REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

QUEZONCITY

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Criminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0263-0280For: Violation of Section 3 (e),

Republic Act No. 3019

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, B., J. andFERNANDEZ, S.J., J.1

LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ, etale

Promulgated:

..i+MtRtY IGI ~~

For resolution is accused Lawrence L. Cruz, Ruderic C.Marzo, Moises Dalisay, Jr., Marlene Young, Riza Jane P. Magaro,Jose L. Zalsos, Providencio A. Abragan, Jr., Ariel P. Anghay, RoyL. Openiano and Bayani C. Areola's «Motion for Reconsideration(Re: Resolution dated 02 Nov mber 2017r dated November 14,

~~5:'::~h ],ne ~,n n w ,h,;,pe"on of the 5;,th d;v;5;on" p" Adm;n;5",UveO,d.,No. 314-2017 dated September 13, 2017, is a ignatory to the assailed resolution.2 pp. 343-353, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

Accused-movants Cruz, et al.) pray that the Courtreconsider and set aside its Resolution promulgated onNovember 2, 2017, on the ground that their constitutional rightto speedy disposition of cases had been violated and the factscharged in the present Informations do not constitute anoffense.3

The same accused-movants allege that the Courtcommitted a reversible error when it denied their ((Motion toQuash)) dated May 29, 2017,4 despite a clear violation of theirconstitutional right to speedy disposition of cases in theproceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman.5 They insistthat [1] the allegations against them are simple; [2] there wereno complex issues involved because the defenses of all theaccused were the same; [3] the records of these cases are notvoluminous; and, [4] there is no need for a mathematicalcomputation of the amount of the alleged actual injurysupposedly incurred by the government because even thecomplainant and the Officeof the Ombudsman had difficulty inspecifying the actual injury in the complaint; hence, theInformations in the present cases are insufficient due to the factthat there is no evidence on record of any actual injurysustained by the government.6

Relying anew on the cases of CoscoZZueZa v.Sandiganbayan7 and Enriquez, et aZ., v. Office of theOmbudsman,S accused-movants Cruz, et al.) point out that dueto the simple nature of the present cases against them, theperiod of two (2)years and eleven (11)months in the terminationof the preliminary investigation of these cases cannot beconsidered justifiable or reasonable.9 They assert that the Officeof the Ombudsman was miserably remiss of its mandate topromptly dispose the cases pending before it and that the Court

/73 p. 352, Vol. II, Record4 pp. 21-32, Vol. II, Record5 p. 344, Vol. II, Record6 pp. 344-345, Vol. II, Record7701 SCRA 188 (2013)8545 SCRA618 (2008)9 p. 345, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

simply glossed over the said failure when it ruled in its assailedResolution that the cases invoked by them cannot be applied tothe present cases because of the differences in theirenvironmental circumstances. 10

Moreover, the same accused-movants aver that the Courterred in holding that there was no political motivation in thefiling of the present Informations. 11 They point out that theprivate complainant in these cases was appointed as CityAdministrator by their political rival, the incumbent mayor ofIligan City,12 and that the private complainant did not evenimplicate a certain Voltaire I. Roviro as a respondent in hiscomplaint-affidavit despite the latter's favorable vote in thesubject city council resolutions;13 hence, there was politicalmotivation in the filingof the present complaints.14

Accused-movants Cruz, et al., further reiterate that thefacts charged in the present Informations do not constitute anoffense. They stress that the said Informations fail to allege withparticularity the supposed undue injury which was purportedlysuffered by the government; hence, it would be futile to proceedto trial under a defective Information.l5 In support of the above-mentioned arguments, they invoke the cases of Dela Chica v.Sandiganbagan,16 Andaga v. People17 and Llorente, Jr., v.Sandiganbagan.18

Lastly, the accused-movants insist that the resolutionpassed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod is a mere expression ofthe sentiment or opinion of the Sanggunian.19 They submit thatthe Court erred when it ruled that the consideration of theabove-mentioned defense is premature at this stage of ~

10 p. 346, Vol. II, Record11 pp. 346-347, Vol. II, Record12 p. 347, Vol. II, Record13 p. 347, Vol. II, Record14 p. 347, Vol. II, Record15 p. 347, Vol. II, Record16412 SCRA242 (2003)17493 SCRA539 (2006)18287 SCRA382 (1998)19 pp. 350-351, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People VS. Cruz, et ai.

proceedings and it is best passed-upon during trial. The sameaccused-movants likewise pray that the Court take judicialnotice of the distinction between the terms ((resolution" and((ordinance" as defined in the case of Municipality ofParanaque v. V.M.Realty Corporation,20 thus:

We are not convinced by petitioner's insistencethat the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" aresynonymous. A municipal ordinance is different froma resolution. An ordinance is law, but a resolution ismerely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion ofa lawmaking body on a specific matter. Anordinance possesses a general and permanentcharacter, but a resolution is temporary in nature.Additionally, the two are enacted differently - athird reading is necessary for an ordinance, but notfor a resolution, unless decided otherwise by amajority of all the Sanggunian members.21

In its ((Opposition (to the Motion for Reconsideration filed byaccused Cruz, Marzo, Dalisay, Jr., Young, Magaro, Zalsos,Abragan, Jr., Anghay, Openiano and Areola)" dated November29, 2017,22 the prosecution contends that the arguments raisedby the accused-movants in their present motion are merereiterations of the arguments they raised in their Motion toQuash dated May 29, 2017.23 The prosecution points out thatthe Court had already passed upon these matters and found thegrounds raised by the accused-movants unmeritorious.24

The Court finds the subject motion bereft ofmerit.

"292 seRA 678 (1998) ~21 Emphasis supplied by the accused-movants -22 pp. 354-359, Vol. II, Record23 pp. 356-357, Vol. II, Record24 p. 357, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

To begin with, the prosecution correctly points out that thearguments raised by the accused-movants in their presentmotion are mere reiterations of the grounds they raised in theirMotion to Quash dated May 29, 2017.25 These same argumentswere squarely passed upon by the Court in its Resolution soughtto be reconsidered.

1. On the accused'sinsistence that therewas inordinate delay inthe termination of thepreliminaryinvestigation of thesecases.

As can be gleaned from its assailed Resolution promulgatedon November 2, 2017, the Court reviewed the factualantecedents of the present cases vis-a.-vis the cases invoked bythe accused-movants in support of their claim of inordinatedelay. Therein, the Court held that the delay in the preliminaryinvestigation of these cases is not vexatious, arbitrary,capricious or oppressive that would warrant its dismissal, thus:

Preliminarily, it is jurisprudentially settled thatthe right to speedy disposition of cases is a flexibleconcept wherein the facts and circumstancessurrounding each case must be evaluated and takeninto account. Only when the proceedings are attendedby vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, or whenwithout cause or justifiable motive, a long period of timeis allowed to elapse, would there be a violation of theright to speedy disposition of cases.26 conseqUentl~

25 pp. 36-166, Vol. III, Record26 Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SeRA 135 (2008)

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-l7-CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et ai.

mere mathematical reckoning of the time involvedwouldnot be sufficient.27

Thus, to warrant a finding of inordinate delay, thefacts and circumstances surrounding the alleged delayin these cases should be akin to the cases invoked bythe accused-movants.

In their motion, the accused-movants invoke thecases of People v. Sandiganbayan (First & ThirdDivision), et al.,28 Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan,29Enriquez, et al., v. Office of the Ombudsman,30andTatad v. Sandiganbayan.31

The Court finds the reliance of the accused-movants on the aforesaid cases misplaced because thefactual milieus of the present cases are different fromthe said cases.

In People, the Supreme Court found that therewas a delay of six (6) years in the conduct of the fact-finding investigation. Therein, the High Tribunal heldthat "the long waiting of six (6) years for the Office of theOmbudsman to resolve a simple case of robbery is clearlyan inordinate delay, blatantly intolerable and grosslyprejudicial to the constitutional right of speedy dispositionof cases."32

Unlike in the above-mentioned case, the records ofthese cases show that the preliminary investigationbefore the Office of the Ombudsman only took a littleovertwo (2)year~

-~rC(27 Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008); See also Dacudao v. Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (2013),Enriquez v. Office of the Ombudsman, 545 SCRA618 (2008)28712 SCRA359 (2013)29701 SCRA 188 (2013)30545 SCRA618 (2008)31159 SCRA70 (1988)32 pp. 396-397, People v. Sandiganbayan (First & Third Division), et 01., 712 SCRA359 (2013)

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et ai.

In Tatad, the Supreme Court ruled that "politicalmotivations played a vital role in activating andpropelling the prosecutorial process. "33

Here, the present cases involve no imputation ofany political motivation in the filing of the presentInformations against accused-movants.

In CoscolZueZa, the Supreme Court held that thepetitioners' constitutional right to speedy disposition ofcases was violated since the record of the case revealedthat the petitioners were only informed of the 2003Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman after theInformation was filed with the Sandiganbayan on June19, 2009.34 In the said case, the Supreme Courtrecognized this circumstance as a plausible reason whythe petitioners had failed to assert their right to speedydisposition of cases.

Here, a review of the record of these cases showsthat the accused-movants were duly informed of theOffice of the Ombudsman's adverse Resolution datedJune 13, 2016. In fact, the accused-movants filed theirrespective motions for reconsideration of the said adverseresolution.

In Enriquez, the Supreme Court found that therewas a violation of the petitioners' constitutional right tospeedy disposition of cases because it appeared fromthe factual antecedents that the Fact Finding andIntelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of theOmbudsman failed to resolve the cases against thepetitioners although the investigation of the said caseshad long been terminated when the latter formallyoffered their evidence on January 29, 2002,35 and themotion for early resolution and the repeated follow-ups ofthe petitioners were also not acted upon by the FF~

33 p. 81, Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)34 p. 198, CoscoJluela v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 701 SCRA 188 (2013)35 p. 630, Enriquez, et 01., v. Office of the Ombudsman, 545 SCRA 618 (2008)36/d, Enriquez, et 01., v. Office of the Ombudsman, 545 SCRA 618 (2008)

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-l 7-CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

The record of these cases is bereft of any motionfor early resolution filed by the accused-movants. InOmbudsman v. Jurado,37 the Supreme Court, citingthe ruling of the United States Supreme Court in thecase of Barker v. Wingo,38 held that the accused'sassertion of his right to a speedy trial is entitled to astrong evidentiary weight in determining whether thedefendant is being deprived of such right, thus:

We have already discussed the thirdfactor, the defendant's responsibility to asserthis right. Whether and how a defendant assertshis right is closely related to the other factors wehave mentioned. The strength of his efforts willbe affected by the length of the delay, to someextent by the reason for the delay, and mostparticularly by the personal prejudice, which isnot always readily identifiable, that heexperiences. The more serious thedeprivation, the more likely a defendant isto complain. The defendant's assertion ofhis speedy trial right, then, is entitled tostrong evidentiary weight in determiningwhether the defendant is being deprived ofthe right. We emphasize that failure toassert the right will make it difficult for adefendant to prove that he was denied aspeedy trial.39

A review of the record of these cases reveal thefollowing circumstances surrounding the preliminaryinvestigation conducted before the Office of theOmbudsman, thus:

1. On March 13, 2014, the OMB-Mindanaoreceived the Affidavit-complaint of privatecomplainant Dexter Rey T. Sumaoy;40

_____ 2_. _I_n_it_s_o_rderdated May 30, 2014, the OMB./)

37561 SCRA 135 (2008) / /"38407 US 514 (1972)39 Emphasis supplied; See also Spouses Uy v. Adriano, 505 SCRA625 (2006) ~ ~

~ p. 89, Vol. I, Rew,d / \I -..f

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et ai.

Mindanao required the respondents (nowaccused) to file their counter-affidavits;41

3. On July 18, 2014, the OMB-Mindanaoreceived the counter-affidavit of accused-movant Lawrence Lluch Cruz, as well as thejoint counter-affidavit of accused-movantsRuderic C. Marzo, Moises Dalisay, Jr.,Marlene Young, Riza Jane P. Magaro, Jose L.Zalsos, Providencio A. Abragan, Jr., Ariel P.Anghay, Roy L. Openiano and Bayani C.Areola;42

4. In its Resolution dated June 13, 2016, theOffice of the Ombudsman found probablecause to indict the respondents (nowaccused) Lawrence L. Cruz and ProvidencioA. Abragan, Jr., with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 on three (3) counts,respectively; Ruderic C. Marzo, Moises G.Dalisay, Ariel P. Anghay, and Bayani C.Areola on two (2.)counts, respectively; RizaJane P. Magaro, Jose L. Zalsos, Frederick W.Siao, Marlene L. Young, Michelle E. Sweet-Booc, Roy L. Openiano and Eulalio G. Gaiteon one (1) count, respectively;43

5. The same resolution was approved byOmbudsman Conchita Carpio Morales onJune 28, 2016.44

6. Thereafter, accused Marzo, Siao, Young,Sweet-Booc, Openiano, Magaro, Zalsos andGaite filed their motions for reconsiderationdated August 1, 2016;45 accused-movantsCruz, Dalisay, Abrangan, Jr., Anghay andAreola filed their joint motion forreconsideration and integrated supplementalmotion to the motion for

________ r,_e_c_o_n_s_id_eration/reinvestigation dated AU~

41 p. 75, Vol. II, Record42 p. 125, Vol. I, Record43 pp. 49-64, Vol. I, Record44 p. 62, id45 p. 65, id

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-l 7-CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

2,2016 and August 19, 2016, respectively;46in addition to the joint submissions ofaccused Cruz, Dalisay, Marzo, Anghay andAreola, accused-movant Abragan, Jr., filed amotion for reconsideration dated August 2,2016 and a supplemental pleading to themotion for reconsideration dated August 9,2016;47 private complainant Sumaoy filed aconsolidated comment dated August 30,2016;48 and, in response, accused-movantsCruz, Marzo, Dalisay, Abrangan, Jr., Anghayand Areola filed a ((Joint Rejoinder toComplainants Comments on Respondents'Motions for Reconsideration/ SecondIntegrated Supplemental Motion forReconsideration (M.R.) to the M.R.s' filed onAugust 2, 2016 and August 8, 2016 withAncillary Prayer to Convert the M.R.s' into aMotion for Reinvestigation with ClarificatoryHearing" dat~d September 19, 2016;49

7. In its Order dated December 22, 2016, theOffice of the Ombudsman found no merit inthe above-mentioned motions forreconsideration filed by the respondents. Ithowever reduced the indictment of accused-movant Abrangan, Jr., from three (3) countsof violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 toone (1) count. 50 The same order wasapproved by Ombudsman Conchita CarpioMorales on January 18, 2017;51and,

8. On the February 16,corresponding Informationsaccused were filedSandigan bayan. 52

2017,againstwith

46 p. 66, id47 p. 69, id48 p. 70, id49 p. 71, id50 p. 86, Vol. I, Record51 p. 86, id52 pp. 46-48, id

thethethe

that the

/?

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

Office of the Ombudsman took prompt action uponthe .filing of the complaint against the accused-movants and their co-accused. Also, the motionsfor reconsideration filed by the respondents wereimmediately resolved. While there may have beendelay in the disposition of the case before theOffice of the Ombudsman, the Court does not findsuch delay as vexatious, arbitrary, capricious oroppressive. 53

Indeed, jurisprudence teaches that the concept of"speedy disposition of cases" is consistent withreasonable delays; what the Constitution prohibits areunreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays whichrender rights nugatory.54 Only when the proceedingsare attended by vexatious, capricious, andoppressive delays; or when unjustifiedpostponements of the trial are asked for andsecured, or when without cause or justifiablemotive a long period of time is allowed to elapsewithout the party having his case tried would therebe a violation of the right to speedy disposition ofcases.55 This is not so in the present cases.56

11. The claim of politicalmotivation in the filingof these cases lacksevidentiary support.

Moreover, the accused-movants submit that the case ofTatoo v. Sandiganbayan,57 is applicable to the present cr53 Emphasis supplied54 Braza v. Sandiganbayan, 691 SCRA 471 (2013); See also Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008),Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 440 SCRA 423 (2004), Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr., 327 SCRA 145 (2000),Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA153 (1987)55 Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA135 (2008); Emphasis supplied56 pp. 7-12, Resolution; pp. 312-317, Vol. II, Record57159 SCRA70 (1988)

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et ai.

because the filing of the present Informations was also politicallymotivated.

To be clear, the Court rejected the application of Tatad tothe present cases after it applied settled jurisprudence that forinordinate delay to exist, the facts and circumstances peculiar toeach case must be carefully evaluated. 58

In Tatad, the Supreme Court applied the "radical relief' ofdismissing the cases against the petitioner since the factualantecedents in the said case revealed that as early as October1974, a report was already lodged with the Legal Panel of thePresidential Security Command against the petitioner.59

However, this report was ((made to sleep" until it becameapparent that Secretary Tatad had a (JaZZing-out"with PresidentFerdinand Marcos.60 It was only on July 5, 1985, that theTanodbayan issued a resolution recommending the filing of thecriminal Informations against the petitioner.61

Here, aside from the making a plain assertion that thecomplainant in these cases belongs to a different political partyand is an appointee of their political rival, the accused-movantshave failed to sufficiently demonstrate how the filing of thecomplaint against them was propelled by any political bias.

The ruling of theSupreme Court in thecase of Municipality ofParaftaque v. V.M.Realty Corporation62

58 See Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017 i(59 p. 80, Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988) ~60 p. 80, Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)61 p. 15, Resolution; p. 337, Vol. I, Record.62292 SeRA 678 (1998)

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. S8-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et ai.

does not apply to thesecases.

The accused-movants maintain their claim that theirfavorable vote on the resolution passed by the SangguniangPanlungsod is only a mere expression of the sentiment oropinion of its members. They also urge the Court to takejudicial notice of the distinction between a resolution and anordinance pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court InMunicipality of Paraftaque v. V.M.Realty Corporation. 63

To be sure, this same argument was resolved by the Courtin its Resolution promulgated on August 2, 201 7 ,64 and in itsassailed Resolution promulgated on November 2, 2017, to wit:

Finally, the accused-movants insist that theapproval of the disputed resolutions were onlydeclarations of a sentiment or opinion of the lawmakingbody of the city of fligan and they do not confer anyrights.

To be sure, the Court already passed upon thisissue in its Resolution promulgated on August 2, 2017.Therein, the Court declared that the consideration ofthe above-mentioned allegation at this stage of theproceedings is premature because this is a matter ofdefense and evidentiary in nature. This is best passedupon in a full blown trial, to wit:

In their bid to dismiss the cases againstthem, the accused-movants further argue that:the facts charged in the subject Informations donot constitute an offense since the saidInformations merely state that their allegedparticipation in the renewal of the disputedcontract was the passage of Resolution NO.--l.1:.~

63292 seRA 678 (1998) / "

~pp.130-14S,Vol.lI,Rew,d A 4

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et a1.

191, which IS only an expression of thesentiment of the Sanggunian Panlungsod;65 thesaid resolution is not necessary for the approvalof the contract of lease;66 the renewal of thecontract of lease does not need to undergocompetitive public bidding pursuant to Section53, Rule XVI of the 2016 Revised Rules andRegulations of the GPRA;67 there was noshowing that the absence of public biddingresulted in the gross disadvantage of thegovernment;68 public officials are not liable fordamages in the discharge of their officialfunctions if there is no bad faith;69 they simplyacted in accordance with their mandate underthe Local Government Code, hence, they enjoythe presumption of regularity in the performanceof their duties;70 and, the prosecution admittedin its comment that a contract of lease need notundergo competitive public bidding.71

The Court finds the resolution of theaforesaid submissions of the accused-movantsat this stage of the proceedings premature.

Jurisprudence abounds holding that the'presence or absence of the elements of the crimecharged, the existence of good faith or lackthereof, the merits and the validity of aparty's defense or accusation,72 as well as theadmissibility of testimonies and evidence, are allmatters of defense and are evidentiary in naturethat is best passed upon during trial proper. 73In People v. Castillo,74 the Supreme Courtruled: ~

65 p. 423, Vol.I, Record; Emphasis supplied66 p. 611, id

67pp.426-427,id ~ j(

68 p. 430, id69 p. 616, id70 p. 616, id71 p. 620, id72 Emphasis supplied73 People v. Castillo, 590 SCRA 95 (2009); See also Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 478 SCRA 348 (2005)Unilever v. Tan, 715 SCRA 36 (2014), United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, 534 SCRA 322 (2007),People v. Yecyec 739 SCRA 719 (2014), Clay and Feather International, Inc. v. Lichaytoo, 649 SCRA 516(2011) and Lee v. KBC Bank N.V., 610 SCRA117 (2010).74590 SCRA95 (2009)

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

Moreover, it was clearlypremature on the part of theSandiganbayan to make adeterminative finding prior to theparties' presentation of theirrespective evidence that there was nobad faith and manifest partiality onthe respondents' part and undueinjury on the part of thecomplainant. In Go v. Fifth Division,Sandiganbayan,75 we held that "it iswell established that the presence orabsence of the elements of the crimeis evidentiary in nature and is amatter of defense that may be bestpassed upon after a full-blown trialon the merits. "76Also,it would be unfairto expect the prosecution to present allthe evidence needed to secure theconviction of the accused upon the filingof the information against the latter. Thereason is found in the nature andobjective of a preliminary investigation.Here, the public prosecutors do notdecide whether there is evidence beyondreasonable doubt. of the guilt of theperson charged; they merely determinewhether there is sufficient ground toengender a well-founded belief that acrime has been committed and thatrespondent is probably guilty thereof,and should be held for trial. 77

Neither does the case of Municipality of Paraiiaque helpthe cause of the accused-movants any because the distinctionsbetween the terms ((resolution" and ((ordinance" were madetherein by the Supreme Court under a different set of facts andcircumstances.

In the said case, the main issue that was resolved by theSupreme Court was ((whether or not a resolution approved by thelocal legislative council is enough to authorize the local chn75521 seRA 270 (2007) / "76 Emphasis supplied77 pp. 13-15, Resolution; pp. 142-144, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

executive to exercise the power of eminent domain?" The HighCourt ruled in the negative ratiocinating that Section 19 ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 expressly provides that in order fora local government unit (LGU) to exercise the power of eminentdomain, the local legislative council must enact an ordinanceauthorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, toexercise such power or pursue expropriation proceedings over aparticular private property; hence, following a strict adherence tothe requirements of Section 19, the Supreme Court rejected thepetitioner's claim that the approval of a resolution by themunicipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriationcase ((substantially complies with the requirements of law."

Plainly, the circumstances and issue in these cases arematerially different from the case of Municipality ofParanaque; hence, the ruling therein does not find materialapplication here.

IV. The facts charged in theInformations constitute anoffense.

The accused-movants further reiterate that the factscharged in the Informations against them do not constitute anoffense. This argument was also passed upon by the Court inits challenged Resolution promulgated on November 2, 2017,thus:

The accused-movants also assert that the factscharged in the subject Informations do not constitute anoffense. They point out that [1] a mere allegation thatthe disputed lease agreement did not undergocompetitive public bidding is not enough to support thecharge that the government suffered undue injury; and,[2] that the supposed injury must be alleged with

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

sufficiently inform the accused of the charges againstthem.

In its Resolution promulgated on August 2,2017,78the Court already assessed the present Informations andfound that the said Informations against accused Siaoand ·Sweet-Booc sufficiently allege the essentialelements of a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019,VlZ:

The Court finds that the Informations inthese cases allege the essential elements of aviolation of Section 3 (e)of R.A. No. 30 19.

The second paragraph of the afore-citedInformations specifically alleges that: (1) theaccused-movants were public officers who wereperforming their official functions at the timematerial to these cases; (2) the accused-movantsacted in evident bad faith, manifest partiality orgross inexcusable negligence; (3) the accused-movants gave unwarranted benefit, preferenceand advantage to Salvatori DevelopmentCorporation (SDC); and, (4) the accused-movants authorized accused Mayor Lawrence Ll.Cruz, by voting in favor of Resolution No. 13-191, during the regular session of theSangguniang Panlungsod, to enter into acontract of lease, without undergoingcompetitive public bidding, with SDC whereinthe City of Iligan leased seven [7] adjoiningparcels of land with an aggregate area of 20,000square meters (sq.m), for a period of five [5]years, at a rental rate ofPhp13.17jsq.m., for thefirst 10,000 sq.m, and Php8.78jsq.m., for thesecond 10,000 sq.m., thereby allowing SDC toreceive lease rentals, paid for by public funds,which caused undue injury and damage to thegovernment.7~

78 pp. 130-145, Vol. II, Record

~ p. 13, ResoJu,;on; p. 142, Vol. II,ReCO'ID

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et ai.

The Informations in these cases are similarlyworded except for the names of the accused, the publicoffice that they were holding at the time material tothese cases and their participation in the disputedtransactions. After another review of all theInformations in these cases, the Court maintainsits finding that the said Informations sufficientlyallege all the elements of a violation of Sec. 3 leI ofR.A. No. 3019 and likewise· comply with therequirements of the Section 6, Rule 110 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure.8o

The accused-movants also assert that the presentInformations must allege with particularity the supposed undueinjury which was purportedly suffered by the government,otherwise, it would be futile to proceed to trial under a defectiveInformation.

In its assailed Resolution promulgated on November 2,2017, the Court held that the amount of undue injury causedneed not be specified, quantified or proven to the point of moralcertainty at the time of the filingof the Information, to wit:

Moreover, the Court finds the accused-movants'reliance on the case of Llorente, Jr., v.Sandiganbayan81 misplaced. In People v.Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 82 the SupremeCourt pronounced that for as long as the ultimate factsconstituting the offense have been alleged, anInformation charging a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.No. 3019 need not state, to the point of specificity, theexact amount of unwarranted benefit granted~

80 pp. 13-14, Resolution; pp. 318-319, Vol. II, Record; Emphasis supplied f\ ~81287 SCRA382 (1998)82770 SCRA 162 (2015)

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et ai.

specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moralcertainty, the undue injury caused,83 viz:

The Sandiganbayan's application of theLlorente ruling in this case is misplaced.

Indeed, this Court held in Llorente thatthe "undue injury must be specified, quantifiedand proven to the point of moralcertainty. "84The validity and sufficiency of theInformation, however, was not an issue inLlorente. The import of the ruling therein is thatproof of undue injury must be established by theprosecution during the trial and not when theInformation is filed. Nowhere in Llorente didwe require that undue injury be specified,quantified and proved to the point of moralcertainty at the time of the filing of theInformation. Such an interpretation wouldeffectively require the prosecution to includeall the relevant evidence in the Informationand to present such evidence of undue injuryeven prior to arraignment.8s Moreover, underthe Sandiganbayan's interpretation of Llorente,the accused would be required to face (and evenrebut) the evidence as soon as the Information isfiled and even before he pleads. This runscoun ter to the function of a motion to quash asa remedy afforded an accused before heproceeds to trial.

Further, such an interpretation wouldundermine the value of the Information as a toolfor an accused to understand the crime forwhich he is being charged as it requires that theInformation already contain a long and detailedlist of other matters not necessary in informingthe accused of the charge. It will also beprejudicial to the prosecution who will then beforced to present evidence even before ther

83 p. 174, People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 770 SeRA 162 (2015)84 Footnote omitted ~ . #~ Emph,,;ssupp!;ed / v U ' _~

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et ai.

proper. This interpretation cannot becoun tenanced. 86

In sum, the accused-movants have failed to raise any newor substantial matter that would warrant a reconsideration ofthe Court's Resolution promulgated on November 2,2017.

WHEREFORE, accused Lawrence L. Cruz, Ruderic C.Marzo, Moises Dalisay, Jr., Marlene Young, Riza Jane P.Magaro, Jose L. Zalsos, Providencio A. Abragan, Jr., Ariel P.Anghay, Roy L. Openiano and Bayani C. Areola's «Motion forReconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 02 November 201 7)"datedNovember 14, 2017,87 is DENIED for being pro forma and/orlack of merit.

Set the arraignment of the accused-movants and the pre-trial on February 2,2018, at 1:30 in the afternoon.

Meantime, the parties and their counsel are directed toappear before the Division Clerk of Court on January 15 to 18,2018, at 9:00 in the morning, for the pre-marking of theirexhibits and to explore the possibility of a stipulations of fact.

AMPARO ~ ..~rr. ~E-TANPreSIdIng sticeChairperson

86 pp. 175-176, People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 770 SeRA 162 (2015) ~87 pp. 343-353, Vol. II, Record / - v

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-0263-0280People vs. Cruz, et al.

TO R. FERNANDEZociate Justice

JANE T. FE ANDEZAssociate Justice