INT. J. SC I . EDec . , 1 992 , VOL. 1 4 , '>0 . 5 , 541-562

In search of a meaningful relationship: an

exploration of some issues relating to

integration in science and science education

Derek Hodson, The Ontario Institute For Studies in Education,

Toronto, Canada

The long-running debate about the desirability of separate courses in biology, chemistry and physics

versus the merits of integrated science, co-ordinated science or combined science, the case for 'balanced'

science within a Science for All programme, and the unresolved question of 'process' versus 'product' orientation in science curriculum design each relates to fundamental philosophical problems concerning

the nature of science and scientific practice and to issues concerning the goals and practice of science education. This article examines the philosophical validity of claims for the conceptual and methodo­

logical integration of the sciences and explores the possibilities for constructing coherent science courses

based on alternative integrating elements rooted in educational theory.

Is there unity within and among the sciences?

Elsewhere, I have advocated the adaptation of the familiar 'Objectives Model'

of curriculum to provide a simple conceptual model of science for the purpose

of focusing the attention of curriculum developers, teachers and students more

explicitly on issues concerned with learning about the nature of science and

scientific activity (figure 1) (Hodson 1990). This model also provides a means of

addressing questions concerned with the unity of science. The rhetoric of many

integrated science courses is underpinned by claims that science constitutes a

single, coherent Form of Knowledge (to use Hirst's [1974] expression) with

common purposes, content, method and criteria of evaluation (Adeniyi 1987, Frey

1989). To what extent are these claims sustainable? Are the purposes of physics and

biology the same? Does scientific knowledge have the same role and status in all

branches of science? Are the methods of all scientists the same? Is there a single

criterion or common set of criteria by which claims to scientific knowledge

(,scientific truth'?) can be judged?

The purposes of science

At the simplest level, the purpose of science is to accumulate scientific knowledge.

Of course, this immediately raises questions about the status of that knowledge and

the reliability of the methods employed in reaching it, and serves to illustrate the

inter-relatedness of the four elements in figure 1 (b). Leaving aside, for the moment,

the dispute between realist and instrumentalist views of scientific knowledge, it can

be argued that all scientists seek knowledge that renders the world more intelligible,

comprehensible and predictable. In other words, scientific knowledge is sought and

0950-0693/92 $3·00 © 1992 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

542

Aims &

(oo>ct�'\

��' )' Teaching/Learning

Methods

(a) Model for Rational

Curriculum Planning.

'Conceptual ;> !-.hgrallon'

Figure L Adapting a Model from Curriculum Planning.

D . HOOSO:\

Purposes

,C"&'"�\ Appraisal Scientific

Validation.. 6:. Knowledge Publication

.

) ��ienllfiC/

Methods & Prcx::-esses

(b) ModeJ for Teaching and Learning about Science.

Figure 1. Adapting a model from curriculum planning.

constructed not 'for its own sake' (as in the stereotypical textbook image of science),

but for its value in solving problems. Problems may arise with respect to insufficient

data, conflict between theory and observational evidence, dispute between rival

theories, failure of an otherwise promising theory to generate predictive knowledge,

and so on. The precise nature of the problems depends on the current stage of

theoretical development of the science or, in Kuhn's (1970) terms, on whether the

science is in a preparadigmic, normal, extraordinary or revolutionary phase.

In passing, it is interesting to note that Laudan's (1977) view of science as a

problem-solving activity points to a decreasing stock of problems, as scientists

become more successful at 'coping with the world', whereas Knorr-Cetina's (1983)

'constructivist' view points to an increasing stock of problems, because the 'knO\vn

world' that science addresses is created by scientific practice and so is continuously

expanding. In both cases, problems are solved (if at all) by the modification of

existing knowledge or the creation of new knowledge generated via a mix of

experiment, observation and critical argument (an issue to be addressed later).

It is also worth noting that industrialization, commercialization and militarization

of contemporary science increasingly determines the direction of the scientific

endeavour and, therefore, the kind of problems that scientists have to confront-a

matter to be raised with students if we are serious in our desire to present an

authentic view of science (Martin et al. 1990).

It has been argued by Smolicz and :"Junan (1975) that much of the rhetoric of

science education assumes that the purpose of science is to gain control of the

environment and, therefore, that the aims of science education should be to give

students confidence in the capacity of science and technology to manipulate, alter

and control events. The extent to which this essentially Western (or �orthern) view

of science is any longer an acceptable (let alone desirable) vie,v for those engaged in

the practice of science is discussed at length by Maxwell (1984). He argues that

many urgent social problems, including poverty, disease and malnutrition, are not

caused by lack of scientific knowledge or technological expertise, but by a mis­

understanding or misappropriation of the purpose of science. \Vhilst he believes

that individual scientists cannot be blamed, he insists that the scientific community

should be held collectively accountable for the fact that science is pursued in a way

that is dissociated from a concern with sound human values. He urges a radical shift

INTEGRATI O N 1,\ SC IENCE A!\O SC IENCE EDCCAT IO,\ 543

from a 'philosophy of knowledge', with its emphasis on the disinterested search for

knowledge, to what he calls a 'philosophy of wisdom', which prioritizes what is

personally and socially desirable and worthwhile.

Given that we are faced with unprecedented levels of environmental degrada­

tion, it is perhaps even more urgent that Maxwell's 'philosophy of wisdom' includes

a more sensitive appreciation of environmental issues and a greater determination

to re-order human activity (and scientific and technological activity, in particular)

in line with sounder environmental values. Unfortunately, far from the community

of scientists being united in a search for wisdom and environmentally sustainable

technology, it is fragmented and disparate in its purposes. This is not to say,

however, that science education should ignore the desirability of seeking to establish

a social climate that will promote and sustain such unity.

Scientific knowledge

Many science textbooks present a simplistic view of the origin and development of

scientific knowledge. Often, theory generation is seen as no more than a process of

looking for regularity in nature, and theory testing is regarded as simple

confirmation or refutation, usually based on a single observation or critical experi­

ment. A more appropriate and sound view is that theories are complex structures

that stand or fall on their ability to describe, explain and predict observable

phenomena, without being dependent on any single observation. In practice, no

theory can accommodate all observations within its domain; there will nearly always

be some observations that cannot satisfactorily be explained. It is when these

anomalies are long-standing, socially significant and strike at the fundamental

assumptions of the theory that it comes under threat of falsification. History shows

us that scientific theories grow and develop in order to accommodate observational

evidence more fully. Hence, if we are to be faithful in our teaching to actual

scientific practice, theories will undergo a process of refinement, development and

replacement throughout a student's science education, and the degree of theoretical

sophistication at any particular stage will be determined by the capacity of the

theory to explain the phenomena the learners will encounter and the kind of

enquiries they will undertake. It need not go further.

Once it is accepted that theories grow and develop, it is necessary to consider

their status. As far as school science is concerned, there have traditionally been two

extreme positions: nai've realism and instrumentalism. In naive realism ; scientific

theory is believed to provide a true description of the world, whereas in instrumen­

talism the real world is considered to be described by means of imaginary scientific

models. A major problem in science curriculum design is deciding which of these

two positions to adopt. Sole use of either extreme position has serious limitations

when compared with the actual practice and history of science, and so a critical

realist position, able to accommodate both perspectives, may be more appropriate

(Jacoby and Spargo 1992).

Critical realists assert that scientists sometimes aim at a true description of the

world and a true explanation of observable events. However, because they cannot

know for certain that their findings and explanations are true, they regard them as

conjectures about reality that are subject to critical scrutiny and test and, possibly,

rejection. On other occasions, a 'true' description of the world may not be sought.

Rather, a convenient predictive instrument is all that is required. Thus, critical

544 D. HODSO"l

realists can be realist about some theories (those that they believe to be true, or to

be the 'current best shot at truth') and instrumentalist about others (those that they

find useful, but do not accept as true). These latter are more appropriately termed

theoretical models. From a critical realist position it is not illogical to retain a falsified

or superseded theory in an instrumental capacity, provided that its status is recog­

nized and acknowledged. It may be that within a restricted domain of application,

and this applies particularly to school science which necessarily is more restricted

than science itself in its theoretical needs, a theory that was once accepted but has

now been falsified (and hence reduced to the status of a model) may be more useful

than a 'true' (currently accepted) theory because it is simpler to use. Nor is it

illogical to use alternative (even seemingly incompatible or contradictory)

instrumental models for different aspects of the same phenomenon -for example,

wave and particle models of light.

\Vhat is confusing to students is that the role and status of theories and models

are not made explicit. We leave students to form their own views from the

classroom experiences we provide, many of which have not been planned with

epistemological considerations in mind. At the very least, we need to be more

careful in our use of the terms theory and model, and we need to make it clear that

conceptual structures are designed with particular purposes in mind (see also Gilbert

1991). Those purposes are either realist (an attempt to describe and explain the

world) or instrumentalist (an attempt to gain an increased measure of control and

predictive power). Role and status are inextricably linked. Moreover, the variety of

specific purposes that motivate theory building and model building within the

sciences ensures that the precise meaning attached to a concept will depend on the

specific role that it has within a particular knowledge structure. Hence, attempting

to integrate the sciences via 'large' concepts such as energy and force are fruitless.

Moreover, it could even be argued that significantly different purposes of knowl­

edge building -in physics and biology, for example -lead to conceptual structures

that are qualitatively different in kind (see, for example, Hull 1974, Mayr 1982,

Rosenberg 1985, Ruse 1973, 1988).

The view that the conceptual structures of science are subject to growth,

development and modification has striking parallels with contemporary views in

constructivist psychology, holding out the prospect of a degree of harmony between

the philosophical and psychological principles underpinning the curriculum

(Duschl 1990, Duschl et al. 1990, Nersessian 1989, Villani 1992). It is interesting

that concept development in children seems to follow certain well-characterized

'learning histories', largely because of the common influences of everyday

experience (Head 1986, Solomon 1987), and that these often reflect the concept's

historical development (Clough et al. 1987, Driver et al. 1985). Hence, encouraging

students to reflect on their own developing ideas is a way of illuminating the way

in which scientific knowledge itself develops (Baird et al. 1991).

However, acceptance of the legitimacy and pedagogical value of children's alter­

native frameworks runs counter to the notion that science and, therefore, science

education can be integrated by means of a few powerful concepts. Such unifying

concepts may exist, but only in the minds of experienced scientists. For children,

concepts are still very much context bound and are often at variance with scientists'

views. Many who hold theories of domain-specific knowledge claim that 'experts'

have both more and different relations between concepts than do novices, and that

INTEGRATION IN SCIENCE A"ID SCIEI'\CE EDCCATIO:\l 545

experts organize their knowledge in terms of conceptual structures that do not exist

for, or are not readily accessible to, novices (Vosniodou and Brewer 1987).

Holton (1978, 1986) has pointed to the existence of certain interdisciplinary

themes (such as randomness, reductionism/holism, concern with the nature of time)

that transcend subject boundaries and serve, periodically, to unify the work of

scientists in seemingly disparate fields. These themes may have some integrative

power within an interdisciplinary science programme at university level (Jordan

1989), but at school level they operate at too sophisticated a level (but see Smith

et al. 1990). Of greater potential as integrative themes are what Smolicz and Nunan

(1975) refer to as the prevailing 'ideological pivots' of Western science and science

education: anthropocentric views of the world, 'positivistic faith' and concern for

analysis and quantification. However, the desirability of continuing to promote

such values has already been called into question in the discussion of scientific

purpose.

Scientific method

Perhaps the most significant feature of science curriculum change during the past

quarter century has been the shift away from the teaching of science as a body of

established knowledge towards the experience of science as a method of generating

and validating such knowledge. Science teachers have been encouraged to provide

courses with exemplify scientific method and put the learner in the position of __

'being a scientist', and scientific method has come to be regarded as the major

integrating feature of the sciences. Underlying these changes is the assumption that

there is such a thing as a distinctive scientific method, and that it can be character­

ized and taught.

Consideration of the extensive literature in the philosophy of science fails to

identify a single, universally accepted description of scientific method. Far from

being dismayed by such lack of agreement, White (1983) regards it as an inevitable

consequence of the complexity of the scientific enterprise, the myriad of possible

starting points, and the differences in knowledge, experience and personality among

individual scientists. Interestingly, children also regard it as inevitable. It is teachers

who create the expectation of a single method through their continual reference to

the scientific method (Hodson 1990).

However, our failure to identify a single, simple method does not mean that

scientists have no methods. Feyerabend's (1975) famous assertion that 'anything

goes' implies the absence of a prescribed method, the absence of an algorithm, rather

than the absence of methods. It should not be taken too literally. Science does

have methods, but the precise nature of those methods depends on the particular

circumstances: on the matter under consideration, on the theoretical knowledge the

scientist chooses to employ, and on the investigative techniques and instrumen­

tation devices a\·ailable. By making a selection of processes and procedures from

the range of those available and approved by the community of practitioners,

scientists choose a 'method' they consider to be contextually appropriate. There

are no universal decision criteria for what to do and how to do it. All decisions

are 'local' - determined by the particular circumstances of individual investiga­

tions-and, therefore, idiosyncratic. As in games playing, success comes to those

who can improvize and exploit opportunities, rather than to those who slavishly

seek to follow strict guidelines. In Percy Bridgham's (1950) words, 'the scientific

546 D. HODSO:-.J

method, as far as it is a method, is nothing more than doing one's damndest with

one's mind, no holds barred'.

The goal of a science curriculum integrated through a common method is

unattainable - except at a very elementary level. Biologists, chemists and physicists

approach problems and conduct investigations in ways that are sufficiently distinc­

tive to warrant the attention of students being drawn to the differences (and their

causes) as much as to their similarities. Moreover, in making their selections

and in implementing their chosen strategies, scientists utilize an additional kind

of knowledge and understanding, often not well articulated or even consciously

applied, that can be acquired only through the experience of doing science and

that constitutes the central core of the art and craft of the creative scientist.

This knowledge combines conceptual understanding with elements of creativity,

experimental flair, the scientific equivalent of the gardener's 'green fingers' and a

complex of affective attributes that provide the necessary impetus of determination

and commitment. With experience, it develops into what Polanyi (1958) calls

connoisseurship. In practice, scientists proceed partly by rationalization (based on

their theoretical understanding) and partly by intuition rooted in their tacit knowl­

edge of how to do science (their connoisseurship).

Because the ways in which scientists work are not fixed and not predictable, and

because they involve a component that is experience-dependent in a very personal

sense, they are not directly teachable. That is, one cannot learn to do science by

learning a prescription or set of processes to be applied in all situations. The only

effective way to learn to do science is by doing science, alongside a skilled and

experienced practitioner who can provide on-the-job support, criticism and advice.

The implications of this for science education will be addressed later in this article.

Assessment and evaluation

By tradition, reproducibility of experimental results and consistency with

'observable facts' are held to be the criteria by which scientific theories are

appraised. As a consequence, school science curricula invariably invest enormous

faith in the capacity of observation and experiment to provide reliable data for

making unequivocal decisions concerning the validity of theories. Even at a level of

sophistication appropriate to the school curriculum it can be pointed out to students

that there are some major problems associated with this position. First, 'consistency

with the facts' does not confer any increased truth status on a theory. Such

consistency simply means that the theory may be true (Duhem 1962). But so may

lots of other theories that might also correspond with the observations. Second,

observation statements are fallible and theory-dependent, so any conclusions based

on them are also fallible and theory-dependent. Third, experiments are messy and

uncertain things that have to be interpreted using theoretical insights. They do not

provide reliable and unambiguous data, because evidence can often be interpreted

in a variety of ways, depending on the theory employed. Indeed, as Feyerabend

(1975) asserts, a well-designed theory creates its own supporting evidence, thereby

insulating it from attempts to falsify it. In practice, it is rarely possible to devise an

experiment that represents a decisive test of a theory, and we seriously mislead

students when we pretend to do so in class (Koertge 1969, Millar 1987).

If it is not possible to perform critical experiments capable of furnishing theory­

independent data, it follows that there are no purely logical criteria (in the familiar

E,TEGRATION IJ'\ SCIE"ICE AND SCIENCE EDCCATIOJ'\ 547

usage of the term) for establishing the superiority of one theory over another. In

other words, theories are empirically under-determined. Empirical adequacy is

not enough in itself to establish validity. In practice, empirical inadequacy is

frequently ignored by individual scientists fighting passionately for a well-loved

theory (Mitroff and Mason 1974), and is often considered subordinate to the

'context of discovery' by the community-appointed validators (Knorr-Cetina

1983). Additional factors that may play a part in decision-making include:

• elegance and simplicity (the aesthetics of science);

• similarity and consistency with other theories;

• 'intellectual fashion', in the sense of compatibility with trends in other disci-

plines;

• social and economic considerations;

• cultural considerations;

• the status of the researchers;

• the views of 'significant others' (influential and powerful scientists, journal

editors, publishers);

• priorities of research funding agencies.

In other words, knowledge is negotiated within the community of scientists by

a complex interplay of theoretical argument, experiment and personal opinion.

Criteria of judgement include social, economic, political, religious, moral and

ethical factors as they impact (sometimes unconsciously) on the decision makers

(Latour and \Noolgar 1979). In other words, science is not propelled exclusively by

its own internal logic. Rather, it is shaped by the personal beliefs and political

attitudes of its practitioners and reflects, in part, 'the history, power structure and

political climate of the supportive community' (Dixon 1973). So much for unity of

the sciences through a common means of theory appraisal!

Towards a unified science education

Whilst there may be little in the literature of philosophy and sociology of science to

support the notion of a science integrated through its purposes, conceptual struc­

tures, methods and criteria of judgement, there may still be compelling arguments

for an integrated science education. In her review of integrated science curricula,

Brown (1977) declares that it is incumbent on curriculum developers to state both

the nature and justification of their integrative principles. The second part of this

article is devoted to that task.

In his Presidential Address to the ASE, Black (1986) warned us of 'the temptation

to invent a unifying philosophy for integrated science' (emphasis added) and

advised us to 'be wary of any attempt to unify science ... that does not draw on the

views of scientists or philosophers of science'. \Nhat follows is not an attempt to

unify science. Rather, it is an attempt to unify science education. For that purpose,

an integrating principle (or principles) rooted in educational theory, rather than

philosophy of science, is necessary. Meeting Brown's challenge requires that we

ignore Black's demand or, at least, the literal interpretation of it. Indeed, as I

tried to argue in the first part of this article, arguments rooted in philosophy and

sociology of science cannot provide integrative principles.

The familiar 'Objectives Model' of curriculum (figure 1 (a)) can be used to

remind us that unity of science education may be sought in terms of coherence and

548 D . HODSON

consistency among the goals (aims and objectives), content (knowledge, skills and

attitudes), teaching/learning experiences and assessment/evaluation procedures of

science education. For example, otherwise disconnected content can be integrated

through the use of unifying contexts, themes or topics (Kirkham 1989, Linjse et al.

1990) or through students' particular interests, as expressed in their choices within

a modular course (SSCR 1987). When the curriculum is focused on a problem­

solving approach there is a sense in which teaching and learning methods provide

integration and, insofar as they impact significantly on classroom activities, a

similar case can be made for the integrative potential of assessment procedures.

:Many of the more significant educational differences between curricula are less to

do with traditional subject classification into biology, chemistry and physics than

with the educational intent (aims and objectives in figure 1 (a)), or what Roberts

(1982) calls the 'curriculum emphasis' of the programme. Any one of seven

major curriculum emphases- Everyday Coping; Structure of Science; Science,

Technology and Decisions; Scientific Skill Development; Correct Explanations;

Self As Explainer; Solid Foundations- could be used as the basis of a coherent

science education programme. Of interest here is the Alberta Ministry of

Education's (1990) current promotion of the STS curriculum emphasis as the means

of achieving balance and integration in science education.

The STS (science , technology and society) concept of curriculum . . . is an opportunity to organize and p resent all the goals of science education in a coherent package .

Although I have considerable empathy with this view, it does sidestep the problem

that STS itself is by no means a coherent, consistent and unproblematic curriculum

emphasis (Heath 1992, Hurd 1991, Rosenthal 1989, Solomon 1988, Zuga 1991).

A range of curriculum emphases is included in the umbrella term 'scientific

literacy', a term that has recently become a rallying call for those who seek to render

science more meaningful and more accessible to all students. The following section

explores the potential of scientific literacy as a focus for integration.

Integration through scientific literacy

Whilst scientific literacy is neither a new concept (Roberts 1983, Shen 1975) nor a

well-defined one (Bodmer 1989, Jenkins 1990, Lewis and Gagel 1992, Mayer and

Armstrong 1990, Shahn 1988), its multidimensionality does have the potential to

provide a kind of integrated science curriculum or, at least, a balanced and coherent

science education. However, there is much dispute about whether science education

programmes can, simultaneously, prepare some students for careers as scientists

and technologists and ensure that all students become scientifically literate (Carter

1991, Fensham 1988). It is my view that these goals are compatible and achievable,

provided that emphasis is placed on the personalization of learning (Bentley and

Watts 1989, Burbules and Linn 1991, Martin and Brouwer 1991, Newton 1986,

Reid and Hodson 1987).

For convenience, the multidimensionality of scientific literacy can be described

in terms of three major elements:

1. Learning science - acquiring and developing conceptual and theoretical

knowledge.

I�TEGRATIO:'\ I� SCIE)JCE AND SCIE:--JCE EDCCATIO"I 549

2. Learning about science - deyeloping an understanding of the nature and

methods of science, and an awareness of the complex interactions between

science and society.

3. Doing science - engaging in and deyeloping expertise in scientific inquiry and

problem solying.

With respect to these three elements, 'personalization of learning' means ensuring

that (i) learning is rooted in the personal experiences of indiyidual learners, (ii)

science is seen as more person-oriented and science education is infused with sound

human and enyironmental yalues, and (iii) eyery student has the opportunity to

pursue scientific inyestigations of their own choosing and their own design. Over­

arching all three aspects is what Hodson and Reid (1988) refer to as prioritization

of the affective: ensuring that the curriculum meets the emotional and spiritual

needs of all students.

In attempting to meet the learning science goal, we need to take cognizan�e of what recent research into children's understandings in science has revealed about

concept acquisition and concept deyelopment, principally that learning is an active

process in which learners construct and reconstruct their own understanding in

the light of their experiences (Driver and Bell 1986). This entails (i) creating

opportunities for students to explore their current understandings and evaluate

the robustness of their models and theories in meeting the purposes of science, and

(ii) providing suitable stimuli for development and change. Unfortunately, many of

the so-called process-oriented science curricula seriously misjudge the nature of

this enterprise. First, by attempting to draw clear distinctions between the various

processes of science. Second, by insisting that they are independent of context and

content and, therefore, are generalizable and transferable to other situations. In

practice, employing the processes of science involves using concepts and theories,

and inyolyes using other processes. Because all processes are theory-impregnated,

and are inextricably linked with other processes, it is not possible to engage in

theory-free investigations or to deyelop skills of observation, data collection,

classification, inference, and so on, in isolation. Since one's capacity to use the

processes of science effectively is dependent on one's theoretical understanding, it

follows that teaching for process skill development is inseparable from teaching for

concept development (Hodson 1992a).

Given the inter-dependence of processes and concepts, it is reasonable to

suppose that engaging in the processes of science changes one's conceptual

understanding and that process skills play a crucial role in the development of

understanding. In other words, encouraging students to deploy the processes of

science (in conducting investigations and solving problems) is a way of developing

their conceptual understanding. In its emphasis on (a) the interrelatedness of con­

ceptual and procedural knowledge and (b) the exploration and development of

personal understanding, this argument is markedly different from those used by

advocates of discovery learning and process-oriented teaching ( Swatton 1990).

A theory-driven approach to investigation, in which students use the processes

and methods of science to inyestigate phenomena and confront problems as a means

of enhancing and developing their understanding, provides a powerful integrative

element for the curriculum. At the same time, students acquire a deeper under­

standing of scientific activity, and investigation (or 'exploration' as Qualter et al.

[1990] call it) becomes a method both for learning science and learning about science.

-

5 50 D . HOD SO;';

Further progress in learning about science can be made by encouraging students to

reflect on the personal learning progress that has been made. For example, when

students reconsider and reinterpret laboratory activities conducted earlier in the

course, they are able to draw meaningful parallels between the development of their

personal understanding and the growth of scientific knO\vledge.

However, if it is to be effective, learning about science has to be afforded a much

more explicit role in curriculum planning than has been common in the past

(Hodson 1990, Kirschner 1992). In criticizing much of our contemporary approach

to laboratory work, "'Toolnough and Allsop (1985) make a case for regarding

practical \vork as having three major aspects: exercises-to develop skills and tech­

niques; experiences-to 'get a feel for phenomena'; investigations-to gain experience

of doing science. Clearly, this last one is a major contributor to children's under­

standing of the nature of science. However, a case can be made for a fourth category

of practical work: \vhat we might call 'getting a feel for scientific practice' (see

Kirschner [ 1992] for a thorough and incisive discussion of this notion). 'Practical

\vork' in this context is not restricted to bench work. Rather, it includes all manner

of other active learning experiences designed to bring about a clearer understanding

of the nature of scientific activity- among them, the use of historical case studies,

simulations and dramatic reconstructions (Brush 1989, Burdett 1989, Bybee et al.

1991, Solomon 1989, Solomon et al. 1992, Wandersee 1990), role playing and

debating (Loving 1991, van der Valk 1989), purpose-built 'nature of science' units

(Carey et al. 1989), activities focused on topics where theoretical explanation is still

controversial (Benson 1989a, Millar 1989), utilization of socio-economic issues

(Aikenhead 1991, 1992), use of computer-based activities (Freidler et al. 1990,

Hodson 1992b) and 'paper-and-pencil' problem solving (Gil-Perez et al. 1990), and

the elegant 'epistemological disturbance' strategy described by Larochelle and

Desautels (1991a).

Of course, investigation/exploration is also the means by which students do

science-use the methods and processes of science to investigate phenomena, solve

problems and follow interests that they have chosen for themselves. It is here that

I wish to take further issue with those who promote the so-called process approach

to doing science. The principal claim of this approach is that doing science can be

analysed into a set of discrete activities, each of which can be clearly and unambigu­

ously described, taught as theory-free, generalizable and transferable skills, and

systematically assessed. I regard such a claim as philosophically unsound and

pedagogically mistaken (Hodson 1992a). As I argued earlier, doing science is a

context-dependent and idiosyncratic activity. In approaching a particular situation,

scientists refine their approach to a problem, develop greater understanding of it

and devise more appropriate and productive ways of proceeding all at the same time.

As soon as an idea is developed, it is subjected to evaluation (by observation,

experiment, comparison with other theories, etc.). Sometimes that evaluation leads

to new ideas, to further and different experiments, or even to a complete recasting

of the original idea or reformulation of the problem. Thus, almost every move that

a scientist makes during an inquiry changes the situation in some way, so that the

next decisions and moves are made in an altered context (see Stewart and Hafner

[1991] for an extended discussion). Consequently, doing science is a holistic and

fluid activity, not a matter of following a set of rules that requires particular

behaviours at particular stages. Science is an organic, dynamic, interactive activity,

a constant interplay of thought and action.

I:'-!TEGRATIOC\! Ic\! SCIE:\CE A:\D SC IENCE EDCCATIO:'-! 5 51

Moreover, in doing science one also increases both one's understanding of what

constitutes doing science and one's capacity to do it successfully. Just as you

'think your way into new ways of acting', so you 'act your way into new ways of

thinking'. In other words, doing science is a reflexive activity: current knowledge and

expertise informs and determines the conduct of the inquiry and, simultaneously,

involvement in inquiry (and, crucially, reflection on it) refines knowledge and

sharpens procedural expertise. Cheung and Taylor (1991) provide further insight

into this 'double spiral of knowing', as they call it, and outline ways in which a

developmental series of investigative tasks sensitive to the relationship between

conceptual knowledge and procedural knowledge can be planned.

Integration via task

In arguing that learning science, learning about science and doing science are

mutually reinforcing activities, and that doing science is itself a reflexive activity,

I have been moving towards the notion that the most powerful integrating factors

for science education are the learning tasks each student undertakes. When an

investigative approach to learning science is adopted, there is integration through the

dynamic interaction of the processes of science and the conceptual understanding

of each individual learner. When students have adequate experience of doing science,

there is integration through the interaction of observation, experiment and theory.

In addition, because of the reflexive nature of scientific activity, there is integration

between doing science, learning science and learning about science: students develop

their conceptual understanding and learn more about scientific inquiry by engaging

in scientific inquiry, provided that there is sufficient opportunity for and support of

reflection.

If scientists enhance their professional expertise through practice, it seems

reasonable to suppose that students will learn to do science (and to do it better) by

doing science-simple investigations at first, probably chosen from a well-tried list

of 'successful' investigations designed and developed by the teacher, but whole

investigations none the less. Then, as confidence, skill and knowledge grow,

progress can be made to more complex, more challenging and more open-ended

investigations. There is some evidence (Schauble et al. 1991) that it may be more

productive to begin with 'engineering type problems' (where the goal is to optimize

desired or interesting outcomes) and then to make a transition to 'science type

problems' (in which the goal is to identify and understand causal relationships

among variables) because, as the authors argue, the former more closely match

children's intuitive problem-solving strategies and their everyday ways of thinking.

Eventually, students can proceed independently: choosing their own topics, and

approaching them in their own way. In this way, they experience the whole process,

from initial problem identification to final evaluation. Also, as Brusic (1992)

reminds us, they experience 'the excitement of successes and the agony that arises

from inadequate planning or bad decisions'. However, the teacher's role is still a

crucial one: role model, learning resource, facilitator, consultant and critic. As

Ravetz (1973) has commented, learning to do science occurs 'almost entirely within

the interpersonal channel, requiring personal contact, and a measure of personal

sympathy between the parties. What is transmitted will be partly explicit, but partly

tacit; principle, precept, and example are all mixed together'.

5 5 2 D . HODSON

Before these kinds of activities can take place, however, it is important for

students to acquire a rich background of what White (1991) calls 'episodes' or

'recollections of events'. There are two senses in which these early experiences are

crucial. First, it is important for students to have first-hand experience of pheno­

mena and events. It is not enough for them to read about blue crystals and forces

of magnetic attraction and repulsion; they need to see them and experience them

directly (Woolnough and Allsop 1985). Second, students need direct experience of

laboratory apparatus and procedures in order to develop both the confidence and

the capacity to use equipment appropriately and skilfully. This is not an argument

for an intensive bench skills training programme. Rather, it is a suggestion that the

adoption of some kind of 'familiarization programme' may be a necessary precursor

to successful scientific inquiry.

Once attention shifts to problem-solving exercises, investigative tasks and,

ultimately, to open-ended scientific inquiry, students are enabled to enhance

their conceptual understanding, build up more 'episodes' and acquire first-hand

experience of the procedures of science -especially those that relate to the structure,

purpose and conduct of experiments- all at the same time.

Within this overall constructivist epistemology and psychology of learning,

there are two major and closely related difficulties that have to be overcome if a

satisfactory degree of integration is to be established:

1. Avoiding the trap of relativism, where any conclusion that students arrive at,

for reasons that satisfy them, is deemed acceptable.

2. Ensuring that practical activities incline students towards currently accepted

knowledge (in curriculum terms) without implying that knowledge is

absolute or 'out there, waiting to be discovered'.

In both cases, the solution to the difficulty lies in a more explicit consideration

of the ways in which scientific knowledge is constructed and social acceptance is

negotiated, and in ensuring that such considerations are prominent in the design of

laboratory activities. In many classrooms, serious mismatches occur between the

professed 'philosophic stance' of the teacher and the curriculum experiences

provided (Hodson 1992c, Linder 1992). For example, in teaching about science

teachers may promote the view that scientific knowledge is socially constructed,

yet fail to acknowledge the social construction of scientific knowledge in the design

of laboratory activities. In school laboratories, an 'experiment' is usually designed

to lead students to a particular view; it is regarded by teachers as a way of

convincingly revealing meaning, rather than constituting an element in the

negotiation or construction of meaning. As a consequence, the implicit curriculum

message is that scientific theory is a body of authoritative knowledge revealed and

authenticated by observation and systematic experimentation. In other words,

students come to believe that certainty about knowledge resides in the method of

science. For an extended discussion of these matters, and of the resulting confusions

that students encounter, see Benson (1989b), Cheung and Taylor (1991), Duschl

and Gitomer (1991), Larochelle and Desautels (1991a, b), Nersessian (1989),

Russell and Munby (1989), Songer and Linn (1991).

As noted earlier, when students are engaged in conducting their own investi­

gations, under their own direction, they refine their conceptual knowledge and

develop their procedural skills concurrently. Most importantly of all, they use their

developing knowledge and expertise in real contexts. In such circumstances, there

]:'-:TEGRATIO:'-: IN S C I E:'-:CE A:'-:O SC IENCE EDCCATIO:'-: 5 5 3

is much to be said for the use of an Investigator's Logbook, in which students reflect

on the progress of their investigation: '\Vhere am I going?' 'Where do I go next?'

'Do I need to rethink, replan?' It is reflections like these, and the requirement to

discuss them with the teacher, that gives students insight into the idiosyncratic and

reflexive nature of scientific investigation. Requiring students to be responsible for

discussing their own learning provides an opportunity for critical self-reflection and

helps to develop the sense of ownership and personal involvement that underpins

the integrative nature of the learning task.

Integration through issues

Another sense in which learning tasks based on investigation/exploration can

provide an integrative element for a science curriculum designed to achieve

universal scientific literacy is through the confrontation of issues. A mix of local and

global issues focusing on the seven priority areas identified by the Bangalore

Conference on 'Science and Technology and Future Human Needs' (Tendencia

1987) might suffice:

• food and agriculture;

• energy resources;

• land, water and mineral resources;

• industry and technology;

• the environment;

• information transfer;

• ethics, and social responsibility.

The claim for integration resides in the belief that knowledge development and

utilization is a socially situated activity (Lave 1988). By grounding content in

socially and personally relevant contexts, an issues-based approach can provide the

motivation that is absent from current abstract, decontextualized approaches and

can form a base for students to construct understanding that is personally relevant,

meaningful and important.

Of course, it is possible to engage in an issues-based approach at several levels

of sophistication. At the simplest level, case studies of the societal impact of

inventions such as the steam engine, the printing press or the computer can be used

to bring about an awareness that science and technology are powerful forces

that shape the lives of people and other species, and impact significantly on the

environment as a whole. Part of this awareness includes recognition that the

benefits of scientific and technological innovations are often accompanied by

problems: hazards to human health, challenging and sometimes disconcerting

social changes, environmental degradation and major moral-ethical dilemmas.

iVluch of STS and environmental education is currently pitched at this level.

At the second level of sophistication, students recognize that scientific and

technological decisions are taken in pursuit of particular interests and are justified

by particular values. As a consequence, the advantages and disadvantages of

scientific and technological developments often impact differentially on society.

Being critically literate involves recognizing that science and technology serve

the rich and the powerful in ways that are often prejudicial to the interests and

well-being of the poor and powerless, and serve to increase further the inequalities

and injustices of the world (Carter 1990, 1991). Within a more global context, it

5 54 D . HODSO:-;

includes recogmzmg that material benefits in the \Vest (:-.Jorth) are sometimes

achieved at the expense of those living in the Third 'World (Brophy 1991). By

addressing issues such as the infringement of Aboriginal land rights and the

destruction of the Amazonian rainforest in the pursuit of financial gain and

economic growth, students recognize that critical considerations in science and

technology cannot be divorced from concern with the distribution of wealth and

power, or from consideration of the root causes of environmental degradation.

\Vhen the goal is critical scientific literacy, it is not enough to view environ­

mental problems merely as matters of careless industrialization and inexpert

management of natural resources, because this ignores the underlying causes of

the problems- the values underpinning industrialization and the exploitation of

natural resources - and sees their solution as a technical problem, for which we

need a quick 'technological fix'. In that sense, the approach depoliticizes the issues,

thereby removing them from the 'realm of possibility' within which ordinary

people perceive themselves as capable of intervention. As a consequence, dealing

with environmental problems is left to the 'experts' and the holders of office, and

ordinary citizens are disempowered. Education for empowerment requires that

science education is much more overtly political in flavour, which entails

recognizing that the environment is not just a 'given', but a social construct. It is

a social construct in two senses: (i) we act on and change the natural environment,

and so construct and reconstruct it through our social actions, and (ii) we perceive

it in a way that is dependent on the prevailing socio-cultural framework. Thus, our

concept of 'environment' itself is a social construct, and so could be different.

Indeed, many indigenous peoples do perceive it in significantly different ways

(Knudtson and Suzuki 1992).

By encouraging students to recognize the ways in which the environment is

socially constructed, we can challenge the notion that environmental problems are

'natural' and inevitable. If 'environment' is a social construct, environmental

problems are social problems, caused by societal practices and structures and

justified by society's current values. It follows that solving environmental problems

means addressing and changing the social conditions that give rise to them and the

values that sustain them. This realization shifts questions of environmental

improvement from the technical domain into the socio-political domain. The

solution to environmental problems does not lie in a quick 'technological fix', but

in socio-political action. In other words, scientists cannot be relied on to put

everything right whilst the rest of us maintain our current profligate lifestyle.

Thus, an essential step in pursuit of critical scientific literacy is applying a social

critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism - the idea

that technological change is inevitable and irresistible. \Ve can control technology

and its environmental and social impact or, more significantly, we can control the

controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact

is reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality and justice are

kept in the forefront of discussion during the establishment of policy (May 1992,

Hodson 1992d).

Students who have progressed this far will already have begun to formulate

their own opinions on important issues and to establish their own value positions.

The third level of sophistication focuses much more overtly on values clarification,

personal decision making about 'where one stands' on important local and global

issues, developing strong feelings about issues and actively thinking about what

I'lTEGRATION 1:,\ SCIENCE A:,\D SC IEKCE EDCCATIO'l 5 5 5

it means to act wisely, justly and 'rightly' In different social, political and

environmental contexts. This phase has much in common with the goals of Peace

Education (Hicks 1988).

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in the issues-based approach is helping

students to prepare for and take action. Preparing students for action means

ensuring that they gain a clear understanding of how decisions are made within

local, regional and national government, and within industry and commerce. With­

out knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located, and

awareness of the mechanisms by which decisions are reached, intervention is not

possible. At level one of an issues approach, students can be made aware of the

societal and environmental impact of science and technology and alerted to the

existence of alternative practices. At level two, students can be sensitized to the

socio-political nature of scientific and technological practice. At level three, they

may become committed to the fight to establish more socially just and environ­

mentally sustainable practices. But only by proceeding to level four can we ensure

that students acquire the knmvledge and skills to intervene effectively in the

decision-making processes and ensure that alternative values are brought to bear on

policy decisions. Of course, the likelihood of students becoming active citizens will

be enhanced by encouraging them to take action now. Suitable action might include

conducting surveys, making public statements and writing letters, organizing

petitions and consumer boycotts of environmentally unsafe products, publishing

newsletters, working on environmental clean-up projects or assuming responsi­

bility for environmental enhancement of the school itself (Hodson 1992e).

What I am arguing here is that education for critical scientific literacy is

inextricably linked with education for political literacy and with the ideology of

education as social reconstruction, and that these orientations provide the most

powerful means of integrating and unifying science education. The integrative

element is each student's progress towards a personal frame\vork of under­

standings, points of view and values, and its expression through personal action.

A similar argument, leading to a curriculum proposal based on a five-phase

'responsibility spiral', has recently been developed by Waks (1992):

By moving through the phases of the spiral , learners of all ages can be guided in forming their convictions and commitments , their l ife- style choices and values , as these bear upon the technology dominated issues facing our society. As they move through these phases, on issue after issue, confronting and thinking through science and technology dominated issues of increasing complexity, learners can make progress toward mature social responsibil ity.

Questions of research, curriculum development and teacher education

In conducting my personal search for a more meaningful relationship among the

sciences, and in exploring possibilities for integration in science education, I began

by seeking my own answers to four series of questions, commencing with the

following:

1. What view of science is it desirable for students to hold?

2. Is it possible to 'translate' this model of science into learning experiences that

adequately 'convey the message'?

3. What view of learning in science should be employed?

5 5 6 D . HODSO:\l

4. Can this model of learning be 'translated' into suitable and effective learning

experiences?

5. Is it both possible and desirable to establish a degree of harmony between

preferred models of knowledge construction in science and preferred models

of learning science and, therefore, between activities that focus on learning

about science and those that focus on learning science?

It goes without saying that other curriculum researchers might answer these

questions differently. For example, Loving ( 1992) provides a detailed discussion of

questions 1 and 2, and some interesting and important comments on questions 3,

4 and 5 can be found in recent work by Burbules and Linn ( 1991), Giannetto et al.

(1992), Gil-Perez and Carrasco sa-AI is ( 1992), Matthews and Davson-Galle ( 1992).

A second series of questions concerns the possibility of using scientific, techno­

logical and environmental issues as an integrating principle, and the extent to which

an issues-based curriculum that involves social critique and education for political

literacy is desirable. Again, others might answer these questions differently.

Inevitably, there will be those who would seek to maintain science education's

current preoccupation with abstract, theoretical knowledge and with pre-profes­

sional preparation, and some will regard the reformulation of science education in

terms of more overtly political goals as undesirable. As McElroy ( 1986) comments:

'It is ironical that the very success of political literacy education is what draws the

most opposition. Politically literate students are seen as a threat to the established

order of power and control. Hence potentially successful political action may be

vigorously resisted while ineffective participation ... is lauded.'

Restriction of an issues-based curriculum to the level of scientific and techno­

logical considerations (level one in the earlier discussion) would be seen by many as

'politically safe', because of its supposed 'neutral' stance. In reality, it is not neutral.

Indeed, it implicitly supports current social practices, current institutions and

current values. Insofar as it fails to address underlying socio-political and economic

issues, excludes consideration of social alternatives, sustains a 'technocratic'

approach to the confrontation of problems and fails to equip students with the

capacity to intervene, the so-called 'neutral' approach actually reinforces the societal

values that created the problems and so has to be regarded as education for social

reproduction (Hodson 1992d, May 1992).

A third series of questions concerns the most appropriate approach to

curriculum development and teacher education. What is not in dispute is that

an investigative approach to learning science, learning about science and doing science

will only work with teachers whose professional expertise includes awareness of

what constitutes good scientific investigation, how students can be brought to a

similar understanding (in kind, if not level) and how they can be encouraged and

supported in their scientific investigations. What may be in dispute is how that state

of affairs can be achieved. However, if we have learned anything from previous

excursions into science education reform it is that centre-to-periphery styles of

curriculum development and directive styles of teacher education are nearly always

unsuccessful. For the kinds of curriculum changes envisaged here, an alternative

approach would need to be adopted.

The constructivist epistemology assumed in the investigative approach seems to

demand a constructivist approach to curriculum development, teacher education

and professional development. Teachers need to articulate their views about the

I :\TEGRATIO:"l I"l S C I E);CE A"lD SCIE:-.iCE EOCCATIO);

THE UN IVERS!TY OF WAI KATO EDUC,I"TION UGRARY

5 5 7

nature of science and the nature of teaching and learning, they need to explore them

and critique them, they need opportunities to consider alternatives, and to model,

test and evaluate them in action. In effect, what is being described here is an action

research spiral in which teachers plan, act, observe and reflect (Kemmis and

:vlcTaggert 1982). Just as scientists and students develop expertise in doing science

by doing science (because of the reflexive nature of scientific practice), so teachers

develop expertise in supporting and encouraging students' scientific investigations

by supporting and promoting students' scientific investigations (because of the

reflexive nature of educational practice).

These arguments can be extended to the issues-based approach to integrated

science education, where anxieties over unfamiliar content and teaching/learning

style make a centralist approach to curriculum development even more inappro­

priate (Bybee 1991, :VIitchener and Anderson 1989). The purpose of confronting

students with issues is to develop the critical thinking and decision-making skills

that constitute critical scientific literacy. It is absurd and contradictory- even

perverse-to deny teachers that same opportunity to develop their critical thinking

and decision-making skills in relation to their professional practice. Educational

practice should be educative and empowering for teachers as well as for students.

Because of its critical and reflexive nature, the issues approach is empowering

for teachers and engagement in it is, in itself, a major stimulus for professional

growth, provided that teachers are given sufficient autonomy. Under these condi­

tions, educational practice has many of the characteristics of the kind of critical

action research envisaged by Carr and Kemmis (1986) as the route to enhanced

professionalism. In other words, the issues-based approach to science education has

a commitment to and a procedure for professional growth built into it. Similar

arguments concerning curriculum development and professional development are

presented at greater length by Hart and Robottom (1990) and Rubba (1991), with

respect to STS education in general. In a modest way, this approach to curriculum

development is exemplified in two recent Canadian initiatives: 'Science Plus'

(McFadden 1992) and 'LoRST' (Aikenhead 1991, 1992). Research into the

effectiveness of the more radical approach advocated by May (1992) is urgently

needed.

A fourth set of questions concerns assessment and evaluation procedures. There

is no doubt that assessment procedures, and public examinations in particular, exert

a significant influence on the curriculum and can promote or hinder the adoption

of particular classroom activities (Kempa 1986). If it is accepted as inevitable that

both teachers and students will put most value on that which is examined, and for

which academic credit can be gained, ways will need to be found for recognizing and

rewarding quality in investigative inquiries (Hodson 1992a) and for monitoring and

rewarding students' abilities to confront complex issues in a critical way (Cheek

1992, Zoller 1990). However, such concerns fall outside the scope of this article.

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