Improving Emergency Preparedness and Public-Safety Responses to

Improving Emergency Preparedness and

Public-Safety Responses to Terrorism and

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Vincent E. Henry, PhD

Douglas H. King, DDS

This article, written from the perspective and based partially on the experience of law

enforcement and public health practitioners, explores the very real public-safety threat

posed by terrorists’ use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). More specifically, it

provides an overview of various types of WMDs and their properties; outlines the general

policies, procedures, and protocols characterizing current police, fire, emergency medical

service, and other public-safety agency responses; and illuminates potential gaps and

lapses in current practice. Arguing the need for a more focused, integrated, and holistic

approach that involves a broader array of personnel and resources from public- and

private-sector entities and that emphasizes preparedness and prevention, the article

concludes by describing a more effective strategic and operational process. Based on the

highly effective Compstat crime control management model, this process involves the

timely and accurate analysis of terrorist intelligence, effective tactical and strategic

responses to various types of WMD events, rapid deployment of necessary personnel and

resources, and relentless follow-up to ensure a more effective and integrated response to

future WMD events. [Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention 4:11–35 (2004)]

KEY WORDS: weapons of mass destruction, Compstat, terrorism, public health,

police, emergency medical services, World Trade Center, bioterrorism, first responders,

fire departments.

July Fourth was a beautiful day in VeteransMemorial Park, and Central City Police OfficersPedro (Pete) Bernal and Dennis O’Loughlinwere happy to be assigned to the Park Car

today. The thousand-acre park was full ofpeople strolling, cycling, and rollerblading,a band was playing at the gazebo, and familiesspread their picnic blankets on the lawns andbarbecued at the small beach at the edge of

MacArthur Lake. ‘‘It doesn’t get much better

than this,’’ Officer Bernal said to his partner as

they cruised slowly past the playground filled

with laughing children, ‘‘and it sure beats

answering jobs all day in Sector Charlie. It’s too

bad every day can’t be as nice and relaxed as

today. A day like today makes you glad to be

alive. Good country, America.’’

From the Department of Criminal Justice and Sociology,

Pace University (recently retired from the New York CityPolice Department after a 21-year career; Henry) and private

practice (King).

Contact author: Vincent E. Henry, PhD, Department ofCriminal Justice, Pace University, 41 Park Row, New York, NY

10038. E-mail: [email protected].

DOI: 10.1093/brief-treatment/mhh008Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention Vol. 4, No. 1

ª Oxford University Press 2004; all rights reserved.

11

‘‘It sure is. What should we do for lunch?’’O’Loughlin replied, savoring the aromas ofvarious ethnic foods emanating from all thepushcarts in the park. ‘‘It’s almost one o’clockand I’m starving.’’ After some discussion, theysettled on a Cuban sandwich for Dennis and twohot dogs with mustard, relish, onions, andsauerkraut for Pete. The call came just as theywere getting back in their cruiser.

‘‘Park Car One on the air?’’

‘‘Park Car One. Go ahead, Central.’’

‘‘Park One, we have multiple aided calls inthe vicinity of the gazebo on the Great Lawn.Callers state several people are having seizures.An ambulance is on the way. Please check andadvise.’’Dennis and Pete looked at each other. Both

were experienced and well-trained cops, andthe implications of the call were readilyapparent to them. Just this week the precinct’sintelligence liaison officer, Lieutenant Ken-nedy, had briefed the outgoing roll call to beespecially on guard for potential terroristevents during the holiday weekend. Based oninformation received at the weekly regionalTerrorstat meeting, Kennedy related that cred-ible but unspecified threats—‘‘intelligencechatter’’—had been received by the FBI andpassed on to local agencies. Although theinformation was not specific, and although thenation and the city remained at Threat Con-dition Yellow, officers should be especiallyattentive when responding to unusual events.‘‘Ten-four, Central. Please try the callback

numbers and determine the number of victimsand if there are any other symptoms. Have theambulance stand by at the south entrance to thepark and have Park Two stand by near theBoathouse until we check and advise.’’Dennis and Pete regretfully put aside their

food, started up their cruiser, and headedslowly toward the Great Lawn. They had been

partners for almost ten years and were experi-enced enough to know that they should notrush into a situation like this, but insteadrespond carefully and gather as much informa-tion as possible on their way to the scene. Agreat many things had changed in police workduring their ten years as partners, not the leastof which was the strategic and tactical approachthey now took to calls that might involvea possible terrorist act. The terrorist attacks onthe World Trade Center and the Pentagon fouryears ago required cops across the nation toadopt a new and very different orientation tothe way they worked, and the possibility thateven themostmundane and seemingly ordinarycall for service might have some terrorist con-nection was always in the back of their minds.So far, Central City had escaped the realities ofterrorism, but Bernal and O’Loughlin and theirentire department were well prepared and welltrained to handle terrorist incidents.Perhaps this was precisely why Bernal and

O’Loughlin were also terribly frightened bythe prospect of a terrorist attack—especiallyone involving weapons of mass destruction.Everyone, it seems, was affected by theSeptember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and inthat respect these police officers were nodifferent: Like many others, they had beenriveted by media accounts of the events and fordays and weeks had closely followed theiraftermath in the news. As police officers,though, Bernal and O’Loughlin had a particu-larly strong interest in the September 11 attacks.Because theywere experienced cops, they couldvery easily relate to the challenges and strugglesfaced by police, fire, and rescue personnel whoresponded to the World Trade Center or thePentagon, and felt great empathy for them. Asexperienced cops, they could well understandthe extent of the human tragedy resulting fromthe terrorist attacks—the anguish of thousandsof families torn apart, the sorrowof thousands offriends of thosewhohad lost their lives, the pain

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12 Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention / 4:1 Spring 2004

and suffering of all of those who had beeninjured, the economic impact on those who hadlost their jobs and whose families had losta source of income. Because Bernal andO’Loughlin understood all this so well—andbecause they were such good cops—they pre-pared themselves thoroughly for the possibilityof such an event in their city. Their departmentprovided excellent training, but like manyother cops, they sought out additional knowl-edge and skills that might become important ifa terrorist attack occurred.Bernal and O’Loughlin knew a great deal

about terrorism and weapons of mass destruc-tion, and what they knew frightened them.They were frightened now, but they also couldnot afford to let their fear become immobilizing:They had a job to do, responsibilities to fulfill.The public needed protection, and it was theirrole as police officers to provide that protection.Beyond the cognitive knowledge and skillsthey’d developed, the two cops had preparedthemselves physically, emotionally, and psy-chologically for this day. Later, they’d both talkabout how frightened they had been, but theiroverall preparation enabled them to put theirfear aside in order to fulfill the expectations ofthem from both the public and from them-selves. Both would later say that although theyhad been afraid, they had also focused on thetask in front of them, and their fear had hada somewhat distant or abstract quality to it.There was a job to do, and they refused topermit the substantial fear they felt preventthem from doing what needed to be done.Despite the warmth of the day, they rolled up

the cruiser’s windows and turned off the airconditioner—if the situation turned out theway they hoped it wouldn’t, at least theywouldbe partially protected from airborne contami-nants drawn in through the ventilation system.Pete rummaged in the gear bags on the cruiser’sback seat, pulling out two pairs of binoculars,a small radiation detector, and a copy of the

department’s field guide to hazardous materialsand weapons of mass destruction.On the way to the scene, they carefully

watched the holiday crowds for anything un-usual or out of the ordinary. No one they passedappeared to be ill, and no one seemed to be ina particular hurry to leave the area. Dennisstopped the cruiser at the edge of the woodssurrounding the Great Lawn, about a quartermile from the gazebo.Pete scanned the area with the binoculars,

first looking at the commotion near the gazeboand then scanning the trees at the edge of thelawn. Dennis also scanned the scene with hisbinoculars. The band had stopped playing andhighly excited people were milling around,trampling the picnic blankets and turningover barbecue grills. Some civilians lay proneor rolled on the ground as others tried toadminister aid or gathered their children andtried to flee the chaotic scene. Some fell to theground as they ran, and others fell to theirknees to vomit.‘‘No birds,’’ Dennis said to his partner. ‘‘I

don’t see any birds in the trees. And there’sa mist or cloud hanging over the area. It couldbe barbecue smoke, but I don’t know. There’sa dog having some kind of seizure, too. Whathave you got?’’‘‘Rats,’’ Pete observed. ‘‘Look at the rats

crossing the road. The rats are running away.The wind is blowing toward the west,spreading the cloud. Move the car up thehill to the east roadway, but don’t get anycloser to the gazebo. I think I see deadpigeons at the verge of the woods. I getnothing on the radiation detector for now,but we may be too far away.’’Dennis and Pete could hear frenzied shouting,

and several civilians, spotting the cruiser, rantoward the cops. The first civilian to approachclose to the cruiser was a highly distraught manwith a flushed face, streaming tears, and vomiton his shirt, who shouted frantically at the cops

Improving Emergency Preparedness

Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention / 4:1 Spring 2004 13

to help. Pete and Dennis both knew that time,distance, and shielding were the keys to theirown self-preservation as well as to the survivalof the victims and that they would becomea liability if they became contaminated oraffected by whatever substance was makingthese people sick. Pete used the loudspeaker toorder the distraught civilian to back off from thepolice car: Theman could potentially be a vectorto spread whatever chemical or biological agentwas afflicting the crowd. They’d later say thatone of the hardest things about the situation hadbeen avoiding the urge to rush in to immediatelyrender aid—it is, after all, the natural tendencyof cops and rescue workers to run towardtrouble in order to help—but the very fact thatthey lived to make the statement was evidencethat they acted wisely and in accordance withthe way they’d been trained. Although theyfollowed their training, they would neverthe-less retain an amorphous and irrational sense ofguilt.Pete continued to communicate with the man

through the loudspeaker, learning more aboutwhat had gone on near the gazebo as the firstvictims had fallen ill and taking notes about thesymptoms. He learned that there had been afaint odor, like the smell of newly cut grass.Dennis picked up the radio and spoke calmly:

‘‘Park Car One to Central. Be advised we havea likely mass chemical or biological event on theGreat Lawn. Numerous civilians down. There isa crowd of several hundred people, and we’ll bemoving them away from the scene to the eastside of the park near the Boathouse. Notifythe Emergency Response Unit. Notify Mid-town Hospital, Saint Mary’s, and all the otherhospitals to expect casualties. Notify the PatrolSupervisor that we’ll set up a temporary emer-gency headquarters in the Parks Departmentoffice north of the Lawn pending his arrival.Notify the Chief and the Fire Department. Haveall available PD units respond to seal the parkexits and perimeter, and have a unit respond to

the Broadway bus station to prevent furthercontamination from people leaving the park.Have the ambulances respond to the Boathousearea to set up an aid station. Central, caution theresponding units not to approach the gazebo orthe Great Lawn itself until we have furtherinformation about the contaminant and itseffects. Also caution the responding units tobe aware of secondary devices or events. Hereare the symptoms, Central . . . ’’

The threat of terrorist events involvingweapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is real,and the futuristic scenario described above isnot at all far-fetched.The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on

the World Trade Center and the Pentagonchanged America forever, ushering in a host ofnew and unprecedented realities for theAmerican people, for the intelligence andnational security communities, for medicalpersonnel, for private security entities, andperhaps especially for police, fire, and emer-gency medical service (EMS) personnel. As theagencies and individuals most likely to be thefirst responders in possible terrorist attacks,they now face compelling demands to adoptnew strategies and tactics, to undertake newtraining, and to view their roles and theirwork in an entirely different way. Police, fire,and EMS personnel are our first line of defensein case of terrorist attack, but the enormityand complexity of the challenges they facemake it abundantly clear that they alonecannot bear the responsibility for ensuringour safety. Although first responders play anabsolutely critical role in homeland securityand domestic preparedness, and althougha great deal of attention and resources havealready been focused upon them in order tocounter the terrorist threat, much more needsto be done. Perhaps most importantly, therealistic potential of attack upon the Americanpeople and their towns and cities by terrorists

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demands that significant systemic changesoccur throughout the range of public agenciesand private entities charged with the re-sponsibility for ensuring public safety. Wemust develop and implement a broader, morecoordinated, more cohesive, and more focusedapproach to terrorism and to WMDs, and thatapproach must involve new relationshipsbetween and among all of these publicagencies and private entities.The actions necessary to bring about all these

changes are extensive, and they lie well beyondthe scope of this article to fully describe orexplore. This article will, however, focus morenarrowly on the issue of WMDs in the hands ofterrorist groups, on the danger they pose to theAmerican people and our nation as a whole, onthe current lapses and gaps in our approach tothe WMD threat, and on the steps necessaryto create a more viable system to counter thethreat. The importance of adequate preparationfor future terrorist acts involving weapons ofmass destruction is illuminated by the virtualconsensus among knowledgeable experts thatthese future acts are a practical inevitability. Itis not a matter of whether such incidents willoccur, but when they will occur (Lynch, 2002;Shenon and Stout, 2002).In the first part of this article, we will define

weapons of mass destruction in general andprovide an overview of specific types of WMDsas a way of understanding the nature of thethreat they pose. We will then examine, ina general way, the type of response protocolsthat police, fire, EMS, and other agencies cur-rently have in place and will highlight some ofthe problems and issues that tend to hinder theiroverall effectiveness. Finally, we will exploresome of the possible solutions for these prob-lems and issues, setting forth a rudimentarydesign or plan for achieving a better, moreeffective, and more efficient kind of interactionbetween public agencies and private entities:the kind of integrated system that will help

ensure public safety through the timely andaccurate analysis of terrorist intelligence, de-velopment of effective tactical and strategicresponses to different types of events, rapiddeployment of necessary personnel and re-sources, and relentless follow-up on terroristintelligence to interdict future attacks and toapprehend and prosecute terrorists.Because the authors seek to highlight the kind

of challenges that might realistically confrontpublic-safety and private-security personnelin the event of a terrorist attack involvingchemical, biological, or nuclear WMDs, thisarticle draws a great many of its examples fromthe realities experienced during and afterSeptember 11, 2001. In particular, because bothauthors had a professional involvement in theWorld Trade Center attack and the rescue andrecovery activities that ensued, a great deal ofthe article focuses upon the protocols followedand the lessons learned in New York City.While fully cognizant that the World TradeCenter attack was unique and specific and thatterrorists might not engage in precisely thesame or even similar strategies in the future,the authors believe that the events surroundingthe attack serve as a useful model from whicha variety of guiding principles and insights canbe distilled. Our goal is not so much to articulatethe kinds of actions and protocols first re-sponders should or must use (to do so would bequite presumptuous and disingenuous, sincekey elements in any antiterrorist strategy areflexibility and adaptability to the specific situa-tions confronted) as to broadly examine thetype of response protocols and practices thatfirst responders typically follow and use.

Weapons of Mass Destruction:

An Overview

WMDs are devices, biological organisms, orchemical substances that, when successfully



detonated or dispersed, are readily capable ofcausing massive casualties. WMDs have beendefined in various ways. The U.S. Departmentof Defense (Henneberry, 2001), for example,defines WMDs as ‘‘weapons that are capable ofa high order of destruction and/or of being usedin such a manner as to destroy large numbers ofpeople.’’ The definition goes on to note thatthese can include nuclear, chemical, biological,and radiological weapons. For legal purposes,Title 18 of the U.S. Code (18 USC 113B) includesvarious types of firearms and other weapons inits definition ofWMDs, but it goes on to include‘‘any weapon designed or intended to causedeath or serious bodily injury through therelease, dissemination, or impact of toxic orpoisonous chemicals, or their precursors; anyweapon involving a disease organism; or anyweapon that is designed to release radiation orradioactivity at a level dangerous to humanlife.’’The Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA, 2001) defines WMDs as ‘‘any weaponthat is designed or intended to cause death orserious bodily injury through the release,dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonouschemicals; disease organisms; radiation orradioactivity; or explosion or fire.’’ The FEMAdefinition goes on to point out that WMDs aredistinguished from other types of terrorist toolsbecause they may not be immediately obvious,it may be difficult to determinewhen andwherethey have been released, and they pose a dangerto first responders and medical personnel.Although a great deal of research has takenplace on battlefield exposure to WMDs, scien-tists have a more limited understanding of howthese weapons can affect civilian populations.Examples of WMDs include nuclear devices

(ranging from nuclear bombs to smaller andmore easily constructed ‘‘dirty bombs’’ thatspread deadly radiation in a relatively smallarea), biological agents (such as anthrax,smallpox, and other deadly toxins), and chem-

ical agents (such as nerve agents and gaseouspoisons). These three categories are oftenreferred to collectively as NBC (Nuclear, Bi-ological, and Chemical) weapons. While theywill be the primary focus of this article, weshould recognize that the airliners hijacked foruse in the September 11 terrorist attacks on thePentagon and the World Trade Center clearlyconform to the FEMA definition providedabove: They were essentially flying bombs(high-powered explosive devices loaded withhighly flammable fuel) that caused a tremendousnumber of casualties; they were not immedi-ately obvious as weapons; and they posed anexceptionally high degree of danger to firstresponders and medical personnel.

Biological and Chemical Agents in

Warfare and Terrorism

Chemical and biological agents have been usedin warfare between nations for many years, andthey have been extremely effective in termsof causing casualties and death as well as inspreading fear and panic among enemy sol-diers. More recently, they have become theweapons of choice for terrorists and extremistgroups for essentially the same reasons, as wellas the fact that they are rather easily manufac-tured and deployed. The first modern wartimeuse of chemical weapons of war occurredduring World War I, when German forces usedchlorine gas against Allied forces in April 1915during the Second Battle of Ypres. Britishforces retaliated in September of that year,firing artillery shells containing chlorine gasagainst the German forces at Loos. Althoughthey were certainly not known as ‘‘weapons ofmass destruction’’ at that time, these forms ofpoison-gas dissemination were generally suc-cessful on the battlefield. They were not,however, perfect weapons: Although Frenchand Algerian troops fled in panic when they

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confronted chlorine gas at Ypres, shiftingwinds during the British action at Loos alsocaused numerous casualties among Britishforces (Duffy, 2002). The fact that the spreadand the effect of poison gases and some bio-logical agents can be so easily affected by thewind and by environmental factors makes themparticularly unpredictable and especially dan-gerous to first responders, rescue personnel,and civilians in densely populated urban areas.Other poison gases were developed for

use during the war. Phosgene gas was used byboth sides in the conflict, and it was seen asan improved weapon because it caused lesschoking and coughing than chlorine gas andwas therefore more likely to be inhaled.Phosgene also had a delayed effect in whichsoldiers might suddenly die up to 48 hours aftertheir exposure. Mustard gas, an almost odorlesschemical, was developed by Germany and firstused against Russian troops at Riga in 1917.The strategic advantages of mustard gas (alsoknown as yperite) were that it inflicted painfulblisters, was more difficult to protect againstthan chlorine or phosgene, and could remainpotent in the soil for weeks, making it danger-ous to recapture trenches infected with the gas(Duffy, 2002).The use of chlorine, phosgene, and mustard

gas continued throughout World War I,inflicting a terrible casualty rate. Accordingto one estimate, there were almost 1,240,000casualties from poison gas during World War I,including more than 90,000 deaths. Russiaalone suffered nearly 420,000 gas casualties(Duffy, 2002).The horrible potential of poison gases to

bring about massive numbers of casualties anddeaths had been recognized long before theiruse onWorldWar I battlefields, but their actualuse by combatants on both sides, along witha recognition of their terrible consequences, ledin 1928 to passage by the Geneva Convention ofthe Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in

War of Asphyxiating Gas, and of Bacteriolog-ical Methods of Warfare. This protocol, whichmore specifically outlawed the use of poison gasand the practice of bacteriological warfare, wasnot ratified by the United States until 1974.The decades following World War I saw

continued development of poison gases as wellas some use on the battlefield. During the 1920s,British forces used chemical weapons againstKurdish rebels in Iraq, and the 1930s saw theuse of mustard gas by Italy during its conquestof Ethiopia and the use of chemical weapons byJapan in its invasion of China. The first nerveagent, tabun, was developed in Germany in1938.In the United States, the first known attempt

by a terrorist or extremist group to use bio-logical agents against the civilian populationoccurred in 1972, when members of a right-wing group known as the Order of the RisingSun were found to possess more than 30 kg oftyphoid bacteria. The group intended to spreadtyphoid through the water supply systems ofseveral major Midwestern cities (Sachs, 2002,p. 3).Another bioterrorism event occurred in

the United States in 1984, when members ofa religious cult known as Rajneeshee infectedan estimated 751 people in Oregon withsalmonella bacteria. The bacteria itself wereeasily grown from cultures purchased froma medical supply company, and cult membersdisseminated the strain by spraying it onrestaurant salad bars. The cult’s goal was toinfluence the results of an upcoming localelection by making a large number of voters toosick to vote on election day (McDade & Franz,1988; Sachs, 2002, pp. 4–5). Investigatorsconsidered the possibility of bioterrorism whenthe outbreak occurred, but it was deemed un-likely, and the source of the contaminationbecame apparent only when the Federal Bureauof Investigation investigated the cult for othercriminal violations. This incident highlighted



how difficult a bioterrorist attack can be todistinguish from a naturally occurring infec-tious disease outbreak (McDade & Franz, 1988).Although the individual or individuals re-

sponsible have yet to be identified, the series ofanthrax attacks that took place across Americain 2001 certainly have all the hallmarks of aterrorism, and the attacks certainly spread alarmand fear throughout the population. In theseincidents, anthrax spores were distributed—perhaps at random—through the U.S. Mail toindividuals, corporations, and political figures,and at least ten cases of anthrax infection weredocumented by health officials (Jernigan, et al.,2001; Traeger et al., 2002).Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein used both

chemical weapons (nerve agents) and biologicalweapons (anthrax) on Iranian forces during the1980–1988 war between Iran and Iraq, andhe also used cyanide against Iraqi Kurds in1987 and 1988. In 1995, members of the AumShinrikyo (‘‘Supreme Truth’’) cult disperseddeadly sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system,killing a dozen people and injuring more than5,500 others.Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 Tokyo subway attack,

which represents the first known use of poisongas or other WMDs by terrorists, had a tremen-dous impact on Japan and on Japanese societybecause it spread such fear and alarm amongmembers of the public. The Japanese people,like the rest of the world community, were notwell prepared for the possibility that a fairlysmall extremist group or religious cult wouldcarry out such an attack, nor were theyprepared for the possibility that either couldcarry out this type of attack. The fact that sucha small group could marshal the resourcesnecessary to kill and injure large numbers ofpeople and spread panic across an entire nationhad repercussions throughout the world, sinceit also demonstrated just how easy it would befor terrorists or extremist groups to manufac-ture and disseminate deadly WMDs.

Aum Shinrikyowas a doomsday cult centeredaround leader Shoko Asahara’s apocalypticphilosophy and his twisted notion that onlythe true believers belonging to the cultwouldbesaved once the world ended. Asahara’s goal inundertaking the attack was to hasten the end ofthe world, a common ideological theme amongapocalyptic extremist groups. Asahara’s cult,which accumulated immense wealth from itsmembers, recruited young scientists as cultmembers and put them to work producingbiological and chemical weapons. It also beganto stockpile hundreds of tons of deadlychemicals and acquired a helicopter to helpdistribute the gas over densely populatedJapanese cities (Lifton, 1999; Kristof, 1995).Sarin, a nerve agent that is several hundred

times more toxic than cyanide, was first de-veloped by scientists in Nazi Germany in the1930s. Sarin, which is also known as GB, isa fairly complex chemical compound that cantake either a liquid or gaseous form, andalthough its manufacture requires a fairly highlevel of skill, training, and knowledge ofchemistry, it is made from widely used chem-icals that are readily available to the public.Once cult members manufactured a quantity

of sarin, it was rather simple to disseminateit: Liquid sarin was sealed in paint cans andother containers that cult members carried intosubway stations in shopping bags. They simplyput down the bags, casually punctured thecontainers with the tips of their umbrellas, andwalked away while the liquid evaporated intoa gas and spread through the area. Expertsconcur that the 1995 subway attack wassimply a test—a ‘‘dry run’’ in anticipation ofand preparation for a much larger and muchmore deadly attack. Experts also concur thatthere would have been many more deathsand injuries had Aum Shinrikyo been ableto manufacture a purer form of sarin ordistribute it more effectively (Lifton, 1999;Kristof, 1995).

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Perhaps one of the most frightening aspects ofAum Shinrikyo’s attack on the Tokyo subwaysystem was the relative ease with which thegroup obtained the necessary precursor chem-icals and manufactured large quantities ofdeadly sarin. There are many other biologicaland chemical agents that are relatively easy toobtain, manufacture, and disseminate, makingthem very attractive to terrorist organizations.Depending upon the particular chemical orbiological agent involved, a relatively small andreadily transportable amount of the substancecan easily spread throughout an area andcontaminate or infect people coming in contactwith it. Especially in the case of toxic biologicalsubstances with a prolonged incubation period(as some bacteria and viruses have), signs ofillness may not be immediately apparent.Individuals infected with the toxic substancemay act as a ‘‘vector,’’ spreading the substanceto others with whom they have contact. Since itmight be days or weeks before the first infectedindividuals become ill, they can spread theinfection to literally hundreds or thousands ofother people, many of whom will in turnbecome vectors spreading the disease.

Terrorism and the Use of

Nuclear Material

While the likelihood remains small that a ter-rorist organization could obtain or manufacturea high-grade nuclear device capable of destroy-ing a large area, much less transport it to theUnited States and detonate it, there is a muchgreater potential for terrorists to constructan improvised nuclear device (IND) or ‘‘dirtybomb.’’ Such an improvised weapon wouldnevertheless have a devastating physical andpsychological impact by spreading radioactivecontamination throughout a densely populatedurban area.A dirty bomb is essentially a conventional

explosive device surrounded by radioactive

material that, upon detonation, spreads thismaterial within a relatively small fallout zone.Depending upon the size of the device andthe type and amount of radioactive materialinvolved, the immediate area surroundingthe detonation might be uninhabitable for along time, and those directly exposed to theradioactive fallout are likely to suffer radiationsickness. The possibility also exists that ex-posed victims might eventually develop cancer,leukemia, or other diseases related to radiationexposure.The possibility that INDs or dirty bombs

might be detonated in urban areas is particu-larly alarming, since the materials required forsuch devices can be obtained fairly easily, largeamounts of radioactive material are not re-quired for an effective device, and radiationcannot be detected through human senses.A seemingly ‘‘ordinary’’ small explosion in ornear a large crowd of people could spreadnuclear contaminants through the crowd withno immediately apparent symptoms. The low-grade nuclear materials required to constructsuch a device are used, transported, and storedin various locations including hospitals andmedical facilities, research laboratories, andindustrial manufacturing facilities across thenation.While these materials are more carefullyguarded today than they have been in thepast, it is probably not beyond the capacity ofa determined terrorist organization to obtainthem.

Biological Agents

Biological agents share some common charac-teristics with chemical agents, but someimportant differences can help distinguish thisclass of WMDs. One of the most importantdifferences is that chemical agents typicallyproduce symptoms relatively quickly, whilebiological agents may not produce symptomsfor periods of up to several weeks. As a result,



there may be no early warning signs, and firstresponders to biological events may not easilyor immediately recognize the fact that a bi-ological WMD has been released. In contrast tothe three categories of chemical agents, withfew exceptions biological agents do not pro-duce immediate symptoms in the skin orrespiratory system. Because many biologicalagents are often living organisms—bacteria orviruses—they cannot be detected by any ofour senses, and the scientific devices used todetect and/or identify them are complex anddifficult to use. Detection generally occursonly after a person has been infected and anincubation period has elapsed.Biological agents, which include anthrax,

tularemia, cholera, plague, botulism, and small-pox, can be disseminated through a populationin several ways. Although some biotoxins (suchas anthrax) may be spread through contact withthe skin (either through direct contact withthe skin or through cuts and lacerations), themost effective means of dissemination in termsof WMDs and the terrorist goal of causingwidespread casualties is to aerosolize the agentinto a fine mist or powder that is inhaled, or tocontaminate food or water that members of thepublic will ingest.There are three categories of biological

agents: bacteria, viruses, and toxins. Bacteriaand viruses are living organisms, and so theyrequire a host organism in order to survive andreproduce. After entering the body (usuallythrough inhalation or ingestion), the organismestablishes itself within the host and begins toreproduce and produce poisonous toxins. Insome cases, they produce severe and often fatalillnesses.The difficulties involved in detecting and

diagnosing biological WMD attacks can beespecially pronounced when the biologicalagents result in a slowly developing communityhealth crisis or an epidemic of some sort.Because they often involve a prolonged in-

cubation period before symptoms becomeapparent, they are difficult to trace back totheir source and may not be easily recognizedas part of a terrorist act. For example, we canrecall the difficulties involved in detectingand diagnosing cases of anthrax infection acrossthe nation in the fall of 2001, as well as in the1984 salmonella event in Oregon. While a morefocused direct attack, such as the rapid releaseof a large quantity of fast-acting biologicaltoxin in an office building or mass trans-portation center, would probably be recog-nized and dealt with more quickly, both formsof attack can have a potent psychologicalimpact on the public. Beyond the deaths andillnesses that may occur, they suit the needsand objectives of terrorists because they cangenerate substantial fear and public alarm.

Chemical Agents

A chemical event is likely to immediatelyproduce dozens of victims, and first responderswho lack adequate personal protection equip-ment may also become victims. All exposedvictims must be decontaminated before leavingthe scene, since hospital emergency roomswill not accept the victims of a biological orchemical incident until they have been properlydecontaminated.Chemical agents can enter the body in various

ways. Some agents are disseminated as aerosolsor gases and enter the body through therespiratory tract, while others are disseminatedin a liquid form and enter the body throughcontact with the skin. Because the eyes andmucous membranes are particularly sensitive tomany toxic agents, irritated eyes and nasalpassages often indicate exposure. While otherchemical agents can be ingested via contami-nated food or liquid, inhalation and skincontact are the primary hazard for victims andemergency responders.

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There are three basic categories of chemicalagent: nerve agents, blister or vesicant agents,and choking agents.

Nerve Agents

Nerve agents (military designations are pro-

vided in parentheses) include the substancestabun (GA), soman (GD), sarin (GB), andmethylphosphonothioic acid (VX), which com-pose an especially toxic class of chemical

weapon that act upon the body by interruptingthe central nervous system to prevent thetransmission of nerve impulses, resulting in

the twitches and spasms that are the character-istic symptoms of exposure to this type ofWMD.

Symptoms of exposure to nerve agentstypically include dilation of pupils (pinpointpupils), runny nose and lacrimation (tearingof eyes), salivation (drooling), difficulty

breathing, muscle twitches and spasms, in-voluntary defecation or urination, and nau-sea/vomiting.

Depending upon their purity, nerve agentsgenerally take the form of colorless liquids,although some may have a slight yellowish

tinge if impurities are present. Tabun andsarin may have a slightly fruity odor, somanmay have a slight odor of camphor, and VXsmells like sulfur. Nerve agents evaporate

fairly quickly and can be taken into the bodyeither through inhalation or absorptionthrough the skin. Nerve agents vary a bit

in terms of their toxicity and the amount ofexposure necessary to bring on symptoms orcause death, but all are exceptionally deadlyat exceptionally low dosages. Exposure to

a fatal dose of a nerve agent, if untreated, willtypically cause death in a matter of minutes.The typical treatment for nerve agents is an

injection of atropine.

Blister or Vesicant Agents

Blister or vesicant agents act by producingburns or blisters on the skin or any otherbody part they come in contact with and canbe fatal. They act quickly upon the eyes,

lungs, skin, and mucous membranes, inflict-ing severe damage upon the lungs andrespiratory tract when inhaled and resulting

in vomiting and diarrhea when ingested.Blister agents include mustard gas (also

known as yperite or sulfur mustard), nitrogen

mustard (HN), Lewisite (L), and phosgeneoxime (CX). Mustard gas and Lewisite areparticularly dangerous because they producesevere injuries for which there is no known

antidote or therapy; a single drop of liquidmustard on the skin can cause serious damageand itching in only a few minutes, and ex-

posure to even a slight amount of mustard in itsgaseous state can cause painful blistering,tearing, and, eventually, severe lesions of theeyes. Depending upon weather conditions as

well as the extent and duration of exposure, theeffects of mustard gas can also be delayed fora period of up to a day. Several hours after the

exposure, respiratory effects become apparentin the form of severe burning pain in thethroat, trachea, and lungs. Although most

mustard gas victims survive, severe pulmonaryedema or swelling of the lungs may result indeath. The only effective form of protectionagainst mustard gas is the use of a full-body

protective suit (level I protection) and the useof a gas mask or respirator.Lewisite, which is typically colorless and

odorless in its liquid state but may emit thefaint scent of geraniums, causes symptoms thatare generally similar to mustard gas but alsoinclude a drop in blood pressure and a de-

creased body temperature. Inhalation ofLewisite in high concentrations can lead todeath in a few minutes, and the antidote for



skin blistering, dimercaprol, must be appliedbefore the actual blistering begins to take place.Phosgene oxime (CX) can exist as a white

powder or, when mixed with water or other

solvents, in a liquid state. Contact withphosgene oxime is extremely painful, and itquickly irritates the skin, the respiratory

system, and the eyes, leading to lesions of theeye, blindness, and respiratory edema. Contactwith the skin immediately produces an area of

white surrounded by reddened skin andswelling. Because phosgene oxime is heavierthan air, it can remain in low-lying areas forquite some time, and so it poses a particular

danger for rescue workers. Phosgene oxime hasa sharp and penetrating odor.

Choking Agents

These agents enter the body via the respiratorytract and often cause severe pulmonary edema.

Because they are most effectively deployed asgases, they are typically stored and transportedin bottles or cylinders prior to being dissemi-

nated into the air. As their name implies, chok-ing agents quickly attack and cause severedamage to the lungs and respiratory system andcan cause pulmonary edema and death. Chok-

ing agents include phosgene (CG), diphosgene(DP), chlorine (CL) in liquid or gaseous form.It should be noted that phosgene (CG) and

phosgene oxime (CX) are chemically differentsubstances that have different properties anddifferent symptoms. Symptoms of chokingagents include severe coughing, choking,

nausea, lacrimation, difficulty breathing, andvomiting. The initial symptoms may subsidefor a period of up to a day but typically return

when pulmonary edema takes place, andindividuals exposed to choking agents may gointo shock as their blood pressure and heart rate

drop precipitously.

First-Responder Safety—Time,

Distance, and Shielding

Generally speaking, the police and emergency

workers who might be called upon to initially

respond to a nuclear, biological, or chemical

event are not adequately trained to deal

effectively with those events. This is not to

say that most police and emergency workers

lack any training in this area, but rather that

they lack the highly specific training and

special expertise required to recognize and

deal with many of the unique threats posed by

such events. At present, many also lack the

special tools, gear, and protective equipment

that may be called for in these events. Patrol

officers, firefighters, and EMS personnel who

initially respond to an event involving WMDs

should not be expected to undertake the

specific duties and responsibilities that are

better performed by well-equipped and more

highly trained specialists. Their roles should

be to recognize the threat, minimize additional

exposure to chemical or biological agents,

ensure the safety of victims, safeguard the

scene, and report their findings to those

competent to deal with these issues. Another

primary responsibility is to minimize their

own contact with the chemical or biological

agent and to provide as much information as

possible to ensure the safety and the effec-

tiveness of other responding units. Police and

emergency workers who rush into the scene

are likely to become contaminated themselves,

and may become victims. First responders who

rush into a WMD event not only risk death or

serious injury from secondary devices that

may have been placed at or near the scene

precisely to disable rescuers, but can also

become a significant liability to other victims

as well as to other responders if they become

vectors and contaminate other rescuers. The

first responder who rushes in and becomes

HENRY AND KING


a victim may contribute to and exacerbate the

overall problem, consuming time and resour-

ces needed by other rescuers.As Gordon M. Sachs (2002) points out, re-

sponders must make some difficult decisions:

The first instinct for emergency responders at

any incident is always to rush in and save as

many people as possible; however, in a ter-

rorist-related incident, there are many factors

to consider. Can the victims be saved? Will

responders become targets? Was an agent of

some type released? If it was, will responders

have the means to detect it? Will their gear

provide adequate protection? These are but

a few of the questions that we must become

accustomed to asking when responding to

terrorist-related incidents. There is no reason

to allow civilians to suffer needlessly; neither

can there be any reason to send responders

haphazardly into unknown and dangerous

environments. (pp. vii–viii)

There are four types or levels of protective

gear used by emergency workers during

WMD events. Level A protection is a chemical-

resistant suit that entirely encapsulates the

emergency worker and includes a self-con-

tained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or an in-

dependent air supply so that the worker is not

exposed to fumes, biological agents, or other

toxic substances that may be present in the

environment. This level of protection provides

maximum respiratory and skin protection and

is typically used when the situation involves

a high potential for liquid splashes or vapor

hazards, or when the chemical agent is un-

identified. Generally speaking, this level-A

protection is used by workers who enter the

‘‘hot zone,’’ or the area closest to the WMD’s

point of dispersal.Level B protection is a chemical-resistant suit

and gloves that may not entirely encapsulate

the rescue worker but does include an SCBAor independent air supply. This type of gearprovides a high level of respiratory protectionbut less protection against liquids and gasesthat may have a topical effect upon the skin orbe absorbed through the skin. This type of gearprovides the minimum amount of protectionthat one should use in the hot zone, but it is notrecommended for prolonged exposure or usethere.

Level C protection is provided by hoodedchemical-resistant clothing with gloves andan air-purifying respirator or gas mask. It isgenerally utilized when there is minimal orno hazard posed by the potential for liquidsplashes or direct contact.

Level D protection is the type that mostpolice, fire, and EMS responders typically haveavailable to them: their uniforms and clothing.This type of protective gear provides minimalprotection from chemical, biological, or nuclearhazards and should not be worn within or nearthe hot zone.Perhaps the most important tools available to

ensure the safety of first responders, though,have nothing to do with equipment or gear.They are the concepts of time, distance, andshielding—when properly applied and used,they can be the key to the first responder’sself-preservation. In terms of time, emergencyresponders should keep the time they spend inthe vicinity of the incident to an absoluteminimum. Minimizing the time spent inproximity to a nuclear, biological, or chemicalsubstance generally reduces one’s chance ofillness or injury because it minimizes exposureto the toxic substance. If emergency workersabsolutely need to approach the scene to rescuesomeone or to inspect it more closely, theyshould not remain there a moment longer thanis necessary. They should also be aware thatif they do approach the scene, they mayinadvertently become a vector to spread thesubstance, and they should take appropriate



steps to decontaminate themselves as quickly aspossible. First responders who come in prox-imity to the scene should promptly notify theirsupervisors and medical personnel to ensurea proper decontamination; and until decontam-ination occurs, they should avoid contact withothers.Similarly, emergency workers should main-

tain a safe and appropriate distance from thehazard, and they should try to move uphillfrom the source if possible. Emergency re-sponders must also bear in mind that manysubstances can be spread by wind currents, andthey should consider the direction of the windin determining a safe distance. We should notethat there are different recommended distancesfor safety, depending upon the type andquantity of the substance involved. There arevarious charts and tables available to firstresponders to help them determine an intervalof safety between themselves and a particulartype and source of toxic substance; police, fire,and EMS workers should prepare themselvesfor the possibility of a WMD attack byobtaining these tables and consulting thembefore approaching the scene. An excellentsource—and one that every emergency re-sponder should obtain and carry in his or hergear bag—is the North American EmergencyResponse Guide. This guidebook was developedjointly by the U.S. Department of Transporta-tion, Transport Canada, and the Secretariat ofCommunications and Transportation of Mexicofor use by emergency services personnel whomay arrive first at the scene of a transportationincident involving a hazardous material. Theguide permits responders to quickly identifythe type of substance involved and to protectboth themselves and the public during theinitial response phase.First responders should also bear in mind that

these charts and tables provide general guide-lines, and that qualified experts who arrive atthe scene are likely to evaluate the situation and

adjust the distances of the ‘‘hot,’’ ‘‘warm,’’ and‘‘cold’’ zones. In their initial establishment ofthese zones, first responders should remainflexible and, if necessary, err on the side ofcaution to extend the distance. First respondersshould also bear in mind that secondary devicesor booby traps designed to injure and disablerescuers may be in the area, and they shouldproceed cautiously. The secondary device(s)might be as powerful or perhaps more so thanthe primary.Shielding refers to any object that can be

used to protect the first responder froma specific hazard and can include buildings,vehicles, and any personal protective equip-ment that may be available. The type ofshielding responders should use will bedetermined by a number of factors, includingweather, the physical environment, the geog-raphy, and the topography of the area—buildings in urban areas may, for example,provide shielding (as well as a better vantagepoint) that is not available in a rural area,where a hill or elevation may be present toperform much the same functions. Simplyrolling up the windows of a police car,turning off the air conditioner, and puttingon gloves can provide some degree of safetyand protection to police officers approachingthe scene of a potentially toxic event; andeven if an officer’s department does notfurnish personal protective gear (as it should),it may be advisable for the officer to purchasean inexpensive and lightweight Tyvek jump-suit for his/her gear bag.We repeat that the most critical concern for

first responders must be their own safety andprotection, and they must avoid the compellingurge to rush into a situation to render help. Thisrestraint or discipline can be very difficultfor the dedicated police officer, firefighter, orEMS worker, but training and common sensemust prevail. As noted above, the rescuer whobecomes a victim exacerbates and complicates

HENRY AND KING


the situation that other responders mustconfront.

The Private Sector’s Role

The problems associated with preventing,deterring, responding to, and investigatingterrorist attacks involving WMDs are enor-mously difficult and complex, as are theirsolutions. Besides developing effective first-response capabilities, wemust recognize that anactual WMD terrorist attack will have a re-sounding impact and repercussions throughoutthe local (and possibly national) economy, thehealth care system, the corporate and businesscommunities, public utilities, and governmentoperations at every level. We must alsorecognize that depending upon the type, thequality, and the extent of the WMD attack,literally hundreds of public agencies andprivate-sector entities may be called upon toparticipate in initial response, in rescue andrecovery, and in ongoing rebuilding efforts.We need look no further than the World TradeCenter attack in New York City to realize thatliterally scores of organizations became in-volved in the overall recovery effort. Whilepolice, fire, and EMS personnel handled most ofthe first-responder duties in the first minutesand hours following the attack, they were veryquickly joined at the scene by personnel froma host of other organizations.These organizations included the American

Red Cross and other relief organizations; thetelephone, gas, and electric utilities operatingin New York City; federal law enforcementagencies (the FBI; the Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco, and Firearms; the Secret Service; andthe U.S. Customs service, to name a few) andlaw enforcement from other states and juris-dictions (the New York State Police, the NewJersey State Police, and practically every localmunicipality in the region immediately dis-

patched officers to the scene); FEMA; everybranch of the United States military and theNational Guard; and a raft of others. Personnelfrom all of these organizations quickly con-

verged on the scene, and while they werewilling and mostly able to help out, the lack ofcentral direction and focus created enormous

confusion and duplication of efforts. Withoutfor a moment diminishing the commitment andbravery displayed by these individuals, the

area that became known as Ground Zeroquickly degenerated to a state of near chaos aseveryone tried to pitch in and help—in partbecause of the nature of the event itself, but also

because the City of New York lacked adequateplans for an event of this magnitude.Immediately after the attack, hospital emer-

gency rooms within a hundred-mile radius ofNew York City were mobilized and put on alert.Medical personnel were called in to hospitals

and medical facilities, and those in privatepractice showed up at hospitals to volunteer.Private ambulance services were mobilized forthe transport of casualties, and buses from the

Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA)were commandeered to bring police and otherrescuers to the scene. Corporate facilities, office

buildings, and college campuses went intoa high security mode, often deploying theirsecurity personnel to evacuate and lock downthe facilities or serving as staging points or

support centers for the rescue and recoveryefforts. The city’s transportation infrastruc-ture—theMTA, bridges and tunnels, roads and

highways—quickly became overwhelmed bythe effort to evacuate tens of thousands ofpeople from lower Manhattan.

Communications systems were overwhelmed.

Most cell-phone service throughout lower

Manhattan ended when the Twin Towers fell

and cellular repeaters were destroyed, and

a main switching station for the city’s hard-

wire telephone system flooded and interrupted



most service in the area. There had been littleor no interoperability between the police andfire radio communication systems to beginwith, and the loss of radio repeaters made radiocommunications even more difficult.In the days following the attack, help poured

in from across the nation in the form ofpersonnel, equipment, food, and medical sup-plies, and a complex logistical system of depotsand distribution points had to be establishedand implemented. The work went on 24 hoursa day for months, and workers required food,medical attention, and places to rest andrecuperate between shifts. Heavy constructionequipment, including some of the world’slargest cranes, were rushed to New York Cityto aid in the removal of debris, and thousands ofconstructionworkers from dozens of companieswere deployed to make the area safe. Therescue-and-recovery phase of operations con-tinued for several weeks in the futile hope thatadditional survivors would be located, and firesburned at the World Trade Center site for99 days. Given the fires and the smoke theyproduced, public health officials set up moni-toring equipment to test air quality throughoutthe lower Manhattan area. As bodies and bodyparts were recovered, they were removed toa medical examiner’s facility for DNA testing inhope of identifying the dead and bringingclosure to surviving family and friends. Caninerescue teams were brought in to aid in thesearch for victims, and the animals requiredextensive and specialized veterinary care.Psychologists and psychiatrists arrived to pro-vide crisis intervention and mental healththerapy for those traumatized by the event,and a special center for family and friends ofvictims was established to help them deal withtheir loss and the legal, financial, and personalconsequences.Even before the rescue-and-recovery phase

ended, the process of removing millions of tonsof debris via truck and barge to a site on Staten

Island commenced. The debris would be siftedby hand by New York Police Department(NYPD) detectives and other law enforcementofficers to locate body parts as well as anypersonal effects or crime-scene evidence thatmight be recovered, and all recovered items hadto be logged, vouchered, and forwarded tothe morgue or to temporary storage facilities.Complicating the entire operation was the factthat the World Trade Center site became theworld’s largest and most difficult crime scene,and all of the precautions ordinarily undertakento discover and preserve evidence were put inplace. Providing security for the site wasa monumental effort.The list of actions and activities that took

place in the aftermath of this horrific anddevastating attack goes on and on, and withoutbelaboring the point further, it should sufficeto say that this was the largest and mostcomplicated enterprise ever undertaken as theresult of a terroristic WMD attack. Tensof thousands of individuals, hundreds ofpublic agencies, and dozens of private-sectorentities played a role in the initial response, inthe rescue and recovery, or in the removaloperations.The recovery efforts involved in this monu-

mental undertaking were all the more remark-able for the fact that, as a practical matter, theformal response plans previously developed bypublic-safety agencies were not adequatelycommunicated to first responders. Not onlywere these plans developedwith relatively littleinput from the many private-sector entities andorganizations that ultimately became involved,but to a large extent they were developed byindividual agencies that did not generallycoordinate their plans with other agencies.The problems encountered in terms of the lackof interoperability of communications equip-ment between the police and fire departments isa kind of metaphor for the overall lack ofcoordination between and among the agencies

HENRY AND KING


involved. To some extent, breakdowns incommunications and in chain of command areto be expected in any crisis event, but it was theperception of many first responders at the sceneof the World Trade Center disaster thatcommand and control functions were entirelyabsent and that a coherent command structuredid not emerge for several days or even weeks.The chaos and uncertainty that infiltrated thefirst-responders’ working environment makesevident the need for more coherent andcomprehensive plans, as well as for far-sightedand contemporary communication of thoseplans, well in advance of an actual terroristincident.Readers can well imagine how much more

efficient and effective operations might havebeen had coordinated policies, procedures,plans, and protocols existed; had these plansaccounted for the role of the private sector; andhad they been adequately conveyed to the firstresponders at the scene. To explore or even listthe organizational lessons to be learned fromsuch an undertaking are well beyond the scopeof this article, but even this brief recitation ofsome of the problems involved should highlightthe compelling need for flexible and adaptableplanning for future WMD events and terroristacts. This planning process must rely upon andincorporate these lessons, just as it must involverepresentatives from each of the agencies andentities that might be called upon to participate.

Policies and Procedures, Protocols

and Plans

One of the most critical considerations inpreparing for potential WMD incidents iswhether the public-safety agencies and pri-vate-sector entities that are likely to be calledupon to respond to such events have developedand implemented comprehensive and realisticpolicies, procedures, and operational protocols

to deal with terrorist incidents. The importanceof developing effective policies, procedures,and operational protocols can scarcely beoverstated: First responders cannot realisticallyhope to function with full effectiveness atthe scene of a disaster, and agencies cannotrealistically expect to maximize their effective-ness and the saving of lives, unless all the actorsand agencies involved have a coordinated re-sponse plan in place. By their very nature,disasters and terrorist incidents tend to beexceptionally chaotic, confused, and disor-dered—especially during their initial stages.Without a plan or protocol in place, they candegenerate even further, putting lives andsafety at unnecessary risk as rescue workerssort out their respective roles, organize them-selves, and generally figure out what to doto begin addressing the myriad problemsinvolved. When emergency responders (as wellas the supervisors, experts, and managers whowill respond later) are made more fully aware ofthese policies, procedures, and protocols, theycan begin the task of saving lives much morequickly.As illustrated by the opening vignette of this

article, first responders who have been welltrained to recognize and analyze various typesof events and who are equipped and preparedto respond safety and effectively are the firstline of defense against terrorist acts involv-ing WMDs. The actions they take will havea tremendous impact on the overall success ofthe rescue and rebuilding efforts. Withoutdiminishing the importance of their role inany way, we must however recognize that theprocess of preparing for terrorist, WMD, andother mass casualty events begins long beforethe first responders arrive at the scene. Toensure a safe, effective, and seamless responsethat does not unnecessarily endanger lives, allthe public agencies and private entities thatmay be called upon to have a role in resolvingthe crisis must be involved in the process of



planning for the event. All must be involved inthe development of coordinated policies andprocedures to ensure that there are no conflictsand no duplication of effort once the eventtakes place, and everyone must be aware of notonly their own roles and responsibilities, butthose of other parties.The process of planning for such events is an

amazingly complex undertaking which is oftenfurther complicated by a host of organizationaland jurisdictional issues, as well as by thedifficulty of developing flexible plans that canbe adapted to meet the particular circumstancespresent in a given incident. Agencies chargedwith the responsibility for law enforcement,firefighting, and emergency medical care gen-erally have the primary role in developingcoherent and effective response protocols, butgiven the realities and requirements of anincident, a host of other public agencies andprivate entities must also be involved in theplanning process. More specifically, there isa compelling need for members of the medical/health-care community, the corporate commu-nity, and the private-security industry to beinvolved in planning for WMD events. Theprivate-security industry, in particular, playsan essential role in preventing terrorism whenit operates effectively to make so-called ‘‘softtargets’’ more resistant to attack. Terrorists,like other criminals of opportunity, are to someextent deterred when high security arrange-ments make it difficult to penetrate a potentialtarget.Wemust not ignore the fact that a criticalpart of planning must involve activities toprevent or interdict terrorist acts, and becauseeffective private-security entities play a criticalrole in this regard, they must be enlisted toassist police and public-safety agencies. Thesame need for additional training that appliesto local law enforcement also applies to theprivate-security industry.Typically, the problem is not that an agency

has no response plan in place (most public-

safety agencies, particularly in the aftermath ofSeptember 11, have developed some sort ofresponse plan), but that agencies often developtheir procedures and protocols in isolation. Anagency response plan may well account foravailable personnel and resources,may considerthe logistical needs involved in various kinds ofevents, andmay fitwell with the overall missionand function of the agency—but, developed inisolation, the plan often does not account forpotential conflicts with the procedures adoptedand followed by other agencies. The respectiveplansmay notmeshwell together, and thereforecannot achieve an effective and integratedmultiagency response.A case in point can be discerned in the re-

sponse of the police andfire departments inNewYork City during and after the September 11event. Historically, there has been a kind ofcompetition between the elite NYPDEmergencyServices Unit and the Rescue Units of the FireDepartment of New York (FDNY), and underordinary circumstances a bit of competition canbe a good thing. Both units are comprised ofspecialized personnel who perform essentiallysimilar rescue functions, and it is inevitable thatthey will compete for recognition and status. Ina fairly substantial number of well-documentedcases, though, this sense of competition—whichextended to competition over budget appropri-ations and equipment—has resulted in outrightconflict when both units have responded to thesame incident.Aside from the informal competition between

personnel from different agencies, there canalso be conflict and competition at the highestlevels, even when the agencies serve the samemunicipality, and these turf wars precludethe development of effective, efficient, andintegrated response protocols. These turf warsand the politics that go with them jeopardizepublic safety. Again, one need look no fur-ther than the NYPD and FDNY: As this articleis written, more than 20 months after the

HENRY AND KING


September 11 terrorist attack on the TwinTowers, the two agencies are still trying to ironout conflicts and establish a single, unified andpredesignated command and control structure(Rashbaum, 2002; Gardiner, 2003; Haberman,2003). Indeed, a set of studies commissioned byboth agencies and conducted by the McKinseyand Company management consulting firm asa follow-up to the September 11 attack revealeda host of organizational difficulties and short-comings that reduced the effectiveness ofthe agencies’ respective responses. Prominentamong these shortcomings were insufficienttraining of personnel in necessary skills andareas of knowledge, inadequate equipment,poor intra/interagency communication, anda lack of interoperability between the agencies’radio systems. The police and fire departmentshad set up separate command centers, forexample, which had been unable to communi-cate with each other (NYPD, 2002; FDNY,2002).The point of this is certainly not to dispar-

age the reputations of two fine agencies or todiminish the remarkable heroism displayed bytheir personnel, but to frankly acknowledgea persistent political and organizational realitythat can and does exist in other municipalitiesacross the nation and that can and doescontinue to pose a significant threat to publicsafety. The conflict, ‘‘rivalry,’’ and lack ofcommunication between the police and firedepartments of a major city is not unusual, butit is indicative of an even larger and moresignificant set of issues that affect nationalsecurity and homeland defense. The problem,stated succinctly, is that far too often thefederal, state, and local agencies responsible forensuring public safety and reducing the threatof terrorism do not share information or re-sources and have not established structuresthat would permit them to do so. The FBI, forexample, which plays a critical role in gather-ing and disseminating intelligence for home-

land defense, has been criticized for failing tocooperate or share information with state andlocal law enforcement agencies (Oates, 2001;Van Natta & Johnston, 2002; MacDonald,2001).The fact that there are few structures and

channels currently in place for law enforcementagencies to share intelligence information canbe attributed to a number of causes. First, wemust bear in mind that the American system oflaw enforcement is highly decentralized, strat-ified, and complex: There exist approximately17,784 separate and relatively autonomous stateand local law enforcement agencies in theUnited States and nearly 70 federal lawenforcement agencies, and that these employmore than 700,000 sworn officers (Hickman &Reaves, 2001; Reaves & Hart, 2001; Reaves &Hickman, 2002). These agencies range in sizefrom single-officer departments to an agencywith nearly 40,000 sworn members, and theyrun the gamut in terms of their mandates,the size and complexity of jurisdictions, and thetraining and experience of their officers. Theupshot of all this is that in the absence ofa national network for sharing crime intelli-gence, the complexity of the system and theorganizational barriers that exist between allthese agencies effectively preclude the efficientsharing of information. To date there has beenno coherent and cohesive formal system de-veloped to share information and intelligencebetween and among these agencies, and theprospect of quickly establishing such a commu-nication network is daunting.Terrorism prevention and interdiction ef-

forts begin with gathering, analyzing, anddisseminating intelligence information. Wetypically conceive of the intelligence functionas residing within the federal sphere—amongsuch agencies as the Central IntelligenceAgency, the National Security Agency, theDefense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, anda host of other semiclandestine agencies—and



in the aftermath of the September 11 attacksthese agencies have been criticized for failingto develop, analyze, and share intelligence.This failure involves not only these competingagencies, but state and local law enforcementas well (Oates, 2001). Especially in an age ofcommunity policing, state and local lawenforcement officers often have extensiverelationships and sources within the commu-nities where terrorists or terrorist sympa-thizers may reside. These relationships andsources cannot be fully exploited, nor can thepotential intelligence value of theirinformation be recognized, unless local officersare to some extent brought into the intelli-gence-gathering loop. With rare exception,though, there are no established structures orchannels in place for information to passbetween local agencies or, as importantly,across local, state, and federal jurisdictionallines. As a result, an essential resource withtremendous potential is being wasted. Stateand local law enforcement agencies andofficers could conceivably possess essentialbits of information that would help federalintelligence agencies ‘‘connect the dots’’ andidentify terrorist activities, but they simply donot recognize the value of the informationbecause they have not been briefed on thelarger intelligence picture.It is indeed unfortunate that such an in-

formation-sharing network has not been de-veloped, since these 700,000 sworn lawenforcement officers interact with literallymillions of Americans each day and observeinnumerable events and activities in the courseof their daily duties. Every interaction andevery observation is, potentially, a source ofbasic crime intelligence. Indeed, most lawenforcement officers informally gather, analyze,and disseminate crime intelligence on a dailybasis: They interactwith the community, obtaininformation, analyze that information in somerudimentary way, and in many cases pass that

information on to other officers or agencies inorder to prevent, deter, or solve conventionalcrimes. Police officers generally know what tolook for—what kind of information to gatherand how to act on it—when it comes toconventional crime: That is their business, theyknow how criminals operate and are thereforeattuned to criminal methods, and they areregularly alerted by their agencies and thecommunity to emerging crime patterns andconditions. The same cannot be said when itcomes to terrorism, however. In sharp contrastto their expertise in fighting conventionalcrime, most American police officers probablylack the training, expertise, and informationalcontext to recognize behaviors and activitiesthat may be indicative of terrorist activity(Henry, 2003).At the same time, we must bear in mind that

the same complexity and decentralization thatmakes it difficult for law enforcement agenciesto share information and intelligence is anessential safeguard for American principles ofliberty, and that there are legitimate practicaland policy concerns with creating a law en-forcement network that could be used improp-erly to deprive individuals of their civil rights.The authors do not suggest that local lawenforcement agencies unilaterally engage inovert or covert surveillance or that theyproactively investigate ‘‘suspicious’’ personsor organizations. The process of gathering,analyzing, and disseminating intelligence isa complicated business requiring particularskills, resources, and expertise that are, gener-ally speaking, beyond the current capabilitiesof most local law enforcement agencies. In orderto preserve the proper, delicate balance be-tween the pursuit of public safety and theprotection of civil liberties, intelligence activ-ities must also be subject to a superseding layerof administrative and judicial supervision. Inshort, the complexity of the intelligence pro-cess, the level of skills and expertise it involves,

HENRY AND KING


the resources it consumes, justifiable concernsfor civil liberties, and the current absence ofstructures and channels for sharing informa-tion all militate against local law enforcementagencies unilaterally engaging in extensiveintelligence operations.The point here is that the American law

enforcement community has a great deal ofunexploited potential for gathering raw terror-ist intelligence that might prove valuable toother agencies at the local, state, and federallevels. If organizational and structural barriersthat exist to restrict the flow of informationbetween agencies and across jurisdictionallayers were erased or diminished, if the turfwars and petty conflicts that emerge betweenagencies were minimized, if formalized liaisonand a communications infrastructure designedto maximize the flow of information wereestablished, and if a formal process for gather-ing, collating, analyzing, and disseminatinginformation were created, the threat of terror-ism would be greatly reduced and public safetywould be greatly enhanced. If a system orprocess designed to meet these goals werecreated in municipalities across the nation, andif each of the public-safety agencies and private-sector entities involved in preventing, deter-ring, responding to, and investigating terrorismwithin that municipality used the process tomeet, discuss, and remain current on terrorismissues and threats, the enhancements to publicsafety would be tremendous. The same processcould be used to develop integrated policies,procedures, and protocols that would helpensure the maximum effectiveness of a responseto terrorist actions involving WMDs, just as itcould be used to plan, carry out, and critiquemultiagency training exercises.Fortunately, a viable model for such a system

exists, and that model has been used veryeffectively by police agencies across the nationto maximize the effectiveness of their resourcesand reduce crime. The organizational manage-

ment model or system known as Compstat hasrevolutionized American law enforcement andachieved drastic reductions in crime since itwas first developed in the NYPD in 1994, andits principles have been applied to managea host of other law enforcement functions(Henry, 2002a). An essentially similar model,called network-centric warfare and based inpart on Compstat concepts and practices, isused by the U.S. military to prosecute wars(Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998).Heather MacDonald (2001) was the first to

suggest that the adaptation of Compstat prin-ciples could make a tremendous difference inreducing the threat of terrorism, although thetheme was subsequently taken up by others(Henry, 2002a, 2002b, 2003). After outliningmany of the intrinsic difficulties in collectingand sharing information across agency lines,MacDonald notes that major cities have jointterrorist task forces (JTTFs) that operate underthe leadership of the FBI but include state andlocal law enforcement officers.Insofar as the JTTFs are comprised of agents

from several federal agencies as well as localand state law enforcement personnel, theywould seem to be an integral part of an effectiveintelligence system, especially because locallaw enforcement officials might have bettersources of information in the communities thatcould harbor terrorists. As MacDonald pointsout, though, the FBI’s demand that intelligencecannot be disseminated to law enforcementofficials who lack a proper security clearanceoften means that the same local detectives whocollect and provide intelligence to the FBI areoften precluded from sharing the same in-formation with their own agencies. One of thedilatory tactics that federal law enforcementagencies have employed to limit the trans-mission of intelligence information to local lawenforcement executives has been to delay theirrequired security clearances. It is an ironicreality that local law enforcement officers can



be legally forbidden from sharing informationwith their own chief until the chief receivesan FBI security clearance—a process that cantake months or years. MacDonald cites this anda variety of additional sources and evidenceto make a compelling case that turf warsand federal law enforcement’s penchant forsecrecy have severely hampered terrorist in-vestigations.To address these problems, she argues for the

creation of an intelligence system similar inform, format, and structure to the NYPD’sCompstat system (MacDonald, 2001). While thescope of this article does not permit a fullexplication of the Compstat management sys-tem, the Compstat process helps facilitateaccountability and eliminate turf wars bybringing the commanders of various unitstogether and requiring them to share informa-tion with commanders of other units and withthe agency’s top executives. The Compstatprocess is based on four key principles of crimereduction, but these principles apply equallywell to other law enforcement functions aswell. The four keys to effective crime controlare:

� timely and accurate intelligence� effective tactics and strategies� rapid deployment of personnel andresources

� relentless follow-up to ensure that crimeand other problems have been eliminated.

Compstat involves regular meetings at whichpolice department executives question precinctcommanders intensely about the number,type, and distribution of crimes within theirprecincts as well as about the strategies thecommanders are employing to reduce them. Inthat respect, Compstat is a system to facilitatecommunication and the flow of critical crimeintelligence up and down the organizationalpyramid. Commanders are held highly account-

able for their own and their personnel’sactivities, as well as for the tactics and strategiesthey implement to reduce crime and the resultsthey achieve. Importantly, Compstat ensuresthat commanders of units throughout theagency are aware of what takes place in otherunits. The meetings also permit executives toidentify those commanders who are team play-ers and those who are not (Henry, 2002a,2002b). In the ten years since it was developedand implemented in 1994, Compstat has beenresponsible for a more than 65% reduction incrime in New York City.MacDonald (2001) suggests that biweekly

‘‘Fedstat’’ meetings should be convened inmajor American cities, to be chaired by the FBIspecial agent in charge, with all other relevantlaw enforcement agency heads attending. Thepurpose of these meetings would be twofold:to ensure that (1) every agency involved interrorism response is aggressively pursuing itsobligations and (2) intelligence is being sharedbetween, among, and within the agencies.Security concerns would be addressed byrequiring agency heads to obtain FBI securityclearances—a highly subjective process thatcould, at the FBI’s discretion, be easily ex-pedited. Through liaison between ‘‘Fedstat’’systems in various cities, intelligence informa-tion developed in one area could easily bepassed along to affected agencies in other citiesor regions, and local agencies could requestspecific items of intelligence information fromeach other.It has also been suggested (Henry, 2003)

that local law enforcement agencies in regionswithout JTTFs could organize their ownregularly scheduled intelligence-sharing meet-ings along Compstat lines, and that other lawenforcement and public-safety agencies withina region could participate. The composition ofspecific structures and constellations of theparticipating agencies is less important than thefact that some sort of intelligence network

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(what we might call ‘‘Terrorstat’’) is required,and that Compstat provides an effective, well-documented, and easily implemented existingmodel to create that network. An important

function of these meetings, beyond sharingintelligence and refining tactical and responseplans in light of emerging threats, would be

to identify training needs within the agenciesas well as the public sector. A practicalexample of this kind of training is the

program developed by the NYPD to trainlandlords to recognize terrorist activities andbehavior patterns with regard to the rental ofapartments and housing (Fries, 2002).

To address some of the critical lapsesidentified above—the paucity of coordinatedprocedures and response protocols, the ab-

sence of a system dedicated to the ongoingsharing of information, and the lack ofawareness of other agencies’ resources and

capabilities—a separate structure devoted tothe design, implementation, and testing ofcoordinated procedures and protocols wouldalso be established. Within this structure,

meetings would include representatives fromfederal, state, and local law enforcementagencies operating in the region, fire and

EMS agencies, the medical/health-care com-munity, private-security entities, public util-ities, and all the other organizations thatmight be involved in responding to a terrorist

event. Security concerns would be lesspressing in these meetings, since their prima-ry focus would be to bring all parties

together to ensure mutuality of purpose andcoordination of activities. Similarly, the re-sponsibilities for leadership could be rotated

among the chief executives of the public-safety agencies involved, or a single agencycould be designated to chair the meetings ona permanent basis. Once again, liaison with

other regions could be established to facilitatethe flow of information.

Conclusion

The new realities of terrorism and WMDspresented in our contemporary world demanda new set of policies, practices, and relation-ships among and between a host of entities and

institutions charged with the responsibility toensure public safety and effective homelanddefense. As illustrated by the experiences and

lessons of the September 11 attacks on theWorld Trade Center and the Pentagon, andthe attempted attack by the hijacked plane

that crashed in western Pennsylvania, police,fire, and EMS personnel face unprecedentedchallenges in the future, and similar chal-lenges confront virtually every institution in

America.In this article, we have outlined some of the

issues, problems, and threats posed by the

specter of terrorism and terroristic use ofWMDs, and we have indicated some of thepotential solutions that may help to preventthe inevitable attacks of the future as well as

to respond to and recover from those we areunable to prevent. Most importantly, weidentified the compelling need for highly

coordinated response-and-recovery planningthat integrates the resources, skills, personnel,and capabilities of a range of public-sector

agencies and private-sector organizations. Noplan can pretend to be perfect—there aresimply too many unforeseen issues and exigen-cies that arise in specific events—and planning

must therefore be flexible enough to adapt asthe need arises. This involves nothing less thana new mindset that accepts, accounts for, and

takes up the challenges posed by the realities ofour world.Recent history reveals the extent and di-

mension of the threat posed by WMDs, theiravailability to terrorists and extremist groups,and the massive casualties they can inflict onpublic-safety personnel and members of the



public. These threats are not likely to subside,and in fact may increase. There is a pressingneed for more and better training for the firstresponders to such events so that they canrecognize the indications of WMD use and canoperate safely in order to minimize deaths,injuries, and damage. Similarly, there is a press-ing need for more and better equipment to helpfirst responders achieve their goals, but hereagain we see the need for a new mindset amongemergency workers—a mindset of safety andpreparedness that infiltrates all their duties andactivities. Beyond the essential role played byfirst responders, issues of better training, betterequipment, and better coordination apply aswell to the broad array of secondary respondersand institutions that will be called upon oncethe immediate crisis has passed.

In light of the terrorist threat posed byWMDs, institutions must find the means toachieve greater coordination of efforts andresources across organizational boundaries, and

we must strengthen our nation’s law enforce-ment function to make better use of intelli-gence that can help prevent, deter, and

investigate terrorist acts. We must also achievethese goals without sacrificing the freedomsand liberties that have sustained our nation

and defined its greatness. One way to achievethese goals is through the implementation ofintelligence systems and planning mechanismsbased upon the Compstat model.In some respects this article has raised more

issues and more questions than it has answered,but the reality of our contemporary worldis one of uncertainty. The effectiveness of thesolutions developed to resolve these prob-lems, issues, and questions and to restore a validsense of safety and security among members ofthe public will depend in large measure uponthe commitment demonstrated by the police,fire, and EMS agencies that are our first lineof defense in public safety and homelandsecurity.

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