Improving-Electoral-Practices-Case-Studies-and-Practical-Approaches-PDF.pdf

7/21/2019 Improving-Electoral-Practices-Case-Studies-and-Practical-Approaches-PDF.pdf

1/240

Improving Electoral Practices:

Case Studies and Practical Approaches


2/240

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2014

International IDEA

Strmsborg, SE-103 34, Stockholm,

Sweden

Tel: +46 8 69 8 37 00

Fax: +4 6 8 20 24 22

E-mail: [email protected]

Website: www.idea.int

Community of Democracies

Permanent Secretariat

Aleje Ujazdowskie 41; 00-54 0 Warsaw, Poland

Tel: +4 8-22-3195620

Fax: +48-22-3195628

E-mail: [email protected]

Website: http://w ww.community-democracies.org/

This publication is independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication

do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council members, or those of the

Community of Democracies or the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Korea.

The electronic version of this publication is available under a Creative Commons Licence (CCl) Creative

Commons Attribute-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Licence. You are free to copy, distribute and transmit

the publication as well as to remix and adapt it provided it is only for non-commercial purposes, t hat you

appropriately attribute the publication, and that you distribute it under an identical licence. For more

information on this CCl, see: .

Graphic design by: Turbo Design, Ramallah

Cover Photo: FutUndBeidl/Flickr

Printed in Sweden

ISBN: 978-91-87729-67-6

This publications was produced with support

from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Republic of Korea


3/240

Contributors:

Paloma BiglinoKehinde Bolaji

Amor BoubakriAlberto Guevara Castro

Raul CordenilloNorm KellyFirman NoorByoung Kwon SohnSlawomir Szyszka

Editor:

Raul Cordenillo

Improving Electoral Practices:

Case Studies and Practical Approaches


4/240

4

Elections are the essential root o democracy. Tey are now almostuniversal. As Kofi Annan indicates in Deepening Democracy: A Strategy forImproving the Integrity of Election Worldwide, nowadays, electoral processesare a reality in almost all the countries o the world. Te development oan equitable, transparent and air electoral process is the oundation or thestrengthening o a healthy democracy. Given the multiplication o democraticelectoral processes around the world, however, new challenges and needs haveemerged. o meet these needs, the electoral process must be undergirded bytwo undamental standards: credibility and integrity.

In order to ensure that these two crucial elements are present and visible, othereatures, such as respect or the rule o law, political plurality, transparency,accountability and the proessionalization o electoral management bodies,among others, are necessary. Obviously though, theory is easier than practice,and, in that light, the publication Improving Electoral Practices: Case Studiesand Practical Approaches provides practical direction through eight casestudies, in accordance with three recommendations made by the Report of theGlobal Commission on Election, Democracy and Security.

Te text was developed within the ramework o the Working Group onElections o the Community o Democracies, together with InternationalIDEA, and supported by the Republic o Korea. Te Community oDemocracies is a global intergovernmental coalition o states committedto the development o democracy around the world. Its members pledge touphold the democratic values expressed in the Warsaw Declaration and tosupport them through a variety o initiatives. One o these initiatives is the

Working Group on Elections.

Te Working Group on Elections supports one of the main tenets of theCommunity of Democracies: promoting democratic rules and strengtheningdemocratic norms and institutions around the world. Te Group urges theprotection of human rights and the reinforcement of democratic institutions

Foreword


5/240

5

in order to respond to new societal challenges. Members of the Group identifynot only elections, but also the rightful exercise of power as essential elements

to strengthen democracy. Both of them are sources of democratic legitimacy.

Recognizing the imperatives o democratic elections throughout the world, theWorking Group defines its mission as encouraging democratic and electoralpractices through the promotion o international horizontal exchange andcooperation. Te Groups mandate addresses three principal areas:

1) Reinorcement o capacities o the EMB and strategic electoral stakeholders;2) Promotion o electoral accessibility and participation; and

3) Improvement o electoral processes.In order to achieve its mandate, the Group organizes capacity reinorcementprogrammes, democratic reflection orums and comparative research andpublications. All o these are instruments that promote thinking and debateon the current state o world democracy.

Te Working Group recognizes the importance of learning through theexchange of experiences. Improving Electoral Practices: Case Studies and PracticalApproaches promotes knowledge through the realities and lessons learned fromdifferent countries, and allows us to recognize the challenges and their solutionsto strengthen democratic institutions. It is a study that falls within the mandateof the Group, highlighting best practices in these areas of electoral reform.

Moreover, the three issues within this document, the proessionalization oelectoral management bodies, political financing and plural participation,are integral to an electoral process that is based on credibility and integrity.

When these items are instituted, the elections authority is strengthened byproviding transparency and legitimacy.

Tis publication is a platorm or reflection on the current state o thedemocratic system. Te lessons and experiences expressed within it showwhere new challenges have emerged and how they are overcome. It is a visionthat reveals eight particular cases, yet illustrates the reality o many others.

Finally, I want to finish with Kofi Annans reflection, I believe the timeis ripe to underscore the rule o law, democratic governance and citizenempowerment as integral elements to achieving sustainable development,

security and a durable peace. We, the Working Group, ully agree.

Manuel CarrilloCo-Chair o the Working Group on Elections

or the Community o Democracies


6/240

6

Preface

Introducing reorms to improve the conduct o democratic elections is not astraightorward process. First, we need to assess the soundness and effectivenesso existing policy. We need to determine the gaps and shortcomings, andevaluate whether policy reorms are the best way o addressing them.Furthermore, we have to consult with all relevant stakeholders, particularlywomen and marginalized groups. Te outcomes o the assessment andconsultations will indicate the direction o the reorms. Tey can also inorma plan that will guide the reorm process.

Second, and crucially, there must be political will to reorm. A dedicatedgroup o stakeholders can help ensure this by actively lobbying or reorms,engaging policymakers and civil servants, and contending with those whooppose reorms because it will impact their vested interests. Ideally, a politicalchampion who can watch over the reorm process will come orward.

Tis publication, Improving Electoral Practices: Case Studies and PracticalApproaches, ollows up on the recommendations put orward by the GlobalCommission on Elections, Democracy and Securityto promote the integrity

o elections. In particular, it shares experiences and lessons learned romeight countries that have undertaken electoral reorms to improve theproessionalism and independence o action o their electoral managementbodies, the regulation o political finance and the removal o barriers touniversal and equal participation.

Te publication presents real-lie accounts o how the recommendationsare implemented, and allows or a pragmatic perspective on reorm and itsimpact on electoral lie in the eight countries. Moreover, it highlights ideasand lessons that are relevant to policymakers and implementers, includingthose rom countries in transition that are considering these electoral reorms.


7/240

7

Made possible by the support o the Ministry o Foreign Affairs o theRepublic o Korea, this publication is the first joint project o the Community

o Democracies and International IDEA. It is our hope that this publicationwill help inorm, as well as inspire, policymakers and advocates interested insuccessul electoral reorm.

Yves LetermeSecretary-GeneralInternational IDEA

Maria LeissnerSecretary-GeneralCommunity o Democracies


8/240

8

Acknowledgements

Te production o this book would not have been possible without the kindsupport and contributions o a number o individuals, organizations andstates.

First, we would like to acknowledge the administrative oversight andcontributions o the Permanent Secretariat o the Community o Democracies,particularly Francesco Lembo, as well as the financial support provided bythe Ministry o Foreign Affairs o the Republic o Korea.

We also would like to express our gratitude to the Community o DemocraciesWorking Group on Elections, which supported the realization o this bookand validated its country cases and findings. Te Working Group is co-chaired by Mexico and the Philippines and its members include the Republico Korea, the elections management bodies o Romania, India and Mexico,International IDEA, the Open Society Foundation, the National DemocraticInstitute, the Organization or Security and Co-operation in Europes Officeor Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the InternationalFoundation or Electoral Systems.

For their insights and kind assistance, our sincere thanks also go to EleonoraMura, Annette Fath-Lihic, Vasil Vashchanka, Rumbidzai Kandawasvika-Nhundu, Nana Kalandadze, Sam Van der Staak, Sam Jones, Andrea Milla,Leena Rikkila amang, Andrew Ellis, Nadia Handal Zander, Suzannerochesset and Bridget OSullivan.


9/240

9

Abbreviations

AEC Australian Electoral CommissionAG Action Group (Party)

ALP Australian Labor Party

ATSIEEIS Aboriginal and orres Strait Islander Election Education and Inormation

Service

CABER Commissioners Advisory Board or Electoral Research

CEDAW Convention or the Elimination o All Forms o Discrimination against

Women

COFIPE Codigo Federal de Insitutionces y Procedimientos Electorales (Federal Code o

Electoral Institutions and Procedures)CPEUM Constitucin Poltica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Political Constitution

o the United Mexican States)

CPI Consumer Price Index

CSOs Civil society organizations

DGD Democratic Governance or Development

DLP Democratic Labor Party

DPD Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representatives Council)

DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Peoples Representative Council or House o

Representatives)ECANZ Electoral Council o Australia and New Zealand

ECN Electoral Commission o Nigeria

ECOWAS Economic Community o West Arican States

EMB Electoral management body

EVT Electronic voting trial

FCT Federal Capital erritory

FEDECO Federal Electoral Commission

FPTP First past the post

ICCES Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election SecurityICT Inormation and communication technology

IFE Instituto Nacional Electoral (Federal Electoral Institute)

INE Instituto Federal Electoral (National Electoral Institute)


10/240

10

INEC Independent National Electoral Commission

IPA Institute o Public Affairs

IPAC Inter-Party Advisory CommitteeISIE Instance Suprieure Indpendante pour les Elections (High Independent

Authority or Elections)

IU Izquierda Unida (United Let)

JSCEM Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters

KPU Komisi Pemilihan Umum (Election Commission)

MP Member o parliament

NASRDA National Space Research and Development Agency

NEC National Election Commission

NEO National Election OfficeNCA National Constituent Assembly

NOA National Orientation Agency

NIDD National Identity Cards Database

NSW New South Wales

NYSC National Youth Service Corps

PIANZEA Pacific Islands, Australia and New Zealand Electoral Administrators

Network

PP Partido Popular (Popular Party)

PR Proportional representationPSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol (Congress o the Spanish Socialist Workers

Party)

PDP Peoples Democratic Party

PUP Palmer United Party

RERC Registration and Election Review Committee

RCD Rassemblement constitutionnel dmocratique (Democratic Rally Party)

SBF Stean Batory Foundation

TEPJF Electoral ribunal o the Federal Judiciary

UNDP United Nations Development Programme


11/240

11

Table of contents

Foreword ................................................................................................................................ 4

Preface ...................................................................................................................................... 6

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 8

Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 9

Table of contents ............................................................................................................. 11

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 17On the integrity o elections ................................................................................................ 17Te project, case selection and case studies .................................................................... 18On reorming electoral processes ....................................................................................... 19Overview o the chapters ...................................................................................................... 20Reerences ................................................................................................................................... 22

Chapter 1: Professionalism of Electoral Management Bodies:The Australian Case ....................................................................................................... 25Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 25

Origins and roles ............................................................................................................. 26Independence o EMBs ................................................................................................. 31Parliamentary oversight o electoral administration ........................................... 33ranser o expertise ....................................................................................................... 36Marginalized groups and women .............................................................................. 38When systems ail ........................................................................................................... 40

Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 41Reerences ................................................................................................................................... 43Notes ............................................................................................................................................ 46able 1.1. Establishment o electoral commissions ...................................................... 26Figure 1.1. AEC organizational structure ....................................................................... 29

Chapter 2: Toward Institutionalizing Credible Elections in Nigeria:

A Review of Reform Measures by the Independent National

Electoral Commission .................................................................................................. 49

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 49Historical overview o elections in Nigeria ..................................................................... 51Institutional mandate and organizational design o the INEC ............................... 56Imperatives o electoral reorm ........................................................................................... 58


12/240

12

Phases and implementation mechanisms o electoral reorm ................................... 63

Review and planning phase ......................................................................................... 64

Strategic and operational focus ............................................................................. 64Institutional reforms and reorganizations .......................................................... 65Strengthening gender and communication strategies ...................................... 66Procurement reform ................................................................................................. 67

Implementation phase ................................................................................................... 67

Integrity of the voter register .................................................................................. 67Securitization of the electoral process ................................................................... 68Robust consultation with electoral stakeholders ................................................ 68

Credible and participatory constituency delimitation ..................................... 69Political representation and inclusiveness ........................................................... 69Enhanced institutional and financial autonomy for the INEC .................... 70Prosecution of electoral offenders .......................................................................... 71

Challenges conronting electoral reorm ......................................................................... 72Prospects o institutionalizing reorm .............................................................................. 73Conclusion: lessons learned rom Nigerian electoral reorm .................................... 76Reerences ................................................................................................................................... 77Notes ............................................................................................................................................ 82

Chapter 3: Political Finance: The Case of Poland...................................... 85

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 85Legal basis or transparency ................................................................................................. 86Obligations and procedures or the disclosure o political finance ......................... 89

Electoral committees ...................................................................................................... 89Political parties ................................................................................................................. 90

Electoral campaign finance regulations ........................................................................... 94Institutional supervision o electoral finance ................................................................. 98

Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 104Reerences ................................................................................................................................... 107Notes ............................................................................................................................................ 117able 3.1. Current regulations concerning the transparency o political

finance in Poland ................................................................................................ 88able 3.2. Summary o reporting obligations ............................................................... 92able 3.3. Electoral statements (200111) ...................................................................... 105able 3.4. Political parties annual statements (200112) ......................................... 106able 3.5. Political parties annual inormation on expenditures rom public

unding (200112) ............................................................................................. 106

Chapter 4: Institutional Reform to Broaden Representation in

Korea: The Cases of Minor Parties and Women ....................................... 121


13/240

13

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 121Te reorm o electoral institutions: a general overview ............................................. 122

Representation o minor parties ......................................................................................... 123History o the reorm ..................................................................................................... 123Assessment o the reorm .............................................................................................. 126

Korean political parties ............................................................................................ 126Disproportionate proportional-seat benefit ......................................................... 127Te impact .................................................................................................................. 127

Womens representation ......................................................................................................... 131

History o reorm ............................................................................................................ 131

Assessment o the reorm .............................................................................................. 133Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 135Reerences ................................................................................................................................... 136Notes ............................................................................................................................................ 138able 4.1. Comparison o the 16thand 17thNational Assembly

election results ..................................................................................................... 128able 4.2. Te 18thNational Assembly election results .............................................. 129able 4.3. Te 19thNational Assembly election results .............................................. 129able 4.4. Summary o emale representation: the 16ththrough 19th

Korean National Assembly elections ........................................................... 133able 4.5. Comparison o the 16thand 17thNational Assembly elections ............ 133

Chapter 5: Inclusiveness Policies in the Transitional Elections

in Tunisia ................................................................................................................................ 141

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 141Te new election legal ramework: toward equitable representation ...................... 143

Broad representation o political groups .................................................................. 144Te parity rule and the promotion o womens representation ........................ 147

Youth: Zouaouas soldiers ............................................................................................. 148Inclusion o marginalized regions .............................................................................. 149Te exceptional inclusion o unisians abroad ..................................................... 151

Te role o the new electoral administration in an inclusive electoral process.... 152Protecting the emerging democracy and the challenges o inclusive elections ... 155Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 156Reerences ................................................................................................................................... 157able 5.1. Representation o political groups in parliamentary elections (19562009) ......................................................................................................... 145able 5.2. Representation o political groups in the transitional elections .......... 146able 5.3. Representation o marginalized regions 200911 ................................... 151


14/240

14

Chapter 6: Electoral Reforms and Womens Representation in

Indonesia: Successes, Challenges and the Way Forward ................. 163

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 163Electoral reorms ...................................................................................................................... 164Te electoral system in the Reorm Era ........................................................................... 165More conducive regulations or womens representation ............................................ 167Increasing emale representation ........................................................................................ 168Criticisms and challenges ...................................................................................................... 170Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 172Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 174Reerences ................................................................................................................................... 175

Notes ............................................................................................................................................ 179able 6.1. Variants o general elections (1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014) ................. 166able 6.2. Elected emale candidates positions on candidate lists ......................... 168able 6.3. Number o emale MPs (19552015) ........................................................... 169able 6.4. Percentage o emale MPs (200414) .......................................................... 170able 6.5. Political parties that met the 30 per cent quota in their MP candidate list (2004 general election) .......................................................... 171

Chapter 7: Lessons Learned in Removing Barriers to Womens

Participation in the Mexican Federal Congress ........................................ 181Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 181Institutional and historical background .......................................................................... 183

Who is represented in Mexican democratic institutions, and how? .............. 183Mexicos electoral system .............................................................................................. 184

Quotas: international environment and the road to womens representationin parliament ............................................................................................................................. 185

International environment ........................................................................................... 185

First steps toward the introduction o quotas ........................................................ 186Strengthening the rule o law: the role o the Electoral ribunal ........................... 190

Judicial intervention to guarantee the implementation o quotas:reasoning and main decisions by the Electoral ribunal ................................... 190

Data analysis ............................................................................................................................. 192

Increased presence o women in the lower house: time and quotas matter.. 192

Conclusions: the road toward improving the quality o equality ............................ 193Reerences ................................................................................................................................... 194

Appendix .................................................................................................................................... 197Bivariate regression model .................................................................................................... 197rivariate regression models ................................................................................................. 198

Presence o quotas ........................................................................................................... 198


15/240

15

Size o quotas .................................................................................................................... 199

Notes ............................................................................................................................................ 200

able 7.1. International and regional instruments signed by Mexico ................... 186able 7.2. Registered candidates to the lower house by gender (1994-2000) ..... 187Figure 7.1. Percentage of women in the Mexican Federal Congress (19522012).... 184Figure 7.2. Percentage o emale candidates or the lower house nominated

by the three major political parties (19942012) .................................... 188

Chapter 8: Equal Representation in Spain:

Lessons Learned from Balanced Electoral Lists ...................................... 203

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 203

Where we were ......................................................................................................................... 204Where we are ............................................................................................................................. 205What the law says .................................................................................................................... 205How the system works ........................................................................................................... 208

Te supervision o balanced lists ................................................................................ 208Te consequences o non-compliance: the Garachico case ............................... 209Balanced lists, equality and reedom in the jurisprudenceo the Constitutional Court ........................................................................................ 211Balanced lists vs. zipper lists ........................................................................................ 213

On balanced lists ..................................................................................................................... 213

Advantages o balanced lists ........................................................................................ 214Conditions or establishing balanced lists .............................................................. 215

Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 216Requirements or implementing balanced lists: sanctions ornon-compliance ............................................................................................................... 217

Reerences ................................................................................................................................... 219Notes ............................................................................................................................................ 222

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 227

Proessionalizing EMBs ......................................................................................................... 227Regulating political finance ................................................................................................. 230Removing barriers to political participation ................................................................... 231Improving womens political participation ..................................................................... 232Electoral reorm ....................................................................................................................... 233Recommendations or countries in democratic transition ......................................... 234Notes ............................................................................................................................................ 235

About the Contributors ................................................................................................ 236

About International IDEA ............................................................................................ 238


16/240

Introduction


17/240

17

Introduction

Raul Cordenillo

Holding regular elections is an integral part o any unctioning democracy.

Elections give citizens the opportunity to participate in the political processby allowing them to identiy and select their political representatives. Teserepresentatives, in turn, consult citizens, aggregate their political preerencesand ensure that they are heard in democratic institutions and processes.

In anticipation o elections, citizensthrough various orums, includingtheir respective political partiesacquaint themselves with the candidates orelection and discuss and debate the burgeoning issues related to governance,the economy and the overall state o their country. Ater elections, citizens

hold their elected representatives accountable to ensure that their politicalinterests are heard and appropriately addressed. Failing to do so might makecitizens rethink their choice o representatives or the next elections.

On the integrity of elections

I elections lack integrity, there is no opportunity or citizens to participateand advance their interests in the political process. In such cases, officials

and election management bodies (EMBs) are also not accountable to thecitizens, and the results o elections are not transparent. Tus, citizens maylose confidence in the election process.

Te Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security (which wasestablished jointly by International IDEA and the Kofi Annan Foundation andchaired by Kofi Annan), in its September 2012 report, Deepening Democracy:

A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide, highlightedthe importance o the integrity o elections. In particular, it stressed that

elections can urther democracy, development, human rights, and security, orundermine them, and or this reason alone they should command attentionand priority. Elections that are conducted with integrity uphold human rightsand democratic principles, and are more likely to produce elected officials


18/240

18

Improving Electoral Practices: Case St udies and Practical Approaches

who represent their citizens interests. As such, democratic governments servetheir strategic interests by supporting elections with integrity.

Te report identified five major challenges to conducting elections withintegrity: (1) the implementation o the rule o law and electoral justice; (2)the proessionalism and independence o EMB actions; (3) the establishmento institutions and norms o multiparty competition; (4) the removal obarriers to universal and equal participation; and (5) the regulation o politicalfinance. Te report then made recommendations to match these challengesand encourages governments, international organizations and various othersectors to implement them.

The project, case selection and case studies

Te Community o Democracies Working Group on Elections, the PermanentSecretariat o the Community o Democracies and International IDEA, withthe support o the Republic o Korea, undertook a project to look closelyat the Global Commissions recommendations, particularly the creation oproessional and competent EMBs with ull independence o action; oversightover political finance; and the removal barriers to the participation o women,youth and traditionally marginalized groups. Te objective was to look atpractical approaches to their implementation, as well as to identiy goodpractices and lessons learned that could benefit democracies in transition.

Case studies were commissioned on eight countries, which comprise thechapters o this book. Tese include Australia, Indonesia, the Republic oKorea, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Spain and unisia. Tey were selected toinclude participating states o the Community o Democracies rom allcontinents and at different levels o political and economic development.ogether, they represent different models o democracy, orms o governmentand electoral systems. While the eight countries do not necessarily constitutea representative sample o all democracies worldwide, they possess experiencesthat are relevant to the project.

Written by local contributors, each chapter highlights one o the three GlobalCommission recommendations that are the ocus o the project. Te choiceo ocus was proposed by the contributors themselves, and was based on therelevance o the recommendation to that country. For example, the chapters

on Australia and Nigeria ocus on the creation o proessional and competentEMBs with ull independence o action, while the chapter on Poland ocuseson oversight over political finance. Te chapters on the Republic o Korea andunisia ocus broadly on removing barriers to political participation, and the


19/240

19

Introduction

chapters on Indonesia, Mexico and Spain ocus on removing barriers to theparticipation o women.

Each chapter presents the countrys constitutional and legal ramework, aswell as current practices in the conduct and management o elections. It thenidentifies the electoral reorm processes that were aimed at implementing therelevant Global Commission recommendation and highlights achievements,challenges and lessons learned by that country.

Te chapters conclude with a set o recommendations that could helpelectoral authorities and electoral stakeholders initiate locally owned and

inclusive processes leading to change and improvement in electoral processes,particularly or countries in transition. In so doing, this book, and the projectas a whole, ulfils the objectives o the Community o Democracies WorkingGroup on Elections and the mandate o International IDEA.

On reforming electoral processes

Since this book tackles electoral systems and their reorm, it is importantto highlight their key characteristics. According to Electoral System Design:Te New International IDEA Handbook, the choice o electoral system isone o the most important institutional decisions o any democracy. Whileelectoral systems have a significant impact on the political lie o the countryconcerned, it is only recently that there has been a conscious effort to select anddesign such systems. raditionally, they have been the result o circumstance,colonial experience or even the influence o neighbouring countries.

Moreover, electoral systems, once chosen, oten remain airly constant aspolitical interests solidiy around them and respond to the incentives presented

by them. As such, reorm o electoral systems is not an easy venture. It is otenpiecemeal, requiring political will, time, resources, national advocates and,at times, even external developments that impact the country. Te interplayamong these actors could vary rom country to country.

In recognition o these challenges to electoral reorm, the chapters in this bookhighlight the reorm processes that have been taking place in each country.

As such, they allow or a clear and pragmatic presentation o how reormsaimed at the proessionalization o EMBs, the regulation o finance or the

removal o barriers to inclusive political participation have been undertakenin these countries.


20/240

20


Overview of the chapters

Chapter 1, Proessionalism o Electoral Management Bodies: Te AustralianCase, presents the experience o a proessional electoral administrationoperating in a long-established, well-resourced democracy. In particular,it highlights the strengths o the Australian system, which include a non-partisan, proessional, public-sector work ethic, career-path opportunitiesor officials and a relatively substantial budget. It also discusses areas orimprovement, which relate to the lack o oversight over key aspects o thebudget and limits on the independence and oversight o the EMB. It concludeswith lessons that may be relevant to countries in transition.

Chapter 2, oward Institutionalizing Credible Elections in Nigeria:A Review o Reorm Measures by the Independent National ElectoralCommission, ocuses on the ongoing reorms since the 2007 elections inNigeria. It presents the political context o election administration in thecountry and its institutional mandate and organization. It then discusseswhy electoral reorm was necessary and how this was undertaken, includingits core elements. Tis is ollowed by a discussion o the challenges acedand how these were addressed and could be managed better. Te important

lessons learned in the Nigerian electoral reorm process are outlined in theconcluding section.

Polands experience o shaping and applying political finance regulations isdiscussed in Chapter 3, Political Finance: Te Case o Poland. It ocuseson our areas o this rather broad topic, including the evolution o the legalbasis or the transparency o political financing in Poland, the obligations andprocedures or disclosure or both political parties and electoral committees,provisions o the Election Code that regulate electoral campaigns and

institutional supervision by the National Election Commission. Te chapterdescribes the reorm process undertaken in Poland to regulate political financeand highlights lessons that may be relevant to other countries, includingthose in transition.

Chapter 4, Institutional Reform to Broaden Representation in Korea: Te Casesof Minor Parties and Women, explains how political reformthrough a seriesof amendments to the National Party Law and the National Election Lawwascrucial for Koreas democratic consolidation, increasing the representation of

minor parties and women. Te chapter uses election data to assess the impactof institutional changes as a result of the above-mentioned reforms. It concludesthat while the reforms were successful, further measures could be considered tomake representation in the Republic of Korea even more inclusive.


21/240

21

Te experience o unisia, particularly during the transitional electionsheld on 23 October 2011, is presented in Chapter 5, Inclusiveness Policies

in the ransitional Elections in unisia. Te chapter examines the policieso inclusiveness carried out in the ramework o the democratic transitionprocess in unisia and evaluates their contribution to the inclusion oindividuals and groups that had been victims o deliberate political exclusionunder the old regime. Te lessons that can be learned rom the experienceo unisias transitional elections could help increase inclusiveness in post-transition electoral processes elsewhere as well.

Chapter 6, Electoral Reorms and Female Representation in Indonesia:

Successes, Challenges and the Way Forward, discusses the improvementin emale representation in the Indonesian Parliament as a result o recentreorms in the electoral system, in particular the use o open candidate listsand the zipper system. It also highlights gaps in policy that could be consideredto urther improve the system and suggests policy recommendations orpolicymakers in Indonesia and beyond.

Chapter 7, Lessons Learned in Removing Barriers to Womens Participationin the Mexican Federal Congress, describes almost two decades o legal

efforts to dismantle obstacles to womens participation in democraticprocesses and, more specifically, to improve the descriptive and substantiverepresentation o women in Congress at the national level in Mexico. Inparticular, it highlights the use o gender quotas and the role o the Electoralribunal o the ederal judiciary, which have both contributed to reinorcinglegal certainty and strengthening the rule o law. It concludes with lessonslearned rom the reorm process that may be useul or improving electoralprocesses elsewhere.

Te Spanish experience with regard to ostering equal opportunities ormen and women is presented in Chapter 8, Equal Representation in Spain:Lessons Learned rom Balanced Electoral Lists. In particular, it highlightsthe reorm process ollowing the introduction o Law 3/2007 on EffectiveEquality between Women and Men and the impact o balanced electoral listson the electoral system as a whole. It highlights the role played by electoralcommissions, courts o law and the Constitutional Court as principalcustodians o equal representation. Te chapter concludes with lessonslearned that can be helpul as a guide or electoral reorms aimed at ostering

womens equal representation.Te countries covered by the eight chapters tackle issues that stem romdifferent contexts. As such, the ways o addressing them vary considerably.

Introduction


22/240

22


Yet there are also commonalities among them, particularly in terms ochallenges to electoral reorm and how to address them. Tese differences and

commonalities, as well as the findings and recommendations o the chapters,are summarized in the conclusion o this book.

References

Reynolds, Andrew et al., Electoral System Design: Te New InternationalIDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2008)

Te Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, DeepeningDemocracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide(Stockholm and Geneva: International IDEA and Kofi AnnanFoundation, 2012)


23/240


24/240

Professionalism of Electoral

Management Bodies: TheAustralian Case

Chapter 1


25/240


26/240

26


o indigenous and womens representation in Australia. Ten, the chapterconsiders the implications o an election ailure, as it occurred in 2013 in

Western Australia. It concludes with a summary o Australias successes andlessons learned, and how they are relevant to countries in transition.

Origins and roles

Te origins o Australias proessionalized electoral administration lie in pre-ederation colonial society, when electoral administration was primarily theresponsibility o public servants working in existing government departments.

When the ederation was established in 1901, legislative responsibilities weresplit between the national (ederal) parliament and state legislatures;1 thepowers o each, including the jurisdictions responsible or conducting elections,were defined in the constitution. Electoral administrations continued to bepart o the public service, but, over time, they achieved greater independencerom government by establishing statutory offices; however, these remainedsubject to ministerial direction. At the national level, the Australian ElectoralCommission (AEC) was established by the Commonwealth ElectoralLegislation Amendment Act o 1983.2Although the AEC is regarded as anindependent EMB, the government has retained control over budgetary and

legislative matters (Hughes 2001).At Australias sub-national state and territory levels, each jurisdiction hasexperienced a similar evolution in electoral administration and governmentalinfluence: all states and mainland territories established electoral commissionsrom 1987 through 2009 (see able 1.1). Australia has three tiers o government(national, state and territory, local), and local government elections aretypically administered by (or with the assistance o) the relevant state orterritory commission. In 2008, there were more than 550 local governmentbodies across Australia (Sawer, Abjorensen and Larkin 2009: 262).

Table 1.1. Establishment of electoral commissions

Jurisdiction Electoral management body Date established

National

Commonwealth Australian Electoral Commission 1984

States

New South Wales New South Wales Electoral Commission 2006

Victoria Victorian Electoral Commission 1995


27/240

27

Professionalism of Electoral Management Bodies: The Australian Case

Queensland Electoral Commission of Queensland 1992

Western Australia Western Australian Electoral Commission 1987South Australia Electoral Commission of South Australia 2009

Tasmania Tasmanian Electoral Commission 2005

Territories

Australian Capital

Territory

Australian Capital Territory Electoral

Commission

1992

Northern Territory Northern Territory Electoral Commission 2004

Source: Author

Te AEC is headed by three commissioners: a ull-time chie executive, asenior judge as the part-time chairman and a part-time commissioner, whousually has statistical skills (currently the Australian statistician) due to theimportance o boundary redistributions. Commissioners are appointed bythe governor-general on the recommendation o the government o the day.

Te government is not required to consult with opposition parties or to vetpotential appointees through an independent mechanism. Although there isthe potential or partisan appointments to be made, which would diminishthe organizations independence, to date this has not been done. Te chieexecutive commissioners appointed since 1983 have been officials with astrong background in electoral administration or public-sector managementroles.

At the sub-national level, wider consultation is sometimes required beore

appointing an electoral commissioner, to strengthen the likelihood andperception o non-partisan appointments. For example, Queensland andSouth Australia require consultation with a parliamentary committee priorto the ratification o an appointment. Te South Australian legislation alsorequires a resolution rom both houses o parliament beore the governor canappoint the electoral commissioner. Most Australian jurisdictions prohibitappointments o people with political affiliations; however, i a governmenttried to make a political appointment, it would likely be a person whosepartisan allegiance was less well known or obvious. Although there may

occasionally be private concerns that a particular commissioner supports onepolitical party over another, these concerns have rarely been supported withsolid evidence.


28/240

28


Te independence o electoral commissioners has not been a significant issuein Australia, but other actors, in addition to the appointment process, that

can affect commissioners independence include the length and securityo their tenure. I a commissioner lacks long-term security, then his or heractions may be (or perceived to be) related to a desire or reappointment.

When the timing o a potential reappointment coincides with an election, thismay also have an impact, regardless o the length o appointment. It can beexpected that the longer the length o an appointment, the more confidencea commissioner will have to act independently. However, other issues, suchas being innovative and having the ability to replace an underperormingcommissioner, also need to be considered.

AEC commissioners are appointed or up to seven years. Te up to provisiongives governments some flexibility to determine the length o an appointment,and, in reality, AEC commissioners are typically appointed or five years,which is consistent with government policy on senior appointments. Shorter-term appointments could be associated with weaker independence, especiallyi the commissioner is seeking reappointment. In sub-national jurisdictions,the length o tenure ranges rom up to five years or the Australian Capitalerritory (AC) and Northern erritory through to appointments to the age

o 65 or South Australian commissioners (Kelly 2012: 41). All jurisdictionsprescribe the circumstances under which a commissioner may be dismissed,such as bankruptcy and mental or physical incapacity, and all jurisdictionsexcept or the national and Queensland commissions require a parliamentaryresolution in order or a dismissal to take effect.

Te AEC has a permanent staff o around 850 to service an electoralpopulation o almost 15 million people (AEC 2013: 106). It has a nationaloffice, seven regional offices and divisional offices to service each o the 150

House o Representatives electorates. Australia is possibly the only countryin which a permanent, ull-time divisional returning officer is appointed orevery lower-house electorate. Additional casual staff are employed duringelection periods. wo-thirds o the AECs staff are women, and while womenare ar more numerous at the lower administrative levels, the executive levelscurrently have an equal gender balance (AEC 2013: 1036). However, allcommissioners, including those currently in position, have been male.


29/240

29

Figure 1.1. AEC organizational structure3

Source:.

In between conducting ederal elections, which are due every three years,the AECs work includes management o the electoral roll (enrolling newelectors and updating the details o existing electors), community education,legislative review and staff training or election events. Te AEC also conducts

industrial elections (such as trade union elections) on a ee-or-service basis,and AEC staff provide assistance in overseas elections as part o Australias aidprogramme. Te AEC also provides administrative and technical support orelectoral-boundary redistributions, which are conducted according to part IVo the Commonwealth Electoral Act o 1918 by committees made up o AECand state officials. Redistributions are conducted on a state-by-state basis, andthe timing is specified by section 59 o the act.

Te AEC is also responsible or maintaining the register o politicalparties, according to part XI o the act. Tis work includes processing newapplications and reviewing whether parties remain eligible or registration.For the 2013 election, 54 parties were registered, including 22 that wereregistered in the nine months beore the election. Tis can create a heavy


Electoral Commissioner

Deputy Electoral Commissioner

First Assistant CommissionerFirst AssistantCommissioner

State/Territory OfficesState/Territory No divisions

NSW 48

Australian Capital Territor y* 2

Victoria 37

Queensland 30

Western Australia 15

South Australia 11

Tasmania 5

Northern Territory 2

Australian Electoral CommissionOrganization Chart27 February, 2014

The ACT has two divisions that are managedby the NSW State Manager. During electionperiods, an AEO for the ACT is appointed

BusinessSupport

Finance &BusinessServicesBranch

Legal,Parliamentary& Procurement

Branch

Funding anddisclosure

Branch

ElectionsBranch

RollManagement

Branch

StrategicCapability

Branch

InformationTechnology

Branch

PeopleServicesBranch

Education &Communications

Branch

IndustrialElections

(national oversight)

Free-For-ServiceElections

(national oversight)

Governance

FinancialManagement

Property,Workplace

Services andSecurity

Legal Services

CommercialLaw and

Procurement

Registration andDisclosure

Compliance

Election Policyand Procedures

Election ServiceDelivery

Voter ServicesDelivery

National RollProgrammeDesign and

Analysis

Systems Designand Support

National RollProgramme

Delivery

Election andExternal

Communication

Enrolmentand Internal

Communication

Education andCommunityEngagement

IndigenousElectoral

ParticipationProgram

StrategicResearch and

Analysis

Electoral Policyand Reform

PortfolioManagement

Office

InternationalServices

ICT InfrastructureManagement

Enterprise and ITGovernance

IT Solutions

IT StrategicOutcomes

RecruitmentLearning andWorkforcePlanning

Elections and HTSystems

EmployeeServices

Chief FinanceOfficer

Chief LegalOfficer

AssistantCommissioner

ProgrammeManager




ProgrammeManager


A/g AssistantCommissioner



30/240

30


administrative load on the commission to veriy that submitted membershipnames are eligible to meet the minimum 500-member threshold to register.

Tere is also an appeals process through which people can lodge objectionsto the registration (or example, on the grounds that the party name couldbe conused with that o another party). Te AEC is responsible or decidingwhether an application to register a party should be allowed. I it is rejected,the party can appeal the decision to the Administrative Appeals ribunal, aseparate agency that independently reviews decisions made under the powero national legislation.4

Te AEC is also responsible or administering party and candidate unding

and disclosure schemes and conducting compliance reviews. By internationalstandards, Australias political finance laws are relatively weak. Disclosurereturns are required rom political parties, donors and associated entities, butmay be submitted more than a year ater an election, thus negating theirvalue in identiying sources o influence in elections. Political parties andcandidates have ew limitations on who they can accept money rom, andthere are no limits on how much can be raised rom private donations or spenton election campaigns. Te threshold or disclosing donations is also quitehighit was raised rom $1,500 to $10,000 in 2006 (and is now $12,400,

due to mandatory Consumer Price Index (CPI) increases)which exemptsmany donations rom disclosure.5

A public unding system based on an amount per vote has been in placesince 1983. Candidates and parties that achieve a minimum o 4 per cent othe vote receive a specified amount or each vote received. At its inception,the average amount received was $0.45 per vote,6 which has steadily risento $2.53 per vote with CPI increases. Tis equates to more than $5.00 pervote or each election i a voter supports the same party or both houses.

Unlike many countries, where public unding is used to replace, minimize orrestrict the influence o private donations, the Australian system allows publicunding in addition to private donations.

One o the significant benefits o the provision o public unding in Australiais that its introduction has been accompanied by financial reporting anddisclosure regimes. Parties and donors are required to lodge annual returns,while candidates must lodge election disclosure returns. Tese are publishedon the AEC website,7which provides a database o disclosures since 1998.

Candidate returns contain details o donations received and campaignexpenditures, which are categorized by type (e.g. electronic and newspaperadvertising, printing, mailing and opinion polling). Party returns list donorsand totals or receipts, expenditures and debts. Donors returns are used to


31/240

31

match inormation provided by parties and candidates in order to maximizethe possibility o identiying any non-disclosures (by the party, candidate or

donor).

All electoral commissions at the Australian sub-national level have similarresponsibilities and structures as the AEC. One exception is New South Wales(NSW), where the NSW Election Funding Authority administers partyregistration, public unding and financial disclosure. Although the authorityis legally separate rom the NSW Electoral Commission, this separation islargely symbolic, as the NSW electoral commissioner is also the authoritychair, and the commission provides staffing and support to the authority.

Te significant difference is that the other two members o the authority arenominated by the government and opposition, which makes it the only EMBin Australia with partisan-based appointments. Tis creates a perception opolitical bias, and can jeopardize the perceived independence o the electoralcommissioners. Tis is particularly important, as the authority has the powerto initiate legal proceedings against candidates who do not comply with therequirements o the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act o1981. Tis creates a clear conflict o interest, as the two nominated membersare in a position to decide whether legal action should be commenced against

their own party colleagues. Although having an independent chair holdingthe deciding vote may prevent blatantly partisan decisions that avour oneparty over the other, it does not prevent the two partisan appointees romcolluding against other parties and candidates (Kelly 2012: 101).

Independence of EMBs

It is widely accepted that, in order to ensure ree and air elections, EMBsshould be impartial and independent, both o the government o the dayand o any political partisan connections (see Dacey 2005; Wall et al. 2006;

ACE 2007). Tere are different strategies to achieve this independence.In some countries, such as in the strongly two-party US system, partisanbalance is achieved by providing political appointments to EMBs rom theDemocratic and Republican parties. In other countries, responsibility orelectoral management can be delegated to a non-partisan body. In bothcases, structures o mutual constraint are established to achieve a neutralbureaucracy (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002). While Australia has a US-style two-party system, it addresses this neutrality problem by delegatingresponsibility or the administrative aspects o electoral administration to anon-partisan body that has achieved a degree o bipartisanship. Te governingparty maintains control over electoral legislation, which heavily prescribeshow elections are conducted.



32/240

32


International IDEA classifies the Australian system as an example o theIndependent model o electoral administration. However, there are three

important criteria or independence that the AEC does not meet: powers,formal accountability and budgetary control. In these three respects, the AECconorms more to IDEAs Government or Mixed models. With regard tothe power criterion, the AEC does not have the authority to independentlydevelop its regulatory ramework. Tis power resides with the parliament andgovernment o the day, which, critically, limits the AECs ability to operateindependently. While it can easily be argued that a democratically electedparliament should be allowed to legislate or its EMBs, the partisan influenceand level o detail in the Australian legislation appears excessive.

One example o the extent to which legislation, driven by partisan objectives,dictates electoral administration can be seen in the ten pages o detail in section90B o the Commonwealth Electoral Act o 1918. Tis section requires the

AEC to provide electoral-roll inormation to political parties or campaigningpurposes, to the exclusion o other electoral competitors. Such privilegedaccess to electoral inormation would not be possible in a truly independentsystem. Another example o partisan influence is legislation passed in 2004to amend section 48 o the act, in relation to the boundary-redistribution

processes. Te amendment was developed by the coalition government andLabor opposition to require the AEC to ignore previously established rules orboundary redistributions or Northern erritory seats. Tis example o partycartel behaviour had a clear partisan impact on representation.8

For the second criterion, the AECs ormal accountability mechanism, andthat o most sub-national commissions, requires it to report directly to theresponsible government minister prior to reports being tabled in parliament.Tis is contrary to reporting directly to parliament, which is a condition o

International IDEAs Independent model. By reporting to government in thefirst instance, political parties in government have the advantage o earlieraccess to inormation on sensitive issues, which allows the government toprepare its response prior to the public release o inormation. Conversely,reporting directly to parliament provides a transparent process that isaccessible to all political stakeholders at the same time. Importantly, it createsa stronger perception that the EMB is dealing with all political actors equally.

Te third criterion, whereby the AEC does not fit the Independent model,

is the budgetary process. Te AEC is reliant on the government o the dayor its budget, and occasionally the government will use this orm o controlto limit or direct the perormance o a commission. One example o thisoccurred in 1996, when the coalition government withdrew unding or


33/240

33

an electoral education programme or indigenous voters. Te Aboriginaland orres Strait Islander Election Education and Inormation Service

(ASIEEIS) programme was centred in electorates with large populationso indigenous citizens, a demographic with traditionally low levels o voterenrolment and turnout. ASIEEIS had operated or almost 20 years, andwas considered instrumental in improving enrolment and turnout rates. Teabolition o the programme was seen to advantage right-o-centre coalitionparties, as indigenous people are seen to be predominantly let-o-centrevoters. Importantly, it prevented the AEC rom being able to independentlydecide on where its education programmes would be best targeted (Kelly2012). In 2009, the Labor Government used its budgetary powers to orce

the closure o two AEC electoral education centres (Kelly 2011). Althoughthis action did not have the same partisan implications as the ASIEEIS cut,it is a similar example o limiting the AECs control over its own budget.

Parliamentary oversight of electoral administration

In a healthy democracy, there will most oten be tension between theindependent operation o a air electoral system and political players whowant to maximize their results within the system. It can be argued that

there should be ongoing tension between the electoral system and politicalparties, where each is attempting to exert dominance, or at least influence,over the other.9o prevent political parties rom dominating the electoralsystem through the actions o their parliamentary representatives, ideallyan independent watchdog will oversee the actions and perormance o boththe administrator o the systemin this case, the AECand the politicalparticipants in elections.

Australia does not have such an independent body. Te primary vehicleor oversight over the AECs activities is the Joint Standing Committee onElectoral Matters (JSCEM), which was established in 1983.10Tis committeeconducts an inquiry into the conduct o each general election, as well asinquiries into other electoral matters, such as public unding, voting systemsand boundary redistributions. Inquiries invite public submissions, hold publichearings and then report to parliament with recommendations. Over thepast 30 years, the JSCEM has been effective in raising the profile o electoraladministration issues and encouraging public debate on these matters.

However, parliaments and parliamentary committees are made up o electionwinnersmembers and senatorswho are the beneficiaries o the existingelectoral system and thus have a vested interest in maintaining it or evenchanging it to give them an even greater advantage. Most Australian voters



34/240

34


support a political party rather than individual candidates. MPs loyalty totheir party is very strong, as they rely on their party affiliation to be elected.

o reciprocate, the party expects elected representatives to act in its interests.Tereore, parliamentary activity, and the work o the JSCEM, requires closescrutiny to determine whether MPs actions are based on principles o electoralairness or on the MPs own sel-interest and partisan considerations. JSCEMrecommendations have oten been made or political advantage rather thanelectoral best practice.

JSCEM committee members are appointed by their respective parties, soit should be no surprise that they act in their partys interest. As a result,

because the committees activities relate so closely to the uture success othe parties, the JSCEM can be the most partisan parliamentary committee.Te governing party is permitted a majority on the JSCEM, ollowed byrepresentation rom the opposition party, and typically one or two membersrepresenting other parties. By reflecting the make-up o the parliaments, thecommittee can be perceived as simply reinorcing the status quo. In so doing,it creates a significant incumbency advantage, primarily or the incumbentgovernment over the opposition and minor parties, but also or parties withparliamentary representation over non-parliamentary parties.

Te provisions or postal voting provide a good example o partisan interestsoverriding independent electoral administration over the past couple odecades. Te use o postal voting, where voters receive their ballot papers inthe mail and then post them back to the AEC, has steadily increased duringthis periodrom 2.8 per cent o all voters in the 1993 election to 8.3 percent in 2013. Te circumstances or when postal voting can be used have alsoexpanded, and now include when a voter is outside their electorate on pollingday; when a voters residence is not within 8 kilometres o a polling booth;

illness, infirmity or approaching maternity; religious belies precludingattendance at a polling booth; when a voter is in prison; and work conditionsthat prevent attendance.

As a result o several amendments to the act since the 1980s, political partiesare able to actively encourage electors to lodge postal votes. Parties can mailapplications or a postal vote to electors, accompanied by party campaignmaterial. Te major parties also encourage intending voters to return theirapplications to the party rather than directly to the AEC. Beore orwarding

the applications to the AEC, the parties enter details rom the applications intotheir databases, including inormation such as voters names and addresses,to be used or campaigning purposes (or example, sending urther campaignmaterial to coincide with the expected arrival o the ballot papers).


35/240

35

Tis growth in postal voting raises several questions regarding the integrityo elections, or example: are saeguards in place to ensure that postal voting

is conducted without coercion or undue influence, can election officials beconfident that a postal vote has been cast by the person stated on the electoralroll, and does the involvement o political parties in the distribution andcollection o postal-voting application orms corrupt the process? Te AEChas consistently made submissions to the JSCEM, criticizing this practice aspoliticizing the independent administration o elections. Te AECs concernsinclude:

the potential or voter conusion (thinking that the parties are responsible

or postal voting rather than the AEC); the intention to disenranchise voters (by delays in returning ballots to theAEC);

the unnecessary use o postal voting increases costs and delays thefinalization o results;

political parties stockpile applications beore sending them to the AEC,despite this being an offence under section 197 o the act;

the secrecy and integrity o the ballot may be compromised; parties attempting to obscure the act that the application is returned to a

party by using terms such as returning officer; and party officials correcting details on applications beore sending them tothe AEC (Kelly 2012).

Despite these criticisms, the JSCEM and successive governments have chosennot to recommend ending this practice. AEC concerns in recent submissionshave concentrated on the administrative delays in processing applicationsrather than the inherently partisan distribution o application orms.

Although committee inquiries may be influenced by partisan interests, theJSCEM has acilitated a worthwhile relationship between the legislators andadministrators o the electoral system. It conducts private briefings or the

AEC twice a year, in which many politically non-contentious issues canbe resolved. Te AEC can raise administrative issues with the committeethat may be resolved through minor amendments to legislation. Given thelevel o detail contained in the act, it is important that amendments can bereadily made when required, and the JSCEM hearings process has become aneffective mechanism to achieve this.

At the sub-national level, the most populous statesNew South Wales,Victoria and Queenslandhave replicated the JSCEM model. Smaller statesreer electoral administration issues to existing legislative or justice-type



36/240

36


committees on an issue-by-issue basis. At both the national and state levels,these committee inquiries have given community and other representative

organizations a voice and a orum to discuss the needs o their members.

A good example o a committee inquiry process leading to positive reormis the introduction o an electronic voting trial (EV) or blind and vision-impaired voters in the 2007 national election. Te trial was implementedater the introduction o similar technology in earlier AC territory elections,and submissions made to the 2004 national election inquiry rom at least ourorganizations representing the interests o blind and vision-impaired citizens.Te primary motivation or introducing the EV was to allow all voters to

vote in secret instead o having to tell an assistant how they wanted to vote.

Te EV proved quite costly, since it was only used by 850 voters at29 locations. Rather than persisting with the EV or uture elections, the

JSCEM recommended that it be replaced by a telephone-based system, whichwas used or the 2010 and 2013 elections (JSCEM 2009: 13). Althoughthe EV was deemed a ailure, the JSCEM process provided a mechanismor groups representing the disabled to lobby or changes to assist theirconstituents. Because o the regularity o election inquiries, the acilitation o

opportunities or blind and vision-impaired citizens to vote in secret remainsan issue that the AEC and JSCEM will continue to address and work onimproving. For example, the JSCEMs report on the 2010 election dedicatedsix pages to the issue (JSCEM 2011: 6772), whereas it was not mentioned adecade earlier in the reports on the 1998 and 2001 elections.

Transfer of expertise

In a democracy, it is desirable to have adequate proessional electoraladministration expertise. In Australias ederal systemwhich has onenational, six state and two territorial parliamentsthere are nine separateelectoral commissions, each with permanent, ull-time administrations. Withthe addition o local-level government elections, it can sometimes appear thatthere is always an election being held somewhere in Australia. Tus, AEC staffhave regular opportunities to assist in the conduct o sub-national elections.Likewise, state administrators play a role in national and local elections,as well as each others sub-national elections. For example, commissionsprovide pre-polling acilities or out-o-state voters, specialist staff, and shareinormation and resources. Tere are strong collegial relationships betweenelectoral administrations, and innovations in the management o electoralsystems are regularly disseminated between the jurisdictionsor example,developments in electronic voting and the management o electoral-rollinormation.


37/240

37

In addition to conducting industrial elections and the occasional reerendum,the ederal nature o Australias democracy provides a proessional career path

or electoral administrators and opportunities to transer to (and be promotedbetween) state and national administrations. For example, o the nine chieexecutive commissioners in Australia in 2011, seven had previously heldsenior positions in another Australian electoral administration (Kelly 2012).Tis transer o expertise and experience flows through the organizations,and encourages innovation and best practice. When an election is held,commissioners rom the various jurisdictions meet to observe the conduct othe election, giving them practical, actual experience and an understandingo each others election environment and issues to address. Using the earlier

issue o providing opportunities or blind and vision-impaired electors tovote in secret, EVs have been held in recent years in ederal, AC, NSWand Victorian elections. Tis has enabled the testing o different systems, theresults o which have been disseminated among, and analysed by, the variouscommissions.

As all Australian jurisdictions operate on either a three- or our-year electoralcycle, on average, two or three elections are held in the country each year(plus local government elections). Tereore, administrators can observe trials

regularly between their own elections. Tis encourages healthy competitionbetween jurisdictions, with commissioners and administrators wanting toexhibit best-practice conduct to their colleagues. Te Electoral Council o

Australia and New Zealand (ECANZ)11which consists o the chie electoraladministrator o each o the nine Australian jurisdictions and New Zealandschie electoral officerwas established to provide cross-jurisdictionalsupport: cooperation and coordination between electoral authorities is oneo its key goals. Tere is a research element to ECANZs work, but the AECalso recently established its own research body, the Commissioners Advisory

Board or Electoral Research (CABER),12

which is made up o academics andother electoral experts. CABERs role is to provide independent expert adviceto the AEC on strategic research directions.

An important area o cross-jurisdictional cooperation in Australia hasbeen the management o the various jurisdictions electoral rolls. Te

AEC manages and maintains the rolls on behal o the state and territorycommissions, and citizens only need to enrol once or both national and stateor territory elections, which avoids some conusion. However, quite oten

the states and territories will have different enrolment requirements than thenational regime, so a citizen may enrol or one jurisdiction but not the other.Tis is particularly the case with some jurisdictions (such as nationally andor NSW) that are moving to direct enrolment and updating, where data on



38/240

38


citizens held by the government, such as drivers licence inormation, is usedto automatically enrol people, without the need to fill out an application.

Unortunately, this type o data cannot be used in all jurisdictions.

Te transer o expertise also has an international perspective: the AEC hasa legislated responsibility to provide international electoral assistance whererequested when it is approved by the Australian Government. For example,in 20123 assistance was provided to Bhutan, Indonesia, Nepal, PapuaNew Guinea, imor-Leste and several Pacific countries. o assist in thedevelopment o proessional electoral administration in the Pacific, the AECprovides support to the Pacific Islands, Australia and New Zealand Electoral

Administrators Network (PIANZEA),13

whose orerunner was establishedin the late 1990s. Te benefits o PIANZEA include the provision o a cross-jurisdictional dialogue and support structure, in a similar way to that takingplace at the Australia-New Zealand level. Another aspect o the AECsinternational assistance is its work in BRIDGEBuilding Resources inDemocracy, Governance and Electionsa ramework o workshops, trainingmodules and accreditation that ocuses on developing electoral administratorsand improving education and awareness among election stakeholders.14

Marginalized groups and women

Despite Australias strong record o electoral administration, its perormancein ostering the adequate representation o marginalized groups and womenis less positive. Te countrys electoral legislation does not provide anyguarantees or incentives to encourage representation despite poor levels orepresentation or these groups. Indigenous peoples make up about 2.5 percent o the countrys total population (Australian Bureau o Statistics 2011),and indigenous representation in the Australian Parliament has historicallybeen very low, and oten non-existent. During the first 70 years o the nationalparliaments existence (190170), there were no indigenous members, andthere have been only our indigenous members o parliament (MPs) elected inthe 44 years since (in a current parliament o 150 MPs and 76 senators). woo these parliamentarians, including the first indigenous woman, SenatorNova Peris, have been elected since 2010. Te situation is similar in sub-national parliaments. Tis under-representation has led to regular debatesin recent decades about introducing reserved seats or indigenous peoples,but to date no firm proposal has been put beore parliament (Lloyd 2009).Indigenous political activism tends to be channelled through existing broad-based political parties, particularly the Australian Labor Party (ALP), ratherthan through the establishment o a specific indigenous-rights party.


39/240

39

Although Australia was the first country in the world to provide women withthe right to vote and stand or parliament (in 1902, see Sawer, Abjorensen and

Larkin 2009: 119), the first women were not elected to the national parliamentuntil 1943 (McCann and Wilson 2012: 10). Women comprised under10 per cent o all members o parliament until the 1980s. Women make up31 per cent o the current parliament. Although this is a clear improvement,

Australia continues to slip in the Inter-Parliamentary Unions internationalrankings or womens representation in lower or single housesrom 15thin1999 to 43rdin 2013.15Tis issue has been deused to a degree, and the greatestocus is now on the number o emale MPs rom individual parties. ypicallyin Australia, womens representation is greater in let-o-centre parties, such

as the Greens (60 per cent) and ALP (43 per cent), than in the right-o-

Documents

Improving-Electoral-Practices-Case-Studies-and-Practical-Approaches-PDF.pdf