed, before Spencer sanctions may be imposed.

In Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 200 l), the court held:

"Under Spencer and its progeny, before prohibiting further pro seattacks on a conviction and sentence, the trial court must firstaddress the merits of the claims . . .."

In Jordon v. State, 760 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), the court held:

"When a trial court denies a motion for postconviction relief (FN1)and restricts a litigants right to proceed subsequently in court, itmust address the merits of the claims advanced by the litigant anddetermine that they are frivoulous before commencing down theroad to bar future filings." Footnote 1: "The phrase postconvictionrelief as used in this opinion includes motions filed pursuant toFlorida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800 and 3.850."

6

In Morgan v. State, 983 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), the court held:

"The State commendably suggests, and we agree, that before an orderprohibiting further pro se attacks on a conviction and sentence canbe rendered, the trial court must first address the merits of the claimclaim. If it determines the claim to be frivolous, it may then pursuethe Spencer sanction . . .. See Long v. State; Jordon v. State . . .."

In the Long case, this Court's own Spencer ruling is set forth as controlling the

District Court's position on sanctions. In the Jordan case (Footnote 1), the court held that

the decision applies to 3.800 and 3.850 motions. In the Morgan case, the State's position

is indeed "commendable" in protecting a pro se defendant's right of access to the courts.

In addition to those three (3) cases, there are others, with the exact same holding.

The ultimate fact in the Petitioner's case, as in the above cases, is that the trial court

did not address the merits of the claim(s) before imposing the Spencer sanction, and, as

such, the cases are indistinguishable. Any differences in the relative facts should be

incidental, and should not frustrate this Petition.

Petitioner has demonstrated, above, different results concerning the Spencer rule of

law, and that the 4th DCA's Order expressly and directly conflicts with the opinions of the

Long, Jordan, and Morgan cases, wherein the District Courts of Appeal reversed the

Spencer sanction Orders, and remanded for the trial courts to consider the merits of the

defendants' claims. Because the 4th DCA chose not to certify conflict, this Petition is

necessary to bring to this Court's attention that not all of the District Courts of Appeal are

in conformity concerning this very serious Due Process violation issue.

The Petitioner avers that this Spencer sanction violation is a serious issue of

exceptional importance, because it restricts a pro se litigant's right to the courts, as noted in

7

State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999):

"("The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury . . . ..").Thus, denying a pro se litigant the opportunity to file future petitionsis a serious sanction, especially where the litigant is a criminaldefendant who has been prevented from further attacking his or herconviction, sentence . . .."

Petitioner has demonstrated that previous pro se litigants, Long, Jordan, and

Morgan, had been affected by that violation. The purpose of this Petition is for this Court

to rectify the non-conformity of the Fourth DCA's ruling, both for the Petitioner, and for

any future pro se litigants.

Petitioner respectfully wishes to emphasize that this Petition is the culmination of

but two (2) pro se attempts to have the 17th Judicial Circuit Court address and rule on

the merits of Petitioner's claim of record-evidenced Fraud on the Court, whereas Due

Process requires that an evidentiary hearing be held for allegations of Fraud. This is

an entirely separate issue from the "previously rejected 2008 defective warning claim,"

which the 4th DCA cites in its Order. (Please see the Statement of the Case and Facts, herein).

This Petition is being made in good faith, and is absolutely neither a frivolous, nor a

malicious, attempt to waste this Court's valuable time and resources, regardless of any

previous filing. Due Process and Spencer require that the merits of Petitioner's claim must

be addressed by the trier of fact (trial court), before Petitioner is deprived of pro se access

to any court. Petitioner fervently believes that he has a right to file this Petition, pursuant to

Thomas v. State, 1 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), which states:

'The litigant has the right to challenge whether the [Spencer] orderwas warranted and . . . an order restricting further pro se filings"cannot restrict or frustrate in any way an appeal taken from that order."'

8

CONCLUSION

Petitioner wishes to reiterate that the Spencer issue is of exceptional importance, in

that it has repeatedly surfaced before the District Courts of Appeal (in a plethora of cases).

Absent a conflict-resolving ruling, from this Honorable Court, it will continue to be an issue.

Petitioner asserts that this Court does have discretionary jurisdiction to review the

Order of the court-below, and that this Court should exercise that jurisdiction to consider

the merits of Petitioner's Argument. However, absent that, and as an alternative, Petitioner

hereby respectfully asks that this Court would postpone decision on jurisdiction, and give

Petitioner an opportunity to submit the merits of his Argument (to this forum), before this

Court makes its fmal decision. A brief, on the merits, would reveal many crucial record-

facts that Petitioner is restricted from presenting, herein, and said brief also would give this

Court a complete perspective of the validity of this Petition.

Consistent with Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2007), which holds that a

pro se litigant should be allowed one opportunity to amend a pleading, if a court

determines that any pleading defects exist, this Petitioner seeks this Court's indulgence.

Respect ly submitted by:

Charles Williams, pro se L15671SU, South Florida Reception Center13910 NW 41" StreetDoral, FL 33178-3014

9

OATH

UNDER PENALTIES OF PERJURY, I declare that I have read the foregoing

Petitioner's Jurisdictional Brief, and that the facts stated in it are true.

Charles Williams, pro se #L15671

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petitioner's

Jurisdictional Brief has been handed to the mailroom official at the South Florida

Reception Center, South Unit, for mailing to the Office of the Attorney General,

1515 N Flagler Drive, Suite 900, West Palm Beach, FL 33401-2299, on this _L3__ day

of Fel,wy 2013.

Provided to rles Williams, pro se L15671South Florida Reception Center SU, South Florida Reception Center

13910 NW 41" Streeton »|D M for mailin9- Doral, FL 33178-3014

l/M Initials C'

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this brief complies with the font requirements of rule

9.210(a)(2) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Charles Williams, pro se L15671

10

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CHARLES WILLIAMS, pro se,Defendant/Petitioner,

CASE NO.: SC13-v. 4th DCA NO.: 4D11-4882

STATE OF FLORIDA,Plaintiff/Respondent.

APPENDIX INDEX

1. Fourth District Court ofAppeal's Order, dated December 5, 2012

2. Fourth District Court ofAppeal's decision, dated December 5, 2012

Charles Williams, pro se #L15671SU, South Florida Reception Center13910 NW 41®* StreetDoral, Florida 33178-3014

11

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFOURTH DISTRICT, 1525 PALM BEACH LAKES BLVD., WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401

December 5, 2012

CASE NO.: 4D11-4882L.T. No. : 96-24813 CF10A

CHARLES WILLIAMS v. STATE OF FLORIDA

Appellant / Petitioner(s), Appellee / Respondent(s).

BYORDEROFTHECOURT:

ORDERED that appellant has filed various untimely and successive postconviction

motions. The underlying motion in this appeal was wholly frivolous and repetitive of theclaim raised and rejected in Williams v. State, 998 So.2d 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Appellant appears to have brought false information before the courts as his allegationsof fraud in his 1998 trial are unfounded. As explained in this court's written opinion

rejecting this claim in 2008, the warning that appellant alleges he actually received frompolice was clearly sufficient. Williams, 998 So.2d at 651; see also Florida v. Powell,130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010). The City of Pompano Beach police officer would nothave had reason to replace the warning form with a forgery during the 1998 trial as thetrial predated Roberts v. State, 874 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), where this courtidentified the deficiency in the warning form used by the Broward Sheriff's Office.Appellant is cautioned that abusive, repetitive, malicious, and/or frivolous or false filingwill result in the sanction of this court no longer accepting his pro se filings. See Statev. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1999).

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true copy of the original court order.

Served:

Howard Forman, Clerk Charles Williams Attorney General-W.P.B.Hon. Lisa M. Porter

Ic

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFOURTH DISTRICTJuly Term 2012

CHARLES WILLIAMS,Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,Appellee.

No. 4D11-4882

[December 5, 2012]

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

MAY, C.J., WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court forthe Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Lisa Porter, Judge;L.T. Case Nos. 96-24813 CF10A and 96-21461 CF10A.

Charles Williams, Doral, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

Notfinal until disposition of timelyfiled motion for rehearing.

RIL9N BEUTTENMULLER, clerkFourth District Court of Appeal

OF