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IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND
SSSSSSSSSS
SEPTEMBER TERM, 2009
SSSSSSSSSS
NO. 322
SSSSSSSSSS
SUSAN JOAN GRIFFIN,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND,
Appellee
SSSSSSSSSS
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY
(Timothy J. Martin, Judge)
SSSSSSSSSS
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
SSSSSSSSSS
DOUGLAS F. GANSLER
Attorney General of Maryland
JEREMY M. McCOY
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
200 Saint Paul Place
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(410) 576-6444
Counsel for Appellee
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
QUESTIONS PRESENTED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ARGUMENT:
I. THE MOTIONS COURT PROPERLY DENIED
GRIFFIN’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HER
STATEMENT TO THE POLICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. Prior to her waiver of her Miranda rights, Griffin
was not subjected to custodial interrogation that
triggered Miranda protections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Griffin’s waiver of her Miranda rights and her
statement to police were voluntary and not
improperly induced by the police, nor were the
product of intimidation, coercion, or deception. . . . . . . . . . 17
C. Even if Griffin’s statement was erroneously
admitted into evidence, any error from its
admission was harmless. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
II. IF PRESERVED FOR REVIEW, THE MOTIONS
COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
TO JOIN SUSAN AND JOHN GRIFFIN’S TRIALS
BASED ON THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE SAME
ACT OF STARVING THEIR SON TO DEATH AND
THE MUTUAL ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE
AGAINST THEM.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Page
ii
III. THE MOTIONS COURT PROPERLY DENIED
GRIFFIN’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT
FOR HER RESIDENCE WHERE: (1) THERE WAS A
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE ISSUING JUDGE
TO FIND PROBABLE CAUSE JUSTIFYING THE
WARRANT; AND (2) THE POLICE RELIED ON THE
WARRANT IN GOOD FAITH.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
PERTINENT PROVISIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Apx. 1 - 5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ashford v. State, 147 Md. App. 1,
cert. denied, 372 Md. 430 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156 (1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Birchead v. State, 317 Md. 691 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Blake v. State, 381 Md. 218 (2004),
cert. dismissed, 546 U.S. 72 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341 2008).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7
Page
iii
Buck v. State, 181 Md. App. 585 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Conboy v. State, 155 Md. App. 353 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 33
Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Faulkner v. State, 156 Md. App. 615 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652 (2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Haley v. State, 398 Md. 106 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Herbert v. State, 136 Md. App. 458 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Holmes v. State, 368 Md. 506 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 29, 30
Imes v. State, 158 Md. App. 176,
cert. denied, 384 Md. 158 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Knight v. State, 381 Md. 517 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Lee v. State, 186 Md. App. 631,
cert. granted, 411 Md. 355 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233 (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Page
iv
Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452 (1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 526 A.2d 30 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, passim
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135,
89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15
Ognowski v. State, 87 Md. App. 173 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Osburn v. State, 301 Md. 250 (1984).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76 (2007),
cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1681 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 32, 33
Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Raras v. State, 140 Md. App. 132,
cert. denied, 367 Md. 90 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16
Robinson v. State, 151 Md. App. 384,
cert. denied, 377 Md. 276 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Rowe v. State, 41 Md. App. 641 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Page
v
Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
State v. Amerman, 84 Md. App. 461 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 29
State v. Coley, 145 Md. App. 502 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 31
State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199 2003).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Williams v. State, 188 Md. App. 691 (2009),
cert. granted, 412 Md. 495 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Constitutional Provisions
United States Constitution
Fourth Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 32
Statutes
Annotated Code of Maryland:
Maryland Declaration of Rights:
Article 22. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Page
vi
Rules
Maryland Rules of Procedure:
Rule 4-253.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Rule 8-131.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
CONTENTS OF APPENDIX
State’s Motion Exhibit 2 - signed Miranda rights advisement
and waiver form. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Apx. 1
Application and Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant for
Griffin Residence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Apx. 2-3
Search Warrant for Griffin Residence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Apx. 4-5
IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND
SSSSSSSSSS
SEPTEMBER TERM, 2009
SSSSSSSSSS
NO. 322
SSSSSSSSSS
SUSAN JOAN GRIFFIN,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND,
Appellee
SSSSSSSSSS
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY
(Timothy J. Martin, Judge)
SSSSSSSSSS
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
SSSSSSSSSS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee, the State of Maryland, accepts the Statement of the Case set forth in
the brief of Appellant, Susan Joan Griffin.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the motions court properly deny Griffin’s motion to suppress her
statement to the police?
2. If preserved for review, did the motions court properly exercise its
discretion to join Susan and John Griffin’s trials based on their participation in the
2
same act of starving their son to death and the mutual admissibility of the evidence
against them?
3. Did the motions court properly deny Griffin’s motion to suppress
evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant for her residence where: (1) there was
a substantial basis for the issuing judge to find probable cause justifying the warrant;
and (2) the police relied on the warrant in good faith?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dr. Eric Beauvois, an emergency room physician at St. Joseph’s Medical
Center in Towson, testified at trial that while on duty during the afternoon of
December 26, 2007, he attended to two-year old Andrew Griffin, who was brought
to the emergency room by his father, John Griffin. (T. 2/17/09 at 19, 21-22).
Andrew’s body was “quite cold; and he did not have any pulse.” (Id. at 21). After
attempting pediatric advance life support, the medical staff was unable to revive
Andrew. (Id. at 22).
Dr. Beauvois testified that when he examined Andrew, “[h]is appearance was
frankly shocking in that he was -- he appeared to be a child who was grossly
malnourished and [sic] as well as some physical injuries to his face and body.” (Id.).
He described Andrew as having “very low muscle mass” and described his
appearance as “like a Holocaust victim, no muscle mass, grossly malnourished[.]” (Id.
at 23). Erin Sadler, a registered nurse at St. Joseph’s also testified that when she
arrived to help work on Andrew:
[I]t was really hard to look at him. It was an awful sight
actually. The child was very small. I thought it was an infant at first,
and then when I learned of his age, it was very devastating. It was hard
to look at him. I honestly thought that he had a terminal illness or was
a very sick child. He was very small and -- but then you knew that he
3
was older because he had a full set of teeth, yet he was nothing but skin
and bones.
(Id. at 91-92).
Dr. Beauvois testified that John Griffin told him that he had earlier put Andrew
down for a nap, and when he subsequently tried to wake Andrew, he could not revive
him, and then brought him to the emergency room. (Id. at 22). Dr. Beauvois testified
that after Andrew died:
I asked Mr. Griffin if Andrew had any medical problems, and he
said no, he’s a healthy child which I was very surprised by given his
appearance. I did later ask him about the abrasions to his face and other
injuries, and I was told that -- well, I was told two things.
One was that a couple of weeks prior to December 26th,
[Andrew] had had a flu-type virus and had lost a lot of weight during
that illness, and then secondly I was also told that a couple of days
before the 26th that he had fallen into the Christmas tree; and that was
where the facial injuries had come from.
(Id. at 27).
Dr. Beauvois testified that Andrew “had multiple abrasions on his face and
arms, and then he had a bruise that did not -- that appeared to have been more than
two days old under his right eye on his right cheek, and so I was concerned that it
appeared that he had injuries that were in different stages of healing.” (Id.).
In response to questions about John Griffin’s response to the death of his son,
Dr. Beauvois testified that although John Griffin seemed “appropriately upset,” he
was “concerned” that John Griffin “didn’t hold Andrew, didn’t talk to him, didn’t tell
him that he loved him, and that’s what I mean by those are some of the things that
I’ve seen with every other similar case.” (Id. at 37, 39-40). Dr. Beauvois testified
that when police officers arrived at the emergency room, “Mr. Griffin looked at me,
looked at the police officers, and looked back at me and said what are they doing
4
here?” Beauvois testified that John Griffin’s statement “wasn’t a casual remark. It
was very -- it was very direct. He said what are they doing here and looked back at
me.”
Dr. Zabiullah Ali, an Assistant Medical Examiner in the Office of Chief
Medical Examiner, and an expert in forensic pathology, testified that he performed
an autopsy on Andrew Griffin on December 27, 2007. (T. 2/23/09 at 7-9). Based on
an external examination of Andrew, he described him as being 28 inches tall, but was
“extremely emaciated” at only 13 pounds. (Id. at 9-10). Dr. Ali described “several
bruises” on Andrew, “in different stages of healing on the face, head, and
extremities[,]” and described his extremities as “severely atrophic which means
wasted atrophic, wasted -- and also the muscles of the chest and abdomen and back
region and the buttocks were severely atrophic and wasted.” (Id. at 10). Dr. Ali also
described Andrew’s hair loss as “commonly seen in severe malnutrition starvation.”
(Id. at 12).
Dr. Ali described several injuries and bruises on Andrew’s body, extremities,
head, and face, which he opined was caused by “blunt force trauma.” (Id. at 14-15,
20, 22, 27, 28, 32, 38). Dr. Ali testified that Andrew also appeared to be dehydrated.
(Id. at 62). Dr. Ali testified that there was “no organic reason for Andrew to not be
able to absorb calories.” (Id. at 65). He testified that Andrew’s failure to physically
grow and maintain weight indicated a “chronic process” as opposed to an acute event
that caused rapid weight loss. (Id. at 71-72). Based on the results of the autopsy, Dr.
Ali testified that within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Andrew’s manner
of death was “homicide” caused by “starvation.” (Id. at 72).
Detective Alvin Barton of the Homicide Unit of the Baltimore County Police
Department testified that during the afternoon of Andrew’s death, he arrived at the
5
Griffin family home and spoke with Susan Griffin (“Griffin”). (T. 2/19/09 at 5, 9).
Detective Barton testified that Griffin “wasn’t crying or upset” when he spoke with
her about Andrew, and that Griffin told him that Andrew “was a normal child and had
the normal bouts of colds and flus.” (Id. at 9, 22). Griffin told Barton that she knew
Andrew was thin, but that “he eats an awful lot” and had “no problem with his food
intake and drinking.” (Id. at 22). Griffin told Barton that earlier the previous
summer, she had been carrying Andrew down the stairs in the house when she
slipped, and Andrew hit his head on either the wall or the piano bench, and
“developed a large knot on his head.” (Id. at 24). Griffin described to Barton that
Andrew frequently “would just fall over without breaking his fall,” and explained the
marks on Andrew’s face with various stories about an accident with the Christmas
tree, her versions of which Barton testified “changed several times.” (Id. at 24-25).
Detective Barton also testified about his observations of the Griffin house after
executing a search warrant. (Id. at 32). Barton observed rags and paper towels
soaked with blood in the master bedroom trash basket, near the bassinet where
Andrew stayed. (Id. at 31-34). Barton testified that he looked inside the bassinet and
“noticed that it had a fair amount of what looked to be consistent with blood, mostly
dried blood stains around. The bassinet itself had a canopy that went over top that
kind of -- it’s like an accordion canopy that comes over half of it, and it had blood
inside there and all on the bedding.” (Id. at 34). Detective Barton also testified that
he observed what appeared to be older blood stains on the blanket covering the master
bed, and “what appeared to be blood droplets on the walls,” on “all four sides of the
room.” (Id. at 35-36). Barton testified that blood droplets appeared to be on some
shirts and boxes contained in the bedroom, and that “we did notice that on the ceiling
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).1
6
of the room there appeared to be what were blood droplets.” (Id. at 36-37).
Additional facts are as supplemented in the following Argument.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE MOTIONS COURT PROPERLY DENIED GRIFFIN’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS HER STATEMENT TO THE POLICE.
Griffin argues that the motions court erred in denying her motion to suppress
her statement provided to police following the death of her two-year old son, Andrew
Griffin, on December 26, 2007. Griffin argues that prior to being advised of her
Miranda rights, she was “in custody” and that “Miranda rights were required.”1
(Brief of Appellant at 15-19). Griffin’s claim is meritless as the record demonstrates
that Griffin was neither placed in custody, nor interrogated by police until after she
waived her Miranda rights. Griffin also argues that her waiver of her Miranda rights
was not voluntary and that her statement was improperly induced by the police. (Brief
of Appellant at 19-34). The record demonstrates that Griffin was properly advised of
her Miranda rights, she was not improperly induced by the police to waive her rights,
and that her waiver of those rights in this case was made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. Griffin’s claim is without merit.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court
looks exclusively to the record of the suppression hearing and does not consider the
trial record. Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104 (2009); Williams v. State, 188 Md. App.
691, 702 (2009) (quoting Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 349 (2008)), cert. granted, 412
Md. 495 (2010). Although the reviewing court extends great deference to the hearing
7
judge’s findings of fact and will not disturb them unless clearly erroneous, it
“review[s], independently, the application of the law to those facts to determine if the
evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the law and, accordingly, should be
suppressed.” State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 581-82 (2004); Dashiell v. State, 374 Md.
85, 93-94 (2003). Furthermore, where the motion to suppress is denied, the evidence
is to be reviewed in the light most favorable to the State as the prevailing party on the
motion. Bost, 406 Md. at 349; Haley v. State, 398 Md. 106, 131 (2007).
In this case, at the suppression hearing during which Griffin’s statement to
police was being challenged, Detective Barton testified that on the afternoon of
December 26, 2007, after responding to St. Joseph’s regarding Andrew’s death, he
went to the Griffin home as part of the investigation. (T. 8/21/08 at 69-70).
Detective Barton testified that he told Griffin why he was there, and that he wished
to interview her. (Id. at 71-72). Barton testified that:
Well, I began to speak with her at the home, and we talked for
some length, not very, very long and not very in depth; but it was
obvious to me that we needed to speak more in depth, and we were
going to need to search the house as well under the authority of the
search warrant. So I asked her to go back to the police headquarters so
we could take care of that there and the search of the house.
(Id. at 72).
Detective Barton testified that when he said to Griffin that “we were going to
need to speak in depth about the situation regarding Andrew,” she “was very
cooperative the entire time. She had no problem with -- from the very first I spoke
with her throughout the last time I spoke to her.” (Id. at 72-73). Barton testified that
Griffin was never placed under arrest at her house, and that no police officer made
any threats, promises, or inducements to Griffin in order to agree to submit to an
interview or make a statement. (Id. at 73). Detective Barton arranged for Detective
8
Ruby to transport Griffin to the police station, and asked him to complete the Miranda
rights form and information sheet used by the Homicide Unit. (Id. at 74). Barton
testified that Griffin was not in custody, and that Detective Ruby “knew that she was
not in custody.” (Id. at 73).
Detective Ruby testified at the suppression hearing that on the afternoon of
Andrew’s death, he was assigned to respond to the Griffin residence in order to
transport Griffin from her house to the police station, in connection with an
investigation into the death of Andrew Griffin. (Id. at 48, 50). Detective Ruby
testified that at the time of the transport, there was no discussion among the officers
about arresting Griffin. (Id. at 52). Ruby testified that although he searched Griffin’s
coat and purse, which he does “any time anybody gets in my car,” Griffin was never
handcuffed. (Id. at 53). Detective Ruby testified that he was never instructed to
interrogate or arrest Griffin, and that after transporting her to the police station, he
“just did what we usually do when we do a transport. We basically sit with the person
to make sure they stay in one general area. We can’t have people walking around the
building.” (Id.).
Detective Ruby testified that he sat with Griffin in a standard police interview
room, and Griffin was allowed to go to the snack room and the bathroom. (Id. at 54).
Ruby denied making any threats, promises, or inducements to Griffin to provide a
statement, and testified that the only information he had about the investigation was
that a child had died. (Id. at 55, 57). Detective Ruby testified that during the time he
was with Griffin, he did not “question her in any way in order to elicit information
regarding this offense.” (Id. at 56). Eventually, Ruby was instructed to “complete an
information sheet where we discuss the person’s identity, their address, just
particulars that we have there and to complete the Miranda waiver.” (Id.). The
9
Miranda rights advisement and waiver form that was signed by Griffin and Detective
Ruby was admitted into evidence as State’s Motion Exhibit 2. (Apx. 1).
During the period in which Detective Ruby was waiting with Griffin, Griffin
engaged in a nearly non-stop, unsolicited monologue, during which Griffin attempted
to exculpate herself by trying to explain away her dead child’s injuries. (R. State’s
Exhibit 14C - Version 3 of Griffin’s 12/26/07 Interview with Police). Griffin
variously claimed that: Andrew would gnaw on his own mouth; he had scratches on
his body because she did not cut his fingernails very well; that he had recently walked
into the family Christmas tree; that he often suffered nosebleeds and fell down; and
that he was underweight, but that their difficulties with their pediatrician prevented
them from obtaining adequate medical treatment for their son. (Id. at 3, 6, 8, 9, 12,
13). Griffin also claimed that Andrew, who weighed thirteen pounds at the time of
his death, had lost “ten to fifteen pounds” after a bout with the flu a few weeks earlier.
(Id. at 13). At one point, when Detective Ruby had to momentarily step out of the
room, Griffin told him: “Go ahead. I’m sorry. I’m just venting. You’re used to it,
I’m sure.” (Id. at 28).
During these comments, Detective Ruby asked Griffin only for biographical
information, and made no attempt to interrogate Griffin. (Id. at 6). Griffin stated her
willingness to voluntarily speak with the police: “I probably shouldn’t even be talking
to you guys but I have nothing to hide and I’m trying to just talk, I guess to figure out,
see if somebody can figure something out.” (Id. at 8-9). Detective Ruby explained
to Griffin that after the officers completed their warrant search of her home and
returned to the police station, “they’ll sit and talk to you and they’ll go through the
whole thing, and they’re going to ask you all your basic -- all the basic questions, you
know, tell me what happened[.]” (Id. at 16). Griffin appeared to understand that
10
Detective Ruby was not interrogating her, acknowledging that “I probably should be
telling them, not you. You’re like a babysit, I guess.” (Id. at 51). Detective Ruby
explained to Griffin that, “I don’t need to get involved in it because I don’t want you
telling me a story and then telling them a story[,]” and when Griffin said that she
thought she “was supposed to be telling” Ruby her story, Ruby explained: “No, you
can tell me that, but it’s just the fact that I’m not going to sit here and ask you
questions.” (Id. at 52).
Once Detective Ruby realized that the officers at Griffin’s house were going
to be returning to the police station later than he had anticipated, he continued to try
to collect biographical information from Griffin, advise her of her Miranda rights, and
to make sure she understood that she was not under arrest:
DETECTIVE RUBY: Okay. They are -- actually I thought they
were on their way back but they’re on their way back now, so it’s going
to be a little bit.
I told them what I would do is start this paper work. We have
two different papers here. The first one is an information sheet --
MS. GRIFFIN: Okay.
DETECTIVE RUBY: -- which goes over your name and all
your particulars, relatives and things, and that I like to use in the event
that you have like a seizure or we need to get somebody for you. It
gives us a little bit of background because I don’t know -- I don’t even
know your phone number at this point, okay.
The second paper is called a Miranda rights waiver, okay. And
you’re not under arrest. Please don’t get -- don’t misinterpret this, what
this is, is because you’re in a secure building, you’re not able to freely
just walk around, okay. And because you are not just able to freely
walk around, when they come in they’re going the [sic] ask you
questions. We just have to advise you of these rights, okay, but you are
not under arrest. Okay?
11
MS. GRIFFIN: Then can I ask you -- I know you can’t answer
but if you will, if everything goes kosher, I mean, is that the end part of
it, that I’ll be able to go be with the kids.
DETECTIVE RUBY: Say that again.
MS. GRIFFIN: Do you know if that is close to the end part
where I can go be with the kids, answer their questions and stuff?
DETECTIVE RUBY: Yeah, after they do the questioning and
then it’s done, but like I say, we have to do these papers just to get to
that, okay? Just because you’re here, you’re not free to walk around.
(Id. at 58-59).
Detective Ruby went over the Miranda rights waiver form with Griffin,
advising her of the various components of her rights, determining her age, address,
and education level, which included four years of college. (Id. at 63-78; Apx. 1).
Griffin responded clearly to each question, and understood and repeated each
advisement provided on the waiver sheet and read by the officer. (Id. at 63-78).
Detective Ruby twice more repeated to Griffin at the time of the advisement and
waiver that she was “not under arrest.” (Id. at 67, 69). Ruby also repeatedly advised
Griffin that she could consult with an attorney at any time before or during
questioning. (Id. at 68, 71, 72). Ruby informed her that if she chose to answer
questions, she could elect to stop at any time, and no additional questions will be
asked. (Id. at 74-75).
After advising Griffin of her rights and asking her to repeat and initial each
advisement, Detective Ruby again made clear that Griffin was willing to voluntarily
waive her Miranda rights and speak with police:
DETECTIVE RUBY: . . . Okay. Now, the bottom part here
says, I have read and understand this explanation of my rights. We
covered that by going over each one. My decision to waive these rights
and be interviewed is free and voluntary on my part.
12
That means we are not making you any promises or anything like
that. We are not threatening you. We are not yelling and screaming or
raising --
MS. GRIFFIN: There’s nothing you promised. I want to
see my kids. I’m worried about their well-being and trying to worry
about this at the same time, that’s all.
DETECTIVE RUBY: They are -- I --
MS. GRIFFIN: Granted, this gives me time to try to get my
head on just to deal with them but I want -- don’t want them, and they
don’t need their parents blamed for, you know, or --
DETECTIVE RUBY: Right.
MS. GRIFFIN: Well, if their parents did something, that’s fine,
but, but they -- I know, only I know and my husband know, but we
need, you know, and the knowing we know --
DETECTIVE RUBY: Your kids are going to be fine.
MS. GRIFFIN: I know they’re going to be fine but I want to be
there with them.
DETECTIVE RUBY: I understand.
MS. GRIFFIN: And I don’t want them to have their parents
being arrested, not now, not ever. I mean, a knee-kicker --
(Beeping sound)
MS. GRIFFIN: -- that’s what I’m saying --
DETECTIVE RUBY: Right.
MS. GRIFFIN: -- and blamed for something because that’s --
they don’t need this.
DETECTIVE RUBY: Right.
MS. GRIFFIN: I mean --
DETECTIVE RUBY: I understand.
13
MS. GRIFFIN: Only he and I can know what really isn’t or
whatever. I can’t tell you what is because I don’t know, but I do know
that.
I’m sorry, you want me to read this again?
DETECTIVE RUBY: If you will, just read that back to me.
MS. GRIFFIN: I have read and understand this explanation of
my rights. My decision to waive theses rights and be interviewed is
free and voluntary on my part.
DETECTIVE RUBY: Do you understand that?
MS. GRIFFIN: Yes.
DETECTIVE RUBY: Do you have any questions about that?
MS. GRIFFIN: No.
(Id. at 75-77). Griffin thereafter signed the Miranda waiver. (Id. at 78; Apx. 1).
A. Prior to her waiver of her Miranda rights, Griffin was not subjected to
custodial interrogation that triggered Miranda protections.
Griffin argues that she was “in custody” and that “Miranda rights were
required.” (Brief of Appellant at 15-18). Although not entirely clear in her brief,
Griffin points to the portions of the record regarding her interaction with Detective
Ruby prior to the administration of Miranda warnings in support of her claim. (Brief
of Appellant at 15-17). The record demonstrates that Griffin was not in custody while
she waited with Detective Ruby for the investigating officers to arrive, and that even
if she was in custody, she was not subjected to interrogation by police that would
trigger Miranda protections.
Miranda warnings are required only when an individual is both in custody and
subjected to interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Conboy
v. State, 155 Md. App. 353, 396-70 (2004). To determine whether a detained suspect
was subjected to Miranda custody, the Supreme Court, and this Court, have “asked
The Supreme Court recently emphasized that not every restraint on the2
freedom of movement, such as in a “temporary and nonthreatening detention”
involved in a traffic stop or an investigative Terry stop, constitutes Miranda custody,
explaining that the “freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a
sufficient condition for Miranda custody. We have declined to accord it ‘talismanic
power,’ because Miranda is to be enforced ‘only in those types of situations in which
the concerns that powered the decision are implicated.’” Maryland v. Shatzer, 130
S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1994)).
14
whether ‘there is a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree2
associated with a formal arrest.’” Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010)
(quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984)); accord State v. Rucker, 374
Md. 199, 211 (2003). Both Courts have made clear that to determine Miranda
custody, “‘the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable [person] in the suspect’s
position would have understood his [or her] situation.’” Rucker, 374 Md. at 210
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)). That determination is
made based on an objective examination of the totality of the circumstances, not on
the subjective belief of either the suspect or the police involved. See Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (“the initial determination of custody depends
on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views
harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned”); Owens
v. State, 399 Md. 388, 428 (2001) (“[t]he question of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’
is determined objectively, to the exclusion of the subjective intent of law enforcement,
in light of the totality of circumstances of the situation”).
In the present case, Griffin voluntarily accompanied Detective Ruby to the
police station while the police executed a search warrant for her home, and was
cooperative with police and their desire to speak with her. (T. 8/21/08 at 72-73).
Griffin expressed her desire to willingly cooperate and speak with the police,
15
explaining that: “I have nothing to hide and I’m trying to just talk, I guess to figure
out, see if somebody can figure something out.” (R. Griffin Interview at 8-9). Griffin
was repeatedly informed that she was not under arrest, and that she was there to
interview with police after they returned from executing the search warrant. (Id. at 58-
59, 67, 69). Griffin was never handcuffed by police, and when she was at the police
station, she was allowed to go to the snack room and to use the bathroom. (T. 8/21/08
at 53, 54, 56). Under an objective examination of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding Griffin’s cooperation with police in their desire to speak with her at the
police station, the evidence in this case demonstrated that there was no “formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated with a formal
arrest[,]’” Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1224 (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655), and
therefore, Griffin was never subjected to Miranda custody.
Even if, arguendo, Griffin was in custody for Miranda purposes during the
time she sat with Detective Ruby prior to the administration of Miranda rights, there
was no interrogation of Griffin by Detective Ruby or any other officer, or the
functional equivalent of interrogation that was likely to elicit an incriminating
response from Griffin. Without interrogation or its functional equivalent, there is no
custodial interrogation implicating Miranda rights.
“‘[I]nterrogation’ refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words
or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.” Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 760 (1996) (quoting
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 301 (1980)). Or, as the Supreme Court noted
in Innis:
The concern of the Court in Miranda was that the ‘interrogation
environment’ created by the interplay of interrogation and custody
16
would ‘subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner’ and thereby
undermine the privilege against self-incrimination. The police practices
that evoked this concern included . . . the use of line-ups in which a
coached witness would pick the defendant as the perpetrator . . . the
reverse line-up in which a defendant would be identified by coached
witnesses as the perpetrator of a fictitious crime, with the object of
inducing him to confess to the actual crime . . . the use of psychological
ploys, such as to ‘posi[t]’ ‘the guilt of the subject,’ to ‘minimize the
moral seriousness of the offense’ and ‘to cast blame on the victim or on
society.’ . . .
* * *
“Interrogation,” as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must
reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in
custody itself. . . .
* * *
[T]he definition of interrogation can extend only to words or
action on the part of police officers that they should have known were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
446 U.S. at 299-302.
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement should be
considered in determining whether the statement was a “form of persuasion”
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8. Or,
as this Court explained, “‘[w]here an objective observer would believe that the
encounter was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
defendant, the court will find that the encounter constituted the ‘functional equivalent’
of interrogation.” Blake v. State, 381 Md. 218 (2004)(quoting United States v.
Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1162 (7th Cir. 1994), in turn citing, Innis, 446 U.S. at 301),
cert. dismissed, 546 U.S. 72 (2005).
Here, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Griffin’s
interaction with the police prior to receiving Miranda advisements indicate that there
17
was no interrogation or functional equivalent of interrogation of Griffin by the police.
Additionally, there is no indication that the actions of the police in this case during
that period constituted behavior that the officers knew or should have known was
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Griffin. Griffin’s statements
during that period consisted of unsolicited, voluntary comments from Griffin,
constituting classic “blurts” that were properly admissible at trial. At no point did
Detective Ruby seek to interrogate Griffin about the specifics of what happened to her
son Andrew. There was no custodial interrogation of Griffin that necessitated
Miranda warnings before they were properly administered in this case.
B. Griffin’s waiver of her Miranda rights and her statement to police were
voluntary and not improperly induced by the police, nor were the product of
intimidation, coercion, or deception.
Griffin alleges that the waiver of her Miranda rights and her statement to the
police were not voluntary. She claims that she was improperly induced by police to
waive her rights by allowing her to believe that she might be able to go see her kids
after the interview. (Brief of Appellant at 19-28). She also argues that her statement
to police was rendered “involuntary” by the length of her interview, her inexperience
with the criminal justice system, by the deception of one of the police officers who
failed to identify himself as a police officer, and by ignoring her requests for water
and to use the bathroom. (Brief of Appellant at 28-34). The record in this case
demonstrates that Griffin knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her
Miranda rights and freely elected to answer questions from police. She was never
subjected to any improper inducements, intimidation, coercion, or deception that
compelled her to waive her Miranda rights or that rendered involuntary her statement
to police.
18
A trial court’s determination as to whether a statement in response to
interrogation or a confession is given voluntarily “is a mixed question of law and fact”
that is reviewed de novo. Knight v. State, 381 Md. 517, 535 (2004); Buck v. State,
181 Md. App. 585, 631 (2008). “[I]n order to pass federal and Maryland
constitutional muster, a confession must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”
Buck, 181 Md. App. at 632. The “privilege against compelled self-incrimination in
Article 22 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] . . . has long been recognized as
being in pari materia with its federal counterpart.” Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233,
252 (1986).
This Court recently explained the standard of review for a claim of
involuntariness in waiving Miranda rights:
The United States Supreme Court has set forth a two-step
process to determine whether a suspect has made a voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent waiver of his or her Miranda rights:
First, the relinquishment of the right must have
been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have
been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals
both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
comprehension may a court properly conclude that the
Miranda rights have been waived.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410
(1986) (citation omitted). The determination whether an accused
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent is
determined by reviewing the “totality of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation.” McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 615, 526 A.2d 30
(1987).
19
Lee v. State, 186 Md. App. 631, 649, cert. granted, 411 Md. 355 (2009).
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence
and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
384 U.S. at 444. Accord Raras v. State, 140 Md. App. 132, 152-53, cert. denied, 367
Md. 90 (2001).
In the present case, Griffin was fully advised of her Miranda rights by
Detective Ruby, repeated and understood those rights, and completed the Miranda
rights waiver form that was presented to her. (R. Griffin Interview at 63-78; Apx. 1).
The record demonstrates that Griffin voluntarily accompanied Detective Ruby to the
police station and was cooperative with police and their desire to speak with her. (T.
8/21/08 at 72-73). Griffin expressed her desire to willingly cooperate and speak with
the police, explaining that: “I have nothing to hide and I’m trying to just talk, I guess
to figure out, see if somebody can figure something out.” (R. Griffin Interview at 8-
9). Griffin clearly understood that she was under no compulsion to waive her rights
20
and speak with police, and had not been induced, intimidated, or coerced into waiving
her rights and speaking with the police.
To the extent Griffin claims that she thought she would be able to return home
if she answered the officers’ questions, (Brief of Appellant at 25-27), there is nothing
in the record that indicates that police promised her that she would definitely be
returning home or promised that she would not be arrested if she spoke with police.
When she inquired about the possibility of going home after the questioning, she
appeared to realize that that would only be happening if the police were satisfied that
she had not committed a crime:
MS. GRIFFIN: Then can I ask you -- I know you can’t answer
but if you will, if everything goes kosher, I mean, is that the end part of
it, that I’ll be able to go be with the kids.
DETECTIVE RUBY: Say that again.
MS. GRIFFIN: Do you know if that is close to the end part
where I can go be with the kids, answer their questions and stuff?
DETECTIVE RUBY: Yeah, after they do the questioning and
then it’s done, but like I say, we have to do these papers just to get to
that, okay? Just because you’re here, you’re not free to walk around.
(Id. at 58-59). Additionally, Detective Ruby’s response could be interpreted, in the
light most favorable to the State, as merely communicating to her that after the
interview, the officers would not need to question her further and that she might be
able to go home. The detective never promised that she would go home regardless
of her responses to the questions from police. In fact, the officers were entitled to
wait to hear what Griffin had to tell them before deciding whether to arrest her or how
to specifically charge her. See Faulkner v. State, 156 Md. App. 615, 652 (2004)
(police are not required to “ignore a suspect’s request to explain what happened while
authorities are still deciding whether to charge” the defendant with a crime; for
21
purposes of prompt presentment “some reasonable and necessary delay may result
from police questioning designed to determine whether to charge the suspect, and for
what crime”). Additionally, Griffin’s subsequent questions about whether there is a
“chance” she could go home, and her statements that she “needs to be with” her
children, (Brief of Appellant at 26-27), were not clear refusals to speak with police,
and did not demonstrate that she was invoking her right to silence, but rather
expressed her desired outcome of her cooperation with police by continuing to answer
their questions.
The fact that Detective Lane told Griffin that “I don’t work with these guys,”
that he works with the “Child Advocacy Center”and did not specifically identify
himself as a police officer, (Id. at 312), did not improperly deceive Griffin to the point
of coercion, or even imply anything other than he was a police officer that worked in
another unit. As the appellate courts in this State have made clear, police “are
permitted to use a certain amount of subterfuge, when questioning an individual about
his or her suspected involvement in a crime.” Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 178 (1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082 (1998). To the extent Detective Lane attempted to
distance himself from the other officers in order to gain Griffin’s trust, much like a
“good cop, bad cop” scenario, that was an allowable degree of subterfuge. As the
Court of Appeals explained, the police “are not permitted to employ coercive tactics
in order to compel an individual to confess, but they are permitted to ‘trick’ the
suspect into making an inculpatory statement.” Id. at 179. See also Rowe v. State, 41
Md. App. 641, 645 (1979) (“[d]eception short of an overbearing inducement is a
‘valid weapon of the police arsenal’”).
Likewise, the length of the interview and the alleged delays in providing
Griffin with water and a bathroom break were not coercive. (Brief of Appellant at 31-
22
34). Throughout the interview, Griffin continued to speak nearly non-stop, and her
will to answer questions was never overcome by the conditions of the interview. The
motions court indicated that it examined the videotape of the entire interview, and
although the court found that Griffin was “tired” and upset, and “certainly wanted to
go home and certainly wanted to see her children,” she was nevertheless “very
responsive to virtually all the inquiries and all the discussions and very alert to this
Court.” (T. 8/21/08 at 99). The court indicated that it looked “carefully at Detective
Ruby’s statements to her” and did not find any inducements or promises made to
Griffin. (Id. at 99-100). The court explained that based on its observations of the
videotape, it did not find that Griffin was coerced into signing the Miranda waiver
form and did “not find anything in what Detective Ruby did to under the totality of
those circumstances effect an overriding of her willpower or beating her into
submission to sign that form.” (Id. at 100).
The motions court explained that although Griffin did not feel well, it found
that her physical ailments did not prevent her from “understanding exactly what was
going on,” or prevent her from “voluntarily enter[ing] into this agreement to talk with
police officers.” (Id.). The court addressed all of the concerns raised by Griffin
alleging a coercive environment or conditions, (id. at 100-101), and held:
But at the end of the day after I watched however many hours it
was, I just did not feel under the totality of the circumstances that her
responses were involuntary or against her free will or coerced or
induced . . . I don’t think they intimated that if you talk to us, you are
going home.
If you tell us what we want to know about how this happened,
you’re going to see your children. She can believe what she believed,
but I don’t think it came as the result of any of the actions of the police
officers. As a result, I do not believe that the motion to suppress her
statement should be granted, and I will deny the motion.
23
(Id. at 101-102).
Additionally, Griffin never testified at the suppression hearing. As this Court
stated in Ashford v. State, 147 Md. App. 1, 56, cert. denied, 372 Md. 430 (2002), “the
failure of a defendant to testify almost forecloses any chance of prevailing” on a
suppression motion based on an alleged absence of voluntariness. Id. “Only the
defendant can truly tell us what was going on in the defendant’s mind. Without such
testimony, there is usually no direct evidence of involuntariness.” Id. Such is the case
here. All of the circumstances suggest nothing other than a fully voluntary waiver and
willingness to answer questions. Thus, the trial court properly denied Griffin’s
motion to suppress her statements to police.
C. Even if Griffin’s statement was erroneously admitted into evidence, any error
from its admission was harmless.
In light of the overwhelming evidence of Griffin’s guilt based on the physical
evidence of Andrew’s abuse and starvation, any error from the admission of Griffin’s
statement, in which she denied any involvement in her son’s starvation death, is
harmless. An error is harmless where the State establishes beyond a reasonable doubt
that it could not have influenced the verdict. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659
(1976); see Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 578-80 (1992) (erroneous admission of
evidence harmless in light of overwhelming proof of guilt); Robinson v. State, 151
Md. App. 384, 393-95 (erroneous admission of evidence harmless given
overwhelming weight of evidence properly introduced), cert. denied, 377 Md. 276
(2003).
Even without Griffin’s statement, there was ample evidence to convict her,
based on the testimony of the medical personnel and the medical examiner regarding
the condition of Andrew’s “extremely emaciated” body at the time of his death, (T.
2/23/09 at 9-10), and the testimony that her two-year old son’s manner of death was
24
“homicide” caused by “starvation.” (Id. at 72). Trial testimony from John Griffin
indicated that Susan Griffin “stayed at home and [was] taking care of the children”
from the birth of their first daughter eleven years earlier, through the date of
Andrew’s death. (T. 2/24/09 at 62). In light of this evidence of Susan Griffin’s
involvement in the starvation death of her son and the very minimal prejudice at issue,
any error in the court’s ruling permitting Griffin’s statement to be introduced into
evidence at trial, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Griffin offers no valid
claim for reversal.
II.
IF PRESERVED FOR REVIEW, THE MOTIONS COURT
PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO JOIN SUSAN AND
JOHN GRIFFIN’S TRIALS BASED ON THEIR PARTICIPATION
IN THE SAME ACT OF STARVING THEIR SON TO DEATH AND
THE MUTUAL ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST
THEM.
Griffin argues, for the first time on appeal, that the motions court erred in
joining the Griffins’ trials, alleging that the court improperly employed a test for
joinder that examines what is “neat and proper,” that the court mistakenly believed
that if “most if not all” of the evidence is mutually admissible, joinder is appropriate,
that the court “lost track” of which party was claiming prejudice, and that the court
failed to respond to defense counsel’s claim that the determination of joinder was
“premature.” (Brief of Appellant at 36-37). With the exception of Griffin’s claim
that joinder was premature, none of these claims were presented in opposition to the
joinder motion, and are therefore not preserved for this Court’s review on appeal. See
Md. Rule 8-131(a) (ordinarily the appellate court will not decide an issue not raised
or decided by the trial court).
This Court has stated that: “‘Prejudice’ within the meaning of Rule 4-253,3
is a “term of art,” and refers only to prejudice resulting to the defendant from the
reception of evidence that would have been inadmissible against that defendant had
there been no joinder.” Ognowski v. State, 87 Md. App. 173, 186-87 (1991) (citing
Osburn v. State, 301 Md. 250, 254-55 (1984)).
25
Even if preserved for this Court’s review, her claims are without merit. The
motions court properly exercised its discretion to join the defendants based on their
joint participation in the starvation death of their son and the mutual admissibility of
the evidence against them.
Maryland Rule 4-253 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Joint trial of defendants. On motion of a party, the court
may order a joint trial for two or more defendants charged in separate
charging documents if they are alleged to have participated in the same
act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions
constituting an offense or offenses.
. . .
(c) Prejudicial joinder. If it appears that any party will be
prejudiced by the joinder for trial of counts, charging documents, or
defendants, the court may, on its own initiative or on motion of any
party, order separate trials of counts, charging documents, or
defendants, or grant any other relief as justice requires.3
The Court of Appeals has reaffirmed that “the decision to join or sever charges
ordinarily lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Galloway v. State, 371
Md. 379, 395 (2002). “In its consideration of joinder (and thus severance), a trial
court weighs the conflicting considerations of the public’s interest in preserving
judicial economy and efficiency against unduly prejudicing the defendant.” Id. This
balancing test was summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
In sum, the analysis of jury trial joinder issues may be reduced to a test
that encompasses two questions: (1) is evidence concerning the
offenses or defendants mutually admissible; and (2) does the interest in
26
judicial economy outweigh any other arguments favoring severance?
If the answer to both questions is yes, then joinder of offenses or
defendants is appropriate.
Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 553 (1997); see also Imes v. State, 158 Md. App. 176,
191 (in order to determine whether defendant received a fair trial, the test is whether
joinder “(1) permits the State to introduce, against a particular defendant, otherwise
inadmissible evidence, and (2) that otherwise inadmissible evidence tends to
contradict the defendant’s theory of the case”), cert. denied, 384 Md. 158 (2004).
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has made clear that “[t]he law of trial
joinder in bench trials is more flexible” than the joinder requirements in jury trial
trials. Conyers, 345 Md. at 552. “A judge has the discretion to permit joinder of
offenses or defendants even if there is no mutual admissibility of offenses because it
is presumed that a judge will not transfer evidence of guilt as to one offense [or
offender] to another offense [or offender]. Id. at 552-53.
In the present case, at the motions hearing Griffin argued only that she would
be prejudiced by the possibility that John Griffin would claim that his wife was 80
percent responsible for caring for the children, and that she was therefore more guilty
of killing their son, and that joinder was premature because of potential medical
experts that the defense might call. (T. 8/21/08 at 11). The motions court properly
rejected these claims and granted the State’s motion to join the defendants:
. . . I do not see how Mr. Griffin’s comments about an 80
percent/20 percent care of the children would effect prejudice upon him
if both cases were tried together, and I certainly think for logistical
purposes and practical purposes, I think there’s going to be basically the
same forensic evidence.
There’s going to be basically the same police officers testifying.
It involves the same parties, the same household, the same facts as
we’ve described.
27
(Id. at 15-16).
Griffin has not proffered, either at trial or on appeal, what evidence was
permitted to be introduced against Susan Griffin that was not also admissible against
John Griffin. They were both responsible for the health and safety of their son who
lived with them, and they both failed in that responsibility. The evidence of their
son’s abuse and starvation was mutually admissible against both of them, regardless
of the percentage of the household duties each claimed, and regardless of possible
defense witnesses.
With respect to Griffin’s unpreserved claims that the court improperly used a
standard of what is “neat and proper,” and that the court mistakenly believed that if
“most if not all” of the evidence is mutually admissible, joinder is appropriate,
Griffin’s claims are simply inaccurate. The motions court clearly examined the proper
standards for mutual admissibility and that joinder is appropriate “for reasons of
economy, of time, and other resources of the Court and witnesses.” (T. 8/21/08 at
14). Finally, whether the court did or did not “los[e] track” of which party was
claiming prejudice in its explanation, the court properly determined that Griffin had
not established prejudice that required the denial of the joinder motion in this case.
Accordingly, the lower court properly granted the motion for joinder.
III.
THE MOTIONS COURT PROPERLY DENIED GRIFFIN’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE
SEARCH WARRANT FOR HER RESIDENCE WHERE: (1) THERE
WAS A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE ISSUING JUDGE TO
FIND PROBABLE CAUSE JUSTIFYING THE WARRANT; AND
(2) THE POLICE RELIED ON THE WARRANT IN GOOD FAITH.
Griffin’s final argument is that the motions court erred in denying her motion
to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant executed for the Griffin
28
residence. Griffin specifically claims that the “facts related in the Affidavit fail to
show probable cause to believe that ‘murder’ of the child was committed, or that the
items sought were to be found on those premises.” (Brief of Appellant at 41). Griffin
also argues that the warrant was a “general warrant” that failed “to specify the things
to be seized,” and that there was nothing in the warrant or the nature of the crimes that
“would authorize the seizure of a computer or the analysis of its contents.” (Brief of
Appellant at 42-43). Griffin is wrong. In this case, the issuing judge had a substantial
basis to conclude the warrant was supported by probable cause. Even if there was no
substantial basis for finding probable cause in this instance, the good faith exception
to the warrant requirement prohibits the exclusion of the seized evidence in this case
because the officers objectively exercised their professional judgment and could have
reasonably believed that the statements within their affidavit in support of the warrant
application related sufficient probable cause. Griffin presents no valid basis for
reversal.
The well-settled standard of review of a magistrate’s decision to issue a
warrant is not de novo, but is a deferential standard. This Court has stated:
We determine first whether the issuing judge had a substantial
basis to conclude that the warrant was supported by probable cause.
State v. Amerman, 84 Md. App. 461, 463-64 (1990). We do so not by
applying a de novo standard of review, but rather a deferential one.
The task of the issuing judge is to reach a practical and common-sense
decision, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, as to
whether there exists a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular search. The duty of a reviewing
court is to ensure that the issuing judge had a “substantial basis for . .
. conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.” The U.S. Supreme Court
explained in [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)] that the purpose
of this standard of review is to encourage the police to submit to the
warrant process.
29
Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 667-68 (2006) (citations omitted); accord
Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76, 89-90 (2007) (discussing appropriate standard of
review), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1681 (2008); see also McDonald v. State, 347 Md.
452, 467 (1997) (“The judge’s determination that probable cause exists is entitled to
great deference”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151 (1998); Birchead v. State, 317 Md. 691,
701 (1989) (review of judge’s decision is whether there was a substantial basis to
believe evidence would be discovered in place described); Potts v. State, 300 Md.
567, 572 (1984) (“After-the-fact judicial scrutiny of the affidavit should not take the
form of de novo review”).
The “substantial basis” standard of review does not require the legal
sufficiency or a prima facie requirements of a “clearly erroneous” standard of review,
but rather examines the totality of the circumstances to determine “only the
probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity[.]” Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). Substantial basis has been described as:
“something less than finding the existence of probable cause,” and “is
less demanding than even the familiar ‘clearly erroneous’ standard by
which appellate courts review judicial fact finding in a trial setting.”
State v. Coley, 145 Md. App. 502, 521 (2002) (quoting State v. Amerman, 84 Md.
App. 461, 470-72 (1990)). The Supreme Court explained that the deferential
“substantial basis” review reflects the strong preference for searches conducted
pursuant to warrants:
[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an
affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s
determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by
reviewing courts. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts
toward warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong
preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; courts should
30
not invalidate warrants by interpreting affidavits in a hypertechnical,
rather than a commonsense, manner.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the present case, there was a substantial basis for the issuing court’s finding
of probable cause. Detective Massey’s affidavit indicated the following facts:
On 12/26/07 at 1456 hours, Baltimore County Police Officers from the
Towson Precinct were dispatched to Saint Joseph’s Medical Center for
an “expired patient” call. Upon arrival, officers were advised that the
victim Andrew Griffin a two year old male was brought to the hospital
by his father John Griffin at 1426 hours. Victim Griffin sustained
numerous injuries to his face. The victim was provided medical
attention however the victim was pronounced deceased at 1446 hours.
Officers conducting the initial investigation were advised that the
victim ran into the Christmas tree several days ago, while at their
residence, 376 Old Trail Road Baltimore, MD 21212. An inspection of
the victim’s injuries revealed that they are inconsistent with the victim
running into the Christmas tree several days ago and appear not to have
occurred from a single event.
(Apx. 3).
The warrant application listed and described the address referred to in the
affidavit, and sought the following evidence relating to the commission of the crime
of murder: (1) “Any and all bloody clothing”; (2) “Any items that may lead to
motive”; (3) “Any and all bloody items”; and (4) “Any items that could reveal
evidence of negligence.” (Apx. 2).
From this information, the affiant, Detective Massey concluded that there was
probable cause to believe that evidence of physical abuse causing the death of a two-
year old child with numerous injuries would be found in the child’s house and where
the victim had reportedly run into a Christmas tree, which was inconsistent with his
injuries and his death. Under the circumstances contained in the affidavit, there was
31
a fair probability that evidence of the murder of this two-year old boy with numerous
facial injuries would be found in a search of the family home. The issuing judge had
a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed to support the warrant.
In Holmes v. State, 368 Md. 506, 521-22 (2002), this Court of Appeals
explained that “[d]irect evidence” is not required for a search warrant, and that
“probable cause may be inferred from the type of crime, the nature of the items
sought, the opportunity for concealment, and reasonable inferences about where the
defendant may hide the incriminating items.” See also Coley, 145 Md. App. at 530
(“In Holmes, the nexus test was satisfied with very little, if any, direct evidence.
Instead, there was adequate circumstantial evidence that, when combined with
reasonable inferences generated from that evidence, would support the finding of
probable cause by the issuing magistrate”).
In this case, the only direct evidence was that a two-year old boy with
numerous facial injuries was declared deceased after his father brought him to the
hospital. His injuries were inconsistent with the proffered explanation that he had
run into the family Christmas tree several days prior. The issuing judge was properly
able to reasonably infer, based on the circumstantial evidence presented, that there
was a fair probability that the toddler’s home contained evidence of physical abuse
leading to his death. Additionally, the items particularly described to be seized under
the warrant application, namely items that were bloody or that reveal evidence of
motive or negligence, were reasonably specific based on the limited information
available to the officers, and specifically related to the injuries to Andrew. The
motions court properly held that the items requested were not “so far afield from the
circumstances of this death and what [the police are] trying to do that it is a general
warrant so vague as to be unspecific.” (App. 18).
32
Even if this Court were to find no substantial basis in support of the issuing
judge’s probable cause determination, the police nevertheless acted in good faith
reliance on the search warrant. There is a good faith exception to the warrant
requirement when police officers objectively exercise their professional judgment
and could have reasonably believed that the statements within an affidavit in support
of a warrant application related sufficient probable cause. See Patterson, 401 Md.
at 106-07. The doctrine was first explained by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984), and this Court has summarized the purpose of the
good faith exception as follows:
The [Leon] Court emphasized that “the exclusionary rule wasdesigned to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors ofjudges and magistrates.” Id. at 916, 104 S.Ct. at 3417. It said that“suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should beordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual casesin which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.”Id. at 918, 104 S.Ct. at 3418. In this regard, the Court questionedwhether the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect when the offendingofficers “acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conductdid not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 728 (1991).
The “good faith” exception is therefore applicable when the police officers’
conduct is objectively reasonable:
This is particularly true, . . . when an officer acting with objective goodfaith has obtained a search warrant and acted within its scope. . . . [I]tis the magistrate’s responsibility to establish whether the officer’sallegations established probable cause, and accordingly an officercannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable causedetermination, or his judgment that the warrant is otherwise technicallysufficient.
33
Connelly, 322 Md. at 728-29 (citations omitted); see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 981, 989-90 (1984) (a police officer is not “required to disbelieve a judge
who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses
authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested”); Herbert v. State, 136 Md.
App. 458, 487-88 (2001) (the “mere exercise” of obtaining a warrant “will salvage
all but the rarest and most outrageous of warranted searches[;]” when police search
pursuant to a warrant, the good faith exception makes it “hard for the State to lose a
suppression hearing.”).
In Patterson, supra, this Court noted that Leon outlined four situations when
an officer’s reliance on a search warrant would not be reasonable:
(1) the magistrate was mislead [sic] by information in an affidavit thathe officer knew was false or would have known was false except forthe officer’s reckless regard for the truth;
(2) the magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and neutral judicialrole;
(3) the warrant was based on an affidavit that was so lacking inprobable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirelyunreasonable;
(4) the warrant was so facially deficient, by failing to particularize theplace to be searched or the things to be seized, that the executingofficers cannot reasonable [sic] presume it to be valid.
Patterson, 401 Md. at 104 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
In this case, the motions court specifically addressed each of the four
exemptions from the good faith exception, and found that none of them applied in
this case, (App. at 19-21), nor does Griffin challenge on appeal, the motion court’s
finding of good faith reliance by the police on the issuing judge’s probable cause
determination in this case.
34
Lastly, even if the motion court erred in denying Griffin’s motion to suppress
evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, in light of the overwhelming evidence
of Griffin’s guilt based on the physical evidence of Andrew’s abuse and starvation,
any error from the admission of evidence from Griffin’s residence, is harmless and
could not have influenced the court’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. See
harmless error analysis in subheading C of Argument I, supra. Griffin presents no
legitimate basis for reversal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the judgment of
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DOUGLAS F. GANSLER
Attorney General of Maryland
JEREMY M. McCOY
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
McCOYJ\Griffin, Susan Joan 11-10.wpdTimes New Roman 13 point
35
PERTINENT PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV. Security from unwarrantable
search and seizure.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 22. Self incrimination.
That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a
criminal case.
Rule 4-253. Joint or separate trials.
(a) Joint trial of defendants. On motion of a party, the court may order a
joint trial for two or more defendants charged in separate charging documents if they
are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of
acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.
(b) Joint trial of offenses. If a defendant has been charged in two or more
charging documents, either party may move for a joint trial of the charges. In ruling
on the motion, the court may inquire into the ability of either party to proceed at a
joint trial.
(c) Prejudicial joinder. If it appears that any party will be prejudiced by
the joinder for trial of counts, charging documents, or defendants, the court may, on
its own initiative or on motion of any party, order separate trials of counts, charging
documents, or defendants, or grant any other relief as justice requires.
(2010 Rules)
Rule 8-131. Scope of Review.
(a) Generally. The issues of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject
matter and, unless waived under Rule 2-322, over a person may be raised in and
decided by the appellate court whether or not raised in and decided by the trial court.
Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears
36
by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may
decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the
expense and delay of another appeal.
(b) In Court of Appeals — Additional limitations. (1) Prior appellate
decision. Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in
reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals or by a circuit court
acting in an appellate capacity, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an
issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that
has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals. Whenever an issue raised in
a petition for certiorari or a cross-petition involves, either expressly or implicitly, the
assertion that the trial court committed error, the Court of Appeals may consider
whether the error was harmless or non-prejudicial even though the matter of harm or
prejudice was not raised in the petition or in a cross-petition.
(2) No prior appellate decision. Except as otherwise provided in Rule 8-
304(c), when the Court of Appeals issues a writ of certiorari to review a case pending
in the Court of Special Appeals before a decision has been rendered by that Court, the
Court of Appeals will consider those issues that would have been cognizable by the
Court of Special Appeals.
(c) Action tried without a jury. When an action has been tried without a
jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will
not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous,
and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses.
(d) Interlocutory order. On an appeal from a final judgment, an
interlocutory order previously entered in the action is open to review by the Court
unless an appeal has previously been taken from that order and decided on the merits
by the Court.
(e) Order denying motion to dismiss. An order denying a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is reviewable only on
appeal from the judgment.
(2009 Rules)
SUSAN JOAN GRIFFIN, * IN THE
Appellant * COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
v. * OF MARYLAND
STATE OF MARYLAND, * September Term, 2009
Appellee * No. 322
* * * * *
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of October, 2010, three copies of
the Brief of Appellee were hand-delivered to Bradford C. Peabody, Assistant Public
Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Appellate Division, William Donald
Schaefer Tower, 6 Saint Paul Centre, Suite 1302, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.
JEREMY M. McCOY
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
200 Saint Paul Place
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(410) 576-6444
Counsel for Appellee
