IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU …images.assettype.com/barandbench/import/2019/12/JK-HC-order-on... · Shoeb Alam, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Jammu

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

AT JAMMU

WP(C) PIL No.46/2019

In re, Court on its own motion

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Coram:

HON’BLE MR JUSTICE RAJESH BINDAL, JUDGE

O R D E R

“Judges should be of stern stuff and tough

fibre, unbending before power, economic or political,

and they must uphold the core principle of the rule of

law, which says „Be you ever so high, the law is

above you.” - P.N. Bhagwati, J, in AIR 1982 SC

149 SP Gupta v. Union of India.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Reports are available of proceedings in the suo motu cognizance

taken by the Supreme Court of India which proceedings were registered as

Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl) No. 1/2018 entitled In re: Kathua, Jammu and

Kashmir. On 13th April, 2018, the Supreme Court directed registration of this

suo motu writ petition taking note of information brought to its notice by

some lawyers practicing in the Supreme Court that members of the Kathua

Court Bar Association, Jammu and Kashmir are obstructing the lawyer who is

appearing on behalf of the family of a rape victim in proceedings in court.

The Supreme Court noted that there was support from the Jammu and

Kashmir High Court Bar Association.

2. In the order recorded on 13th April, 2018, while issuing notice to

the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association amongst others, the

Supreme Court had noted thus:

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“It is settled in law that a lawyer who appears for a victim

or accused cannot be prevented by any Bar Association or

group of lawyers, for it is the duty of a lawyer to appear in

support of his client, once he accepts the brief. If a lawyer

who is engaged, is obstructed from appearing in the court

or if his client is deprived of being represented in the court

when he is entitled to do so in a lawful manner, that

affects the dispensation of justice and interference with

the administration of justice. In fact, this Court has held

that a Bar Association cannot pass a resolution that they

would not defend and accused in any particular case. It is

the duty of the Bar Association as a collective body and

they cannot obstruct the process of law.

In view of the aforesaid, we issue notice to the Bar

Council of India, the State Bar Council, Jammu &

Kashmir, the High Court Bar Association at Jammu and

the Kathua District Bar Association. The Bar Council of

India and the State Bar Council shall be served through

the Secretary and as far as the Bar Associations are

concerned, they shall be served through the President and

the Secretary of the respective Associations. Mr. M. Shoeb

Alam, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Jammu &

Kashmir is requested to serve copies of the petition on the

said authorities.

Additionally, a copy be served on Mr. M.Shoeb Alam

to assist the Court on behalf of the State of Jammu &

Kashmir.

Dasti, in addition, is permitted.”

(Emphasis supplied)

3. An affidavit dated 24th April, 2018 was filed by Sh. Prem N.

Sadotra, General Secretary of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar

Assocaition, Jammu in these proceedings wherein in para 14, it is stated as

follows:

“14. …….It is submitted that after the cognizance by the

Hon‟ble Supreme court, J&K High Court Bar Association

Jammu received a letter from the Hon‟ble High Court of

J&K as also a request letter from the Bar Council of India.

In view of these developments an extra ordinary meeting of

the General House of J&K High Court Bar Association

Jammu was summoned on April16, 2018. In due deference to

the request of Bar Council of India and Hon‟ble J&K High

Court and in view of the fact that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court

of India was seized of the issue, the General House of J&K

high Court Bar Association Jammu decided to resume its

work but at the same time continue with the agitation by

adopting peaceful and constitutional methods for

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deportation of Rohingyas and Bangladeshies illegally settled

in and around Jammu who are admittedly a security threat

and rescinding of the directions issued in terms of a meeting

held and 14/02/2018 chaired by the Hon‟ble Chief Minister

of J&K State. …”

4. The above deposition is noted to highlight the admission by the

Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association that it was conscious of the

law as well as the methods of agitation which could be adopted by it.

5. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association had also

exhibited its awareness that no obstruction or threat could be extended to

counsels appearing in a case.

6. However, despite this awareness, to our greatest pain and

dismay, several recent events have been brought to our notice which are

contrary to the above assurances, which were placed before the Supreme

Court of India in Writ Petition (Crl) No. 1/2018.

7. Information has been received from the Registry that on 1st of

November, 2019, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association had

taken a decision to abstain from work in all courts including the High Court,

District Courts, Jammu and Kashmir Special Tribunal and Revenue Courts

for an indefinite period.

8. With regard to these abstentions, a noting dated 10th

December,

2017 has been placed by the Registrar General of this court enclosing a series

of reports received from Registrar Judicial of this Court and the Principal

District and Sessions Judge, Jammu.

9. Amongst these is the report received from the Principal District

and Sessions Judge, Jammu that the main entrance of the District Courts

building complex on was blocked 4th November, 2019 by certain striking

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lawyers. On intervention of the Principal District Judge, the lawyers permitted

few under trial prisoners and ladies to enter the Courts complex, but the same

was blocked again.

10. The Principal District Judge had to personally remain present at

the entry gate on 5th November, 2019 to facilitate entry into the District

Courts of lawyers willing to work, appear in courts as also under trial

prisoners, litigants and public. However, at 11:30 am on the same day, the

main gate was again locked by the striking lawyers. Once again, the Principal

District Judge had to intervene and facilitate access into the building to the

litigants, staff and public.

As per the report received, very few litigants and under trial

prisoners were permitted to enter into the District Court complex. Very few

lawyers appeared in urgent bail applications, matters involving stay etc.

before noon. However, the main gate was blocked again.

11. On 6th

November 2019, the striking lawyers illegally started

physically checking identity cards of those who wanted to enter into the Court

building. Yet again few staff members, under trial prisoners and some

accused were able to enter the Court.

12. As a result of the main gate being locked, the judges, staff and

those who were inside the District Courts were confined therein by these

striking lawyers.

13. The enquiries made have revealed that the lawyers who had

locked the restricted entry and exit into the District Court and who were

counselled by the District Judge on the 4th and 5

th November 2019 include S.

Baldev Singh Nitin Bakshi, Azhar Usman Khan, Mr. Mahinder Singh Palli,

Suresh and Rahul, Advocates.

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14. This position has subsisted and additional reports dated 14th

November 2019 regarding the same position on 8th, 9

th, 11

th, and 13

th

November 2019 and a report dated 19th November, 2019 with regard to the

position of appearance of accused persons of 14th, 16

th and 18

th November,

2019 have been received.

15. In the judgment of the Supreme Court reported at (2017) 5 SCC

702 Hussain & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors.wherein the appellant had

been in custody for a long period, the Supreme Court has observed that timely

delivery of justice is a part of the human rights. Denial of speedy justice is a

threat to public confidence in the administration of justice. The Supreme

Court has noted that successful implementation of the action plans requires

disposal of cases of under trials in custody in two years in Sessions trial cases

and in six months in magisterial trials cases.

16. It is reported that on the above and other dates as well for the

reason that accused persons were prevented entry and/or did not appear in the

Courts, the judges had to issue warrants/notices in large number of cases to

ensure appearances of the under trials. The Learned Principal District Judge

has compiled a report dated 26th November, 2019 from 23 trial courts in this

regard.

17. Another aspect repeatedly highlighted in all case management

examinations is the time taken and the delays on account of service of

accused persons. As a result of the locking of the main gate from 4th

November, 2019, these striking lawyers have actually pushed back the

criminal justice system in the District Courts, Jammu irretrievably. They have

also caused multiplication of the work of the Court, court officials and the

police authorities who shall have to use valuable resources and time in

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attempting to serve those accused persons whose cases were listed on the days

the main door of the court was locked and their entry prevented.

18. We are not setting out the impediment and the obstruction

caused in the civil justice dispensation system in the District Courts, on

account of their locking the main gate. However, it needs no elaboration that

consequential delays would be unsurmountable and grave prejudice would

have resulted to several litigants who are in dire need of immediate justice.

19. It is noteworthy that some of the most sensitive cases in the

country are being tried in the Jammu district courts. From the designated NIA

Court alone, information has been received that some extremely sensitive

cases involving national security had to be adjourned on account of the

aforesaid conduct by these lawyers. For the reason that complete list of cases

would make this order extremely unwieldy, we are noticing hereafter some of

the critical trials which could not proceed and had to be adjourned on account

of contumacious and criminal conduct of the above lawyers.

20. Some of the following old cases which were listed before the

Court of 3rd

Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Jammu, during this

period which had to be adjourned in the foregoing circumstances include:

S.No. Title of cases Date of occurrence Date of Institution Date of hearing Nature of

proceedings not

undertaken due to

absence of Defence

counsels

i. CBI vs Mohd Saleem Zarger

RC-05/199o/CBI New Dehli,

U/Ss 302/341/346 RPC, 3

TADA, 3/25 Arms Act

21.4.1990 23.11.1991 4.11.2019 Prosecution

evidence

ii. State through CBI. V/S Mohd

Yasin Malik & Ors (RC-1)

Offences U/Ss 302/307 RPC, ¾

TADA Act & 27 of Arms Act.

29.8.1990 24.11.1990 25.11.2019 Arguments on

charge/discharge

iii. State through CBI V/S Mohd

Yasin Malik & Ors. (RC-1)

Offences U/Ss 120-B, 364, 368

r/w 34 RPC, 3 of TADA Act &

27 of Arms Act.

10.09.1990 18.09.1990 25.11.2019 Arguments on

charge/discharge

iv. State v. Mubarik Ali FIR No.

10/2009 P/S Assar U/Ss

10,11,17, 18, 20 & 21 UA (P)

Act

24.5.2009 28.5.2010 16.11.2019 Prosecution

evidence

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21. Some of the old cases which were listed before the Court of 2nd

Additional District & Sessions Judge, Jammu and had to be adjourned:

S. No. Title Date of

Institution

FIR No. Offence under

Sections

Stage of

proceedings

Remarks

i. State v/s pritpal Singh 29.10.2003 116/03 P/S

Gandhi Nagar

U/S 302 RPC Prosecution

Evidence

No prosecution

witness present

ii. CBI V/s Sadha Ram 11.03.2005 24/2004 P/S

Crime Branch

U/S

420/467/468

RPC

Final

Arguments

Deferred due to

absence of

lawyers

iii. State V/s Ramesh

Singh and ors

26.08.2006 81/2006 P/S

Kanachak

U/S 302 RPC Final

Arguments

Deferred due to

absence of

lawyers. iv. State V/s Sumit

Chowdhary

06.06.2008 116/2007 P/S

Satwari

U/S 307 RPC Prosecution

evidence

Statement could

not be recorded

due to lawyers

strike

22. Some of the old civil cases which had to be adjourned pending

before the Court of 2nd

Additional District Judge, Jammu include:

S. No. Title Date of Institution Cases Stage of

proceedings

Remarks

i. Wazir Mansa Ram v. Nasib

Devi

01.10.1974 Execution Arguments Proceedings could

not be conducted

effectively due to

lawyers strike

ii. Shree Vinayak Misser

Dharamshall Trust v/s Baldev

Raj

01.10.1974 Suit for possession Evidence of

Defendant

Proceedings could

not be conducted

effectively due to

lawyers strike

iii. Nand Gopal V/s Gulam

Hussain and ors

16.11.1994 Suit for possession Evidence of

Defendant

Proceedings could

not be conducted

effectively due to

lawyers strike

23. Similar reports have been received from the other courts in the

complex.

24. So far as pendency of cases is concerned 46,189 cases are

pending in Jammu Wing of the High Court while 39,241 cases are pending in

the District Courts at Jammu.

25. The reports received from the Registrar General and Principal

District & Sessions Judge, Jammu reflect the number of working days and

cases which have had to be adjourned from Ist November 2019 on account of

abstentions from work and obstructions by the lawyers.

As a result, cases which are time bound are also being adjourned.

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26. It is extremely difficult to set workable action plans for time

bound disposal of old cases which is in the teeth of the repeated direction of

the Supreme Court of India.

27. The report received from the Principal District & Sessions Judge,

Jammu indicates that the protesting lawyers have changed strategy to effect

replacement/rotation of those locking the gates. However, S. Baldev Singh,

Nitin Bakshi, Azhar Usman Khan and Mahinder Singh Palli, Advocates are

spearheading the protestors and have been enforcing the closure along with

their associates. Their arrogance is to the extent that they actually put a lock

on the main gate and remove its key which was kept in their custody.

28. A representation dated 23rd

November 2019 has been received in

the Chief Justice‟s Secretariat from Shri Rampaul S/o Shri Sardha Ram

complaining about the obstruction to the courts.

29. Reports received from the Registrar Judicial show that an effort

to similarly obstruct lawyers and litigants even in the High Court was

unsuccessfully attempted by shifting sofas, which are court property, from

their assigned places, to be used as barricades at access points within the

court. We are informed that these sofas could not be used to completely

prevent litigants. However, active measures were attempted to completely

obstruct willing lawyers from appearing in the Court.

30. Given the turn of events in other parts of the country, we

exercised restraint in the matter hoping that better sense would prevail over

the members of the Bar. Unfortunately, this was not to be.

31. Despite the mandate of the law laid down by the Supreme Court,

open threats are yielded by unruly elements in the Bar that the Bar

Association is a strong one and lawyers would be removed from its

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membership if they chose to oppose the strike call or appear in courts. The

entire justice dispensation system in Jammu has been held to ransom.

32. Conduct of these advocates of locking the District courts and

preventing the litigants in civil cases, under trials and lawyers from accessing

the courts is a very serious matter and cannot be ignored.

33. The unequivocal, unexceptional and authoritative enunciation of

law in the judgments which we are noting hereafter, bind lawyers and all

courts. The same are being extracted merely as a reminder that violations of

law are working grave injustice to the litigants, they are putting unbearable

pressure on the courts which are already stretched and resulting in such delays

and judicial arrears which shock our conscience. In fact the turn events as has

been placed before us, shows how not only rights guaranteed under Article

21 of the Constitution of India of litigants, prisoners and under trials are being

violated, but lives of judges and seekers of justice, court staff officials and

visitors to the courts imperiled and safety of court property threatened.

34. John Marshall, J., the Fourth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

of the United States in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 US 264 (1821) has stated as

follows:

“It is true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should

not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should.

The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure

because it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We

cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts,

with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must

decide it if it be brought before us. We have no more right to

decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp

that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to

the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly

avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our

best judgment and consecientiouly to perform our duty.”

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We are today again reminded of our duty as judges as stated by

John Marshall, J.

35. We are left with no option but to ensure that the violation is dealt

with in accordance with the mandate of the law laid down by the Supreme

Court of India.

36. Let us briefly consider the position in law on the high position

and regard accorded to advocates as well as permissibility and legality of

strikes by them.

II. ROLE OF ADVOCATES

37. Lawyers not only have a unique role in the administration of

justice but very important duties and obligations as officers of the Court.

Significantly, several judicial pronouncements have emphasized the manner

in which these must be performed.

38. In the judgment of the Supreme Court reported at (1995) 3 SCC

619 In re Sanjeev Datta, the Supreme Court has stated thus:

"20. The legal profession is a solemn and serious

occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who belong to

it are its honourable members. Although the entry to the

profession can be had by acquiring merely the qualification

of technical competence, the honour as a professional has

to be maintained by its members by their exemplary

conduct both in and outside the Court. The legal

profession is different from other professions in that what

the lawyers do, affects not only an individual but the

administration of justice which is the foundation of the

civilised society. Both as a leading member of the

intelligentsia of the society and as a responsible citizen,the

lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others both

in his professional and in his private and public life. The

society has a right to expect of him such ideal behaviour. It

must not be forgotten that the legal profession has always

been held in high esteem and its members have played an

enviable role in public life. The regard for the legal and

judicial systems in this country is in no small measure due

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to the tireless role played by the stalwarts in the profession

to strengthen them. They took their profession seriously and

practise it with dignity, deference and devotion. If the

profession is to survive, the judicial system has to be

vitalised. No service will be too small in making the system

efficient, effective and credible."

(Emphasis supplied)

39. That members of the legal profession have social obligations to

discharge was emphasized in (1995) 1 SCC 732, the Indian Council of Legal

Aid and Advice vs. Bar Council of India. The Supreme Court has stated as

follows:

“It is generally believed that members of the legal

profession have certain social obligations, e.g., to render

"pro bono publico" service to the poor and the

underprivileged. Since the duty of a lawyer is to assist the

court in the administration of justice, the practice of law

has a public utility flavour and, therefore, he must strictly

and scrupulously abide by the Code of Conduct behoving

the noble profession and must not indulge in any activity

which may tend to lower the image of the profession in

society. That is why the functions of the Bar Council

include the laying down of standards of professional

conduct and etiquette which advocates must follow to

maintain the dignity and purity of the profession.”

(Emphasis by us)

40. The following observations of the Supreme Court in (2003) 2

SCC 45 Ex.Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India & Anr. are also

extremely pertinent:

“21) It must also be remembered that an Advocate is an

officer of the Court and enjoys special status in society.

Advocates have obligations and duties to ensure smooth

functioning of the Court. They owe a duty to their client.

Strikes interfere with administration of justice. They

cannot thus disrupt Court proceedings and put interest of

their clients in jeopardy. xxxx”.

41. This is the high pedestal on which lawyers stand placed.

Lawyers are the leaders of society. Their conduct and what they espouse

is what moulds and guides not only new comers to the Bar but also their

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communities and whole societies. The burden on the shoulders of the

members of Bar to ensure that they follow the law and that their conduct

is above reproach is therefore heavy. It can brook no compromise under

any circumstance.

III. STRIKE OR ABSTENTION FROM WORK

BY LAWYERS – WHETHER PERMISSIBLE?

42. Members of the Bar Associations resorting to abstention from or

boycotting courts for any reason has been a matter of huge concern for

decades together and the subject matter of binding and authoritative judicial

pronouncement for almost thirty years. Even though the issue of legality of

the call for the boycott or a strike by the lawyers is not res-integra yet in

blatant violation of the law, strikes are being resorted to by those who seek its

very enforcement before the courts.

43. It is necessary to consider the principles laid down by the

Supreme Court on this critical issue.

44 On 17th

December 2002, the Supreme Court of India decided

Writ Petitions (C) No. 132 of 1988 along-with Nos. 394 of 1993, 821 of 1990,

320 of 1993 and 406 of 2000. This judgment has been reported in (2003) 2

SCC 45 titled Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India & Anr. wherein

the Supreme Court considered the issue of legality of the boycott of courts;

the duty of the Bar Council and the Bar Association and the response of the

court in the matter of lawyers‟ strike. It is noteworthy that the judgment was

the outcome of detailed hearings in which the Bar Council of India, Attorney

General for the India, Bar Associations, several members of the Bar including

Senior Counsels addressed the court.

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45. We find that the Supreme Court of India has noted the

submissions of the learned Attorney General in para 9 of the judgment to the

effect that strike by lawyers cannot be equated with strikes resorted to by

other sections of the society, pointing out the basic difference that members of

the legal profession are officers of the Court and by the very nature of that

calling, are required to aid and assist in the dispensation of justice. The

learned Attorney General had placed the following observations of the Kerela

High Court in the judgment reported at AIR 1997 Ker. 291 Bharat Kumar K.

Palicha vs. State of Kerela before the Court:

"No political party or organization can claim that it is

entitled to paralyse the industry and commerce in the entire

State or nation and is entitled to prevent the citizens not in

sympathy with its viewpoint,from exercising their

fundamental rights or from performing their duties for

their own benefit or for the benefit of the State or the

nation."

(Emphasis by us)

46. The above judgment of the Kerala High Court stands approved

by the Supreme Court in (1998) 1 SCC 201 Communist Party of India (M) v.

Bharat Kumar, at page 202.

47. Some observations on the contours of the rights of the lawyers to

go on protest vis-à-vis the rights of the litigants who have engaged them

needs to be made. The Delhi High Court made some pertinent observations in

the case reported at AIR 2000 Delhi 266 B. L. Wadehra (Dr.) vs. State (NCT

of Delhi) which we may borrow. In para 30 of the pronouncement, the Delhi

High Court stated as follows:

"30. In the light of the above-mentioned views expressed

by the Supreme Court, lawyers have no right to strike i.e.

to abstain from appearing in Court in cases in which they

hold vakalat for the parties, even if it is in response to or in

compliance with a decision of any association or body of

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lawyers. In our view, in exercise of the right to protest, a

lawyer may refuse to accept new engagements and may

even refuse to appear in a case in which he had already

been engaged, if he has been duly discharged from the

case. But so long as a lawyer holds the vakalat for his

client and has not been duly discharged, he has no right to

abstain from appearing in Court even on the ground of a

strike called by the Bar Association or any other body of

lawyers.If he so abstains, he commits a professional

misconduct, a breach of professional duty, a breach of

contract and also a breach of trust and he will be liable to

suffer all the consequences thereof. There is no

fundamental right, either under Article 19 or under Article

21 of the Constitution, which permits or authorises a

lawyer to abstain from appearing in Court in a case in

which he holds the vakalat for a party in that case.On the

other hand a litigant has a fundamental right for speedy

trial of his case, because, speedy trial, as held by the

Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home

Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81: (AIR 1979 SC

1360) is an integral and essential part of the fundamental

right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the

Constitution. Strike by lawyers will infringe the above-

mentioned fundamental right of the litigants and such

infringement cannot be permitted. Assuming that the

lawyers are trying to convey their feelings or sentiments and

ideas through the strike in exercise of their fundamental

right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed

by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, we are of the view

that theexercise of the right under Article 19(1)(a) will

come to an end when such exercise threatens to infringe

the fundamental right of another. Such a limitation is

inherent in the exercise of the right under Article

19(1)(a). Hence the lawyers cannot go on strike infringing

the fundamental right of the litigants for speedy trial. The

right to practise any profession or to carry on any

occupation guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) may include the

right to discontinue such profession or occupation but it

will not include any right to abstain from appearing in

Court while holding a vakalat in the case. Similarly, the

exercise of the right to protest by the lawyers cannot be

allowed to infract the litigant's fundamental right for

speedy trial or to interfere with the administration of

justice.The lawyer has a duty and obligation to cooperate

with the Court in the orderly and pure administration of

justice. Members of the legal profession have certain

social obligations also and the practice of law has a public

utility flavour….”

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48. The Delhi High Court also extracted the Rules notified by

the Bar Council of India regarding the manner in which lawyers will

conduct themselves in the following terms:

“30…. According to the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975

"an Advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a

manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, a

privileged member of the community and a gentleman,

bearing in mind that what may be lawful and moral for a

person who is not a member of the Bar or for a member of

the Bar in his non-professional capacity, may still be

improper for an Advocate". It is below the dignity, honour

and status of the members of the noble profession of law to

organize and participate in strike. It is unprofessional and

unethical to do so. In view of the nobility and tradition of

the legal profession, the status of the lawyer as an officer

of the court and the fiduciary character of the relationship

between a lawyer and his client and since strike interferes

with the administration of justice and infringes the

fundamental right of litigants for speedy trial of their

cases, strike by lawyers cannot be approved as an

acceptable mode of protest, irrespective of the gravity of

the provocation and the genuineness of the cause. xxxx”

(Emphasis supplied)

49. The above conclusions of Delhi High Court stand approved by

the Supreme Court of India in para 18 of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal.

50. After a detailed enunciation of the law, in para 20 of Ex-Capt.

Harish Uppal, the Supreme Court has concluded as follows:

“20) Thus the law is already well settled. It is the duty of

every Advocate who has accepted a brief to attend trial,

even though it may go on day to day and for a prolonged

period. It is also settled law that a lawyer who has accepted

a brief cannot refuse to attend Court because a boycott call

is given by the Bar Association. It is settled law that it is

unprofessional as well as unbecoming for a lawyer who

has accepted a brief to refuse to attend Court even in

pursuance of a call for strike or boycott by the Bar

Association or the Bar Council. It is settled law that

Courts are under an obligation to hear and decide cases

brought before it and cannot adjourn matters merely

because lawyers are on strike. The law is that it is the duty

and obligation of Courts to go on with matters or

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otherwise it would tantamount to becoming a privy to the

strike. It is also settled law that if a resolution is passed by

Bar Associations expressing want of confidence in judicial

officers it would amount to scandalizing the Courts to

undermine its authority and thereby the Advocates will

have committed contempt of Court. Lawyers have known,

at least since Mahabir Singh's case (supra) that if they

participate in a boycott or a strike, their action is ex-facie

bad in view of the declaration of law by this Court. A

lawyer's duty is to boldly ignore a call for strike or boycott

of Court/s. Lawyers have also known, at least since Roman

Services' case, that the Advocates would be answerable for

the consequences suffered by their clients if the non-

appearance was solely on grounds of a strike call.”

(Emphasis by us)

51. Commenting on impact of lawyers strikes, in Ex Capt

Harish Uppal, the Supreme Court noted the observations of the

celebrated jurist Mr H.M. Seervai as under:

"21. xxxx. Lawyers ought to know that at least as long as

lawful redress is available to aggrieved lawyers, there is no

justification for lawyers to join in an illegal conspiracy to

commit a gross criminal contempt of court, thereby

striking at the heart of the liberty conferred on every

person by our Constitution. Strike is an attempt to

interfere with the administration of justice. The principle

is that those who have duties to discharge in a court of

justice are protected by the law and are shielded by the law

to discharge those duties, the advocates in return have

duty to protect the courts. For, once conceded that lawyers

are above the law and the law courts, there can be no limit

to lawyers taking the law into their hands to paralyse the

working of the courts. „In my submission‟, he said that „it

is high time that the Supreme Court and the High Court

make it clear beyond doubt that they will not tolerate any

interference from anybody or authority in the daily

administration of justice. For in no other way can the

Supreme Court and the High Court maintain the high

position and exercise the great powers conferred by the

Constitution and the law to do justice without fear or

favour, affection or ill-will.‟

52. In para 35) of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal, the Supreme Court

concluded as follows:

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17

35) In conclusion it is held that lawyers have no right to go

on strike or give a call for boycott, not even on a token

strike.”

(Emphasis by us)

53. Deprecating strikes by lawyers, the concurring judgment by M.

B. Shah, J. (for himself and D. M. Dharmadhikari, J.) in Ex-Capt. Harish

Uppal, while agreeing with the majority judgment (which has been authored

by S.N. Variava, J.) had added as follows:

“For just and unjust cause, strike cannot be justified in

the present-day situation. Take strike in any field, it can be

easily realized that that weapon does more harm than any

justice. Sufferer is the society-public at large.

38. On occasions the result is – violence or excess use of

force by the administration. Mostly the target is to damage

public properties.

39. Further, strike was a weapon used for getting justice

by downtrodden, poor persons or industrial employees who

were not having any other method of redressing their

grievances.But by any standard, professionals belonging to

a noble profession who are considered to be an intelligent

class, cannot have any justification for remaining absent

from their duty. The law laid down on the subject is

succinctly referred to in the judgment rendered by Brother

Variava, J.”

(Emphasis by us)

54. In the case reported at (1984) 1 SCC 722, Lt. Col. S. J.

Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Administration), the High Court had directed

that a criminal trial must go on from day to day. Before the Supreme

Court, it was urged that the advocates were not willing to attend court on

day to day basis as the trial was likely to be prolonged. It was held by the

Supreme Court that it is the duty of every advocate who accepts a brief in

a criminal case, to attend the trial day today. It was held that the lawyer

would be committing breach of professional duties if he failed to do so.

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18

55. In furtherance of the above, in the judgment of the Supreme

Court reported at 2018 SCC Online 304, Krishnakant Tamrakar vs. State of

M.P, the Supreme Court has very recently directed as follows:

“51. Since the strikes are in violation of law laid down by

this Court, the same amount to contempt and at least the

office bearers of the associations who give call for the

strikes cannot disown their liability for contempt. Every

resolution to go on strike and abstain from work is per se

contempt. Even if proceedings are not initiated

individually against such contemnors by the court

concerned or by the Bar Council concerned for the

misconduct, it is necessary to provide for some mechanism

to enforce the law laid down by this Court, pending a

legislation to remedy the situation.

52. Accordingly, we consider it necessary, with a view to

enforce fundamental right of speedy access to justice

under Articles 14 and 21 and law laid by this Court, to

direct the Ministry of Law and Justice to present at least a

quarterly report on strikes/abstaining from work, loss

caused and action proposed. The matter can thereafter be

considered in its contempt or inherent jurisdiction of this

Court. The Court may, having regard to the fact situation,

hold that the office bearers of the Bar Association/Bar

Council who passed the resolution for strike or abstaining

from work, are liable to be restrained from appearing

before any court for a specified period or until such time

as they purge themselves of contempt to the satisfaction of

the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court based on an

appropriate undertaking/conditions. They may also be

liable to be removed from the position of office bearers of

the Bar Association forthwith until the Chief Justice of the

concerned High Court so permits on an appropriate

undertaking being filed by them. This may be in addition

to any other action that may be taken for the said illegal

acts of obstructing access to justice. The matter may also

be considered by this Court on receipt of a report from the

High Courts in this regard. This does not debar

report/petition from any other source even before the end

of a quarter, if situation so warrants.”

56. The court summed up its conclusions in para 53 of the

Krishnakant Tamrakar. The relevant conclusions in para 53 (iv) are

extracted hereunder:

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19

“53. xxxx Pending legislative measures to check the

malady of frequent uncalled for strikes obstructing access

to justice, the Ministry of Law and Justice may compile

information and present a quarterly report on

strikes/abstaining from work, loss caused and action

proposed. The matter can thereafter be considered in the

contempt or inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The Court

may direct having regard to a fact situation, that the

office bearers of the Bar Association/Bar Council who

passed the resolution for strikes or abstaining from work

or took other steps in that direction are liable to be

restrained from appearing before any court for a specified

period or till they purge themselves of contempt to the

satisfaction of the Chief Justice of the concerned High

Court based on an appropriate

undertaking/conditions.They may also be liable to be

removed from the position of office bearers of the Bar

Association forthwith until the Chief Justice of the

concerned High Court so permits on an appropriate

undertaking being filed by them. This may be in addition

to any other action that may be taken for the said illegal

acts of obstructing access to justice. The matter may also

be considered by this Court on receipt of a report from the

High Courts in this regard. This does not debar

report/petition from any other source even before the end

of a quarter, if situation so warrants.”

(Emphasis supplied)

57. The above authoritative pronouncements by the Supreme Court

declaring that lawyers have no right to abstain from appearing in cases in

which they have been engaged or in which they hold vakalatnama and that

lawyers have no right to go on strike, bind every lawyer in the country. These

principles bind the Jammu & Kashmir High Court Bar Association, all

District Court Bar Associations and every lawyer in the Union Territory of

Jammu & Kashmir as well in the Union Territory of Ladakh.

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20

IV. PERMISSIBLE FORM OF PROTEST BY LAWYERS

58. The Supreme Court has also ruled on the contours of the only

permissible form of protest by lawyers in para 35 of Ex.Capt. Harish Uppal

in the following terms:

“35. ………The protest, if any is required, can only be by

giving press statements, TV interviews, carrying out of

Court premises banners and/or placards, wearing black or

white or any colour arm bands, peaceful protest marches

outside and away from Court premises, going on dharnas

or relay fasts etc. It is held that lawyers holding Vakalats

on behalf of their clients cannot not attend Courts in

pursuance to a call for strike or boycott. All lawyers must

boldly refuse to abide by any call for strike or boycott. No

lawyer can be visited with any adverse consequences by

the Association or the Council and no threat or coercion

of any nature including that of expulsion can be held out.

It is held that no Bar Council or Bar Association can

permit calling of a meeting for purposes of considering a

call for strike or boycott and requisition, if any, for such

meeting must be ignored. It is held that only in the rarest

of rare cases where the dignity, integrity and independence

of the Bar and/or the Bench are at stake, Courts may

ignore (turn a blind eye) to a protest abstention from work

for not more than one day. It is being clarified that it will

be for the Court to decide whether or not the issue involves

dignity or integrity or independence of the Bar and/or the

Bench. Therefore, in such cases the President of the Bar

must first consult the Chief Justice or the District Judge

before Advocate decide to absent themselves from Court.

The decision of the Chief Justice or the District Judge

would be final and have to be abided by the Bar. It is held

that Courts are under no obligation to adjourn matters

because lawyers are on strike. On the contrary, it is the

duty of all Courts to go on with matters on their boards

even in the absence of lawyers. In other words, Courts

must not be privy to strikes or calls for boycotts. It is held

that if a lawyer, holding a Vakalat of a client, abstains

from attending Court due to a strike call, he shall be

personally liable to pay costs which shall be addition to

damages which he might have to pay his client for loss

suffered by him.”

(Emphasis by us)

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21

59. Lawyers must conduct themselves as above. Nothing more

is permissible or tolerable.

60. The Supreme Court has unequivocally declared that it is

only “in the rarest of rare cases”, “where the dignity, integrity and

independence of the Bar and/or the Bench are at stake, courts may

ignore (turn a blind eye) to a protest abstention from work for not more

than one day”

61. So far as the form which the protest can take is concerned,

the Supreme Court has clearly stated that lawyers must appear in all

cases in which they stand engaged and cannot abstain from court

appearance under any circumstance. The protest can only “outside and

away from court premises”. It can only be in the form of “giving press

statements, TV interviews, carrying of banners and/or placards, wearing

black or white or any colour arm bands, peaceful protest marches, going

on dharnas or relay fasts etc”.

62. The Supreme Court (in Ex Capt Harish Uppal) approved the

conclusions of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Dr. B. L.

Wadehra that

“Lawyers should adopt other modes of protest which will

not interrupt or disrupt court proceedings or adversely

affect the interest of the litigant. Thereby lawyers can also

set an example to other sections of the society in the matter of protest and agitations.”

63. The afore noticed affidavit dated 24th April 2018 in the Suo

Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1/2018 clearly manifests that the J&K

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22

High Court Bar Association is cognisant of the above binding

enunciation of the law.

V. BOYCOTT OF A PARTICULAR COURT/ JUDGE

/ FORUM IS NOT PERMISSIBLE – IT TANTAMOUNTS

TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUDICIAL PROCESS.

64. There are instances when the Bar Associations have passed a

resolution to boycott a particular court or judge. Even this action has been

deprecated and has been the subject matter of binding adjudication by the

Supreme Court. In (1999) 1 SCC 37 Mahabir Prasad Singh vs. Jacks

Aviation Private Limited, an application was made to the trial court to suo-

motu transfer the case to some other court as the concerned Bar Association

had passed a resolution to boycott that court. For this reason, it was urged that

the lawyers could not appear before that Court. The trial court rejected the

application. In the revision petition, the High Court stayed the proceedings

before the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had rightly

rejected the application and that the High Court had committed a grave error

in entertaining the revision petition and passing an order of stay. Following

the ratio of the judgment in the case reported at (1984) 1 SCC 722, Lt. Col. S.

J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Administration), the Supreme Court held as

follows:-

“15. This is not a case where the respondent was prevented by

the Additional District Judge from addressing oral arguments,

but the respondent's counsel prevented the Additional District

Judge from hearing his oral arguments on the stated cause that

he decided to boycott that Court for ever as the Delhi Bar

Association took such a decision. Here the counsel did not want

a case to be decided by that Court. By such conduct, the counsel

prevented the judicial process to have flowed on its even

course. The respondent has no justification to approach the High

.





23

Court as it was the respondent who contributed to such a situation.

16. If any counsel does not want to appear in a particular

court, that too for justifiable reasons, professional decorum

and etiquette require him to give up his engagement in that

court so that the party can engage another counsel. But

retaining the brief of his client and at the same time abstaining

from appearing in that court, that too not on any particular day

on account of some personal inconvenience of the counsel but

as a permanent feature, is unprofessional as also unbecoming

of the status of an advocate. No Court is obliged to adjourn a

cause because of the strike call given by any association of

advocates or a decision to boycott the courts either in general

or any particular court. It is the solemn duty of every court to

proceed with the judicial business during court hours. No court

should yield to pressure tactics or boycott calls or any kind ofbrowbeating.”

(Emphasis by us)

65. The Supreme Court has even ruled against the strikes by lawyers

to pressurize the State Government to withdraw all powers from a statutory

authority from discharging quasi-judicial functions and transferring cases

before the officer to any other officer. In the case reported at (1995) 5 SCC

716, U.P. Sales Tax Service Association vs. Taxation Bar Association,the

issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court could issue a

writ or direction prohibiting a statutory authority from discharging quasi

judicial functions i.e. direct the State Government to withdraw all powers

from it and transfer all pending cases before the officer to any other officer

and whether advocates would be justified to go on strike as a pressure group.

On this question, the Supreme Court held as follows:

“11. It is fundamental that if rule of law is to have any

meaning and content, the authority of the court or a

statutory authority and the confidence of the public in

them should not be allowed to be shaken, diluted or

undermined. The courts of justice and all tribunals

exercising judicial functions from the highest to the

lowest are by their constitution entrusted with functions

directly connected with the administration of justice. It is

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24

that expectation and confidence of all those, who have or

arelikely to have business in that court or tribunal, which

should be maintained so that the court/tribunal perform

all their functions on a higher level of rectitude without

fear or favour, affection or ill-will. Casting defamatory

aspersions upon the character, ability or integrity of the

judge/ judicial officer/authority undermines the dignity of

the court/authority and tends to create distrust in the

popular mind and impedes the confidence of the people in

the courts/tribunals which is of prime importance to the

litigants in the protection of their rights and liberties. The

protection to the judges/judicial officer/authority is not

personal but accorded to protect the institution of the

judiciary from undermining the public confidence in the

efficacy of judicial process. The protection, therefore, is

for fearless curial process. Any scurrilous, offensive,

intimidatory or malicious attack on the judicial

officer/authority beyond condonable limits, amounts to

scandalising the court/tribunal amenable to not only

conviction for its contempt but also liable to libel or

defamation and damages personally or group libel.

Maintenance of dignity of the court/judicial officer or

quasi- judicial authority is, therefore, one of the cardinal

principles of rule of law embedded in judicial review. Any

uncalled-for statement or allegation against the judicial

officer/statutory authorities, casting aspersions of court's

integrity or corruption would justify initiation of

appropriate action for scandalising the court or tribunal

or vindication of authority or majesty of the

court/tribunal. The accusation of the judicial officer or

authority or arbitrary and corrupt conduct undermines

their authority and rudely shakes them and the public

confidence in proper dispensation of justice. It is of

necessity to protect dignity or authority of the judicial

officer to maintain the stream of justice pure and

unobstructed. The judicial officer/authority needs

protection personally. Therefore, making wild allegations

of corruption against the presiding officer amounts to

scandalising the court/statutory authority. Imputation of

motives of corruption to the judicial officer/authority by

any person or group of persons is a serious inroad into the

efficacy of judicial process and threat to judicial

independence and needs to be dealt with the strong arm of law.”

(Emphasis by us)

66. Despite such clear position in law, it is unfortunate that we have

witnessed such boycotts in this court. We have so far exercised great restraint.

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25

VI. OBSTRUCTING ACCESS TO COURTS- EFFECT THEREOF

67. Well settled principles of law regarding the working of the legal

profession are expected to be followed by the members of the Bar who seek

enforcement of the law. When this does not happen, the confidence of the

public in the legal profession is shaken. Even more serious is the impact of

their conduct on the administration of justice. Unfortunately, strikes and

boycott calls have attained unruly and violent proportions holding the entire

judicial system to ransom. As a result, the administration of law and justice is

threatened. The Supreme Court has held that as a result, “the rule of law is

undermined” (para 22 of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal).

68. It has been observed that the nature of the protest by lawyers

unfortunately also sees destruction of public property.

69. We find that in the judgment of the Delhi High Court reported at

AIR 2000 Delhi 266 B. L. Wadehra (Dr.) vs. State (NCT of Delhi), the

Court had observed as follows:-

“32. Either in the name of a strike or otherwise, no

lawyer has any right to obstruct or prevent another lawyer

from discharging his professional duty of appearing in

Court. If anyone does it, he commits a criminal offence

and interferes with the administration of justice and

commits contempt of Court and he is liable to be

proceeded against on all these counts.”

(Emphasis supplied)

70. The above observations of the Delhi High Court stand approved

by the Supreme Court in para 18 of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal, when it has been

held that “the conclusions reached by the Delhi High Court as above are

absolutely correct and the same needs to be and are hereby approved”.

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26

71. Therefore a lawyer obstructing or preventing another lawyer

from appearing in the court commits a criminal offence. His act tantamounts

to interference with the administration of justice and by his obstruction he has

also committed contempt of court. Such lawyer has rendered himself liable to

be proceeded against for both.

VII. WHETHER ANY LIABILITY FOR A LAWYERS‟ STRIKE

ENURES UNDER THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961

72. Is there any legislation, delegated or otherwise, which envisages

any action for conduct declared to be illegal by the Supreme Court ? We now

examine this critical aspect. .

73. In Ex.Capt. Harish Uppal, Justice M. B. Shah, J. in his

concurring judgment (para 45 of the report) directed that “appropriate rules

are required to be framed by the High Courts under Section 34 of the

Advocates Act by making it clear that strike by advocate/advocates would be

considered interference with the administration of justice and

advocate/advocates concerned may be barred from practicing before courts

in a District or in the High Court”.

74. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction of the Supreme Court of

India, the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir has framed the Jammu and

Kashmir Advocates (Regulation of Practice in the High Court and

Subordinate Courts) Rules, 2003. („Advocates Rules‟ hereafter)

75. Significantly Rule 4 of the Advocates Rules prohibits advocates,

individually or jointly, from giving a call for strike, abstention from Court or

boycott of judicial proceedings. This rule reads as under:-

“4. Prohibition against giving a call for strike or boycott of

Judicial Proceedings.

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27

No Advocate individually or jointly with other Advocates,

Group of Advocates or any Association shall give a call for

a strike, abstention from court or boycott of Judicial

Proceedings.”

76. Under these Rules, even calling of a meeting for considering a

matter regarding a call for strike is prohibited. Rules 5, 6 and 7 which are also

relevant in this regard read thus:

“5. Prohibition against requisitioning meeting of Bar

Association/Council.

No Advocate individually or joint with other Advocates, Group

of Advocates or any Association shall requisition meeting of

Bar Association, Bar Council or any Group of Advocates to

consider call for a strike, abstention from court(s) or boycott of

Judicial Proceedings.

6. „Committee of Bar‟ not to call meeting of the

Association/Council to consider call for strike

A Bar Association/Bar counsel or „Committee of Bar‟ shall not

entertain or act upon any requisition for a meeting received

from one or more members of the Bar Association/Bar Council

to consider call for strike, abstention from court work or

boycott of Judicial Proceedings and shall refrain from calling

such a meeting on its own or on such a requisition.

7. The advocates not to go on Strike.

Save as otherwise provided in these Rules, no Advocate

individually, as part of a group of Advocates or a member

of an Association shall go on strike, abstain from work or

boycott the Judicial Proceedings whether in pursuance or

otherwise of a call given for strike, abstention from court

work or boycott of Judicial Proceedings.”

77. For contravening the provisions of Rules 4, 5, 6 and 7 of these

rules, penalty is provided under Rule 10 and 11 of the Advocates Rules

which, for expediency, are extracted hereunder:

Penalty for Contravention of Rules 4, 5 & 6.

10. An Advocate or a member of „Committee of Bar‟

contravening the provisions laid down in Rules 4, 5 & 6

may be debarred for appearing, pleading and conducting

cases in the High Court and/or Subordinate Courts for a

period not less than one year but not exceeding five years.

11. An advocate or a member of „Committee of Bar‟

contravening Rule(s) 7 and 9 may be debarred from

appearing, pleading and conducting cases in the High

Court and/or Subordinate Courts for a period not less than

2 years but not exceeding seven years.”

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28

78. Unfortunately, these rules have remained in the rule book

without being worked or applied in the event of contraventions.

The result is the terrible situation that we are faced with today.

VIII. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COURT WHEN COUNSEL

FOR BOTH SIDES ARE ABSENT BECAUSE OF A

STRIKE CALL

79. A very precarious situation arises when lawyers abstain

from working in response to a strike call by the Bar Association. In the

judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in the case reported at (1998)

8 SCC 624 K. John Koshy vs. Dr. Tarakeshwar Prasad Shaw, the

Supreme Court was considering the challenge to the validity of an order

passed when lawyers were on strike and held that the court should not

refuse to hear the matter, as, otherwise, it would tantamount to the court

becoming a privy to the suit to the strike. The observations of the

Supreme Court shed valuable guidance on issue under consideration and

deserve to be considered in extenso. It was observed thus:

“We do not propose to express any opinion in regard to the

merits of the case nor do we desire to dwell on events

preceding the making of the order dated 13-3-1995, We also

do not desire to say anything on the question whether

circumstances did or did not exist for making the order of

13-3-1995. It is an admitted fact that since the members of

the Calcutta Bar were on strike, the counsel for both sides

were absent and hence the Court passed the order after

hearing the respondent. If the matter was urgent and the

respondent who was present in person insisted on being

heard and orders being passed on his application as his

career was at stake, could the Court refuse to take up his

application for hearing and refuse to pass an appropriate

order on merits? The answer must obviously be in the

negative because to do so would tantamount to the Court

becoming privy to the strike. The court is under an

obligation to hear and decide cases brought before it and

cannot shirk that obligation on the ground that the

advocates are on strike. Therefore, the Division Bench was

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29

fully justified in proceeding to hear the respondent and in

passing orders on merits. We must also mention that at the

relevant point of time, the interim order passed by this

Court in the Common Cause, A Regd. Society v. Union of

India, pending in this Court against lawyers proceeding on

strike was in force whereunder the Bar Associations were

precluded from dismembering any member of the Bar who

appeared in court despite the strike call. Under the

circumstances the fear of being debarred from membership

also did not exist. We are, therefore, of the opinion that

despite the same if counsel did not appear, they are only to

blame. The Court in the circumstances did the right thing to

proceed to hear the case.”

80. In (2000) 4 SCC 465 Koluttumottil Razak vs. State of Kerela,

counsel had not appeared in the Court as advocates had called for a strike. As

the appellant was languishing in jail, the Supreme Court held that the

adjournment would not be justified. The court felt that it was its duty to look

into the matter itself.

81. Appeals were filed before the Supreme Court of India against

denial of bails by trial and appellate courts in cases where the trials/appeals of

the appellants were pending and the appellants had been in custody for a long

period. In the judgment of the Supreme Court reported at (2017) 5 SCC 702

Hussain & Anr. vs. Union of India, adverting to the principles laid down by

the Court in the judgments delivered as back as in 1980 in the case reported

at (1980) 1 SCC 81 Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar

with regard to speedy trial being a part of a reasonable, fair and just procedure

guaranteed under Article 21 as well as grant of bail pending appeal in (2001)

4 SCC 355 Akhtari Bi v. State of MP. and (2005) 7 SCC 387 Surinder Singh

vs. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court had observed as follows:

“12. Timely delivery of justice is a part of human rights.

Denial of speedy justice is a threat to public confidence in

the administration of justice. Directions of this Court in

Noor Mohammed v. Jethanand and Anr. are as follows:

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30

“34. …… Therefore, we request the learned Chief

Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well as the

other learned Chief Justices to conceive and adopt a

mechanism, regard being had to the priority of

cases, to avoid such inordinate delays in matters

which can really be dealt with in an expeditious

manner. Putting a step forward is a step towards the

destination. A sensible individual inspiration and a

committed collective endeavour would indubitably

help in this regard. Neither less, nor more.”

13. In Thana Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics this

Court directed that liberal adjournments must be avoided

and witnesses once produced must be examined on

consecutive dates. Directions were also issued for setting

up of sufficient laboratories, for disposal of seized

narcotics drugs and for providing charge-sheets and other

documents in electronic form in addition to hard copies of

same to avoid delay.

14. In Akhtari Bi (supra) this Court observed as under:

“5. … … …it is incumbent upon the High Courts to find

ways and means by taking steps to ensure the disposal of

criminal appeals, particularly such appeals where the

accused are in jails, that the matters are disposed of within

the specified period not exceeding 5 years in any case.

Regular Benches to deal with the criminal cases can be set

up where such appeals be listed for final disposal. We feel

that if an appeal is not disposed of within the aforesaid

period of 5 years, for no fault of the convicts, such convicts

may be released on bail on such conditions as may be

deemed fit and proper by the court. In computing the

period of 5 years, the delay for any period, which is

requisite in preparation of the record and the delay

attributable to the convict or his counsel can be deducted.

There may be cases where even after the lapse of 5 years

the convicts may, under the special circumstances of the

case, be held not entitled to bail pending the disposal of the

appeals filed by them. We request the Chief Justices of the

High Courts, where the criminal cases are pending for

more than 5 years to take immediate effective steps for

their disposal by constituting regular and special Benches

for that purpose.”

15. Again in Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh

and Ors. it was observed that long delay has the effect of

blatant violation of rule of law and adverse impact on

access to justice which is a fundamental right. Denial of

this right undermines public confidence in justice

delivery. These observations have been reiterated in recent

Constitution Bench judgment in Anita Kushwaha etc. etc.

v. Pushap Sudan etc. etc. In the said judgment it was

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31

noticed that providing effective adjudicatory mechanism,

reasonably accessible and speedy, was part of access to

justice.”

(Emphasis supplied

82. Extremely pertinent observations having been made by the

Supreme Court on the question as to whether a litigant should suffer a penalty

because his advocate had boycotted the court pursuant to a strike call made by

the Association of which the advocate was a member. The Supreme Court has

also ruled on the liability of the lawyer for the loss suffered by the litigant in

such circumstances.

In the judgment reported at (2001) 1 SCC 118 Ramon Services

Private Limited vs. Subhash Kapoor, it was held that when an advocate

engaged by a party is on strike, there is no obligation on the part of the Court

to “either wait or adjourn the case on that account”. It was held that this

Court has time and again set out that an advocate has no right to stall court

proceedings on the ground that they have decided to go on strike. It had been

so held in the case reported at (1999) 1 SCC 37 Mahabir Prasad Singh vs.

Jacks Aviation Private Limited referred to earlier.

83. In Ramon Services Private Ltd, the Supreme Court had

therefore directed that the advocate concerned should pay the half amount of

the cost imposed on his client on account of the adjournment necessitated by a

lawyers strike. The observations of the Court putting the profession to notice

in para 15 of Ramon Services Private Limited, are extremely pertinent and

read as follows:

“15. Therefore, we permit the appellant to realise half of

the said amount of Rs. 5000 from the firm of advocates M/s B.C. Das Gupta & Co. or from any one of its partners.

Initially we thought that the appellant could be permitted to

realise the whole amount from the said firm of advocates.

However, we are inclined to save the firm from bearing the

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32

costs partially since the Supreme Court is adopting such a

measure for the first time and the counsel would not have

been conscious of such a consequence befalling them.

Nonetheless we put the profession to notice that in future

the advocate would also be answerable for the

consequence suffered by the party if the non-appearance

was solely on the ground of a strike call. It is unjust and

inequitable to cause the party alone to suffer for the self-

imposed dereliction of his advocate. We may further add

that the litigant who suffers entirely on account of his

advocate's non-appearance in court, has also the remedy

to sue the advocate for damages but that remedy would

remain unaffected by the course adopted in this case. Even

so, in situations like this, when the court mulcts the party

with costs for the failure of his advocate to appear, we make

it clear that the same court has power to permit the party to

realise the costs from the advocate concerned. However,

such direction can be passed only after affording an

opportunity to the advocate. If he has any justifiable cause

the court can certainly absolve him from such a liability.

But the advocate cannot get absolved merely on the

ground that he did not attend the court as he or his

association was on a strike. If any advocate claims that his

right to strike must be without any loss to him but the loss

must only be for his innocent client such a claim is

repugnant to any principle of fair play and canons of

ethics. So when he opts to strike work or boycott the court

he must as well be prepared to bear at least the pecuniary

loss suffered by the litigant client who entrusted his brief

to that advocate with all confidence that his cause would be

safe in the hands of that advocate.”

(Emphasis by us)

84. All courts in Jammu and Kashmir as well as Ladakh are

bound by the mandate of the above law and have to apply the same. We

have no option to follow the principles as above.

85. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has also given guidance

on the manner in which condolence references by courts sought to be held. To

effectuate the entitlement of the fundamental right under Article 21 of persons

in custody, in Hussain & Anr. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India

has deprecated the practice of obstructing court proceedings by uncalled for

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33

strikes/abstaining of work by lawyers or frequent suspension of court work

after condolence references observing as follows:

“27. One other aspect pointed out is the obstruction of

Court proceedings by uncalled for strikes/abstaining of

work by lawyers or frequent suspension of court work

after condolence references. In view of judgment of this

Court in Ex. Captain Harish Uppal versus Union of

India, such suspension of work or strikes are clearly

illegal and it is high time that the legal fraternity realizes

its duty to the society which is the foremost. Condolence

references can be once in while periodically say once in

two/three months and not frequently. Hardship faced by

witnesses if their evidence is not recorded on the day they

are summoned or impact of delay on under trials in custody

on account of such avoidable interruptions of court

proceedings is a matter of concern for any responsible

body of professionals and they must take appropriate steps.

In any case, this needs attention of all concerned

authorities–the Central Government/State

Governments/BarCouncils/Bar Associations as well as the

High Courts and ways and means ought to be found out to

tackle this menace. Consistent with the above judgment, the

High Courts must monitor this aspect strictly and take

stringent measures as may be required in the interests of administration of justice.”

28. Judicial service as well as legal service are not like

any other services. They are missions for serving the

society. The mission is not achieved if the litigant who is

waiting in the queue does not get his turn for a long time.

Chief Justices and Chief Ministers have resolved that all

cases must be disposed of within five years which by any

standard is quite a long time for a case to be decided in the

first court. Decision of cases of undertrials in custody is

one of the priority areas. There are obstructions at every

level in enforcement of right of speedy trial – vested

interests or unscrupulous elements try to delay the

proceedings. xxxxxx”

(Emphasis by us)

86. The practice in this court of holding repeated condonence

references would therefore be contrary to the mandate of the directions of the

Supreme Court of India.

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87. We find that full court references are held in this court

irrespective of whether the lawyer who has demised ever practised in the

High Court or did not have an active practice in this court.

Our oral missives on this count have evoked no response.

IX. ROLE OF SENIOR COUNSEL

88. Despite the afore noticed judicial pronouncements of the highest

court of the land dating back from 1980, this court is seeing a unique form of

protest. Information has been received that even senior counsel have given

public calls by provocative speeches, incitory messages on the social media,

invoking lawyers to boycott work and incting protests, dharnas in public

spaces as also spearheading and encouraging sloganeering within the court

premises leading to disruption of the work of this court and also district courts

in Jammu and neighbouring districts. This information shall be verified and

action shall be taken thereon.

89. A practice came into existence in the United Kingdom of

appointment of Queens Counsel to assist other Crown Law Officers. It was an

office conferred by the Crown that was recognized by the Courts. Such

members had the special privileges of wearing distinctive uniforms; a formal

right to address the court with preference and sitting in a particular area in the

court. The conferment of the office was recognized as honorific.

Significantly, appointments were made on the basis of merit and eminence.

Over a period of time, similar practices came to be adopted in other

jurisdictions (including India) as well in recognition of the excellence, high

professional standing and personal integrity of counsels.

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35

90. In India, the Legal Practitioners Act was enacted in 1879

defining „legal practitioners‟ to mean an advocate, vakil, attorney of any high

court, a pleader, a mukhtar, a revenue agent. The Indian Bar Councils Act,

1926 was then passed to unify various grades of legal practice and to provide

autonomy to the Bar.

91. So far as recognition and designation in Indian advocates is

concerned, the same has also been the subject matter of authoritative judicial

pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the judgment dated 12th October,

2017 in Writ Petition Civil No. 454 of 2015 Ms Indira Jaising vs. Supreme

Court of India. In para 15, the Supreme Court has noted that prior to the

coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961, designation as a senior

advocate was a matter of choice for any advocate, who had completed ten

years of practice and who was otherwise willing to abide by certain

conditions, including not to directly deal with clients or file papers and

documents in the courts etc. Designations, which were exclusively dealt with

by the Bar, came to be vested in the Supreme Court with the enactment of the

Supreme Court Rules 1966. Similar was earlier the position in the Bombay

High Court.

92. The enactment of the Advocates Act, 1961 brought a change in

the scenario. Section 16 of this enactment statutorily entrusted the task of

designation of Senior Advocates to the Supreme Court of India. Under the

Supreme Court Rules, Rule 2 of Order IV and its sub-rules delineates the

qualities to be possessed by an advocate for designation as also prescribes the

contours within which a senior advocate would function.

93. The Rule 2 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013

and its sub-rules may also be seen at this stage:

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36

“2(a) The Chief Justice and the Judges may, with the

consent of the advocate, designate an advocate as senior

advocate if in their opinion by virtue of his ability, standing

at the Bar or special knowledge or experience in law the

said advocate is deserving of such distinction.

(b) A senior advocate shall not-

(i) file a vakalatnama or act in any Court or Tribunal in

India;

(ii)appear without an advocate-on-record in the Court or

without a junior in any other Court or Tribunal in India;

(iii) accept instructions to draw pleadings or affidavit,

advise on evidence or do any drafting work of an

analogous kind in any Court or Tribunal in India or

undertake conveyancing work of any kind whatsoever but

this prohibition shall not extend to settling any such

matter as aforesaid in consultation with a junior;

(iv) accept directly from a client any brief or instructions

to appear in any Court or Tribunal in India.

Explanation:-

In this order-

(i) „acting‟ means filing an appearance or any pleadings or

applications in any Court or Tribunal in India, or any act

(other than pleading) required or authorized by law to be

done by a party in such Court or Tribunal either in person

or by his recognized agent or by an advocate or attorney

on his behalf.

(ii) „tribunal‟ includes any authority or person legally

authorized to take evidence and before whom advocates

are, by or under any law for the time being in force,entitled to practice.

(iii) „junior‟ means an advocate other than a senioradvocate.

(c) Upon an advocate being designated as a senior

advocate, the Registrar shall communicate to all the High

Courts and the Secretary to the Bar Council of India and

the Secretary of the State Bar Council concerned the name

of the said Advocate and the date on which he was so

designated.”

94. Senior advocates are expected to promote the highest standards

of advocacy and assistance in maintaining the rule of law in the legal system.

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95. So far as the High Courts were concerned, no uniform criteria or

yardstick was followed and the position varied from court to court. However,

the qualities entitling a lawyer to designation were the same as above. As

does the manner in which the designated senior lawyers must conduct

themselves and the restrictions on their activities.

96. In Indira Jaisingh, the Supreme Court has laid down the

essentialities and the procedure to be followed by all High Courts regarding

designation.

97. In the above judgment, the Supreme Court has observed that “the

designation of senior advocate is hardly a title. It is a distinction; a

recognition”.

98. Pursuant to the judgment dated 12th October 2017, in Indira Jaisingh,

this court vide Notification No. 33 dated 25.04.2018 framed the “Criteria for

Designating Senior Advocates, 2018”, which were subsequently amended

vide Notification No. 846 dated 01.10.2019 in this regard prescribing as

follows:

“2 – Eligibility Conditions:-

(a) An Advocate shall be eligible to be designated as a

Senior Advocate, if he/she:

(i) has attained the position of eminence at the Bar;

(ii) possesses ability, legal acumen, special knowledge

or distinction and reputation achieved in practice of law;

(iii) is ordinarily practicing in the High Court of

Jammu and Kashmir for not less than ten years

preceding the date of consideration of his/her case for

designation as a Senior Advocate;

(iv) has been assisting the Court in administration of

Justice maintaining high ethical standards, both inside

and outside the Court expected of a Senior Advocates;

(v) has furnished at least 15 judgments, in the

preceding five years, where he has contributed to the

growth of law;

(Emphasis supplied)

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38

99. The High Court of Delhi had occasion to deal with certain issues

relating to the conduct of amongst others, two senior counsels in a Division

Bench judgment reported at 2008 (105) DRJ 557, Court On Its Own Motion

vs. State &Ors. In this judgment dated 21st August, 2008, it was observed in

para 240 that “we are dealing seniors, who are expected to conduct

themselves as gentleman and role models for younger members of the Bar”.

100. Senior counsels are men of eminence and high standing ability

fully aware of the law. They would know the law laid down by the Supreme

Court of India in the judgment as above.

101. Our experience in our law practices before elevation, as also the

prevalent practice in the courts in Punjab & Haryana as also Delhi, has shown

that district court and trial practices are unique, requiring expertise which is

different from the skills required for conducting appellate and writ work in

the High Court. District Courts have their independent strong Bar associations

led by the stalwarts practising in the trial courts and concerned with issues

relating to the trial courts. We understand that this is the position in all other

parts of the country as well.

102. It has been our experience at the Bar as well that registration of

documents did not entail any judicial intervention and only very young

lawyers at the inception/beginning of their careers are known to facilitate

parties in this work. We have not experienced designated senior counsels

visiting offices of Registrar/Sub Registrars of documents.

103. Senior advocates are expected to lead the younger members of

the Bar by example, so far as following law is concerned. Therefore,

use of social media to incite young advocates and members of the Bar into

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abstaining from work; boycotting court(s); leading sloganeering within the

premises of the Court; locking courts etc. by any senior counsel would not be

acceptable conduct from persons who have been honored by the High Court

in awarding them the special status of senior advocates.

104. So far as licenced advocates are concerned, in the aforesaid

judgments, the Supreme Court has held that such conduct tantamounts to

criminal contempt of court as well as professional misconduct.

105. Two senior advocates were found guilty of criminal contempt by

the Division Bench comprising of Manmohan Sarin, J and Madan B. Lokur, J

(as His Lordship then was) in the judgment in 2008 (105) DRJ 557, Court On

Its Own Motion vs. State & Ors. Amongst the punishments awarded, the

Division Bench held that on account of their conduct, they had forfeited the

right to enjoy the honour conferred on them by this Court of being designated

as senior advocates. The Division Bench recommended to the Full Court to

strip them of their designation as such. The Full Court accepted such

recommendation.

106. We extract Rule 8 of the above “Criteria for Designating Senior

Counsel” framed by this court in this regard which reads as follows:

“(8) Withdrawal of designation of Senior Advocate by

the Court in the event of violation of rules:

In the event a Senior Advocate is guilty of

conduct which according to the Full Court disentitles

the Senior Advocate concerned to continue to be worthy

of the designation, the Full Court may review its

decision to designate the concerned person and recall

the same, after complying with principles of natural

justice.”

107. Therefore in case, it is verified before us that any person has

conducted in a manner unbecoming of the honour bestowed on them, review

in terms of Rule 8 may be warranted and similar orders may be warranted.

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X. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SUPREME

COURT

108. In Writ petition (Criminal) Dairy No. 18239/2018 Afshan

Pracha vs. Union of India and others, the Supreme Court has come down

heavily on obstructions caused by the Members of the Bar to the petitioner

and by an interim order dated 9th of May 2018, prohibited the Bar Association

of Tis Hazari Court in Delhi from “going on strike or participating in any

kind of boycott of any court in Tis Hazari or any other court.”

The court had relied on the Constitution Bench pronouncement

in (2003) 2 SCC 45 Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India.

109. This writ petition was disposed of on 11th

May 2018 by the

Supreme Court observing that:

“We are absolutely sure, the bar which maintains

the highest tradition, shall maintain a peaceful

atmosphere not only in Delhi but throughout the country

so that there is a fair and speedy trial and prevalence of

peaceful atmosphere.

110. A transfer petition being Transfer Petition (Civil) No.

2419/2019 M/s PLR Projects Pvit. Ltd. v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd and

others was recently brought before the Supreme Court on the contention that

the lawyers of the local Bar are not permitting the representation before the

Chief Justice of the High Court of Orissa and even outside lawyers are not

permitted to appear. Orders dated 16th October 2019, 22

nd October 2019 and

24th October 2019 were recorded by the court noticing the position. Very

pertinent observations in the order dated 24th October 2019 have been made

therein which may be usefully extracted and read thus:

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“We have the benefit of hearing learned Attorney

General of India as we have issued notice as also learned

counsel appearing for the Orissa High Court.

We are informed that both in the High Court and

practically all districts the working has been brought to a

stand still by the strike of the advocates This means that

the access to justice for a common man is not available.

Learned counsel appearing for the State of Orissa

assures that all police assistance as may be required will

be made available both for the High Court and for the

district courts to ensure that egress and ingress in all

court premises is available so that the willing advocates

and litigants can go and appear in their cases. We will

expect the courts to perform their task to the best of their

abilities even if lawyers refuse to assist the courts. The

litigants cannot be without access to justice and one

wonders if an alternative would have to be explored in

adjacent states for access to justice, if the advocates

continue to be on strike.

We are informed that the origination of the strike,

though as usual subsequently many other issues are

added, was over a decision of collegium clearing the

names of some candidate (who practices in this court) and

not clearing the name of other candidates. This can hardly be a ground for the lawyers to abstain from work.

Learned Attorney General points out that the

perennial issue of strikes has received attention of this

court in many cases including of the Constitution Bench

in Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC 45. The

judgments of this Court in Hussain v. Union of

India (2017) 5 SCC 702 and Krishnakant Tamrakar v.

State of Madhya Pradesh (2018) 17 SCC 27 have again

been brought to our notice apart from the Report of the

Law Commission (Report No.266) wherein Chapter-VII

Loss of Courts‟ Working Days in an aspect discussed.

The Law Commission has opined that there is staggering

number of working days lost due to strike by advocates

without any justifiable reasons.

We have asked learned counsel appearing for the

Orissa High Court to file an affidavit setting out the

grounds for going on strike and abstaining from work in

the year 2018-19 both in the High Court and in each of the

district courts, giving a chart of the number of working

days for each district and the number of working days lost

which will give a clearer picture. Affidavit in this behalf

qua the High Court and subordinate courts be filed on or before 6th November, 2019.

.








42

xxxx

We thus consider it appropriate to issue notice to

the Bar Council of India through the Chairman requesting the Chairman to be in Court to assist us.

We also consider it appropriate to issue notice to

the Chairman of the Orissa State Bar Council and the President of the Orissa High Court Bar Association.

We have a little doubt that conduct of the lawyers

really falls within the domain of contempt in view of the

law enunciated aforesaid. However, before proceeding to

take action in that behalf, we deem it appropriate to

simply issue notice to explain their conduct. We would

specifically desire the Bar Council of India to inform us

as to what steps they propose to take in respect of the

conduct of the advocates who have violated the directions

of this Court as enunciated in the aforesaid judgments.

The Chairman of the Orissa State Bar Council and

President of the Orissa High Court Bar Association will also appear in person.

We are informed by the learned counsel

appearing for the High Court, Shri Sibo Sankar Misra

that some resolutions have been passed by the Co-

ordination Committee headed by the President of the

Orissa High Court Bar Association to the effect that: (i)

his suspension from the Bar Association, (ii) a letter

written to the Bar Council of Orissa to initiate action

against him and (iii) letter to the State Government to

remove him from the panel of lawyers apart from

initiating contempt proceedings. In doing so, we have not

the least doubt that the said conduct of the lawyers

amounts to interfering with the proceedings of this court. As to what consequences should follow for this would also

be considered on the next date. In the meantime, all of the

aforesaid three decisions are stayed as also the local Bar

Association and Bar Council are denuded of the authority

to take any action in future also against the counsel in question.

Now coming to the last aspect, the grievance of the

petitioner about the facilitation of his representation

before the High Court. Learned senior counsel states even

if a counsel is engaged from outside Orissa or the party decides to appear in person, security must be ensured.

We are in full agreement and learned counsel for

the Orissa High Court assures this Court in that behalf. It

will be open for the counsel to appear or the party going

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43

to appear in advance intimate the Registrar for

making specific security arrangements for their presence

and the police department of the State Government will also render full assistance in this behalf.

List on 8th November, 2019.

We desire the learned Attorney General to again assist us

on the next date.”

(Emphasis by us)

111. On 8th November 2019, the Supreme Court recorded as

follows:

“We are happy to note that the resolution to go on

strike has been withdrawn thus giving access to justice to

the common man for which this institution exists. xxxx

We have impressed upon the Chairman and Members of

the Bar counsel of India who are present here that they

are senior members and must ensure that discipline is

observed among the advocates so as to ensure that the

working of the Courts is not brought to a standstill. We

have given example of this court where if really the

advocates feel that there a cause to protest, they wear

white bands. The advocates bring access to justice to the

common man and thus, there can be no question of

advocates abstaining from work, an aspect repeatedly re-

emphasized by this court that it would be contemptuous

in view of the judgments passed by the court but more

importantly would go contrary to the oath of profession

of the advocates itself. It is for the advocates to ensure

that this discipline is adhered to.xxxx

We certainly expect the High Court of Orissa to continue

working and lawyers not to abstain but all district courts

should at least now start working forthwith and the Bar

Council of India to enforce the same by taking action, if

the situation so arises, against any delinquent advocates.

xxxx”

(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly access to courts has to be ensured and cannot be

imperiled at any level or by any person.

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44

XI. CONCLUSIONS

112. In view of the afore noted pronouncements of the Supreme Court

reported in (2003) 2 SCC 45 titled Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of

India &Anr;(2017) 5 SCC 702 Hussain &Anr. vs. Union of India, & Ors.

and 2018 SCC Online 304, Krishnakant Tamrakar vs. State of M.P, the

mere call for meeting, or the very decision to proceed on strike; remaining

absent from court and boycott of judicial proceedings; locking the courts,

preventing entry to those wanting to enter are completely illegal rendering all

persons responsible for the same for appropriate action as mandated by the

Supreme Court of India.

This conduct tantamounts to criminal contempt of court in terms

of the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India.

113. This conduct also calls for action in accordance with the Jammu

and Kashmir Advocates (Regulation of practice in the High Court and

Subordinate Courts) Rules, 2003.

114. We have no manner of doubt that such conduct as is in blatant

violation of the mandate of law, in the clear pronouncements of the Supreme

Court of India cannot be countenanced or condoned. As observed by the

Supreme Court, we would become party to such violations if we continue to

ignore such actions which have been held by the Supreme Court to be clearly

contumacious and falling under the serious category of criminal contempt of

court, professional misconduct and even criminal offences.

115. We are reasonably hopeful that given the reminder of the legal

position hereby, good sense and conscience of the members of the Bar would

prevail and they would conduct themselves in accordance with law ensuring

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45

the rights of the public guaranteed under the Constitution of India. We would

take a view on this on receipt of further reports from the Registrar General.

116. However, the conduct of those who have indulged in provoking

the contumacious conduct as also the obstruction of access to the District

Courts is unpardonable and must invite stringent action in accordance with

law.

XII. RESULT

117. We accordingly direct as follows:

i) At the first instance issue notice to the advocates detailed in para

27 of this Order to show cause as to why they should not be

proceeded against for criminal contempt of court.

ii) Notice to show cause to these advocates as to why they should not

be proceeded against under rules 10, 11 of the Jammu and

Kashmir Advocates (Regulation of Practice in the High Court and

Subordinate Courts) Rules, 2003 as well as proceeded against for

the acts which are penal under the provisions of the Indian Penal

Code.

iii) The noticees as above shall file a response within two weeks of

the receipt of the notices.

iv) The response shall be accompanied by a date wise list of cases

wherein these lawyers were engaged by litigants between 1st

November 2019 till date and the courts where these cases were

listed.

v) The Registrar General shall procure from the Registrar Judicial as

also from the Principal District & Sessions Judge, Jammu upto

date reports regarding the position with regard to the obstructions

to access to the courts as well as CCTV video coverage recorded

and photographs thereof, if any, and place the same before us.

vi) The Registrar General shall circulate the judgments referred

herein to all Bar Associations in the Union Territories of Jammu

and Kashmir as well as the Union Territory of Ladakh and to all

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46

Principal District & Sessions Judges for circulation and

compliance.

vii) The Registrar IT shall conduct an inquiry and collect all postings

on the social media on Youtube or any other site, tweets,

messages, interviews and speeches etc. by any counsel in

violation of the judgments of the Supreme Court inciting

violence/abstention from the court etc and place the same before

this court.

List on 29.01.2020

(Rajesh Bindal) (Gita Mittal)

(Judge) (Chief Justice)

Jammu.

11.12.2019

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Documents

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU …images.assettype.com/barandbench/import/2019/12/JK-HC-order-on... · Shoeb Alam, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Jammu