Social, Ethical, Political, and Policy Implications Of Interpretations Of Islam’s Foundational Text: The Qur’an

REPORT OF THE SYMPOSIUM ORGANIZED BY THE NYU CENTER FOR DIALOGUES: ISLAMIC WORLD–U.S.–THE WEST

New York University’s Casa Italiana November 10, 2010

Director’s PrefaceIn November 2010 when the NYU Center for Dialogues convened its symposium on the “Social, Ethical, Political and Policy Implications of Interpretations of Islam’s Foundational Text: the Qur’an,” I could not have predicted the powerful transformations that have taken place across the Muslim world these past few months. As these events continue to unfold, analysts and journalists have repeatedly raised the question: what role will Islam play? How will Islam influence the governments and societies that blossom from these revolutions? These questions relate in a direct way to the central question and challenge of the symposium: what are the practical implications of contemporary interpretations of Islam’s foundational text, the Qur’an?

Believed by Muslims to have been revealed by God to the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century, the Qur’an constitutes the root of Islam — the foundation upon which the Islamic religion (as it is practiced in various forms today) was built. Far from being a purely religious text, the Qur’an lays the groundwork for ethical, political, and social foundations of society. Unlike Catholicism, there is no one person in Islamic tradition with the ultimate authority to mandate how the Qur’an and its ethical, political, and social injunctions should be interpreted. Religious schools of thought that vary widely in their theoretical and theological approaches to the Qur’an have been established throughout the Muslim world, not only across the Arab Middle East and North Africa, but also in Central Asia, South Asia, sub–Saharan Africa, and China.

Despite the relative freedom of interpretation permitted by the lack of a central authority, various groups and individuals throughout history have tried to claim that authority and have prohibited different interpretations, sometimes violently. Today Muslims and non–Muslims alike are faced with the challenge of Muslim fundamentalists who claim to speak on behalf of all Muslims and who view the world through the narrow lens of an interminable clash of civilizations between the West and an Islamic East.

The symposium on the “Social, Ethical, Political and Policy Implications of Interpretations of Islam’s Foundational Text: the Qur’an” was conceived as a forum for progressive Muslim intellectuals to discuss and disseminate their methods of interpreting the Qur’an and reflect upon the positive, practical implications of their work. By initiating an intra–Muslim debate, the NYU Center for Dialogues sought to illuminate the work of a number of innovative Muslim scholars who have found new and constructive meanings in the Qur’an that widen the traditional boundaries of Islamic exegesis.

The symposium’s agenda was divided into two sessions. In the first session, participants discussed the critical differentiation between normative Islam and historical Islam, as well as the methods they employ in interpreting the Qur’an as a historical text. This discussion naturally segued into the second session, in which participants explained how they apply contemporary interpretations of the Qur’an to challenges facing the Muslim world today — challenges such as curricular reform and Islamic fundamentalism.

There are several individuals who deserve acknowledgement and thanks; this symposium would not have been possible without them.

First and foremost I would like to thank the symposium’s participants: Robert Lee, Professor of Political Science at Colorado College (United States); Andreas Christmann, Senior Lecturer of Contemporary Islam at the University of Manchester (United Kingdom); Abdelmajid Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis (Tunisia); Adel Rifaat and Bahgat El Nadi, political scientists published together under the pseudonym “Mahmoud Hussein” (Egypt); Amin Abdullah, Professor of Islamic Studies at Universitas Islam Negari Sunan Kalijaga (Indonesia); Dale Eickelman, Professor of

Anthropology and Human Relations at Dartmouth College (United States); and Stefan Wild, Professor Emeritus of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies at the University of Bonn (Germany). The participants’ outstanding presentations at the symposium are evidence of their rigorous research, and their firm commitment to both challenge previously held assumptions and broaden the field of Qur’anic interpretation for a new generation.

As the idea of this symposium was forming in my head, I was fortunate to have the encouragement of Ambassador Heidrun Tempel, then Special Representative for Dialogue among Civilizations at the German Federal Foreign Office and now Deputy Head of the German Mission in Jakarta. It was through Ambassador Tempel that we were able to secure the generous grant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, which made this symposium possible. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Ambassador Tempel and to her colleagues: Stephen Buchwald, Julia Fugel, Elmar Jakobs, and the rest of the staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations.

Finally, I would like to thank the indefatigable NYU Center for Dialogues staff, most especially Helena Zeweri, until recently an Assistant Research Scholar; Reema Hijazi, Assistant Research Scholar; Joanna Taylor, Junior Research Scholar; and Liz Behrend, Consultant. They all dedicated a significant amount of time during and after office hours to ensure the success of this symposium and I am very grateful for their outstanding work and proud to have them as colleagues. Finally, as has been the case with many other reports produced by the Center since its inception eight years ago, my thanks go to Shara Kay. We are fortunate to have her as our editorial advisor and we appreciate her intellectual and stylistic rigor.

The publication of this report comes at a significant moment in the history of the Muslim world. Over the past two months revolutions have overthrown old, despotic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and there have been widespread protests across the region demanding change and reform. As is already being seen with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Islam will be an integral part of the discussion as these countries form new governments. We hope that this report, in its various translations, will serve as a valuable resource for the region’s emerging leaders and policymakers, as well as its citizens, and will aid the region in deciding how to best consider Islam in relation to government and civic life.

March 3, 2011

Mustapha TliliFounder and DirectorCenter for Dialogues: Islamic World–U.S.–The WestNew York University

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe international symposium on the “Social, Ethical, Political, and Policy Implications of Islam’s Foundational Text: the Qur’an” was convened on November 10, 2010 in New York, New York, by the New York University Center for Dialogues: Islamic World – U.S. – the West. This symposium brought together an international group of scholars to participate in an intra–Muslim debate on the methods and practical implications of contemporary interpretations of the Qur’an.

Founder and Director of the NYU Center for Dialogues, Mustapha Tlili, opened the symposium by reminding the audience of the troubling Islamophobic events, in particular the demonstrations against the “ground–zero mosque,” that shook New York and the United States in the final months of 2010. Now more than ever, Tlili stated, there is a need for intra–Muslim debate and dialogue with the two–fold aim of challenging the misconceptions of Islam in the West and encouraging Muslim–majority countries to face the problematic realities of their own societies.

Before the start of the first session, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought, Abdelmajid Charfi, briefly reflected on the important legacy of Algerian scholar Mohamed Arkoun who had intended to participate in the symposium but sadly passed away in the fall of 2010.

The participants in the first session explored the critical distinction between normative Islam and historical Islam, and discussed the methods they employ to interpret the Qur’an as a historical text.

Professor of Political Science at Colorado College, Robert Lee, presented the ideas of the late Mohamed Arkoun. According to Lee, Arkoun was primarily opposed to what he titled “Islamic Reason,” or the monopolistic hold of Muslim governments, theulama, and Islamist movements on Qur’anic interpretation. In contrast to these groups, Arkoun believed that the Qur’an is an open and dynamic text and he argued that it should be submitted to analysis from a variety of different literary, anthropological, sociological, and historical perspectives. For Arkoun, the entirety of the Qur’an can not be understood as containing a singular meaning. Instead, the “truth” of the Qur’an can be found in the “plurality of meanings” yielded by critical interpretations of the text.

Following Professor Lee’s presentation, Senior Lecturer on Contemporary Islam at the University of Manchester, Andreas Christmann, presented the ideas of Muhammad Shahrur who was unable to attend the symposium for health reasons. Often compared to Protestant reformer Martin Luther, Shahrur argues in his work that political leaders and the ulama have monopolized interpretations of the Qur’an and have used religious institutions and practice in a way that poses the “least resistance to political tyranny.” However, according to Christmann, Shahrur firmly believes that Islam can and should be reformed and that it can provide a necessary “third way” between radical fundamentalism and secular nationalism. He envisions an Islam that is entirely depoliticized, but forms the moral force of politics and society as a sort of “civil religion.”

The last speaker in the first session, Professor Emeritus Abdelmajid Charfi, approaches the Qur’an from a historical perspective. He argued that the historical context in which the Qur’an is read and interpreted has immense implications for the ways the text is understood. For Charfi, the differing interpretations that have emerged throughout history necessarily suggest that the Qur’an does not and could never have one singular meaning or “truth.“ Charfi summarized his subsequent arguments in three main points:

Muslims interpreting the Qur’an today need to acknowledge the limits imposed by traditional exegesis. The relationship between exegesis and jurisprudence should be reversed. In other words, traditional exegesis

should not inform contemporary interpretations of the Qur’an, but instead contemporary interpretations of the Qur’an should pave the way for new forms of exegesis.

Finally, Charfi argued against a strictly linear interpretation of the Qur’an as the revelations were assembled according to length and not according to a continuous narrative.

The panelists in the second session focused on how they combine theory with practice to address challenges the Muslim world is facing today.

Political scientist and author, Adel Rifaat presented on behalf of “Mahmoud Hussein,” the pseudonym under which he publishes with co–author Bahgat El Nadi. In their most recent book Penser le Coran (Grasset et Fasquelle, 2009), the authors seek to expose the historicity of the Qur’an using the original sacred texts, especially the testimonies of the Companions of the Prophet, in order to prevent radical fundamentalists and other literalists from claiming that historicity is imposed on the Qur’an by foreign intellectual traditions. Rifaat cited three main examples of this historicity:

The Qur’an distinguishes God from his Word. God is eternal but his Word is time–bound and dependant upon the context in which it is revealed.

God is constantly in dialogue with the Prophet and the Companions and He allows for explanation based on the context of the situation.

Finally, God does not weigh each of his revelations equally. What God says in one verse is occasionally abrogated in a later verse.

Amin Abdullah was unfortunately unable to attend the symposium because his request for an entry visa to the United States was rejected. His ideas were presented by a member of the NYU Center for Dialogues staff. As a professor of Islamic studies at the Universitas Negari Islam Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta, Abdullah has spearheaded many curricular reform efforts including moving oversight of his Islamic University from the Ministry of Religion to the Ministry of Education when he was the university’s president. Abdullah explained that many Islamic universities in Indonesia are now required to integrate multidisciplinary approaches into their courses, including using social science methodologies to interpret the Qur’an and other sacred texts. He acknowledged, however, that many departments still remain rooted in traditional methodologies and practices.

Abdullah argued that the main project for the field of Islamic Studies today is eliminating misunderstanding and mutual suspicion between Islamic Studies, Islamic Thought and Islamic Religious Knowledge.

In his closing remarks, Mustapha Tlili underscored the need for a stronger dialogue between the West and the Muslim world. He encouraged universities and scholars in the West to realize the implications of this dialogue and to engage their peers in the Muslim world in order to continue the long, and too often obscured, history of intellectual cross–fertilization between the Muslim world and the West.

OPENING SESSIONOpening Remarks: Mustapha Tlili, Founder and Director, NYU Center for Dialogues (U.S.)Mustapha Tlili, the symposium’s organizer, welcomed participants and remarked on the particular importance and timeliness of the event. This past summer, the Qur’an was to be burned by an obscure pastor of a non–denominational church in Florida until President Obama and other U.S. administration officials personally intervened. Even more recently, New York City witnessed huge demonstrations for and against the so–called “Ground Zero” mosque. Misunderstandings about the Muslim faith abound in the West. Meanwhile, Muslims themselves, in the U.S. in particular, do not seem to agree on what being Muslim is about. Those who speak in their name are often driven by a quest for power, and project conflicting images of Islam and different understandings of its holy texts.

The absence of a central authority in Islamic theology and tradition heightens the anxieties of Muslims and non–Muslims alike regarding Islam, Tlili explained. History tells us, however, that the search for a universally recognized truth has been part of Islamic tradition since the advent of the faith more than 14 centuries ago. To Tlili’s mind, if you strip Islamic history of its competition forpolitical power, what remains can all be articulated in terms of interpretation of the faith, its tenets, and its underpinning fundamental texts — above all, the Qur’an.

What makes the current moment unique, Tlili continued, is the weight and challenge of globalization, which requires the Muslim world to confront its realities — to look in the mirror of modernity and answer the question of how to be Muslim in the 21st century. In the “flat world” of today — in contrast to the times of Al–

Mu’tazila 1 and Al–Muwahiddin 2 — information is transmitted globally in an instant. The Muslim world can no longer hide certain truths, he said, about its lack of economic development, education, women’s rights, freedom of expression, rule of law, and regard for our shared humanity.Tlili claimed that while Islam may have a bad name in today’s world, it’s not all the fault of its enemies. Islam, for him, is what Muslims make it to be and, thus, the importance of this symposium: how we interpret the Qur’an is not simply a matter of piety. It has real implications on how Muslim–majority societies, whether those of yesterday or today, build states, economies, ethical systems, legal systems, and relationships with the non–Muslim world. The science of Qur’anic interpretation has evolved through the centuries. But, if we admit that it, as any science, relies on intellectual tools and categories, we should not — Tlili said — hesitate to apply the modern human and social sciences to its interpretation. In fact, this is, according to Tlili, the most important challenge that the Muslim world faces today.

Tlili then paused to mourn the deaths of two major thinkers who had planned to attend the symposium: the first, his former teacher, dear friend, and colleague, Mohamed Arkoun (1928–2010), who passed away two months ago, and the second, the other giant of modern Islamic thought, Professor Nasr Abu Zayd (1943–2010), who passed away last spring. Tlili hoped the symposium would pay homage to their lives, their intellectual struggles, and to the extraordinary importance of the body of rigorous research they left behind. He also acknowledged two other important absences: the Syrian thinker, Muhammad Shahrur, author of the seminal book, The Book and the Qur’an: A Contemporary Reading, who was prevented from coming for health reasons, and Mohammad Amin Abdullah, the eminent Indonesian scholar of Islam and of the Qur’an, who was denied an entry visa to the U.S.

Tlili concluded by stating that as intellectuals, the participants’ foremost duty was to rigorous and clear thought. Piety serves its purpose, he said, but critical intellect has a different function — one in which the sacred becomes an object for rigorous and clear examination. With everything that we know in the world today, must Islam be simply the Islam of piety? Or can it be the Islam to which Abdelmajid Charfi, Mahmoud Hussein, Amin Abdullah, Muhammad Shahrur, and the late Mohammed Arkoun and Nasr Abu Zayd apply the tools of critical thought? He submitted that this is the preeminent question facing the symposium and the Muslim world today.

In Memory of Mohamed ArkounAbdelmajid Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought, University of Tunis (Tunisia)

Dr. Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis (Tunisia), spoke in memory of Mohamed Arkoun as a respected colleague and valued friend. Charfi described his difficulty in preparing this speech, both because of the close nature of his friendship with Arkoun, and because of the erudition of Arkoun’s work.

Charfi knew Arkoun for four decades and they often met in Paris and at academic conferences in Europe and the Middle East. When Arkoun would visit Tunis, Charfi welcomed him as a houseguest. Drawn together by intellectual affinity and a shared love of long walks, they enjoyed frank discussions on a range of personal and professional matters. Charfi learned to recognize the fragility and anxiety Arkoun hid beneath his intellectual brilliance.

Charfi described how Arkoun’s background and personal experiences informed his friend’s academic perspective. Arkoun acquired French nationality after Algerian independence, when he was dismissed from his university post in Algeria on the grounds that his teaching was subversive. The benefit of this experience, Charfi postulated, was that it gave Arkoun the opportunity to combine intimate knowledge of both Islamic and Western cultures. Despite living in France, Arkoun always identified as Kabil, Algerian, and Maghrebi. Moreover, his encounters with authorities from the Front de Libération Nationale in Algeria taught him to remain aloof from political rhetoric. Instead, he adopted an overview of the problems in Maghrebi societies and sought to analyze their underlying causes. Because Arkoun avoided taking a public position on such

political matters, he was often reproached for lacking compassion. Yet, as Charfi witnessed, Arkoun was consumed by the topics he studied and believed that his work was capable of effecting change.

Charfi commented on the difficulty of discussing Arkoun’s work due to its richness and depth. Leaving more in–depth treatment to presenters later in the symposium, Charfi said he would limit his comments to a few aspects of Arkoun’s work. He first noted Arkoun’s brilliant speaking ability in three non–native languages: French, English, and Arabic, which he learned relatively late in life (at the age of 17). He then outlined Arkoun’s primary contributions to the history of Islamic thinking.

Above all, Charfi said, Arkoun was adept at deconstructing established dogmas and critiquing seemingly self–evident beliefs. Even if one disagrees with his concepts, or finds them destabilizing, one cannot remain untouched after reading an Arkoun text, Charfi observed, for Arkoun’s approach encourages readers to think critically for themselves.

Arkoun employed ideas from the modern social sciences and also developed his own concepts, many of which — Charfi said — have become indispensable for understanding religion in general and the Qur’an and Islam in particular. Some of these original concepts have been popularized, such as demythication,demystication and demytholigization, as well as unthought andunthinkable.3 Other concepts have met with objection. For example, Arkoun’s admonitions to transgress and displace certain theological constructs previously regarded as sacred have been widely resisted. Notably, Arkoun believed that religious texts must be re–interpreted in a new light to overcome the early official closing of the mushaf — the standardized collection of Qur’anic verses in a single volume.Charfi concluded by summarizing the implications of Arkoun’s approach beyond its importance to Islamic studies alone. Arkoun’s assessment of the need to criticize and question everything is relevant, Charfi said, in a modern world characterized by dehumanization and the creation of docile consumers. Regardless of whether we agree with Arkoun’s own ideas, he continued, believers and nonbelievers alike must take responsibility for developing their own intellectual and spiritual potential. Charfi suggested that this is where Arkoun has often been misunderstood. Olivier Carré, for example, compared Arkoun to Sayyid Qutb in his “fundamentalist” fixation on original texts and in his claims about the performative nature of prophetic religious discourse.4 Indeed, both Qutb and Arkoun see the Qur’an as unique in being highly performative and all–encompassing. However, Carré attacked Arkoun for rejecting positive rationalism and questioning the original text as a product and source of religion.

SESSION I — Normative Islam versus Historical Islam: A Critical Distinction for Our Times and the Modern Epistemological Tools that Make it PossibleTlili introduced the session, crediting modern epistemologicaltools with making possible the critical distinction between normative and historical Islam, a distinction found in the work of both Arkoun and Charfi. Tlili introduced Robert Lee, Professor ofPolitical Science at Colorado College, as eminently qualified to present Arkoun’s work. Lee is immersed in the intellectual world of Islamic civilization, Middle Eastern societies and Islamic intellectual movements. From this perspective, and as a translator of Arkoun’s work, he has much to say about Arkoun.

SESSION I — The Ideas of Mohamed Arkoun:Robert Lee, Professor of Political Science, Colorado College (U.S.)

Lee began by claiming that he was ill–suited to speak on Arkoun’s behalf. As a student of the politics of the Middle East, he said, he lacked the insight to Arkoun’s work that philosophers, anthropologists, semioticians and historians of Islam have. However, he has read much of Arkoun’s writing, heard him

lecture, translated one of his books, written about the political implications of his work, and enjoyed his friendship.

Lee defended Arkoun against claims that he was an uncommitted scholar; despite Arkoun’s postmodernist terminology, his passion and the volume of his output belied a deeply felt commitment.

Lee explained Arkoun’s opposition to what he called “Islamic Reason,” the application of methodologies, based on Greek logic, which contributed to rigid orthodoxies in Islam. Arkoun decried the monopolization of religious interpretation by modern governments, the ulama — Muslim leaders classically trained in Qur’anic interpretation — and Islamist movements, all in the service of their respective political projects. Though he sympathized with reformers, he also criticized them for failing to address the root of the problem: the repression of innovative thought in the Muslim world. Because of these positions, some perceived Arkoun to be against Islam itself, and few Muslim–majority countries welcomed him to speak or sell his books.

It is more difficult to understand what Arkoun was for than what he was against, Lee said. Lee believed him to be an idealist, motivated by faith in the truth of his ideas and in their ability to resurrect a unified Muslim consciousness, or perhaps even a unified human consciousness.

Arkoun expressed this idea through the term remembrer, which Lee translated as “putting back together.” Arkoun hoped his ideas could help make the “Muslim consciousness” whole again, and inclusive of all believers. Arkoun extended his inclusiveness to the “Peoples of the Book”—meaning Muslims, Jews, and Christians—who he saw as fundamentally united in belief.

Asking how Arkoun’s treatment of the Qur’an fit into his objective of “putting back together” Islam, Lee pointed to the critical distinction Arkoun made between the prophetic moment of Qur’anic revelation, and the ensuing compilation of the mushaf, or Closed Official Corpus (in Arkoun’s terminology). Because of the gap between revelation and text, Arkoun approached the Qur’anic text as a literary document to be analyzed with modern interpretive tools, in order to remembrer the truth of the prophetic moment that preceded it.

Lee used two examples of Arkoun’s exegesis to illustrate his application of theory in practice: the Fatiha—the statement of faith that begins the Qur’an—and sura 18 (The Cave).

Summarizing Arkoun’s reading of the Fatiha, Lee emphasized his multilayered analysis. Arkoun applied linguistic, historical, and anthropological analyses to understand the language of the text, its changing interpretations over time, and the society in which it was revealed. Arkoun concluded that the text holds a plurality of equally valid meanings and that the “truth” is found in infinite plurality itself.

Lee’s second example, The Cave, yielded a different set of observations from Arkoun. Observing that the long sura does not cohere in theme or narrative, Arkoun problematized traditional readings, such as al–Tabari’s, which sought a unified interpretation. Arkoun blamed such forced readings on “Islamic Reason,” which sacrificed rich symbolism in favor of logic and rationale.

Based on his own readings of the text, Arkoun concluded that Qur’anic interpretation and its edifice of “Islamic Reason” have historically been related to worldly power struggles. By contextualizing those interpretations in history, without denying their validity, he sought to liberate the Qur’an.

Lee’s concluding remarks drew attention to the intellectual risks Arkoun took by attacking the inherited tradition of interpretation, as well as contemporary political regimes and movements that appropriate religion for ideological aims. Opposed to these abuses of Islam, Arkoun urged Muslims to challenge received knowledge and reopen the realm of ideas that Islamic tradition has rendered “unthought” and “unthinkable,” such as the distinction between the compiled Qur’an and the original revelation. Arkoun believed that, through reassembling (remembrer) Muslim tradition by accepting all its past and potential iterations, the Peoples of the Book and humanity as a whole could be brought together.

SESSION I — The Ideas of Muhammad Shahrur (Syria):

Andreas Christmann, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Islam, University of Manchester, U.K. (Germany)

Thanking Lee for an illuminating presentation, Tlili introduced Muhammad Shahrur as a thinker in the same spirit as Arkoun. Shahrur is the author of The Book and the Qur’an: A Contemporary Reading, one of the most widely disseminated—and controversial—contemporary books on interpreting the Qur’an. Though the Syrian thinker’s work represents a different school, Shahrur, like Arkoun, applies the tools of critical thought to the Qur’an and the tradition of interpretation. Tlili explained that Shahrur was unable to participate in the symposium because of health reasons, and invited Andreas Christmann, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Islam at the University of Manchester, to present Shahrur’s ideas in his place. A scholar of Islamic civilization and thought, Christmann published an English translation of Shahrur’s writings in 20095.Christmann opened his presentation with a brief overview of Muhammad Shahrur’s biography and professional background. Shahrur was not trained in traditional Islamic studies or in the modern study of Islam, but is a retired professor of soil engineering. His “layman’s” Qur’anic interpretations, which Christmann characterized as modern, scientific, liberal, and progressive, are therefore from a quite different perspective than the usual scholar’s.

Christmann contextualized Shahrur’s work in contemporary Islamic discourse by explaining that it responds to both radical Islamists, who politicize Islam for right–wing ideological aims, and to Leftists and secular–nationalists, who seek to eliminate religion from public life. Shahrur’s interpretations of the Qur’an offer a third alternative: an Islam that is progressive and liberal and which he believes should be the source of universal moral values and the foundation for political leadership.

Christmann proceeded to summarize Shahrur’s work by distilling it into ten theses, drawing a comparison to the Ninety–Five Thesesof Martin Luther and suggesting that Shahrur’s work has the potential to similarly reform institutionalized Islam. Christmann noted that many of Shahrur’s readings of the Qur’an entail redefining Islamic terms as universal ethical principals.

Christmann articulated a first thesis that he determined to be the most prioritized of Shahrur’s ideas: the necessity of separating state and ’religion,’ while reinvesting public life with ’Religion.’ Christmann used lowercase ’religion’ to denote Shahrur’s concept of historical and institutional Islam, as distinguished from ’Religion,’ capitalized, which refers to Shahrur’s ideal of a universal civic religion. The separation of state and ’religion,’ Christmann clarified, means that state authorities must not manipulate religion for their political agendas, nor should institutional religion co–opt state power in pursuit of theocracy. Shahrur is concerned that combining state and religion (din wa–dawla) obstructs religious freedom by privileging one religious faction over others. Yet he is equally concerned by the prospect of state without religion (dawla bidun din), which he believes leads to authoritarianism. Instead, the moral values of ’Religion,’ writ large, should reconnect state and society.

The second thesis Christmann enumerated was Shahrur’s observation that Historical Islam (’religion’) has been politicized and de–moralized by the ulama. To achieve Universal Islam (’Religion’), Shahrur contends, it must be de–politicized and re–moralized. According to Shahrur, the religious classes have interpreted Islamic beliefs and practices in ways that impose the least resistance to political tyranny and despotism. Christmann described Shahrur’s third thesis as his proposed solution: civil society and civil ’Religion.’ Objecting to Islamist calls for achieving the Islamization of Muslim society by collapsing public and private spheres, Shahrur emphasizes the importance of a sphere of civil society that can operate alongside private religion and public politics. This sphere will provide an ethical model that overshadows both state politics and private religion while allowing dissent and freedom of thought, speech and religion.

According to the fourth thesis Christmann described, in order to achieve this solution, religious reform must precede political reform. Because Shahrur believes that both politics without religion and politics with the current form of Islam lead to authoritarianism, religious reform must come first. Shahrur envisions religious reform as the reshaping of Islam into a ’civil religion,’ in which freedom of thought, human rights, democracy and social justice are valued as religious imperatives.

In his fifth thesis, Christmann clarifies that Shahrur does not view this religious reform as a new interpretation of Islam, but as the recuperation of essential Qur’anic principles that have been obscured by traditional Islam. Shahrur draws a distinction between the Islam passed down by religious scholars and the Islam found in the text of the Qur’an. This Universal Islam of the Qur’an, according to thesis six, does not include the sunna of the Prophet—stories of the Prophet’s life, apart from the prophecies that became the Qur’an. Shahrur sees Islam as a natural religion for all humankind, while the sunna are bound to a particular time and place that cannot be accepted as normative. Abandoning thesunna and relying only on the Qur’an, Shahrur concludes that Islam has only three, not five, pillars: belief in God, belief in the Last Day, and doing good work.

Christmann’s seventh thesis discussed the distinction Shahrur makes between general ’Religion,’ which is global, human and universal, and particular ’religion,’ which refers to specific culture– and context–bound institutional religions. According to Shahrur, the latter is against human instinct and therefore unsuitable for being the religion of public life. It is the former, therefore, that should be politicized and publicized.

Moving from the general to the specific, Christmann illustrated how Shahrur’s views on religion are reflected in his views on religious law, religious duties and jihad. His eighth thesis addressed Shahrur’s treatment of shari’a — Islamic law — which Christmann described as being at the heart of Shahrur’s reform project. Observing that shari’a law and hudud penalties are notfixed, Shahrur concludes that shari’a law only refers to theupper and lower limits of human legislation. Therefore, shari’acan and should — to Shahrur’s mind — be implemented everywhere, but should be limited to the requirement that human societies legislate laws to uphold justice, equality and morality. Specific laws, such as criminal, family and commercial law, should remain the provenance of parliamentary legislation.

In his ninth thesis, Christmann described Shahrur’s reinterpretation of the slogan, Al–’Amr bi al–Ma’ruf wa al–Nahy ’an al–Munkar, which is frequently used by Islamists to justify religious policing and their literal implementation of shari’a rules.6By contrast, Shahrur does not see the phrase as pertaining to individual conduct in matters regarding dress, but as a general imperative to care about the democratic norms and liberal values of civil religion in society; in short, as an obligation of good civil citizenship. He therefore places NGOs and human rights groups under this rubric.Lastly, Christmann’s tenth thesis articulated Shahrur’s interpretation of jihad as a non–violent fight against political tyranny, injustice and the oppression of human rights, as well as the duty to do charitable work for one’s family, neighborhood and society at large. Christmann summed it up as ’human rights jihad:’ the religious obligation of good civil citizenship. He further explained that Shahrur arrived at this view by reinterpreting not as martyrdom but as the process of giving witness. Jihad fi sabil Allah thus becomes a struggle “for the sake of God’s covenant with humankind,” rather than a military fight against kufr —disbelief.

SESSION I — Abdelmajid CharfiProfessor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis (Tunisia)

Tlili observed that Christmann’s presentation provided a natural transition to Abdelmajid Charfi’s intervention in the discourse on Qur’anic interpretation. Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought, University of Tunis, Charfi distinguishes between Islam as history and as message. That distinction is made possible, Tlili continued, by the application of critical tools borrowed from the humanities and social sciences. Both Arkoun and Shahrur arrive at the same distinction, yet Charfi has dedicated most of his scholarly work to this particular issue. Moreover, Tlili stressed, Charfi is the head of a school of thought and has mentored an entire generation of young scholars, equipping them with the tools of modern critique. Tlili concluded by highlighting Charfi’s important book, Islam Between Message and History (L’Islam entre le message et l’histoire) , translated into French in 2004 and English in 2009, and encouraging all to read it.  7 Charfi began by discussing his initial approach to the topic of the symposium. He first tried to list all the social, ethical andpolitical implications of interpreting the Qur’an as a foundational text. Yet he

immediately realized this approach was futile because Muslims living under different conditions necessarily approach the text from diverse perspectives. As an example, Charfi compared a wealthy young Malaysian man with a poor Nigerian, or a Saudi woman living in tribal conditions with an Iranian who has internalized the dominant ideology of the theocratic state. Each would clearly arrive at a different, even completely contradictory, interpretation. The only trait shared among them is the influence of a particular social, political, and cultural context. Based on this observation, Charfi revised his approach, deciding instead to focus on the historical and epistemological aspects of interpreting the Qur’an. With this framework, he sought to avoid time–bound polemics and encompass the entire range of interpretation, from extremism to mysticism.

Charfi pointed out that, while it may seem natural to acknowledge the external factors affecting interpretation, in fact this notion is informed by modern linguistics and semiotics. Moreover, he said, it contradicts traditional assertions about Qur’anic interpretation that are upheld by the overwhelming majority of Muslims today. He described his presentation as an attempt to reveal truths often overlooked and clarify the terms of debate about Qur’anic interpretation and its legitimacy.

Before delving into these “truths,” Charfi noted that it is first necessary to understand the role of the Qur’an in Islam and the history of Qur’anic exegesis. To illustrate the importance of the Qur’an, he contrasted it with the Bible in Catholicism. In Catholicism, church teachings inform the understanding of the gospels, whereas, in Islam, the Qur’anic text is sacred and preeminent. Charfi asked rhetorically: do modern approaches, such as those that use recently developed critical tools, therefore challenge the sacredness of the text or its interpretations? In answer, he argued that even traditional interpretation was based on contemporary culture and historical conditions, contending that modern readers are no different.

Taking a historical view, Charfi said, it is possible to see the two–stage process whereby Islam evolved from a spontaneous, oral, prophetic message into an institutionalized, dogmatic, and ritualized religion. Charfi said that this process was driven by theulama, whose readings of the Qur’an were inflected by their particular social position. Unlike the majority of Muslims, theulama were urban, had a direct relationship to the ruling power, and were heavily influenced by Greek philosophy. By the 11th or 12th Century, their Qur’anic readings, rooted in their specific class interests, were firmly established. This resulted, according to Charfi, in the formation of “Sciences of the Qur’an” — the opinions and methods of the ulama that go unquestioned as orthodoxy.

Charfi opined that the entrenchment of orthodox interpretations abrogated alternate readings. Becoming aware of the historical processes by which such interpretations evolved allows us to consider those other possibilities. Charfi outlined three such alternate readings: the Qur’an as created, the theory of revelation, and the idea that the Qur’anic message can stand alone without the hadith (stories of the Prophet’s life).

According to dominant Muslim belief, the Qur’an is the uncreated word of God. In an alternate interpretation, Charfi proposed the idea that the Qur’an is created, explaining that this view would acknowledge the text’s historical as well as divine dimensions. Rather than assuming the Qur’an exists outside of history, such a reading would allow Qur’anic moral injunctions to be understood in light of the particular historical context in which they were revealed.

The second idea, which Charfi described as having been rejected by orthodox belief, pertains to the theory of revelation. The Prophet is traditionally understood to have been a passive recipient of Gabriel’s message. An alternative, Charfi suggested, would be to understand his role as active, implying a stage of mediation between the direct word of God and the Qur’an. In another formulation, Charfi added, we might describe the Prophet’s role as expressing the divine message in human language.

Finally, Charfi described the possibility that the Qur’anic message is sufficient without the hadith of the Prophet. Though today this idea is widely considered heretical, it had proponents in earlyIslamic history. Charfi claimed that this idea was suppressed because the Qur’an did not provide an answer to every problem encountered in Muslim societies. Social institutions were formed to legislate for societies, and the hadith provided necessary religious legitimacy.

Charfi noted that these three positions can be considered from a perspective of modern rationality without being seen as an attack on the sacred nature of the Qur’an. Yet they are often suppressed for breaking with

orthodox belief. Thus, in Charfi’s view, they are fertile avenues of inquiry and consistent with the spirit of the text.

Charfi reasoned that the Qur’an should no longer be considered a text of law, but a text of faith. Indeed, despite traditional assertions to the contrary, Qur’anic commandments are primarily moral in nature and not legal. Legal commandments in the Qur’an, Charfi continued, responded to concrete problems in the contemporary social order. For example, when the Qur’an portrays the law of retaliation as necessary, it must be understood in a context in which the state did not have a monopoly on violence. Such commandments, Charfi claimed, are therefore not ahistorical or normative, and Muslims should remain free to legislate on the basis of general Qur’anic values rather than taking literally the specific cases depicted in the text.

In another example, Charfi pointed to the idea of shura, or consultation, which Islamists now consider a central Qur’anic concept. Historically, because there was a separation between the political and religious spheres, traditional exegetes did not treat shura as an imperative in governance. Charfi again pointed out that modern readings find in the text what traditional readings did not.

Charfi concluded by summarizing his four main points: first, that the Qur’an does not contain a single meaning, but addresses readers in all times and places with multiple meanings that renew themselves on the basis of changing historical conditions. Therefore, as Charfi himself demonstrated, readers should seek a hermeneutic interpretation rather than follow a single exegesis. Second, in order to free Qur’anic interpretation from the dogmatic straitjacket of orthodoxy, it is necessary to acknowledge the limits imposed on traditional exegesis by the “Sciences of the Qur’an.” Third, the relationship between exegesis and jurisprudence should be reversed. Instead of subjecting the Qur’an to theologically–based interpretations, as has traditionally been done, the text should be the basis for new theological constructs. Finally, the linear method of exegesis—reading the Qur’an from beginning to end—is neither rational nor necessary. suras were not compiled in order of revelation, but according to their length. Charfi elaborated on this point by dismissing all idealogical models of interpretation, including that of Shahrur. Instead, he admonished Muslims to find their own relationship with the Qur’an, a relationship that takes into account the interactions between sacred text, history, and truth. It is futile, he argued, to propose ideas that are only valid to Muslims today, as opposed to Muslims of the future, or, for that matter, the past. Muslims must struggle individually and collectively to find a peaceful relationship with the text. The implications will differ from traditional interpretations, which do not account for the logic of the Qur’an’s organization and its spiritual value.

SESSION I — Discussant: Stefan WildProfessor Emeritus of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies at the University of Bonn (Germany)

Tlili invited the session’s discussant, Stefan Wild, a major Arabist and scholar of Islamic thought in Germany, to comment on the diverse material presented by Lee, Christmann, and Charfi. Wild declined to summarize what he described as an already condensed series of papers on complex ideas. He instead limited his remarks to a few observations designed to facilitate discussion on the panel and with the audience.

Referring to the letter of invitation, which described the symposium as an “intra–Muslim debate,” Wild remarked that he was glad that criterion had not been rigidly enforced, therefore allowing his participation. Yet he acknowledged the importance of the sentiment behind it. However, he opined, dialogue andresearch are different things. While dialogue is important, it may have nothing to do with academic research and may even be in conflict with it.

Turning to the subject of Arkoun, Wild discussed a point of difference he had with the thinker. Wild explained his belief that Muslim scholars should first develop ideas of how to apply exegesis to real world matters such as gender issues and shari’abefore non–Muslims are invited to join the conversation. Arkoun disagreed, arguing that Muslim universities should start by incorporating non–Muslim ideas into their curricula. He advocated fervently for a joint effort by scholars from the West and theMuslim world. Wild justified his own

position by pointing to the crisis of organized religion in Europe and expressing sympathy with Muslim scholars who are reluctant to follow the path of Western intellectual history.

Wild then introduced the ideas of the late the Egyptian Qur’anic scholar, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, who Wild said would have loved to participate in the symposium. A friend and early follower of Abu Zayd’s, Wild discussed Abu Zayd’s importance in the history of Islamic exegesis and described the hardships Abu Zayd endured for his work, including being accused of heresy, having his marriage forcibly dissolved, and fleeing to exile. Wild described Abu Zayd’s approach to Qur’anic interpretation as a theory of communication based on sender (God), recipient (Prophet), and coded message (Qur’an).

Abu Zayd was famous for his attempt to create a humanistic hermeneutics of the Qur’an, preferring to examine not what a verse literally says but the direction in which it points. For example, where the text says women inherit half what men do, Abu Zayd saw a direction towards greater freedom and equality of genders, when one keeps in mind the rights women lacked at the time the verse was revealed. Wild noted that some of Abu Zayd’s books were first published in German, suggesting they could not have been published in Egypt. Yet they were also published in Syria. Wild concluded by posing a question to the audience and panelists: why did the liberal Qur’anic interpretations of Abu Zayd find publication in an oppressive state like Syria?

SESSION I — Floor DiscussionTlili opened the discussion to the audience. An Arabic andIslamic Studies professor from The New School (a university inNew York City) observed that a common theme running through the presentations was frustration at how the weight of tradition defines Muslim learning and practice. She asked whether there is evidence of pre–modern interventions in the hegemony of exegetical literature and suggested that such an avenue of inquiry might be more fruitful if it looked to non–Arabic language heritages.

Charfi answered, explaining that scholarly work has focused on the circumstances of the revelation because that’s where the greatest amount of historical material is available for study. In scholarship, he said, it used to be believed that one must understand the circumstances surrounding the revelation in order to understand the Qur’anic text. Now, on the basis of many studies, it is clear that the narratives describing those circumstances were developed by exegetes decades and centuries after the fact. Referring back to Wild’s comments, Charfi stated that he agreed with Arkoun that non–Muslim scholars should participate in these inquiries, for their researchand perspective can offer a more balanced understanding than research by Muslims alone.

An audience member asked the panelists to discuss the extent to which new Qur’anic interpretations had made an impact on the larger Muslim world, or what impact they might potentially have on social and political outcomes in Muslim societies.

The question drew responses from each panelist, beginning with Christmann, who said it was a very difficult question but one often asked about academic work. He contended that it is not possible to measure the effect of words in practical and social terms. The only notable measure of Shahrur’s influence, according to Christmann, is in the number of his followers, which Christmann said was not large enough to constitute a social movement in the Middle East. Though interest is growing, Shahrur’s readership, he explained, is largely limited to intellectuals and university graduates, in particular natural scientists and engineers. In sum, in Christmann’s view, it is not possible to see the implications of scholarship on policies.

Wild spoke up to say he was not as pessimistic as Christmann. He pointed out that the strong censorship in many Arabic countries is an indication that thinkers like Abu Zayd and Shahrur are taken seriously. Wild mentioned seeing Abu Zayd’s book in a Jedda bookstore, anecdotal proof that there is an audience for such ideas. He cautioned that theological faculties in the Arabic world are not a good indicator of new trends in thought. Explaining that such institutions do not even recognize 19th Century reformists, Wild opined that change is more likely to come from academic centers outside the Arab world.

Lee had earlier described Arkoun as being pessimistic about his own influence. Lee qualified that description by saying he believed Arkoun had underestimated himself. Lee added that if Arkoun’s followers in the Muslim world were small in number, it could be attributed to the fact that he wrote in French and his texts were so dense, so his ideas were not accessible to the general public. Lee suggested that Charfi and others would be more likely to have an effect on mainstream thought.

Charfi cautioned that we must distinguish between the effects of scholarly efforts in different Muslim countries. He offered Tunisia as an example where reformist approaches are taught in universities and people are receptive to modern approaches and theories; in Yemen, on the other hand, they are less developed. The greatest impediment to reform comes from Wahhabism, a movement centered in Saudi Arabia, whose adherents, according to Charfi, use their resources to spread hostility to modernist ideas. Their influence is especially significant at the popular level, he said.

The next questioner wondered if the lively debate about the historicity of the Old and New Testaments, seen in Christian and Jewish circles since the 19th Century, had any parallel in Muslim discourse.

Lee answered, referencing Charfi’s book Islam Between Message and History, which he described as an argument for differentiating Islam from the message of the religion, a position similar to Arkoun’s. However, Lee conceded, such an approach is not widely embraced in the Muslim world.

The audience member spoke again to clarify his original question. He described how, in recent Jewish and Christian discourses, even people of faith acknowledge evolution and eclecticism in the gospels. There is evidence of the same processes at work in thesuras, but have Muslims been similarly attuned to this historicity of the Qur’anic text?

Christmann answered that such work is being done in Europe, particularly in Berlin (including Corpus Coranicum , a research project of the Berlin–Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities under the directorship of Angelika Neuwirth), precisely because it is not yet embraced in the Muslim world. There are Muslim scholars who approach the Qur’an using historical criticism, such as Sayyid Muhammad Al Qimni, and others. However, they do not use such methods to the same extent as applied to the Bible by Western thinkers in the 19th Century. The main difference, according to Christmann, is that the Muslim thinkers still approach the reading of the text as, in Charfi’s words, a “reading of faith.” A truly historical critical reading would see the Qur’an as an expression of human tradition rather than divine intervention, but among Muslim believers, God’s power is not separated from that of the historical/human.

Wild suggested that the Wahhabi influence is partly responsible for the suppression of historical criticism. Although exegesis from the 1st through 3rd Centuries incorporated historicity, as in their treatment of abrogated verses, the tradition was not developed further. Today, Wild said, “petro–Islam” controls much of the intellectual production of Muslim theological centers, not only in Saudi Arabia but in places like Bosnia and the former Soviet Union.

Charfi had a more positive outlook on the issue of historicity, pointing out that many studies have already been made on the issue. Yet he cautioned against applying the Biblical approach of historical criticism to the Qur’an without accounting for the different nature of the Islamic text.

A City University of New York (CUNY) professor in the audience turned the conversation toward literary analysis, asking whether the Qur’an’s treatment as a literary text was considered a threat to its status as a sacred religious text.

Lee responded by referencing Arkoun. Arkoun, he said, believed that the Qur’an should be treated as a literary text. The literary approach is not denigrating because it preserves the sanctity of the oral revelation as distinct from its written iteration. In this view, the text is an avenue by which to better understand the original prophetic moment. However, there are many who disagree; they see the Qur’anic text as sanctified, and therefore object to it being treated like the Bible or other literary texts.

Charfi agreed, describing the Qur’an as a text of human language that must be approached through human language. He again referenced historical exegesis, explaining that Muslims throughout history have analyzed the grammatical, linguistic, and poetic aspects of the Qur’an. Moreover, Charfi said, not only would it would be impossible not to approach it as a literary text, but reading it through that lens has not prevented

Muslims from appreciating other aspects of the text. The literary aspect is only one level of analysis and does not preclude existential, moral, ethical, anthropological and theological dimensions. As a point of entrance into the text, linguistic analysis is less contentious than deeper levels of analysis, where exegetes are more likely to disagree and project their own ambitions, concerns, and traditions onto the text.

The next question was posed to Christmann concerning Shahrur’s dismissal of the sunna (the sixth thesis in Christmann’s summary); how did Shahrur reconcile the fact that God sent a book and a messenger? If the Prophet’s practices were his interpretation of how to live God’s message, how do we notentangle the sunna in our own interpretations of the Qur’an?

Christmann explained that Shahrur’s treatment of the Qur’anic text divides it into two categories: one universally applicable, absolute and, eternal (prophethood), and the other temporal, historical, and relative (messengerhood). In his dissection of Islamic concepts, Shahrur categorizes each word as belonging to one of the two categories, then distinguishes the eternally divine from the historically contingent. For example, Christmann explained, Shahrur cannot reconcile the idea of Mohammed being human and divine, for if divine, he would be a god (which constitutes shirk ). Therefore, Shahrur concludes that as a human, Mohammed and everything related to him is contingent, historical, and temporal. Shahrur then addresses each verse in turn, showing what is eternally divine and what is historically contingent, and concludes that obedience to God is different from obedience to the Prophet.

A woman in the audience asked if thinkers like Shahrur and Abu Zayd could be convinced to appeal to a larger, less elite audience in order to instigate grassroots movements for reform. She argued that such an effort would defend against claims that the reform movement is driven by the West.

She also commented that, as a secular Muslim, she objected to Shahrur’s claim that Islam has only three Pillars of the Faith rather than five. Such arguments, she opined, were a manipulation of language and can be blamed for alienating mainstream Muslims and marginalizing reformist ideas. She asked for Christmann’s opinion on this problem.

Responding to the first comment, Christmann replied that Shahrur is aware of such critiques and has been asked by his own friends and followers to clarify his arguments by simplifying them and using illustrative examples. However, he added, Shahrur already believes that his language is broadly accessible, for as a natural scientist he does not speak in the language of philosophers and the ulama. As for the accusation that Shahrur manipulates language, Christmann said it was such a frequent charge that it constituted a cliché.

In response to the issue of the Pillars of Islam, Christmann said Shahrur would ask for a Qur’anic verse that specifically mentions five. The woman retorted, “believers are those who believe xyz,” referring indirectly to the doctrinal rational for the Five Pillars — profession of faith, prayer, fasting, alms–giving, and pilgrimage.

Christmann explained that those are rather tenets of aqida, while the explicit mentioning of Islam as based on Five Pillars is only to be found in the hadith (Jibril), not in the Qur’an. He said that the Qur’anic verses do refer to only three “items” of Islam, which Shahrur sees as the Pillars; he considers the sum of five to be an imposed number not intrinsic to the text but attributed to it by theulama (through the hadith). Christmann described the accusation of textual manipulation as a “killer argument,” meaning it can be used against any interpreter of the Qur’an who subjectively chooses between several opinions on a given verse. Christmann asserted that the accusation of Shahrur’s linguistic manipulation is weak and without merit.

Christmann then returned to the topic of literary exegesis, reiterating Charfi’s point that it has a long history in Islam and a designated technical term in Arabic (al–tafsir al–adabi). Ironically, the first person who revitalized this classical tradition in the 20th Century was the Islamist Sayyid Qutb, in the 1930s and ’40s. After Qutb began using a purely literary perspective, other schools followed.

An audience member interjected asking how Shahrur can be considered an authentic Muslim voice if the Qur’an itself comes from God in its entirety? How can aspects of the text be distinguished as historical or literary versus divine?

Christmann responded that the question encompassed two issues: origin and interpretation. Within the Muslim world, the Qur’an is always considered the divine word of God, Christmann agreed, even if the text also contains things that are historically contingent and not universally applicable. But this belief does not

preclude applying various interpretive methodologies to the text; divinity is irrelevant to the literary approach.

Charfi illustrated the discussion about linguistic analysis with an example. Observing that many suras narrate the speech of human personages, he contended that those sentences should not be read literally as the divine word of God, since they are being reported from a non–divine source.

Charfi also addressed the earlier comment about applying Western methodologies to the Qur’an. He urged that we must stop defining modern civilization as exclusively Western. While many modern ideas may have Western origins, what is more important is the universality of values such as freedom, equality, justice, and democracy. Charfi criticized the fear of Western influences, defending the universality and applicability of modern criteria to all languages and texts. He tempered his position by agreeing that Muslims should take a critical position vis–à–vis Western elements, though not because of apparent Western hypocrisy in implementing their own values.

Most importantly, Charfi said, it is necessary to be wary of the anti–intellectualism found in much Islamic thinking, which adheres to tradition, consensus, and what is considered invariable in Islam. It is the right and obligation of each believer to examine ideas that are considered self–evident, and to free himself or herself from the intellectual constraints of traditional thought.

Charfi concluded his comments, and the first panel, by reiterating the connection between the mutually reinforcing spheres of traditional Islam and non–democratic Muslim regimes, which repress critical approaches that threaten their claims to religious legitimacy.

SESSION II — INTERPRETING THE QUR’AN, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE MODERN WORLD: Muslim Societies at a CrossroadsTlili described the focus of the second session as “applied interpretation;” an occasion to translate the ideas discussed in Session One to real world scenarios. Before introducing thespeakers, he invited discussant Dale Eickelman to speak about an unanticipated absence on the panel.

Eickelman explained that the empty seat on the stage was intended for Mohammad Amin Abdullah, the rector of Indonesia’s Universitas Islam Negari Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta. The day before the symposium, organizers learned that, despite several appeals, U.S. Homeland Security had denied Abdullah a visa. Eickelman had hoped that, after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent apology for refusing entry to Tariq Ramadan, fewer mistakes would be made in the screening of distinguished scholars hoping to visit the U.S. He reminded the audience that the objection to Ramadan was based on a small donation he had made to an organization years before it was labeled a supporter of terrorism.

Eickelman spoke scathingly about the failure of authorities to recognize Abdullah’s credentials, which include a higher degree from Canada. Abdullah also succeeded in moving oversight of hisIslamic university from the Ministry of Religious Affairs to theMinistry of Education based on his belief that Islamic education should be mainstreamed. Eickelman recounted his recent visit to the university, where he saw visible efforts to disseminate broader knowledge about Islam, including materials censored in many other Muslim countries. Eickelman described the goal of Abdullah’s life’s work as “mainstreaming” Islam, and concluded with an apology to the audience that Abdullah was unable to attend the symposium.

SESSION II — Mohammad Amin AbdullahProfessor of Islamic Studies, Universitas Islam Negari Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta (Indonesia)

In Abdullah’s absence, his speech was presented by a staff–member of the NYU Center for Dialogues. Abdullah’s comments focused on the recent expansion of Islamic studies to include not only historical and

doctrinal aspects, but also Islam as a culture, civilization, community, and political, economic, and globalizing force. Nevertheless, he acknowledged, many Islamic studies departments remain rooted in uncritical tradition, often leading to conflict among Muslims of different denominations and beliefs.

So how does the field of Islamic studies, Abdullah asked, compete with other “scientific disciplines” in addressing contemporary issues in areas such as human rights, gender equity,international relations, and the environment? To Abdullah’s mind, this is where the tools of modern epistemology find their relevance. He cited the works of Richard C. Martin (an “outsider” to Islam) and of Mohammed Arkoun (an “insider”) as good examples. Richard C. Martin’s book, Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies,8 presents Islam as a historical entity subject to scientific study beyond “sacred” theological interpretation. Abdullah cited the work of Khaled M. Abou El–Fadl 9 and Jasser Auda 10 as representing a new generation of interdisciplinary approaches to Islamic studies that still rigorously maintain the discipline of Islamic Religious Knowledge, or ’Ulum al–Diin.Abdullah’s speech also covered the development of Islamic studies in the context of Indonesia, where inter–disciplinary and multi–disciplinary approaches have been put into practice since the establishment of Islamic State Universities in 2002. At the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, a new scientific paradigm called “integrated–interconnected science” 11recognizes that a scholar must analyze his field by integrating other disciplines and recognizing their interconnectivity.Abdullah’s remarks then delved deeper into the ontology of contemporary Islamic studies, and the importance of differentiating between Islamic Studies (Dirasat Islamiyyah), Islamic Thought (al–Fikr al–Islamy), and Islamic Religious Knowledge ( ’Ulum al–Diin ). He emphasized that Islamic Thought or al–Fikr al–Islamy has a scientific and systematic structure, and a strong and comprehensive body of knowledge on Islam, while ’Ulum al–Diin often emphasizes certain parts rather than the full body of knowledge. He also discussed how certain religious groups, sects, or organizations may intentionally or unintentionally skew this knowledge set to suit their own purposes and perspectives. In his opinion, the presence of al–Fikr al–Islamy, which is more historical, systematical, comprehensive, non–sectarian, non–provincial, and non–parochial, helps students complete their knowledge of ’Ulum al–Diin .

Pointing to the proliferation of Islamic scientific journals, symposiums, seminars, encyclopedia, and new books published by both ’insiders’ and ’outsiders,’ Abdullah concluded that the Islamic academic world keeps growing and follows the development of research methods in general. He remarked that contemporary Islamic studies, or Dirasat Islamiyyah, always uses and collaborates with methods of thought and research in social sciences and contemporary humanities to reveal Islamic religiosity in daily life, not only limited in circle of foundational texts. These new approaches have surprised and sometimes offended students of ’Ulum al–Diin who are still implementing old scientific paradigms and perspectives. Some Islamic studies approaches have been criticized as secular, liberal, apostate, and the like. 12

Looking to the future, Abdullah described the main project of the contemporary Islamic Studies as eliminating misunderstanding and mutual suspicion between Islamic Studies (Dirasat Islamiyyah), Islamic Thought (al–Fikr al–Islamy), and Islamic Religious Knowledge ( ’Ulum al–Diin ). Their only true differences, he believes, are in methods (process and procedure), horizon of observation and theoretical framework (approaches), and sources of data. Abdullah called for the present generation of students, scholars, and other stakeholders to unite these three clusters.

Tlili then introduced Mahmoud Hussein as “two men with a shared mind.” Mahmoud Hussein is the nom de plume of Adel Rifaat and Bahgat El Nadi, political scientists who have co–authored a number of books and articles. Their most recent book, not yet translated into English, raises the implications of interpretation for the social, political, cultural, and ethical issues faced by Muslim communities today. Tlili added that their work also carries implications for the relationships between Muslim and non–Muslim communities around the world, on issues ranging from the status of women to freedom of expression. Adel Rifaat gave the presentation on behalf of the pair.

SESSION II — Mahmoud Hussein(Adel Rifaat and Bahgat El Nadi), Authors (Egypt/France)

Over the course of Islam’s history, Rifaat began, religious conformity has too often stifled intellectual curiosity. Unfortunately, in world opinion it is widely assumed that this is an intrinsic quality of Islam. Yet the current state dates only to the last 30 years and followed a period of great intellectual and political progress in the Muslim world. During this “Muslim Renaissance,” thinkers were freed from the literalist interpretations that had bound them for years. It paved the way for the national liberation movements that characterized the first half of the 20th Century in the Muslim world, during which the region’s emergent middle classes adopted a political discourse of secular rationalism. Yet after a period of economic and social gains, the progressive momentum gave way to corruption and unequal development. From the 1980s, the tide turned and the religious orthodoxy that had waned during years of secularization took hold once again.

Rifaat assessed the current situation thus: in this new century, Muslims are inextricably drawn into the orbit of globalization where their only hope for success is to adapt by regaining intellectual freedom and mastering the tools of criticism and innovation. However, fundamentalist thought, which counteracts those needs, is again dominant. In the face of this dilemma, Rifaat stressed the importance of recent reformist thought, which furnishes the tools necessary to address the modern world.

Rifaat honored the recently deceased thinkers Arkoun and Abu Zayd, and welcomed symposium panelist Charfi as a preeminent representative of their school of thought. He praised their representation of Islam as both a divine message and a human story, thereby lighting a path for believers to combine faith in God with knowledge of the world.

Such thinking, Rifaat said, is considered by dogmatists to be an affront to the sacred nature of revelation because it connects the divine with temporal events. Dogmatists react violently to the idea that a text of revelation was influenced by its historical context. Fundamentalists refuse to debate the reformers regarding these objections, instead condemning the reformers’ interpretive methodologies as illegitimate.

Rifaat described Mahmoud Hussein’s recent work as a powerful defense of reformist thought against such attacks, since it exposes the historicity of the Qur’an without relying on “illegitimate,” profane disciplines. Their critique uses the testimony of the Companions of the Prophet — a source unassailable by traditional standards of exegesis. By relating a Qur’anic verse to the reported circumstances of its revelation, they prove that the historicity of revelation is not imposed from the outside, but is contained within the Qur’an and is the very will of God.

Rifaat expanded on this conclusion by elaborating three related findings. First, the Qur’an distinguishes God from his Word; while God transcends time, his Word is time–bound and linked to the context in which it was revealed. Second, the Word of God is not presented in monologue, but through exchanges betweenheaven and earth. God dialogues in real time, through the Prophet, with the first community of Muslims. Third, God does not weigh each of his revelations equally but has truths of different orders: absolute and relative, perpetual and circumstantial.

In light of these conclusions, Rifaat asked rhetorically how literalist dogma was able to impose itself despite counterfactual evidence in the Qur’an? In answer, Rifaat described the process of the Qur’an’s revelation, which took place intermittently over the course of 22 years, in changing circumstances, and touched on a diverse range of topics. The Prophet and Companions memorized these revelations through recitation. Only after the Prophet’s death was the Qur’an systematically committed to writing. Under the Caliph Uthmann, verses were standardized and grouped in a single volume, the mushaf. Their grouping was ordered not by chronology of revelation but by length of verse, creating problems for the text’s intelligibility. Yet the literalist approach treats the order of verses as if decreed by God, and the text is traditionally studied in strictly that order, verse by verse.

Rifaat described this approach as severing any causal link between verse and the circumstances of revelation. In the absence of such connections, many verses are difficult or impossible to decipher. The difficulty of finding meaning is a feature in the earliest Qur’anic commentaries and in all schools of interpretation. From the beginning, it was clear that the context of revelation held the key to understanding, and efforts were made to reconstruct those circumstances by gathering the testimony of the Companions. This material, called al–asbab nuzul, is used by all exegetes and actually constitutes its own branch of exegesis.

Given this tradition, Rifaat asked, how do literalists justify their reliance on temporal events while rejecting a connection between the Word of God and human time? In fact, Rifaat argued, theyfailed to explain the contradiction and merely issued decrees justifying their approach. Thus their work is premised on an a priori belief that the Word of God transcends time, though they are unable to explain the logic of the argument.

Rifaat dismissed this position as outmoded. If one reads the Qur’an using those same external sources, it is possible to use the testimony of the Companions to rationally rediscover the connection between text and context. The verses become morethan phrases to be recited in order: they are moments of revelation connected by temporal continuity.

Rifaat acknowledged that the chronicles of companion testimony contain contradictory accounts, and are of debatable veracity. Rifaat argued that their analysis, then, is a task for historians rather than religious scholars, who accept the authoritativeness of all hadith without question. Rifaat explained that they are nevertheless significant — not because they are necessarily accurate, but because they constitute a critical mass of evidence regarding the historicity of the revelation. Most importantly, literalists cannot object to their use.

Rifaat’s examples showed that the Qur’an has a clear time dimension in which moments are relational; some are more important than others; and a subsequent event may override a precedent. God is both always right, and yet says contradictory things. Rifaat resolved this seeming dilemma by emphasizing the historicity of God’s declarations. God’s interventions exist in time, making truths relative and contingent on particular but changing circumstances. Therefore, Qur’anic verses cannot be read as though they all have the same weight, and are absolute and eternal, for God made them situational. Lessons and inspiration can always be found in verses, but they are not mandatory lessons for all times and places. Jettisoning the literalist assumptions about the Qur’an frees believers to read it not as a set of commandments and prohibitions, but as a guide to help find God’s way on the path of life.

SESSION II — Discussant: Dale EickelmanProfessor of Anthropology and Human Relations,Dartmouth College (U.S.)

The discussant Dale Eickelman thanked Tlili again for organizing the symposium despite the setbacks cause by visa problems, deaths, and other challenges.

Eickelman reflected on both sessions and drew out the common threads running through all of the presentations. He said each of the speakers combined thinking with practice, which is a courageous act in much of the Muslim world. Even if their work is not fully accepted in public, it is referred to in private discussions. The fear of public opinion on these issues is a characteristic of the current political moment, and can change over time.

The discussant observed that another theme common to the presentations was the difficulty of defining what it means to be a Muslim, for there is no agreement on the question among Muslims. Although the text of the Qur’an is stable, its interpretation is not. As one delves deeper, Eickelman added, even the text becomes unstable. For example, when early fragments of the Qur’an were found in Yemen, containing aberrations from the standard text, they were destroyed at the behest of conservative Islamic factions.

Eickelman compared Arkoun’s embrace of the multiplicity of meaning to Shahrur’s. Both are resolutely modernist although in different ways. Shahrur argues that since the time of the Prophet Muhammad, we live in a post–prophetic world. Since prophecy is at an end, humankind must rely on reason to understand revelation. In their separate ways, both thinkers, together with the late Nasr Abu Zayd, illustrate that the Qur’an is a defiantly open text that cannot be closed by anyone. One way of thinking about the debate over what it means to be Muslim is to invoke Oxford philosopher Walter Gallie’s notion of “essentially contested concepts.” 13

Eickelman commented that the stated intent of the symposium was to foster a dialogue among Muslims, with non–Muslims serving as discussants. This was also the model that Wild advocated in his comments during the first session. Yet, without identifying names, a reader of the symposium’s transcript would be

unable to distinguish Muslim from non–Muslim participants. All share a passionate rapport with the text. As Charfi indicated, a passionate rapport is necessary.

Eickelman then commented on efforts to censor Shahrur’s first book when it was published in 1990. State authorities refused to censor him, responding to Shahrur’s attackers by suggesting that they simply publish their criticisms. Eickelman also recalled the experiences of El Nadi and Rifaat, who served prison time during their leftist student days. Their presentation today made a passionate rereading of their texts and approach to Qur’anic interpretation accessible to a wider audience.

Eickelman emphasized the importance of Amin Abdullah’s proposition for curricular reform in Indonesia. His presentation, the discussant said, like the others, reminded us how ideas and practices are inscribed in the times in which they occur, and of the limits of speech in many places in the Middle East.

Finally, Eickelman suggested the importance of what is not said in public. The Arabian Peninsula, for example, has a number of think tanks, but the approach to critical studies of religion is morerestrained. While part of the Arabian Peninsula inspires forward thinking, many Gulf leaders are wary of publicly attaching their names to projects involving religious issues and prefer to donate privately. Westerners must pay closer attention to grey areas and layers of meaning. For instance, if explicit feminist statements are ineffectual in the Middle East, there is possibility in more subtle approaches that may not be initially noticed by outsiders less attuned to the realities and practices of contemporary censorship. Thus in the new Islamic Studies (Dirasat Islamiyya) curriculum used in the primary and secondary schools of the United ArabEmirates, textbook images depict women and men as equals, at least up to the age of eight, without heavy–handed explanations of how such images differ from predecessor textbooks in which representations of young girls were absent. There is a strong tradition of saying things indirectly in the Arab world and elsewhere in the Middle East, and outsiders would benefit from comprehending such local social norms.

To begin the floor discussion, Eickelman reviewed his main points, beginning with the idea that Qur’anic interpretation is not an arcane topic but one that engages practical reason and often occupies the center stage of public debate. It has implications for how believers think about their faith and its role in society. Because of the different audiences for interpretation, we must take an ethnographic approach and be sensitive to the grey areas, understanding that even if ideas are not publicly embraced, they may still resonate in private.

SESSION II — Floor DiscussionThe floor discussion opened with a conversation among the panelists, who returned to the issue of who is entitled to carry on this debate about Islam and whether their ideas are marked by their identity as Muslims or non–Muslims. Wild responded to the opinion expressed earlier that the commentary by Muslim and non–Muslim panelists was indistinguishable. He referred to Abu Zayd’s declaration that he would not longer speak of God per se but instead about “the divine.” Abu Zayd wrote that he wanted to be inclusive of readers who are uncomfortable personalizing divinity. Yet, Wild contended, this notion cannot be translated into Arabic, both linguistically and culturally. Muslim readers would not accept the idea and as a result, he predicted, the book would remain un–translated.

There was a brief discussion of what the Arabic translationfor “the divine” in this context would be, whether al–ilahi or al–muqaddas, until Charfi said the important thing was not how the concept is translated but how it is explained. Frequently in translation, words do not correspond exactly, but a writer is free to develop his own critical terminology by explaining his use of a word. The importance is not the translation but the context.

Tlili spoke about the importance of the social and political credibility that come from having an intra–Muslim debate. In the wake of 9/11 and the Iraq war, the discussion about what being a Muslim means and how to reconcile Islam with democracy is problematic in the Muslim world; the imposition of these ideas from without has failed materially and poisoned Muslims’ understanding of themselves and their relationship to the non–Muslim world. For this reason, debates on issues fundamental to the faith and to Muslim identity

must be nurtured from the inside to have social and political value and a chance of influencing the Muslim community. Hence the invitation to this symposium was intended to draw voices from the Muslim world and nurture this debate, but also to offer an opportunity for exchanging ideas with colleagues from the West, who share epistemological tools.

The next question drew a distinction between theory and practice and the questioner opined that, although the ideas discussed on the panels have practical implications, they were insufficiently illustrated. Muslims implement practical interpretations of religion on a daily basis, she said, and there are vibrant interpretations in the area of gender equity, which was not reflected in today’s presentations. She said it was an especially important area for discussion because of Western criticism. She suggested that it would be fruitful to ask how practice gets theorized, rather than vice versa.

El Nadi disagreed that we should discuss the details and applicability of the Qur’an, for people find in religion whatever they are seeking. He advocated instead examining the relationship between the Prophet/the divine/God and the Companions. By asking how they treated the verses, we can derive a model for practice. The Companions did not accept the revelation as a fait accompli, but discussed it and requested changes, and God complied. If the Companions had freedom and authority, why must believers today see the text as unchangeable?

Rifaat expanded on El Nadi’s comments, observing that practice has not remained unchanged over the centuries, especially in the area of gender relations. As an example, he pointed out that today’s women are wearing the veil in countries where 50 years ago, it did not exist. So, when talking about practice, Rifaat said, we have to be aware that practice is constantly changing, especially in the last century. A change in practice can be justified through Qur’anic interpretation, and in different cultural contexts, different practices will be justified by the text.

Rifaat continued, commenting on how reformers treat the text. Despite differences of opinion among reformers, they are united in an effort to think differently about the relationship between the word of God and the reality in which that word resonates with human beings. Today, reformers confront a restriction on critical thought in the Muslim world, with anyone who questions the status of the Qur’an as the word of God being shut out of the conversation. He and El Nadi therefore take as their starting point that the Qur’an is the word of God, yet question the implications of this assumption. According to literalist thinking, since God is eternal and makes no mistakes, then His word is inalienable and applicable in every time and place. Yet this line of thought presupposes that God and his words are one and the same. Rifaat and El Nadi’s work argues that the word of God is not the essence of God, but is time–bound. This approach gives Muslim believers the freedom to take responsibility of their own reading of the Qur’an, and to live as citizens of a pluralist world without renouncing their faith.

Eickelman agreed that gender is a central issue, but cautioned that it is also frequently a conversation–stopper in the West, where stereotypes of women in Islam are entrenched. However, the reality of gender relations is far more complex, he said. Interesting debates are taking place in the Arabian Peninsula about the role of women. In the Saudi press last year, the argument was made that the separation of the sexes was bida — forbidden — citing hadiths that indicate it was not original to early Islam. Such conversations are made possible by the accessibility of the hadiths on the Internet. According to Ziba Mir Hosseini, women in Iran learn to imitate men’s voices to be taken seriously in magazines. In Kuwait, where classrooms have been integrated since the 1960s, people argue against separation by saying that women’s higher academic performance raises the level of education for men as well. On the Internet, women can enter the public sphere without being marked by gender.

Lee, a panelist from the first session, objected to Rifaat’s claim that the current climate of intellectual repression dates back only 30 years. Lee cited Arkoun, who commented on the problem as early as the 1960s and believed that the solidification of Islamic interpretation began long before. Lee argued that Islam had not disappeared under secular movements, mentioning by way of example that the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 and was a factor in Egyptian society even under Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt’s President from 1956 to 1970). Moreover, he said, many Middle Eastern states attained independence through religious projects. Arkoun himself was restricted from speaking in Algeria, where seminars were run as indoctrination

sessions on behalf of the state. Lee concluded that the problem is of long–standing duration and cannot be attributed to recent Islamist movement or policies of the Western powers in the Middle East.

El Nadi clarified Mahmoud Hussein’s position, agreeing with Lee that Islam had not disappeared under Nasser. Yet, he maintained, Islam was not as powerful a force in that era as it is today. Nasser was free to impose at will on the Muslim Brotherhood, whereas now it is the religious faction that imposes on the government. For example, in Tunisia during Ramadan you used to see leaders on television drinking orange juice. Such a thing is unthinkable today. When the socialists disappeared, the new power regimes of Anwar Sadat and Husni Mubarak and others based themselves on religious trends as a tactic to counteract leftists.

Rifaat added that it is in vogue today to talk about the Muslim Brotherhood as the only mass movement in the early 20th Century. However, there was a more powerful movement, the Wafd Party, which had its roots in the masses. The question of whether national movements should be religious or secular was a major debate in the interwar period and a key element of post–colonialism. The Muslim Brotherhood retreated not only because of acts of state repression but because of the popular sensibilities of an emerging middle class that expressed a clear preference for secularization in public affairs.

Charfi suggested that, despite a clear movement backwards on issues like the status of women and veiling, at a deeper level there is secularization and even Westernization happening throughout the Muslim world. Even movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Phalangists in Lebanon were modeled on European Fascist movements of the same era. This speaks to the tension between secularization and religion; even when religion is dominant, it responds to external secular influences.

In conclusion, Eickelman noted that neither secularization nor religion can be isolated as singularly representative of a period. For example, Israel’s opposition to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and support of Hamas created a scenario in which the religious movement reflected the sensitivity among the people. In other situations, religion is more ideological than moral or ethical. It is misleading to look closely at religious movements in isolation. In some instances, women’s veils may allow them to participate more openly in public space. For those who wear the veil, religion is often not their primary motivation, as many research studies have shown. People take what they want from religion and from modern values, forming a kind of bricolage. They may be pious in certain areas but impious in others. The search is underway to find a new balance to relieve this tension.

SESSION II — ClosingIn his closing remarks, Tlili thanked the speakers for sharing many perspectives that warrant further exploration andacademic research. He described the symposium as the beginning of an ongoing debate, and raised the question of why such a debate can take place in the West but not the Muslim world. This is a major problem, as discussed by Wild; many Muslims do not have the benefit of the discourse developed here.

Ideas can influence progress and impact lives, Tlili stated. Unlike Charfi, who suggested that Islamism is losing its force, Tlili believes Islamism is still the dominant political discourse, and that there is a dangerous polarization between Western radical discourse and Islamist radical discourse. Because of this, regimes in the Muslim world are increasingly retreating from a commitment to openness and secularization, a trend seen in places like Turkey and Tunisia. New mosques are drawing large crowds and there are ever more social taboos in the name of religion. Yet these phenomena are too new and complex to be fully analyzed yet, Tlili said. The Muslim world is caught between the state and the Islamists: two forces of confused religiosity.

Tlili asked how we can reopen the conversation and give universities and intellectuals a renewed sense of possibility in light of the obstacles posed by the media and political structures. In answer, he stressed the need for stronger dialogue between the West and the Muslim world, and enjoined the West to recognize its stake in the outcome. Granting that all civilizations have contributed to global culture over the course of history, but that the last three centuries have been dominated by the Enlightenment, Tlili suggested that the

West has a moral responsibility to engage the Muslim world intellectually by, for instance, opening their doors to figures like Abdullah. The Muslim–Western dialogue has tremendous implications for all. If we leave the Muslim world to choose between oppressive regimes, radical Islamists, and a confusing religiosity divorced from modernity, the future is not bright. Tlili closed by expressing the hope that all present felt a need for this conversation to continue, and that the symposium had made them feel more engaged in the dialogue.

NOTES TO SESSIONS1 Al–Mu’tazila (8th — 10th Centuries) was a theological school, which argued that human reason could be applied alongside Qur’anic revelation.

2 Al–Muwahiddin (12th — 13th Centuries) was a theological school, which advocated a strictly literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith and condemned polytheism and the worship of saints as these practices contradicted the school’s belief in the absolute oneness of God (tawhid).

3 Mohammed Arkoun, The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought (London: The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2002).

4 Olivier Carré, Mysticism and Politics: A Reading of Fi Zilal al–Qur’an by Sayyid Qutb (Boston/Leiden: Brill, 2003). For Carré’s discussion of Arkoun, see p. 50.

5 Andreas Christmann (Trans., Ed.), The Qur’an, Morality, and CritiPenser le Coran cal Reason: The Essential Muhammad Shahrur (Boston/Leiden: Brill, 2009).

6 Literally translated as “promoting the good and preventing evil,” Shahrur interprets the phrase as an obligation of good civil citizenship. Ibid.

7 Abdelmajid Charfi, Islam Between Message and History, trans. David Bond (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

8 Richard C. Martin (Ed.), Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies (Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, l985).

9 Khaled M. Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003).

10 Jasser Auda, Maqasid al–Syariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach (Herndon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008).

11 Pokja Akademik, Kerangka Dasar Keilmuan & Pengembangan Kurikulum Universitas islam Negeri (Fundamental Scientific Theory and Curriculum Development in the State Islamic University) (Yogyakarta: Sunan Kalijaga, 2006). See also M. Amin Abdullah, Islamic Studies di Perguruan Tinggi: Pendekatan Integratif–Interkonektif (Islamic Studies in Higher Education: Integrative–Interconnective Approaches) (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006).

12 Khaled Abou El–Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005); also Roel Meijer (Ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: C. Hurst 7 Co. Ltd., 2009).

13 Gallie argued that it is impossible to conclusively define concepts such as social justice, democracy, or moral goodness. Clarification of such concepts involves considering how the concept has been used by different parties throughout its history. See W.B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956).

APPENDIX I: CONFERENCE PROGRAM

November 10, 2010

9:00AM — 9:30AM

Registration

9:30AM — 10:00AM

Opening Session

Mustapha Tlili, Founder and Director, NYU Center for Dialogues (U.S.)

In Memory of Mohamed Arkoun, Professor Emeritus of the History Islamic Thought, Sorbonne (Algeria/France, 1928–2010)

Abdelmajid Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought, University of Tunis (Tunisia)

10:00AM — 1:00PM

Session I

Normative Islam Versus Historical Islam: A Critical Distinction for Our Times and the Modern Epistemological Tools that Make It Possible

The ideas of Mohamed Arkoun (Algeria/France): Robert Lee, Professor of Political Science, Colorado College (U.S.)

The ideas of Muhammad Shahrur (Syria): Andreas Christmann, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Islam,University of Manchester, U.K. (Germany)

Abdelmajid Charfi

Discussant:

Stefan Wild, Professor Emeritus of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies, University of Bonn (Germany)

Floor Discussion

1:00PM — 2:30PM

Lunch

2:30PM — 5:30PM

Session II

Interpreting the Qur’an, Responding to the Challenges of theModern World: Muslim Societies at a Crossroads

Mohammad Amin Abdullah, Professor of Islamic Studies, Sunan K. Islamic State University, Yogyakarta (Indonesia)

Mahmoud Hussein (Adel Rifaat and Bahgat El Nadi),Political Scientists and Islamologists (Egypt/France)

Discussant:

Dale Eickelman, Professor of Anthropology and Human Relations, Dartmouth College (U.S.)

Floor Discussion

5:30PM — 6:00PM

Closing

APPENDIX II: PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIESAbdelmajid Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought, University of Tunis (Tunisia)Abdelmajid Charfi is Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis. Prior to this, he was Professor of Arab civilization and Islamic Thought first at the École Normale Superior in Tunis and then at the University of Manouba from 1969 to 2002. Between 2003 and 2005, he served as a member of the Council of the Arab Foundation for Modern Thought. He was a fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin from 1999 to 2000 and held the Chair of Comparative Religions at UNESCO from 1999 to 2003. He is currently the Director of the collection “Ma’alim al Hadatha“ and is a member of the editorial board of several journals including IBLA (Tunis); Revue Arabe des Droits de l’Homme (Tunis); Islamochristiana (Rome); and Prologues, Etudes Maghrébines (Casablanca). Charfi is the author of numerous internationally acclaimed works including: L’Avenir de l’ islam en Occident et en Orient; Damas, Dâr al–fikr (2008, in collaboration with Murad W. Hofmann); L’Islam un et multiple (Beirut, 2006–2009); L’islam entre le message et l’histoire (Beirut, 2001, 2nd ed. 2008; French translation, Paris: Albin Michel; Tunis: Sud Editions, 2004; English translation, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010; German and Persian language translations in progress); Modernisation de la pensée islamique (Casablanca, 1998 ; 2nd ed. Beirut, 2009; Persian translation, Tehran, 2003); and Islam et modernité (Tunis, 1990; 5th ed. Beirut, 2009; Persian translation, Tehran, 2005). He has also published several articles on modern Islamic thought in various journals in both French and Arabic and has lectured extensively at universities throughout Europe.

Robert Lee, Professor of Political Science, Colorado College (U.S.)Professor Robert Lee has taught in the Political ScienceDepartment at Colorado College since 1971. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University in 1972, having previously received an M.S. in Journalism and an M. A. in Political Science from Columbia, and a B.A. with a major in history from Carleton College. He is a member of the Middle East Studies Association, the American Institute for Maghrib Studies, and the Middle East Institute. His specialty is comparative politics, especially the politics of the Middle East and North Africa, but he also teaches courses on the international relations of the region and other courses in Political Science. Lee’s first book, Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity (Boulder: Westview, 1997), treats the thought of Muhammad Iqbal, Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, and Mohamed Arkoun. Lee also edited and translated Mohamed Arkoun’s Ouvertures sur l’Islam (Paris: Grancher, 1992), which was published as Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers (Boulder: Westview, 1994). His most recent book, Religion and Politics in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview, 2010), surveys comparative approaches to the understanding of religion and politics, focusing on four countries: Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Israel.

Andreas Christmann, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Islam, University of Manchester (U.K.)Andreas Christmann received his M.A. (1993) and Ph.D. (1999) from the University of Leipzig where he studied Arabic, Islamic Studies, and Comparative Religion. During his Ph.D. period he was awarded the Volkswagen–Research–Fellowship and prepared at St. Antony’s College in Oxford (1995–1997) to do field work in Syria. Since 1999, he has taught in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Manchester University and is currently Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Islam and Director of Postgraduate Studies. He has participated in several national and international research groups including a two–year research project on “The Islamic World and Modernity“ organized by the Social Science Research Council and the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin, where he took part in the working group on “Islamic Discourse and Modern

Muslim scholarship.” He was also a participant in the workshop “Multiple Modernities: Between Nation–Building and Muslim Traditions’ sponsored by the German–American Research Network and co–organized by the working group on “Muslims, Practices, and the Public Sphere” (Florence, 1999). He is a member of the German Association for the History of Religion (DVRG) and the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES). He has been a member of the Journal of Semitic Studies (JSS) editorial board since the year 2000. His most recent publications are The Qur’an, Morality and Critical Reason: The Essential Muhammad Shahrur (Leiden, 2009) and Der Fastenmonat Ramadan und das Fastenabschlussfest ’id al–fitr in Damaskus (Munich, 2009). He has worked intermittently on the writings of Muhammad Shahrur since his first stay in Damascus in 1995, and in a more focused and systematic way since their first meeting in 2001. The Qur’an, Morality and Critical Reason is the first comprehensive introduction in English of Muhammad Shahrur’s writings on Islam and the Qur’an, resulting from close collaboration with Muhammad Shahrur since the autumn of 2006.

Stefan Wild, Professor Emeritus of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies, University of Bonn (Germany)Stefan Wild was Director of the German Oriental Institute in Beirut, Lebanon from 1968 to 1973, Professor of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies at the University of Bonn from 1974 to 1977, and is now Professor Emeritus at Bonn University. He has written a study on Lebanese place names, has worked on classical Arabic lexicography, on classical and modern Arabic thought and literature, and worked extensively on the Qur’anic text. He was editor and co–editor of Die Welt des Islams: International Journal for the Study of Modern Islam (Leiden) from 1982 to 2009. In 2003–2004 he was a Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin and in 2005 was awarded the Prize of the Helga and Edzard Reuter Foundation. In October 2010, he gave the H.A.R. Gibb–Lectures at the Center of Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University on the topic of the Qur’an.

Mohammad Amin Abdullah, Professor of Islamic Studies, Universitas Islam Negari Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta (Indonesia)Mohammad Amin Abdullah is currently serving his second termas the Rector of Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia — the first of all the Islamic State Universities, and one of the leading Islamic universities in Indonesia. Dr. Abdullah is well known as an Islamic philosopher who distinguishes normative Islam from historical Islam. Internationally recognized for his role in promoting a modern, pluralistic and tolerant understanding of Islam, Dr. Abdullah helped lead the world’s second–largest Muslim organization, the Muhammadiyah, from 2000–2005, when he served as Vice Chairman of its governing board. Born in the regency of Pati, Central Java in 1953, Dr. Abdullah received his Baccalaureate degree from Pesantren Gontor Ponorogo; his Ph.D. in Islamic Philosophy from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey; and conducted his post–doctoral study at McGill University in Toronto, Canada. He is the author of numerous books, including Religious Education in a Multi–Cultural and Multi–Religious Era; Between al–Ghazali and Kant: Islamic Ethical Philosophy; The Dynamism of Cultural Islam; and Islamic Studies in Higher Education. He is also the author of dozens of articles, and frequently speaks at international seminars in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Dr. Abdullah is currently engaged in the process of modernizing his institution’s curriculum, and expanding its relationships with other leading universities worldwide, while maintaining its links with the past.

Mahmoud Hussein: Adel Rifaat and Bahgat El Nadi, Political Scientists and Islamologists (France)Mahmoud Hussein is the shared pseudonym of Bahgat El Nadi and Adel Rifaat, Egyptian–French political scientists and Islamic scholars born in Egypt, in 1936 and 1938 respectively. El Nadi and Rifaat met for the first time in 1955 during the student demonstrations that shook Egypt after the Bandung Conference. They were both active in the Egyptian democratic leftist movement from 1959 to 1964 and were subsequently incarcerated in Nasser’s concentration camps in 1966. Arriving in France, where they established themselves as political refugees, they proceeded to enroll in the Sorbonne and at the école des Hautes études en Sciences Sociales. In 1975 they jointly received their doctorate in Political Philosophy. From 1978 to 1998, El Nadi and Rifaat were senior officials at UNESCO, first as members of the cabinet of the Director General, then as co–directors of UNESCO Courier, an international cultural monthly published in 30 languages. They are the authors of several internationally–renowned books including: La luttes des classes en Egypte (Paris: Maspéro, 1969); Arabes et Israéliens, un premier dialogue: avec Saül Friedlander et Jean Lacouture (Paris: Le Seuil, 1974); Versant sud de la liberté: essai sur l’émergence de l’individu dans le Tiers–Monde (Paris: La

Découverte, 1989); Sur l’expédition de Bonaparte en Egypte (Paris: Actes Sud, 1998); and AL–SÎRA, le Prophète de l’islam raconté par ses compagnons (2 vol.) (Paris: Grasset, 2005 and 2007); and Penser le Coran: La Parole de Dieu contre L’Intégrisme (Paris: Grasset et Fasquelle, 2009). They have also participated in the creation of several film documentaries including: “Versant sud de la liberté” (France2, 1993); “Sur l’expédition de Bonaparte en Egypte” (France3, 1998); “Lorsque le monde parlait arabe, ou l’âge d’or de l’islam” (France5, 2000).

Dale F. Eickelman, Professor of Anthropology and Human Relations, Dartmouth College (U.S.)Dale F. Eickelman is Ralph and Richard Lazarus Professor of Anthropology and Human Relations at Dartmouth College. He has a M.A. in Islamic Studies from McGill University (Montréal) and a Ph.D. in Anthropology from the University of Chicago. Among hispublications are Public Islam and the Common Good, co–edited with Armando Salvatore (Boston: Brill, 2004); Muslim Politics, co–authored with James Piscatori (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, new ed. 2003); The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 4th ed. 2002); and New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere, co–edited with Jon Anderson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2nd ed. 2003). Eickelman is also a former President of the Middle East Studies Association, and since 2003 has served as Senior Advisor to Kuwait’s first private liberal arts university, the American University of Kuwait. He was named a Carnegie Scholar in 2009 for a two–year project, “Mainstreaming Islam: Taking Charge of the Faith,” and for the first part of 2010 was concurrently a Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin.

APPENDIX III: MUSTAPHA TLILI’S OPENING STATEMENTNo one here today will doubt that Islam has, in the West, a “bad name.” I leave it to you to conjure all the dramatic instances that prove this statement. The last, you may recall, occurred this summer in Florida where, if not for the intervention of world leaders including President Obama, the Qur’an was to be burned by an obscure pastor of a non–denominational church. The so–called “ground–zero mosque” heightened the drama for weeks this summer to the point where New York City witnessed huge demonstrations for and against the project; political leaders in the City and beyond made their positions part of their bid for office; and, as customary in this country, pundits filled the air–waves with incendiary and often ignorant pronouncements.

Muslims themselves, in this country in particular, do not seem to agree on what being Muslim is about. Those who speak in their name are often driven by a quest for power, and project conflicting images of Islam and different understandings of its holy texts. Whether in this country or in Europe, the non–Muslim public can feel bewildered by the moral, ethical and legal positions articulated by so–called authorized voices of Islam in the West. The multitude of points of view available on the internet amplifies the confusion to an extent unimaginable only a few years ago.

The absence of a central authority in Islamic theology and tradition heightens the anxieties of Muslims and non–Muslims alike regarding Islam. Unsurprisingly, there is a thriving “fatwa stock market” (as I call it) in the Muslim world that often relies on the internet to communicate its message, and intentionally frustrates dialogue with other cultures and faiths.

History tells us, however, that the search for a universally recognized truth has been part of Islamic tradition since the advent of the faith more than 14 centuries ago. One can even venture to say that if you strip Islamic history of its competition for political power, what remains can all be articulated in terms of interpretation of the faith, its tenets, and its underpinning fundamental texts—above all, the Qur’an. Various dimensions of Islamic civilization and culture cannot be properly understood if they are not interpreted in light of the context that produced them, whether the impressive openness of Al–Mu’tazila, the fundamentalism of Al–Muwahiddin, or the political and religious agendas of today’s Wahabbis.

What makes our moment different is the weight and challenge of globalization, which requires the Muslim world to confront its realities—to look in the mirror of modernity and answer the question of how to be Muslim while being part of world civilization in the 21st century. In the “flat world“ of today—in contrast to the times of Al–Mu’tazila or Al–Muwahiddin, or the Wahabbis of the 18th century, or even that of the Islamic reform movement of the 19th century—information is transmitted globally in an instant. The Muslim world can no longer hide certain truths about its lack of economic development, education, women’s rights,

freedom ofexpression, rule of law, and regard for our shared humanity. Any open–minded Muslim intellectual or ruler would easily recognize these lacks as plaguing the umma today, from Malaysia to Nigeria, from Morocco to Azerbaijan.

Yes, Islam has a bad name — but let’s be truthful, it’s not all the fault of its enemies. Islam, I submit, is what Muslims make it to be and, thus, the importance of this symposium. This event could not be happening at a more opportune time, considering the stakes of the relationship between the Muslim and the non–Muslim world, particularly the West. Reading and interpreting the Qur’an, the foundational text of Islam, has always been and will remain the ultimate basis for building an understanding of what it means to be a Muslim. Islam is a faith and a way of life informed by an understanding of the faith. How we interpret the Qur’an is not simply a matter of piety. It has real implications on how Muslim societies, whether yesterday or today, build states, economies, ethical systems, legal systems, and relationships with the non–Muslim world. The science of Qur’anic interpretation has evolved through the centuries. But, if we admit that, as any science, it relies on intellectual tools and categories, we should not hesitate to apply what French philosopher Paul Ricoeur calls “the sciences of suspicion”—the modern human and social sciences—to its interpretation. In fact, I submit that this is the most important challenge that the Muslim world faces today.

Two major thinkers who took up this challenge in the most impressive way and who had planned to be with us here have sadly departed this world. I speak of my former teacher, dear friend, and colleague, Mohamed Arkoun, who passed away two months ago, and the other giant of modern Islamic thought, Professor Nasr Abu Zayd, who I did not know personally but only through his works and correspondence; he passed away last spring. We mourn their deaths and we pay homage to their lives, their intellectual struggles, and to the extraordinary importance of the body of rigorous research they left behind. Generations of Muslims and non–Muslims will look to the work of these two eminent scholars when it is time to ponder the question, what does it mean to be Muslim in the 21st century? There are two other important voices absent from our discussion: the Syrian thinker, Muhammad Shahrur, author of the seminal book, The Book and the Qur’an: A Contemporary Reading, and Mohammad Amin Abdullah, the eminent Indonesian scholar of Islam and of the Qur’an in particular. Muhammad Shahrur could not be with us today for health reasons. As for Professor Amin Abdullah, we had hoped until yesterday that he would be present, but he was denied an entry visa.

I intended for these remarks to be both general and provocative, to challenge us to measure up to the task before us; as intellectuals, our foremost duty is to rigorous and clear thought or, as you might say in French, une pensé sans fard. Piety serves its purpose, although nobody can ultimately know its role in our salvation. Critical intellect has a different function—one in which the sacred becomes an object for rigorous and clear examination. With everything that we know in the world today, must Islam be simply the Islam of piety? Or can it be the Islam to which Abdelmajid Charfi, Mahmoud Hussein, Amin Abdullah, Muhammad Shahrur, and the late Mohamed Arkoun and Nasr Abu Zayd apply the tools of critical thought? I submit, ladies and gentlemen, that this is the most important question before us in this symposium and before the Muslim world today.

Islam and modernity: how to be Muslim and modern todayA roundtable discussion with:

Abdelmajid Charfi, Emeritus Professor of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis and author of l’Islam entre le message et l’histoire (Islam between the Message and History).

Hamadi Redissi, Professor of Political Science at the University of Tunis and author of l’Exception islamique (The Islamic Exception).

Boutheina Cheriet, Quillian Visiting International Professor at Randolph-Macon Woman ’s College, Professor of Sociology at the University of Algiers, and former Minister in charge of Women ’s Affairs and the Family (2002-2003, Algeria).

The three panelists stand at the forefront of an emerging school of thought within the Muslim world. Using the tools of contemporary social science, they have undertaken to critique Islam from within. Their work turns on several fundamental questions: Is it legitimate to question the timelessness of the Qur’an? Are certain key elements of Islamic heritage a product of history and thus no longer relevant today? Why has the Islamic world long stagnated in semi-modernity? What roles can women play as catalysts for reform? In raising these questions, our panelists offer a vision of what it means to be at once Muslim and modern today.

Presented by NYU’s Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West and the Institute of French Studies with the generous support of Air France.

Wednesday, May 3rd, 2006 at 6:30 pm at La Maison Française of NYU, 16 Washington Mews (at University Place), New York, New York.

Islam and modernity: how to be Muslim and modern todayBy Shaanti Kapila

On May 3, 2006 Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West and NYU’s Institute of French Studies (IFS) presented, “Islam and modernity: how to be Muslim and modern today?“ a roundtable discussion at La Maison Française of NYU. The roundtable was jointly moderated by Dialogues’ Director Mustapha Tlili and IFS Director Ed Berenson and featured Abdelmajid Charfi, Emeritus Professor of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis; Hamadi Redissi, Professor of Political Scienceat the University of Tunis; and Boutheina Cheriet, Professor of Sociology at the University of Algiers, and Algeria’s former Minister in charge of Women’s Affairs and the Family. The event was made possible by the generous support of Air France.

Ed Berenson began the evening by welcoming guests to the roundtable, the second event in a series co-sponsored byDialogues and IFS and supported by Air France, featuring innovative thinkers from the Francophone Muslim world. Mustapha Tlili then introduced the three panelists and emphasized the importance of their contributions to the slowly emerging, yet important trend of self-criticism within Islamic intellectual circles. Tlili emphasized self-criticism as a necessary means to reconcile Islamic heritage and scripture with the challenges of modernity.

Abdelmajid Charfi spoke first and began by underlining what he sees as the three essential contrasts that define modernity versus pre-modernity: (i) the dominance of authority in pre-modern thought and practice versus the individual rights and freedoms upon which modernity is based; (ii) the prevalence of faith and superstition in pre-modern times compared to the predominance of rationalism in modern times; and (iii) the closed nature of the pre-modern world in contrast to the openness of the modern world to innovative ideas and knowledge.

Insofar as religion is concerned, Charfi proposed that while religiosity today may not be so different than it was in the past, the shift from traditional to modern religiosity has proven complicated in Muslim societies, where vast economic, social, and political disparities cause many Muslims to look to religion as a source of legitimacy and identity. The important task for Muslims today is to chart a path by which they can be faithful to their religion and live in modern times.

Muslim thinkers, Charfi insisted, must meet the challenge of constructing a new interpretation of Islam that is compatible with modernity and that ensures that the religious experience of the Prophet has meaning today. This should lead to a new readingof Islam whereby the Prophet will remain the model, but many of the traditions attributed to him since the Revelation will lose their normative, constraining aspects. According to Charfi, the Prophet, through the Revelation, opened new horizons for man that enabled him to assume liberty and responsibility for himself and entrusted him with adapting to changing situations using his own free will. For example the Qur’an explicitly states that man has complete liberty with regard to belief. Charfi emphasized the centrality of the notion of the prophecy in Islam, Mohammed being the final in a long line of prophets revered in the Abrahamic tradition; therefore, Muslims believe that in transmitting the Qur’an, the Prophet Mohammed has transmitted the final word of God.

Charfi concluded by adding that Muslim thinkers must renounce the institutionalization of religion, which has again and again proven detrimental in the history of Islam. The Islamic faith cannot flourish in the 21st century, Charfi said, if Muslims do not eschew the institutionalization and dogmatization of religion.

Boutheina Cheriet spoke next and began by describing the recent turbulent political history of Algeria. During a bloody civil war that lasted throughout the 1990s, the country was terrorized by radical Islamist groups that sought to create an ideal, pure Islamic state free from all Western influence. The Islamist groups — with FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) at the helm — had particularly conservative views on the rights of women, confining them to strictly domestic roles. Cheriet traced the origins of this harshgender bias to the first moments of Algeria’s independence when the country was plunged in a modernizing socialist movement that was Islamic in outlook. In Algeria, as in other Arab and Muslim countries, the political elites embraced Islam’s role in modernization, without permitting public debate concerning what elements of religion should remain salient in Algerian life. As in most Muslim countries, women in Algeria were never considered equal, Cheriet said. Although the first post-independence governments encouraged women’s participation in all domains, they did not introduce perfect legal equality for women. The Algerian Family Code adopted in 1984 evidences women’s inequality within the family, for example with regard to divorce and in matters of inheritance.

Cheriet attributed the gender bias against women in Algeria, and Muslim societies in general, to a reverence of the houri (the virgins of Paradise described in the Qur’an). Women will never be permitted to be completely liberated and modern so long as they are linked to a mythological “pure” standard, she said. Cheriet agreed with Abdelmajid Charfi that it is Muslim thought and not Islam itself that is resistant to modernity. Once Muslims begin to modernize Islamic thought on a broad scale, radical groups professing an ideology of Islamic salvation will lose their appeal, she said.

The final panelist to speak was Hamadi Redissi, who summarized the thesis from his book, l’Exception islamique (Paris: Seuil, 2004). He maintained that it is not Islam per se, but rather the ways in which Muslims have interpreted and instrumentalized Islam that have led to the current schism between Islam and modernity. Redissi offered four points about the “exception” to which he refers in his book. First, the “Islamic exception” is a historical, theological statement. Because it was in the interest of early caliphs to cloak political activities under the mantle of religion, Islamic polities tended early on toward a theocratic form of government. Second, Islamic societies have not fully incorporated the tenets of modern capitalism, which creates an exception to the prevailing norms of the international economic system. Third, ideas like democracy were introduced into the Islamic world in an authoritarian manner (for example with the Napoleonic invasions of Egypt, or European colonialism), and were therefore greeted with skepticism. Fourth, Islam has been interpreted as a total way of life and thus non-religious elements, like culture and political systems, tend to become synthesized to conform to an “Islamic” standard.

Redissi then went on to elaborate the ideological, cultural, economic, social, and political aspects of the Islamic exception. With regard to ideology, Redissi said that Islam has not been able to surpass the temptation to fundamentalism, which has wavered over the past two and a half centuries between jihad (struggle, both internally and against impious Muslims), limited-scale holy war (against non-believers), and planetary holy war (as embodied by Osama bin Laden's calls to kill Westerners).

Moving on to culture, Redissi contrasted Islamic civilization withJapanese civilization to highlight the stark differences in the way each has been able to adapt to changing circumstances. The Japanese have adopted a model of “co-habitation,” remaining faithful to their traditional values while becoming technologically modern. Islamic civilization, on the other hand, has tended toward synthesis in the form of an “Islamicization of modernity.” However, Redissi noted, it is impossible to synthesize the modern into the medieval and thus Islam has become a prisoner of its own model.

Redissi held that the predominance of tribal societies throughout Islamic history has created economic and social exceptions. Many Islamic societies were tribal well into the 20th century, which hindered the advance of capitalism within these lands. Likewise, absent a strong middle class — historically a driver of change — Islamic societies have tended to remain fractious and susceptible to authoritarian rule.

Redissi noted that the political exception stems from the lack of secularism in the majority of Islamic societies (with the notable exception of Turkey). Whereas the Protestant Reformation encouraged a clear delineation between church and state in the West, there has been no similar reformation in Islam, andpolitical systems within most Islamic countries continue to be dominated by religious tenets.

In conclusion, Redissi affirmed that Islam is indeed compatible with modernity, but that it is the responsibility of Muslims to break with the characteristics that have created the Islamic exception and to encourage new interpretations of Islam that will enable Muslims to be faithful to their religion and productive citizens of an increasingly globalized planet.

Following the three panelists’ presentations, the floor was opened to questions from the audience. The first question asked whether there exist centers of research exist in the Muslim world at which thinkers work to reinterpret the Qur'an. Abdelmajid Charfi responded that although researchers with modern training who are interested in “Islamic sciences” are rare in the Muslim world, Tunisia is an exception. In Tunisia, teams of researchers composed mainly of young thinkers with good knowledge of Islamic texts and modern methodologies approach questions of scriptural and historical interpretation. The study of religion is taught as a human science in Tunisia, whereas elsewhere it is approached as a dogmatic science and is considered the purview of 'ulema. Boutheina Cheriet added that some individual research on improving the condition of women in Islam is being done by scholars in Morocco, but that there are no real centers and no systematic approach to the discipline. She reminded the audience that most Muslims live in authoritarian states and that any attempts toward democratization are closely monitored.

The second question asked how fundamentalism in the Muslim world can be defeated. Abdelmajid Charfi replied that he and his colleagues were not equipped with the political power to conquer fundamentalism. The fight against fundamentalism must begin upstream, he said, by offering youth a credible alternative. The new interpretations of Islam that are conceived by scholars in universities must be introduced into the educational systems through textbooks and curricular reforms.

A third question was posed about the ideology of the Islamist group FIS in Algeria. Hamadi Redissi replied first, maintaining that FIS cannot move away from the idea that the state is responsible for upholding religion. Although he insisted that religion should remain in the private sphere, the concept of separation of church and state does not exist in the Muslim world, he said. Rather, Muslims talk of a more subtle “distinction” between religion and political and civil life. Boutheina Cheriet added that it was never clear to what extent Algerians actually supported FIS, which attempted to gain power through democratic means in the early 1990s.* Youcef Yousfi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations and a guest at the roundtable, interjected that, had FIS come to power, there would no longer be an Algerian state today.

The fourth question considered whether Islam itself can be blamed for the deficit of democracy in the Muslim world, given the lack of democracy in non-Islamic regions like Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Hamadi Redissi answered that the failures of democracy are linked to the colonial experience, which weighed heavily on the Muslim world; his book, in fact, begins with the arrival of Napoleon in Egypt. While there are many variables affecting systems of government, a common variable throughout the Muslim world is Islam. Redissi acknowledged that there are different “types” of Islam — some of which may be considered

more conducive to democracy than others — yet when a positive comment is made about Islam few distinctions are demanded.

Abdelmajid Charfi insisted that distinctions should be made on three levels. First, there is the Quranic level — the level of the message — which is open to infinite interpretations. Second, there is the level of historical practice, which has differed widely from state to state and which can be submitted to analysis. Finally, there is the personal level whereby each Muslim carves out a unique vision or practice of Islam.

A fifth audience member offered that the challenge of modernity is not confronting Islam, the religion, but rather Islamic societies and states. This questioner compared the panelists to a doctor who has offered a diagnosis of a problem (reconciling Islam with modernity), but has not suggested a course of treatment. If some of the major Islamic states — Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, for example — were to form an economic union, would this spark changes in Muslim societies that would reverse the symptoms? Mustapha Tlili referred the question to Abdul Wahab, Ambassador and Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to the United Nations and present among the guests, who responded that this is precisely what the D8 (Developing Eight) countries of the OIC have sought to do. The D8 members — Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey — have sought to cooperate on trade and economic issues to improve their countries' welfare and economies.

The final question was whether there is something intrinsic to Christianity that enabled the West to become a model of modernization for the Muslim world. Likewise, should Muslim women strive to emulate women in the West even though religious values in the West seem to be in decline? Hamadi Redissi was the first to reply, stating that the West, modernity, and democracy are all part of a common heritage. Boutheina Cheriet responded to the second question, maintaining that it is offensive to say that the emancipation of women would lead to the decay of religious values. The problem for Muslims, she said, is that most are stuck living under authoritarian political regimes, and this is what should cause them concern.

Ed Berenson then brought the evening to a close, with thanks to panelists, the sponsors, and the assembled guests.

* Algeria adopted a new constitution in 1989, which wrested power from the FLN (National Liberation Front), the party that had dominated the country since independence in 1962, and established a multi-party democracy. In the first national elections that were contested under the new constitution in December 1991, the Islamist FIS party, formed in 1989, won a majority of votes in the first cycle of voting. Faced with a likely FIS victory in the conclusive round of voting, the military intervened, postponing the subsequent elections and disbanding the National Assembly. This touched off a civil war between FIS and the secular Algerian military, which has resulted in more than 100,000 deaths since 1992. In 1996 a referendum on the constitution was passed that banned Islamist parties in Algeria.

Saturday, 4 August 2012

Islam: the Test of GlobalizationAbdelmajid Charfi*Globalization has consequences for the religious sphere, but it does not constitute a break with the previous situation. It constitutes rather an acceleration of a process begun with the birth of nation-states. The impact of the values of modernity in general, since

even those in power, whatever their tendency, invoke values of democracy, progress, freedom and justice, whereas submission is what was required of subjects. Nevertheless, people today look to religion for fixed reference points, because of the brutal transition from the Middle Ages to the 20th and 21st centuries, and because modernity is not an endogenous phenomenon. Islam then is playing the role of bulwark against western hegemony. It is also instrumentalized both by the powers that be and by the oppositions, all of whom give themselves over to displays of one-upmanship over fidelity to Islam. Does Islam then maintain its relevance in the context of globalization? The fact is that the bases on which social relations are now founded no longer permit discrimination on the ground of sex or religion, and that there is a loosening of the grip of traditional ritualism and thatmore and more Muslims are looking for an understanding of the faith that is freed from old-fashioned dogmas. These new givens are being demonstrated particularly when it comes to the exercise of power and the condition of women. As a result, traditional conceptions are destined to evolve, particularly concerning the status of the Koran, the growing awareness of the historical process that made the Koran into a juridical code, the archetype that has been stuck to the person of the Prophet, and the alienation that consists in the sacralization of every human act.

We shall not linger, in this lecture, over the principal characteristics of the globalization that we have all been experiencing for about twenty year. Let it suffice to recall that this is a universal phenomenon possessing at once unarguably positive dimensions, as well as negative, not to say dangerous dimensions for the future of humanity. While the economy is the primary object of globalization, its unintended consequences for the religious domain are not negligible. And it is from this perspective that we are interested in that which, in this phenomenon, affects Islam in particular, the religion of one fifth of the world’ population. Its followers are mostly to be found in the geographical area stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, but large Muslim minorities live in different regions of the globe, North as well as South.

Let us begin by observing that historically, geographically and sociologically, Islam has never been monolithic. It is both one and many: one, by the creed which unites Muslims, that God is one and that Mohammed is his prophet; and many, by the multiple ways of understanding the Islamic faith, of formal practice of its recommendations concerning prayer, fasting, tithing and pilgrimage, as well as those concerning ethical behavior, right down to the deepest mystical experiences, and with the most varied intellectual expressions and all sorts of instrumentalizations along the way.

Let us add that Islam recognizes no intermediaries between God and man. The relation to divinity famously passes through the Koran as revealed to the Prophet, and accessorily, for the Shiites, through the Imam and his qualified representatives. This is the reason why the “Ulemas”, or doctors of Islam, refuse to be called “holy men”. Their task is limited, in theory, to the interpretation of the sacred texts for everyday believers, and to defining the duties incumbent upon them. And yet, this did not prevent the establishment of a religious “institution” to regulate the sacred, which considers itself qualified – to the exclusion of simple believers and of women altogether – to define dogmas and to distribute certificates of conformity or non-conformity with the demands of the religion.

The representatives of this institution receive, as a general rule, the same training, and are traditionally destined for the roles of cadis, or judges, of muftis, of prayer imams, of ‘udûls, or notaries, and other more or less official functions according to country and historical period. Although, in certain circumstances, they played a counter-balancing role in relation to the political powers, acting in favor of what might today be called the rule of law, by defending their prerogatives against the abuses of political power in the jurisdictional arena, they were basically in step with governments. These latter guaranteed them moral and material privileges, and relied on them for the administration of the population. In exchange,

the Ulemas provided the political authorities with the legitimacy that they needed and that they lacked, being most often acquired by inheritance or by brute force, and conserved independently of the will of their subjects.

It is in these terms that the relations between religion and politics manifested themselves in Muslim societies, with the exception of the relatively rare cases where there was connivance between the two functions, when the political authorities intervened directly in religious affairs, or when the “clerics” imposed an orientation of some sort on politicians, as was the case, for example, in the age of the Abbasid Caliph Al-Ma’mûn, of the Fatimid Caliph Al-Hâkim, or during the reign of Almoravides. This situation was seriously disrupted by the emergence of modern Nation-States in the Muslim world. The monopoly previously enjoyed by the Ulemas in the legal domain was demolished by the introduction of positive law during the colonial period, and then since the political independence occurring between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the 1960s. Moreover, the modern State tends to be an intrusive one, reaching into areas that never used to interest it, such as the economy, education or health. As a consequence, it tries to subordinate the religious authorities and to control them closely in order to be sure that they always provide it with an appearance, a surplus, or a decisive contribution of legitimacy.

What new does globalization bring to this picture? It is tempting to answer that what has occurred is not a radical break with the previously reigning situation, that there has merely been an acceleration of processes already at work at the economic, social, political, cultural, and therefore also religious, levels. At any rate, these levels are interwoven and connected among one another in a dialectical relation, to such a degree that it is sometimes difficult to affirm, despite appearances and notwithstanding the declarations of the actors involved, that such or such question has to do with one level rather than with another.

At the economic level, every country has seen a modernization of the means of production, at different speeds, but pursued everywhere with unequal success. Thus, the tractor, the automobile and the machine in general are supplanting the animal and human physical effort; services are occupying an ever growing place of importance in economies; and the same, or almost the same, industrial products are invading the markets of every country.

At the social level, nomadism loses ground each day, and the countryside is increasingly depopulated, in favor of a breakneck urbanization. The diminution or the disappearance of traditional social constraint exercised by the tribal group follows from this. The patriarchal family is giving way to the nuclear family, with all the consequences that come with it concerning the means of socializing young people. In sum, it is a mechanical solidarity, in the Durkheimian sense, that is replacing organic solidarity little by little – which is a source of conflicts and dramas due to this difficult transition.

At the political level, what is remarkably novel is that political personnel of every ideological slant constantly invokes the previously unknown values of democracy, progress, freedom and justice, even if in practice they distance themselves from them to a greater or lesser degree.

And finally at the cultural level, the tidal wave of secularization affects contemporary Muslim societies the same as it does other modernized or modernizing human societies, whatever their culture or their religion might be. What some observers consider to be a resurgence of the religious is unsurprising since the transition from the Middle Ages to 20th century modernity happened brutally. This resurgence of the religious – sometimes in an aberrant form – or rather its persistence, is in fact nothing but a reaction of defensiveness or of fear in the face of the rapid and disorienting mutations for which minds had not at all been prepared by traditional dominant structures. It is therefore unsurprising that, following the ceaseless movement that characterizes our era, more or less disoriented people look to religion for the fixed reference points which they have lost in other spheres of life, all the more since the novelties modernity has introduced, fascinating as they may be, are perceived as having been imposed by the West. The fact that modernity – and now globalization – is not an endogenous process obviously feeds into this attitude, with its apparent preference for a return to the past and for the preservation of cultural identity.

In such conditions, Islam plays the role of bulwark against Western hegemony in general and American

hegemony in particular. It is obviously not a matter of passing judgment on the effectiveness of this bulwark, or of determining whether it constitutes the best defense. Islam is equally instrumentalized by anachronistic and/or despotic regimes in search of legitimacy, just as it is solicited by opposition movements to justify their struggle against the established order, which is perceived as being impious and contrary to Islamic norms. Here too, it is not a matter of passing judgment on the validity of this upmanship emanating from two antagonistic clans. It is preferable, in our judgment, to analyze the challenges with which Islam is confronted today, similar in this to all the religious systems that bear the weight of a long history from which they do not manage to liberate themselves.

In our book Islam Between Message and History, we analyzed the institutionalization of the prophetic message that occurred shortly after the death of Mohammed. This process, in its complementary form of confessionalization, ritualization and dogmatization, has resisted the accidents of history and the different conjunctures Muslims have experienced. The question to be asked in our time concerning this fact is the following: is it still relevant in the current context of globalization? Again, not because the latter is a novel and positive phenomenon in every aspect, but because it is the end result of a multiform movement begun with the European Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, pursued by the Enlightenment, and crowned by the scientific and technical advances of the last two centuries whose repercussions on the functioning of societies, on the ways of believing and the content of these beliefs, and on the new world-views these have generated, are undeniable.

Confessionalization was inevitable insofar as it allowed Muslims to recognize one another and distinguish themselves from non-Muslims, through clothing, food and general behavior. Let us not forget that in the early days of Islam, they were a minority in the countries they conquered, and that although the ancient societies were far from uniform, everyone and each social and religious category had to stay in its specific place, which was perceived as natural in the clearly hierarchical general structure of society as a whole. This rule, accepted and interiorized by practically everyone, explained not only the privileged status of Muslims but also the inferior status of women and non-Muslims, to say nothing of slaves. The different statuses brought both exclusive duties that were not binding for other groups and equally exclusive rights hardly enjoyed by others, all of this being justified by concerns of a religious nature. Today, the bases on which social relations are founded no longer permit discrimination between members of different social groups, be it because of differences of religion, color, or sex.

Regarding ritualization, which consisted in a uniformization of the ways of performing rites, especially prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage, it seemed natural given the fact that the institutionalized religions did not tolerate the flexibility and the freedom to which the Muslims contemporary to Mohammed were accustomed. It matters little, from this point of view, that the Koran does not go into detail about devotional acts and is content to incite believers to carry them out; the nascent dogma of the normativity of the Prophet’s actions, as they were transmitted by certain Companions – usually second-order ones like Abu Hurayra, known only by his sobriquet – and then entrusted to the first collections of theHadîth, is sufficient to come to its aid as a supplement. What was happening was in fact a gradual downward egalitarianization that took account of the dispositions of the greatest number, but left the strongest personalities, those who would find refuge from the 3rd century of the Hijra in mysticism, dissatisfied. Now that the believer is no longer perceived as a member of a group with no autonomy, the loosening of the vise of ritualization has become quite imaginable.

Dogmatization, the third form that institutionalization took, does not have the same importance in Islam as it has in Christianity, which has seen, especially in the Eastern Churches, incessant and virulent quarrels over the definitions of the faith, especially concerning the trinity and the incarnation. The absolute transcendence of God in Islam shielded him from parallel dogmatic disputes. The Koran remains nevertheless a theological book, and theology, insofar as it is the attempted rationalization of faith, could not but institute intangible dogmas. The first Muslim theologians, the mutakallimûn, defended as a general rule the principle of free will in human actions, but the combined opposition of the politicians and the specialists of the Hadîth wound up imposing the dogma of the divine determination of man’s acts in their minutest detail. Other dogmas were similarly imposed, among which we might especially cite, in the case of Sunnism, the normativity of the Tradition just mentioned, the honorability of all the Companions without exception, the preeminence of the first four “rightly guided” Caliphs in the order of their accession to the

head of the Caliphate, etc. Without a doubt, the contemporary Muslim is no longer comfortable with this dogma; he seeks an understanding of the faith that is free of dogmas bearing the mark of their bygone era.

The institutionalization of Islam in question had to wed itself to the reigning forms of social organization, and yield to the norms accepted in every pre-modern civilization. It therefore permitted the religious justification and legitimization of the era’s values and institutions, and could not in any case extract itself from the categories imposed by the mental horizon that has been fashioned by the common estate, shared by all peoples, of the available science and knowledge.

It is at this level that it seems necessary to us to locate the problem of the difficult relationship between modernity and globalization, on the one hand, and historical Islam, i.e. the concrete applications of the prophetic message, on the other. We do no more here than point out a few of the difficulties that seem most significant in this regard, always keeping in mind that the problems that arise for an Islamic thinking confronted with globalization, when expressed in purely religious terms, obscure the other, strictly profane and historical, dimensions of these difficulties.

Let us take as an example the question of power. The latter had systematic recourse to religious legitimacy to ground the monopoly on violence it enjoyed. And this legitimacy was almost never questioned by the believers of any branch whatsoever. And yet, the amazing advances of the human and social sciences caused the mask to fall from the face of power, which was shown in truth to be that of a regulating institution of society, neither more nor less. From then on it could no longer receive its legitimacy from any source but the consent of the populations in question and the popular will. The interiorization of this new conception of power made headway in the West in a context that favored the transition from absolute power to democracy, i.e., the rise of the bourgeoisie, industrialization, scientific and technical progress, the birth of Nation-States, etc.

No such things took place in the Muslim world. One is, since the acquisition of political independence, therefore in the presence of autocratic regimes that perpetuate the notorious postponing of democracy. This situation is not confined to Islamic countries; it has existed and continues still in Latin America, in Africa and elsewhere. What is deserving of attention regarding this is that religious thought is torn between the attraction of freedom and democracy, on the one hand, and nostalgia for the regime of the Caliphate, on the other. The socio-economic conditions do not help it to free itself from the tar pit of this nostalgia; conceptual confusion and an ideological hodge-podge win the day.

And yet, a new factor, which is of a nature such as to turn completely on its head the classical schema of the evolution of political power, is the emergence, thanks to the more or less advanced generalization of teaching and to the lightening progress of information and communication technologies, the possibility of divulging in real time any event whatsoever in any part of the world. Ordinary citizens now have the ability to know the unspeakable and formerly well-kept secrets of the regimes in place, which strips these regimes of a formidable weapon in the manipulation and indoctrination of the masses. Of course, states today possess means of control and coercion of which yesterday’s dictatorships could not even dream. Nevertheless, they must take ever greater account of a public opinion that is not eternally duped by their lies, and which aspires to take part in strategic choices, in decision making, and in the control of public agents, from bottom to top. Thus, the religiously colored justifications of submission to despotism (the famousTa’at ûlî-amr) tend to lose the incontestable authority that they used to enjoy. And it is extremely rare now to find declared enemies of democracy, whether it is called by the termshûra or taken for what it really is: a mode of government that was born in the West and that has become a universal value and an integral part of the rights of man, and as an aspiration to the concrete realization of the corresponding ethics and institutions.

The question of condition of women supplies us with another example of the difficulties of the adaptation of religious thought to the new conditions imposed by globalization. Indeed, it is well known that in every civilization’s past, and with the exception, more or less widespread in space and time, of the upper classes, women were considered ontologically and sociologically inferior to men. Concerning dress codes, which revealed social distinctions and discriminations, it was the case that in each town, even

each village, and each region women would dress according to the tradition of their milieu and to climatic considerations. And, as on might expect, this situation was justified by religious considerations. Those whose job it was to manage the sacred began, moreover, with a consideration of their own interests and excluded women from the high sacerdotal offices and forbade them access to certain functions, which varied from one context to another.

Women did not obtain a theoretical equality with men, still put only partially into practice, even in many advanced societies, until after a difficult struggle and all sorts of sacrifices. It is nevertheless necessary to insist on the fact that this equality, obtained and consented to at such a high cost, would not have been able to establish itself, despite women’s struggle on behalf of their basic rights, and in face of the ferocious opposition of clerics and conservatives of every stripe, without industrialization and the need it created to resort to the female labor pool, and without as a result the financial autonomy that this allowed women to acquire, thus throwing off the yoke of the inferior status which had previously been theirs.

In the history of Islamic societies, in the very absence of the notion of original sin and of its correlate, the stigmatization of sex, women enjoyed, just like everywhere else, only inferior rights to those enjoyed by men. The reformist movements in the Muslim world, since the end of the 19th century, have made the improvement of the status and the education of Muslim women one of their principal battle cries, but almost entirely in vain. The modes of production and socio-economic structures did not change accordingly. And mentalities could not change without radical changes in these structures. In other words, the opposition to women’s liberation and to their juridical equality with men, although expressed in religious terms, in fact reflect a reality and a balance of power that religion does nothing but justify. The proof of this is that wherever modernization has attained a certain level of advancement, the situation of women has evolved despite every opposition. Tunisia, Turkey, and recently Morocco are a good illustration of this rule.

As in the case of democracy, gender equality has today become, thanks to globalization, development of the means of information and communication, and the generalization of education, a general aspiration of the younger generation, whom traditionally trained clerics and Islamist no longer dare confront directly. They are therefore leading a rear-guard fight by remaining attached, under false pretexts, to polygamy and to inequality of inheritance rights, and by passing judgment on unveiled women and those who bravely refuse prohibitions on interaction between the sexes and on participation in public life, all the while affirming the fundamental equality of men and women in Islam, without realizing the blatant contradiction in which they find themselves.

The two examples that we have mentioned – the conception of power and the condition of women – perfectly show that the spokesmen for Islam, whether an official, traditional Islam or an activist, revolutionary one, are up against this globalization over which they have no control. The conspicuous ritualistic religiosity dissimulates poorly a profound secularization of Islamic societies, along the lines of what all contemporary societies have known. What appears as a return to religiosity is nothing more, in most cases, than the expression of a return to communitarian identities. On the one hand, as we have said, it is more a matter of the search for certainty in a world that is losing its familiar orientation. On the other hand, it is a question of reaction to historical backwardness and to humiliation, to underdevelopment, to the despotism of local governments, and to the warlike and arrogant policies the United States of America in particular, and to the West in general, which supports the Israeli occupation of Palestine without reserve and is deaf to the legitimate complaints and suffering of the Palestinians, and which participates actively or through its silent complicity in the occupation of the Muslim lands of Iraq and Afghanistan.

As a consequence, holding Islam as such to be responsible for the evils that are eating away at Muslim societies betrays an essentialist vision of religion that the history of religions and religious anthropology have completely dispensed with. Islam, like any other belief system, can, paradoxically and varying with each case, be either a cause of alienation or of its opposite. Our hypothesis is that globalization, because a certain number of its manifestations is notoriously alienating, is of a nature such as to push Islam to play an de-alienating role concerning money, the rule of the law of the market, merciless competition, egotism, and everything dehumanizing in relations between groups and individuals. From another angle, through

the means that it puts at the disposal of a greater number of people, globalization offers to humanity as a whole an opportunity to leave the material and symbolic ghettos into which it had been shut, and thus to enlarge its intellectual horizons, which were dramatically limited for preceding generations.

In this sense, we are all at a crossroads, and thanks to the digital revolution we are going through a privileged moment, one that incites us to redouble our efforts to keep religious thought from lagging behind cognitive progress, and to allow it to help us to assume responsibility for the fullness of our condition. To this end, the revision of our relation with the interpretative tradition of the prophetic message is a necessary, although insufficient, condition. It is obviously impossible to embrace every domain in which this tradition exercises incontestable authority. We shall as a result limit ourselves to the essential traditional conceptions that determine all the others in a certain way, and that seem destined by the force of things to evolve.

The first conception, and by far the most sensitive, concerns the status of the Koran. Is it, as the tradition proclaims, an exclusively divine text in both content and form, supernaturally dictated to the prophet Mohammed, whose role was purely that of passive transmitter? Or is the Koran, written in human language, for the believer divine in its origin and its inspiration but equally eminently human, to the extent that the personality of the Prophet, his culture and the conditions of his individual and communal life could not help but intervene in the elaboration of this sacred text? Can the believer allow that the Prophet had a privileged relation with divinity, an uncommon experience of the divine which the Koranic discourse, which was originally oral before being set down in the Mushaf, would perfectly account for?

Once it became canonical, the Koran served as a reference for the religious justification and for the legitimation of customary social relations and institutions of the Muslim empire. In other words, the interpretations of the Koran that come down to us in the first exegeses and date back to the 3rd century after the Hijla reflect the preoccupations of Muslims after the movement of the conquests and the constitution, in the vast fields of the empire, of Muslim communities of Arab or convert origin, much more than the preoccupations and ways of understanding that were proper to the first audience of the prophetic message. The attachment to the literalness of the text, in particular, was not universal until the point at which the Koran became practically a binding juridical code, which it in fact was more in theory than in reality.

One of the priorities of a critique internal to Islam consists in becoming and in making others aware of this historical process. This is a difficult operation which requires all sorts of competences, whose objective is to traverse the thick and successive layers of interpretations and manipulations that have been imposed on the Text in order to get back to the original message and apprehend it in all its richness and depth. On the way, one can cast aside philosophical concepts inherited for the most part from the dominant mythical consciousness and from efforts to rationalize the givenness of revelation. In sum, it can be hoped to seize what was given in revelation in its universality and in its intentions, and not in its circumstantial injunctions.

This way of proceeding would first of all question, and even contradict, the very widespread idea that the first generations of Muslims, the “pious ancients” (as-salaf as sâlih), had better knowledge of the precepts of Islam and applied them perfectly, and that the following generations are destined to drift ever further away. This idea is no longer acceptable to the degree that at its birth Islam needed time in order to be interiorized, that it did not go about this though brain-washing, and that the minds of the first Muslims were still soaked in the beliefs and perceptions of the world and society that were impossible to erase all at once and to replace them with new ones. Furthermore, it does not take account of the accumulation, which is larger with every passing day, of human knowledge and of elements of universal culture, especially today. In fact, the first Muslims whose task it was to apply what they understood of Islam could only do so in the framework of the cognitive and social systems at their disposition. Their solutions were dictated by imperatives which are no longer ours. To conform to them would amount to cutting religion off definitively from life, while the maintenance of this connection is paradoxically the declared objective of those who are attached to the veneration of the past and of the ancients, closer in their eyes (although they would never admit this) to angels than to humans, who are burdened by a multitude of constraints and subject, among other things, to desires, ambitions, loves and hates.

In the same order of ideas, we have witnessed a veritable transfiguration of the person of the Prophet, who has become super human over the years, a being to whom each attributes all the ideals and all the aspirations of the men of his time, and even their fantasies, including sexual, despite the Koran’s affirmation that he is certainly an example to follow, but that he is just a simple mortal charged with transmitting the divine message.

The living message was therefore not sufficient to feed this archetype in all the Islamic lands. It is therefore the textual tradition that took its place. The Hadith was born of this need, as well as the normativity of the acts and words of the Prophet, i.e., the necessity of conformity to the smallest of deeds and gestures of Mohammed recorded in the 3rd/9th century in the collections of prophetic traditions said to be authentic.

To revise the historical interpretations is also, as a result, to unmask the illusory character of these traditions which claim to reflect faithfully the will of the Prophet, while they are in fact and can be nothing but representations influenced, in good or in bad faith, by historical factors that it is possible to analyze and clarify, at least in large outline and in their general texture, by the methods of modern human and social sciences.

It is the same not only when it comes to other foundations of Muslim law, in particular concerning consensus (igmâ’) and analogy ( qiyas), but above all concerning the postulates which form the basis of the entire edifice of the jurisprudential rules inaccurately referred to as the Sharî’a. To take an example, to affirm, with Shâfi’î (204/820), who is only translating a common conception of his contemporaries, that all human acts without exception must all necessarily obey one of the five legal qualifications or statutes (ahkâm) which are, in descending order, the obligatory, the recommended, the permissible, the reprehensible and the illicit, is nothing more than the expression of a situation in which every aspect of life is sacralized, in other words characterized by an alienation that it is urgent to leave behind.

In the same vein, to consider that it is necessary to take Koranic verses literally, not taking into consideration the particular circumstances at their origin, or that the effort of personal reflection, (ijtihâd) only applies in the absence of an explicit text, or that the “tawâtur”, i.e. the presence of several transmitters of the same tradition, leads to certain knowledge, or that it is forbidden to revise a consensus elaborated by a previous generation, and so many other similar presuppositions, to consider that they are still valid today is to ignore that they are the pieces of a human, juridical, social and political edifice which fully played its role in the past, but which has now fallen into complete ruin under the effects of modernity.

To think Islam according to the imperatives of globalization is therefore also to admit that this type of organization in no longer valid, and that it is vain to pursue the chimera of restoration, such as was attempted by the Afghan Taliban, and as Islamist movements of every persuasion dream, whether they be Wahhabis, Khomeynists, Muslim Brothers or something else.

It is not appropriate, regarding this, to put into doubt the authentic aspiration of these groups, in the face of ever-present despotic regimes set up after the fall of the Caliphate and the end of colonization, to limit the powers of the State in favor of the application of their conception of the Law of God. And yet, this aspiration, legitimate as it may be, does not take account of two essential factors, without which it collapses without any chance of success:

The first is that the modern Nation State is an organization that has imposed itself everywhere in the world, and that even if one tries to escape it this will only be by means of assimilation into a larger political entity, such as the European Union, or by means of supra-national international conventions, but never through a return to the system of Empire whose frontiers expand and contract as a function of the balance of power, and which allows for the coexistence of different legislations, particularly on a sectarian basis, within it.

The second factor is the fiction of a Divine Law of which only the experts, the Ulemas, are the faithful interpreters. Modern historical knowledge, which is more refined every day, has taken it upon itself to

destroy this fiction, by showing the all too human character of theFiqh whose prescriptions are determined by the cultural, social and economic contexts of a bygone era.

Following these considerations, it appears that what is called globalization (if one is looking for brevity), but more fundamentally, that the structural changes at every level, the progress of human knowledge in the area of the human and social sciences, and the universal aspiration towards a spectrum of values falling under the description of inalienable “human rights”, effectively put Islam and the other great historic religions to the test. Will it be up to the task with which it is confronted? No one, in our opinion, has managed to give a convincing response one way or another. What is certain, however, is that religious thought is never disembodied, and that it is in the final analysis the historical conditions which shape and condition its adequation with reality in all its dimensions. 

Translated by John Rogove

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

The final/definitive version of Abdelmajid Charfi’s essay was published inPhilosophy&Social Criticism, vol 36 nos 3-4 March and May 2010, SAGE Publications Ltd, (LA, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC), all rights reserved, p. 295-307, Special Issue: "Postsecularism and multicultural Jusirdictions", Reset-Dialogues on Civilizations Istanbul Seminars 2008-2009, Edited by: Alessandro Ferrara, Volker Kaul and David Rasmussen. Link to the issue http://psc.sagepub.com/content/36/3-4.toc

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

*Abdelmajid Charfi is a leading Tunisian scholar on Islam, he teaches at the Faculty of Arts, University of Manouba, Tunis.

À l'heure où les islamistes qui contrôlent le Nord-Mali détruisent les mausolées de saints et les mosquées historiques de Tombouctou, l'islamologue et universitaire tunisien Abdelmajid Charfi décrypte l'idéologie des djihadistes. Quels rapports entretiennent-ils avec le wahhabisme des pays du Golfe ? Qu'est-ce que la charia ? Quelle place cette dernière réserve-t-elle aux châtiments corporels ? Éléments de réponse.Jeune Afrique : Pourquoi les islamistes d'Ansar Eddine s'attaquent-ils aux mausolées de saints à Tombouctou ?Abdelmajid Charfi : Je pense que l’influence du wahhabisme est à l’œuvre chez Ansar Eddine [défenseur de l’islam, NDLR] au Mali. Depuis ses débuts, au XVIIIe siècle, le wahhabisme a toujours lutté contre la vénération des saints. C’est pour ça qu’en Arabie saoudite on a détruit tous les mausolées qui existaient, même ceux des compagnons du Prophète… Donc c’est vraiment l’islam bédouin, l’islam très rigoriste, qui explique cette attitude destructrice. Ce qui est sûr, c’est qu’Ansar Eddine est sous influence directe du wahhabisme, il n’y a pas d’autre secte en islam qui a la même attitude vis-à-vis de la vénération des saints et du maraboutisme.

Capture d'écran d'une vidéo de militants islamistes détruisant le 1er juillet 2012 des bâtiments religieux à Tombouctou.© AFP

Comment définiriez-vous la charia que les islamistes veulent imposer ?Il y a le sens originel du mot, qui indique « la voix », et il y a l’utilisation très récente du mot charia. Dans l’histoire islamique, ce terme n’était pas utilisé, n’était pas du tout courant. C’est surtout depuis l’apparition des Frères musulmans, dans la première moitié du XXe siècle, qu’on utilise le mot charia pour indiquer la jurisprudence islamique. Elle repose sur des interprétations humaines de versets coraniques, mais également sur toute une élaboration de règles strictes, qui concernent autant la vie privée que la vie publique du croyant. Enfin, la charia touche aussi bien les actes cultuels, c'est-à-dire les actes rituels du culte, que les actes de la vie courante.Quelles sont ses origines ? La charia est-elle clairement mentionnée dans les textes fondateurs de l'islam ?

La charia repose sur les quatre fondements du « droit islamique » : le Coran, la Sunna (la tradition du prophète), le consensus et l’analogie. Pour les tenants de l’application de la charia, c’est le consensus qui prévaut, beaucoup plus que le Coran et la Sunna, parce que le Coran peut être sujet a beaucoup d’interprétations… Quant à la Sunna, n’en parlons pas, vous pouvez trouver des hadiths dans tous les sens qui affirment des choses et leur contraire ! Donc c’est vraiment le consensus au sein de la communauté qui est le véritable fondement de cette doctrine.Quid des châtiments corporels (main coupée, coups de fouet, lapidation...) que les partisans de la charia entendent infliger ? Sont-ils mentionnés dans le Coran ?Non, ils sont plus anciens que l’islam lui-même ! On les retrouve notamment dans des règles de droit chrétien datant du IVe siècle, avec les mêmes peines infligées aujourd’hui par les prétendus défenseurs de la charia. Donc ce ne sont pas des peines proprement musulmanes, ce sont des peines valables dans des sociétés tribales, traditionnelles, où couper la main du voleur est, par exemple, tout à fait « normal ».Peut-on isoler certains principes de base de la charia ?Ce ne sont pas des principes, plutôt des attitudes de conservatisme. Il existe une certaine nostalgie de l’âge d’or où les choses étaient simples, où les relations étaient « bien » tracées dans la communauté des musulmans : il y avait ceux qui connaissaient et ceux qui devaient se fier aux savants. Il y avait donc une hiérarchie bien organisée, les gens étaient heureux. C’est du moins comme ça qu’on perçoit l’histoire islamique. Mais en fait cette nostalgie est une forme de conservatisme. C’est la nostalgie d’un idéal tout à fait fictif, mais c’est surtout, à mon avis, une réaction à tous les bouleversements que connaissent les sociétés modernes. Il y a une réaction de repli : au lieu d’affronter les difficultés du présent, on préfère se rapporter au passé. C’est pour cela que je qualifie cette attitude de conservatrice.La charia défendue par les islamistes d’Ansar Eddine, au Mali, a-t-elle des caractéristiques particulières ?Ce sont des talibans, il n’y a pas de différences entre ces derniers et les islamistes maliens. Les talibans ont suivi le wahhabisme, Ansar Eddine fait pareil aujourd’hui. Vous verrez : s’ils sont au pouvoir pendant quelque temps, ils vont interdire aux gens d’aller à l’école, ils vont interdire le théâtre, la musique, etc… Je dirais qu’ils appliquent un islam primaire. Aujourd’hui, ce sont les coups de fouets, mais demain cela pourrait être couper la main du voleur ou lapider la femme adultère, comme les talibans ont pu le faire en Afghanistan.

Capture d'écran d'une vidéo AFP montrant un militant islamiste célébrant la destruction de mausolées au Mali le 1er juillet 2012.© AFP

Conçue comme cela, la charia ne mènerait donc qu’aux châtiments corporels…Comme je vous l’ai dit, la charia concerne aussi bien les actes cultuels que les actes de la vie courante. Mais lorsque ces ignares, parce qu’il faut bien les appeler comme ça, veulent appliquer la charia, ils ne retiennent que l’application des peines corporelles et un certain ordre moral traditionnel.Y a-t-il tout de même des spécificités régionales dans l'application de la charia, notamment dans les pays africains ?Avant, les différences d’interprétation étaient liées aux écoles juridiques de l’islam : malikisme, hanafisme, hanbalisme, et chaféisme. Mais aujourd’hui, ces différences s’estompent. C’est l’interprétation rigoriste wahhabite qui, avec les moyens dont dispose l’islam du pétrole, prend le dessus. La charia est présentée comme étant une, dans le sens rigoriste que les wahhabites comprennent. Maintenant, ce sont eux qui disent ce qui est dans la charia et ce qui ne l’est pas.___Propos recueillis par Benjamin Roger

Lire l'article sur Jeuneafrique.com : Mali | Abdelmajid Charfi : "Au Mali, Ansar Eddine est sous l'influence directe du

wahhabisme" | Jeuneafrique.com - le premier site d'information et d'actualité sur l'Afrique 

Follow us: @jeune_afrique on Twitter | jeuneafrique1 on Facebook

Vol. 12, No 2&3, 2005 / Anti - Semitism & Islamophobia

FocusIslam and Democracy: Are They Compatible?

There is no direct correlation between the absence of democracy and Islam.     by Abdelmajid Charfi

Ever since September 11, 2001, the question of the connections between Islam and democracy, between Islam and terrorism and, more generally, violence has been very much on the agenda. In the booming colonial literature of a century ago, it was another question that was more frequently posed: that of the responsibility of Islam in the backwardness of the Muslim people, especially since it promotes fatalism and is allegedly opposed to freedom of choice and the spirit of initiative. We should ask ourselves whether these questions — or rather accusations — are pertinent, and whether Islam as a religion is effectively at the source of the obvious lack of democracy in many Muslim countries and, particularly, in the Arab world.To start with, it should be pointed out, as an example, that Latin America has long suffered under dictatorial regimes run by corrupt military juntas and nobody, at least in the West, has thought of holding Christianity, the majority religion of the Latin American people, responsible for these dictatorships. Neither has anyone judged that the Orthodox religion of the Russians — who had allowed Communism to take root in their countries — was to blame for their unrelenting autocratic rule over the peoples of the defunct Soviet Union.Why then this essentialist view of Islam which, supposedly, is incapable of evolution or change? And why also overlook the fact that the majority of Muslims are living today in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and elsewhere under democratic regimes — within the limits permitted by their socioeconomic conditions.

Those who label Islam a violent religion are on the wrong track.

Fueled by Islamist Literature

It is true that a whole body of Islamist literature exists that is financed and encouraged in part by the Islam of petrol which feeds this essentialist view of Islam. It provides it with irrefutable arguments concerning the predilection of a fringe of Muslims for a caliphate regime and political systems that fall far short of the criteria for democracy. However, the general tendency is to take such a view at face value and to regard it as representative of a prevalent Muslim attitude, instead of placing it within its proper context. It is equally true that, throughout history, political power in the countries of Islam did not usually allow for citizen participation in civic affairs. But which power in pre-modern history was democratic in the sense that we understand it today?This negative perception of Islam is without doubt being fueled by ideological rather than religious motives. It manifestly provides its detractors with a clean conscience to implement their policies of hegemony and exploitation under the guise of the struggle of good against evil, and the propagation of democracy, liberty, and human rights.

They overlook the discrepancy posed by such justification with their selfish economic and strategic interests, and with their arrogant and criminal conduct, even according to international law and the basic principles of ethics. Nevertheless, although it is material interests which guide the politics of the big powers, neither the cultural nor the psychological dimensions are to be disregarded. In certain instances, they can be very important, albeit never determining. They serve rather to justify hegemonic and belligerent machinations, and to give a semblance of legitimacy for actions that are devoid of it.

A Degree of Nostalgia

Even if today’s West has ceased to be the Christianity of the Middle Ages and is now largely secularized, its attitude towards the Muslim world remains tinged with the animosity and strife that have marked the shared history of both Muslims and Christians around the Mediterranean since the inception of Islam. The former remember with nostalgia the period when they were masters of Spain, the south of France and Sicily. The latter do not forget that countries which once were the cradle and centers of Christianity —Palestine in the first place, but also Syria, Egypt, Turkey, with towns charged with history and Christian symbols like Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria or Constantinople — have fallen under the rule of Islam. The religion of Christ has forever been banished from these lands, while its followers have dwindled to a minority.It is not then by chance that the West, traditionally anti-Semitic, has installed Israel in the heart of the Arab world.1 It was one way for the West to rid itself of the Jews; at the same time it was able to throw a western bridgehead in a part of the world it often perceived as basically hostile. And it is not the least paradoxical to see the traditionally anti-Jewish religious extreme right and ultra-conservatives — currently in the ascendance in the U.S.A. — give their unstinting support to the Zionist entity, as they believe this would hasten the Second Coming of Christ. In such a unique situation, not one leader has seen fit to decry the blatant denial of justice of which the Palestinians are victim, or the alleged Israeli democracy which treats the latter as second class citizens and practices a segregationist policy based on religion and race. Why then does the West give such an importance to the establishment of democracy in Muslim countries? Everybody is familiar with the scores of analyses asserting that democracy is the best defense against the terrorism carried out by certain Islamist groups, operating almost everywhere around the world and striking blindly against innocent victims. These analyses can be accepted without reservation, provided Islam is not associated with such terrorist acts, even if their perpetrators insist on the fact. In the name of Christian values, some militants of the pro-life movement in the U.S.A. have attacked doctors and clinics that practice abortions. The Irish Catholics have perpetrated several terrorist acts against their Protestant enemies. It does not mean that

Christianity which has been abusively invoked in these cases should be held responsible for the reprehensible acts one commits in its name. Similarly, ultra-Orthodox Jewish settlers and Israeli soldiers armed to the teeth kill with impunity peaceful citizens of the occupied territories, expel others from their homes, blow up their houses, uproot their millenary trees and destroy their crops under the false pretence of the fight against terrorism and their religious right over the land of Palestine. It would be wrong, however, to see in Judaism a religious or systematic hatred towards non-Jews. The same measure should apply to Islam. 

Understanding the Historical Context

One must always seek to understand the historical conditions which lead to the reading of sacred texts in one way rather than in another. It is in the nature of sacred texts to be susceptible to divergent, even contradictory, interpretations, arising from a specific context, from the expectations of the readers, or from the underlying cultural framework. It is not possible then to assert that Islam is for or against democracy, or for the equality of the sexes, freedom of conscience or any other value. The mainstream readings, called orthodox, are in effect nothing but the reflection of the preoccupation of the faithful during a certain period. They may change; the faithful, however, need not recognize the changes. This is completely justified, to the extent that the Prophetic messages are systematically perverted under the influence of socio-historical factors, and because religion, in getting institutionalized, is transformed into a congealed and dogmatic system of beliefs and non-beliefs. The believers are then called upon to cut across successive layers of historical interpretations in order to arrive at the original meaning of the founding texts.If militant Islamism, which is essentially political and is responsible for a number of contemporary terrorist acts in and outside Muslim countries, claims its action springs from a reading of the Qur’an and the Prophetic Tradition which it considers as the only valid sources, it is because religious teaching in the majority of the traditional religious centers is far behind the modern advances grounded in the scientific achievements of the past two centuries. The Catholic Church had held anti-modernist attitudes until the Vatican II Council. The Muslims do not dispose of a clergy like that of Catholicism. With a historical retard in the religious domain as indeed in other domains, it is normal that we should witness among them all sorts of religiosities, each trying in its way to be faithful to the teachings of Islam. We are, in effect, in the presence of a manipulative process which profits those who have the means to influence public opinions through television satellites and other media that spout all day long a discourse both reactionary and retrograde.Sunni Islam — which is in the majority — has always held a legitimistic position vis-à-vis the established powers. The Muslim clerics were ready to recognize any regime, even despotic, provided it conceded to them the monopoly of social control through

the prerogatives of religious law which they are supposed to apply. Today, this position has become anachronistic by the fact that religious law is essentially universal, whereas the Muslims live in countries where the law is by nature territorial. The modern Muslim nation-states follow then a law where the reference to the shari’a is most tenuous if not totally absent, except in what relates to the personal status which remains in most cases subject to the rules of classical jurisprudence.

Not Unlike Other Religions

In other words, Islam is not free from the manipulation by the religious for social ends. All the traditional and pre-modern societies have experienced the system of laws justified by religion, which was considered the ultimate authority for the legitimization of the established order, including the political. Today, the aspirations of Muslims for democracy and the participation of citizens in the public sphere do not differ from the aspirations of other people, irrespective of creed, language or color. The maintaining of undemocratic regimes, or frankly anti-democratic ones, that claim more or less openly a religious legitimacy, should be explained only by the fact that Muslim societies have not yet generally succeeded in modernizing their production and social systems, or in acquiring institutions that guarantee popular sovereignty. Agriculture, breeding, handicrafts and small businesses are the most widespread means of production. Income from petrol is enough to cater to the needs of the population in certain countries. But almost in all Muslim countries, industrialization is either insufficient or simply inexistent. This shapes, directly and indirectly, the social configurations of the countries, not to mention that it is a necessary condition, albeit not sufficient, for the establishment of a democratic system.Consequently, dealing with the question of democracy in terms of its compatibility or incompatibility with Islam is not a valid approach. Like all religions, Islam adapts to any political regime. This does not mean that all regimes are comparable in measuring up to its principles, far from it. To the contrary, our reading of the Muhammedian message leads to the assertion that in dispensing with intermediaries between man and the Divine, and ending the dependence of man on supernatural powers, human beings are enabled to fully exercise their freedom and responsibility. And what better system than democracy through which to exercise these two fundamentals? Consequently, any position at variance with this is nothing but a hang-over from the past, doomed sooner or later to disappear or to be marginalized.Those who seek to label Islam as a violent or despotic religion are on the wrong track. They would better be advised to address the origin of injustices and frustrations experienced by Muslims and to help in the emergence or the consolidation of conditions that are promote the establishment of democracy, instead of pretending to impose it by the force of arms. They should also start by practicing democracy in their own international relations and the functioning of such institutions as the World Bank,

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the UN Security Council. And finally, they could show their serious concern for democracy by ending their support, especially by covert means, in the Muslim world and elsewhere, for dictatorial regimes, since these tend to facilitate the exploitation, by foreign powers, of the riches of their own people. 

1.“The hunting of Jews has always been a European sport. Now, the Palestinians, who had never practiced it, are paying the price,” Eduardo Galeano, Le Monde diplomatique, August 2005, p. 10.