In June of 1863, General Robert E. Lee advanced

his Army of Northern Virginia north via the

Shenandoah and Cumberland Valleys into

Pennsylvania.

Confederate General Robert E. Lee decides to invade the North:

• To shift the focus of the summer campaign from war-ravaged Virginia to the North

• To provide his starving army with food from the lush farmlands in the North

• To galvanize the Peace Democrats in the North and to influence Northern politicians

• To impress foreign powers and to persuade them to support the Southern cause

Lieutenant General Richard Ewell’s Corps led with advanced units moving north toward Harrisburg and east to Gettysburg, On June 26, a lead force of Major General Jubal Early’s Division of Ewell’s Corps entered Gettysburg via the Cashtown Pike after easily routing about 800 of the local 26th Pennsylvania infantry militia near Marsh Creek.

Early subsequently demanded money and supplies from the town (of which little could be found), and he burned a few train cars and a bridge before continuing to York.

No one was killed, but after Early’s division occupied the town, some Confederate pickets shot dead a 21st Pennsylvania militia cavalryman named George Sandoe, making him the first Gettysburg fatality.

Robert E. Lee did not know where the Union Army was because General J.E.B. Stuart, his chief cavalry officer who was “the eyes and ears of the Confederate Army,” had not been in contacted with him for about a week.

DAY 1

WEDNESDAYJULY 1, 1863

MCPHERSON’S RIDGE

THE RAILROAD CUT

BARLOW’S KNOLL

THE TOWN OF GETTYSBURG

CEMETERY HILL

OAK RIDGE AND MCPHERSON RIDGE

Shortly after 10:00 a.m., Major General John Reynolds arrived with lead units of his Union 1st Corps Infantry. Reynolds was widely considered to be one of the best officers in the Union Army, and under fire he quickly directed his men into action.

At dawn on July 1, 1863, neither George Meade nor Robert E. Lee was looking for a battle at Gettysburg. The biggest battle of the Civil War took both commanders by surprise.  Early that morning, General Henry Heth led a column of 7,000 Confederate soldiers toward Gettysburg on Chambersburg Pike. He saw the Union cavalry men, but had orders from General Lee not to bring on a sustained fight.

Three miles west of Gettysburg, Union scout Lieutenant Marcellus Jones of the 8th Illinois Cavalry spotted a column of Confederate infantry. He sent a rider back with word that the Confederates were on their way. Then he borrowed a Carbine from his sergeant, rested it on a fence rail, and fired a warning shot.

Heth’s men responded with shots of their own and continued their march toward Gettysburg. Meanwhile, Union General John Buford led his 2,700 cavalry men toward the McPherson farm one half mile west of Gettysburg and positioned them in a arc stretching from the west to the northeast, from Hagerstown to Harrisburg Roads. The Battle of Gettysburg had begun.

HERR’S RIDGE AND MCPHERSON’S RIDGE

“For more than two hours,”

Buford’s First Brigade resisted the Confederate advance, but they were far outnumbered.

Meanwhile, Buford had sent word to General John Reynolds that he needed help.

• The first of his troops on the scene were those of Cutler’s Brigade, The 56th Pennsylvania fired the first infantry volley.

• When Confederates under the command of Brigadier General James Archer entered the woods (a woodlot immediately south of the McPherson Farm), Reynolds sent portions of Brigadier General Solomon Meredith’s “Iron Brigade” to stop them.

• The Iron Brigade pushed the Confederates back and captured many, including General Archer.

• Near the eastern edge of the woods, General John Reynolds was shot in the brain and instantly killed---the highest ranking officer casualty of the battle.

11:00 A.M.

Arriving at Gettysburg immediately behind General Reynolds’s 1st Corps was the 11th Corps, which was under the command of General Oliver Otis Howard. At the death of General Reynolds, General Howard became the highest ranking officer on the field.

THE 11TH CORPS WAS MADE UP OF 26 REGIMENTS OF INFANTRY AND FIVE BATTERIES OF ARTILLERY.

• On the day before the Battle of Gettysburg, the 11th Corps reported 10,576 officers and men for duty.

• Its loss in that battle would be 368 killed, 1,922 wounded, and 1,511 captured or missing

11th CORPS GEN. OLIVER O. HOWARD

1ST DIVISIONBARLOW

2ND DIVISIONVON

STEINWEHR

3RD DIVISIONSCHURZ

1ST BRIGADEVON GILSA

1ST BRIGADECOSTER

1ST BRIGADESCHIMMILEFENNIG

2ND BRIGADEAMES

2ND BRIGADESMITH

2ND BRIGADEKRZYZANOWSKI

17TH CT VOLUNTEERS

MCLEAN’S FARM AND BARLOW’S KNOLL

Brigadier General Francis Channing Barlow was a twenty-nine year old Harvard graduate and former New York lawyer.

Rodes’s division was the first unit of Ewell’s Corps to arrive in Gettysburg, and shortly after 2:00 p.m., it became hotly engaged with the Union 1st and 11th Corps northwest of town.

When Jubal Early approached the field along the Harrisburg Road, he was perfectly positioned to attack Barlow’s division on the extreme right flank of the 11th Corps.

Around noon, the battle had paused, but another Confederate division, under Major General Robert Rodes of Ewell’s Corps, arrived on Oak Hill. Under the cover of the woods on Oak Hill, Rodes deployed his troops to strike the northern flank of the Union First Corps positioned along Oak Ridge. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Carter’s battalion immediately began an hour-long artillery barrage to enfilade Union guns near the railroad cut and along Seminary Ridge.

Early placed Gordan’s brigade on the right of the road, Hayes’s brigade astride and to the left of the road, and Avery’s brigade on Hays’s left. At approximately 3:45 p.m. Gordon attacked.

Gen. John Gordon Gen. Isaac Avery Gen. Harry Hays

BARLOW’S KNOLL

Brigadier General Francis Barlow arrived with his division of the 11th Corps, and was ordered to protect General Schimmelfennig’s right flank. He anchored his troops on a knoll overlooking Rock Creek and the Harrisburg Road. The 11th Corps line was stretched terribly thin.

By swinging his 3,200 men up the gentle slope of the knoll and then into battle line, Barlow planned to send them down the opposite side in a northwesterly direction to slam into the left flank of Dole’s Georgia Brigade. At the same time, he could give Wilkeson’s guns the infantry support they needed.

As Barlow’s men moved up the knoll, Confederate skirmishers in the area were speedily swept aside. A little before 3:00 p.m., Barlow had his two brigades on top and along the eastern and northern slopes of the knoll. Already Wilkeson had zeroed in on two Southern batteries located on the eastern edge of Oak Hill.

Barlow was ready to make his move. Colonel von Gilsa already had skirmishers moving north along the creek side to feel out the Confederate left flank. Dole was pushing his Georgians slowly toward Gettysburg just to the let of Barlow’s battle line.

So intent was Barlow upon attacking Dole that he did not heed the military lightning flashing on his own right, directly across the creek.

Barlow, poised on the knoll and ready to cut into Dole’s left flank, was about to drive his regiments forward. Doubleday, whose 1st Corps was then very much in need of Barlow’s assistance said:  “Barlow had advanced with von Gilsa’s brigade, had driven back Ewell’s skirmish line, and with the aid of Wilkeson’s Battery, was preparing to hold the Carlisle Road. He was not aware that Early was approaching, and saw Dole’s advance with pleasure, for he felt confident he could swing around his right and envelop Dole’s left; a maneuver which could hardly fail to be successful.”

BARLOW SEEMS NOT TO HAVE SENSED THE DANGER!

Intent on pressing his attack on Dole, he and his two brigades suddenly heard the thunder of General Jubal Early’s division artillery. Less than a half-mile further north on the Harrisburg Road, cannoneers of Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Jones’s battalion quickly found the range and fixed upon Barlow’s exposed right flank.

Bombarded from two directions, from Oak Hill and the Harrisburg Road, Lieutenant Wilkeson’s four Napoleons on the knoll now returned fire both ways.

The concentration of Southern fire on the knoll soon succeeded in knocking this gallant young artilleryman from his horse.

As Wilkeson lay mortally wounded, Lieutenant Eugene A. Bancroft took command of the battery. And while the southern cannons were weakening the defenses surrounding Barlow’s Knoll, Early’s entire division moved in for the kill.

.

At about 3:30 p.m., Early had deployed three of his brigades into battle line on the opposite side of Rock Creek, and 6,300 Rebels stood ready to wade across the stream and roll up General Howard’s right flank.

Theirs was to be the closing trick of the first day’s flanking game

Leading Early’s right brigade was Brigadier General John B. Gordon. One of the South’s most colorful leaders, Gordon was keen of mind and bold in strategy and was the epitome of the southern gentleman. His immediate chore was to close ranks with his fellow Georgians in Dole’s brigade off to his right near the Carlisle Road and force Barlow off the knoll.

IN GORDON’S OWN WORDS: “The Union forces…were again advancing and pressing back Lee’s left and threatening to envelop it. The Confederates were stubbornly contesting every foot of ground, but the Southern left was slowly yielding. A few moments more, and that day’s battle might have been ended by the complete turning of Lee’s flank. I was ordered to move at once to the aid of the heavily pressed Confederates. With a ringing yell, my command rushed upon the line posted to protect the Union right.”

When General Gordon turned his Georgians loose, a full brigade of Rebels came out of the wheat fields, crossed the creek, and broke into the open area at the foot of the knoll. Within minutes, the charging Confederates had flushed out and sent over the hillock the remnants of von Gilsa’s three regiments, previously positioned along the creek.

Thrown first into disarray, and then into panic, these same unlucky “Dutchmen” were the first troops to “run for it” at Gettysburg, just as they had been at Chancellorsville.

As Gordon chased von Gilsa’s men to the rear, he ran into real resistance as his Georgians approached the top of the knoll. Changing fronts as best it could, Barlow’s 2nd Brigade, under General Ames, made a stubborn fight of it.

They were further handicapped, Ames reported, by “the men of the First Brigade of this division running through the lines of the regiments of my brigade and thereby creating considerable confusion.”

Private William Warren also noted in his diary that “the Dutchmen ran right through our regiment and broke it up.”

Barlow, now with but four fighting regiments, fought to hold his ground against increasing odds

Barlow’s position grew desperate, for in addition to Gordon’s Georgians, two additional Confederate brigades were beginning to curl in on the Union flank. With 4,500 Confederates closing in, Barlow had to withdraw or face entrapment. Still unwilling to yield his position, he tried to rally his regiments as they began to move back from the knoll, but at this point, he was severely wounded and General Ames assumed command.

GENERAL GORDON DESCRIBED IT THIS WAY: “That protecting Union line once broken left my command not only on the right flank, but obliquely in the rear of it. Any troops that were ever marshaled would, under like conditions, have been as surely and swiftly shattered. There was no alternative for Howard’s men except to break and fly, or to throw down their arms and surrender. Under the concentrated fire from front and flank, the marvel is that any [of the soldiers] escaped.”

As the Southern divisions tightened the noose, the outnumbered Union troops were steadily compressed toward the center of Gettysburg. Howard’s right flank collapsed first, leaving Doubleday’s rear unprotected. Under intense pressure from Heth and Pender, the 1st Corps followed the retreat of the 11th Corps through the town, jamming the streets and alleys in an effort to move south to Cemetery Hill. Many of these men had lost their will to fight, and much of their cohesion as the Rebels closed in.

Yet there was some resistance as a few Northern units tried desperately to make yet another stand!

To aid in the withdrawal of the Northern forces, General Oliver Otis Howard sent Colonel Charles R. Coster’s brigade and one artillery battery to the northeastern rim of town to ward off the fast approach of the Confederate brigades led by General Hays and Colonel Avery.

Since overrunning the Northern defense line near the Alms House, Hays had moved ahead unmolested, and Avery’s brigade to his left also moved quickly to flank the 11th Corps.

Luckily, Colonel Coster got his brigade into position beyond the railroad station in town just before the Southerners closed in. Coster’s brigade fought stubbornly and long enough to allow many Union soldiers to get through the town to Cemetery Hill. Protected by this temporary screen, General Ames’s First Division was able to withdraw.

Close behind Ames’s First Division, the shattered ranks of General Shimmelfennig’s Third Division of the 11th Corps intermingled with Doubleday’s First Corps troops now streaming through town. As these Union soldiers scrambled toward Cemetery Hill, the Rebels jammed into town from the east, the north, and the west. Every street echoed rifle fire and the boisterous Rebel yells of Lee’s victorious men. Casualties were high among the Union soldiers, and thousands of Federal infantrymen were taken prisoner as their lanes of escape collapsed.

The melee in and about town was so confused, though, that the Confederate surge lost its momentum. When General Ewell reached the center of Gettysburg, he observed a state of jubilation and disorder among his own troops so great that any organized pursuit of the fleeing Yankees was at that moment impossible.

Precious moments were lost as Ewell reorganized his men for an assault on Cemetery Hill. A discretionary order from General Lee suggested a prompt move against the hills to the south of Gettysburg, but Ewell chose not to move. His work for the day was done. His hesitation gave Howard’s men precious minutes to regroup for the defense of their hilltop.

With some Union regiments protecting the escape route to Cemetery Hill, Northern soldiers were able to break free from the havoc in town and struggle up the slope toward Howard’s headquarters. On the crest, Howard and his aides continued efforts to reorganize the new arrivals and post them in positions to war off any sudden Confederate attack. At 4:30 p.m., 2nd Corps commander Major General Winfield Scott Hancock and his staff arrived, sent ahead by General Meade to take temporary command of Gettysburg.

Once Hancock was on the scene, he lifted the spirits of all around him; he was a commander whose presence and ability called forth immediate respect and trust. Within minutes of his arrival, his direction brought gradual order out of what had been milling confusion. Soon the Federals in Cemetery Hill, and further east on Culp’s Hill, were fortifying already strong defensive positions.

The first day at Gettysburg had been costly for the more than 20,000 Union soldiers who reached the field; 9,100 were casualties before evening. But their sacrifice had interrupted Lee’s original plans, exacted thousands of Confederate casualties, and given Meade the advantage of defending the strategic heights south of town on the following day. Were it not for the stubborn resistance of the left wing of the Army of the Potomac that day, General Lee might well have turned Gettysburg into another Chancellorsville—but with far more serious consequences.

At the end of the first day of fighting, the Confederates were clearly victorious. But the Union troops were firmly entrenched on the “high ground” of Cemetery Hill, awaiting an attack from Ewell’s Corps, which never came.