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Philosophical Review In Mendel's Mirror: Philosophical Reflections on Biology by Philip Kitcher Review by: Michael Weisberg The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 419-423 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30043685 . Accessed: 28/06/2014 08:33 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 91.213.220.138 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:33:33 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

In Mendel's Mirror: Philosophical Reflections on Biologyby Philip Kitcher

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Page 1: In Mendel's Mirror: Philosophical Reflections on Biologyby Philip Kitcher

Philosophical Review

In Mendel's Mirror: Philosophical Reflections on Biology by Philip KitcherReview by: Michael WeisbergThe Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 419-423Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30043685 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 08:33

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to The Philosophical Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.138 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:33:33 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: In Mendel's Mirror: Philosophical Reflections on Biologyby Philip Kitcher

BOOK REVIEWS

graph were more widely accessible. He rightly complains that ethical discourse about technology in our country is weak. I wonder, though, whether the tone he takes in some essays might have the opposite effect from the one he desires, as he sometimes leans in the direction of moral skepticism and cultural disgust. Such overtones are unlikely to encourage those still clutching to the hope of moral progress. But, to repeat, these are not substantial criticisms; they raise more rhetorical than philosophical worries.

In his essay on the city, Jamieson notes that utopian thinkers "are the con- science of the ages speaking to us now." These words apply equally well to our

author.Jamieson is a conscience of our age whose vision for common discourse and moral progress deserves wide discussion.

North Carolina State University

GARY L. COMSTOCK

The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3 (July 2005)

Philip Kitcher, In Mendel's Mirror: Philosophical Reflections on Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xv, 385.

In Mendel's Mirror is a collection of Philip Kitcher's wide-ranging essays in the

philosophy of biology. These essays span many of the major topics in the field, such as the units of selection problem, the nature of species, and the notion of

biological function. Some of the essays are already well known and familiar to all students of the subject. Others are less well known, but hopefully their inclu- sion in this collection will facilitate their becoming more widely appreciated. The volume illustrates the ways in which the conceptual tools of contemporary philosophy of science can help elucidate, untangle, and clarify conceptually murky issues, especially when deployed by a philosopher as skilled as Kitcher.

It is hard to make nontrivial generalizations about a volume of this scope and depth. However, there are several philosophical threads running through In Mendel's Mirror Taken together, these threads exemplify Kitcher's distinc- tive contribution to philosophy of biology.

The first thread is a series of arguments against biological reductionism. In "1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences," Kitcher argues that molecular

genetics lacks the language and conceptual apparatus required to reduce clas- sical genetics. Key classical concepts such as gene cannot be expressed in the

language of molecular biology, thus, Kitcher argues, they cannot be reduced.

Returning to the same topic fifteen years later in "The Hegemony of Molecular

Biology," Kitcher reasserts his antireductionist position and uses this analysis to assess the claims of enthusiastic proponents of the Human Genome Project. Unlike some philosophers, Kitcher thinks that our inability to reduce classical

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genetics is an acceptable state of affairs and that the elimination of classical

genetics is not demanded by the advancement of science. Another theme running throughout several essays is a commitment to what

Kitcher calls "pluralistic realism." This seems to be the simultaneous defense of

pragmatism and realism about kinds, functions, and causes. Kitcher's treat- ment of the units of selection problem in "The Return of the Gene" (jointly authored with Kim Sterelny) exemplifies this commitment. The essay begins by offering responses to some of the most famous objections to genic selection- ism. Kitcher then goes on to argue that there is not a unique correct way to rep- resent how natural selection gives rise to evolutionary change. Although he defends a version of genic selectionism, he does so on the basis of its generality and unity, not on its unique ability to represent the causal structure of selec- tion. Kitcher believes that there are several equally acceptable treatments of selection (individual, genic, and group) that are often available for a particular episode of selection.

Kitcher's treatment of species concepts is quite similar. In "Species" and "Some Puzzles about Species," he disputes proposals made by David Hull, Michael Ghieslin, and many practicing biologists, arguing that since "our

objective interests may be diverse ... the patterning of nature generated in dif- ferent areas of biology may cross-classify the constituents of nature" (128). In other words, different biological activities may lead us to classify species in dif- ferent sorts of ways. Kitcher does not think that this leads to the cynical conclu- sion that in systematics, anything goes. Instead, he believes that we should be

equally realist about a number of different classification schemes. Different

types of investigations demand different species concepts. As long as each con-

cept "identifies a relationship among organisms that is intrinsically of biologi- cal interest," (124) there is no reason to reach the skeptical conclusion that

biological classification is merely a matter of convenience. Evolutionists and

paleontologists will want to adopt historical conceptions of species, while phys- iologists require structural conceptions.

This helps us to understand why Kitcher calls his position "pluralistic real- ism." These approaches embody a pluralist commitment; they suggest that the best way to construct a representation depends on the needs and goals of the scientist. However, the approaches are also realist because they acknowledge that each type of representation picks out a different but equally real structure in the world.

Kitcher's defense of pluralistic realism is quite plausible, but I must confess a certain lingering skepticism. Philosophers interested in puzzles about species and the units of selection owe a great debt to Kitcher, who was among the first

philosophers to make this kind of pluralism a live option. But Kitcher's essays do not contain a completely satisfying response to philosophers such as Elliott

Sober, who argue that natural selection has a model-independent causal struc- ture that ought to be captured in models of selection. Kitcher has showed us

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how to be pluralistic if we share his metaphysical starting point. But I do not see how his arguments would convince someone starting from a richer ontology, like Sober-someone who thought that natural selection really had a Newto- nian force-like causal structure or that the biological world consisted of a single set of natural kinds that carved nature at its joints.

The final theme running through these essays is what Kitcher has called else- where "local critique."I This is the idea that instead of looking for an underly- ing conceptual or philosophical mistake made by your opponent, you should

engage with her arguments one by one. "Battling the Undead" is a good exam-

ple of this method. The essay is an examination of Richard Lewontin's critiques of mainstream theories about development and genetic determinism. Kitcher

opens the essay by noting the ways that Lewontin develops his critiques; Lewontin tries to find the underlying conceptual or political mistake that leads to mistaken conclusions. Kitcher thinks that a philosopher of biology ought to use a more narrowly defined strategy. When arguing against creationists,

genetic determinists, anti-egalitarians, or overly adaptationist biologists, one should apply local critique-take on the arguments one at a time. Kitcher prac- tices what he preaches; his discussions of evolutionary psychology, creationism, and genetic determinism patiently expose the errors of his opponents point by point.

For example, Kitcher diagnoses problems in contemporary evolutionary psychology in "Pop Sociobiology Reborn: The Evolutionary Psychology of Sex and Violence," coauthored with A. Leah Vickers. The essay concerns what Kitcher calls "pop sociobiology with a fig leaf' (334), the evolutionary psychol- ogy of human sexual preferences (David Buss) and rape (Randy Thornhill and

Craig Palmer). Kitcher concludes that these, as well as many other accounts

given by evolutionary psychologists, fail to meet the evidential standards

required by evolutionary biology. He quite convincingly illustrates the prob- lematic tendency of Buss, Thornhill, and Palmer to rely on anecdotal evidence, to fail to consider plausible alternative hypotheses, and to work with an

extremely impoverished conception of the environments in which our ances- tors found themselves.

One must admire Kitcher's disciplined adherence to the strategy of local cri-

tique. Surely his position ought to be the default-too many critiques of evo-

lutionary psychology, sociobiology, and even creationism suffer from obsessive attention paid to the underlying motivation of the proponents without suffi- cient attention paid to the details of the arguments actually raised. But perhaps Lewontin and his allies also make useful observations when they look for the motivations underlying argument forms that arise again and again in the course of inquiry. Even if Kitcher's approach to responding to these mistakes

ought to be our first and most central strategy, Lewontin may still be right when

he claims that the same mistake made again and again is likely to be the result

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of a common misunderstanding engendered by deep conceptual problems at the foundation of a discipline.

Although a main focus of this volume is on conceptual issues in contempo- rary evolutionary theory, Kitcher has long argued that philosophers of biology should expand their attention beyond this one small part of biology. Kitcher's earliest work in this direction was the aforementioned "1953 and All That," an

essay about classical and molecular genetics. He has also made important con- tributions to the study of Darwin's methods, the possibility of using evolution-

ary theory to give a new foundation to ethics, and the struggle against defenders of "creation science."

One of the first essays in this collection is "Darwin's Achievement," Kitcher's reconstruction of the central arguments in On The Origin of Species. Earlier reconstructions of Darwin's methodology emphasized the deductive structure of these arguments. These reconstructions were employed as evidence that Darwin employed a hypothetico-deductive strategy to confirm his hypotheses about common origins, descent with modification, and natural selection. Kitcher argues that this sort of reconstruction rests on "very generous assess- ments of observational consequences obtainable from Darwin's theory" (81). As an alternative, he proposes that Darwin's theory is "an explanatory device, aimed at answering some very general families of questions" (49). Conse-

quently, Darwin's confirmatory strategy is best understood as one of inference to the best explanation and not hypothetico-deductivism, contrary to earlier accounts. For students of Darwinian methods, Kitcher's essay raises fertile

questions about hypothesis formation and confirmation, which have received

surprisingly little attention in the subsequent literature on Darwin's methods. This essay is also important for those who wish to understand the development of Kitcher's more general philosophical positions. His analysis of Darwin's methods in this essay seems to provide a template for his analyses of confirma- tion and scientific progress in his book The Advancement of Science.

In Mendel's Mirror also chronicles Kitcher's contribution to discussions about the relationship between evolutionary biology and ethics. From Darwin's gen- eration onward, philosophers and biologists have been tempted by the pros- pect of evolutionary ideas changing, overthrowing, or providing a new foundation for ethical theory. For example, biologist E. O. Wilson says that the time has come to take ethics out of the hands of the "merely wise."2 Respond- ing to Wilson and Michael Ruse in "Four Ways of Biologicizing Ethics," Kitcher

argues that evolutionary studies of human beings are not the sort of things that could "lead us to revise our system of ethical principles by teaching us new fun- damental ethical principles." However, Kitcher acknowledges that evolution-

ary theory may "teach us facts about human beings that, in conjunction with

moral principles that we already accept, can be used to derive normative prin- ciples that we had not yet appreciated" (322).

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The collection closes with a recent essay that returns to Kitcher's earliest contribution to philosophy of biology. In "Born-Again Creationism," Kitcher takes on the so-called Intelligent Design Movement spearheaded by Philip Johnson and Michael Behe. Combining razor sharp criticism with an equally razor sharp wit, Kitcher chronicles how Behe,Johnson, and their philosophical allies fail to articulate specific proposals about how intelligent design is sup- posed to work, despite the surface sophistication of their ideas. For example, commenting on Behe's discussion of the molecular basis of cilia and flagella locomotion, Kitcher argues that Behe mistakes what we do not know with what we cannot know. Although it is true that we cannot give a plausible evolutionary account of flagella locomotion at present, this is due to our relative lack of

understanding of the details of flagella locomotion itself. To give an evolution-

ary explanation, "our ideas should be educated by the details of how the flagel- lum is actually assembled and the loci in the bacterial genome that are involved. Until we know these things, it's quite likely that any efforts to describe

precursors or intermediates will be whistling in the dark" (361). In Mendel's Mirror is an excellent collection, containing many essays already

considered to be classics and many more that deserve to be. Careful study of this volume will reward those new to the subject as well as seasoned veterans.

MICHAEL WEISBERG

University of Pennsylvania

Notes

1 Philip Kitcher, "Evolutionary Theory and the Social Uses of Biology," Biology and Philosophy 19 (2004): 1-15.

2E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 7.

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