Improving Water Supply and Sanitation Services for the ... · PDF fileImproving Water Supply and Sanitation ... Improving Water Supply and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor

March 2009

Guidance Notes

The Water and Sanitation Programis an international partnership forimproving water and sanitation sectorpolicies, practices, and capacities toserve poor people

Improving Water Supplyand Sanitation Servicesfor the Urban Poor in India

GuidanceNotesfinalpress190309.p65 4/8/2009, 2:18 PM1


In 2006–07, the Water and Sanitation Program–South Asia (WSP–SA) initiated a research to identify barriers to

service delivery for the urban poor. The findings of the research have been presented in the Guidance Notes on

Improving Water Supply and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor in India. The Guidance Notes provide a

systematic analysis of the barriers to service delivery for the urban poor and recommend practical solutions and

strategies for overcoming these barriers. The Guidance Notes are based on an in-depth research of various

initiatives from across the world (including South Asian, African, and Latin American countries) and consultations

with urban poor communities across four major Indian cities (Mumbai, Bengaluru, Vadodara, and Delhi). An

accompanying volume, Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor, is a documentation of

‘Global and Indian Case Studies’ and ‘Consultations with Urban Poor Communities’.

Guidance Notes

Improving Water Supplyand Sanitation Servicesfor the Urban Poor in India


Acronyms and Abbreviations 4

Section 1: Introduction 5

Purpose of the Guidance Notes

Overview of the Current Situation

Obstacles to Improving Service for the Poor

Section 2: Give the Poor a Voice 9

Promote Meaningful Participation in Planning and Design

Publish the Stories of the Poor

Inform and Educate Poor Communities

Empower the Poor to Act within and beyond Their Own Communities

Getting Started: Actions and Resources

Section 3: Take Vested Interests into Account 17

Incorporate Informal Service Providers into the Solution


Section 4: Eliminate Administrative and Legal Barriers 21

Delink Service Provision from Land Tenure

Institutionalize Simplified Procedures and Provide Assistance


Section 5: Strengthen Capacity, Autonomy, and Accountability ofService Providers and Provide Incentives to Serve the Poor 25

Separate and Clarify the Responsibilities of the Actors

Strengthen Capacity

Recognize and Work with Alternative Providers

Introduce Accountability and Performance Monitoring Systems


Contents


Guidance Notes:Improving Water Supplyand Sanitation Servicesfor the Urban Poor in India

Section 6: Adopt Appropriate Investment Finance,Cost Recovery, and Subsidy Policies 37

Adopt Realistic Cost Recovery Policies and Targeted Subsidies

Develop a Cost Recovery Strategy

Subsidize Investments

Restructure Charges and Payment Practices to Accommodate the Poor

Promote, Legitimize, and Finance Small Private Service Providers


Section 7: Overcome Physical and Technical Barriers 45

Protect Water Resources

Adopt Appropriate Technologies and Delivery Systems


Section 8: Summary of Policy Issues 49

Policy Framework

List of Policy Issues Associated with the Proposed Strategies

Resources 53

Accompanying Volume1 :Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

1 Includes documentation of ‘Global and Indian Case Studies’ and ‘Consultations with Urban Poor Communities’.


Acronyms and AbbreviationsADB Asian Development Bank

BMC BrihanMumbai Municipal Corporation

BWSSB Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board

CAESB Water and Sanitation Company of Brasilia

CBO Community-Based Organization

CRC Citizen Report Card

IDA International Development Association

JNNURM Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission

KES Kenyan Shillings

KIWASCO Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company

LWSC Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company

MBK Maji Bora Kibera (Better Water Supply for Kibera)

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

NWSC National Water and Sewerage Corporation of Uganda

O&M Operation and Maintenance

OBA Output-Based Aid

OPP Orangi Pilot Project

PERPAMSI Professional Organization of Water Enterprises of Indonesia

PKR Pakistani Rupees

SANAA National Autonomous Water and Sewerage Service of Honduras

SONES National Water Company of Senegal

SPSP Small Private Service Provider

TCC Tiruchirapalli City Corporation

ULB Urban Local Body

WAVE Women’s Action for Village Empowerment

WBI World Bank Institute

WSS Water Supply and Sanitation (or Sewerage)

WUP Water Utility Partnership for Capacity Building

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Section 1

Introduction


Purpose of theseGuidance NotesAs policymakers and service providersin India take action to improve waterand sanitation services for the poor,they can take advantage of lessonsfrom several experiences in India andelsewhere. There are relevantexamples, both within India andthroughout the developing world,of initiatives that have led toimprovements for both the poorpopulation and the service providers.India could learn from the lessons ofthese examples, adapting them asappropriate, as the country addressesthe needs of the urban poor and strivesto meet the Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MDGs) for water supplyand sanitation.

The Government of India’s JawaharlalNehru National Urban Renewal Mission(JNNURM) provides a framework forthis, targeting 63 key cities and urbanareas, focusing on services to the pooras one of its explicit missions. TheseGuidance Notes are aimed primarily atproject planners, service providers, andcommunity leaders, but provide somesuggestions for policymakers as well.They have been developed incollaboration with the Ministry ofHousing and Urban Poverty Alleviationand the Ministry of Urban Development.The intent is to identify barriers toproviding adequate services for thepoor and to propose practical solutionsbased on the experience of a numberof relevant cases that have beenreviewed for this purpose. TheseGuidance Notes focus on practicalactions—many of which can beimplemented at least partially within theexisting framework. Promoting policyreform per se is not the primary

objective, though more appropriatepolicy frameworks would ensure anenabling environment and are essentialfor long-term sustainability of servicesfor the poor, especially for addressingmany of the financial barriers discussedin Section 6. For this reason, desirablepolicy initiatives are listed at the endof each section and a final sectionsummarizes them.

Overview of theCurrent SituationThe poor in India face severe hardshipsbecause they lack convenient accessto efficient water supply and sanitationservices. According to the 2001Census of India, more than 28 percentof India’s urban population lives inslums. Attempts to serve them to datehave been sporadic and largely basedon notions of charity, rather thantreating the poor as legitimatecustomers of the utility. As a result,slum areas receive low-quality servicesthat create a net drain on utilityresources. There are increasing callsfrom the poor and civil societyorganizations that represent theirinterests to address this problem andthe Government of India is takingimportant steps in that direction.

A visitor to a poor part of any city inIndia will see two common scenes:women lining up with pots waiting forwater, and men and children defecatingin the open. In Mumbai, a city of15 million people, more than half thepopulation lives in slums. Nearly 30,000families live on the pavements. TheMumbai water utility produces anaverage of 158 liters of water per capitaper day, but this production figure doesnot represent consumption by endusers. It also conceals the acute

inequality in distribution of basicservices and the hardships faced bythe poor, especially women.

Access toImproved Water Supply

Despite the expansion of water supplyinfrastructure, those who have accessto infrastructure do not necessarily getadequate services, and the poorcontinue to rely on alternative sourcesthat are often very costly to theconsumer and incur hidden costs tosociety. India has successfullyexpanded water supply infrastructure incities, but this has not necessarilytranslated into improved service to thepoor. Figure 1 shows the percentageof households that had access to asource of safe water (that is, pipedwater supply, tankers, hand pumps,and so on) versus the percentageof households that actually had ahousehold connection to thepiped system.2

The graph shows that more than95 percent of urban households hadaccess to safe water sources.However, having access is not theequivalent of receiving adequateservice. Only 74 percent of thepopulation had access to piped watersupply and 55 percent of householdshad household connections. Theremainder, primarily poor households,must rely on standpipes, neighbors’connections or alternative sources.Women, especially, spend hours andadjust their work schedules andsleeping patterns to stay up late atnight to fetch water. Recent researchshows that standpipe users are notsatisfied with the hours of supply or thequality of water provided.

2 World Bank. January 2006. India Water Supply andSanitation: Bridging the Gap between Infrastructure andService. Background Paper, Urban Water Supply andSanitation, p. 12.

These Guidance Notes focus on practical actions—many of whichcan be implemented at least partially within the existing framework.

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Intermittent supply, which results inunreliable and inadequate quantity andcontaminated water, affects the richand poor alike. As a result, largenumbers of households rely onexpensive tanker supplies and watervendors. With over 13,000 tankers, thetanker industry in Chennai mines thesurrounding farmland for water, usinggovernment-subsidized powerintended for agriculture purposes. InDelhi, about 1,400 water tankerssupply water to residents. Half areprivately controlled, and it is allegedthat the owners are allowed to floutrules, pilfer water or extract it illegally.They then sell it at predatory prices.

Access to Safe Sanitation

The health and environmental costs ofinadequate sanitation in slums arehuge. It is estimated that only about28 percent of the urban population hassewerage connections and only about63 to 73 percent has a household toiletconnected to a sewer or onsitedisposal.3 Figure 2 shows that there is a

wide difference in rates of access tosewerage infrastructure among the13 states for which access rates areshown. However, as in the case ofwater supply, access to infrastructuredoes not necessarily translate intoadequate service. Often public toilets

are not maintained and cannot beconsidered safe and sanitary. In manycases, sewers are not really a viableoption: they do not function properlydue to inadequate water for flushing,blockages, and the frequent failure ofpumping stations. Disposal of sewage isfrequently neglected. Many residents ofslums defecate in the open and, evenwhen they use toilets, most of thehuman waste goes into open drains.According to the 10th Five Year Plan,‘Three-fourths of surface waterresources are polluted and 80 percentof the pollution is due to sewage alone.’

The lack of viable sanitation solutions inslums contributes to serious healthand environmental risks for the entirepopulation of Indian cities, not just thoseliving in slums; the poor are, however,particularly vulnerable to infection fromcontaminated water. The health impactof unsafe water and lack of basicsanitation facilities are well documented.

Source: For 1991, Census of India; for 1993, Demographic and Health Survey 1992/93 and NationalSample Survey Organization (NSSO); for 1996, NSSO; for 1999, National Family Health Survey1998/99; for 2000, Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey.

Source: World Bank. January 2006. India Water Supply and Sanitation: Bridging the Gap betweenInfrastructure and Service. Background Paper, Urban Water Supply and Sanitation, p. 15.

Figure 1: Percentage of Households with Access to aSource of Safe Water and Percentage of Householdswith Private Connections

Figure 2: Percentage of Population with Access toSewerage in 13 States of India

3 See Footnote 2.

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Obstacles toImproving Servicefor the PoorWhy do poor people not get access toservices? Consultations with a broadrange of stakeholders in India resultedin the identification of obstacles toimproving service to the poor. Theseobstacles have been grouped under sixproposed action areas as follows:

1. Give the poor a voice.

• The voice of the poor, too often, isnot heard and misperceptions aboutthem persist.

2. Neutralize vested interests.

• Water vendors, organized crime,corrupt public officials, anddishonest utility staff may have avested interest in preventing betterservices for the poor.

3. Eliminate administrative and

legal barriers.

• Land ownership and tenure issues

often create a barrier to the

provision of service to the poor.

• The poor may be unaware ofadministrative and legalrequirements, or find it difficult tounderstand them and comply.

4. Strengthen capacity, autonomy,and accountability of service providersand provide incentives to servethe poor.

• Public service providers sometimeslack the autonomy, as well asfinancial and human resources andincentives required to provideservices to the urban poor.

• Municipalities and utilities are notheld accountable for the provision ofsatisfactory water supply andsanitation services.

• The services provided by smallprivate service providers (SPSPs)are not recognized, encouraged,and regulated.

5. Adopt appropriate financial policies.

• Tariffs do not cover the full cost ofefficient services.

• Poor households find it difficult topay connection fees upfront.

• Poor households find it difficult topay monthly bills.

• Increasing block tariffs penalizehouseholds that share asingle connection.

• Small-scale service providers lackadequate finance to extendnetworks into peri-urbaninformal settlements.

6. Overcome physical andtechnical barriers.

• The overexploitation anddegradation of water resourcesaffects the poor disproportionately.

• Physical and technical challengesmake extending formal piped watersupply and sewerage networks intoinformal and unplanned settlementsmore difficult.

What can be done to remove these

barriers? Practical strategies are

proposed in the following six sections

of this document. These are illustrated

by case examples of initiatives to deal

with the obstacles.4

Each section ends with suggestionsfor getting started. There is (a) a list ofrelevant actions and strategies that thekey players (policymakers/projectplanners, governance bodies/serviceproviders, and community leaders/advocates) can implement; and (b) alist of the relevant cases included inthe accompanying volume.

The final section lists the policyreforms that would help to enhanceand consolidate the success ofthese efforts.

Resources, including publications andorganizations, are listed at the end ofthese Guidance Notes.

4 Detailed case studies are presented in theaccompanying volume.

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Section 2

Give thePoor a Voice


ObstaclesThe voice of the poor is not heard toooften, and misperceptions aboutthem persist.

Project designers and service providersoften assume they know what type ofservices the poor want and are willingto pay for. It is assumed that the poorcannot pay for services and that theseshould be provided free of charge.Politicians exploit the poor by promisingfree services in exchange for their votes.Such assumptions and practices resultin costly and unsustainable supply-driven public programs to provideservices. In contrast to commonperceptions, evidence collected duringthe field work for these Guidance Notesshows that it is feasible for many of thepoor to be legitimate customers whopay their bills. To promote thatobjective, it is essential that theiropinions be heard.

PromoteMeaningfulParticipationin Planningand DesignGiving the poor the opportunity toparticipate in planning and design canmake the difference between successand failure, so adequate time andresources should be allowed formeaningful consultation during thepreparatory phases of projects.Standard technical solutions are notalways appropriate. Consultation withbeneficiaries helps to assure thatappropriate technological solutions willbe selected, but project designers needto be aware that consultation takes time

and resources. In their haste to qualifyfor funding or achieve quick results,local officials and utility managers maybypass the time-consuming andpotentially messy participatory processunless it is required as a precondition offunding.5 Project designs sometimesinclude a requirement that a certainpercentage of residents make aninitial contribution to capital costs orsign a ‘commitment to connect’ toservices as a sign of their interest in theproject, but there is a distinct differencebetween pressurizing residents to signup for a project as compared toenabling a community to take someinitiative and contribute to theproject design.

Meaningful consultation involveseliciting ideas from the beneficiariesprior to the design of a project orprogram. It helps to ensure that theproject design is responsive todemand, and that beneficiariesunderstand and accept their roles andresponsibilities. Rallies, essays byschool children, drawing and paintingcompetitions, radio talk shows, articlesin newspapers, and information postedon a municipal website are good waysto publicize a project and buildawareness, but they do not necessarilyconstitute meaningful consultation perse. Similarly, surveys may provide usefuldata for assessing demand andattitudes, but do not constitute activecollaboration or create communitycohesion. Managers of the JawaharlalNehru National Urban RenewalMission (JNNURM) have becomeaware of these distinctions. As a result,JNNURM guidelines are being revisedto promote more meaningful

participation of beneficiaries inplanning. A model of a bottom-upapproach that promoted meaningfulparticipation in Brazil is described inBox 1. Another example of effectiveconsultation in the context of theSlum Sanitation Project in Mumbai isdescribed in Box 2.

5 See, for example: Baindur, Vinay. September 5, 2005.‘For the People, by Diktat.’ India Together op-ed.http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/sep/gov-nurm.htm

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Giving the poor the opportunity to participate in planning and design canmake the difference between success and failure.



Box 1: PROSANEAR Project, Brazil: People Were Asked What They Wanted

Prior to planning water supply and sanitation projects, PROSANEAR teams went into communities to ask what kind ofwater project the people wanted, if any, and what kind they would be willing to support with their money and labor.Residents were allowed to talk about the full range of problems they faced, but once the discussion turned to theimportance of water supply and sanitation, they were generally eager to hear how PROSANEAR could help them.Neighborhoods were allowed to choose from a range of simple, innovative systems that made water and sanitationaffordable and environmentally appropriate for poor crowded settlements. There were no blueprints. In many places,groups of households were batched together in a creative condominial sewerage system approach that not only madethe networks more efficient and affordable but also forged new bonds among neighbors.

PROSANEAR sought to make a permanent impact by mobilizing local clubs, as well as women’s, sports, and religiousgroups, to educate people about the importance of sanitation and teaching them how to operate and maintain their newsystems. The results were powerful, and they went far beyond the better health and greater convenience enjoyed by1 million people newly connected to water taps and toilets. For example, getting formal postal addresses and water billsin their names meant they had graduated from squatter status to resident—a new status in society.

Source: World Bank. 2006. Community Participation and Low-Cost Technology: Bringing Water Supply and Sanitation to Brazil’s Urban Poor. Water andSanitation Feature Story #10. See also Case Study 3, accompanying volume.

Box 2: Stakeholder Participation in the Slum Sanitation Program in Mumbai

The Slum Sanitation Program initiated by the BrihanMumbai Municipal Corporation in 1995 with World Bank support wasbased on a demand-driven and participatory approach, in which the municipality would provide the initial capital to buildcommunity toilet blocks, while community-based organizations (CBOs) or small local business enterprises would take fullcharge of operation and maintenance (O&M).

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were engaged to mobilize communities, facilitate relationships with the localgovernment, and train the communities in essential skills and attitudes. They initially carried out a general informationcampaign that assessed the willingness and readiness of the communities to participate in the sanitation scheme. Oncecommunities mobilized and demonstrated an interest, CBOs or local enterprises were created (if not already existing andactive). These organizations were then registered to obtain legal status, which allowed them to manage the communitysanitation block (that is, obtain water, sewerage and electricity connections, sign a memorandum of understanding withthe Corporation, open and maintain a bank account to deposit the maintenance fund and earnings, pay utility bills,and so on). It was only after the CBO or local enterprises had collected at least 50 percent of the expectedmaintenance fund from prospective users and had developed a technically sound and community-endorsed planfor the toilet block, that the Corporation issued the building permit and the actual construction of the community toiletblock began.

Participation in the formal process of planning the services, creating a viable business entity, having it registered, openinga bank account, and working with the Corporation provided invaluable experience, created confidence, and inspiredfurther entrepreneurial and community activities on the part of participants. In one case, a local enterprise that operatesthe toilets has also established a preschool in the new community center that was built adjacent to the toilet block.

Source: Nitti, Rosanna, and Shyamal Sarkar. 2003. Reaching the Poor through Sustainable Partnerships: The Slum Sanitation Program inMumbai, India. World Bank. Urban Notes No. 7. See also Case Study 2, accompanying volume.

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Publish theStories ofthe PoorThe stories of the poor themselves givestatistics a human side and can beused to improve the impact of researchreports and policy papers. Sectoractors should capture and enlist themedia to disseminate stories thattranslate service delivery inefficienciesand deficits into their impact on dailylife at the personal or household level.Poignant examples of the contrastbetween those households withouteasy access to safe drinking water andsanitation services, and those withaccess, can help to create anenvironment for making politicallydifficult or unpopular decisions viable,especially when combined with abroader strategic communicationscampaign to promote the expansion ofservices and more flexible approachesto serving the urban poor. A fewrepresentative examples of the dailyimpact of poor service provision thatwere recently collected in India include:6

• In a community where theCorporation does not provide water,most residents pay the plumber andget a water connection at acommon point near their homes.The rest get their water from thetanker mafia.

• In one area, there were 28 toiletsfunded by the World Bank or thestate and Member of LegislativeAssembly (MLA) funds, and eightWorld Bank-funded toilets especially

for children. These toilets areinadequate for the 25,000 peoplethey serve, but at least they havereduced open defecation tosome extent.

• One woman said it took herhalf-an-hour to fill two buckets ofwater from the hand pump. Eachday, her family requires up to 10-15buckets. In the morning, shefetches water for the morningchores and immediate needs. Afterreturning from work, she fetcheswater for the rest of the day.

• Women dislike defecating in theopen in broad daylight. They go ingroups at night.

• Because of the lack of water, theresidents do not bathe every day,which causes health problems—skin rashes, boils, and so on. Theywash clothes once a fortnight.

Inform andEducate PoorCommunities

The poor are often unaware of official

policies; and their attitudes and

behavior may impede their access to

services. Like many users, they mayhave misperceptions about the need topay for public services. They may notbe fully aware of the health impact ofpoor sanitation practices. Many areilliterate and unaware of their rights.Educational programs that give thepoor the information and skills theyneed to participate as well-informedcitizens are an essential component ofany effort to promote their participationin planning and management ofservices. Programs to promoteconstructive attitudes and behavior that

6 These and other examples were collected during field workfor slum consultations conducted by Geeta Sharma, WSP-SA,along with NGO partners between December 2006 andJanuary 2007 in Mumbai, Delhi, Bengaluru, and Vadodara.For details, see accompanying volume.

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will enhance their chances of gettingand making effective use of services(for example, regular payment ofbills and good hygiene) are alsoessential. Education that buildssuch skills and attitudes not onlyhas a positive effect on access towater and sanitation services,it can also help develop basicfinancial management skills withbroader applications anddevelopment impact.

Empower thePoor to Actwithin andbeyondTheir OwnCommunities

Community-based organizationsand their federations can help thepoor take action on their ownbehalf. All the strategies describedabove involve some form ofoutreach to the poor. These areessential to ensure that the formalstructures and decisionmakingactivities actively seek to serve thepoor better. But it is equallyimportant and effective for the poorto take action for themselves. Bydoing so, they gain self-respect andimportant skills, as well as betterservices. They also dispel commonlyheld notions that the poor arehelpless or lack initiative. Self-helpactivities can be initiated by adynamic individual within thecommunity or a nongovernmentalorganization that is committed tothe interests of the community.However, when an outsideorganization initiates action, it is

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essential that the community activelyexpresses its demand and willingnessto pay for services, and that theleadership quickly be assumed bysomeone in the community.

There is no blueprint for creating suchorganizations because the socialdynamics in each community are oftenunique—only a savvy resident is likelyto appreciate them fully. In fact,initial success often hinges on a

single individual’s commitment andleadership skills.

A number of well-documented casesdemonstrate the willingness and abilityof the poor to create or manage theirown services.

The Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi wasone of the first to demonstrate that thepoor want good quality services andare willing and able to pay for them.

While local community user groupsare useful for solving local problems,federations and networks enable poorcommunities to act beyond theirboundaries to influence policies oraccess sources of developmentassistance. In Tiruchirapalli city, TamilNadu, a network of self-help groups isenabling poor residents get fundingand assume responsibility for localsanitation (see Box 3).

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Box 3: Community-Based Organizations and Federations (Karachi and Tiruchirapalli)

Two South Asian experiences—the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi, Pakistan, and the activities of self-help groupsin Tiruchirapalli city, in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu—provide useful lessons about how community involvementcan help projects.

Orangi is Karachi’s largest katchi abadi (informal settlement) and has a population of 1.2 million. The OPP was established in1980 by Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, the renowned Pakistani social scientist. The OPP provided social and technical guidanceto enable low income families to construct and maintain an underground sewerage system with their own funds and undertheir own management. The project has shown that poor people can finance and build sewers in their communities.Working together internally as well as with the government to achieve their objectives has given community members dignityas well as confidence in themselves. To date, the people of Orangi have laid down 1.3 million feet of sewer line and investedabout PKR 57.2 million (US$700,000).7 About 900,000 people in 94,122 houses have benefited. The average cost of thesystem is very low—about PKR 1,000 (US$13) per household. The residents of Orangi maintain the system themselves atno cost to the government. The OPP Research and Training Institute is currently assisting initiatives in a number of otherareas in Pakistan and other countries. Training in the OPP model has been provided to groups from Nepal, Cambodia,Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, Central Asia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.

In Tiruchirapalli city, about half the 339 community toilets in the city are being managed by community-based organizationsand half are managed by the city corporation. Since 2000, 41 of the community-managed toilets have been managed bylocal Sanitation and Hygiene Education (SHE) teams supported by the nongovernmental organization Gramalaya and theWomen’s Action for Village Empowerment (WAVE), a federation of SHE teams. In each community, the SHE team organizesits members (all women) into two to seven self-help groups with 15 to 20 members each. Each self-help group takesresponsibility for managing the community toilets—collecting user fees, keeping accounts, and depositing the income in abank account—for a month at a time. During that month, members of the responsible self-help group rotate as caretakerand fee collector for a day at a time. In addition, most SHE teams employ two cleaners and a watchwoman. User fees areused to cover operation and maintenance expenses. Each SHE team elects two members as team leaders who areresponsible for operating the bank account and represent the SHE team at WAVE meetings. When a major expenditure ontoilets is required, SHE teams can take a loan from the WAVE federation. For slum communities, the primary benefit of thecommunity-managed toilet complexes has been access to clean and safe sanitation facilities and a decrease in water-bornediseases. The women who participate have gained new skills and confidence, which they often apply to other arenas in theircommunities and households. From the city corporation’s perspective, one of the major benefits is that this arrangementreduces costs as a result of community-managed toilets. While some of the smaller toilet blocks require subsidies, thesecan be justified by the overall benefits.

Source: Case Studies 5 and 7, accompanying volume.

7 US$1 = PKR 78 (as of September 30, 2008). Conversionrates are from www.exchange-rates.org/history/PKR/USD/T;all conversions in the text are approximations.8 Literally, the Golden Jubilee Urban Employment Scheme.

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Existing community developmentsocieties, neighborhood groups, andneighborhood committees of women(that have been functioning since theywere formed under the Swarna JayantiShahari Rojgar Yojana8 of theGovernment of India in 1998), are wellplaced to play a meaningful role inarticulating the concerns of the poorand playing a role in planning,designing, and managing services.


Table 1: Relevant Case Studies in Accompanying Volume

Case Study Topic

PROSANEAR Project, Brazil (Case Study 3) Community participation in project planning

Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, Pakistan (Case Study 5) Self-help organizations, self provision of services

Temeke District, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Case Study 14) Federation of water user associations

Tiruchirapalli, Tamil Nadu, India (Case Study 7) Community-managed toilets

Federation of Water Associations: Giving the Poor a Voice, Federation of water associationsManila, Philippines (Case Study 4)

Mumbai Slum Sanitation Program, Community and local enterpriseMaharashtra, India (Case Study 2) operation of toilets

Getting Started:Actions andResourcesThis section suggests the followingactions for sector actors.

Policymakers and Project Planners

• Avoid top-down planning.

• Make meaningful participation byproject beneficiaries mandatory.Facilitate beneficiary involvement inproject design and development ofproposed solutions.

• Allow adequate time forconsultation and participationby beneficiaries.

• Hire qualified NGOs to facilitatemobilization of poor communities.

• Publish information for the generalpublic about the living conditions

and accomplishments of theurban poor, and about strategiesto improve access to services.

• Make information available informats that are accessibleto the poor.

• Plan for an effective interfacebetween community-managedservices and the formalservice provider.

Governance Bodiesand Service Providers

• Create a specialized unit withinthe utility to communicate withpoor communities and facilitateaccess to services.

• Develop a client-oriented culturewithin the utility.

• Train staff in effective clientrelations skills, particularly forserving the poor.

• Develop a supportive frameworkfor interfacing with community-managed services.

Advocates andCivil Society Organizations

• Act as intermediaries betweenservice providers andpoor communities.

• Deliver educational andawareness programs aimed atenabling the poor to act on theirown behalf.

• Identify and work with dynamicindividuals in the communityto provide leadership forself-help initiatives.

• Encourage participation inpolitical processes.

• Promote networks amongcommunity organizations withcommon interests.

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Section 3

Take VestedInterestsinto Account


Water vendors, organized crime,corrupt public officials, and dishonestutility staff may have a vested interest inpreventing better services for the poor.

When the poor cannot get piped watersupply services legally they are forcedto provide for themselves in someway—legal or illegal. In cities with ahigh percentage of unservedpopulations, such as Dhaka, Manila,and Karachi, the amount of money thatpasses hands informally in the watersector to provide water to the unservedpopulation is reportedly greater thanthe revenue of the formal serviceprovider. Vested interests will naturallyoppose any changes to the status quothat threaten their source of revenue.Sometimes confrontations can beavoided by giving informal and illegalservice providers new roles orincentives that bring them into theformal system. Ultimately, improvingtransparency reduces opportunities forillicit activities.

IncorporateInformal ServiceProviders intothe SolutionInstitutional arrangements and legalreforms that incorporate informalvested interests into the formal solutionreduce opposition and improvetransparency. Such arrangementsbenefit both sides: the informalproviders gain security and legitimacy,and the utility or alternative serviceorganization can take advantage of theknowledge and skills informal providershave accumulated. Regularization of

informal service providers often helpsutilities to reduce illegal connections andcorrupt practices by staff, lower waterprices, and improve the reliability ofservices—especially if adequateregulatory arrangements are introduced.

Such solutions must be tailored to eachsituation. There are, however, a numberof cases that might provide models that

are adaptable to other environments. Insome places, formal utilities have hiredvendors who lost their markets whenpiped services were extended andimproved. In Paraguay, local privatefirms that won contracts to build andoperate new water supply systems inpreviously unserved neighborhoodswere encouraged to hire small-scaleservice providers (known as aguateros)

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Regularization of informal service providers often helps utilities to reduceillegal connections and corrupt practices by staff, lower water prices, andimprove the reliability of services.

Obstacles



Box 4: Water Kiosk Operators Unite in Kenya

In the informal settlement of Kibera in Nairobi, Kenya, more than half-a-million poor people get water from over650 informal local water kiosks. The kiosk operators lay pipes, as much as 1,500 meters long, to connect their storagetanks to the local utility network. Although the utility recommends that water be sold for Ksh 19 per jerrycan (aboutUS$0.10), the prevailing price is usually Ksh 2 (the equivalent of US$1.30 per m3, or eight times the utility’s domestic tariff),primarily because of the costs associated with establishing and running water kiosks: capital investment, bribes paid toutility staff to obtain and retain a connection, and the high tariffs associated with higher consumption blocks. During watershortages, the prices are even higher, soaring to Ksh 5 or even Ksh 10 per jerrycan.

The utility historically had little incentive to address the problems in Kibera. This was because (a) revenue collection in thesettlement was negligible; (b) there were many illegal connections; and (c) the water delivered to Kibera was estimated tobe less than 10 percent of the city’s total consumption. Instead, the utility simply used water rationing to limit its losses.Until recently, the utility considered kiosk operators to be part of the problem and driving them out of business was seenas an effective measure to reduce unaccounted-for-water.

In May 2004, following an intervention by WSP–Africa, kiosk operators decided to form an association, which they calledMaji Bora Kibera (MBK), Swahili for ‘Better water services for Kibera’. They drafted a constitution, formed an executivecommittee, and applied for official registration. Soon a joint task force was formed with members from the utility, MBK,and WSP–Africa. At the suggestion of the utility, the MBK wrote a letter stating clearly the problems faced by watervendors and offering to cooperate with the regularization of their connections, pay bills regularly, stop paying bribes,report leakages, and expand service to unserved areas. The utility was asked to provide a regular supply of water, adoptbetter billing and collection practices, and provide engineering advice for network improvements. The letter was awatershed in vendor-utility relations. The MBK and the utility continue to build their relationship. The MBK is working on anumber of initiatives to strengthen self-regulation and address the remaining barriers to good services.

While there remains some concern that the association could be an obstacle to long-term change in Kibera (if themembers were to protect their own interests at the expense of consumers), there is also a recognition that both the utilityand vendors can gain from further collaboration.

Source: Brocklehurst, Clarissa. June 2005. Rogues No More? Water Kiosk Operators Achieve Credibility in Kibera. Water and Sanitation Program Field Note.

to handle day-to-day operations.10

The case of water kiosk operators

who entered into formal service

arrangements with the Nairobi Water

Company in a slum in Nairobi, Kenya

(see Box 4), provides another

potentially promising example.

9 Kenyan shillings.10 Triche, Thelma, Sixto Requeno, and Mukami Kariuki.December 2006. Engaging Local Private Operators in WaterSupply and Sanitation Services, Initial Lessons from EmergingExperience in Cambodia, Colombia, Paraguay, the Philippines,and Uganda. World Bank. Water Supply and SanitationWorking Note 12, p. 16.

19



Case Study Topic

Parivartan Program, Ahmedabad, India (Case Study 1) Politicians who undermine the scaling up of theprogram by providing funds outside the program

Nongovernmental Organization-Assisted Water Points: Difficulty with mastaans, musclemen orSocial Intermediation for Urban Poor, influential persons who control slum areasDhaka, Bangladesh (Case Study 11)

Temeke District, Dar es Salaam, Resistance of water vendors to waterTanzania (Case Study 14) services improvement program

Getting Started:Actions andResources

This section suggests the followingactions for sector actors:


• Take the role of informal or illegalactors (and other vested interests),and the contributions they can

make, into account in formulatingpolicies and regulations andplanning projects.

• Assess the business dynamics ofexisting informal operators todetermine why their activitiesare so lucrative.

• Determine whether owners of rentaldwellings have vested interests.

• Incorporate existing vested interestsinto solutions, where feasible, as a

means of increasing transparency,neutralizing opposition, andreducing costs.

• Use neutral intermediaries who aretrusted by both parties (such asrespected local or internationalnongovernmental organizations, orprofessional mediators) to promotedialog between formal and informalservice providers.


• Hire disenfranchised vendors towork in the utility when expansioneliminates their markets.

• Team up with informal serviceproviders to improve service andcost recovery in marginal areas.


• Act as intermediaries betweeninformal or illegal service providersand the formal sector.

• Help informal or illegal serviceproviders to create institutionalstructures that will promotecooperation among them, andenable them to negotiate withformal structures.

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Section 4

EliminateAdministrativeand Legal Barriers


Obstacles• Land ownership and tenure issues

often create a barrier to theprovision of service to the poor.

• The poor may be unaware ofadministrative and legalrequirements, or find it difficult tounderstand them and comply.

Municipal policies often prevent utilitiesfrom providing connections to residentswho do not have legal tenure. Mostlegislation on land tenure is outdated,irrelevant to current realities, andcannot be enforced. Complexprocedures not only constitute a barrierfor the poor, they create opportunitiesfor bribes to be extracted from existingor prospective users, and such bribesrepresent a heavier burden for the poorthan for the nonpoor.

Delink ServiceProvision fromLand TenureLegal reform is needed to enable thepoor to gain secure tenure, adequatehousing, and services. In themeantime, though, innovative strategiesto get around land tenure requirementscan sometimes be found at the locallevel. One such approach is to allowalternative documentation. TheBangalore Water Supply and SewerageBoard (BWSSB) had a longstandingrequirement that only slum residentspresenting both land title documentsand recent property tax receipts couldqualify for individual water andsanitation connections but, as part ofits program to promote connections inslums, agreed to permit residents topresent lease documents and other

‘proof of occupancy’ documents suchas ration cards, identity cards, electioncards or electricity bills instead. (SeeCase Study 10, accompanyingvolume.) The Ahmedabad MunicipalCorporation allows connections andother improvements to proceed onceresidents obtain a ‘no objectioncertificate’ from the owner of the land.Nongovernmental organizationsworking with the AhmedabadCorporation have helped thecommunities to obtain thesecertificates. (See Case Study 1,accompanying volume.)

Another approach to get around thelack of land tenure is to make a singlebulk water or sewerage connection atthe border of the community and allowcommunities or small-scale serviceproviders to operate services. Severalof the previously cited cases—forexample, in the Orangi community inKarachi, Tiruchirapalli city inTamil Nadu, and Kibera in Nairobi,Kenya—used this model. Box 5describes another example inTegucigalpa, Honduras.

InstitutionalizeSimplifiedProceduresand ProvideAssistanceFormal institutions can be veryintimidating for the poor unless specialarrangements are made to promoteand facilitate access. Connecting alarge unserved population is a majorlong-term undertaking that will requireongoing support and assistance evenafter poor residents are connected. Aspart of this long-term effort, utilities andmunicipal service providers need toadjust their systems to attend to thisnew, potentially large, customer base.Simplifying procedures for connection,billing, and collection services, andmaintenance arrangements are part ofthe institutional process of recognizingthe differences between customers inplanned and unplanned areas of thecity. In India and throughout South Asia,the percentage of inhabitants living in

22

Simplifying procedures for connection, billing, and collection services, andmaintenance arrangements are part of the institutional process of recognizing thedifferences between customers in planned and unplanned areas of the city.

WS

P–L

AC



Box 5: Community-Managed Services in Tegucigalpa, Honduras

About 380,000 people live in poor peri-urban areas of Tegucigalpa. One-third of these peri-urban residents do not havedirect access to the water supply network and most do not have access to sewerage. Many of the peri-urban settlementscannot be connected because of the topography (hillsides with steep slopes and unstable terrain), others because of theirillegal status, and some because of the lack of adequate resources to extend the network. Residents of these areas obtainwater from a number of sources, including tankers, rainwater catchments, and community wells.

With the assistance of several international development agencies and nongovernmental organizations, the NationalAutonomous Water and Sewerage Service (SANAA) is introducing alternative water and sanitation systems in these areas.These systems receive bulk water from SANAA or its tankers but are managed internally by the community. Three watersupply models are used. The preferred model involves a metered connection to SANAA’s network that feeds a communitystorage tank, to which the secondary network within the community is connected. Where connection to the network is notfeasible, the community storage tank is supplied by tankers. The third option is a rainwater catchment and filtering system.

A revolving fund is used to finance construction and the beneficiary community repays the fund at zero interest over 5 to 10years. Communities that wish to benefit from this program must establish a water administration board with four officersselected by the community. The water boards operate and maintain the system, collect fees from the users to cover theirown costs as well as the bulk water charges and the capital cost. They organize committees and engage staff to maintainthe system, operate community water taps, collect fees, and prevent theft. Committees are also established to educate thecommunity about water use and hygiene.

Source: Rivera, Kenneth. Improving Water Supply, Sanitation, and Health Services for Low-Income Urban Communities in Latin America—A Case ofTegucigalpa. Building Partnerships for Development, draft of May 2006 (part of field research conducted in seven Latin American cities).(See also Case Study 15, accompanying volume.)

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Box 6: Dedicated Units in Water Utilities (Hyderabad and Bengaluru)

Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board created a Single Window Cell to receive, process, andcoordinate water and sewerage connection applications. The Single Window Cell distributes a detailed two-page brochurethat clearly explains the application procedures. A dedicated team of staff and contract laborers installs all approved newconnections for which payment has been received. These reforms have reduced the time required to process connectionsfrom six months to three months and have significantly increased the number of applications processed.

The Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board has a Social Development Unit, which focuses on connectinghouseholds in slums to piped water and sewerage. This unit is headed by a proactive senior development specialist whointeracts directly and effectively with community groups, nongovernmental organizations, and influential individuals topromote communication, implement connection programs, resolve complaints, and so on. The Social Development Unitalso uses NGOs as intermediaries to assist households with the application process and facilitate communications. Topromote connections, the unit has introduced a reduced connection fee and simplified connection procedures. It alsoaccepts ‘proof of occupancy’ in lieu of the requirement for land tenure. Residents of slums are encouraged to connect tothe Board’s water supply system and are actively discouraged from resorting to illegal means. Connection charges vary onthe basis of house size: Rs 550 (US$12)11 for houses of less than 150 square feet, Rs 800 (US$17) for houses of 150–600square feet, and the full rate of Rs 1,800 (US$39) for houses over 600 square feet. Slum dwellers are allowed to pay theconnection charges in two installments.

Source: Water and Sanitation Program–South Asia. January 2007. Bangalore Water Service Delivery, Ingenious Model Shows the Way. Case Study. (See CaseStudies 8 and 10, accompanying volume.)

11 US$1 = INR 46 (as of September 30, 2008). Conversion rates are from www.exchange-rates.org/history/INR/USD/T; all conversions in the text are approximations.


unplanned parts of cities is significantand growing. A permanent body thatcan help institutionalize effectiveapproaches throughout the utilitywill make it less likely that changes inmanagement or political leadershipwill undermine or reverse thisinitiative for expanding services in asustainable manner.

The Hyderabad Metropolitan WaterSupply and Sewerage Board (inaddition to the Customer Care Officedescribed in Box 11) created a SingleWindow Cell to receive, process, andcoordinate water and sewerageconnection applications. Anotherpotentially effective model is adedicated unit within the utility thatcommunicates with poor communities,assists them with formalities, promotesappropriate services, and liaises withother stakeholders. The SocialDevelopment Unit in the BWSSB, India,is an example (see Box 6).

Successful programs have involved notonly changes in organizational cultureand staff attitudes, but also theestablishment of client-friendlymechanisms that facilitatecommunications with customers. TheCitizen Report Card, a tool forassessing customer satisfaction that


Case Study Topic

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (Case Study 1) Alternative documentation

Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (Case Study 10) Alternative documentation; dedicatedunit in utility to promote service to the poor

Hyderabad Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board Dedicated unit in utility to promote connections(Case Study 8)

Orangi Project, Karachi, Pakistan (Case Study 5) Bulk connection at border of community

Tegucigalpa, Honduras (Case Study 15) Bulk connection at border of community

Tiruchirapalli City (Case Study 7) Bulk connection at border of community

24

was originally used in Bengaluru, hasbeen introduced in several countries.(See discussion in Section 5.)

Getting Started:Actions andResourcesThis section suggests the followingactions for sector actors:


• Initiate land tenure reforms.

• Amend municipal laws andregulations that make it difficult orimpossible for the poor toget services.

• Authorize alternative documentationrequirements for connections.


• Adopt alternative documentationrequirements, such as proof ofresidence or no-objection from theowner of the land, to allow thosewho lack land tenure to qualify forservice connections.

• Explore alternative service modelssuch as installing bulk water orsewerage connections at the border

of poor communities from/to which acommunity-based organization orsmall-scale private operator can takeresponsibility for the operation andmaintenance of network serviceswithin the community.

• Simplify procedures and forms, andtranslate forms and instructions intolocal languages.

• Create dedicated user-friendly unitsto promote service to the poor.

• Design access mechanisms(for connections, complaints,and so on) that are appropriatefor the poor, and appointqualified professionals or engagenongovernmental organizations toassist the poor with proceduresand forms.


• Assist poor residents to obtaindocumentation requiredfor connections.

• Support communities to negotiatewith the utility for the establishment ofa bulk connection and to createCBOs or engage small-scale privateoperators to operate services.

• Develop programs to assist the poorwith procedures and forms.



Section 5

Strengthen Capacity,Autonomy, andAccountability of ServiceProviders and ProvideIncentives to Serve the Poor


Obstacles

• Service providers lack the autonomyas well as financial and humanresources, and incentives required,to provide services to theurban poor.

• Municipalities and utilities arenot held accountable for theprovision of water supply andsanitation services.

• The services provided by smallprivate service providers arenot recognized, encouraged,and regulated.

The poor performance of water supplyand sanitation (WSS) services in India isdue in large part to inappropriateinstitutional frameworks, lack ofregulatory mechanisms, inadequatefinancial resources, absence ofappropriate attitudes and skills, and alack of explicit directives and incentivesto serve the poor. In fact, there are nofully autonomous water and sanitationutilities in Indian cities and few, if any,permanent monitoring and regulatorymechanisms. A few metropolitan cities,such as Delhi, Chennai, Hyderabad,and Bengaluru, have WSS boards withlimited functional autonomy. In Kolkataand Mumbai, dedicated departments ofthe municipal corporations manageWSS operations. In the remainingcities, WSS services are either operatedby a state-level specialist agency withlimited autonomy, or are managedjointly with other services by amunicipal department.12

Until recently, the emphasis in India hasbeen on creating infrastructure ratherthan promoting strong institutions,

financial viability, efficiency, servicequality, customer relations, andspecifically targeting the poor.Reflecting this, training programs focusprimarily on technical and engineeringskills and only rarely addresscommercial, managerial, and strategicaspects of WSS services, let alonestrategies for serving the poor.13

In the absence of efficient autonomousservice providers, the distinctionbetween the utility and the municipaladministration is blurred; managers ofthe services do not control theresources required to provide theservices and cannot be heldaccountable. There is a lack of clarityregarding the roles of stategovernments, state governmentutilities, municipal bodies, communityorganizations, and private players. Insuch cases, targets for service qualityare typically not established ormonitored. Tariffs rarely cover costsand, as a result, financial viability andsustainability are undermined.Therefore, many urban utilities fail toprovide satisfactory service to a largepart of the population—particularlythe poor.

In contrast to the prevailing conditions,the Jawaharlal Nehru National UrbanRenewal Mission’s mission statementemphasizes the importance ofimproving the efficiency andaccountability of service providers andintroducing institutional models thatenhance the viability of services.

Small private service providers (SPSPs)are active throughout India—filling inpart of the large gap between demandand the formal utilities’ ability to provideservices. Since, in most places, formal

utilities will be unable to satisfy thedemand of 100 percent of urbanhouseholds for the foreseeable future,taking advantage of the services ofthe SPSPs should be an essentialcomponent of strategies to expand andimprove services to the urban poor.Working with SPSPs will requireinnovative approaches to link them withformal utilities, introduce appropriateregulatory mechanisms, and devisestrategies for eliminating illegal andabusive activities without driving theSPSPs out of business.

This section will focus primarily on theinstitutional, regulatory, and capacityissues. Mechanisms to address costrecovery are discussed in more detail inSection 6 because a strategy toimprove cost recovery must alsoaddress the financial constraints andaffordability issues that are specific toproviding services to the poor.

Separate andClarify theResponsibilitiesof the ActorsThe roles and responsibilities ofpolicymakers, service providers,governance bodies, and regulatorsneed to be clearly defined andseparated to ensure the autonomy andaccountability of service providers.In small towns with simple systems andlimited human resources, it is notalways realistic or meaningful tocompletely separate these roles.In large urban areas, and particularly inlarge countries with many large urbancenters, it becomes even moreimportant. In the latter context, clearlydistinguishing among the followingactors and their roles is recommended:

12 India, Water Supply and Sanitation, Bridging the Gapbetween Infrastructure and Service. Op. cit., p. 9. 13 Ibid. pp. 20-21.

26

The roles and responsibilities of policymakers, service providers, governancebodies, and regulators need to be clearly defined and separated to ensurethe autonomy and accountability of service providers.



• Policymakers set overall servicecoverage and quality objectives,social policies, and cost-recoverypolicies. They should set guidelines,establish programs, and createinstitutions to promote and regulatethe achievement of serviceobjectives, financial viability, andefficiency. The respective roles andresponsibilities of policymakers atthe state and municipal levels needto be clear and complementary.

• Governance bodies (for instance,the boards of utilities) represent

asset owners. They providestrategic direction, mobilizeinvestment finance, approveannual budgets, and appoint themanagement team in a manner thatis consistent with establishedpolicies. Governance decisionsshould be based on long-termstrategic and financial criteria ratherthan short-term political interests.

• Service providers plan andsupervise the development ofinfrastructure, and manage andoperate services on the basis of

technical and financial criteria toachieve the objectives set bypolicymakers and their governancebodies. To do this, they needadequate autonomy (for example,control overstaffing, financialresources, and procurement) andprotection from political interference.Their financial accounts should bering-fenced to promote financialviability and accountability.

• Utility regulators (or economicregulators) compensate for thelack of competition in monopolyservices by ensuring that tariffs arereasonable, that is, commensuratewith the cost and quality of services,and enforcing service standards.A good regulatory system ispredictable, credible, andtransparent. The roles of state andmunicipal governments regardingregulation should be clear andany conflicts or overlappingresponsibilities should be eliminated.

• Other specialized regulators usuallyenforce technical, labor, health, andenvironmental standards. Here, too,the respective roles of state andmunicipal governments shouldbe clear.

• When two or more service providerscarry out complementaryfunctions—for example, when oneentity is responsible for assetmanagement and another foroperations, or when a large utilityprovides bulk treated water andSPSPs manage distribution andcommercial activities—theirrespective responsibilities need tobe clearly delineated.

Institutional reforms should be tailoredto fit the country and local context.There is a great deal of literature and an

27


accumulated body of experience oninstitutional reform of water supply andsanitation services, covering topicssuch as the creation of autonomouspublic companies, governance,contracting private operators, andcreating regulatory frameworks.However, while the basic principles—separation of roles, managerialautonomy and accountability, andfinancial viability—are universallydesirable and applicable, there are no

Box 7: Engaging Local Private Operators for Water Supply and Sanitation Services

Contracts with private operators, if well designed and appropriately monitored, can be an effective way to introduceautonomy and accountability. Until recently, tenders for private operators of water supply and sewerage services wereaimed at large international firms, but in a number of countries tenders are increasingly aimed at local private operators,particularly in small towns with 10,000 to 50,000 residents. The experiences of Colombia and Paraguay (where, since2001 and 2002, respectively, local firms have been engaged to operate water supply services in large urban orperi-urban areas with poor populations) may be relevant to large cities in India.

In Colombia, the poor performance of services operated by local governments led to the decision to engage privateoperators. In Paraguay, it was the high cost of subsidies required for investments and the failure of user associations toset tariffs high enough to repay loans for capital investments that led to the decision. In both countries local privateoperators have been engaged to construct or rehabilitate the infrastructure and operate the service for 15 to 20 years.In Colombia, most of the operators are companies with experience in providing other urban services, such as solidwaste management. In Paraguay, large construction companies have sought the contracts but the government usuallyengages an experienced small local private operator (aguatero) to manage operations once construction is complete. Inboth countries, it is estimated that private operators are contributing about 20 percent of capital costs. The remainder isfinanced by grants from the national or local governments, using their own funds or the proceeds of World Bank loans.

In Colombia, the municipal government contracts the private operator. In Paraguay, they are contracted by community-based user associations. In both cases, the national governments provide support to the local entities during thepreparation and procurement process but the local entities assume full responsibility for day-to-day supervision of theoperators. While competition for the contracts was somewhat limited in Colombia (only one or two bidders), it wasstrong in Paraguay (four to eight bidders). The contracts include very specific service targets that the operators arerequired to achieve. In both countries a national regulator specifies formulas and rules for setting tariffs.

The contracts were in their early stages at the time they were reviewed in 2005, but initial results were mostly positive.In both countries, previously unserved neighborhoods were getting connections. In Paraguay, the cost of governmentinvestment subsidies had been cut in half. One of the lessons learned in Paraguay was that user associations needintensive training and support initially to ensure proper monitoring and a healthy relationship with the operator. Inaddition, user associations that receive a small percentage of the operators’ tariff revenues are most likely to provideeffective overseeing.

Source: Triche, Thelma, Sixto Requena, and Mukami Kariuki. December 2006. Engaging Local Private Operators in Water Supply andSanitation Services, Initial Lessons from Experience in Cambodia, Colombia, Paraguay, the Philippines, and Uganda.World Bank, Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes, No. 12.

universal blueprints or ideal institutionalmodels to achieve them. Care should betaken to tailor institutional reforms toeach country and urban context.

The existence and potential role ofSPSPs should be recognized and takeninto account. Outsourcing themanagement of services to privateoperators or putting public operatorsunder performance contracts have beenshown to be effective ways of separating

operations from policymaking and

regulation, as well as promoting

financial and managerial autonomy.

The examples presented in Boxes 7, 8,

and 9, and in the case studies and

other listed resources, are intended to

promote an understanding of some of

the conditions that promote success

and to stimulate the exploration of

these and other models.

28



Box 8: Successful Performance and Incentive Contracts in a Public Company:Uganda’s National Water and Sewerage Corporation

The National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) is an autonomous state company that provides water andsewerage services in the larger towns and cities of Uganda. Until 1998, in the absence of an effective accountabilityframework, the NWSC had made a number of poorly conceived investments. The company was very inefficient andfinancially unsustainable: its fixed assets were underutilized, 51 percent of water was unaccounted for, it was grosslyoverstaffed, and it was unable to service its debt. In 1998, a new general manager began to introduce performanceincentive programs and a client-oriented culture with a strong emphasis on service quality. Substantial improvementsresulted, but by 2000 it was clear that achieving financial sustainability would take several more years of effort. In 2000, theGovernment of Uganda and the NWSC agreed to a three-year performance contract under which the latter’s debt serviceobligations were suspended in return for continued performance improvements.

The performance contract specified the actions that the NWSC must take and the targets it was expected to meet withregard to a number of key operational and financial indicators. A Performance Contract Review Committee wasestablished to monitor and report on the NWSC’s performance. In 2003, the Review Committee found that the NWSC hadperformed very well with regard to qualitative targets such as updating the asset registers, introducing incentive contractswith its area managers, and outsourcing noncore activities. It had met or come close to meeting quantitative targets forcollection efficiency, connections, metering, and staff per 1,000 connections, but had fallen short with regard to financialperformance, and remained unable to service debt. Nevertheless, the performance contract and the internal managementinitiatives that had been introduced had established a solid foundation for further improvements.

The government and the NWSC entered into a second performance contract for 2003–06, which introduced moremeaningful financial indicators based on ratios rather than absolute results. In 2003, the NWSC also began to introduce aninnovative strategy for improving its area managers’ accountability and autonomy. In January 2004, following an internalcompetitive bidding process in which all area managers were allowed to participate, two-year Internally DelegatedManagement Contracts were awarded for all NWSC service areas.

By 2004, as a result of consistent improvements in operations and cash management, the NWSC’s revenues exceededoperating costs (including depreciation) for the first time and the company was on the road to financial sustainability.Compared to its performance in 1998, coverage in the NWSC’s service areas increased from 48 percent in 1998 to

68 percent in 2006. Total connections increasedfrom 50,826 to 125,000. Unaccounted-for-waterwas down to 31 percent (35 percent in Kampala and16 percent in other service areas). Annual turnoverincreased from about US$11 million to US$30million, and operating profit after depreciationimproved from a loss of US$0.4 million to a surplusof US$2.2 million.

The government and the NWSC agreed to a thirdperformance contract for 2006–09, whichemphasizes the extension of services to the urbanpoor with the goal of achieving full coverageby 2015.

29

Source: Silva Mugisha. April 2006. Performance Assessment and Monitoring of Water Infrastructure: An Empirical Case Study of Benchmarking in Uganda;Triche, Thelma, and Steve Ostrover. March 2005. Assessment of the Long-Term Financial Sustainability of the NWSC, Report 1 of the Review and Updateof the Implementation Strategy for Reform and Divestiture of the NWSC, submitted to the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. See alsoCase Study 9, accompanying volume, and the NWSC’s website at www.nwsc.co.ug


StrengthenCapacityThe content of training programs mustbe broadened to target a wider rangeof actors and, in contrast to thehistorical emphasis on engineering andtechnical skills, focus attention onimprovements in service quality,access, and sustainability. Programsto strengthen the capacity andprofessional development of sector

professionals and service providersshould include a variety ofcomplementary componentsand approaches.

• Broaden the focus to includeservice quality, efficiency, andservice for the poor: The content oftraining programs for WSS staff andmanagers needs to be broadenedto include training in corporatization,private sector participation, tariffsetting, financial and commercial

management, benchmarking,customer and community relations,communications, and outreach tothe poor.

• Move beyond conventional forms oftraining: Training programs need tobe scaled up and new types oftraining mechanisms need to beintroduced to meet the growingneeds of the sector as well as tomotivate and enable staff to servethe poor effectively. Intensive

Box 9: Regulation by Contract: The Senegal Lease Contract

In 1995, the Government of Senegal launched wide-reaching reforms in the urban water sector. The state-run watercompany was dissolved; a new asset-holding company, SONES, was created, and a private operator was engaged to runthe systems. These reforms resulted in significantly better services and financial health for the sector. The contractualframework included a concession contract and a sector development contract between the government and SONES, anda contract with the private operator. This 10-year affermage (usually referred to as a ‘lease contract’ in English—though itis not really an accurate translation) was innovative in that it provided financial incentives for the private operator to achieveambitious performance targets for leakage reduction, improvements in billing, and collection efficiency.

The regulatory framework was built into the contract and was coherent (that is, it linked service levels to tariffs), credible,and transparent. SONES’s monitoring capacity was strengthened through a practical training workshop early in thecontract period, and an objective outside conciliateur was engaged when needed to verify performance and resolveconflicts. (Figure 3 illustrates these arrangements.) The operator’s remuneration was based on its performance and,although it was independent of the tariff, the government committed to gradually increasing tariffs to the full cost recoverylevel (including debt service) and had a strong incentive to respect this commitment because it was essential to ensure thefinancial health of the sector and expand services. Tariffs for water supply were increased about 3 percent (in real terms)per year over 1996–2002.

Several factors contributed to the success of the reform: the use of an appropriate form of contract that was tailored tolocal conditions; strong political will and good leadership within the government; a well-designed process; and flexibilityand innovation when it was needed. Design and preparation included the development of a financial model that could beused to set and revise performance targets, project revenue requirements, and calculate the associated tariff increases.Good relationships among the parties and an effective dispute resolution process meant that the private operator and thestate asset-holding company were able to reach an agreement on how the former was reimbursed for lost earnings whenthe latter experienced a delay in the completion of investments.

The reform has had positive outcomes for the poor, in part due to the nature of the operator’s incentives, and in part dueto the government’s policy of subsidizing connections in low-income neighborhoods. However, in 2004, some issues stillremained due to the tariff inequities that result when multiple households use a single connection, and the fact thatnonpoor households were benefiting from the subsidized block of the tariff, especially if they consumed no more than10 cubic meters of water per month.

Source: Brocklehurst, Clarissa, and Jan G. Janssens. January 2004. Innovative Contracts, Sound Relationships: Urban Water Sector Reform in Senegal.World Bank. Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board, Discussion Paper No. 1.

30



training programs, mentoring,on-the-job training, continuingeducation courses in formalinstitutions, short seminars, onlinecourses, and study tours tolocations where the poor are gettingadequate services are among themany innovative approaches thatcan be used to meet these needs.

• Create incentives and buy-in:Without incentives and prospectsfor promotion, training is not likelyto bring about any changes inservices for the poor. Internalcommunications and awarenessprograms and incentives for staff tosupport the reform and improveservices for the poor are essential.The creation of career paths thatinclude specialization in services forthe poor is also important to createprofessional pride and commitment.

• Target nontechnical audiences: Inaddition, training and awarenessprograms need to be aimed atpolicymakers, regulators,consumers and consumerassociations, consultants,nongovernmental organizations,and private sector firms that supportthe WSS sector.

• Take advantage of existingmaterials: A large body of trainingmaterials has been created by theWorld Bank Institute (WBI) and byWSS training institutes in othercountries. The potentially relevantmaterials need to be identified andadapted to the Indian context.

• Professionalize: A professionalassociation of WSS serviceproviders similar to that created inIndonesia (see Box 10) would helpcreate a professional identity and asector-specific constituency, provide

training and certification programs,and offer valuable opportunitiesfor networking. Promoting thedevelopment of local private serviceproviders should be an essentialcomponent of the strategy.

• Outsource: It is often practical andcost-effective to increase capacityby contracting outside entities toprovide specialized services (suchas information technology, vehiclerepair, community mobilization).Managers should identify theessential functions that should

normally be carried out in-houseand the functions that could becontracted out. Decisions aboutoutsourcing must also take intoaccount whether qualifiedcompanies or individuals areavailable to provide the serviceand whether outsourcing iscost-effective. The contracting ofNGOs to liaise with slumcommunities by the SocialDevelopment Unit in Bangalore is anexample of effective outsourcing(see Box 6).

Box 10: Professional Association ofIndonesian WSS Service Providers

Municipal WSS services in Indonesia are provided by some 300 semi-autonomous municipal water utilities (PDAMs). After the financial crisisthat hit the country in 1998, most water utilities struggled financially andthe quality of the service provided deteriorated under the combinedpressure of population growth, aging infrastructure, inefficiencies, andlow revenue. Corporatization of water utilities, improved performance,and increased accountability and provision of timely and accurateinformation to decisionmakers—are part of the challenges to be met.Water utilities are members of a Professional Organization of WaterEnterprises (PERPAMSI), headquartered in Jakarta with 28 provincialcenters. The mission of PERPAMSI is to assist its members improvethe management of their water supplies, assets and finances, as wellas to provide training and certify professional staff. In addition,PERPAMSI provides training in public awareness, negotiations withlocal governments, and customer outreach. A strong PERPAMSI isconsidered a strategic element for improving WSS services throughoutthe country. Through a training arrangement, the World Bank Instituteassists PERPAMSI in the three areas of (a) public communications andinformation services; (b) performance benchmarking; and (c) utility stafftraining programs. The program includes the training of PERPAMSI’strainers in its provincial centers; the trainers will in turn train staff in themember water utilities. WBI is also supporting PERPAMSI buildstronger ties with universities and training institutions, to strengthenPERPAMSI’s capacity, and engage it in the delivery of appropriatetraining services.

Source: World Bank. January 2006. India Water Supply and Sanitation: Bridging the Gapbetween Infrastructure and Service. Background Paper, Urban Water Supply andSanitation, p. 41.

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Recognize andWork withAlternativeProvidersIn addition, alternative serviceproviders, such as SPSPs andcommunity groups, can complementthe capacity of the conventional utilityby providing services in areas wherelarge utilities are unable to operate.An Asian Development Bank surveyshowed that SPSPs were providingwater to about 6 percent of thepopulation in Delhi, 10 percent inDhaka, 5 percent in Kathmandu,36 percent in Cebu, 19 percent inHo Chi Minh City, 44 percent in Jakarta,and 14 percent in Ulaanbaatar.14

Several innovative projects haveincorporated SPSPs into servicedelivery models for serving the poorand a number of recent publicationshave examined the characteristics ofSPSPs and innovative ways of engagingthem to better serve the poor.15

markets. In other contexts, alternativessuch as a performance contractmonitored by an overseeing agency, ora community-based monitoring system,may work better.

Regardless of the regulatory model, itshould incorporate pro-poor regulatoryprinciples and mechanisms, andpro-poor regulation:

• Provide a framework for competitionso that a wide range of servicesare available.

• Create incentives (or obligations) forthe dominant operators to extendservices to poor neighborhoods.

• Allow a flexible approach to servicequality so that service providers canexperiment with alternativetechnologies and delivery modelswhile respecting basic servicequality requirements.

• Establish tariffs that encouragehigher access to services withoutjeopardizing financial viability.

• Establish a framework to deal withthe different circumstances andneeds of all customers.

In India, the question of which level ofgovernment is responsible foreconomic regulation needs to beresolved. Larger cities, such as thosetargeted by the JNNURM, should becapable of engaging and enforcingcontracts with service providers, butthe current capacity and motivation ofmunicipal officers to monitor andenforce contracts is a constraint. Forexample, in Delhi, many privately-run—and highly profitable—public toiletcomplexes fell into disuse largelybecause the municipality did notenforce contract provisions. Bothpoliticians and municipal staff need

14 Asian Development Bank. 2004. The Role of Small-Scale Private Water Providers in Serving the Urban Poor. Case Study No. 11 inBringing Water to the Poor, Selected ADB Case Studies.15 See, for example: McGranahan, Gordon, Cyrus Njiru, Mike Albu, Mike Smith, and Dana Mitlin. 2006. How Small Water Enterprisescan Contribute to the Millennium Development Goals, Evidence from Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Khartoum, and Accra. Water,Engineering and Development Center, Loughborough University. See also the list of resources at the end of this report.

IntroduceAccountabilityand PerformanceMonitoringSystemsThere are a number of regulatoryinstruments and institutional modelsthat can be used to promoteaccountability. Experience shows thatthe choice of a regulatory model shouldbe appropriate for the local context andthe size of the market, and it should beconsistent with the legal framework andinstitutional arrangements for theprovision of WSS services.Independent regulators (with a highlevel of discretion) are often presentedas the ‘best practice’ but they are notsuitable to all environments. Theyrequire broad-based confidence (of thepolicymakers, the public, and theutilities) in their objectivity and fairness,and are best suited for regulating fullyautonomous utilities with very large

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training in concepts and skills,particularly with regard to distinguishingthe governance of a public serviceprovider by the public owner, theenforcement of contracts with serviceproviders, and economic regulationof either a public or private serviceprovider. If the economic regulationof services is considered a function ofthe state government, it will be easierto distinguish it from ownershipgovernance or contract enforcement byurban local bodies. If such institutionsshare regulatory responsibility withstate governments, their respectiveroles need to be clearly distinguishedand complementary.

Regulation by Contract

A well-designed and credibly enforcedcontract, whether a performancecontract with a public operator or acontract with a private operator, canprovide an excellent regulatoryframework without an independentregulator. The specificity of theirprovisions provides security andpredictability for all actors in places thatlack a regulatory track record or broadpublic support for independentregulation. Such contracts shouldspecify (a) the responsibilities andobligations of the operator, thecontracting party, and consumers;(b) general service conditions; (c) feesand tariffs to be charged by theoperator; (d) payments, if any, to bemade to the contracting party or to theoperator; and (e) standards (or targets)for improving service quality, coverage(including specific targets for poorcommunities), technical efficiency,timeframes for outputs and, especiallyin the case of a public service provider,commercial and financial performance.The operator should also be required toestablish a system for responding to

customer complaints and mechanismsfor facilitating the access of the poor.Incentives for meeting targets, such aslinking payment to performance, shouldbe incorporated. The operator shouldreport his performance in formatsthat are understandable to localgovernment and consumers. A goodperformance contract (combined with adynamic utility manager) made a bigdifference in turning around theperformance of Uganda’s NationalWater and Sewerage Corporation(see Box 8).

Regulation by contract requires acompetent overseeing entity that can

monitor performance, enforce the

contract, and follow-up on unresolved

complaints. However, an independent

regulator (with a high level of

discretion) is not desirable when

regulation by contract is used. The

experience with the concession

contracts in Manila demonstrates

why: the discretion of the regulator

contradicted the specificity of the

contractual provisions, creating

uncertainty and confusion.16 A good

16 Ehrhardt, David, Eric Groom, Johathan Halpern, and SeiniO’Connor. 2007. Economic Regulation of Urban Water andSanitation Services: Some Practical Lessons. World Bank.

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Box 11: Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board’s Public Meetings,Citizen’s Charter, and Grievance Resolution System

In 1998, the managing director of Hyderabad Metropolitan Water launched the Customer Meets Campaign, atwo-week initiative intended to improve employees’ commitment to customer care. During the campaign, seniormanagers held meetings with customers to learn about their service needs and concerns. The diversity and number ofcitizens who turned up, the directness of their grievances, and the gratitude they expressed for the opportunity to voicetheir concerns made an impression on management. As a follow-up to these meetings, the Metro Customer Care (MCC)office was created in February 1999 to receive and coordinate responses to complaints lodged by customers using adedicated telephone number. The MCC standardized and simplified procedures for lodging grievances. An onlinecomputer-based program monitors staff performance in responding to complaints. The Citizen’s Charter, launched by theChief Minister in January 2000, outlines measurable service delivery norms for services provided by the Water Board. Itspublication was a landmark, as it publicly acknowledged the Water Board’s commitment to improving service delivery.Evaluation of results show that the MCC’s contribution has improved response to complaints for all income groups and amajority (96 percent) of MCC customers surveyed found procedures easy to follow. However, the MCC is not specificallyaimed at the poor and the number of complaints from poor customers is not commensurate with their numbers, perhapsbecause they lack access to telephones or because they are less exacting than more affluent customers. Nineteenpercent of slum residents reported that the complaint mechanism was more accessible than in the past and 44 percentfound it more polite and respectful.

Source: Case Study 8, accompanying volume.

Source: Ehrhardt, David, Eric Groom, JonathanHalpern, and Seini O’Connor. 2007. EconomicRegulation of Urban Water and SanitationServices: Some Practical Lessons. World Bank.

example of regulation by contractwith a private operator is the leasecontract in Senegal, which isdescribed in Box 9 and illustrated inFigure 3.

It is not normally appropriate for acontracting or regulating authority toverify every report or make frequentinspections, but some method ofverifying the operator’s reports,such as an annual independentperformance audit, is desirable.In Thailand, for example, theperformance agreement in placebetween the Ministry of Finance andthe Metropolitan Waterworks Authoritythat provides water supply services toBangkok is audited annually by aprivate firm, the Thai Rating andInformation Service. Finally,procedures need to be established fordealing with poor performance bythe operator and the resolutionof disputes.

Other Regulatory Mechanisms

There are several relatively simple andinexpensive regulatory mechanisms,such as regular feedback from usersand publication of performanceindicators, which are also very effectivefor monitoring performance andstimulating improvements. Hyderabadintroduced the Citizen’s Charter andGrievance Resolution System (see Box11). The Citizen’s Report Card, firstused in Bengaluru in 1994, is anothergood example. Citizen’s Report Cardsurveys systematically gather anddisseminate public feedback on publicservices that are not subject tocompetition and thus may lackincentives to be responsive tocustomers’ needs. These Report Cardscan be used as a combined advocacyand benchmarking tool. Through thismedium, citizens can collectively exertpressure for change. Successfulapplication requires (a) an

Figure 3: RegulatoryOrganizations Supportingthe Contract in Senegal

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understanding of the sociopoliticalcontext; (b) technical competence toexecute and analyze a survey; (c) acampaign to publicize the results andbring about change; and (d) follow-upsteps to institutionalize the mechanismand link it to public decisionmaking.The second Bengaluru Citizen’s ReportCard in 1999 resulted in severalpositive responses, such as thecreation of the Bangalore Agenda TaskForce by the state government tomonitor feedback; the initiation oftraining programs on customerresponsiveness by the Water Board;and the introduction of regularconsumer satisfaction surveys by theKarnataka Electricity Board.17

Getting Started:Actions andResourcesThis section suggests the followingactions for sector actors:


• Clearly distinguish and definethe roles of key sector actors(policymakers, governance bodies,service providers, and regulators),separate or combine functionsas appropriate to promotetransparency and efficiency.

• Give service providers adequateautonomy to make management(input) decisions, combineservice development andpromotion activities with operations,and hold service providersaccountable for results throughtransparent mechanisms.

• Examine the potential benefits andchallenges of private participation(including that of local small privateservice providers) in urban WSSservices, and adapt strategies andcontractual forms developedelsewhere to India’s context.

• Examine the potential benefitsand challenges of performancecontracting with public operators,and adapt strategies and

contracts developed elsewhere toIndia’s context.

• Carry out comprehensive capacityneeds assessments for key actors,and develop and implementstrategies to broaden and scale uptraining and capacity-buildingprograms with a new focus onensuring effective access to service,improving service quality, andpromoting financial sustainability.

17 Waglé, Swarnim, Janmejay Singh, and Parmesh Shah.February 2004. Citizen Report Card Surveys—A Note on theConcept and Methodology. Social Development Notes,Participation and Civic Engagement, Note No. 91. World Bank.

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Case Study Topic

Uganda’s National Water and Sewerage Performance contract with public operatorCorporation (Case Study 9)

Hyderabad Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Customer care office and grievance resolution systemBoard, India (Case Study 8)

• Take advantage of training materialsdeveloped by WBI and by serviceproviders and institutions in othercountries and adapt them toIndia’s context.

• Design regulatory and accountabilityframeworks that fit into the existinglegal framework and have the broadsupport of policymakers, the public,and the utilities, including SPSPs.

• Promote and support the start-upof a professional association ofwater supply and sanitationservices providers.


• Develop effective internalcommunication, performancemonitoring, andimprovement systems.

• Evaluate capacity needs anddevelop human resources, training,and outsourcing strategies toacquire the necessary skillsand capacity.

• Create incentives for managersand staff to improve performance

and ensure that all staff supportthe reforms.

• Change the organizationalculture to focus on servicequality and customer relations.

• Have performance auditedannually and publishaudited results.

• Strengthen skills for negotiatingwith policymakers andoverseeing bodies.

• Develop models for engagingwith SPSPs to provide servicesin areas where the utilitycannot provide services orwhere the former can do somore effectively.


• Monitor and disseminateinformation on the serviceproviders’ performance inpoor communities.

• Work with the regulator or theservice provider to developlicensing and performancemonitoring mechanisms that areappropriate for slums and poorcommunities and give anaccurate picture of the quality ofservice in those areas.

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Section 6

Adopt AppropriateInvestment Finance,Cost Recovery, andSubsidy Policies


Obstacles

• Tariffs do not cover the full cost ofefficient services and there is aperception that the poor are unableand unwilling to pay for service.

• Poor households find it difficult topay upfront connection fees.

• Poor households find it difficult topay monthly bills.

• Increasing block tariffs penalizehouseholds that share asingle connection.

• Small-scale service providerslack adequate finance to extendnetworks into peri-urbaninformal settlements.

Services that are not financially viablecannot be managed and operatedefficiently, and will not be sustainable.Financial autonomy is an essentialcomponent of managerial autonomyand accountability. Managers who donot have adequate resources or havelittle control over financial resourcescannot make optimal decisions.Dependence on public subsidiesmakes the services vulnerable topolitical intervention and changes inpolitical priorities. A vicious circledevelops: when tariffs are too low anda utility cannot pay its debt, thegovernment must help out and, as aresult, tends to get involved in day-to-day management. The JawaharlalNehru National Urban Renewal Missionrecognizes this and encourages levyingreasonable user charges so thatwithin seven years revenues will coverat least the cost of operation andmaintenance. Achieving this will requirea multifaceted strategy that mightinclude improvements in financial

management, improvements inoperational performance, redesign oftariff structures and connectioncharges, gradual tariff increases, and acampaign to increase connections.Targets for cost recovery that arerealistic and charging methods thattake the constraints faced by thepoor into account are more likely tolead to financial viability as well asimproved access for them. A fewrelevant strategic approaches areproposed below.

Adopt RealisticCost RecoveryPolicies andTargetedSubsidies

Cost recovery can be improved by(a) reducing costs through efficiencyimprovements; (b) charging an averagetariff that reflects costs; (c) structuringtariffs to balance efficiencyconsiderations with targeted subsidiesthat promote affordability; and(d) introducing strategies to improve thecollection of tariffs, including billing andcollection strategies that are tailored toconditions in poor neighborhoods.Development of a realistic strategy toimprove cost recovery and maintainfinancial viability while expandingservice to the poor requires consideringa number of factors.

Regulators are understandablyreluctant to increase tariffs and mustbe convinced that a tariff increase isjustified before giving approval. Ifpoliticians are playing the role of tariffregulator, the task is even morecomplex. Utility managers should learnhow to prepare tariff proposals that

justify proposed increases within thecontext of a medium-term plan, identifythe risks associated with failing torecover costs, and provide evidencethat consumers are willing and able topay the proposed tariffs. They mustalso demonstrate that they are takingother steps to reduce costs andimprove cost recovery.

It may be possible to improve financialperformance without increasing tariffs inreal terms by improving the efficiency oftechnical and commercial operationsand increasing connections. This willput the utility in a better position toattract additional finance for expansion.It will also provide resources to expandand improve services to the poor.

If a large tariff increase (in real terms) isrequired, even after taking into accountthe effects of efficiency improvementsand increased connections, theincrease should be phased over timeand accompanied by perceivableimprovements in service. Realincreases should, of course, be inaddition to automatic increases toreflect inflation. Phasing a tariff increaseover a few years is feasible only if areliable operating subsidy is available(or debt service can be suspended)during the interim. If this type offinancial assistance is not available,a larger increase may be acceptableif customers support the reasons forthe increase. A well-planned publicawareness and educational campaignthat precedes the increase is essentialto build support.

The tariff structure may createeconomic distortions or undermine thefinancial performance of the utility,particularly if the lowest tariff does notcover the full cost of operation andmaintenance and/or if the tariff paid by

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Targets for cost recovery that are realistic and charging methods that takethe constraints faced by the poor into account are more likely to lead tofinancial viability as well as improved access for them.



the largest consumers is so muchhigher than the full cost of providing theservice that large consumers have anincentive to reduce their consumption.Cross subsidies must be designedcarefully to minimize these effects.In localities where there are not asufficient number of higher incomeresidents to subsidize the poorestresidents through a reasonablesurcharge, cross subsidies aregenerally not a viable option.

Colombia and Chile have developedtwo different but viable approaches tosubsidies on the basis of householdincome. The need for cross subsidies isminimized because the poor aresubsidized primarily by transfers fromthe central governments.18

Expanding service to the poor mayresult in a higher average cost becauseof physical conditions, higher collectioncosts, and lower average consumptionfrom connections in poor households.It should not be assumed that individualhousehold connections will result inhigher levels of consumption—suchassumptions have proven unfounded,especially when cheap alternativesources are available. This createsa dilemma that needs to beacknowledged and dealt withrealistically. Practices that would reducethe cost of serving poor neighborhoodsshould be introduced. Communitymanagement of billing and collection,and outsourcing the installation ofconnections, have reduced costs insome locations. (Examples of these are

mentioned below.) Service levels alsoaffect financial viability. Individualhousehold connections for water andsewerage are often the preferredoptions, but when many householdsare served through a single waterconnection, water consumption perconnection may be higher than theutility’s average and make up for someof the higher costs. Similarly, blocktoilets increase economies of scale.Financial projections and the design ofcross subsidies should reflect thesefactors. Tariff rules should seek tobalance the need to ensure financialviability with the broader benefits ofdelivering services to the poor, andprovide for offsetting any negativefinancial effects on the utility.

General operating subsidies andblanket investment subsidies usuallybenefit the rich more than the poor,unless tariffs are structured to ensurethat only the poor benefit from thesubsidies. In general, subsidies shouldbe targeted at the poor and should belimited and temporary. Subsidizinginvestments and/or connections in poorneighborhoods is preferable tosubsidizing monthly consumptionbecause the former is both targetedand limited in scope, and is generallysufficient to ensure that the poor will beconnected and stay connected. Manystudies show that the poor are willingand able to pay tariffs that cover the fullcost of operation and maintenance forwater supply services.19 Charging suchtariffs not only promotes the financialviability of the services; it helps thepoor become legitimate customersand gives them a stronger voice. Ifsubsidies for consumption are to bemaintained over an indefinite period oftime, the source of funding should bereliable and should not undermine thefinancial viability of the utility.

18 Information on Chile and Colombia’s subsidy programs may be obtained from the respective water supply and sanitationregulators, the Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico in Colombia, and the Superintendência de ServiciosSanitarios in Chile.19 See for example: Guha, Shion. May 2008. ‘Valuation of Clean Water Supply by Willingness to Pay Method in a Developing Nation:A Case Study in Calcutta, India’, The Journal of Young Investigators, Vol. 18, Issue 5.

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Develop aCost RecoveryStrategyA cost recovery strategy includesefforts to reduce costs, ensurecommercial performance, and theadoption of tariffs that cover the cost ofan efficient service. Some of the keysteps in developing a cost recoverystrategy and a tariff proposal are:

• Evaluate demand of variouscategories of customers (includingpoor households) throughwillingness-to-pay studies, takinginto account seasonal variabilityand the availability of alternativesources of water and sanitation thatare free, or lower in cost, than theproposed service.

• Build a financial model that will beused to project costs (including

depreciation or debt service) andrevenues. Calculate the requiredaverage tariff to achieve the costrecovery objective for both watersupply and sanitation, andappropriate tariffs for each tariffblock, if relevant.

• Evaluate operational andcommercial performance todetermine whether costs can bereduced or revenues increasedwithout a tariff increase, or tomitigate the required tariff increase.Propose a realistic improvementprogram to improve operational andcommercial efficiency, and projectits impact on financial performance.

• Evaluate tariff structure to determinewhether it promotes efficiency,maximizes revenues, or unfairlypenalizes any group of consumers,such as poor households whoshare a single water connection, or

suppresses the demand of largecustomers below levels required tomaintain financial viability. If relevant,propose a more efficient or fair tariffstructure and project its impact ondemand and revenues.

• Justify any proposed investmentson the basis of expansion andimprovement priorities, technicaland financial feasibility, includingrealistic estimates of demand andcost effectiveness, and theavailability of investment finance.

• Evaluate the ability of poorhouseholds to pay upfront capitalcontributions or connectioncharges and to accumulateadequate funds to pay monthlybills, and propose mechanisms toaddress these constraints.

• Identify and secure sources ofany subsidies that will be offeredto promote expansions andconnections in poor neighborhoods.

• Taking into account all of the above,calculate the required average tariffsfor both water supply and sanitationand develop a strategy forincreasing the average tariff toachieve the cost recovery objective,including the identification ofsources of any temporary operatingor capital subsidies.

This type of model building and analysisrequires the services of a team that hasexpertise in financial analysis,economics, operational efficiency,engineering, investment planning, andsociology. The Government of Senegalused a process similar to thatdescribed above to develop its costrecovery strategy. (See Box 9.)

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SubsidizeInvestmentsA full or partial subsidy for investmentsmay be justified in poor urbancommunities as long as poorcustomers can pay tariffs that cover thecosts of operation and maintenance.There are a number of studies thatdemonstrate that the poor are willingand able to pay at least part of thecost of investments in water supply.Investment subsidies, thus, need notcover the entire capital cost, nor shouldit be assumed that they are needed inall cases. There are real benefitsassociated with requiring users to

contribute something, even if nominal,to the cost of investments, because itmotivates them to get more activelyengaged in the planning process.Higher levels of subsidies may berequired for sanitation but can usuallybe justified because of the publichealth and environmental benefits.It cannot be emphasized enoughthat if investments are subsidized,they should nevertheless be demand-driven, the result of meaningfulparticipation of the community in theplanning process.

One way to structure investmentsubsidies is to provide them as output-based aid (OBA). The OBA approach

has been tested in a number ofcountries in Latin America, Africa, andAsia. The operator must prefinance theinvestment and receives the subsidyafter the desired outputs are achieved.It is most often used to promote andreward investments that serve thepoor. The subsidy is usually specifiedas an amount per connection andis paid on the basis of the numberof poor households that areactually connected.20

A number of countries have introducedtransparent, targeted subsidies forinvestments that expand services to thepoor. Examples of targeted subsidiesare presented in Box 12.

Box 12: Targeting Investment Subsidies for the Poor in Cambodia, Colombia,Paraguay, the Philippines, and Uganda

The governments of Colombia, Cambodia, Paraguay, the Philippines, and Uganda used the proceeds of World Bank loans orInternational Development Association (IDA) credits to expand and improve water services for the poor while promoting theengagement of private operators. In most cases in Colombia, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Paraguay, private operatorswere selected via a competitive process in which they specified the investment subsidy they required. In some of these, thesubsidy was specified as lump sum investment, in others as an output-based aid subsidy per connection. In either case, thesubsidy is paid after the investments are completed or customers are connected. These operators are required to operatethe systems under contracts that resemble concessions or lease contracts for 10 to 25 years, and are responsible for allmaintenance and replacements during that period. The subsidy is not intended to cover the full cost of construction; theunsubsidized portion is recouped from users through connection fees and tariffs over the life of the contract.

In Colombia, tariff rules require that the average tariff includes the full cost of replacement of assets even if the initialinvestments are subsidized and there is no debt service. However, the tariff structure is such that low-income households donot pay any charges for capital investments. Nonpoor consumers pay tariffs that cover the full replacement cost ofinfrastructure and those in the two highest income brackets pay, in addition, a surcharge to subsidize consumers in the twolowest income brackets. In this way, the higher income consumers do not benefit from the investment subsidies.

In Uganda, the government planned and bid-out the construction and operation of water supply systems for small townsseparately from contracts with private managers. The investments were largely funded by government grants using donorcredits or grants and tariffs are expected to cover only operation and maintenance costs. Since almost all residents of smalltowns are considered poor, all benefited more or less equally from the investment subsidy. However, the towns were requiredto mobilize a portion of the construction cost and the relatively more affluent residents were generally required to contributemore than less affluent residents. Tariffs cover the cost of operation and maintenance. Uganda is now planning a pilot projectunder which private firms would both construct and operate the systems and would receive an output-based aid subsidyper connection.

Source: Triche, Thelma, Sixto Requena, and Mukami Kariuki. December 2006. Engaging Local Private Operators in Water Supply and Sanitation Services, InitialLessons from Experience in Cambodia, Colombia, Paraguay, the Philippines, and Uganda. World Bank. Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes, No. 12.

20 It is worth noting that OBA investment subsidies are sometimes referred to as connection subsidies because they are paid on the basis of the number of connections installed. This is a misnomerbecause the subsidy is usually intended to cover the cost of the major system components, not individual connections per se. In many OBA projects, the users must still pay a connection charge.

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RestructureCharges andPaymentPractices toAccommodatethe PoorReduce ConnectionCharges for Poor Households

Connection charges that create barriersfor poor people may be reduced byimproving efficiency (that is, loweringthe cost of installing connections),subsidizing connection charges, andeliminating bribes. Upfront connectioncharges, and the bribes users mustpay to middlemen who facilitateapplications, can present barriers forthe poor because accumulating therequired sum is difficult for people wholive from day to day. Plans that allowpoor users to pay the connectioncharge in installments over a year ortwo are sometimes proposed but thesemay not be the optimal solutionbecause they may include high interestcharges and can increase monthly billsby as much as 100 percent. High billsincrease the risk of disconnection dueto delinquency in payments andundermine the objective of keeping thepoor connected.

Sometimes, connection charges havenothing to do with the actual cost ofinstalling a connection per se. Highconnection charges may need to beevaluated to determine whether theyare justified and to bring them in linewith the actual cost of making aconnection. Collection charges may beexorbitantly high due to the inefficiencyof the utility. In that case, theappropriate strategy is to reduce costsby improving efficiency. In Bengaluru,

the Social Development Unit wasable to reduce its average cost ofconnections and introduce reducedconnection charges for smaller housesby hiring a private plumber to installthe connections.

However, when the charges reflectactual costs and efficiency is good,but the charge is still a barrier toconnection for poor households, thereis a growing recognition that reducingthe connection charge by subsidizingconnections is a viable and appropriatecomponent of a strategy. A number ofways have been used to structure andfund connection subsidies. Utilitiesoften find that the additional revenuesgenerated by new connections and thereduction of the costs of operatingstandposts more than compensate forinternally subsidizing connectioncharges. Allowing the charges to bepaid in installments that are free ofinterest is another solution. In Andhra

Pradesh, a grant from the state wasused to reduce the charge (seeBox 13). Faced with the problem ofextending services into poorerneighborhoods and towns, the largeurban water supply utilities in twoAfrican countries, Côte d’Ivoire andUganda, reduced connection chargesby adding a surcharge to the tariffs paidby all users. In some donor-financedprojects, part or all of the cost ofconnections may be financed by theproject. In Buenos Aires, poorhouseholds were charged lowerconnection fees in return for providinglabor during the construction andinstallation process. Similarly, poorhouseholds in the peri-urban areas ofCiudad del Este in Paraguay earnedconnection vouchers when theyworked on the construction of thewater supply system.21

Removing bureaucratic barriers andimproving the efficiency of the

Box 13: Subsidized Connections in Andhra Pradesh

In the late 1990s, the residents of Vijayawada (population 1 million) inAndhra Pradesh, India, got their water from about 900 private hand-boredwells and a municipal system serving 36,000 house connections and6,500 public standposts. Most of the standposts had lost their taps and rancontinuously. At that time, the municipality’s charge for a house connectionwas Rs 4,000 (US$87), and the monthly consumption fee was Rs 40(US$0.86). The state government of Andhra Pradesh released funds underthe National Slum Development Project to provide a 50 percent subsidytoward the connection costs. When the Vijayawada Municipal Corporationannounced this program, there was an overwhelming response from slumdwellers, and more than 5,000 came forward offering to pay the Rs 2,000(US$43) deposit. Using the cash inflow, the municipality was able to extendits distribution pipelines to several unserved areas.

Source: Arvind Kumar (Indian Administrative Service, Municipal Commissioner, Vijayawada MunicipalCorporation). April 9, 1999.

21Triche, Thelma, Sixto Requena, and Mukami Kariuki. December 2006. Engaging Local Private Operators in Water Supply andSanitation Services, Initial Lessons from Experience in Cambodia, Colombia, Paraguay, the Philippines, and Uganda. World Bank.Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes, No. 12. (Vol. II, Unpublished Case Studies, is available from The World Bank Energy andWater Department.)

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connection application process mayalso reduce the cost to users,especially to those who have beenpaying bribes to utility staff ormiddlemen to speed up the process.The creation of a dedicated unitwithin the utility (such as the SocialDevelopment Unit in Bangalore WaterSupply and Sewerage Board)and engaging nongovernmentalorganizations to assist the poor withthe application process have producedgood results.

Introduce FrequentCollection of Water Charges

If the very poor have difficultyaccumulating monthly fees, it may bepossible to increase the frequency ofcollection at the community level.Keeping tariffs below the full cost ofoperation and maintenance is notdesirable or effective. In fact, it mayreduce the utility’s incentive to collectcharges. More frequent collection ofcharges may be a viable solution.For example, in the ManggahanFloodway area of Manila, communityrepresentatives collect water fees fromconnected residents on a daily orweekly basis and pay the monthly billsto the utility on behalf of the residents.A 15 percent surcharge is added to thetariff to cover the cost of community

administration. (See Case Study 4,accompanying volume.)

Eliminate DistortedTariffs for Poor Households

There are several situations in whichthe poor pay relatively high tariffs forbasic consumption. Administrative orregulatory actions may be required toeliminate these distortions. Block tariffsare generally designed to provide a lowlifeline tariff for a basic essentialhousehold consumption and todiscourage excessive use by thosewho consume more than a basicvolume of water. However, such tariffsmay penalize the poor when severalhouseholds use one connection. Asystem of verifying the number of poorpersons or households using eachconnection and adjusting the applicabletariff accordingly can be introduced tosolve this problem. Assuming the basicessential consumption for a family offive is 10 cubic meters of water permonth, if five families share a singleconnection, the lifeline tariff would beapplied to a total consumption of50 cubic meters from that connection.Such a system is best administered atthe community level, perhaps by acommunity association, and thenumber of persons should be verifiedperiodically to prevent abuse.

Water charges may also be distortedwhen poor people pay their waterbills as part of their rent. Greatertransparency can be achieved byrequiring landlords to inform tenants ofthe amount of the water bill and tojustify the amount included in rent.

Resale of water by vendors who haveprivate connections (with or withoutlifeline rates) can result in excessiveprices if there is little or no competition.Legitimizing the resale of water and/or

allowing communities to appointseveral authorized vendors wouldincrease competition and drive pricesdown. If effective competition cannotbe created, the regulator or thecommunity may set a maximum tariff tobe charged by vendors—taking intoaccount the vendor’s reasonable costs.In such cases, regulation andenforcement at the lowest level feasibleis preferable.

Posting the allowed on-sale tariff aswell as the tariff paid by the vendorfor bulk water will help to preventexcessive prices and make the margincharged by the vendors transparent.Allowing authorized vendors to beeligible for the same tariff as individualhouseholds may also help to reducethe on-sale tariff.

Promote,Legitimize,and FinanceSmall PrivateService ProvidersLegitimizing and providing finance tosmall private service providers (SPSPs)can be an effective way to promote theexpansion of acceptable services tounserved neighborhoods. There arerelatively few SPSPs for water in India.Private operators of toilet complexesare more common. Projects to promoteSPSPs often use the OBA approach.A recent report reviews the earlyexperience of several World Bank-supported projects that promoted thecontracting of local private operators—many of which are SPSPs.22 Similarinitiatives are being funded by theGlobal Partnership on Output-BasedAid and other donors.

22 Triche, Thelma, Sixto Requena, and Mukami Kariuki. Op. cit.

43


Getting Started:Actions andResourcesThe following actionsare recommended:


• Make cost recovery and long-termfinancial sustainability a high priority.

• Issue cost recovery and subsidyguidelines to clarify concepts andpromote standardization of methodsin each state (if not throughoutIndia). Standardization of methodswill make it possible to compareperformance and establishbenchmarks across utilities facingsimilar conditions and will promoteexchange of ideas.

• Establish efficiency and costrecovery targets as a condition ofinvestment lending and grants.

• Approve tariff increases andchanges in tariff structure that areaimed at improving cost recoveryand long-term sustainability.

• Use output-based aid schemes topromote connections in poorcommunities, but scrutinize such

proposals to ensure that theconnections are sustainable, thatis, that poor households are willingand able to pay monthly charges.

• Legitimize and support SPSPsto fill gaps in service to thepoor communities.


• Develop realistic financial modelsto project costs and revenues, andcalculate the required averagetariff to achieve full cost recoveryover time.

• Identify inefficiencies in operationsand commercial functions andfocus on improving those, whichwill result in greatest cost savings.

• Adopt lifeline rates that coveroperation and maintenance costs.

• Simplify and redesign tariffblocks to eliminate subsidiesfor customers who are not poorand also extend the lifelinerate to those households whoshare connections.

• Determine whether the connectioncharge is a barrier to householdconnections for poor households.Evaluate the feasibility and impact

of subsidizing connectioncharges without underminingthe financial viability of the utility.Alternatively, adopt methodsfor collecting connection chargesthat eliminate the barrierwithout increasing monthlybills excessively.

• Work with poor communities toimprove collection of bills throughpractices such as daily or weeklycommunity collection.


• Carry out willingness and ability-to-pay studies to determine theconditions under which poorhouseholds want and can pay forhousehold connections.

• Support communities to organizeconnection campaigns, frequentcollection of bills, and otheractivities that make householdconnections a feasible solution.

• Assist households that share asingle connection to qualify forthe lifeline rate.

• Organize communities withoutaccess to piped services toappoint and negotiate withvendors to ensure fair prices.


Case Study Topic

Manila, Manggahan Floodway (Case Study 4) Network of user associations that bill andcollect water tariffs within the community

Uganda’s National Water and Sewerage Subsidized connection chargesCorporation (Case Study 9)

Bangalore Water Supply and Reduction of the cost of installing connectionsSewerage Board (Case Study 10) through outsourcing

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Section 7

OvercomePhysical andTechnical Barriers


Obstacles• The overexploitation and

degradation of water resourcesaffects the poor disproportionately.

• Physical and technical challengesmake it difficult to extend formalpiped water supply and seweragenetworks into informal andunplanned settlements.

Inadequate attention to managingwater resources is leading to theoverexploitation and degradationof water resources in India andexacerbates the already difficult serviceand environmental conditions in poorurban neighborhoods. One observerdescribed the situation as follows:

“In India the exploitation ofgroundwater has been encouraged,but little has been done to rechargeit. As a result, groundwater tablesnationwide are falling. In years whenrains are low, this problem becomesan emergency. The poor whodepend on dug wells (which dryfirst) are the first to suffer.”23

In water scarce areas or during the dryseason, the poor are vulnerable toexploitation by vendors chargingexcessive prices. In Chennai, morethan 13,000 tankers are mining thesurrounding farmlands for water. Withagriculture in crisis and groundwaterlevels insufficient for farming, farmersfind it easier to live off the money theyearn from the private water operators.

In Ahmedabad, overharvesting ofgroundwater has caused the city’swater table to drop an average ofseven feet per year in the past20 years. About 75 percent of the

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation’selectricity consumption is used forpumping water, mainly because thecity’s water pumping system isantiquated and inefficient but alsobecause Ahmedabad is locatedclose to a dry region and much ofits water must be pumped fromunderground wells, an extremelyenergy-intensive process.

India has adopted the Dublin Principlesregarding the need for integrated waterresources management to protect theenvironment, and the economic pricingof water, to ensure efficient use ofwater resources, but further action isneeded to implement these principlesin their true spirit. In particular, farmore attention needs to be directedtoward sanitation and the safe disposalof wastewater.

In addition to the broad problem ofwater resources, there are oftenspecific physical and technicalchallenges associated with providingservices in poor neighborhoods.Conventional water distributionnetworks and sewerage oftencannot be used. This may be dueto geography or geology, or to thelack of roadways under which pipescan be laid. Innovative alternativetechnologies are needed to overcomethese barriers.

Protect WaterResourcesGovernment and utilities shouldencourage the use of water-savingtechnologies and simple but safesanitation. Overexploitation of waterresources, which is already a seriousproblem in many places, increases thecost of water supply services, making

the expansion of services to the pooreven more difficult than it is whenresources are plentiful. Recently, inChennai, the government made itcompulsory to construct rainwaterharvesting structures in every buildingafter the city faced an unprecedentedwater shortage. Two years later, thegroundwater levels in Chennai haverisen substantially.

Rather than reacting to near-disasters,public authorities and utilities shouldadopt comprehensive strategies forreducing water losses. They shouldalso encourage the adoption of watersaving technologies and low-costsanitation at the household andcommunity level.

Adopt AppropriateTechnologies andDelivery Systems

Some appropriate technologies arealready widely used in India. Othersthat have been successfully introducedelsewhere might be adaptable to localconditions. These include:

• Connect flush latrines with septictanks: On-site sanitation optionsare already widely used inurban areas of India where it isimpractical to lay sewers and whereresidential plots are large enough toabsorb effluents.

• Condominial sewerage systems:The unit to which service is providedis a group of houses, rather thanindividual houses. Small boreconnection branches that run fromthe main sewer through householdlots with a direct connection to eachhouse are constructed with smallerpipes and installed at shallower 23 Pushpendra Agarwal, 2001.

46

India has adopted the Dublin Principles regarding the need for integratedwater resources management to protect the environment, and the economicpricing of water, to ensure efficient use of water resources.



grades than conventional sewers,resulting in cost-savings.(See Box 14.)

• Bulk sewerage: A sewerageconnection is provided at theboundary of the community intowhich the community-managedinternal sewerage systemis discharged.

Box 14: Condominial Sewerage in Brasilia

Between 1993 and 2001, Brasilia’s water and sewerage utility CAESB applied the condominial model on a massive scalein both low-income peri-urban neighborhoods and in more affluent areas of the capital. An estimated 188,000condominial connections benefiting 680,000 people were installed. Sewerage treatment capacity was also increasedusing adapted technologies.

Substantial cost savings resulted from several alternative technical practices. For example, in Santa Maria, a largeneighborhood that typifies the system as a whole, the average public network length is about 2.8 meters per connection,compared with about 5.6 meters per connection for conventional systems. In addition, whereas conventional networkdesign usually calls for a minimum pipe diameter of 150 millimeters, pipes of 100 millimeters were used for 56 percent ofthe system. The pipes were also laid at a minimum depth of 0.5 meters, compared to the conventional 1.0 to 1.3 meters,and simple inspection chambers were installed instead of high-cost manholes for 84 percent of the inspection points.

Throughout the metropolis, the condominial branches conformed strictly to standards of pipe location, hydraulic capacitymaterial specifications, and building regulations, but a few exceptions were made to accommodate highly localizedphysical conditions. Residents at the level of each condominium were allowed to choose among three location options forthe branch routes: through the backyard, the front yard or under the sidewalk. Routing through the yard has theadvantage of being less expensive to install, but the household is responsible for maintenance. With the more expensiveoption of routing under the sidewalk comes the advantage that the utility assumes responsibility for maintenance.

As the cost of condominial branches (US$2.8 million) was borne by the beneficiaries, CAESB’s costs (US$1.7 million)were much lower than for conventional sewerage. However, it was estimated that consumers paid no more for thecondominial branches than they would have paid for conventional connections. About 1.5 percent of households opted toinstall the branches themselves and consequently paid no connection charge, but were expected to pay for materials.Finally, the regular sewerage charges for households that opted for routing through the yard were discountedby 40 percent.

Prior to undertaking investments, CAESB undertook a process of social intermediation. During a series of meetings, theapproach was explained and each community chose an option and signed the required agreements. This process did notresult in any delays in the execution of the works. In lower-income communities, especially, the mobilization efforts led togreater contact among neighbors and built social capital.

The alternative technical practices have resulted in neither a higher incidence of obstructions nor a higher cost ofmaintenance relative to the pre-existing conventional system.

Source: Melo, Jose Carlos. August 2005. The Experience of Condominial Sewerage Systems in Brazil, Case Studies from Brasilia,Salvador, and Parauapebas. World Bank.

• Interceptors and shallow sewers:These could be an option forneighborhoods with septic tanks.

• Low-cost sewage treatmenttechnology adapted to localconditions, using low-cost materialsand construction techniques.

• Rainwater collection system: Roofchannels divert rainwater

to a filter and then to a groundlevel storage tank from whichit is pumped by hand to anelevated tank.

• Community storage tanks:When service is unreliable orintermittent, large storage tanks canbe installed in poor communities toincrease the hours of availability.

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Case Study Topic

Lima, Peru (Case Study 16) Condominial sewerage

Tegucigalpa, Honduras Study (Case Study 15) Bulk water supply

Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, Pakistan (Case Study 5) Bulk sewerage connection

Manggahan Floodway Communities, Manila (Case Study 4) Street or block metering

• Bulk water supply: Water is suppliedto a community tank to which thecommunity connects its internaldistribution system. Consumptionis invoiced on the basis of amacro-meter at the tank, whichregisters the consumption of theentire community.

• Relaxed standards: In Manila,private operators and communityassociations have installedwater pipes and connectionsabove ground.

• Street or block metering for watersupply: Meters are installed at theend of each street or block. Billing ofeach individual connection is basedon average consumption.

Urban land-use ordinances or technicaland environmental regulations mayprevent or discourage the use ofalternative technologies. For example,in Recife, Brazil, in the mid-1990s, anenvironmental policy that favoredtertiary treatment of sewage threatenedto block the construction of simplecondominial sewerage systems withprimary treatment in urban slums.Similarly, the requirement thatwastewater treatment plants be locateda minimum of 100 meters fromresidences made it difficult to buildsmall-scale treatment plants in denselyinhabited slums. Project designers

successfully argued that primarytreatment was better than no collectionor treatment at all but the distance ruleremained a barrier.24 Since the objectiveof the distance rule is to protect healthand avoid eyesores in residentialneighborhoods, it might be just aseffective to substitute stringent safetymeasures and aesthetic designs for arule regarding distance. Regulationshould be flexible enough to allowimprovements. The best should not bethe enemy of the good.

Getting Started:Actions andResourcesThe following actions are recommended:


• Adopt flexible standards thatpermit the use of alternativetechnologies and levels of servicein poor neighborhoods.

• Enforce land-use, technical andenvironmental standards ina manner that allows gradual andphased improvements.


• Adopt aggressive programs toreduce water losses.

• Encourage the use of water-savingtechnologies and low-cost sanitationby customers.

• Consider alternative technologieswhen faced with physicalconditions that prevent the use ofconventional technologies.


• Assist communities to examinealternatives to conventionalinfrastructure and adoptappropriate solutions.

24 Establishment of a Regulatory Framework for Water and Sewerage Services in the Municipality of Recife,Initial Diagnosis. Report submitted by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu to the Secretary of Infrastructure andPublic Services, Municipality of Recife, January 1997, Part VIII. A. Environmental Standards.

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Section 8

Summary ofPolicy Issues


Policy FrameworkWhen India’s Prime Minister ManmohanSingh launched the Jawaharlal NehruNational Urban Renewal Mission(JNNURM), on December 3, 2005, hereferred to the fact that in the early partof this century 50 percent of thepopulation of India will be living in cities.Rapid urbanization has alreadyoutpaced infrastructure developmentand has been accompanied by aproliferation of slums, increasedhomelessness, growth in urban povertyand crime, and an increase in pollutionand ecological change. To date, effortsto address urban problems havefocused on the planning andimplementation of developmentprojects but too little attention has beenpaid to the people themselves.

The JNNURM seeks to redress thisby improving the quality of life ofurban residents through security oftenure, improved housing, andessential services.

The JNNURM recognizes that this willrequire reforms in policies, laws,statutes, and procedures, particularlythose that inhibit the functioning of landand housing markets, to align themwith the contemporary needs of India’scities and towns. To achieve itsobjectives, in addition, the JNNURMrecognizes the importance ofinstitutional reform and the need toimprove the performance of municipalgovernment and service providers.It will encourage and assist citygovernments to (a) improve propertytax collection; (b) apply user charges

that cover at least operation andmaintenance costs; (c) introduceimproved accounting and transparencyin local budgets; and (d) institutionalizea higher degree of communityparticipation in the decisionmakingprocesses. These are sweepingchanges and the success of themission will depend on its ability toenlist the support of a large number ofpartners and stakeholders.

These guidelines recommend practicaltactical strategies for overcomingobstacles to improving water supplyand sanitation services for the urbanpoor but, in many cases, overcomingthe obstacles will require more thantactical strategies. It will requirechanges in policies or legislation, ortheir implementation. Even where policyreform is not essential, the proposedstrategies might benefit from a moresupportive policy or legal environment.

A diagnosis of national, state, andmunicipal policy and frameworks, andhow they are implemented, may beneeded to determine where the gaps,overlaps, and inconsistencies exist.Some policy changes and legalamendments will undoubtedly bewarranted. However, in many cases,while current policies themselves maybe adequate, their implementation isweak, or they may not be understoodand appreciated by the key actors.In those cases, strategies to improvethe implementation of policies maybe needed.25

25 This might seem like a daunting task in the Indian contextbut, if properly focused, it is quite feasible. A useful approachwould be to establish an evaluation methodology that could beapplied in all the states for the purpose of reviewing their legalframeworks and proposing revisions. Initially the approachcould be piloted in one or two states and a representativenumber of municipalities. Once the methodology is refined itcould be used by other states. Such an exercise was carriedout in Mexico in 2003-04: the legal frameworks of all 31 states,the Federal District, and several major cities were reviewed.

50

Improvements in the planning and delivery of services are essential topromote more efficient use of water resources, but must be complementedby an effective framework for overall water resources management.



List ofPolicy IssuesAssociated withthe ProposedStrategies

Some of the key policy issues that needto be addressed in the context of theproposed strategies have beenidentified in each of the previoussections of these Guidance Notes.These are consolidated below.

Give the Poor a Voice

The relevant policy reforms that wouldenhance the voice of the poor inplanning and delivering serviceimprovements include:

• Establishing requirements forgreater transparency in all aspectsof service planning and delivery, andmore public access to information.

• Formulating local policies to printmaterials in local languages.

• Setting down requirements orincentives for utilities to create theinstitutional mechanisms to promotebetter client relations and specialunits to assist the poor.

• Removing barriers that prevent thepoor from participating in electionsand running for office.

Take VestedInterests into Account

Policy reforms that would reduceopportunities for illegal activities thatinhibit reform include:

• Legalizing and regulating smallservice providers.

• Initiating policies that wouldpromote more competition amongsmall service providers.

• Creating policies and procedures topromote transparency and publicaccess to information.

Eliminate Administrativeand Legal Barriers

Lack of land tenure is one of themajor barriers to access to servicesby poor households. Removing thisobstacle requires:

• Initiating land tenure reform.

• Linking service provision tolong-term occupancy, notland ownership.

• Streamlining or simplifyingprocedures for poor residents.

Strengthen Capacity,Autonomy, and Accountabilityof Service Providers

Legislation or de facto practicesregarding the respective roles of keyactors and their institutional formatsmay not clearly distinguish roles orpromote accountability. This may resultin gaps or overlapping responsibilities.Regulations or their enforcement maynot allow for adequate flexibility intechnical solutions. Reforms may beneeded to ensure:

• Adopting management models thatpromote the autonomy andaccountability of service providers.

• Establishing effective tariffregulation, mechanisms formonitoring service quality, and

51


incentives for service providers tooperate efficiently and providereliable services.

• Clarifying the responsibilities ofstates and municipalities and theelimination of any overlaps,inconsistencies, and gaps intheir roles.

• Adopting minimum standards thatcan be adapted to local conditionsand needs.

Adopt Appropriate InvestmentFinance, Cost Recovery, andSubsidy Policies

All the recommended actions require asupportive and rational financialframework. Existing laws should beevaluated to determine whether theyallow and provide for:

• The principle of full cost recoveryfor services.

• Targeted subsidies for investmentsand connections (but not tariffsubsidies) for poor households,where warranted.

• Tariffs that recover all operationand maintenance costs atthe minimum.

• Reliable sources of subsidies sothat the financial viability of serviceproviders is not compromised.

Overcome Physical andTechnical Barriers

Improvements in the planning anddelivery of services are essential topromote more efficient use ofwater resources, but must becomplemented by an effective

framework for overall water resourcesmanagement. This requires national,regional, and local solutions. In poorcommunities this often has to do withthe specific local topography orgeology and requires local adaptationsand solutions. Existing legislationshould be evaluated to determinewhether it promotes:

• Coherent national, regional, andlocal approaches to effective waterresources management.

• The reduction of water losses byutilities and the adoption ofwater-saving technologiesby customers.

• Flexibility for environmentaland technical standards andmanagement models to be adaptedto local needs and conditions.

52



RESOURCES


Give the Poor a Voice

Baindur, Vinay. September 5, 2005. ‘For the People, byDiktat.’ India Together op-ed. http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/sep/gov-nurm.htm

d’Cruz, Celine, and David Satterthwaite. 2006. The Roleof Urban Grassroots Organizations and their NationalFederations in Reducing Poverty and Achieving theMillennium Development Goals. Global Urban Development,Vol. 2, Issue 1.

Water and Sanitation Program. January 2007. SlumSanitation Program in Mumbai: Stakeholder ParticipationPaves Way for Sustainability. Case Study.

Take Vested Interests into Account

Brocklehurst, Clarissa, Shagun Malhotra, and Alain Morel.June 2005. Rogues No More? Water Kiosk OperatorsAchieve Credibility in Kibera. Water and Sanitation ProgramField Note. www.wsp.org

Kariuki, R. Mukami, and Jordan Schwartz. October 2005.Small-Scale Private Service Providers of Water Supply andElectricity: A Review of Incidence, Structure, Pricing, andOperating Characteristics. World Bank Policy ResearchWorking Paper 3727. Available online athttp://econ.worldbank.org

Triche, Thelma, Sixto Requeno, and R. Mukami Kariuki.December 2006. Engaging Local Private Operators in WaterSupply and Sanitation Services: Initial Lessons from EmergingExperience in Cambodia, Colombia, Paraguay, the Philippines,and Uganda. Water Supply and Sanitation Working Note 12,World Bank, p. 16.

Valfrey-Visser, Bruno, David Schaub-Jones, BernardCollignon, and Emmanuel Chaponnière. November 2006.Access through Innovation: Expanding Water Service Deliverythrough Independent Network Providers—Considerations forPractitioners and Policymakers. Building Partnerships forDevelopment. www.bpdws.org

Wampler, Brian. October 2000. A Guide to ParticipatoryBudgeting. http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/GPB.pdf

Water and Sanitation Program, and Ministry of Housing(Peru). June 2007. Evaluation of Small-Scale Providers ofWater Supply and Sanitation Services in Peru. WSP andMinisterio de Vivienda, Construcción y Saneamiento, Lima.

World Bank. November 2006. Identifying Appropriate Policyand Regulatory Frameworks for SPSPs in the Water Sector:The Role of SPSP Associations? Synthesis Report.Water and Energy Department.

Eliminate Administrative and Legal Barriers

Alfaro, Raquel. November 1997. Linkages betweenMunicipalities and Utilities: An Experience in OvercomingUrban Poverty. Working Paper. Water andSanitation Program.

Brocklehurst, Clarissa, Shagun Malhotra, and Alain Morel.June 2005. Rogues No More? Water Kiosk OperatorsAchieve Credibility in Kibera. Water and Sanitation ProgramField Note. www.wsp.org

Caseley, Jonathan. December 2003. Blocked Drains andOpen Minds: Multiple Accountability Relationships andImproved Service Delivery Performance in an Indian City.IDS Working Paper 211.

CEPT (Center for Environmental Planning and Technology).n.d. Wealth Creation and Well Being: Impact of SlumUpgradation and Improved Service Delivery to the Poor—ACase Study of Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad. Schoolof Planning, CEPT. Ahmedabad. n.d.

Connors, Genevieve. 2007. Watering the Slums: How a Utilityand its Street-Level Bureaucrats Connected the Poor inBangalore. Ph.D. Dissertation. Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.

Davis, Jennifer, and Sunil Tanka. The Hyderabad MetropolitanWater Supply and Sewerage Board. Massachusetts Instituteof Technology. Paper written for Henry Lee, Lecturer in PublicPolicy at the Kennedy School of Government. Available onlineat http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Urban-Studies-and-Planning/11-479Spring-2005/3AFFDD6C-7096-4CC8-85ED-89839F8BAC15/0/pm2background.pdf

Dickson, Eric. November 2006. Management Models ofWater and Sanitation: Approaches to Decentralization inHonduras. International Development Research Center(Canada), Urban Poverty and Environment Program.

Gramalaya and WaterAid India. February 2007. TiruchirapalliShows the Way: Community-Municipality-NGO Partnershipfor Citywide Pro-Poor Slums Infrastructure Improvement.Policy paper.

Shukla, Shikha. 2005. Ensuring Access of Urban PoorCommunities to Basic Services. Water and SanitationProgram–South Asia. New Delhi.

Shukla, Shikha. October 2006. Draft Case Note onHMWSSB’s Metro Customer Care. Prepared for GuidanceNotes on Grievance Redressal Mechanisms, for WSP–SA(Performance Improvement Program).

WAC (Water for Asian Cities). Best Practices—Orangi PilotProject. WAC Program.

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Water and Sanitation Program. February 2006. Connectingthe Slums: A Utility’s Pro-Poor Approach in Bangalore.Field Note.

Water and Sanitation Program. January 2007. BangaloreWater Service Delivery: Indigenous Model Shows the Way.Case Study.

Strengthen Capacity, Autonomy, andAccountability of Service Providers andProvide Incentives to Serve Poor Users

ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2004. The Role of Small-Scale Private Water Providers in Serving the Urban Poor,Case Study No. 11 in Bringing Water to the Poor, SelectedADB Case Studies.

Barnes, Nancy, and Abdelkarim Asa’d. 2003. A ChallengingExperience in Organization Development: A Guidebook. Thisreport is based on the experience of the Jerusalem WaterUndertaking. For more information, see www.jwu.org orwww.gtz.de

Brocklehurst, Clarissa, and Jan G. Janssens. January 2004.Innovative Contracts, Sound Relationships: Urban WaterSector Reform in Senegal. Water Supply and SanitationSector Board Discussion Paper No. 1. World Bank.

Brocklehurst, Clarissa, C.B. Evans, and R. Mukami Kariuki.2003. New Designs for Water and Sanitation Transactions:Making Private Sector Participation Work for the Poor. Waterand Sanitation Program and PPIAF.

Connors, Genevieve. 2007. Watering the Slums: How a Utilityand its Street-Level Bureaucrats Connected the Poor inBangalore. Ph.D. Dissertation. Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.

Ehrhardt, David, Eric Groom, Jonathan Halpern, and SeiniO’Connor. 2007. Economic Regulation of Urban Water andSanitation Services: Some Practical Lessons. World Bank.(Discusses the basic principles and the design of regulationto fit the local context; a short practitioners’ note is alsobeing prepared.)

Mugisha, Silver. April 2006. Performance Assessment andMonitoring of Water Infrastructure: An Empirical Case Studyof Benchmarking in Uganda.

Pilgrim, Nick, Bob Roche, John Kalbermatten, Cathy Revels,and R. Mukami Kariuki. 2007. Town Water Supply andSanitation Initiative: Principles of Town Water Supply andSanitation (Vol. I), and Guidance Manual and Training Modules(Vol. II). World Bank–Bank of Netherlands Water Partnership.

Public Affairs Foundation. n.d. Citizen Report Cards: AResource Kit. Bengaluru.

Tremolet, Sophie. May 2006. Adapting Regulation to theNeeds of the Poor: Experience in Four East AfricanCountries. Building Partnerships for DevelopmentResearch Series.

Tremolet, Sophie, and Jonathan Halpern. June 2006.Regulation of Water and Sanitation Services: Getting BetterServices to Poor People. OBA Working Paper Series, No. 8,Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid.

Tremolet, Sophie, and Catherine Hune. August 2006. TakingAccount of the Poor in Water Sector Regulation. Water andSanitation Working Paper Series No. 11, World Bank.

Wagle, Swarnim, Janmejay Singh, and Parmesh Shah.February 2004. Citizen Report Card Surveys—A Note on theConcept and Methodology. Social Development Notes,Participation and Civic Engagement, Note No. 91.World Bank.

World Bank. January 2006. India Water Supply andSanitation: Bridging the Gap between Infrastructure andService. Background Paper, Urban Water Supplyand Sanitation.

Adopt Appropriate Investment Finance,Cost Recovery, and Subsidy Policies

Brocklehurst, Clarissa, and Jan G. Janssens. January 2004.Innovative Contracts, Sound Relationships: Urban WaterSector Reform in Senegal. Water Supply and SanitationSector Board Discussion Paper No. 1. World Bank.(Tariffs were increased gradually over several years whilesubsidies were gradually decreased until full cost recoverywas attained.)

Ehrhardt, David, Eric Groom, Jonathan Halpern, and SeiniO’Connor. 2007. Economic Regulation of Urban Water andSanitation Services: Some Practical Lessons. World Bank,forthcoming. (Discusses the basic principles and the designof regulation to fit the local context; a practitioners’ note isalso being prepared.)

Kingdom, Bill, Roland Liemberger, and Philippe Marin.December 2006. The Challenge of Reducing NonrevenueWater in Developing Countries: How the Private Sector canHelp: A Look at Performance-Based Service Contracting.Water Supply and Sanitation Board Discussion PaperSeries, Paper No. 8. World Bank.

Makino, Midori. 2002–03. Water Tariffs and Subsidies inSouth Asia. Papers 1 through 5. Water and SanitationProgram–South Asia.

World Bank. January 2006. India Water Supply and Sanitation:Bridging the Gap between Infrastructure and Service.Background Paper. Urban Water Supply and Sanitation.

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Overcome Physical and Technical Barriers

ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2004. Water for Slums:Private Sector Participation in Manila. Case No. 11 in BringingWater to the Poor: Selected ADB Case Studies. (Flexibletechnical standards allowed the installation of connections toplastic pipes above ground.)

Centre for Science and Environment. 2000. A WaterHarvesting Manual for Urban Areas: Case Studies fromDelhi. New Delhi.

Centre for Science and Environment. 2007. A WastewaterRecycling Manual for Urban Areas with Case Studies.New Delhi.

Dickson, Eric. November 2006. Management Models ofWater and Sanitation: Approaches to Decentralization inHonduras. International Development Research Center(Canada), Urban Poverty and Environment Program.(Describes the rainwater collection systems in Laguna delPedregal, among other innovations.)

Foster, Vivien. n.d. Condominial Water and SewerageSystems: Costs of Implementation of the Model, El Alto—Bolivia/Pilot Project. Economic and Financial Evaluation,Water and Sanitation Program.

Godfrey, Amaka, ed. 2005. Low-Cost Toilet Options: ACatalogue. WEDC.

Melo, Jose Carlos. August 2005. The Experience ofCondominial Sewerage Systems in Brazil: Case Studies fromBrasilia, Salvador, and Parauapebas. World Bank.

National Institute of Urban Affairs. June 2005. Status of WaterSupply, Sanitation, and Solid Waste Management in UrbanAreas. Sponsored by Central Public Health and EnvironmentalEngineering Organization (CPHEEO), Ministry of UrbanDevelopment, Government of India.

Pickford, John. 1995. Low-Cost Sanitation: A Survey ofPractical Experience. WEDC.

World Bank. January 2006. India Water Supply andSanitation: Bridging the Gap between Infrastructure andService. Background Paper, Urban Water Supply andSanitation, pp. 18-19.

Organizations and Institutions

American Water Works Association Research Foundation(www.awwarf.org)

Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi(www.cseindia.org)

Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (www.gpoba.org)

Gramalaya, a nongovernmental organization that promoteshealth and hygiene education, promotion of self-helpgroups among women, construction of low-cost housingand toilets; active in the slums of Tiruchirapalli(www.gramalaya.org)

National Water and Sewerage Corporation of Uganda(www.nwsc.co.ug)

Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), a nonprofitorganization that advocates for the rights of women workingin the informal sector, conducts research on thecontributions and working conditions of women, anddevelops strategies for working with women who work inthe informal sector (www.sewa.org)

Thai Rating and Information Service (www.tris.co.th/index.html)

The Administrative Staff College of India (ASCI) haspromoted the creation of professional associations(www.asci.org.in)

The Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute(www.oppinstitutions.org)

WaterAid, United Kingdom-based nongovernmentalorganization that promotes access to safe water, sanitation,and hygiene education (www.wateraid.org)

Water, Engineering, and Development Center,Loughborough University, United Kingdom(www.wedc.lboro.ac.uk)

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Water and Sanitation Program–South AsiaWorld Bank55 Lodi EstateNew Delhi 110 003India

Phone: (91-11) 24690488, 24690489Fax: (91-11) 24628250E-mail: [email protected] site: www.wsp.org

March 2009

WSP MISSION:To help the poor gain sustained accessto water and sanitation services.

WSP FUNDING PARTNERS:The Governments of Australia, Austria,Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UnitedKingdom, the United States of America; theUnited Nations Development Programme,The World Bank, and the Bill andMelinda Gates Foundation.

AusAID provides WSP–SAprogrammatic support.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:

These Guidance Notes have been peer reviewed by Catherine Revels, Chris Heymans,and Ravikumar Joseph (WSP–SA); Anup Wadhawan (formerly with WSP–SA);Glenn Pearce-Oroz, Mario Alejandro Suardi, Genevieve Connors, and Raghu Kesavan(World Bank); Jeremy Colin (Water Sector Specialist); and Arnab Roy (Kolkata UrbanServices to the Poor Program). Thanks are also due to P.K. Mohanty (Joint Secretary,Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India) andAlkesh Sharma (UNDP) for lending their experience and inputs to the developmentof this document.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed are entirely those of theauthor and should not be attributed in any manner to The World Bank, to its affiliatedorganizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the companiesthey represent.

AUTHORS:These Guidance Notes have been authoredby Thelma Triche and Arthur McIntosh.The case studies and slum consultationdocuments (accompanying volume) havebeen compiled by Geeta Sharma andShikha Shukla.

TASK MANAGER:Geeta Sharma

Editors: Meenakshi Shedde and Anjali Sen GuptaPictures by: Arthur McIntosh, Geeta Sharma, WSP–SA,Sajid Darokhan, and WSP–LACCreated by: Write MediaPrinted by: PS Press Services Pvt. Ltd.


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