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I – Neurath, Sociology and the Unified Science

Otto Neurath was a member of the Vienna Circle who, with the rest of the Circle, set out

to, “create a climate which will be free from metaphysics in order to promote scientific studies in

all fields by means of logical analysis.” (Neurath, pg.282) Specifically, Neurath had a vision of

what he called a ‘unified science’; a single body of knowledge into which all other fields of

scientific study could be ‘reduced’ into. After all, Neurath declares that, “the body of scientific

propositions exhausts the sum of all meaningful statements.” (Ibid, pg. 282) Out of a desire to go

about the process of actually exhausting the aforementioned sum, Neurath believed that the only

way to go about accomplishing this would be to unify all the sciences into one single science.

However, when Neurath mentions the sciences, he is not merely talking about the fields of

chemistry, physics, biology, etc; what are referred to as the “hard sciences” in common parlance.

Along with those disciplines, Neurath also desired to include what are commonly called ‘social

sciences’ – sociology, economics, anthropology, history, etc. – in his vision of a unified science.

In order to aggregate all the various sciences under the banner of unified sciences, it

would first be necessary to develop a unified language into which the statements of various

scientific disciplines could be translated. Such a language is, “common to the blind and the

seeing, the deaf and the hearing. It is ‘intersensual’ and ‘intersubjective.’ It connects what the

soliloquizer asserts today with what he asserted yesterday, the statements he makes when his ears

are closed with those he makes when he opens them.” (Ibid, pg. 286) This language would,

according to Neurath, be the language of physics because it is the only language which is precise

and objective enough to state observations and formulate predictions with adequate clarify and

specificity.

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Within Neurath’s unified science, the truth value of a particular statement is determined

based on how it relates to statements already known to be true and scientific laws. In this respect,

there is no verification principle to determine the truth of a claim; the truth-value of an

observation is determined by it being, “compared with the totality of existing statements

previously coordinated. To say that a statement is correct, therefore, means that it can be

incorporated into this totality. What cannot be incorporated is rejected as incorrect.” (Ibid, pg.

291) Thus, the unified science is constantly evolving and changing, incorporating facts in the

context of all that is known to be true. The truth, according to unified science, is therefore not

some sort of eternal, unchanging entity but is dynamic, evolving, and in a constant state of flux.

Neurath viewed the social sciences as a part of his unified science. But exactly how does

he go about translating the observations and hypotheses of the social sciences into the language

of the universal science? Neurath takes a very specific view of the world, which he calls

physicalism. For Neurath, physicalism is the view that everything is operating and is a part of,

“the space-time system to which that of physics corresponds”, and furthermore that all reality is

contained within this spatio-temporal continuum, i.e. there is nothing which transcends physical

reality. (Ibid, pg. 286) Given his adherence to physicalism and disdain for metaphysics, Neurath

believes that there are physical laws which govern the behavior of people, just as there are laws

that govern gravity and the behavior of machines. In specific, just as quantum physics is used to

scientifically analyze and describe sub-atomic particles, behaviorism is used to scientifically

analyze and describe the conduct of people. It is through a behaviorist analysis of humans that

Neurath seeks to incorporate the social sciences into his vision of unified science. It is in this

regard that, “the alleged distinction between ‘natural sciences’ and ‘moral sciences,’ to the effect

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that the former concern themselves ‘only’ with arrangement, the latter with understanding as

well, is non-existent.” (Ibid, pg 298)

In terms of the divisions within the social sciences, Neurath feels that they are illusory,

and that these supposed divisions are nothing more than “useful protocol sentences and laws”

which “economics, ethnology, history and other disciplines have to offer.” (Ibid, pg 309) In

reality, all these divisions fall under the scope of sociology, which is the science of social

behaviorism. Each social science concerns itself with humans acting in a specific context. For

example, economics concerns itself with how humans behave while trying to satisfy their desires

under conditions of scarcity. Anthropology studies the behavior of humans in the context of a

particular culture. In each case, the topic is the behavior of humans in some specific context.

Therefore, “Without metaphysics, without distinctions explicable only through reference to

metaphysical habits, these disciplines cannot maintain their independence. Whatever elements of

genuine science are contained in them become incorporated into the structure of sociology.”

And sociology, in turn, is a part of the universal science.

II – Criticisms of Behaviorism, Sociology and the Unified Science

Neurath’s physicalistic interpretation of reality and positivist epistemology are not

without criticism. He argued that the natural sciences and social sciences are one in the same,

both a part of the Unified Science. The Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek takes a different

view, however. Naomi Beck writes on Hayek:

“According to Hayek, the aim of the social sciences is to study the consequences of the fact that we perceive the world and each other through concepts and sensations, which are organized in a mental structure common t us all. Thus, data in the social sciences is of a different kind than in the physical sciences. The social scientist studies the ways people interpret reality, rather than reality itself. In other words, he studies the results of a classification process that takes place in the human mind, and to which he does not have direct access. (Beck, pg.574)

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In other words, the natural sciences concern themselves with the study of causality, while social

sciences are concerned with the study of the conscious, willful pursuit of goals based on our

perception of causality. It is entirely reasonable to maintain a separation between physical

sciences and social sciences based on this fact.

This is a valid enough argument, but it only holds if one assumes that humans actually

have some notion of free will, and that the actions of individuals are nothing more than

involuntary reactions to external stimuli; that the behavior of humans is nothing more than a

predictable effect of some natural cause. Neurath is of this opinion. He subscribes to a

psychological school of thought known as behaviorism, which postulates that psychology is the

scientific study of behaviors. These behaviors, in turn, are predictable reactions to external

stimuli. In a sense, behaviorism views the human mind not as an autonomous agent exercising

free will, but rather as an organism responding to its environment by exhibiting specific

behaviors. Furthermore, behaviorists postulate that once can use the scientific method in order to

deduce which sort of stimuli will elicit which sort of behaviors. In effect, by reducing human

agency to a mere causal phenomenon, behaviorism carries with it an implicit assumption of

determinism. If science shows us that the behaviors of any particular person are nothing more

than causal reactions to some form of stimulus, then that is an admission that there is no free

will; everything that person does is merely an involuntary, pre-determined reaction to an

observable cause.

Neurath offers persuasive evidence to suggest his adherence to behaviorist determinism.

He writes, “Just as the behavior of animals can be studied no less than that of machines, stars and

stones, so can the behavior of animal groups be investigated.” (Neurath, pg. 300) Clearly, he

admits his belief that people are like machines, programmed to perform behavior Y when

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stimulated by X. However, a problem arises from such taking behaviorist logic to its full

conclusion. As discussed previously, one of the aims of Neurath’s unified science was to

eradicate metaphysics and discredit it as a reputable source of knowledge. However:

if one eliminates from the treatment of human action the notion of conscious aiming at definite ends, one must replace it by the – really metaphysical – idea that some superhuman agency leads men, independently of their will, toward a predestined goal: that what put the bridge-builder into motion was the preordained plan of Geist or the material productive forces which mortal men are forced to execute. (Mises, 245)

In other words, by implicitly denying the free will and agency of individuals, Neurath’s

behaviorism must necessarily admit the existence of a metaphysical, teleological force; a

conclusion which would certainly be anathema to all Neurath stood for!

Another issue which Neurath’s brand of behaviorism gives rise to is its inability to

explain why some people react differently to the same stimulus. By his own reasoning, Neurath

admits that, “the employment of physicalistic statements concerning one’s own body in making

physicalistic statements about another’s is completely in line with our scientific work, which

throughout makes this sort of ‘extrapolation’.” (Neurath, pg 298) In other words, Neurath is

saying that according to his universal science, it is perfectly valid to take one’s own behavioral

reaction to a particular stimulus and ‘extrapolate’ one’s response to any other person. Clearly,

this reasoning runs completely contrary to reality. One need only look at how various people

react to being robbed at gun point to see why such reasoning is faulty. Some people will comply

with their captor’s demands, while others will attempt to disarm and fight the gunman. Each

person will react in a different and unpredictable way because as free agents, we all choose to

exercise our individual autonomy in different ways when confronted with the same situation. But

because Neurath chooses to adopt a behaviorist view of psychology, free will is not an available

option to explain this difference in reactions. Neurath may very well have an answer to this

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problem, but even if he does, this issue raises many questions regarding the validity of his

unified science, which relies on the notion of behaviorism.

III – An Alternative Methodology for the Social Sciences

Neurath’s vision of a unified science is ultimately a failed one. Physical science and

social science are of different natures, and attempting to combine them into a unified theory only

leads to contradictions and epistemic quagmires. In light of this revelation, many questions are

still left unanswered. What is the proper role of social science? Is there more than one kind of

social science? What is the scope of the social science(s)? What sort of methodology should

serve as the foundation of social sciences?

Similar to Neurath, I believe that what have traditionally been considered the various

branches of the social sciences – history, anthropology, economics, sociology, etc. – all fall

under the scope of one discipline. However, with Neurath that discipline was sociology; I am of

the belief that all social sciences fall under the scope of economics. With Neurath, his belief in

the coherence theory of truth can be seen to influence his affinity for sociology. To Neurath,

protocol sentences derive their truth values from being coherent with other protocol statements.

The truth of a particular claim is contingent upon it’s consistency with other previously

established claims. One can see a train of thought analogous to his coherence-theory present in

his choice of sociology as the unifying social science. Neurath explains that, “sociology does not

investigate purely statistical variations in animal or, above all, human groups; it is concerned

with the connections among stimuli occurring between particular individuals.” (Neurath, pg. 301)

In other words, sociology is concerned with the coherence of individuals’ reactions to stimuli,

much like his theory of truth is concerned with the coherence of any given protocol sentence

with other protocol sentences.

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I personally subscribe to Moritz Schlick’s correspondence theory of truth, which states

that only protocol sentences denoting a first-person observation are truly meaningful, and that

their truth is derived from their correspondence with objective reality. Whereas one can classify

Neurath’s correspondence theory of truth as more ‘collectivist’ and relativistic in a sense,

Schlick’s truth theory relies on subjective and individual observations, which are compared to

objective reality. This kind of reasoning is analogous to economic reasoning, which Mises

defines as “the science of human action”. More specifically, economics studies how peoples’

subjective desires manifest themselves in their corresponding choice of action. This is analogous

to the coherence theory of truth comparing a subjective observation to objective reality; the

subjective desires are “compared” to objective reality through their manifestation in action.

The specific methodology of the economic science is called praxeology. It is an

axiomatic system of deductive reasoning whose axioms are synthetic a priori. Hans Herman-

Hoppe and Mises write:

Its statements and propositions are not derived from experience. They are, like those of logic and mathematics, a priori. They are not subject to verification and falsification on the ground of experience and facts. They are both logically and temporally antecedent to any comprehension of historical facts. They are a necessary requirement of any intellectual grasp of historical events. (Herman-Hoppe, pg. 8)…The theorems attained by correct praxeological reasoning are not only perfectly certain and incontestable, like the correct mathematical theorems. They refer, moreover, with the full rigidity of their apodictic certainty and incontestability to the reality of action as it appears in life and history. Praxeology conveys exact and precise knowledge of real things. (Mises, pg. 39)

Although such a methodology naturally raises some concerns and objections, I will address those

in the next section. Criticism aside, one might reasonably ask what benefits are to be gained

through the use of praxeology. One large benefit is that, as stated above, “the theorems … are

perfectly certain and incontestable.” Assuming one uses proper logic, a valid deduction scheme,

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and accepts the premises of the theorem to be true, the conclusion is undeniable. In the science of

praxeology, the premise of every theorem traces back to the fundamental axiom of action: that

people act. It’s obvious that this is always the case; even if someone chooses not to act, they have

still made a choice – the choice to not act. Therefore, no matter the circumstances, it is always

true that people act. Thus, the conclusions of praxeological reasoning are always irrefutably true.

Certainly this is a desirable property for any theory to have!

Another benefit of praxeological reasoning is that it is atemporal. The theorems and

conclusions of praxeology are valid regardless of whether it is the year 20 B.C. or 20,000 A.D.

Because its axioms are synthetic a priori, not only are they valid across time, but furthermore

have meaning and genuine content. Because the axiom of action is synthetic, it is more than just

a tautology. This gives us an invaluable tool with which not only can we analyze the past, but

also predict the future.

Finally, the Austrian school of economics, which makes use of the science of praxeology,

is most adequate for explaining social phenomenon because it can account for agency and free

will. As we saw with Neurath and his behaviorism, problems arise when one tries to deny the

validity of free will in a field of study whose focus is the choices people make in their decision to

act. The Austrian school, however, does not encounter this problem. As stated above, social

sciences can all be traced back to economics. The reason for this is because that economics is the

study of actions carried out on an individual basis. Other fields, such as sociology, concern

themselves with the interactions among acting people in groups of varying size. Before one sets

out to study the actions of a society as a whole, one must first have a firm grasp of human action

at an individual level. Thus, all social sciences start from the study of economics. The

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methodological individualism of economics serves as the building block from which all the other

disciplines of the social sciences are created.

IV – Criticisms of the Praxeological Methodology

The praxeological methodology of Austrian economics is not without its critics. In

particular, there are four arguments commonly raised against the science of praxeology being a

valid source of knowledge which I wish to address. The first, and most common, criticism is that

praxeology is unscientific. Because of the deductive nature of praxeology, it ignores empirical

and scientific evidence in favor of abstract theorems and deductions. Since its results are not

based on scientific data or empirical observation, praxeology does not deserve serious

consideration as an epistemological foundation of the social sciences.

It is absolutely true that praxeological theorems are not based on empirical data.

However, it is a straw man to somehow claim that Austrians shun empirical evidence. A quick

survey of praxeological and Austrian literature will show this to not be the case. There is nothing

wrong with using tangible evidence or empirical data to substantiate a claim. For example, in

Austrian economist Murray Rothbard’s book The Mystery of Banking, Rothbard cites many

historical examples, such as the era of free banking in Scotland, to serve as evidence of his

claims that a free market in banking would lead to favorable results. Mises used the German

hyperinflation of the early 20th century in Human Action as an example to prove that inflationary

monetary policy inevitably leads to currency collapse; a conclusion he derived using his

aprioristic praxeological reasoning. There is nothing wrong with using historical and empirical

figures to substantiate a praxeological deduction; in fact, such evidence can often times be

helpful for explaining ideas. However, what Austrians and praxeologists note is that the truth-

value of their claims is not derived from the validity of their evidence; the evidence just so

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happens to conform to their theorems because of the synthetic a priori nature of praxeological

deductions.

Another objection that is raised against praxeology, related to the unscientific criticism, is

that it is a degenerative theory. These objections can be traced back to the philosopher Imre

Lakatos in his essay Science and Pseudoscience. Lakatos discusses the difference between

progressive and degenerative theories. He makes two major claims. He states, “the typical

descriptive unit of great scientific achievements is not an isolated hypothesis but rather a

research programme.” (Lakatos, pg. 4) He also says:

All the research programs I admire have one characteristic in common. They all predict novel facts, facts which had been either undreamt of, or have indeed be contradicted by previous or rival programmes. … in a progressive research programme, theory leads to the discovery of hitherto unknown novel facts. In degenerating programmes, however, theories are fabricated only in order to accommodate known facts. (Lakatos, pg. 4-5)

Critics claim that praxeology qualifies as a degenerate theory because praxeology does not

predict novel economic facts. Adam Smith and the Classical School made many of the same

free-market arguments that were deduced using the Austrian’s praxeology. Thus it is degenerate.

However, to claim that the Austrian economists have not “predicted any novel facts

which had been undreamt of” is absurd, and ignores some of the claims which Austrian

economists have made over the years. One great example of a novel prediction nobody saw

coming was the Great Depression. In 1912, almost two decades before the start of the

Depression, Ludwig von Mises published his book The Theory of Money and Credit. In it, he

talked about the disastrous effects that expansionary monetary policy and artificially cheap credit

could have on an economy. Specifically, Mises predicted that should a central bank manipulate

interest rates below the market equilibrium, a large economic boom followed by an even larger

bust would ensure, and that it would have disastrous effects on the economy for many years to

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come. He deduced this hypothesis via praxeological reasoning. When the stock market started to

crash on Black Tuesday, which flung the economy into a subsequent depression, nobody had

seen it coming. However, Mises used the power of praxeology to predict this event almost 20

years before it actually happened! If that does not qualify as “predicting novel facts which had

been undreamt of,” I don’t know what does. In retrospect, many economists from all different

schools of thought generally agree that one of the major causes of the Great Depression was

indeed the lowering of interest rates, precisely as Mises had predicted.

A final criticism, one which I have thought of on my own, regards the a priori nature of

praxeology. In recent years, computer scientists have developed automatic theorem proving

machines. If one feeds it an input of definitions, rules of deduction, axioms, and a theorem to try

and solve, the machine will attempt to prove it within those parameters, and if it can be proved, it

will print the proof out step-by-step. One example of such a machine is called Isabelle, a

program developed by the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory. Since praxeology is a

deductive, axiomatic science similar to logic and mathematics, in theory it is possible to

somehow translate the axioms of praxeology into the language of set theory, explicitly define

rules of deduction, and put it into a machine such as Isabelle. Isabelle could then prove all of the

results of Austrian economics and praxeology through the use of an automated algorithm. This

might seem like a lot of effort, but the implication here is twofold. One, it would strongly suggest

that praxeology is not synthetic a priori as Mises claims, but rather analytic a priori. This, in

turn, would imply that the Austrian school’s methodology of choice is nothing more than an

elaborate tautology, which would greatly damage the explanatory power and credibility of the

praxeological science.

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The second major implication this would hold in store for not just the Austrian school,

but for the economics profession in general, is that a computer would be able to accurately prove

and discover knowledge regarding economics, a science which studies human conduct. The

implications here would be vast. Most importantly, though, it would imply that the world would

no longer need economists, because computers could simply derive all the answers to our

problems. I am not sure what an appropriate response to these issues would be, but they are

certainly interesting questions raised by the fact that praxeology is a deductive science.

V – Conclusion

By analyzing Otto Neurath’s vision of a unified science, and how social sciences would

fit into such a vision, this paper has sought to highlight the methodological and epistemological

differences between the physical sciences and social sciences. Namely, the two kinds of science

are incompatible because of the scope of the subject matter: the physical sciences aim to study

the deterministic chains of causality that exist in nature, while the social sciences seek to

ascertain a greater understanding of how people perceive the natural world, and also how they

interact with one another. I also demonstrated the impossibility of a unified science, at least in

the way which Neurath conceived of it. I then called the reader’s attention to the science of

praxeology, a synthetic a priori deductive method of reasoning which is used by the Austrian

School of Economics to derive atemporal conclusions regarding the nature of human action.

Finally, I have defended praxeology as a methodological basis for all the social sciences from

some of the more common criticisms often used against it. Although it is not without issue, the

praxeological methodology is an interesting one which has the potential to offer insight into the

social sciences from a viewpoint which is not often considered by mainstream academia.

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