Evaluate the temporal or Kalam cosmological argument for the existence

of God 3496 words

In my essay I am going to outline and evaluate the Kalam version of the

cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is an a posteriori

argument since it relies on a premise that can only be known through our

experience of the world. This premise seeks to establish the impossibility

of both an actual infinite and traversing an actual infinite if it did exist. In

order to do this there is an appeal to both scientific research in astronomy

and astrophysics and logical inferences, for instance the Hilbert Hotel

example.

Having outlined the argument I will present Mackie’s critique which

revolves around the misunderstanding of the nature of an infinite and the

idea that the universe could have originated by itself in a finite time

space. However I will demonstrate how Mackie’s critique is

unsatisfactory on many levels since it seems to miss the point of the

Kalam cosmological argument. Having discussed Mackie’s critique, I

wish to demonstrate how the appeal to scientific evidence leaves the

Kalam argument open to falsification. This appeal to scientific evidence

can be reconciled on the basis that using scientific evidence makes it a

more attractive argument for the sceptic since it uses such evidence in the

justification of a religious belief. On the basis of Ockham’s razor I will

conclude that the Kalam cosmological argument is a strong argument for

the existence of God since it is both coherent and intuitively plausible

from both a philosophical and scientific perspective.

The most important question one must ask themselves when considering

any cosmological argument for the existence of God was posed by

Leibniz1:1 G.W Leibniz, “the Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason,” in Leibniz Selections, edited by Philip Wiener, The Modern Students Library, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951, p.527

“Why is there something rather than nothing?”

The first premise of the cosmological argument asserts that there is a

causal explanation for everything that begins to exist. The second premise

of the argument begins with the assumption that at a point in time the

universe came into existence. This notion is supported by the idea that it

is impossible that an actual infinite can exist and even if it did exist it

would be impossible to traverse it. Since the universe could not have

existed in an actual infinite, at a certain point in time the universe must

have begun to exist. From this the argument concludes that this existence

was caused. One then infers from the nature of the argument that this

cause was an uncaused, timeless God.

Let us now discuss the second premise of the Kalam cosmological

argument since this offers the most crucial supporting evidence for the

argument. The second premise states that at a point in time the universe

began to exist, which as a result entails the non-existence of an actual

infinite. An actual infinite is a series of events without a beginning. There

is not only scientific evidence but also logical inferences that may be

offered to show how an actual infinite cannot exist. Let us take Al

Ghauzali’s example2 in which he states how once in every twelve years

the planet Jupiter revolves in its orbit, whereas Saturn revolves in its orbit

every thirty years. As a result one can see how Jupiter will have

completed over twice as many revolutions in that time space than Saturn.

However in an actual infinite time space they would have both completed

the same infinite number. Since neither has completed the same number

of revolutions, this implies that an actual infinite is impossible.

2 J.L. Mackie, Critique of the Cosmological Argument, Philosophy of Religion selected readings, Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, David Basinger, Third Edition, page 229, Oxford University Press

This is supported by an example given to us by David Hilbert3 called the

“Hilbert Hotel”. He asks us to imagine a full finite number of rooms in a

hotel. If a new guest were to arrive, the proprietor would not be able to let

them stay because all the rooms in the hotel would be full. One is then

asked to imagine an infinite number of full rooms in a hotel, and again a

new guest arrives requesting a room. This time the proprietor could let

them stay by freeing up a room by moving the person in room one to

room two, and then the occupant of room two to room three, and so on

until infinity. Consequently the new guest would then be able to stay in

room one, however before this new guest arrived the hotel was full, but

even with the new guest the numbers are still the same; infinite. However,

how is it possible that in this once full hotel can there be one more person

than there was before? This process could be repeated an infinite number

of times and yet the result would always be the same, there would always

be the same infinite number of people in the hotel. No one could

genuinely think that such a hotel could exist in reality thus highlighting

the impossibility of the idea that there can be an actual infinite. In relation

to the universe, since an actual infinite consists of an infinite temporal

regress of events, and since it seems highly intuitively implausible that an

actual infinite can exist, one may draw the conclusion that not only are

past events finite and have a beginning but logically since there is no

difference between the universe and this series of events, this entails that

the universe also began to exist at a point in time.

The second part of the second premise of the Kalam cosmological

argument explains how it is impossible to form an actual infinite by

successive instances of addition. This is different from the first part of the

second premise because it considers how even if the existence of an

3 William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Philosophy of Religion selected readings, Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, David Basinger, Third Edition, page 211-212,Oxford University Press

actual infinite was coherent in some way, it would be impossible to

transverse it. This is because it is impossible, no matter how much

successive addition, to reach an actual infinite. It is impossible to reach an

actual infinite by counting since no matter at what point one starts one

could always add another addition before reaching the actual infinite.

Since it is impossible to reach an actual infinite by successive addition

one cannot therefore count down from an actual infinite. The past cause

and effect in the temporal series of the world has been put together by

successive instances of addition in which one event is caused by a

preceding event. This suggests that for this event to take place in the first

place the complete series of its causal antecedents must have happened

and be actual. The present moment in time would never have existed if

the universe was an actual infinite, but since it has arrived one may

conclude that the universe is finite and at a point in time it began to exist.

Scientific proofs offered by research in astronomy and astrophysics

have strengthened the second premise of the Kalam cosmological

argument. The Big Bang has been seen by many to be the time at which

the universe began to exist. Hubble discovered how the universe was

expanding from the red-shift in light he observed from the distant

galaxies. By tracing the origins of the universe back in time, scientific

research suggests that the universe becomes increasingly dense until a

point of infinite density is reached. Scientists conclude that from this

point, the universe began to expand4. This point has been marked down as

the point at which the universe came into existence. This point of infinite

density entails that the universe was created out of nothing since no

object that has an infinite density can posses any size at all because if it

did then it would be greater in density. As a result, scientists have

4 Richard J. Gott, et al, “Will the Universe Expand Forever?” Scientific American, 1976, page 65

concluded that the Big Bang, from which the universe was created, must

have happened out of nothing5.

The second scientific proof that supports the second premise of the

cosmological argument is the thermodynamic properties of the universe.

Since the universe is a closed system, the second law of thermodynamics

suggest that the processes within this system are working towards a state

of thermodynamic equilibrium or heat death. The nature of this

equilibrium is dependent upon firstly whether the universe will continue

to expand or, secondly, if the universe is dense enough whether this will

allow it to overcome the expansion and as a result the universe would re-

contract. However if the universe had existed for an infinite amount of

time the universe should have already reached a state of equilibrium. The

fact that the universe hasn’t suggests that the universe has a finite past

and began to exist at a certain point in time6. Thus this scientific evidence

seems to confirm the second premise of the cosmological argument, that

at a point in our finite past, the universe began to exist.

Let us now discuss the objections raised by Mackie when considering the

validity of the cosmological argument. His first criticism revolves around

the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite. If there was an infinite

past, there would be no starting point in time and thus it would be

impossible to traverse an infinitely distant starting point from the present

day. However since the present day has arrived, this entails that the past

must be finite because if it was infinite, today would never have arrived.

However Mackie asserts that if one were to look at the notion of infinity

more closely one would realise that in an infinite past there would be no

starting point and consequently one could take any point in the past time

from which only a finite stretch of time needs to be traversed in order to

reach the present moment. However this is irrelevant since the Kalam 5 Fred Hoyle, From Stonehenge to Modern Cosmology, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1972, page 366 P.C.W. Davies, The Physics of Time Asymmetry, London: Surry University Press, 1974, p.104

argument states the impossibility of traversing the whole temporal series

of events or how the whole series cannot be formed by successive

addition and not just a finite segment of it.

Mackie also describes how if one were to have a proper understanding of

the principles cited in an infinite set theory this would show that there

was no contradiction in terms. This can be clearly demonstrated with

reference to Al Gauzali’s earlier example of the revolutions of Jupiter and

Saturn. In an infinite time span, a smaller number of revolutions, in the

case of Saturn, would equal the larger number of revolutions, in the case

of Jupiter, which is of course contradictory. However if one examines this

more closely one can see how there is no real contradiction. In order to

see this one must understand the relationship between two sets of criteria

for “smaller than” groups and “equal to” groups. When one considers a

“smaller than” group in a finite context one should see how the members

of this group can be matched on a one-one basis with a part of another

group .In contrast, in order for two groups to be equal, the members of

both groups must be equally correlated on a one-one basis. These terms

are mutually exclusive only when considering finite groups and not

infinite groups according to Mackie. As a result one can see how there is

no contradiction. However Mackie seems to miss the point again here. He

questions the logical consistency of an infinite set theory rather than

whether such a system could be instantiated in the real world. The real

issue is whether or not this system could be instantiated in the real world

which consequently would give rise to the absurdities found in such

examples as the Hilbert Hotel. However since an actual infinite does not

exist according to the second premise of the Kalam argument, such

absurdities do not arise, because only finite collections of things exist.

Mackie then questions the validity of the first premise of the

cosmological argument. He asks on what a priori grounds should one

accept that whatever begins to exist must have a cause for its existence.

For example he believes that the Big Bang may have had some physical

antecedent, despite there not being any scientific laws to date to explain

this phenomenon. However, as demonstrated earlier, the scientific model

of the Big Bang requires creation ex nihilo, since the universe contracted

down to a mathematical point of infinite density which is synonymous to

saying nothing. Mackie simply denies this model without supplying us

with any alternative. Other scientific models such as the oscillating model

have been proposed by scientists in order to explain the Big Bang, but

these have proven to be physically and observationally wrong. Since

Mackie cannot propose an alternative explanation, this objection appears

to be limited and purely negative in nature.

From earlier discussion one has seen how supporters of the Kalam

cosmological argument have appealed to conclusions drawn from the Big

Bang theory and the second law of the thermodynamic properties of the

universe in order to justify the second premise of their argument. This

however leaves the argument open to falsification. In order to falsify an

argument one takes a logical property of an empirical statement, in this

case the evidence from the Big Bang and laws of thermodynamics, and

either conduct a physical experiment or observation which would show

the assertion to be false. For instance, in order to show how a physical

law can be made falsifiable one only needs to show how it can be

logically possible that there could be an exception to the law and not to

show that it is physically possible to violate it, thus destroying its status

as a physical law. Since science is only provisional, one cannot rule out

the possibility that advances in this field could result in evidence that

would demonstrate, for instance how there could be a physical property

that existed before the Big Bang which would then provide an alternative

explanation for the existence of the universe other than God. If further

research in this field did cast doubt and thus falsify the second premise of

the argument, this in turn would undermine a person’s belief in God.

However, religious beliefs, unlike scientific evidence, are non-

provisional, and by suggesting that faith in God can be justified on the

basis of scientific evidence like the Big Bang, is to misunderstand the

nature of faith. According to Kierkegaard7, a leap in faith occurs when

one believes something despite the absence of available evidence. If one

decides to take a leap of faith, they go beyond their reason in order for

them to believe in something higher. Thus, according to Kierkegaard, it

does not matter if there was some empirical evidence that would run

contrary to the Kalam claim of the existence of God since faith in God is

a voluntary act of will. Bavink8 argues that a believers confidence in God

is not based upon arguments and proofs, for instance someone doesn’t

believe in God simply on the basis of the strength of argument forwarded

that he created the world. Scientific evidence, like the Big Bang theory,

and logical inferences, such as Hilbert’s Hotel, are not needed to

rationally justify a belief in God since it is a believers epistemic right to

believe in God despite the fact that there may be no arguments available

to support such a conclusion. This is because it dos not matter what

arguments one may use in justifying a belief in God since such arguments

will not allow one to come to knowledge about God. For a believer

knowledge in God should be presupposed, as in the Bible. Belief in the

existence of God should not need to have proofs but should be in the

same vein as belief in the self, other minds and the external world. Thus

one might say that an appeal to science may not strengthen or undermine

a person’s belief in God, but it could give the argument a lot more appeal

to those who are more sceptical in their beliefs, who believe that in order

7 Soren Kierkegaard, www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/kiekegaard, William McDonald8 The Doctrine of God, trans. William Hendriksen, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951. Translation of vol 2 of Bavink’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, p76

to fully justify a religious belief one must have sufficient reasons for it.

Such an appeal to science not only justifies the second premise of the

Kalam cosmological argument but can also be used to defend it in the

face of objection. Thus the scientific evidence and logical inferences the

argument can use make it more appealing for the sceptical non-believer.

The main problem with the Kalam cosmological argument is the final

premise, that the universe has a cause of its existence. The premise that

the universe has a cause of its existence does logically follow on from the

first and second premise, but why should one infer from this that the

cause was God. Craig argues that it must have been a personal creator on

the basis of the intuitive principle that in order for something to exist one

can infer that it has a cause of its existence. As a result this creator would

have to be self caused and timeless. If one applies Ockham’s Razor9,

which states how the best explanation for any phenomenon is the one

which introduces the fewest assumptions and rejects any explanation that

does not provide enough compelling reasons, to the Kalam cosmological

argument, then this would leave the sceptic with the possibilities that

either the universe was uncaused out of nothing, the universe must be

eternal or that an eternal being created the universe. In light of the

discussed scientific evidence concerning the Big Bang and second law of

thermodynamics, and the logical inferences such as Hilbert’s Hotel, one

would reject the idea that the universe was eternal under the Ockham’s

Razor criteria. As a result one has to either accept that the universe was

uncaused from nothing or that it was caused by a self caused being. The

scientific explanation for the Big Bang could be offered as evidence for

either conclusion.

Consequently one has to decide which is the best and most coherent

explanation, whether the universe sprung into existence from nothing in 9 History of Western Philosophy, Franciscan Schoolmen chapt, p462-463, Bertrand Russell, Gorge Allen and Unwin LTD 1961

the event of the Big Bang or whether a self caused being brought the

universe into existence in the form of the Big Bang. It seems intuitively

wrong to think that finite matter can create itself out of nothing. For

example one does not expect a bear to spring into existence uncaused. As

a result, from our intuitions one may make a leap of faith, suspending our

reasoning for something higher, and accept the theistic position that the

universe was caused by an uncaused timeless being, God.

Swinburne10 offers an inductive variant that supports the conclusion

drawn from the application of Ockham’s Razor to the Kalam

cosmological argument. Swinburne asserts that the probability of the

universe existing without a God is lower than the existence of the

universe with a God. For Swinburne a hypothesis is made stronger by

evidence that would have been more likely to occur if the hypothesis had

been true than if such a hypothesis had been false. Since the hypothesis

that the universe was self- caused without a God is less probable than

with the existence of God, Swinburne concludes that the existence of God

is the most possible and simplest explanation for the cause of the

universe.

In conclusion, I consider that the Kalam version of the cosmological

argument is a strong argument for the existence of God. Having appealed

to scientific research, such as the Big Bang theory, and logical inference,

for instance the Hilbert Hotel example, the argument seems to be justified

in establishing the impossibility of an actual infinite and the existence of

a beginning of the universe. From the discussion of the various criticisms

including Mackie’s which revolves around the misunderstanding of the

nature of an infinite and the universe originating by itself in a finite time

space, and how the appeal to science leaves the argument open to

falsification, one has seen how the former is unsatisfactory on many 10 Cosmological Argument, Swinburne, inductive cosmological argument part, www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#5

levels and the latter is reconcilable on the basis that it makes the

argument more attractive for the sceptical non believer. Mackie’s critique

is unsatisfactory because he seems to not only misunderstand the nature

of an infinite with regard to the context of the argument but also fails to

offer another model explaining the phenomena of the universe. Having

applied Ockham’s Razor to the argument, this leaves one with the

possibilities that either the universe is eternal, the universe was uncaused

from nothingness, or that the universe was created by an eternal being. I

conclude that it is a more intuitive and coherent explanation to say that

the universe was caused by an uncaused God. To reject this conclusion

would be to say that this universe was either eternal, which seems

implausible from the scientific evidence one has available to them, or that

finite matter could create itself out of nothing from which consciousness

would then arise. The explanation of God being the cause of the universe

is far more probable and simple than to say that finite matter could create

itself out of nothing, as one has seen from Swinburne’s inductive variant,

and consequently satisfies the criteria presented to us by Ockham’s

Razor. As a result I think that the Kalam cosmological argument provides

a strong case for the existence of God.

Bibliography:

G.W Leibniz, “the Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason,” in

Leibniz Selections, edited by Philip Wiener, The Modern Students Library,

New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951, p.527

J.L. Mackie, Critique of the Cosmological Argument, Philosophy of Religion

selected readings, Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach,

David Basinger, Third Edition, page 223-231, Oxford University Press

William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Philosophy of

Religion selected readings, Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce

Reichenbach, David Basinger, Third Edition, page 210-222,

Oxford University Press

Richard J. Gott, et al, “Will the Universe Expand Forever?” Scientific

American, 1976, page 65

Fred Hoyle, From Stonehenge to Modern Cosmology, San Francisco: W.H.

Freeman, 1972, page 36

P.C.W. Davies, The Physics of Time Asymmetry, London: Surry University

Press, 1974, p.104

Soren Kierkegaard, www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/kierkegaard, William

McDonald

The Doctrine of God, trans. William Hendriksen, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,

1951. Translation of vol 2 of Bavink’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, p76

History of Western Philosophy, Franciscan Schoolmen chapt, p462-463,

Bertrand Russell, Gorge Allen and Unwin LTD 1961

Cosmological Argument, Swinburne, inductive cosmological argument part,

www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#5