In-house Licensing Review: Outcome Report · In-house Licensing Review – Outcome Report ... to make a case which would justify extending the SIA’s remit to ... Page 7 4 Resource

In-house Licensing Review

Outcome Report

May 2009

In-house Licensing Review – Outcome Report

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Contents 1 Executive Summary ........................................................................................ 2

1.1 Recommendation ..................................................................................................... 2 1.2 Outline........................................................................................................................ 2

2 This Report ......................................................................................................... 4

3 Background ......................................................................................................... 5

4 Resource Implications ................................................................................... 7

5 Two Sides to the Debate? ......................................................................... 8

6 Additional Factors ......................................................................................... 10

Annex A Analysis of Questionnaire Responses ....................................... 12

Annex B Risk / Ranking Input from Workshops ...................................... 23

Annex C Analysis and Notes from Meetings and Workshops ......... 29


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1 Executive Summary

1.1 Recommendation

This report concludes that that there is no clearly defined or substantiated risk to

public protection to be addressed and that we are unable, at this time, to make a

case which would justify extending the SIA’s remit to include licensing of in-house1

guards.

1.2 Outline

The research and consultation undertaken during this review followed better

regulation principles in line with both the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act

2006 (LARRA), and the Regulators’ Compliance Code.

Our assessment of the evidence took into account that regulation should only be

targeted where action was needed; that regulation should only intervene where

there is a clear case for public protection, and any proposal for further regulation

should be proportionate and follow a risk-based approach.

In light of these terms of reference, the consultation concluded that there was

insufficient quantifiable evidence of risk or threat to public protection for Ministers

to justify the introduction of additional regulation for in-house licensing.

The consultation therefore invited the SIA Board and Ministers to confirm their

acceptance of the review’s recommendation that there was no clearly defined or

substantiated risk to be addressed and to accept the outcome and subsequent

analysis from the consultation which has led to the conclusion that we are unable,

at this time, to make a case which would justify extending the SIA’s remit to

include licensing of in-house guards.

1 The Private Security Industry Act 2001 does not use the term in-house, but it is used in this context to describe those individuals who perform activities that would be considered designated activities if they were carried out for the purpose of or in connection with any contract for the supply of security services.


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At the Board Meeting of 29 January 2009 the SIA Board examined the evidence in

detail and endorsed the review’s recommendations, and requested that the

evidence be submitted to the Secretary of State for consideration and approval.

In considering the review the Minister discussed the evidence in detail with the SIA

Chair and Chief Executive, and approved the recommendation, requesting that the

subject be re-visited in three years time.


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2 This Report This paper is drafted to share with all interested parties the rationale and evidence

gathered during the review. While stakeholders are welcome to comment and

provide feedback, there are no plans to re-visit this issue until 2012/13 – unless

significant substantiated evidence is presented that clearly suggests that the

evidence upon which the recommendation is based has changed or been

undermined to such an extent that a clear risk to public protection across the in-

house sector has developed.


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3 Background The 1999 Home Office White Paper (CM 4254) proposed that in-house staff

would be within the scope of the Private Security Industry Act. However, in-house

guards were removed from the bill during its passage through parliament. We

were charged to review the in-house question once licensing of the private

security industry had been in force for some three to four years.

Mr. Clarke: We do not generally propose to require them to have licences if they are

employed in-house by companies. Those companies will already have satisfied themselves

about their employees, and the Government do not intend to add an additional layer of

checking where it is not necessary…

The Government are not closed to the arguments that have been made in favour of

regulating in-house staff. We will bear them carefully in mind. The authority has a general

duty to keep the operation of the industry and its parent legislation under review, and we

will also have a formal review of all the arrangements after the authority has

operated for three years… We will pay close attention to any recommendation from

the authority that in-house manned guards should be brought into regulation.

Ref. Hansard: 28 March 2001 (column 971)

In order to meet this obligation we consulted widely through a range of

mechanisms: think tank sessions; paper and web-based questionnaires; workshop

sessions; 1 to 1 meetings with key stakeholders and desk research.

We structured the informal consultation to ensure that we were cognisant of

better regulation principles (Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 [LARRA]

and the Regulators’ Compliance Code), whilst focusing on identifying any risk and

public protection issues, and of course identifying if there is any added value to be

had by any interested party from the introduction of regulation.


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The consultation examined:

• What risk is there to the public from in-house security not being licensed? • Is there confusion/misplaced trust from the public due to in-house security

not being licensed? • Has this gap driven those that cannot get a licence to move to in-house

security guarding? • Is there a two tier standard? • Will businesses move to in-house licensing because of regulatory financial

impact?

The approach gathered input from a wide range of interested industrial and

commercial sectors as well as the contract security industry - approx 125

organisations provided input.

• ACS companies • Private security industry (non ACS companies) • NHS • Universities • Retail • Shopping malls • Manufacturing • Warehouse/distribution • Hotels • Facilities management • Local Government • Ministry of Defence • Police services • Utilities

The information gathered during these consultations has been analysed and

developed into the following documents:

• Analysis of Questionnaire Responses (Annex A) • Risk / Ranking Input from Workshops (Annex B) • Analysis and Notes from Meetings and Workshops. We include here the

executive summary (Annex C).


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4 Resource Implications At a very high level we considered the implications for the SIA as an organisation

and the UK economy in general if in-house licensing were to be introduced. We

considered two scenarios and developed our best estimate at volumes.

Scenario 1 – all current licensable sectors:

• Introducing in-house licensing of designated activities as currently defined within the Private Security Industry Act 2001 (e.g. guarding property against destruction or damage, against being stolen or against being otherwise dishonestly taken or obtained) would potentially add 3 – 5 million licensees.2

Scenario 2 – Front-line security guarding sector:

• Were we to introduce in-house licensing to front line security guards3 only, this would potentially add 100,000 licensees and cost approximately £190,000,000 to the UK economy (estimate based on data from a major retailer).

Licence cost £245 Training cost £350 Back fill cost £750

Total £1,345 Front Line Guards 2,600 Line/store managers 1,000 Corporate roles 100

Total 3,700

Therefore cost to major retailer alone = circa £5m.

2 To illustrate the point: a major retailer advised us that all of their staff have duty to protect property and thus they would require approx 150,000 licenses. 3 For the purpose of this paper, by front line we mean only those security guards who are in uniform and clearly visible and identifiable as providing a guarding activity.


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5 Two Sides to the Debate? There are a number of areas where we expect to face opposition to the above

recommendation and these can be summarised as follows:

1. The contract private security industry has long maintained that there should be a level playing field where in-house guarding is subject to the same legislative and regulatory conditions to which it is subject.

2. The contract private security industry has consistently claimed that individuals who were unable to obtain an SIA licence migrated from the contract industry into the in-house sector when the current legislation was introduced. Note: during our consultation, whilst the contract industry continued to express this view, no substantiated evidence was produced to support it.

3. There is a view within the contract industry that if the in-house sector was regulated then a significant number of individuals would not be able to obtain an SIA licence. They quote figures from the SIA website for the number of refused licences; if we extrapolate these figures to consider the implication of licensing in-house front line guards only then we could reasonably forecast that 3,085 of an estimated 100,000 population would not be able to obtain an SIA licence.

However the evidence gathered during our consultation process would suggest that the estimated figure quoted (3,085) could in fact be substantially lower as most large organisations which employ in-house front line security guards already carry out criminality checks, which was not the case for the contract private security industry prior to the introduction of regulation.

4. The contract industry may challenge the review’s recommendation given that both the Republic of Ireland and France have some form of regulation for in-house security guarding:

a. Republic of Ireland – currently licences companies which provide security services and individuals working in the security industry. In addition if a company which does not provide guarding as a service but employs its own security guards then the company is not required to be licensed, however the individual guards do require a licence.

b. A similar situation applies in France: “persons who are to be employed for a security role by companies which do not primarily work in the security field, have to receive a pre-approval by the local prefect (local government representative), as defined in the 11th and 6th article of the law number n°83-629 voted on the 12 July 1983.”


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Whilst the information in 4a/4b above is interesting it has no direct relevance for

us. UK Legislation is constructed on the presumption that the contract supply only

is licensable, with the ability to make some circumstances (through additional

controls) subject to in-house licensing where there is additional risk or concern.

UK definitions of licensable activity follow this assumption and may not fit a

different kind of regime.


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6 Additional Factors • In discussions with major industrial/commercial sectors it is apparent that

the vast majority of these have very good recruitment processes which include criminality checks and thorough training programmes. Quite often the training is to a much higher standard than the SIA approved training, and sector-specific. Certainly this has been evidenced within the NHS; universities and national retailers.

• For the majority of major commercial organisations and both the NHS and further education, protection of image/brand is paramount and it is this which is one of the prime drivers in ensuring recruitment processes include criminality checks plus comprehensive training once individuals are appointed.

• There is no evidence to suggest that the general public distinguish between one type of guard from another. Additionally we have not been presented with, nor been able to identify any risk or public protection issues where both contract and in-house guards are deployed together. This is supported by the case of one major retailer who uses 62% in-house staff and 38% contract staff.

• Within the in-house area there is a mix of corporate approaches to SIA licensing. Some organisations voluntarily put their staff through the SIA licensing route whilst other organisations – in particular universities and the NHS – prefer to go for their own vetting and training processes. However, from the input gathered during the informal consultation process those organisations which went down the SIA licensing route voluntarily were in the minority.

• In discussions with those participants at both the workshops and 1 – 1 sessions it was apparent that the key business drivers in deciding to use in-house or contract guarding staff were based on a number of commercial factors, e.g. cost; operational issue and brand/reputation protection.

• There is evidence that our enforcement partners are using SIA tools to help regulation. For example, whilst it is not mandatory Surrey police have asked a major retailer to employ an SIA licensed security guard in one of their stores which sell alcohol between the hours of 22:30 and 08:00. We have also been advised that some alcohol licensing authorities are beginning to request an SIA licensed security guard for small branches selling alcohol during all opening hours as part of the licence condition. This reduces the need for mandatory regulation by the SIA.


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• A cross-over example also exists where a major retailing group has adopted the SIA licence as the standard for all of their in-house security guards. The business driver behind this move is to allow them to move into the contract private security industry and bid for contract work.


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Annex A Analysis of Questionnaire Responses This provides an analysis of the responses from the in-house questionnaire that

was made available in both paper format and also online via our website.

We wrote directly to skill sector councils, trade bodies (CBI, etc.) and all SIA

approved contractors (540 at the time the questionnaire was made available); in

addition, multiple press releases were placed in trade magazines.

Whilst we made every effort to contact organisations the level of responses

received was very disappointing: just 48 individuals took the time to complete and

submit the form.

Accepting that the low level of responses is disappointing, it is nevertheless

incumbent upon us to reflect the views of those who have taken the time to

present these to the organisation.

Even though the response level was extremely disappointing and we must place a

degree of caution on the outcomes, it is interesting that the responses actually

correlate fairly closely to our view of the balance between in-house and contract

security.


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Annex B Risk / Ranking Input from Workshops This provides a cross section of the input received during the risk/ranking session

within the workshops. It shows the assessment from the audiences at these

sessions and we found it to be a useful tool in getting the participants at the

workshops engaged with the process. In all cases the roles were both nominated

and ranked by the participants.

Unsurprisingly the workshop session with the contract security industry produced

the highest risk rankings

Ranking factors RAG STATUS:

Risk

Crim

inality

che

cks

Training

to SIA stand

ard OR suita

ble

alternative training

Employment role 20 plus R

Magnitude

of threat ‐

Employer

Magnitude

of threat ‐

Consum

er

Public protection

Prim

ary

Second

ary

Incide

ntal

11‐19 A

4 ‐ 10 G

3 5 5 5 5 5

2 3 3 3

1 1 1 1 1 1


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Universities, 6-7 October 2008

Risk

Crim

inality

che

cks

Training

to SIA stand

ard OR suita

ble


Employment role

ROLE Magnitude

of threat ‐ Employer

Magnitude

of threat ‐ Con

sumer

Public protection

Prim

ary

Second

ary

Incide

ntal Risk Score

RAG status

Fron

t Line Ro

le

Residence Manager 3 5 3 1 1 3 16 A

Security Officer 3 5 5 1 1 5 20 R x

Building attendant/ porter 2 3 1 5 1 3 15 A

Receptionist 2 3 1 1 1 1 9 G

Building porter 3 3 1 5 1 3 16 A

Maintenance 3 5 1 5 1 1 16 A

Cleaners 3 5 1 5 1 1 16 A

Campus Manager 3 3 5 1 1 5 18 A

Reasons/Comments for ranking:

1. Cannot assume the university would carry out a criminality check 2. Recruitment suitable to role 3. Training delivered as part of employee role 4. Security Officer criminality check carried out 5. Porter criminality check not carried out because of cost 6. Building porter training suitable to role 7. Maintenance criminality check not carried out 8. Cleaners - all access 9. Campus manager - responsible for all security, overall management (non-

frontline). Not a general role 10. Campus manager - assume criminality check


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NHS, 30 October 2008

Risk

Crim

inality

che

cks

Training

to SIA stand

ard OR suita

ble


Employment role

ROLE Magnitude


Magnitude

of threat ‐ Con

sumer

Public protection

Prim

ary

Second

ary

Incide

ntal Risk Score

RAG status

Fron

t Line Ro

le

Security Guard 3 5 5 1 5 5 24 R X

Mental Health Staff 3 5 5 1 1 1 16 A

Residence Manager 2 1 1 1 1 5 1 12 A

Hospital Porter 3 5 5 1 5 3 22 R

Cleaners 3 3 3 1 1 1 12 A


1. Security guards - a different role in hospital because they are dealing with vulnerable members of the public

2. Criminality checks carried out on all NHS staff but not refreshed 3. No training requirement for security guards - it is available but not

mandatory 4. Staff - involved in conflict resolution - prior to security guards being called 5. Residence manager - key-holding, manage accommodation blocks for NHS

staff 6. Porters - some key holding. Also used as incidence response 7. Site specific training 8. High risk as can become involved in conflict resolution - could react in

appropriately 9. Porters have greater access to the patients than security guards 10. Cleaners - high access, key-holding


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BRC, 6 November 2008 (large national retail companies)

Risk

Crim

inality

che

cks

Training

to SIA stand

ard OR suita

ble


Employment role

ROLE Magnitude


Magnitude

of threat ‐ Con

sumer

Public protection

Prim

ary

Second

ary

Incide

ntal Risk Score

RAG status

Fron

t Line Ro

le

Front‐line Security Officer 1 1 1 1 1 5 10 G x

Store Detective 2 3 1 1 1 5 13 A x

Store Manager 2 1 1 5 1 3 13 A

CCTV Op 1 1 1 1 1 5 10 G x

Contract Security Officer 2 3 1 1 1 5 13 A x


1. Criminality checks carried out on Security Officer 2. Training provided to the standard of SIA and above 3. Low threat to public because of the level of checks on staff 4. "Company values" - in-house more likely to follow 5. Store Detectives make arrests - increased risk - detain in a dedicated area 6. Store Detectives checked by police because they make arrests 7. Store Manager - not criminality checked but are training in security role 8. CCTV operative - remote based therefore lower risk to consumer and

public 9. Contract - more false arrests 10. NB - some retailers pointed to the fact that they send contract guards they

employ on further specific retail training courses 11. NB - Cannot account for other retail companies - especially smaller local

retail companies


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Contract companies, 1 October 2008 (Birmingham)

Risk

Crim

inality

che

cks

Training

to SIA stand

ard OR suita

ble


Employment role

ROLE Magnitude


Magnitude

of threat ‐ Con

sumer

Public protection

Prim

ary

Second

ary

Incide

ntal Risk Score

RAG status

Fron

t Line Ro

le

Retail ‐ Security guard 3 3 3 5 5 5 24 R X

Floor manager 3 5 5 5 5 5 28 R X SECURITY OFFICER (TEMP &

REGULAR) 3 3 3 5 5 5 24 R X

PRIMARY FLOOR MANAGER 3 5 5 5 5 5 28 R X

SECONDARY FLOOR MANAGER 3 5 5 5 5 3 26 R X

CCTV OPERATORS 3 3 3 5 5 5 24 R X

STORE DETECTIVES 3 3 3 5 5 5 24 R X

SALES STAFF 1 1 1 1 3 7 G

CASHIERS 1 1 1 1 3 7 G

KEYHOLDERS 3 1 1 5 1 5 16 A X

CLEANER 1 1 1 1 1 5 G

Factory & Warehouse

Operations Manager. L L H H H Y 17 A

Line Manager. M M H H H Y 20 R X

Mobile Patrol Officer. H H H H H Y 23 R X

Gate House Officer H H H H H Y 23 R X

Receptionist L L L L L Y 5 G

Out of Hours Key Holder. L L M H L Y 11 A

CCTV Officer. H H H H H Y 23 R X

Warehouse Men L L L H L Y 9 G

Drivers. L L L H L Y 9 G


1. Security Officers perform primary security functions 2. Primary Floor Manager oversees security functions 3. Secondary Floor Manager responsible when Primary Floor Manager not

available 4. CCTV Operators perform primary security function


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5. Store Detectives perform primary security functions 6. Sales staff vigilant for security breach but not primary function 7. Cashiers vigilant for security breach but not primary function 8. Primary Keyholders have access to premises and alarm codes 9. Cleaner has no primary security functions


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Annex C Analysis and Notes from Meetings and Workshops 82 individuals representing contract security companies, universities, NHS, retail,

facilities management, manufacturing companies, diplomatic residences, utility

companies, trade associations, commerce, finance, hotel and hospitality

participated in the workshops and meetings to discuss in-house security held from

May to November 2008.

C.1 In-house Roles

All groups agreed that in-house security undertook multi-faceted roles and that a

definition would be very hard to reach in the case of in-house security roles that

are not front line security guards. In some sectors, particularly retail, front of

house security guards are contract security and back of house security is provided

by in-house guards; therefore risk to the public from unlicensed guards is

minimised.

It was acknowledged that the scope for in-house licensing is large, possibly

including all key-holders, and it was suggested that only front-line primary roles

should be considered for licensing, where a contract security guard could fill an in-

house role (e.g. parallel role).

Despite the view that contract security companies call for in-house security to be

regulated, during our consultations contract companies were not requesting for all

in-house security to be licensed. It was acknowledged that it is always in a

company’s interest to reduce risks and it was recognised that licensing has

increased the standard of contract security, however, contract security companies

acknowledged that in-house teams are often better paid and work better hours,

that their training was specific and suitable to their roles, not generic security

training.


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Some companies thought that in-house licensing could be cost prohibitive and not

relative to the benefit of licensing, particularly with regards to the licensing of

directors which would not be appropriate. This was a common view: that

companies cannot see where SIA licensing would benefit the in-house sector as

jobs are highly specialised.

In a number of sectors such as the NHS and universities, self-regulation is

preferred as there is no identified public benefit to licensing the in-house sector.

The retailers are in favour of an SIA affiliated scheme which would promote and

advise best practice, to drive standards up and also serve as an indicator by which

to measure whether the in-house security standards have been raised or not.

Universities suggested that a compulsory registration scheme would work better

than licensing in-house, whereby reputable organisations with in-house security

could register with the SIA and comply with best practice procedures. The costs

would be less than licensing and umbrella organisations could work with the SIA to

draw up a code of practice. In the Republic of Ireland, where in-house security is

subject to licensing, companies have experienced a generally positive result.

Retailers reported that loss prevention turnover has reduced and staff members

feel valued as a consequence of licensing in-house security.

It is widely accepted that regulating the contract security industry was beneficial

but it is thought that the SIA is not administering or enforcing the contract sector

well enough so it was questioned why it should branch out into in-house. In spite

of this view, throughout our consultations, although contributors have been

sceptical and critical of the SIA, the overwhelming majority support in-house

licensing to a certain degree – i.e. just licensing front line security guards and

administering the process well.

Voluntary licensing, or vetting and training guards to the same level as licensed staff

but not applying for the badge, is widespread. Many employers do not apply for the

badge because of the cost and the fear of losing staff to competitors.


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C.2 Criminality Checks

It is apparent that the frequency and degree of vetting of employees varies

according to the role and company. Most in-house guards are CRB checked upon

employment and some employers carry out checks every three years. For example

the NHS carry out criminality checks upon employment for all and are looking at

revisiting these checks every three years.

All retail representatives we spoke to claimed to carry out criminality checks on

their in-house security staff and some refreshed the CRB check every 2-3 years. In

addition, one retailer carries out fiscal checks on their employees, but more as an

integrity check during the interview process.

Some in-house security roles are not subject to criminality checks but these roles

tend to be non public facing and pose a potential risk to the employer, not a

member of public. Contract companies acknowledge that there is a variation of

understanding with the criminality checks and that licensing in-house security

would offer a centralised system of vetting and all criminality checks would be

carried out in the same way, ensuring a transparent process.

It is evident that most responsible employers have robust procedures in place for

recruitment, selection and employment. Universities have control measures in

place, criminality checks carried out, management are good and risks are minimal.

However, they do put people on the job before the CRB results are back, and

most do not refresh the criminality checks after initial employment either. Three

out of ten of the delegates in the session checked CRBs every three years.

It was noted that in the employment contract, however, it is an obligation for the

employee to tell the employer of any offence. Individuals we spoke to thought that

minimising risks by employing the correct people and having appropriate HR

policies in place is a responsibility that should be left to the employer to assess and

measure, that it is at the employer’s risk if they do not carry out proper checks on


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their staff and it was felt that this should not be imposed on the employer by an

authority.

C.3 Training

As with criminality checks, the frequency, quality and degree of training varies

depending on the role and employer. There are varying levels and extents of in-

house training from none to ‘on the job’ training to SIA basic level or higher, with

specific company based training as well. It is noted that the NHS has developed a

training programme in conjunction with Skills for Security that is currently being

piloted to be rolled out next year, and conflict resolution training is available.

The costs of training staff and backfilling those on training were raised. Universities

already license to a high degree and thought that introducing in-house licensing

would compromise security at universities because they would not be able to

afford to license all their staff and as a result people would be out of a job. SIA

licence holders often have to repeat training content when applying for multiple

licences. As opposed to SIA training courses which cover all aspects of the training

rather than those specific to the role, the training provided to in-house security is

specific and proportionate to the work they do.

Companies who provide their own in-house training ensure it is appropriate and

proportionate to the environment therefore there is no identified risk or public

protection issue with in-house security not being SIA licensed.

C.4 Risk to the Public

It has been identified that seasonal and temporary staff in retail are normally

recruited with minimal or no training and that they do not undergo criminal

record checks, which could pose as a risk to the public. Also, most employers

carry out criminality checks upon employment rather than pre-employment so the

results are not received until the person has been in post for a few weeks already,

which increases the risk to the public.


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In spite of this, in general it was thought that there is no risk to the public or

employer of using in-house security – in fact two retailers we spoke to said they

had more reported problems with contract guards using excessive force than in-

house security guards. They felt that there may sometimes be a greater risk to

employers and the public when employing contract security.

Some retailers hire more expensive in-house security guards rather than contract

because they cannot control the behaviour of contract guards who are more of a

risk to them in terms of their reputation. Also, one retailer stated that more false

arrests are made by contract guards compared to in-house guards, therefore

contract guards are more of a risk to the public and the employer. However,

retailers pointed out that contract staff can also be used to look at the standards

and behaviour of their in-house staff, and if managed and sourced appropriately can

be an asset.

It has been highlighted that public perception could be a risk as people think all

security is licensed and set at a basic standard. It is important to note however,

that this has not been proven and more often than not, members of the public

don’t see the difference between in-house and contract guards even when in

different uniforms: as long as a security guard is in a uniform the public places trust

in that person.

Should that person be inappropriately trained and vetted they could pose as a risk

but again, most responsible employers take steps to ensure that their staff are

trained and vetted. It was thought by some employers that contract guards

sometimes have low confidence and customers can sense this which can lead to

trouble in volatile situations.

C.5 Shift of Staff

At the time of the regulation of contract security staff some companies and

organisations brought their staff in-house in a move to better control the

recruitment and conduct of staff. This is particularly the case with retailers and has


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been experienced by the contract security companies. One contract security

company lost 15-20% of business when regulation came in because it was more

cost effective for companies to move their security in-house rather than contract

it out.

There is no evidence that the shifting of staff to in-house security roles is due to

individuals not being able to get an SIA licence. However, this is not to say that this

doesn’t occur in some places. On their experience since regulation one retail

company said they had experienced a number of people with a low level of

competency applying for in-house security roles because they cannot get a licence

to work in the contract sector.

It seems as though those who fall into this bracket are not working for reputable

companies and the number of incidences where this occurs is relatively small.

Some employers of contract guards ‘poach’ the good ones and bring them in-

house.

The apparent shift to more in-house roles is not universal as the NHS has

experienced the reverse. In the NHS, the number of in-house versus contact staff

has fluctuated historically but now with the introduction of the ‘Implementation of

Agenda for Change’ contract staff is cheaper to hire. The shift is not apparent yet

but the expectation is for numbers to increase on the contract security side in the

healthcare sector and this can be true for other sectors and companies depending

on their business models.

The above summary identifies no strong case for the licensing of in-house security.

There is some anecdotal evidence of small risks but these are not significant in

such a large market. It is noted that those companies and organisations in dialogue

with the SIA are responsible employers and it is often those who we are not

aware of who could pose a greater risk to the public in providing inadequate in-

house security. However, we estimate that this would be no more than 10% of the

in-house sector and it would be expected that should in-house licensing be

introduced, this 10% would not be compliant.


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Voluntary licensing and/or a register to recognise best practice in in-house security

provision is suggested and favoured by most people we spoke to, and would be a

cost effective way of raising standards and promoting self regulation of the in-

house sector.

Security Industry Authority P.O. Box 49768 London WC1V 6WY Phone 020 7025 4100 Fax 020 7025 4101 E-mail [email protected]

www.the-sia.org.uk

GEN/09-10/01 (In-house Report)

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In-house Licensing Review: Outcome Report · In-house Licensing Review – Outcome Report ... to make a case which would justify extending the SIA’s remit to ... Page 7 4 Resource