Improving the International Legislative Process

IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONALLEGISLATIVE PROCESSPaul C. Szasz*

I. INTRODUCTION

It is surely an interesting commentary on the perception ofacademic international lawyers, that innumerable studies, despair-ing comments and impractical proposals have been written aboutthe essentially moribund international judicial process and equallyabout the feeble international executive-resulting in a generallynegative lay perception of both the activities and the poten-tialities of international law and international government. On theother hand, far less is being published about the relativelyvigorous international administrative process, though which, interalia, assistance worth billions of dollars is being distributed an-nually, and still less about the international legislative process bywhich an increasingly substantial amount of international law issteadily being created.' Indeed, because the greatest part of suchlaw relates to unfamiliar technical areas-which of course isequally true of domestic legislation-the process by which it isproduced has remained generally unknown, unappreciated,unstudied and unimproved.

In the course of attempting to establish an inventory of signifi-cant multilateral treaties (the principal, though by no means thesole expressions of international law), this author and a colleaguehave identified well over a thousand such instruments. Though afew are just over a century old, the greatest bulk is of post-WorldWar II vintage. Currently well over a score of such instruments arebeing promulgated each year and the general trend is upwards.Taking as an example 1976, as the last year for which reasonablycomplete information is available, at least 26 significant multi-lateral agreements were concluded, of which about a third arepotentially universal (ie., open to all or almost all states) andseveral others are also of a world-wide scope (though not of poten-

* Principal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel, United Nations. The views expressedherein are not necessarily those of the United Nations.

One of the few essays on this subject is one recently published by the Legal Counsel ofthe United Nations, Mr. Erik Suy, Innovations in International Law-Making Processes, inTHE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 187 (1978).

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tial interest to most states), while about half are regional. At leastfive of these multilateral agreements established new interna-tional organizations, such as the International Fund forAgricultural Development (IFAD), the International MaritimeSatellite Organization (INMARSAT) and the International RubberCouncil; six concerned environmental protection, including that ofthe high sea, the Mediterranean and the river Rhine; two concern-ed commodities; wheat and rubber; three were labor conventionspromulgated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO);three concerned cultural questions, such as the importation ofeducational, scientific and cultural materials, the reciprocalrecognition of diplomas and the protection of the archeological andhistorical heritage of the Americas; finally, some dealt with amiscellany of subjects, such as space exploration, plurilingual ex-tracts of civil status records, the limitation of liability formaritime claims, the regulations of a regional trade area andregional postal matters.

One reason, and one to which I shall revert several times, whythe international legislative process is so inadequately known andinsufficiently appreciated is that the arrangements for recordingand publicizing its products are so inadequate. There is no officialjournal, nor any public or private source that systematicallyreports on the promulgation of new multilateral treaties. Worseyet, there exists no general compendium of all such treaties, andstill less any even rudimentary codification of international publiclaw as established by treaties Thus, it is most difficult to com-pile, without considerable research and often the need for someluck or special connections, a complete list of treaties in a givenfield (e.g., human rights, environmental protection, constitutionsof intergovernmental organizations, maritime matters), and evenafter particular treaties are identified, there is no ready way toobtain an up-to-date list of the parties to many of them or even todetermine whether they are already, or still, in force. It can onlybe hoped that the next decades will see a marked improvement inthe documentation of international law, which is seriously defec-tive in practically all respects, as this is a development that can,unlike others relating to the international governmental process,be achieved without major political decisions and by the mere ap-

' Such a project was suggested by C.W. Jenks in The Conflict of Law-making Treaties,30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 401 (1953), in which he also complained that "[e]ven the texts [oftreaties] currently in force are not conveniently available." Id at 431.

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plication of sufficient resources. If necessary, it even could bedone on a private, academic basis should intergovernmental in-stitutions not take up the challenge.

To assert that the international legislative process functions,and perhaps functions better than most other internationalgovernmental procedures, is not to claim that this process isalready perfect or even satisfactory. Indeed, it is imperfect inseveral senses of the word: for example, the output of multilateraltreaties is clearly not adequate to govern any substantial fractionof the matters requiring such regulation by international law; fur-thermore, to the extent treaties are produced they frequentlydeal inadequately with the problems to which they are addressed.In addition to these imperfections, which are of course also moreor less characteristic of the better established, integrated andknown national and local legislatures, there is one defect peculiarto the international process: even after a treaty is adopted by acollective decision, it does not enter into force until individuallyaccepted by a specified number of states, and even then it is, withrare exceptions, not binding except on those states that have soaccepted it. This essay will consider in what ways and to what ex-tent this international process is actually susceptible of ameliora-tion under some reasonable hypotheses of good sense and goodwill, and to what extent certain improvements would require suchdrastic changes in international relations and procedures thatthey cannot be anticipated within the present generation.

While the emphasis herein will be on that aspect of the interna-tional legislative process that proceeds through the formulationof multilateral treaties, primarily those concluded on a universalor at least a world-wide basis but also including significant regionalinstruments, it should be recognized that there are also otherdevices by which a limited body of international law is being pro-duced, which perhaps may be used more extensively in the future.These include: the conclusion of series of similarly formulatedbilateral or restricted multilateral treaties, if these are sufficient-ly numerous and substantively uniform; the articulation andevocation of general principles of international law throughresolutions of sufficiently representative and authoritative interna-tional organs, though this is at best a slow, uncertain and con-troversial process; the slowly growing number of examples of cer-tain technical international institutions that have regulation-makingcompetence in limited areas; and finally the creation by inter-

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governmental organizations of a body of international administra-tive law, which is itself rapidly developing but necessarily of quitelimited scope.

Turning now again to the treaty-making bodies, we find thatthese include several in the United Nations, especially theGeneral Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well asmany of their subsidiary organs such as standing and ad hoc com-mittees of the Assembly and the regional and functional commis-sions of ECOSOC; specialized and related agencies, includingthose, like ILO, IMCO, or WIPO, that are primarily involved intreaty-making and administration, and those, like the World Bank,WHO, or the IAEA, that only occasionally venture into this field;other world-wide organizations, such as the Customs CooperationCouncil (CCC), various fisheries commissions and commodity coun-cils; and regional agencies, including primarily political ones suchas the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, theOrganization for African Unity and the League of Arab States, andeconomic ones such as OECD, COMECON and LAFTA. In addition,individual governments from time to time resume a function thatwas peculiary theirs before the advent of international organiza-tions, by proposing the conclusion of a treaty for some purpose andconvening an international conference therefor.

A contemplation of this plethora of more or less specializedlawmaking organs immediately suggests why the internationallegislative process is highly unsystematic and decentralized andthat, indeed, these characteristics are at once a reason for itsrelative obscurity and for at least some of its imperfections. Onelikely line of improvement that therefore comes to mind, evenbefore examining the details of the various stages of the process,is the achievement of a greater degree of coherence and cen-tralization. This might best be accomplished through the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations, at least in respect of all univer-sal and world-wide treaties. Political realities being what theyare-and it should be appreciated that current internationaldynamics involves not only the interaction of nation-states butalso of international organizations, even though these may havesubstantially identical memberships-it seems unlikely that effec-tive centralization can be achieved in the immediate future. But ifthe international community becomes more alert to this problem,and there are some indications that this is happening, it wouldlogically be the United Nations that would assume at least asignificant coordinating role. In the first place, this could involve

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the regular gathering and dissemination of up-to-date informationabout the activities of all stages of the legislative process invarious international fora: what subjects are under study by eachtreatymaking organ; what multilateral treaties are in the courseof being formulated; what treaties have been promulgated; andwhat state action has taken place or is contemplated in respect ofall promulgated treaties, whether or not already in force. In thesecond place, and this is an enterprise on which the GeneralAssembly has recently though only tentatively embarked,3 thetreaty-making process should be studied, at least with a viewto discovering whether any of the multitude of methods usedare superior to others and whether certain successful onesdeveloped in a particular context or in respect of a particularagreement can be generalized. Though it is the United Nationsthat is naturally called on to play such a central and coor-dinating role, there is no reason why its activities in this respectcannot be reinforced or supplemented by other entities, includingprivate ones, which may even take the lead if the enterprise orthe resources of the public agencies should falter.

II. THE MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING PROCESS

In embarking now on a brief analysis of the multilateral treaty-making process, it will be convenient to concentrate on severalstages in particular: the initiation of the process; the method offormulating treaties; their adoption; and post-adoption activities.It should, however, be realized that there is a degree of artificiali-ty in such a division and that to a considerable extent thesestages, particularly the first three, overlap.

A. INITIATION

The initiation of the legislative process is generally an un-systematic affair even on the national level, though less so wherethe legislative initiative is in practice mostly exercised by the ex-ecutive. On the international level the diversity of initiatives iseven greater, both because of the highly decentralized nature ofthe entire process (which is not characteristic of nationallegislatures) and because of the dearth of cumulative and up-to-date information about treaty-making.

' G.A. Res. 32/48, Dec. 8, 1977, Review of the Multilateral Treaty-making Process. Areport by the Secretary-General in response to this resolution is due in 1980, whichis to be considered at 35th regular session of the General Assembly.

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That some coordination would be valuable is suggested byseveral considerations. One is the desirability of creating ascoherent a body of international law as possible, avoiding bothgaps and overlaps between instruments relevant to the samefield. Another is the need to assure at least some efficiency andrationality for the process, since the need for international law isgreat and increasing as the number of states grows and the worldbecomes more interdependent, while the resources required toformulate that law remain limited; it would be sensible, therefore,to establish priorities, taking into account the areas in whichnew law is particularly needed, the likely difficulty in achievingsuch law, the most appropriate organ for undertaking thatwork (depending on whether it should be a universal, world-wide or regional agency and on whether it should be a technical ora primarily political one) and whether a standing body or an adhoc one appears most suitable.

As already pointed out, in order to permit informed conclusionsabout the aspects of international intercourse in which new law isneeded, the existing legislative texts should be readily available.They should be supplemented not only by current informationabout newly adopted instruments but also by data about in-struments already in the process of being formulated. To make in-formed proposals about the best method of formulating a treaty ina given area, it is necessary to have available information aboutthe activities and procedures of many different legislative bodies.To permit effective coordination to take place, some agency,presumably a subsidiary body of the U.N. General Assembly,would have to absorb these data and develop these proposals.Emphasis could be given to these proposals through endorsementsby the General Assembly in the form of recommendations addressedboth to the intergovernmental organizations concerned and to thestates of the world community, which ultimately control all theseorganizations.

B. FORMULATION

The most complicated and diverse stage in the treaty-makingprocess is, of course, that of formulating the instruments. Thismay involve several sub-stages: preliminary studies, particularlyin technically complex fields; the preparation of initial draftsby the secretariat of the competent organization, by a govern-ment or group of governments, by a non-governmental organiza-

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tion, by an expert body, by a representative body with restrictedmembership, or even (though this is generally not practical) by aplenary political body; finally, the consideration and develop-ment of those drafts may be undertaken in a succession of organs,generally starting with small, expert and sometimes ad hoc onesand moving to larger, more political and less specialized ones.Throughout this stage there may be direct consultations withgovernments, which supplement the deliberations of politicalorgans constituted of national representatives.

As this description suggests, this stage can by a very long one,though its duration naturally depends, as in national legislatures,on the complexity of the subject and the strength and diversity ofthe views about it. In some instances, when a matter is consideredurgent and essentially non-controversial, a treaty may be for-mulated in one or two steps taking only several weeks or months.In others, formulation may take half a generation or longer, or, in-deed, not succeed at all; but in this, again, the internationallegislative process is by no means unique.

One of the limitations of this stage, particularly under presentconditions, is the lack of sufficient manpower. Governments,especially the smaller ones, frequently complain that they areunable to keep up with the plethora of treaty-making activities, thatis, they cannot supply sufficient representatives and experts to allthe meetings and cannot properly review the many treaty pro-posals pending at any given time. A less serious constraint, butstill a significant one, is the capacity of the secretariats of the in-ternational organizations concerned, which must prepare thenecessary studies and drafts, solicit and analyze governmentalresponses and service the meetings of expert and political bodies.As the legislative agenda grows, the related budgetary re-quirements of the organizations also increase, both for theirsecretariats and for these meetings. While it may seem anomalousthat treaties for which there is a perceived need should languishat this stage (or perhaps before it, if it is decided to assign them alow priority in view of more urgent projects), the limited capacityof the international legislative machinery must be recognized andtaken into account.

The capacity of the world community to formulate legislationwill be expanded in part as more and more lawyers, particularly inthe developing countries, are trained to contribute to the process,as members of international secretariats, as experts, as governmen-tal representatives or as national officials charged with evaluating

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treaty proposals. Meanwhile, but even after this expansion hastaken place, the formulation of multilateral treaties should bemade as efficient as is compatible with the political and technicaldifficulties inherent in the process, which often requires extendedtime for negotiation, reflection and study in order to achievesatisfactory results and general agreement. It can certainly not beasserted that the present process is efficient: there are far toomany bodies, both standing and ad hoc. Many of these arespecialized, convened for individual sessions of essentially ar-bitrary duration (often determined by budgetary or schedulingconsiderations) to deliberate on a particular instrument for thetime allotted, only to stop their work repeatedly and to restart itagain (after wasteful formalities) at subsequent sessions. It seemslikely that fewer bodies, meeting for longer periods or in effectpermanently, as do many national legislatures, could considerseveral instruments simultaneously and continue working on eachuntil either a generally satisfactory text is achieved that can besubmitted to the next sub-stage (e.g., governmental comments ordiscussion by a plenary representative body) or until a temporaryimpasse is reached. Aside from other advantages of such amethod, experience shows that when a number of persons, even ifrepresenting widely diverse interests or ideologies, work togetherfor extended periods in an organ or on a project, they tend toevolve more productive working relationships than strangersmeeting episodically for brief intervals. Moreover, broader agen-das, while possibly distracting, do give wider scope for reachingcompromises through the trading of concessions on a variety ofitems. The examples of national and local legislatures suggeststhat narrow specialization is the exception and that most of thesebodies deal, more or less simultaneously, with a broad range ofsubjects.

One relatively recent development, which might enhance the ef-ficiency of the international legislative process, is the emergence,particularly within the United Nations and its related organiza-tions, of ever firmer and better disciplined regional and othergroupings. Naturally there are certain drawbacks to thisphenomenon: at international gatherings, whether these are ses-sions of organs or conferences, an ever-increasing portion of theschedule is consumed by unofficial meetings rather than by officialones at which all participants are represented; only after eachgroup's position has evolved does the inter-group bargainingbegin. Furthermore, the largest of these groups, that of the

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developing states (sometimes called the Group of 77),' can, whenunited, so substantially outvote all the other groups as todiscourage further bargaining under certain circumstances. Forexample, if the participation of the out-voted groups is not con-sidered essential, or if it can in any event be assured by the ap-plication of extraneous pressures, there is likely to be littlebargaining. Nevertheless, for the most part this "partification" ofthe international political process can be welcomed as con-siderably enhancing its coherence. Individual delegations are lessapt to seek special ends reflecting merely the particular quirk ofan uninstructed delegate or an uninformed official in a nationalcapital. Moreover, the inter-group bargaining can be considerablyshortened when carried out principally by group spokesmen.Though sometimes the latter represent the more radical, uncom-promising wings of their group, for the most part leadership tendsto the moderates, who are intent on achieving results rather thanPyrrhic political victories. It is yet too yearly to determinewhether the positive aspects of this development will generallyoutweigh the negative ones, but the present signs are encourag-ing.

Another development worthy of notice, and of encouragement,is the increased participation -naturally always in an advisoryrather than a decision-making role- of observers admitted to someor all of the sub-stages of treaty formulation. Some of these entitiesare essentially political, such as liberation movements acting assurrogate representatives of a future state, but, for the most part,they are expert international intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations that can give considerable substan-tive assistance in technical deliberations.

C. ADOPTION

Throughout the stage of formulation, decisions must from timeto time be made in the several organs in which the treaty is evolv-ing, but these are preliminary and taken with a view to the finaladoption and subsequent promulgation of the instrument. Thisnormally takes place either in the plenary of the most represen-tative organ of the body concerned (e.g., the General Assembly ofthe United Nations, the General Conference of ILO, the Con-

' From the number of these states represented among the 120 participants in the firstUNCTAD Conference in 1964; by now their number exceeds 110, that is over two-thirds ofthe some 155 states participating in international organizations.

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sultative Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of the Councilof Europe or a ministerial meeting of a U.N. regional economiccommission), or at an ad hoc plenipotentiary conference convenedby such an organ. It does not, indeed, make a great deal of dif-ference which of these types of fora is chosen. A decision may de-pend on such factors as the competent organ's agenda and the an-ticipated difficulty of the final stage-i.e., whether a text has beenfully agreed, requiring only its formal adoption, or whether asubstantial amount of negotiation remains to be done.

More important than the formal designation of the body inwhich final adoption takes place are its composition and itsdecision-making procedures. As to the former, in most instancesthe body is constituted so as to be representative of all potentialparties to the treaty, though there may be minor exceptions. Forexample, the General Assembly often adopts treaties open to "allStates," including non-members such as Switzerland and the twoKoreas.

As for decision-making, the general formula rule that hasemerged in the post-World War II period is adoption by a two-thirds majority of those voting for or against (but excluding fromthe count abstainers, non-participants and absentees), with eachparticipating state entitled to cast a single vote. Major exceptionsinclude the ILO, with its tripartite representation of govern-ments, employers and workers; the financial institutions (such asthe World Bank), where votes are weighted roughly in accordancewith capital subscriptions; and organizations, such as OECD, thatfollow a strict unanimity rule. The general rule, however, is com-ing under more and more criticism as the discrepancy in size andpower of states widens; smaller states are emerging, are beingrecognized, and are being admitted to international organizations.In addition, the size of the virtually automatic majority that canbe mobilized by the developing states (many of which are the newmini- and micro-states) has increased.

Naturally; proposals have been made for the adoption of somemeans of weighted voting that would more "properly" reflect the"significance" of the parties aligned on one side or another of in-ternational issues. The first obstacle to such a change is of coursepolitical; as the great majority of the states at present voting ininternational organizations considers that it benefits from theexisting rules, no voluntary change is likely and probably no in-voluntary one could be imposed. Perhaps still more serious is the

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likely impossibility of agreeing on any weighting formula. Onebased on population (exemplified by the United States SupremeCourt's "one man one vote" rule), would give China some 25% ofall votes, four times as many as the United States would com-mand. Military power is not readily measurable, and basing votingstrength on it would but increase the arms race. Economicpower would suit the Western states but hardly anyone else,for political, ideological and perhaps even moral reasons. Thesize of contributions to the organization, both assessed and volun-tary, would seem ideal and perhaps stimulative of largesse, butpolitically this too is a non-starter. One compromise advanced byacademic observers is a multi-chambered system, analogous to theUnited States Congress, where in one chamber each state wouldhave one vote (thereby preserving the principle of sovereignequality) while in on one or more others some type of weightingwould be used. In fact, as long as all of these chambers consistof instructed representatives, unlike those in either House of theUnited States Congress, there would be no need for the actualconstitution of several distinct chambers; instead a complexvoting formula could be used in a unitary organ, requiring the at-tainment of simultaneous majorities (which need not even be thesame ones) on the basis of several different weightings. For thereasons already given, however, no serious consideration has yetbeen or in the foreseeable future is likely to be given to a solutionalong this line.

What is increasingly emerging is a qualified consensus rule. Byitself, a consensus requirement constitutes something of a rever-sion to the classical unanimity principle that was the typical rulefor international organs and conferences until the First WorldWar and largely even until the Second. It may be defined brieflyas taking a decision only when no participant opposes it so strong-ly as to insist on blocking it; a consensus can thus bridge wide,though not all too deep, differences. But since an unqualified con-sensus rule still permits any participant to exercise a veto, andthus, if determined and independent enough, to exact a high pricefor its agreement, the now frequently used qualified rule main-tains the possibility of reverting to voting if the consensus pro-cess breaks down. This alternative is, however, resorted to only ifthe dissenters are considered to constitute a small, unreasonableand substantively overrideable minority. In practice, the threat torevert to voting is one merely maintained in the background to

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prevent any egregious abuse of the general desire to do businessby consensus.

It cannot be denied that resort to any consensus rule does havedisadvantages. One of these is the slowing of the entire process,as at each stage prolonged attempts must be made to overcomeevery genuine (even if objectively unreasonable) objection.Another is that the end product is likely to reflect not the bestsolution, or even the best that a majority could agree on, butrather the least common denominator of agreement-which maybe low indeed. The countervailing advantage is, of course, someguarantee of general acceptability, which is important in view ofthe ultimate requirement that individual states ratify the treaty ifit is to achieve legal status. The deliberateness of the process mayalso help to improve rather than degrade the product as solutionsare found that compromise initially irreconcilable positions, andas individual governments utilize the delay to adjust to and acceptnew realities and regimes.

As can be seen, the decision-making process in internationallegislation is still evolving and no immediate breakthroughs seemlikely. Nevertheless, as more experience is gained with variouslyadjusted rules, it may be hoped that improved procedures willemerge to balance the conflicting requirements of sovereignequality with a reasonable appreciation of the genuine disparityamong states, and the desire for speed in resolving urgent pro-blems with the necessity of proceeding with due deliberation.

D. POST-ADOPTION

On the domestic level the adoption of legislation concludes thelegislative process, but internationally it only moves it to anotherand as yet quite unsatisfactorily functioning stage: securing ofthe agreement of individual states, generally referred to asratification. Ratification is required for two purposes: for anygiven multilateral treaty a minimum level of participation is set(determined at the formulation stage, depending on the nature ofthe instrument and based on some estimate of political realities)before the treaty can enter into force at all; and in any event thetreaty is, even after entry into force, generally binding only onthose states that have ratified it.

There can be no doubt that this stage of the internationallegislative process is both crucial and unsatisfactory.5 Too many

' See the study by 0. Schachter et. al, Wider Acceptance of Multilateral Treaties,UNITAR Series No. 2 (1969).

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treaties, born after long travail through the earlier stages, remainmoribund for years while the minimum number of participants re-quired for entry in force is assembled. Even more agreementsare permanently enfeebled by a low level of participation, par-ticularly by the absence of many powerful or otherwise significantstates.

One source of the difficulty can be found on the internationalplane. Except in a few organizations, there is no systematicmechanism for following up on state action in respect of treatiesformulated by the organization, except perhaps for sporadicreminders and pleas adopted by interested organs. Naturally,better results are achieved where the constitution of an inter-national organization (e.g., of ILO and WHO)6 requires mem-ber governments at least to initiate the domestic ratificationprocess and to report periodically thereon to an internationalorgan. In other cases, secretariats have been charged or havetaken it on themselves to follow up on treaties, prodding govern-ments and offering whatever assistance they can in overcomingdomestic obstacles.

The real difficulty, however, lies with the generally quite inade-quate domestic procedures for adopting or ratifying internationallegislation. On one hand, treaties are sometimes considered as ifthey were some species of domestic legislative proposals, subjectto examination and improvement de novo, instead of being thelargely unalterable (except through limited reservations or dif-ficult amendments) end products of an already extensivelegislative process. The inability to change these instruments,rather than accelerating their consideration, may lead to their be-ing shunted aside indefinitely unless some strong domestic spon-sor can be found. On the other hand, treaties may, as in the UnitedStates, be relegated to a traditional mechanism attuned not to theflood of law-making treaties of the 20th Century but to the occa-sional treaties of alliance of the 18th, whose ratification was sur-rounded by special parliamentary safeguards and obstacles, butwhich now act as bottlenecks effectively preventing participationin a large body of international law. These national obstacles mustawait national remedies. Certainly the treaty-approval process, atleast insofar as it relates to multilateral legislative instruments,

' See Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, adopted Oct. 9, 1946, 62Stat. 3485, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, Article 19(5); Constitution of the WorldHealth Organization, opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14U.N.T.S. 185, as amended 26 U.S.T. 990, T.I.A.S. 8086, Article 20.

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should be freed of any special constraints inappropriate to it. Atthe same time, it may be necessary to involve selected membersof national legislatures in the international process from an earlystage, so that their ideas for changes and improvements can betested in the competent international fora while instruments maystill be changed. Then, after their having participated in the inter-national formulation, it may be hoped that these legislators willease the process of domestic approval.

Here too, an up-to-date inventory of law-making treaties, in-cluding those in force and those awaiting approval by states,would probably be helpful both on the international and the na-tional plane. Such a list, with an indication of which states areeligible to but have not yet taken steps to participate in particulartreaties, could by its very existence serve as a spur to national ac-tion and also alert international organizations to the states theyshould approach to urge ratification.

Finally, some mention should be made of certain limited excep-tions to the generally rigid requirement of individual ratificationsfor treaties to achieve legal force. One of these has become com-mon in respect to the constitutions of international organizations,which are amended much like other types of treaties are made oramended, except that the amendment usually enters into force forall members of the organization as soon as the specified number ofratifications (usually two-thirds) has been attained, thus bindingeven those that did not ratify the change;7 generally, however,they then have the option of withdrawing from the organization.The reasons for this exception are the absolute necessity ofpreserving the legal unity of a constitution and the undesirabilityof delaying each change until all members have individually con-sented. Another exception, which in a sense goes still further, per-mits some technical organizations to adopt regulations thatthereupon enter into force for all members, though usuallypermitting them to opt out by giving a specific notification.' Bothof these procedures may be helpful harbingers of developments inthis final stage of the international legislative process, but it is prob-ably illusionary to hope that states will soon consent to anygeneral substitution of these narrow and limited exceptions forthe usual requirement of individual ratification.

See WHO Constitution, supra note 6, at Article 73.See WHO Constitution, supra note 6, at Article 22.

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III. CONCLUSION

It may confidently be expected that during the next decadessignificant improvements in the international legislative processwill occur. Some of these will, no doubt, evolve through trial anderror, as individual organizations strive to improve their pro-cedures to accord with the perceived necessities of the time. Itmay, however, be hoped that such inchoate groping for bettermethods may be guided and speeded with the aid of systematicstudies of the legislative process, such as those recently initiatedby the General Assembly and by the International Law Associa-tion. Although such improvements may not actually achieve, theymay at least bring us closer to, Tennyson's vision of a parliamentof man, in which the common sense of most creates universal law.9

' Tennyson, LOCKSLEY HALL, lines 128-30 (1842).

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Improving the International Legislative Process