In Defence of Moral Positive Freedom · 1 According to Isaiah Berlin’s famous article“ Two Concepts of Liberty,” there are negative concept as well as positive concept of freedom

In Defence of Moral Positive Freedom

Andrew T. W. HUNG

“Freedom” is one of the central messages of Jesus’ gospel (Luke 4:18, quoting Isa 61:1). According to Martin Luther, human will is in bondage to sin and only God can set us free by his grace. It means that one cannot think and act ethically by his own power. So, for Christians, freedom is not only freedom from the bondage of sin, regardless of whether it is internal or external bondage, but also the freedom to act according to the will of God (Eph 6:6). People are not only constrained by external obstacles, but also by their inner sinful nature. Therefore, Christian freedom involves a negative concept, as well as a positive concept.1 Christian freedom does not release a person from his obligation to allow him to do whatever he wishes, but by providing, through conversion, the motive and the inward strength of will to act according to God’s ethical demands. Even though theologians consider this a spiritual rather than political concept, I would argue that if the Christian understanding of freedom is correct, there would also be political

1 According to Isaiah Berlin’s famous article “Two Concepts of Liberty,” there are negative concept as well as positive concept of freedom. Negative concept stresses the absence of obstacles or freedom from constraints. Posi-tive concept asserts that freedom is found in a person’s ability to exercise and carry out his/her own will. See Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Lib-erty,” in Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 166–218.

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implications. Throughout history, those who exercise their freedom to obey God often break through the evil structures that limit their freedom to speak and act. These people have indeed opened the door to political forms of freedom in Western history.2

Nevertheless, although few controversies on the negative concept exist, Christian moral positive freedom is rejected by many liberals. Isaiah Berlin is the most prominent political philosopher who rejects the religious view of freedom in the political realm. His argument of a purely negative freedom and criticism of positive freedom can be summarized in four aspects: the definition of freedom has to be (1) distinguished from the concepts of ability, (2) distinguished from the concepts of goals, needs and desires, (3) morally neutral, and (4) positive freedom may led to totalitarianism. Hence, in order to avoid a moralized conception of positive freedom, Berlin demands a stringent and verifiable definition of freedom and an objective account of coercion.3

While many Christian theologians have elucidated a theological understanding of freedom that includes the positive as well as the negative concepts of freedom, they rarely attempt to integrate the philosophical argument of moral positive freedom with Christian theology.4 In this article, I will refute Berlin’s

2 John C. Bennett, “Freedom,” in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. James F. Childress and John Macquarrie (Philadelphia: Westmin-ster Press, 1986), 239–40.

3 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 169–73.4 Indeed Raymond Plant in his book, Politics, Theology and History, does at-

tempt to make an integration. However, his discussion on political freedom is very short. Charles Taylor’s article “What’s Wrong with Negative Lib-erty?” and Raymond Plant in his Modern Political Thought (chapter 6) also attempt to defend positive freedom. However, the discussions are not related to Christian theology. Furthermore, Plant’s position of minimalist view of positive freedom seems to contradict with Christian morality. See Raymond

177In Defence of Moral Positive Freedom

criticism and show that the Christian understanding of freedom as a moral positive concept is defensible. The following discussion consists of three parts. First, I will defend the positive concept of freedom which involves the consideration of ability, goals, and needs. Secondly, I will argue that freedom inevitably involves moral discrimination. Thirdly, I refute the idea of liberal neutrality and show that the worry of totalitarianism induced by positive freedom is ungrounded. I will also argue that the value of freedom is something we have to discover and articulate, rather than something determined by individuals themselves. As freedom is value-laden, Christian theology can provide insights in the search of the common good in public deliberation.

I. Argument of Positive Concept of FreedomBerlin insists that the concept of freedom is irrelevant to

that of ability.5 If one does not possess the means to purchase luxurious goods, we should not consider them as lacking freedom. Otherwise, this would lead to confusion between the concepts of freedom and the concepts of poverty and equality.

However, as Raymond Plant states, if one would ask the liberals why freedom is so valuable to us, they would say that it is because freedom allows each of us to pursuit one’s own interest and to shape one’s own life. If the value of freedom lies in achieving our own purposes, then it would be self-undermining to exclude the resources and capabilities necessary to achieve

Plant, Modern Political Thought (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991); idem, Politics, Theology and History (New York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001); Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985).

5 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 169–70.


those purposes.6 As Charles Taylor states, freedom is important to us because our lives have purpose.7 Taylor criticizes negative theorists for neglecting the fact that the modern motivation of defending freedom is the post-Romantic idea of self-realization, that is, everyone has their own form of self-realization that has to be worked out independently. If so, Taylor argues, the ability to carry out one’s purpose is necessary for the concept of freedom.8 One is not free if one cannot determine oneself.

1. Three Causes of InabilityIndeed, the reasons that people are unable to do something

can be threefold: 1. economic insufficiency; 2. lack of relevant skills; and 3. psychological barriers. Should we consider these three situations as “unfree,” or simply “inability” irrelevant to one’s freedom?

Let’s first discuss the economic problem. If one does not have enough money to buy luxury goods, it seems absurd to say that one is not free, because we may argue that luxury goods are what one wants rather than what one really need. However, it is reasonable to consider the poor who is unable to sustain his basic life as unfree. As Richard Bauckham states, certain economic independence is the necessary condition of being free.9 This is also the concrete form of the ideal of freedom for Israel. The loss of economic independence would make one vulnerable to the oppression of the rich, eventually even leading to enslavement. Thus, in the Bible, there is a constant emphasis on the protection of those who are not economically independent, such as, resident

6 Plant, Politics, Theology and History, 219. 7 Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” 219.8 Ibid., 212–13.9 Richard Bauckham, God and the Crisis of Freedom: Biblical and Contempo-

rary Perspectives (Louisville: WJKP, 2002), 10–11.


aliens, widows and orphans.10 Second, skill deficiency is related to one’s education. I argue

that this is also relevant to freedom. Even though we would seldom describe a person as lacking in freedom when he is unqualified as a professional engineer, we would agree that a well-educated person has more freedom and more opportunities to develop his/her career than an uneducated person. The reasons that one cannot become an engineer could be laziness, the lack of natural talent and opportunities for education. One is responsible for his own laziness, and no one has all the talents. We seldom impute these two problems to the lack of freedom. Nevertheless, a person who lacks a basic education could hardly achieve his/her own aims. This would also greatly reduce one’s freedom to develop an authentic life.

Although John Rawls separates the concepts of freedom and ability, he also considers these two concepts as inter-related, because the worth of liberty to a person depends upon that person’s ability in achieving his/her ends. In other words, negative freedom is worthless without the capacity to change one’s life.11 Indeed, Berlin does not reject the need of compelling children to be educated. However, he fails to see education as enhancing the freedom of children in their future development; rather, he considers it as a necessary curb of freedom.12 For the positive theorists, in order to determine the most important positive freedom, we must have an account of human goals and needs that can distinguish human authentic needs from inauthentic ones, and evaluate whether those aims really suit the agent.

10 Ibid.11 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 179.12 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 214–15.


2. Freedom and Goal However, Berlin insists on divorcing freedom from goals/

needs/desires. He says, if freedom was seen as a function of the satisfaction of desires, “I could increase my freedom by eliminating desires as by satisfying them; I could render men (including myself) free by conditioning them into losing the original desire which I have decided not to satisfy.”13

Berlin argues that “if the tyrant manages to condition his people into losing their original wishes and embracing the form of life he has invented for them, he will, on this definition, have succeeded in liberating them . . . But what he has created is the very antithesis of political freedom.”14 Therefore Berlin claims that ascetic self-denial may be a source of integrity or spiritual strength; it may increase inner freedom, but it is difficult to see how it can be called an enlargement of political freedom.

Nevertheless, I think Berlin has confusingly added in the element of external coercion (the imposition of a false morality) —the tyrant—in his criticism of inner freedom. Inner freedom and external coercion are not necessarily related. Furthermore, Berlin’s criticism seems to assume that inner freedom and external freedom are disparate concepts. Even if eliminating inner desire can enhance one’s inner freedom (at least one can feel freer than before), it does nothing to increase external freedom. However, in the discussion below, I will argue that one’s inner freedom is highly related to one’s external freedom. If one is deeply addicted to drugs, one’s external freedom would also be limited. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the claim that eliminating an unhealthy desire can increase one’s freedom in achieving his goals.

Another issue is that the close tie between positive freedom and social material resources will lead to the political implication

13 Berlin, introduction to Liberty, 31.14 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 186.


of re-distribution in the name of enhancing freedom. Obviously, F. A. Hayek, an antagonist of communism, has this positive concept in mind when he insists that freedom and wealth are two distinct concepts, even though both are important things.15 Nevertheless, I think Hayek has committed the fallacy of false dichotomy. Stressing positive freedom and economic independence does not mean that we have to endorse socialism. For instance, though Hong Kong is famous as a capitalist and free society, it also carries out welfare and education policies that serve to meet the demands for basic education and economic independence to a certain extent. Certainly, the link between freedom and ability and resources, while not necessarily leading to communism, implies that the disparity between the rich and the poor in the society can be threatening to the freedom, as well as the livelihood, of poor people. Hayek, in his rigorous rejection of communism, finds it safer to stick with sheer negative freedom which leaves no room for a positive aspect of freedom. However, if the essence of freedom is our ability to achieve our goals, isn’t Hayek throwing out the baby with the bath water?

3. Internal Obstacles of FreedomThe third cause of inability is the psychological barrier. This

is the most pressing issue for Christians and positive theorists, because it is related to one’s psychological health and moral character. For the Christian, if freedom means liberating a person from the bondage of sin, then such a bondage can be internal as well as external. As Taylor states, even though we regard freedom as the absence of obstacles, the obstacles can be internal as well as external. One is not really free, if one’s actions are motivated by group pressure, an irrational fear, false-consciousness, or

15 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960), 17–18.


inauthentically internalized standards.16 Actually, for Taylor, one’s freedom is jeopardized, if one’s

action is out of a despicable motive, or if one’s highly significant goal has been overridden by something worthless or even harmful. Taylor’s argument shows that our inner freedom also affects our exercise of external freedom. Taylor cites three possible internal obstacles to illustrate his argument. They are: irrational fear, attachment to comfort, and uncontrolled feelings of spite.17 First, sometimes, one’s irrational fear may prevent him from doing something he very much wants to do. Second, if a person is very much attached to comfort, he may experience this attachment as an obstacle to do something he would like very much to do, and he may feel that he would have greater freedom without such attachment. Third, sometimes, one may have uncontrolled spiteful feelings and reactions that may undermine a relationship which is extremely important to him.18 Taylor’s idea of the internal obstacle is persuasive because it conforms to our everyday life experience. Indeed, in the New Testament, Paul also expresses such inner struggles in which sin prevents him from doing what he really wants (Rom 7:18–24, NRSV).

16 Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” 215.17 Ibid., 220–21.18 Chandran Kukathas claims that for Taylor, once it is conceded that ‘inter-

nal’ obstacles do restrict freedom, the negative aspect of freedom is no longer useful. Kukathas rejects this argument: while an internal obstacle is removed, it does not follow that the freedom thereby attained is more than sheer negative liberty. However, Kukathas seems to have misunderstood Taylor; the latter never rejects the significance of overcoming external obstacles. What Taylor rejects is that the libertarians neglect the significance of internal obstacles in the concept of freedom. See Chandran Kukathas, “Liberty,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1995), 537.


4. Drug Addiction as an Illustration of Inner ObstaclesApart from irrational fear, attachment and spiteful feelings,

certain vice characters such as greed, lust and ignorance can also become one’s internal restraints to exercising morality. Addictions, especially, seem to be the prevalent inner obstacles to many modern people. The example of drug addiction is a good illustration of one’s freedom being constrained by the inner desire for a drug. I have been involved in voluntary visits to the homeless for a period of time. I found that drug addiction has caused many of them to lose their jobs, families, and even limbs because of vein obstruction by drug powder. They just could not stop using drugs, even though they knew that the drugs were seriously harming them. The addicts seem to be incapable of exercising any significant degree of control over their own life. None of them would tell me that they are free. I cannot imagine that legalizing drug use would make them more free. Rather, they feel very sad about their situation. They are controlled by their addiction; they cannot decide whether or not to use their drugs, because they are addicted to them. Neil Levy calls this the “addiction-as-compulsion view.”19

However, some scholars, such as Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu, reject the addiction-as-compulsion view. They argue that “drug-addicted humans are a lot more likely to decide not to use drugs than is popularly believed, especially when strong counterincentives are presented. Mothers with dependent children, for example, are much more likely to give up their drug addictions.”20 Changes in the drug market price or a conscious

19 Neil Levy, “Addiction, Autonomy and Ego-Depletion: A Response to Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu,” Bioethics 20, no. 1 (2006): 16.

20 Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu, “Addiction and Autonomy: Can Ad-dicted People Consent to the Prescription of Their Drug of Addiction?” Bioethics 20, no. 1 (2006): 5. See also Gary Watson, “Disordered Appetites:


reflection on the harmfulness of drugs may also decrease their heroin consumption. This shows that drug users do in fact respond to powerful incentives. This is also a strong indicator that their behaviour is not compulsive. In fact, they argue, addictive desires should be seen as simply another appetite, one rather stronger than most of the desires most of us are subject to. If our ordinary desires do not compromise the freedom of choice, neither do addictive desires.

Nevertheless, Levy argues that those who have ever struggled with drug addiction know that Foddy and Savulescu have concluded far too hastily. He states,

Addicts often say that they use the drug against their will, and

there does seem to be some sense in which this is true. After

all, not only is there the phenomenological evidence, to which

many of us can attest, that breaking an addiction is difficult,

there is also the evidence that comes from the fact that addicts

slowly destroy their lives and the lives of those close to them.

They engage in illegal, dangerous or degrading activities in

order to procure their drug, they lose their jobs, their partners

and their homes. If it is purely a matter of autonomous choice,

we should not expect their lives to spiral out of control so

dramatically.21

Moreover, there is also evidence showing that addicts usually find it relatively easy to resist their desires in the short-term, but tend to give up over a longer term. So, Levy argues that addiction can impact autonomy without totally destroying it. This explains why addicts sometimes are capable of resisting their desires, but finally

Addiction, Compulsion and Dependence,” in Addiction: Entries and Exits, ed. Jon Elster (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 3–28.

21 Levy, “Addiction, Autonomy and Ego-Depletion,” 17–18.


find it so hard to overcome their addiction.22 In the above discussion, we can see that Foddy and Savulescu

have committed the false dichotomy fallacy. There is a spectrum between freedom and compulsion. That certain addicts can resist drug addictions does not mean that the addiction has no constraint on one’s freedom. Indeed, throughout history, it is not hard to find people who insist on doing things they think are very important, even under the threat of life from a totalitarian regime. However, seldom would liberals claim that these people are still free in a totalitarian regime. If Levy’s “addiction-as-compulsion view” is correct, then one’s inner sinful desire can also be a constraint for one’s freedom even where external restriction does not exist.

II. Freedom and MoralityExamples of drug addiction also shows that freedom

inevitably involves ethical evaluation. This is because they are not simply cases of conflict between two desires (becoming a teacher or a salesman), but a conflict between what is valuable and what is valueless, or even harmful. In the former case, I can identify with the less favourite desire (becoming a salesman) without losing my humanity. I can still see that a salesman job can also actualize the self to a certain extent. However, in the latter case, a youth addicted to drugs at the expense of other developments can be easily seen as losing something very important to human nature. I can never actualize my life with drug addiction, even though it is following my strongest desire. Indeed, for Taylor, the fact that I am doing what I want, in the sense of following my strongest desire, is not sufficient to establish that I am free. On the contrary, we need to have the capacity to make discriminations among motivations.23

“You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free”

22 Ibid., 18.23 Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” 222.


(John 8:32). For the Christian, it is unthinkable to be free without moral truth. According to Oliver O’Donovan, freedom is evoked and sustained by the command of God, in which to obey the command of God is to put ourselves into the way of opposition to the false authorities and morality.24 Freedom is not only liberation from constraints but also an entrance into a new life: the life of liberty (Gal 5:1). This life is to serve Christ and others. Freedom of human being also implies the responsibility of one’s knowing and acting. However, one may falsely exercise his/her freedom, which leads to re-enslavement or alienation of freedom. For instance, suicide is a free act, but it is not an affirmation of freedom, because it encompasses a “destructive and defiant attack upon the nature of the free agent himself.”25 Moral enquiry is therefore demanded in face of this dangerous possibility. The suspension of evaluation is actually to proclaim the cross without the resurrection. For O’Donovan, the structure of freedom is teleological; freedom is given in order to achieve freedom and life.26

Nonetheless, linking freedom and morality together is dangerous in the liberal’s eyes. It may justify the imposition of a tyrant’s morality in the name of freedom. Therefore, negative theorists find it safer to insist firmly that freedom is just the absence of external obstacles. In this way it can conform to the idea of liberal neutrality, and eschew the moral discrimination of motivation.

1. Moral Discrimination of ObstaclesHowever, for Taylor, defending a view of freedom can never

24 Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Po-litical Theology (New York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), 255–56.

25 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline of Evangelical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 107–8.

26 O’Donovan, Desire of the Nations, 256.


exclude moral discrimination. He states,

Even where we think of freedom as the absence of external

obstacles, it is not the absence of such obstacles simpliciter.

For we make discr iminat ions between obstacles as

representing more or less serious infringements of freedom.

And we do this, because we deploy the concept against a

background understanding that certain goals and activities are

more significant than others.27

Taylor makes a comparison between restriction of religious freedom and freedom restricted by traffic lights as an illustration. Let’s assume religion is abolished in certain socialist countries, such as Albania, but there are probably far fewer traffic lights per head in this socialist country than in London. The Albania government may justly claim that Albania is freer than Britain; especially when all people in Britain have to negotiate their way through traffic, but only a few Londoners practice religion in public places. In sheer quantitative terms, the number of acts restricted by traffic lights must be greater than that restricted by a ban on public religious practices. But for liberals, such a claim that Albania is freer than Britain would hardly be acceptable because, as Taylor explains,

we have a background understanding, too obvious to spell

out, of some activities and goals as highly significant for

human beings and others as less so. One’s religious belief is

recognized, even by atheists, as supremely important, because

it is that by which the believer defines himself as a moral

being. By contrast my rhythm of movement through the city

27 Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” 217–18.


traffic is trivial.28

2. Meaning of Coercion Inevitably Involves Human Interests

Plant also argues that even if liberty is defined as the absence of coercion, the concept of coercion is actually complex. If it simply refers to physical violence, which makes certain action physically impossible, then a person who acts under coercion is merely reacting mechanically to external forces. However, if we take this definition in a strict sense, we would exclude many kinds of threats as constraint of freedom; for instance, the threat of taking away a person’s money, job or even life, is not a form of physical violence. Many liberals just cannot accept such a strict definition of coercion. While physical violence or imprisonment is a primary case of coercion, it may be argued that most cases of what is usually called coercion are unlike this.

On the other hand, if we endorse a looser sense of “impossible” in which personal valuation causes one to do what he would never have done without the others’ intervention, then the concept of coercion and the concept of freedom would inevitably depend on the agent’s values or interests.29 They are no longer a value-neutral concepts. If the coercive act is a kind of threat, then the meaning of coercion cannot but involve some conception of what things are important for human living.30 Therefore, the conception of good and human nature is indispensable in the concept of freedom.

Furthermore, as Plant points out, Berlin’s objectivity becomes clouded by his other formulations when he argues in another place saying that:

28 Ibid., 218.29 Plant, Modern Political Thought, 230.30 Ibid., 230–31.


freedom is measured by the number and importance of the

doors and the extent to which they are left open and some

doors are more important than others — the goods to which

they lead are far more central in an individual’s or society’s

life.31

This makes the attempt to divorce liberty from preferences very obscure in two ways. In the first place Berlin’s formulations refer to the importance of the doors which are left open. The question then arises as to how this importance is to be determined. Obviously, the judgment “cannot be made without answering some of the questions about what basically matters in human life.”32

III. Refuting Moral Self-DeterminationThe following issue then emerges: if the concept of freedom

involves morality, who can make the final judgment of the moral good if controversies arise? Some liberals actually accept the positive concept with morality, but they insist that the value of freedom should be self-determined. There are five reasons for such self-determining freedom: (1) this can still conform to the idea of neutrality; (2) the subject is usually the best one to know his own good; (3) our lives would not be good by having another person’s values imposed on us; (4) it allows room for the subject to examine and revise the existing morality; (5) this can avoid the way leading to political oppression. In the following section, I will refute these five arguments.

1. Neutrality is ImpracticableMany theologians and philosophers have actually questioned

whether neutrality in social policy is feasible. Every state in

31 Ibid., 238; see also Berlin, introduction to Liberty, 41.32 Plant, Modern Political Thought, 238.


practice, according to David Fergusson and Susan Mendus, faces decisions which inevitably favour some conception of good over others.33 For instance, when a society set up its laws relating to marriage, divorce, abortion and public funding, it will inevitably assume a particular understanding of flourishing life and human nature. Even with the vigorous defence of freedom and neutrality as an overriding consideration, I argue that many liberals actually cannot really carry through with this exclusive choice consistently. For instance, in a debate to ban pornographic bookstores, Amy Gutmann, a liberal philosopher, criticizes Michael Sandel for allowing a town to ban pornographic bookstores as intolerant. Gutmann suggests,

We can respect the right of free speech by opposing local

efforts to ban pornographic bookstores, for example, but still

respect the values of community and democratic participation

by supporting local (democratic) efforts to regulate the location

and manner in which pornographic bookstores display their

wares.34

She claims that this is the way in which local communities and democracy can be vitalized without violating individual rights. However, by allowing pornographic bookstores to be regulated, Gutmann is already violating the individual rights as understood in liberal neutrality. If the state policy is really neutral, and if moral good is really determined by individuals themselves, what is the justification of regulating pornographic bookstores rather than scientific bookstores? Such differential treatment already involves

33 David Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 59.

34 Amy Gutmann, “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no. 3 (Summer, 1985): 318–21.


moral discrimination.Will Kymlicka, a liberal egalitarian, while stressing the

priority of right over good, also states that liberals do leave room in their theory for acts of paternalism—for example, in cases relating to children, the demented, and the otherwise temporarily incapacitated. He states,

certain acts of paternalism involving competent adults may be

justified when we are faced with clear cases of weakness of

will. For example, most people know that the gain in safety

is well worth the effort of putting on a car seat-belt. Yet many

people let momentary inconvenience override their reason.

Mandatory seat-belt legislation helps overcome this weakness

of will, by giving people an extra incentive to do something

that they know they already have sufficient reason to do.35

However, we may question Kymlicka: who is the final judge to determine who is mentally competent? And what are the criteria for mental competence? Who can determine which case is out of weakness of will? If self-determination is inviolable, why not just let people determine whether safety or convenience is really more valuable according to their own conception of good? If he allows restriction on certain explicit cases of weakness of will, why not also allow the restrictions of pornography, prostitution and drug taking, which are also explicitly cases of weakness of will? Indeed, to distinguish the case of weakness of will also involves moral discrimination. The above cases show that not many liberals, including Gutmann and Kymlicka, can really consistently carry through neutrality in practice. Assessing the value of different liberties seems to be inescapable. Thus, the priority of right over

35 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: OUP, 2002), 213, 276.


good is just untenable.Berlin himself also admits, even in the most liberal society,

we cannot treat individual freedom as the sole or dominant criterion for social action. He recognizes that in our social policy,

We compel children to be educated, and we forbid public

executions. These are certainly curbs to freedom. We justify

them on the ground that ignorance, or a barbarian upbringing,

or cruel pleasures and excitements are worse for us than the

amount of restraint needed to repress them.36

And he further claims that such judgment

in turn depends on how we determine good and evil . . . which

are, in their turn, bound up with our conception of man, and of

the basic demands of his nature. In other words, our solution

of such problems is based on our vision, by which we are

consciously or unconsciously guided, of what constitutes a

fulfilled human life.37

Berlin’s argument shows that liberals are inevitably discriminating the value of different liberties in social policy, and it is acceptable to restrict a certain liberty for other important values.

2. Subject’s Vision of MoralitySecond, it is dubious whether the subject is usually the

best one to know his own good. As discussed above, very often, our moral experience may be distorted by our irrational fear, attachment or spiteful feelings. The recent best example is the phenomena of Hikikomori, in which youths retreat from society

36 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 214–15. 37 Ibid.


and confine themselves in the house for a long period. This is undoubtedly an unhealthy lifestyle, a social problem which our society should tackle. Furthermore, experiences tell us that people who are close enough to us may sometimes know us even better than we do. They are in a better position to advise us.

For the Christian, an individual’s idea can never be the final authority of moral good, because our moral vision has been distorted by our sinful nature. Indeed, for the Christian, moral self-determination itself is already considered a sin. In Genesis, the first sinful act of man is seeing and determining the forbidden fruits of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil as good. As William Schweiker states,

Knowledge of the distinction of good and evil arises, in this

myth, within an act of disobedience against that which is other

than the self and yet claims the totality of one’s life. The divine

claim on human existence, we should further note, mediates

self-understanding. This is why, in the myth, self-identity

structured by the knowledge of good and evil is coincident

with some response to the divine.38

3. Leading Life from InsideKymlicka maintains, “no life goes better by being led from

the outside according to values the person does not endorse. My life goes better if I am leading it from the inside, according to my belief about values.”39 He also argues that praying to God may be valuable, but it would be self-defeating to coerce a person to

38 William Schweiker, “The Good and Moral Identity: A Theological Ethical Response to Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self,” Journal of Religion 72 (1992): 569.

39 Ibid.


church and force him to pray.40 However, while in some cases, like forcing someone to pray,

may be counterproductive, it is unclear why one’s life goes better only if it is led from inside. For instance, I cannot see that a drug-addicted life would really go better than one that is restricted from drug abuse. Indeed, Kymlicka’s example is misleading because we seldom consider praying a moral activity. Furthermore, while the effect of religious activities requires consistency in attitude and practice, many moral issues, such as restraint from drug-abuse and pornography, does not so much require such consistency.

4. Moral Exercising Concept also Allows Self-RevisionLiberals stress moral self-determination because it allows the

subject to revise his/her existing morality. Nevertheless, I argue, moral self-determination and the revision of existing values are two different issues. The former seems to assume moral relativism, while the later affirms the existence of morality. We need to keep checking whether we have rightly understood the moral truth. The rejection of moral self-determination in fact does not exclude the revision of existing morality. On the contrary, the need for revision is directly dependent on the existence of morality. If something is good merely because it is one’s choice regardless of its content, then there is no point to revise it, because the existing view has already been chosen. There is no standard to judge whether it is morally right or wrong.

5. Moral Positive Freedom Would Lead to Totalitarianism?Nevertheless, if morality is not self-determined, does it not

open the way to totalitarianism, allowing tyrants to impose their moral view on people in the name of freedom? I believe that this is

40 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 216.


the main concern of liberalism, and I have three responses to such a criticism.

First, I would argue, as mentioned in the above discussion on inner freedom and political oppression, there is no logical connection between moral freedom and political oppression. As Taylor asserts, there are good reasons to hold that others are unlikely to be in a better position to understand what is best for us.41 So one’s support of moral freedom does not mean that he has to endorse the unreasonable requests or values imposed by a tyrant.

Second, many liberals believe that in order to avoid the rise of totalitarianism, we have to uphold individual freedom as the dominant value. However, such a theory implicitly assumes an atomistic understanding of the self which, according to Taylor, is just an illusion.42

Atomism assumes that individuals are self-sufficient outside the community. Liberalism with the assumption of atomism would therefore assert the primacy of individual freedom in the political structure. However, Taylor argues, the exercise of individual freedom involves one’s self-understanding as autonomous agent. Such self-understanding is not given. Rather, it is socialized within certain community, which is usually sustained by certain common goods. If individual freedom is upheld to the extent that the community is disintegrated, this would lead to self-undermining.43 For Edmund Burke, a radical break with traditions and social order in the French Revolution (a great movement of freedom) actually led to a social anomie which finally opened the path to totalitarianism.44

41 Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” 216.42 Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 187–

210.43 Ibid., 198.44 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New Haven: Yale


Ellen T. Charry maintains that the crisis of modernity lies decisively on its notion of freedom and the self. She states that atomism not only separates human beings from society but also from our dependence on God. The assumption of self-sufficiency of the modern self has actually set individuals in resistance both to socialization in human community and to dependence on God. In her words,

[By] turning from confidence in God to confidence in itself

alone, the secular self proves to be quite alone. It is thrown on

the world to seek its fortune, without history, without guidance,

with scant moral boundaries, and without a framework of

meaning within which to interpret failure and suffering. The

modern self is discouraged from supporting social and political

life, for these necessarily place limits on the self and demand

compromise, self-restraint, and even self-sacrifice that are no

longer supported by the culture. Freedom, self-sufficiency and

an expectation of happiness render it anomic, amoral, asocial,

and alone. Having no access to God, sin and grace, it has only

itself to confide in or worry about. Families and bonds of

community cannot be sustained on this highly individualistic

and morally vacuous basis. This asociality and amorality are, I

suggest, the source of the crisis of modern values.45

Univ. Press, 2003). See also Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule: Commu-nity and Morality in a Democratic Society (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 88. Indeed, the factors leading to the terrible end of the French Revolution is a highly controversial topic. For Berlin, it is because the French people had endorsed Rousseau’s positive freedom. But for communitarians, it is the lack of common understanding and common good which had caused the social anomie and ultimately totalitarianism. However, I shall not go into detailed interpretations of the French Revolution here.

45 Ellan T. Charry, “The Crisis of Modernity and the Christian Self,” in A Passion for God’s Reign: Theology, Christian Learning and the Christian Self,


Charry proposes that instead of seeing liberation as merely released from all constraint, a Christian theology should understand emancipation as the key to transformation.46 It is a critical retrieval of the patristic insights that emancipation is through self-mastery achieved by attending to God. She insists:

Simple emancipation from external authority is insufficient

to fit us for the new life required by and for life in Christ . . .

Indeed, it is under the guidance of God that we are transformed

and outfitted to confront the crises of our day that are of our

own making.47

Third, today’s political discussion usually focuses on who (subject) and how (procedure) to determine the moral goods, rather than on what (content) the moral goods are. Regarding the discussion on morality, I think the focus should not be “who is the moral judge,” because only God is the final authority of morality. Rather, we should ask “what is morality,” unless we are holding onto moral relativism. If morality really exists, it is not just certain preferences we choose; rather, it is the obligations we have to discover. If, we are inevitably making moral discrimination in social policy, then we should focus on the discussion and the articulation of moral good. Indeed, the moral confusion in modern society is very much due to the inarticulacy of moral sources in the discussion of moral philosophy. In order to deal with this immense disagreement over morality in modern society, Taylor claims that we have to formulate, confront and clarify the underlying notions of morality, human nature and society.48

ed. Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 104. 46 Ibid., 93.47 Ibid.48 Andrew T. W. Hung, “A Critique of Modern Moral Philosophy,” CGST


If liberty is linked to the notion of human values, then, according to Plant, there is space for theological insights into the nature of these values.49 If moral command is given by God, then one of the important sources for understanding morality is through divine revelation. However, when Christians stress that authentic freedom could be realized only in Christ, people would easily think of despotic rulers oppressing human freedom. Bauckham reminds us to distinguish between the monarchical image of the one God and the Christian understanding of God as Trinity. The former is traditionally called monotheism, understood as a single supreme ruler of all things. By contrast, the Christian understanding of the Trinitarian God is seen as a nonhierarchical fellowship or community of interdependent Persons, whose freedom is constituted by their loving relationship in their mutuality. The point of this Trinitarian image of God is to draw us into participation in God, within the church community, and out of which human life can be transformed. In this sense, freedom is not an inherent property but an experience of growing into freedom in relationship to God. Bauckham summarizes this dynamic of freedom in our threefold relationship with God:

In relation to God the Father, we know God as authority to

command in a relationship of loving belonging. In relation to

God the Son, Jesus Christ, we know God as loving solidarity,

the fellow human who befriends us. In relation to God the

Spirit, we know God as the spontaneity of love in which we

make God’s will our own.50

The grace of God not only liberates human beings from the

Journal 46 (Jan. 2009): 195–98.49 Plant, Politics, Theology and History, 221.50 Bauckham, God and the Crisis of Freedom, 207.


enslavement of sin, but also transforms their thought and feelings, and empowers them to act according to the Truth. Indeed, Taylor’s historical retrieval of the modern self shows that Christian tradition may become an incomparable moral resource for modern people in their quest for a mature freedom.51

However, in this secular pluralistic society, Christians have no rights to demand the society to legislate according to Christian values. Nevertheless, believers, as citizens, have an obligation to participate in the public deliberation about moral issues. Besides preaching the gospel, we should also share and dialogue with non-believers and other religious persons about the Christian understanding of human nature and human good. Hopefully, political participation can lead to a consensus about the common good for the society. I argue that as long as certain fundamental human rights are secured, and the public deliberation of morality is open and sufficient, the consensus of common good determined by democratic decision-making would unlikely lead to totalitarianism.

IV. ConclusionIn this article, I have made a defence of moral positive

freedom by arguing that freedom is inevitably related to goals and ability. Economic insufficiency, skill deficiency or psychological barriers can significantly constrict one’s freedom to achieve self-realization. Furthermore, the concept of non-moral freedom is just unsustainable. It will only lead to ridiculous political implications. I have also refuted the liberals’ worries about totalitarianism as a result of positive freedom. By rejecting the view of moral self-determining freedom, I argue that Christian theology can provide insights in the understanding of moral freedom. I also argue that

51 Andrew T. W. Hung, “Charles Taylor’s Historical Argument of Christian Morality,” CGST Journal 48 (Jan. 2010): 169–201.


believers should participate in public debates about moral issues in order to achieve a certain consensus of common good for the society.

Documents

In Defence of Moral Positive Freedom · 1 According to Isaiah Berlin’s famous article“ Two Concepts of Liberty,” there are negative concept as well as positive concept of freedom