Imprint - University of Michigan

volume16,no.17 september2016

Human Persistence

Rory MaddenUniversity College London

© 2016 RoryMaddenThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/016017/>

1. Introduction

A great deal of work in the contemporary personal identity de-bate is driven by the assumption that the following two theses areincompatible:

(A) We are fundamentally biological organisms of a certainkind.

(B) Wewouldgowiththecerebrum.

Eachisattractive.Thesis(A)seemstobelittlemorethanacommon-place of our post-Darwinian worldview. Thesis (B) receives strongintuitivesupport fromreflectiononcounterfactualcasesofasort fa-miliartoanalyticphilosophysincethemid-20thcentury,caseswhichmakeitcompellingtojudgethatthepsychologicalcontinuitysecuredbytheisolationortransplantationofacerebrumwouldbesufficientforourpersistence.

But it isusual tofind thosewhoadhere to the “animalist” thesis(A)tryingtoexplainaway,ordiscredit,thehighlyintuitivethesis(B).Conversely,thosewhotake(B)asbedrockintheirtheorizingusuallyregarditasaprimarymotivationforrejecting(A)andfordevelopinganti-animalist,principallyLockean,viewsofourfundamentalnature.1

Theaimofthispaperistoarguethattheseendeavorsrestuponamistake.Onthebasisofaplausiblegeneralframeworkfortheorizingabout thenatureandpersistenceofmacroscopiccontinuants, itcanbeshownthat,farfrombeingincompatible,thesis(A)infactstronglysupportsthesis(B).Asettledandcoherentviewofournatureandper-sistencecanincorporateboththeses.

Oncethegeneralframeworkissetout,thepositiveargumentforthecompatibilityclaimwillbefairlystraightforward.Itskeypointisthatthecerebrumpreservesahighnumberofcapacitiesforactivitycharacteristicof therelevantkindoforganism.Agreaterpartof thepaperwillbegivenover todefensiveanddiagnostic tasks, to rebut

1. Forexamplesofadherenceto(A)motivatingrejectionof(B),seeSnowdon1990,Ayers1991,Olson1997,Mackie1999.Forexamplesofadherenceto(B)motivating rejectionof (A), see Shoemaker 2008, Johnston 2007,Noonan2010,Parfit2012.

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adherence to (B). Parfit claims thatwe are fundamentally “thinkingparts”,entitiesafewincheshighridingaroundinsidetheskullsofhu-manprimates(Parfit2012).Johnstoninsiststhatweare,inprinciple,onlytemporarilyanimals,andfundamentally“protean”persons,uni-versal-like entities,whichmaybecomemultiply located throughoutspaceandtimeinvirtueoftheprojectionofourfuture-directedcon-cern(Johnston2010).

Iftherejectionof(A)leadstosuchviews,then,inthelightofthewidespreadassumptionthatoneisforcedtochoosebetween(A)and(B), it isunsurprisingthatothershaveinsteadattemptedtocometotermswiththerejectionof(B).Butthis,too,ishardtoswallow.First,notethatthethesisthatwewouldgowiththecerebrumisagenericclaim,coveringimportantlydifferentcases:notablyaremnantcase,inwhich a human animal is pareddownuntil only a supported “cere-bruminavat”remains,andamorecomplexseparation-and-attachment case,inwhichacerebrumiscarefullyseparatedfromtheheadofanotherwiseunscathedhumananimalandattachedintotheheadofalivinghumananimalmissingacerebrum.4Accordingly(B)willbeun-derstoodasconjoiningthetwomorespecifictheses:

(B1)Wewouldgowiththecerebruminaremnantcase.

(B2)We would go with the cerebrum in a separation-and-at-tachmentcase.

Botharecompelling.Wearestronglyinclinedtojudgethatthecontin-uouspreservationofourdiverseandhighlyspecificpsychologicalca-pacitieswouldbesufficientforustopersistifcutdowntoacerebruminavat,andalsoforustomovetothelocationofthepersonresultingfromtheattachmentofthecerebrumtotherecipientorganism.Fewwillfeelcomfortableacceptingatheoryofournaturethatforcestherejectionofeither(B1)or(B2).

4. Shoemaker’sfamousBrown-Brownsonstory(1963)istheseminaldescriptionofaseparation-and-attachmentcase.

objections, and to try tomake some senseof theprevalenceof themistakenassumptionthatthethesesareincompatible.2

Beforepressingonwiththesetasksitmaybehelpfulfirsttogivesomecontext.Theaimhere isnot todefend(A)or (B) individually.Butabriefreminderofthecostsofgivingupeitherthesisshouldservetounderlinetheimportanceofademonstrationoftheircompatibility.

Thethesisthatwearefundamentallybiologicalorganismsofacer-tainkind,specificallyhumanprimates,hasbeenpresupposedbythevarioussciencesofhumannature—biology,anthropology,sociology,psychology—forwelloveracentury,andcanreasonablybesaid toformpartofourscientificallyinformedcommonsense.Ofcoursephi-losophersshouldbepreparedtoquestioncommonsense.Butthereareobstaclestogivingup(A)ofamoretheoreticalnature.Olsonandothershave forcefullydirected “theproblemof the thinkinganimal”againstthosewhoclaimtodistinguishusfromthehumananimal.Theproblemisthathumananimalsseemtomeettheconditionsforthink-ing(theyhavefunctioningnervoussystems,forexample).Butiftheydo,thenhowcouldonepossiblydistinguishoneselffromthehumananimalthinkingatone’slocation?3

Amorebasic theoreticalchallenge foranyonewhorejects (A) istogiveanalternativeaccountofourfundamentalnaturethatcanbetakenseriously.Foranindicationofthedifficultyofthischallenge,itisenoughsimply tostate themost recentalternativeaccounts frommajorfigureswhohave felt compelled to reject (A)on thebasisof

2. Is a compatibilist position defended elsewhere? SomeofMcDowell’s com-mentsonLocke’sPrinceandtheCobblercasesuggestacompatibilistview(1997:237;2006:115).Buthiscommentsdonotflowfromanexplicitlystatedtheoryof thenatureandpersistenceofmacroscopiccontinuants,nordoesheanticipateobjectionsofthesorttobeconsideredat lengthbelow.Thushecannotquitedispeltheimpressionoftryingtohaveitbothways.Wigginsisamorecomplexcase.Theargumenttobedevelopedinthispaperis,inaverygeneralway,indebtedtohismetaphysicalpicture.Buthisattitudetothecompatibilityofclaimslike(A)and(B)seemstohavevariedovertheyears,frompositive(1967:55)toneutral(1980:188–189)tonegative(2001:ch7)andbacktoneutral(2012:20).

3. Olson1997.Cf.Snowdon1990.



Hereistheplaninmoredetail:Ibeginbysketchingafairlyfamiliarframeworkfortheorizingaboutthenatureandpersistenceofkindsofmacroscopic continuant.This framework is then instancedwith thekindrelevanttothesis(A)—thekindhuman animal —andappliedtotheremnantcaseinordertoshowfirstthat(A)stronglysupports(B1).

Iturnthentoobjectionstotheproposal.Thefirsttobedispatchedarerelativelysuperficialcomplaints:thattheremnantcaseislikeanyothercaseofmereorganpreservation;thattheorganismhaslosttoomuchof its sizeand shape; that theproposaldrains “animalism”ofitsdistinctivecontent,collapsingintoaLockeanpsychologicalconti-nuityview.Thereplytothelatterobjectionisthattheproposaldoesnothavetheconsequencethatpsychologicalcontinuityisnecessaryforthepersistenceofahumanorganism:theproposalpermitsthatahumanorganismcould,asseemsplausible,persist ifreducedtotheconditionofanon-cognitivehumanvegetable.

Moretimewillbespentontwomoretheoreticallysubstantiallinesof objection. The first objection is that the compatibilist proposalimplausibly separates organism persistence from the possession of“life”,understoodasacertainkindofcapacity forcollectivemetabol-icactivityofmicroscopicparts.Theemphasisonthiscapacityinthe

cognitivepsychology.Studiessuggestthatfromearlyinfancyourprocessingofthebehaviourofsensitive,motileentitiessuchasanimalsandhumanbe-ingsisstructuredbytheprinciplethattheirself-movementis initiatedandsustainedbysomecauseinternaltotheirboundaries(Gelman1990).More-over,thereisevidencethatfromanearlyagewearedisposedtojudgethatthepreservationof something inside ananimateentity is crucial to itspre-servedidentityovertime(GelmanandWellman1991).Inthelightoftheseempiricalstudiesitisanobvioushypothesisthatweshouldbedisposedtojudgethatwhenananimatecreatureiscutdowntoitsinternal“engineofani-mation”—thecerebrumasitisenvisagedinphilosophicaldiscussion—thecreaturehaspersisted.Wouldasupporterof(A)berighttoconcludefromtheavailabilityofsuchapsychologicalexplanationthattheintuitivesupportforthesis(B)istherebydiscredited?Onthecontrary,asitwillbeargued,ourcognitiveprocessinginthiscasebasicallycorrespondstothefactsastheyarerevealedbymore theoretical reflection. It is theoreticallyplausible thatananimateorganismsuchasahumananimalwouldpersistwhencutdowntotherealizerofitsanimatecapacities.

There aremore theoretical obstacles to givingup these intuitivetheses.Forexample,suppose,contraryto(B1),thatonedoesnotper-sistintheremnantcase.Thenwheredidtheconscioussubjectinthevatcomefrom?Wasanewconscioussubjectbroughtintoexistencebycarvingawayextraneousflesh?Thatisdifficulttobelieve.Ontheoth-erhand,ifthisconsciousthingwasnotbroughtintoexistencebutwaspresentbeforetheoperation, thenhowcouldadenierof(B1)claimtoknowthatoneissomethingthatwouldnotpersistratherthantheconsciousthingwhichwouldpersistthroughtheoperation?5

Thereisalsothegeneraldifficultyofconvincinglyexplainingaway,ordiscrediting,ourstronginclinationtojudge(B).Olson(1997)makesanattempt,claimingthatweconfusethetypicalprudential,moral,andsocialconcomitantsofpersistencewithpersistenceitself.Hesuggeststhatwewouldberationaltoextendmoralaccountabilityandselfishfu-ture-directedconcerntothethingwhichinheritsourpsychology,andonthisbasiswemistakenlybelievethatthethingwouldbetheoriginalindividual.Anotheranimalistopponentof(B)emphasizesinsteadthattheresulting“transferofsomeone’sself-awareness”(Ayers1991:291)wouldproduceintherecipientsubjectthe“profoundillusion”thathehimself is theoriginalanimal,an illusionitwouldbeso“immenselyconvenienttofallinwith”thatwearedrawnintojudging(B).

Without going into the details of these putative explanations, ageneralcriticalpointcanbemade.Anyappealtoattributesdistinctiveofhumanpersons,suchasmoralaccountabilityorself-awareness,willstruggletogeneralizetotheapparentlysimilarintuitionthatanon-hu-manhigheranimal,suchasacat,couldbestrippedofitsfur,strippedofitslimbs—indeedcouldbecutrightdowntoitscerebrum—tobere-equippedwith anewbody so as to continue its characteristic fe-linelife.Itisnotplausiblethatoursimilarintuitionherecouldbeex-plainedbythetransmissionofmoralaccountabilityorself-awareness.Acathasnoneofthesepersonalattributes.6

5. ThisstyleofobjectionispressedbyJohnston(2007)andParfit(2012).

6. Moreseriousexplanationsoftheintuitivenessof(B)arelikelytobefoundinongoingworkontheanimate–inanimatedistinctionindevelopmentaland



ofactivitycharacteristicof itskind,anaturalwaytoconceiveof thepersistenceofacontinuantoffundamentalkindK isintermsofthepreservationalongapathofasufficiencyofcapacitiesforactivitychar-acteristicofKs.Hereistheschematicprinciplewhichwillbeassumedhenceforth:

(Persistence) A continuant of fundamental kind K per-sistsifandonlyifasufficientnumberofcapacitiesforK-characteristicactivityarecontinuouslypreserved(alongadominantpath).

Someclarificationsandexampleswillhelpbringthepicturetolife.Why“capacities”foractivity?Takeanartifactofthetoasterkind.We

takeitthatatoastercanpersistunpluggedfromthepowersocket.Butwedonot take it that a toaster canpersistmutilated rightdown toapowercord.One factor inour judgments is this:although theun-pluggedtoasterdoesnotoccurrentlytoastbread,itretainsthecapac-ity for this activity characteristicof itskind. Its improbable intrinsicstructureandorganizationissuchthatitwouldtakeonlyarelativelysimple external intervention (plugging-in) for that characteristic ac-tivity to occur. In contrast, the simpler intrinsic structure of an iso-latedpowercordissuchthattheexternalinterventionontheobjectrequiredforbread-toastingtooccurwouldbesocomplex—ineffectamountingtotheconstructionofmostofatoaster—thattheexternalintervention cannot reasonablybe said tobeamere trigger for themanifestation of a capacity for bread-toasting abiding in the powercordallalong.Atbest,thepowercordhasthecapacitytocontributesomepartialsub-activity(transmittingcurrent)tothebread-toastingactivityofalargersystem.

Whytheemphasison“activity”?Doesn’tthatnotionfailtoapplytoinertcontinuantssuchasboulders?No.Despiteitsbusyconnota-tions,thenotionabsorbstherelevanceofbrutecontinuitiesofmat-terandshape.Thereisnoreasontoexcludesuchactivitiesasfilling

development of contemporary animalism originates in the idiosyn-craticbutinfluentialreductive-mereologicalprojectofvanInwagen.Itisarguedthattherearegoodreasonsnottoelevatethiscapacityoverotherkindsofadjustmentandregulationcapacitiescharacteristicoforganismkinds.

Thesecondsubstantialcomplaintisthattheproposalcannotplau-siblydescribethemorecomplexseparation-and-attachmentcase, inwhichasmallerobjectismovedbetweentwolargerhumananimals.Thisisparticularlypressingif,asseemsplausible,humanorganismscanpersistinanon-cognitive,vegetativestate.Iftheproposalisthatthehumanorganismmoveswiththecerebrum,thenwhatcanonesayabout thevegetativehumanorganism leftbehind?Andwhataboutthevegetativehumanorganismthatreceivesthecerebrum?

Inresponsetothesequeriesitwillbearguedthattherightmodelforsuchcases is furnishedbyactualcasesofcuttingandgraftingoforganisms,aperspectivewhichislikelytohavebeenobscuredbythefactthat,infocallyrealizedorganismssuchashighermammals,pre-ponderanceofmaterialbulk isanunreliableguidetodominance inasymmetric fission and fusion. The conclusion is that the animalistthesis (A) strongly supports the intuitive “Brown-Brownson”verdict(B2),aswellastheintuitiveremnantverdict(B1).

2. The Nature and Persistence of Macroscopic Continuants

Ourinitialfixonmacroscopiccontinuants,suchasboulders,cats,andtrees,istheirimmediateengagementofourperceptualsystems.Fur-ther experience reveals that the activities of these entities figure ina range of law-like generalizations which enable us to systematizeandexplainexternalphenomena.Amacroscopiccontinuantis,mostfundamentally,alocusoflaw-likeactivitycharacteristicofitsgeneralkind.7

What about the persistence through time of amacroscopic con-tinuant?Inthelightofthegeneralconceptionofitsnatureasalocus

7. Wiggins2001isanextendedelaborationofthisbroadlyAristotelianpicture.



betweenjudgementsofsufficiencyofpreservationofcapacitiesandjudgementsofidentityovertime.

The “dominant path” clause is intended to handle fission casesina familiarway.But it isworthnotingthat there isnoassumptionthatasingledominantpathofpreservationofkind-characteristicca-pacitiesmust exclude spatiotemporal forking or other scattering ofmatter.Thatwilldependupon thekindsandcapacities inquestion.Forexample,awatchcanpersistdisassembled intocomponents forcleaning.Why?Given the improbably neatmatching of the compo-nentsandtheirproximityonthetechnician’stable,itwouldtakeonlyarelativelysimpleinterventiontotriggercharacteristictime-keepingactivity.Thissupportsthesuppositionthatkind-characteristiccapaci-tiesarepreserved.Incontrast,ifthewatchweresmashedintosmallparticles, thenallsuch intrinsicorganizationwouldbe lost,andthecomplexexternalinterventiononthepluralityrequiredtobringabouttime-keepingactivitycouldnotexploitanyabidingstructure.Soitisplausible that the kind-characteristic capacitywould not have beencontinuouslypreserved. It iscorrespondinglyplausible thatawatchdoesnotpersistifsmashedintosmallparticles.

Thecapacitiesforactivityofsomekindsofcontinuantarerealizedinamore“distributed”andless“focal”patternthanthecapacitiesofotherkindsof continuant.Forexample, thecharacteristic capacitiesof a homogenousmaterial concretion such as a rocky boulder—tosquashrelativelysoftthings,toblockcertaingaps—arenotobviouslyrealizedinsomepartsmorethaninanyothers.Incontrast,thecapaci-tiesofacomputerwithasmallbutsophisticatedmicroprocessorandbulkymetalcasearerealizedmorefocally.Suchacomputercouldberefittedwithanewcasedespitethetemporarybutdramaticchangeofformandappearancethiswouldentail.Why?Duetoitsfocalrealiza-tion,thetemporarylossofsomeofitsspace-fillingandpaperweightcapacities is consistentwith the continuouspreservationof amuchlargernumberofothercapacitiesforkind-characteristicactivity.

spatialreceptaclesofcertainshapes,resistingpenetration,orrollingdownslopes.

NotethattheactivitiescharacteristicofamacroscopickindKaremacroscopic activities of awhole individualK rather than its smallparts.Thisisnottodenythattheremaybeinterestingcollectivecon-ditionsthatmustbemetbythemicroscopicpartsofaKinorderforthesemacroscopicactivitiestooccur.Butwearejustifiedinrecogniz-ingtheexistenceofmacroscopicentitiesoverandabovepluralitiesofmicroscopicconstituentsbytheexistenceoflaw-likegeneralizationsconcerningtheactivitiesofKsthemselves.

TosaythatK-characteristicactivitiesareactivitiesofindividualKsratherthanactivitiesoftheirmicroscopicpartsisnottosaythatthesemacroscopic activitiesmust be somehow superficial ormanifest, inthe senseof being easily perceivable.Digesting and visualizing areactivitiesofwholehumananimals,buttheyarenoteasilyperceivable.Norneedwhole-Kactivitiesbemanifestinthesenseofbeingapriorideduciblefromone’sconceptionofKs.Onemayhavetolearnfrombitterexperiencethattoastershavethecapacitytogiveelectricshocks.

Whydoes(Persistence)mentiona“sufficientnumber”ofcapacitiesforactivity?

Typically,foragivenkind,thereisawiderangeofactivitieschar-acteristic of that kind. So thedefault presumption about any singleoneofitscapacitiesshouldbethatitspreservationisnotindividuallymetaphysicallynecessaryforthepersistenceoftheentity.Theentitycouldpersistwithout that capacity if a sufficient subset of its otherkind-characteristiccapacities ispreserved.Forexample, thecapacityforpurringischaracteristicofthecatkind.Butaninjuredcatcanper-sistthroughthelossofthiscapacitysolongasitretainssufficientoth-ercapacitiescharacteristicofitskind(breathing,hunting,excreting).

Thenotionofsufficiencyisvague.OneshouldnotalwaysexpecttobeabletodeducewhetheraKhaspersistedfromindependentlyspec-ifiable factsabout thenumberof characteristic capacitiespreserved.A realisticepistemologywill recognize reciprocalevidential support



forsensitivityandmotilitywhichcharacterizeeveryzoologicalorgan-ism.8Humananimalsarepeerless in theirsensitivity toabstractpat-terns in theworld, and in their capacity for complex and extendedcoursesofaction—capacities impressivelycombined incommunica-tionandproblem-solving.Butthesearejustthedevelopmentincer-tainrespectsofthesensitivityandmotilitycharacteristicofeveryani-malkind.Themoreorlesssophisticatedco-ordinationbetweensen-sorsandeffectorsis,asPeterGodfrey-Smithputsit,“partofthe‘designskeleton’of anyorganism thathas to adjust its activities towhat isgoingonaroundit”.9Ananimalisanorganismwithapressingneedtoadjustitsactivitiestowhatisgoingonaroundit;unlikeaplant,itmustseekoutorganicmatter inorder to regulate itsnutrientandenergylevels.Animals’sensorimotormeanstomaintenanceoftheirnutritionandmetabolism is a particular exemplificationof the generally self-regulatingor“homeostatic”natureofalllivingorganisms.

Developing(A)inthisway,weseethatatheoreticalroleforpsy-chology in our persistence need not derive from ametaphysical fe-tishization of the “personal” capacities formoral responsibility, self-reflection,andsoon,whichdistinguishusfromotheranimals.If(A)is true, thenpsychologicalcapacitiesare relevant toourpersistenceforthereasonthattheyarerelevanttothepersistenceofzoologicalorganismsofanykind.Theyareamongthecapacitiescharacteristicoftheorganismkindtowhichwebelong.

Perhapsitisaresultofthelongshadowcastbythe20th-centuryoppositionof“bodily”and“psychological”criteriaofpersonalidentity,butthereisatendencyinthecontemporarydebatetosupposethatthedistinctionbetween “biological” and “psychological” capacities is anexclusiveone.However,thesensorimotorcapacitiescharacteristicof

8. Marinespongesaresometimesconsideredtobeanexception,havingman-aged tomeet thedistinctive animalneed to consumeotherorganisms forenergywithoutdevelopmentofasystemofneurons.Butnotethateventheseorganismspossesscellsgeneticallyakintosynapticcells,withaprobableroleincoordinatingrudimentarycontractionsandenvironmentalsensitivity.SeeNickel2004andSakaryaetal.2007.

9. Godfrey-Smithforthcoming.

3. Human Animals

Wehavesketchedageneralframeworkforreasoningaboutthenatureandpersistenceofmacroscopiccontinuants.Inordertoexplainwhythesis (A)stronglysupports thesis (B1), this frameworkneeds tobeappliedtothesis(A),thethesisthatwearefundamentallybiologicalorganismsofacertainkind.

Whatistherelevantkindofbiologicalorganism?Therelevantkindisnotbox jellyfish, shiitake mushroom,or hedge sparrow.Therelevantkindishuman animal.Specifiedinthisway,(A)combineswiththe(Persis-tence)schematoyieldthefollowingprincipleaboutourpersistence:

(A-Persistence)Oneofuspersistsifandonlyifasufficientnumberofcapacitiesforhuman-animal-characteristicac-tivityarecontinuouslypreserved(alongadominantpath).

Inordertoappreciatetheconsequencesofthisprinciple,moreneedstobe saidabout theactivities characteristicofhumananimals.Thevarietyisenormous,butwecanbeginalist:

Breathing,sleeping,snoring,pointing,listening,walking,running, jumping, tool-using, gossiping, planning, re-membering,fantasizing,excreting,eating,mating,drool-ing,seekingshelter,filling“humanoid”spatialreceptacles,growing,ageing,fightinginfection,ailing,dying,mourn-ing, hunting, relaxing, visually attending, problem-solv-ing,blockinglight,resistingpenetration,sweating,paint-ing,singing,story-telling,fidgeting,digesting…

First observe that the activities characteristic of human animals in-clude,butarenotrestrictedto,activitiescharacteristicofsimplemate-rialconcretions(resistingpenetration).Theyalsoinclude,butarenotrestrictedto,activitiescharacteristicofmostkindsofterrestrialorgan-ism(growing,excreting).Whatisdistinctiveofhumanorganismsinparticularisthespectacularintensificationofthe“animate”capacities



preserved:colourdiscrimination,grammaticalstringdetection,socialhierarchynavigation,durationsenseatdifferenttemporalscales,verti-cal–horizontallinediscrimination,facerecognition,placerecognition,practical know-how, auditoryphoneme individuation, predictivena-ïvephysics,story-telling,episodicmemory.Asingletermlike‘breath-ing’coversnoparallelmultitudeofdistinguishablecapacitiescharac-teristicofhumanorganisms.

Onemightraiseanotherlineofobjection.The(Sufficiency)thesismentions a very specific anatomical structure, the cerebrum.Givenourpresentstateofunderstandingoftherealizationofhumanpsycho-logicalcapacities,thisthesiscanbenomorethanapieceofdubiousempiricalspeculation.

There issomethingto thisobjection,but its forceshouldnotbeexaggerated in thepresent context.The remnant cerebrumcase inphilosophical discussion is intended to lie at a certain conceptualpointona spectrumofpossibleempirical cases.Atoneendof thespectrumareuncontroversialcasesinwhichahumanorganismper-siststhroughmoreorlessseverelossofparts—forexample,thecaseofahumanorganismwhichlosesitslegsbutissavedfromfatalhem-orrhage.Inthiscaseitisclearthatalocusofhuman-animal-charac-teristicactivityendures.

At theotherendof thespectrumarecasesof the followingsort:flesh is cutaway fromahumanorganismuntilnothing is leftbutasmallpatchoflivingtissuefromthevisualcortex.Itisimplausibletosuppose that thehumanorganismsurvives the latterprocess.Why?Thereisnothingremaininginthatsituationwitharangeofcapacitiesforactivitycharacteristicofawholehumanorganism.Inordertobringabout such activities, the relatively simplepatchof tissuewould re-quireextremelycomplexintervention,amountingtotheconstructionfromscratchofanewsubjectofsuchactivityratherthanthetriggeringofacapacityforactivityonthepartofthetissuesampleitself.

Wheredoestheremnantcerebrumcaselieonthisspectrum?Thecaseisdesignedtobealimitingexampleofthefirstkindofcase.Thisis not to deny that it is likely that a cerebrumwould require some

animalsarenoless“biological”thananyotherspecificmodeoforgan-ismicself-regulation,suchasthecapacitiesfortranspirationandpho-tosynthesischaracteristicofbotanicallifeforms.Noneofthesespecificcapacitiesischaracteristicofeverykindoforganismonearth.Butwhyshouldthatmatter?

4. The Remnant Case

Thesis(A)combinedwiththegeneral(Persistence)schemayields(A-Persistence).Theintuitivethesis(B1)—thatwewouldgowiththece-rebrumintheremnantcase—willfollowinturnif(A-Persistence)iscombinedwiththefollowingadditionalthesis:

(Sufficiency) The remnant cerebrum case continuouslypreserves(alongadominantpath)asufficientnumberofcapacitiesforhuman-animal-characteristicactivity.

Is(Sufficiency)plausible?Inthecaseasitisenvisagedinphilosophicaldiscussion,ahumanorganismiscutdownandthecerebrumispro-videdwithsomeformoflife-supportsystemsothatthereisasubjectcontinuing to exercise various capacities—such as action-planningandvisualizing—andpreservingmanymorepsychologicalcapacitiesthatareblockedfromoutwardmanifestationbythelackofotherbodyparts.Ifthispictureofthecaseisaccuratetotheempiricalfactsabouttheanatomicalstructureinquestion,then(Sufficiency)isindeedex-tremelyplausible. In thissituationavery largenumberofcharacter-istic capacitiesof thehumanorganismkindwouldbe continuouslypreserved(alongadominantpath).

Butwhywouldthisbea“sufficient”number?Itmightbeobjectedthatthereisnoreasontosupposethatthepreservationofthecapacityforthinkingwouldbesufficienttocompensateforthelossofhumanorganism capacities controlled lower in the central nervous system,suchasbreathingorexcreting.

The objector’s single term ‘thinking’ grossly underestimates thenumber and diversity of human-organism-characteristic capacities



ahighnumberof capacities for activity characteristicof thehumanorganismkind.

5. Objections and Clarifications

Itwillstrengthenthecasetoanticipatefurtherobjections.Itmightbeobjectedthattheremnantcerebrumcaseisnodifferent

fromothercasesofmereorgan-preservation.11Akidneycomposedoflivingtissuecouldbepreservedafterthedestructionoftherestofahumanorganism.Thisentityisaboutthesamesizeasthecerebruminthevat.Sohowcanthepresentproposalavoidtheabsurdconse-quencethatahumanorganismcouldbecomeakidney?

First,aclarificationisinorder.Theproposalisnotthatahumanor-ganismcouldturnintooneofitsorgans.Onthestandardassumptionthat numerical identity is not temporally relative, nothing could be-comeidenticaltowhatwasonceitsproperpart.Theproposalisratherthatthehumanorganismcouldbereduceddowntocoincidencewithitscerebrum.

Sotheobjectionshouldbereformulated:Howcanthepresentpro-posalavoidthestillabsurdconsequencethatahumanorganismcouldbereduceddowntocoincidencewithitskidney?

Thecrucialdisanalogy is this:a “kidney inavat”, even if careful-lystimulatedtointrinsicactivitymatchingits intrinsicactivitywhencontainedwithina largerorganism, isnot therebysufficient for thepresenceof somethingengaged inactivity characteristicof awholehumanorganism.Itismerelyidlyperformingasub-activity,withthepotentialtocontributetoawholeanimal’sactivityofexcretionshoulditbecoupledtoananimal’sbloodstreamintherightway.Incontrast,acerebruminavatstimulatedtointrinsicactivitymatchingitsintrinsicactivitywhencontainedwithinalargerorganismissufficientforthepresenceofsomethingengagedinvariousactivitiescharacteristicofawholehumanorganism:therewouldbethinking,planning,visual-izing,etc.,andtheblockedcapacitiesformuchmore.

11. This is a commonanimalist claim.SeeSnowdon1990:98,Snowdon1991:112–113,Olson1997:18,andOlson2007:42.

technicallysophisticatedlife-supportandstimulationinordertotrig-ger the occurrence of human-organism-characteristic psychologicalactivity.Butthisinterventionwouldbesodwarfedinitscontributionbythecosmicallyimpressivecomplexityoftheabidingstructuresinthecerebrumthatitishighlyplausibletoregardpsychologicalcapaci-ties aspreservedby the cerebrum, even if someexternal triggeringisrequiredfortheiractivation.Itisacaseinwhichahighnumberofhuman-organism-characteristiccapacitiesarepreserved.

Thereissomeempiricalevidencethattheneuralcorrelateofcon-scious activity includes traffic between the cerebrum and sub-corti-cal structures such as the thalamus.10 If so, then perhaps (Sufficien-cy) shouldbe replacedby a variant claim,mentioninga largerpartofthecentralnervoussystemthanthecerebrum.Thisvariantclaimcould not be used in combination with (A-Persistence) to soundlyinfer (B1).Would thatundermine thepresentargument?No. (B1) isfoundwidelyintuitivenotbecausemanyphilosophershavedetailedempiricalknowledgeof thecerebrum inparticular. It is found intui-tivebecausethecerebrumisconceivedtobetheminimalrealizerofadiverserangeofspecificpsychologicalcapacities.Ifitemergesthatsomethingslightlylargerthanthecerebrumplaysthisrole,then(B1)wouldnolongerbetherelevantintuitivethesisanditshouldbemodi-fiedaccordingly,tomentionthelargerpartofthecentralnervoussys-tem.Thus(Sufficiency)and(B1), insofarastheyareempiricallyandintuitivelyplausiblerespectively,willcontinuetomarchinstep.Thatiswhyone shouldnot exaggerate, for presentpurposes, the signifi-canceofthelimitationsofourknowledgeofthepreciseneuralbasisofhumanpsychologicalcapacities.

So,forsimplicity,weshallcontinuetomaketheassumptionthatitisthecerebrumthatminimallypreservesahighnumberofhuman-organism-characteristic capacities. On this assumption the case isstrongthatthenaturalisticallyattractiveanimalistthesis(A)supportsthehighlyintuitivethesis(B1):thecerebrumcontinuouslypreserves

10. Rees,Kreiman,andKoch2002;AlkireandMiller2005;Merker2007.



SosaysParfit,inarecentdiscussionoftheclaimthatahumanor-ganismcouldpersistinaremnantcerebrumcondition:

If Animalists made this claim, their view would ceasetobeanalternative toLockeanviews.On theLockeanBrain-BasedPsychologicalCriterion,somefuturepersonwouldbemeifthispersonwouldbeuniquelypsychologi-callycontinuouswithme,becausehewouldhaveenoughofmybrain.Thiscriterionimpliesthat,inSurvivingCe-rebrum,theconsciousbeingwouldbethesamepersonasme.WhenAnimalistsenteredthisdebate,theirmainclaimwasthatsuchpsychologicalcriteriaofidentityareseriouslymistaken, becausewe are human animals, sothatourcriterionofidentitymustbebiological.IftheseAnimalistsnowclaimedthat,inSurvivingCerebrum,theconsciousrationalbeingwouldbea livinganimal,whowouldbeme, thesepeoplewouldbe claiming that thetruecriterionofidentityfordevelopedhumananimalsisofthisLockeanpsychologicalkind.(2012:12)

It iscertainly true thatOlson’swell-knownentry to thedebate tookthe “radically non-psychological” (1997: 16) view that psychology is“irrelevant”toourpersistence.Butifanythingdeservestobecalledthe“mainclaim”ofanimalism,itissimplytheclaimthatwearefundamen-tallybiologicalorganismsofacertainkind.Aprincipleddevelopmentofthatmainclaimcandojusticetothefactthatmoreorlessimpres-sivesensorimotorcapacitiesareamongthebiologicalcapacitieschar-acteristic of organismsof our kind, and every animal kind, and arethusnotirrelevanttoourpersistence.

SoisParfitrighttosayanimalismdevelopedinthiswayisclaim-ing that the criterion of identity for developed human animals is abrain-basedLockeancriterion?Parfit isnotright tosaythis.ALock-ean theoryofpersonal identity claims thatpsychological continuityofsomekindisnecessaryandsufficientforustopersist.Thepresent

Suppose thatone insists,perhapsbymeansofasuitablypermis-siveunderstandingof‘excreting’,thatthekidneyinavatiscapableofdoingsomethingthatawholehumanorganismcando.Still,thedis-analogybetweenthecasesisdramatic.Therelativelysimplekidneydoesnotpreserveanythinglikethediverserangeofcapacitiesforhu-manorganismactivitypreservedbythecosmicallycomplexstructureofthecerebrum.Sothereisnoparallelsupportforakidney-analogueof(Sufficiency).

Arelatedobjectioncomplainsthattoomuchofthesize,shape,andappearanceofananimalwouldbelostintheremnantcaseforittobeplausibletosaythatananimalhaspersisted.

Therightresponsehere is thatahumanorganismisahighlyfo-callyrealizedcontinuant,sothatthelossofstereotypicalsize,shape,and appearance is no overriding obstacle to its persistence, beingperfectlyconsistentwith thepreservationofa sufficiencyof capaci-tiesforkind-characteristicactivity.Thetacitbutprobablywidespreadpresuppositionthatanimalismmustbea“body”theoryofpersonalidentityislikelytohavemadethisoptiondifficulttodiscern.Ifitisimaginedthatahumanorganismisamaterialconcretionofthesamecategoryasaboulder—somethingalongthelinesofahomogenous,humanoidstatueofmeat—then,justasaclassicalGreekstatuecouldnotbe reduced to the sizeof a small oblong chunkofmarble con-tainedwithin itshead,neither, itwillbe imagined, couldahumanorganismbereducedtothesizeofitscerebrum.Butthisimageryfailstoacknowledgethat therealizationofkind-characteristiccapacitiesof ahumanorganism isnotdistributed like that of ahomogenousmaterialconcretion.

This invitesa furtherpointofclarification. If (A) isdeveloped inthisway,thenindeedanimalismcontrastswitha“body”theoryofper-sonalidentity.But,ontheotherhand,if(A)hastheconsequencethatwewouldgowiththecerebruminavat,doesn’tanimalismcollapseinsteadintoafamiliarkindofLockeanpsychologicalcontinuitytheoryofpersonalidentity?



(A), claimed that psychology is completely irrelevant to organismpersistence,thusclosingofftheoptionofincorporatingthehighlyin-tuitivethesis(B1)intoasettledandcoherentviewofournatureandpersistence?

Second: if it is a consequenceof thepresentproposal that ahu-manorganismmaypersistintheremnantcerebrumcase,butalsoaconsequenceoftheproposalthatahumanorganismmaypersistasanon-cognitivehumanvegetable,thendoesn’ttheproposalshakeitselfto pieceswhen it comes to describe the separation-and-attachmentcase, inwhichacerebrumistransferredbetweentwovegetativehu-manorganisms?

Thefinaltwosectionsofthepapertakethesequestionsinturn.

6. Life

HereisOlson’sviewofourpersistenceconditions:

What it takes for us to persist through time is what I have called biological continuity: one survives just in case one’s purely animal functions — metabolism, the capacity to breathe and circulate one’s blood, and the like — continue. I would put biology in place of psychology, and one’s bio-logical life in place of one’s mind, in determining what it takes for us to persist: a biological approach to personal identity. (1997: 16–17)

Olson’sviewineffectsubtractssensorimotorandotherpsychologicalcapacitiesfromthelistofcapacitiesforactivitycharacteristicofhumanorganisms,andholdsthattheremainingcapacities—orperhapssomesufficientsubsetofthem—arenecessaryandsufficientforonetoper-sist, aposition structurally similar to theLockeanview that insteadselectsjustthepsychologicalcapacitiesasnecessaryandsufficientforonetopersist.

ThepresentproposalagreeswithOlsonthatthepreservationofafairlyrichsetofnon-psychologicalcapacitiesissufficientforahuman

developmentof(A)holdsthatthecontinuouspreservationofpsycho-logicalcapacitiescanbesufficient forus topersist,because theseca-pacitiesareamongthosecharacteristicoftheorganismkindtowhichwebelong,andingeneralthepreservationofasufficientnumberofK-characteristiccapacitiesissufficientforthepersistenceofaK.12Butthisapplicationofthegeneralconceptionofthepersistenceofmacro-scopiccontinuantsdoesnotsupport thedistinctivelyLockeanclaimthatbrain-basedpsychologicalcontinuityisnecessaryforustopersist.Theproposalisperfectlyconsistentwiththeclaimthatthecerebrumofahumanorganismcouldberubbedawayentirely, leavingtheor-ganismintheconditionofanon-cognitivehumanvegetable.Suchacasewouldinvolvethelossofamassivenumberofcapacitiescharac-teristicofhumanorganisms.But,invirtueofthepreservationofthelowerpartofthecentralnervoussystem,astilldiverserangeofcapaci-ties characteristic of humanorganismswouldbepreserved along auniquepath.Theremainingpartofthenervoussystemislesscomplex,butitneverthelesscontinuestorealize,alongauniquepath,charac-teristiccapacities,forbreathing,excreting,drooling,sweating,andsoon.These,itseemsperfectlynaturaltosay,areasufficientnumberofcapacities for thepersistenceof ahumanorganism.But there isnopsychologicalcontinuityofthesortLockeansclaimtobenecessaryforourpersistence.Sometimesitisrighttorethinkwell-worndepictionsofopposingcampsinthephilosophicalliterature,butthedistinctionbetween animalism and Lockeanism stands up even when animal-ismisdevelopedinawaythatsupportstheintuitiveverdictaboutthetransplantcase.

This clarification invites two more substantial questions. First:whyhasOlson, themostprominentadvocateof theanimalist view

12. Although,justtobeclear,accordingtheviewdefendedhere,noteverycaseofpsychologicalcontinuityfamiliarfromthepersonalidentitydebatewillbeacaseinwhichonepersists.Forexample,acaseoftele-transportationwhichinvolves an interval of pure information-transmissionbetweendissolutionofterrestrialmatterandorganizationofMartianmattercannotbeacaseinwhich relevant capacities are continuously preserved. During the intervalthereisnothingwithhuman-animal-characteristiccapacities.



(1975: 330–331): a self-organizing biological event thatmaintainstheorganism’scomplexinternalstructure.Thematerialsthatorganismsaremadeupofareintrinsicallyunstableandmustthereforebeconstantlyrepairedandrenewed, or else the organismdies and its remains de-cay.Anorganismmustconstantly take innewparticles,reconfigureandassimilatethemintoitslivingfabric,andexpelthosethatarenolongerusefultoit.Anorganism’slifeenablesittopersistandretainitscharacteristicstruc-ture despite constant material turnover. … Organismshaveparts:vastnumbersofthem.Athingisaliveinthebiologicalsensebyvirtueofavastlycomplexarrayofbio-chemicalprocesses,andtheparticlescaughtupintheseprocessesarepartsoftheorganism.(2007:28)13

Onthisviewanorganism ismost fundamentallycharacterizedasacertainkindofcomposite object.Anorganismissomethingcomposedofapluralityofsmallpartsstandinginacharacteristicmultigraderela-tion,therelationofbeingcollectivelycaughtupinaself-organizingevent.ReadersofvanInwagen1990willrecognizethis“micro-collec-tive” vision of an organism. It features in his answer to the SpecialCompositionQuestion,whichasksunderwhatconditionsapluralityofobjectscomposeafurtherobject.VanInwagenanswersthattheycomposeafurtherobjectjustincasetheyarecaughtupinaself-main-tainingbiologicalevent:“anunimaginablycomplexmetabolicstormofatoms”(1990:87).

Themicro-collectivevisioncontrastswiththeconceptionofmacro-scopiccontinuantsappliedhere,accordingtowhichahumanorgan-ismisfundamentallyalocusofmacroscopicactivitycharacteristicofitskind.Itmightbethoughtthatthisisameredifferenceofemphasis.Afterall,noonewilldenythattinypartsofahumanorganismarenor-mallycaughtupinglobalhomeostaticevents;andnoonewilldeny

13. Cf.Olson1997:ch6forfurtherelaborationofthisconceptionofanorganism.

organismtopersist.Inthevegetativecase,alocusofkind-characteris-ticactivityendures.WherethepresentproposaldiffersfromOlsonisthatitishasnocommitmenttotheclaimthattheseparticularcapaci-ties,realizedinthelowerautonomicnervoussystem,aremetaphysi-callynecessary for thepersistenceofahumanorganism. If sufficientother human-organism-characteristic capacities are preserved, thenthehumanorganismpersists.That iswhythehumanorganismcanpersistintheremnantcase.Thecerebrum,infactafarmorecomplexstructurethanthelowerpartofthecentralnervoussystem,realizesahighnumberofhuman-organism-characteristiccapacities.

So why does Olson elevate broadly autonomic capacities—forbreathing, blood-circulation, etc.—into a metaphysically necessarypositionoversensorimotorandotherpsychologicalcapacitiesofhu-manorganisms?

An uncharitable explanation is suggested by the imagery of“put[ting]biologyinplaceofpsychology”.Thismayreflectafailuretoappreciatethatsensitivityandmotilityarecharacteristicofeverykindofzoologicalorganismandaspecificexpressionofthegenerallysen-sitiveandself-regulatingnatureofbiologicallife.

Anotheruncharitableexplanationwouldbethis:thesoundpointthatahumanorganismcanpersistwithoutpsychologicalcapacitieshas beenmisinterpreted as supporting the claim that psychologicalcapacities are completely irrelevant tohumanorganismpersistence.This would be an invalid inference from the premise that psycho-logicalcapacitiesareunnecessarytotheconclusionthattheyarealsoinsufficient.

Butthereisamorecharitable,andmoreinteresting,explanation.According to thisexplanationOlson’swhollynon-psychological the-oryofanimalpersistenceconditionsflowscoherently froman influ-entialvisionofthefundamentalmetaphysicalnatureofanorganism.HereisOlson:

Organisms differ from othermaterial things by havinglives. By a life I meanmore or less what Lockemeant



fundamentallythatwhichiscomposedwhenapluralityofsmallpartsmeetacertaincollectiveconditionisanotionthatemergedfromvanInwagen’sattempttogiveaformallyacceptableanswertohisSpecialCompositionQuestion.But,outsideofhisparticularproject,itisafarmorenaturalstartingpointtopermitthefundamentalnatureofanin-dividualtobecharacterizedintermsoftheactivityoftheindividualit-self,ratherthanthecollectiveactivityofitstinyparts.Afterall,why,inthefirstplace,areweinclinedtoaccepttheexistenceoftheindividualoverandabovetheexistenceofapluralityoftinyinter-relatedpartsifnotbecausewerecognizetheactivityofthewholeindividualitself?

Inadditiontoitsdubiousinitialmotivation,themicro-collectivevi-sionfacestwoproblemscharacteristicofmicro-reductionisminotherareas.Firstthereisaproblemofmultiple realization.Itisplausiblethatacatcouldbeplungedsuddenly intodeepfreeze,andthenlaterre-vived,soastoresumeitsdistinctivefelineactivities.Butthereisnoself-maintainingmetabolicstormduringthefreeze.Afortiori,thereisnocompositeofapluralityofparticlescaughtupinaself-maintainingmetabolic stormduring the freeze. But it is implausible to supposethat there isnoorganismduring the freeze.Thenatural,andbetter,way to thinkabout thecase is that thepreservationofa sufficiencyof cat-characteristic capacities is realized during the freeze—not intheusualway,bythecontinuationofametabolicstorm,butinsteadby thermodynamic stasis.Whatmatters for persistence is that suffi-cient kind-characteristic capacities for whole-organism activity arepreserved.Thespecificunderlyingthermo-chemicalrealizationofthispreservationmayvaryfromcasetocase.

Unger’s (1980)Problemof theMany isanotherwell-knowndiffi-cultyforanyattempttocharacterizeamacroscopiccontinuant“fromthe bottom up”, asmost fundamentally a composite ofmicroscopicpartsinterrelatedinacertainway.Inthevicinityofahumanorganismwillbemanyslightlydifferentbutmassivelyoverlappingpluralitiesofsmallparticlescollectivelyrelatedbytherelevantkindofmetabol-icactivity.Fora theoristwhoholds thatahumanorganism ismostfundamentallyacompositeofsuchaninter-relatedplurality,itisvery

thatahumanorganismcharacteristicallywalks,talks,breathes,fightsinfection,andtherest.

Thedifferenceofsubstanceemergesintheremnantcerebrumcase.Themicro-collectivevisionofthefundamentalnatureofanorganismprovidesatheoreticalreasontosupposethatintheremnantcerebrumcaseahumanorganismisnotpreserved.Inthissituationtheremnantneeds complexexternalmaintenance inorder to regulate its globaltemperatureandnutrition.Externalmaintenanceisneededtopreventitsparticlesfromlosingtheircomplexcollectiveorganization.Soitisnotanentitywhoseparticlesarecaughtupinaself-maintainingbio-logicaleventoftheusualkind.Accordingtothemicro-collectiveview,then,theentityisnotanorganism.14

WecannowdiscernthemoreprincipledreasonforOlsontoselectthecapacitiesrealizedintheautonomic“life-supportsystem”ofahu-manorganismasmetaphysicallynecessaryforitspersistence.Thesecapacitiesdirect the self-maintainingcollectivemetabolicactivityofitssmallparts.Ifthisself-maintainingcollectiveactivityofpartsisfun-damentaltoitsverynatureasanorganism,thennoorganismcouldpossiblyloseitslife-supportcapacities.

Aswehave seen, the “macroscopic” conceptionhas the contraryconsequencethat thehumanorganismpersists in theremnantcasebecauseamassivenumberofcapacities foractivitycharacteristicofthehumanorganismkindarepreserved.Itseesnotheoreticalreasontomakelife-supportcapacitiesinparticularmetaphysicallynecessary.

Havingseenhowthisdisagreementaboutpersistenceconditionsflowsfromthesecontrastingvisionsofthefundamentalnatureofanorganism,thequestionariseswhetherthereisanywaytoadjudicatebetweenthesevisions.

Thereareinfactanumberofreasonstopreferthemacroscopicviewadoptedhere.Apreliminarypointisthis:thenotionofanorganismas

14. Olson explicitly appeals to the absence of the proper relation among thesmallpartsofthecerebrum:“thedetachedcerebrum…isnotananimalbe-causeitspartsdonotcoordinatetheiractivitiesinthewaythatthepartsofanorganismcoordinatetheirs.Itscellsdon’tworktogetherasaself-sustainingunit”(1997:115).



symbionts—suchasbacteria in thegut thatcannot survivewithouttheirhosts—demonstratethegeneralriskofbettingonanysuchsin-gleessenceoflife.17

In the caseofhumanorganisms inparticular, onemight attempttodefendthenecessityofself-maintenanceonthefollowinggrounds:Inahumanorganismtheautonomiclife-supportcapacitiesobviouslyhaveaspecialcausalrole.Duetothethermodynamicinstabilityofsuchacomplexorganicstructure,thelossofthesecapacitieswillveryrap-idlyleadtothelossofalmosteveryothercapacity,includingpsycho-logical capacities.18 Psychological capacities, in contrast,donothavethisspecialcausalrole.Iftheorganismlosesonlyitspsychologicalca-pacities,thenitcanretainitsstructureandmanyothercapacitiesforamuchlongerperiod,asdemonstratedbythehumanvegetablecase.

Butitwouldbeanonsequiturtoinferfromthepremisethataca-pacityhasthisspecialcausalroletotheconclusionthatthecapacityismetaphysicallynecessaryforpersistence.Hereisananalogytomakethepoint:Imagineakindoffragileentitywhichspendsitslifebalanc-ingonanetworkofwobbly tight-ropeshighover jaggedrocks thatwouldsmashittopiecesshoulditfall.Justasacomplexorganiclifeformisthermodynamicallyunstable,needingconstantlytoself-adjustandworktofightitstendencytofallfromastateoflowentropytoastateofhighentropy,sothiskindofcreatureisinagravitationallypre-carioussituation,needingconstantlytoself-adjustandworkagainstitstendencytobedestroyedbyafallfromastateofhighgravitationalpotential toa stateof lowgravitationalpotential.So thecapacity tokeepbalancedhasacausallycentralroleforanentityofthiskind.If

17. Forexample,studiesshowthatparasitesofgenusMycoplasma dependupontheir hosts for amino-acid and co-factor biosynthesis, and fatty-acid me-tabolism.SeeDupréandO’Malley2009forreferencestorelevantempiricalstudies.

18. A few characteristic brutematerial capacitiesmay be preserved for ratherlonger, through theearly stagesofdecomposition:humanoid space-filling,mattress-compressing….Wouldthesefewcapacitiesbesufficientfortheper-sistenceofadiminishedorganism?Wouldafewgrainsofsandbesufficientforasmallheap?Itseemstobeaborderlinecase.

difficulttoavoidtheabsurdconclusionthattherearemanymassivelyoverlappinghumanorganismsinone’svicinity.

This isnot theplace forasurveyof responses to theProblemoftheMany.15Butitisimportanttonotethatthereisawayforwardforthealternativeconceptionofamacroscopiccontinuantasmostfunda-mentallyalocusofkind-characteristicmacroscopicactivity.16 Onthisconception,anobject’spathofmacroscopicactivityhasexplanatorypriorityoveritsconstitutionbysmallparticles.Apluralityofsmallpar-ticlesconstitutesamacroscopiccontinuantatatimebecauseitspathofmacroscopicactivitypassesthroughthepluralityatthattime.Giventhe“coarseness”ofapathofmacroscopicactivity,asinglepathmaypassthroughmanyslightlydifferentpluralitiesofparticlesatatime.Soitfollowsthatasinglemacroscopiccontinuantmaybeconstitutedbymanyslightlydifferentpluralitiesofparticles.Giventhisdirectionofexplanation,thereisnoneedtoadmitmanymacroscopiccontinu-antscorrespondingtothemanypluralities.

Inresponse to thesegeneralproblems foramicro-collectivecon-ception of the fundamental nature of a macroscopic continuant, itmightbepointedoutthatthethesisthatthecapacityforself-mainte-nanceisnecessaryforhumanorganismpersistenceislogicallydetach-able from themicro-collective conception.One canunderstand theactivityofself-maintenanceassomethingdonebytheorganismasawhole,andagreethatitisnotstraightforwardlyconstructiblefromthecollectiveactivityofsmallparts.

Butisthereanygoodreasontosupposethatpreservationofthisparticularwhole-organismcapacityismetaphysicallynecessaryforthepersistenceofahumanorganism?Isthereanygoodreasontosupposethatthelossofthecapacityforself-maintenancecouldnotbecompen-satedbythepreservationofotherkind-characteristiccapacities?

Perhapsitisthoughtthatempiricalsciencehasrevealedself-main-tenancetobetheessenceoflife.Ithasnot.Theexistenceofobligate

15. SeeWeatherson2009forasurvey.

16. ThefollowinggeneralapproachtotheProblemoftheManyisdevelopedinexplicitdetailinJones2015.



(B1)Wewouldgowiththecerebruminaremnantcase.

(B2)We would go with the cerebrum in a separation-and-at-tachmentcase.

We have seen how (A) strongly supports (B1). But (B2) concerns amorecomplexcase,inwhichahealthyandwholehumanorganismisnotwhittleddownleavingacerebruminavat,butinsteadhasitscere-brumcarefullyseparatedaway.Thisleaveswhatappearstobealivinghuman organism in a vegetative state. Nearby is another living hu-manorganisminavegetativestate,missingacerebrum.Thecerebrumseparatedfromtheoriginalorganismisthencarefullygraftedintotheskullofthisreadyorganism.Soonenoughthespecificpsychologicalcapacitiesoftheoriginalhumanpersonwillbeexpressedwherethecerebrumwasgraftedtogetherwiththewaitingorganism.

It is,onthe faceof it,muchharder toseehow(A)couldbecon-sistentwith the intuitive verdict (B2) that oneof uswould gowiththe cerebrum in the separation-and-attachment case. First considertheseparationphase.If(A)wearehumanorganisms,and(B2)wegowiththecerebrum,thenwhataboutthehumanorganismthatisleftbehind inavegetative state?Wheredid it come from? It cannotbesupposedthatitexistedbeforetheseparationevent.Forinthatcaseoneshouldhavetosupposethatthereweretwohumanorganismsatone’slocationbeforetheseparationevent.Thisseemsabsurd.Ontheotherhand,iftheorganismdidnotexistbeforetheoperation,thenitmusthavebeencreatedbytheremovalofthecerebrum.Butitsoundsbizarretosaythatremovinganorganfromahumanorganismcouldbringanewhumanorganismintoexistence.

Parallelworriesafflicttheattachmentphaseofthecase.If(A)wearehumanorganisms,and(B2)wegowiththecerebrum,thenwhathappenstotherecipientvegetativehumanorganism?Isitstillpres-entattheendoftheprocess?Ifso,thentheremustbetwohumanor-ganismsattheendoftheprocess.Butthatsoundsverystrange.Therewould appear to be only a single humanorganismpresent,with aneworgan.Ontheotherhand,ifwesaythattherecipientorganism

itwere to lose that specific self-regulatory capacity, then very soonthereafteritwouldloseallofitsothercapacitiesforcharacteristicac-tivity.Itwouldplungetoitsannihilation.

Butitwouldbeamistaketoinferthattheentity’slossofitssenseofbalanceconstitutes itsdestruction.It isobviouslypossiblefortheentitytopersistforabrieftimeasitsplungestoearth.Thisisnotjustintuitivelyobvious.Itistheoreticallyexplicableontheframeworkad-optedhere:asufficientnumberofotherkind-characteristiccapacitiesmaybepreservedforabrief time,compensatingforthe lossof thespecificcapacity tomaintainbalance.Arapid targeted interventioncouldsavetheentity.Itcould,asseemsplausible,becaughtonthewaydown.

Thesituation isexactlyparallel forahumanorganism that losesitscapacityformetabolicself-maintenance.Withsomeveryquickex-ternal intervention, it could in principle be caught on its plunge tothermodynamicannihilation.Thisiswhathappenstotheremnantce-rebruminavat.Inthissituation,externalinterventionsavesitfromlosing a large number of human-organism-characteristic capacities,despitethe lossof thecapacitytokeepmetabolicallybalancedwith-outassistance.

So,asitseems,thereisnosoundtheoreticalmotivationformeta-physically fetishizing the autonomic self-regulatory capacities real-izedlowerinthenervoussystemoverandabovetherichercapacitiesrealized in the cerebrum.We are thus free to take the theoreticallymoreelegantviewthatahumanorganismcanpersistinvirtueofthepreservationofasufficientnumberofhuman-organism-characteristiccapacities,withoutprejudiceastowhichcapacitiesmustbepreserved.

7. The Cutting and Grafting of Organisms

Thefinalmajorareaofconcernaboutthepresentproposaltomaketheanimalistthesis(A)compatiblewiththeintuitivethesis(B)relatestotheseparation-and-attachmentcase.Recallthat(B)conjoinsthefol-lowingtheses,bothcompelling:



sproutrootsof itsownandflower.Anewlivingorganismhasbeencreated—ageneticcloneoftheparent.Yetbiologicalprocessesthatweregoingoninthetissueoftheparentorganismmaywellhavecar-riedonundisturbedinthetissueofthedaughterplant.

Plantcuttingispreciselyacaseofasymmetricfissionoforganisms.Dominanceinasymmetricfissionoforganismscanmarchinstepwithpreponderanceofbiomass—butitneednot.Supposeonetakesacut-tingfromabananaplantwithagiantleaf,muchlargerinmassthanitsremainingrootandstemstructure.Onenourishesthedetachedleaf,andwhole-plantactivitybeginstomanifest.Itremainsplausiblethatthislargerthingisanewdaughterplant,andtheparentplanthastheremainingrootandstemstructure.Why?Atthefissioneventagreaterrangeofcapacitiesforkind-characteristicactivityispreservedintherootandstemstructurethanintherelativelysimpleleaf.Inafocallyrealizedorganism,preponderanceofbiomass isanunreliableguidetoidentificationofthedominantlocusofkind-characteristicactivity.

Thesameistrueofhumanorganisms.Byseparatingtherestoftheorganismawayfromthecerebrum,one ineffect takesa large livingcutting from the parent organism, a parent organismwhich is nowmuch lessmassivebutnevertheless dominant in virtueof realizingthegreaterrangeofkind-characteristiccapacities.Itmaybedistractingthatitisthecuttingwhichbetterpreservestheoriginalgrossformandappearanceoftheparentorganism,but,ashasalreadybeenpointedout,thesesuperficialcontinuitieshavenooverridingsignificanceforthepersistenceoffocallyrealizedcontinuants.

But still, one might be puzzled. It has been agreed—plausiblyenough—that an individual humanorganism could persistwith itscerebrumrubbedaway.Butsuchahumanvegetablecouldbeanex-actduplicateofthehumanvegetable leftbehindafterthecerebrumseparationevent.Howcanitbeheldthatthehumanorganismwouldpersistasthevegetableinthefirstcase,butnotasthevegetableinthesecond?Howcanthisbecoherent?

This should be nomore or less puzzling than perfectly familiarpairsofcases.Abarofsoapcanberubbeddownto1/5ofitsoriginal

isgonebytheendoftheprocess,thenwearecommittedtotheap-parentlybizarreconclusionthatimplantinganeworgancandestroyahumanorganism.19

Inordertoseetherightwaythroughthesequestions,wecanbe-ginbynotingthattheimageryoforganremovalismisleadingaccord-ingtothepicturedevelopedinthispapersofar.Wehaveseenthatthesmallerobjectresultingfromtheseparationeventpreservessuf-ficienthuman-organism-characteristiccapacitiestocountasalocusofactivityofthatkind:itisahumanorganism.Sotheseparationeventismoreaccuratelyviewedasafission event: it isanevent inwhichhuman-animal-characteristicactivitydividesintotwopaths.Therearetwohumanorganismsattheendofthefissionevent:onepreservingthediverseanddistinctivepsychologicalcapacitiespreservedbythecosmically complexcerebrum—theotherpreserving theautonomiccapacitiesrealizedbythesimplerremainingfragmentofthenervoussystem.Moreover,giventhisasymmetryinthenumberofcapacitiespreserved,itisplausibletoregardthisasacaseofasymmetricfission.Sotheoriginalhumanorganismgoeswiththecerebrum.Thehumanorganism inavegetativestate is the inferior “branch-line”of thefis-sion.Itisanewoffshootorganism.

Thisverdictmayseemsurprising.Biologicalprocessesinthebulkofthetissueoftheinitiallyundividedhumanorganismmaycarryonperfectlyundisturbed in thehumanvegetable leftbehindby thece-rebrum.Sohowcouldthisvegetativeorganismpossiblybeanewlycreatedorganism?

Butthissituationismetaphysicallynodifferentfromactualcasesofplant cutting.Thisisahorticulturaltechniqueofpropagatingplantsbyasexualmeans.Apartofaparentorganismiscutoffandplacedinto,say,ajarofwater.Suitablytendedandnourished,theentityinthejarcancometomanifestwhole-plant-characteristicactivity:itcan

19. Olson(1997:111–123)pressesobjectionsofthiskindagainstananticipatedproposal to combine the animalist claim that we are fundamentally hu-mananimalswiththeclaimthathumananimalshaveLockeanpersistenceconditions.



grafting.Aninferiorplantcanbegraftedontoasuperiorplant.Eventu-allythepartsoftheinferiorplantareabsorbedintotheactivityofthesuperiorplant,andtheinferiorplantisnomore.Thisisacaseofasym-metric fusionoforganisms.Again, there isnoreasontoassumethatdominanceinfusionshouldmarchinstepwithpreponderanceofbio-mass.Alargebutsimpleplantcouldbegraftedontoasmallbutmorerichlyendowedplant,sothat,bytheendoftheprocess,theactivityprevalentlyexpressedistheactivitycharacteristicofthesmallerplant.

Theimageryofimplantinganorganintoahumanorganismisthusmisleading.TheattachmentphaseoftheBrown-Brownson-typecaseisafusionoftwolociofhumanorganismactivity.Itisthegraftingofalargehumanorganismontoasmallhumanorganism.Moreover,itisanasymmetricfusioninwhich,again,capacity-dominanceinvertspreponderanceofmass.Invirtueofthegreatdiversityofspecificca-pacitiesrealizedbythecosmicallycomplexcerebrum,ascomparedtothoserealizedbythesimplerlowernervoussystem,itisplausiblethatthemoremassivehumanorganismwillbeabsorbed into thedomi-nantlocusofactivityofthelessmassiveorganism.21

So, far from creating trouble for animalism, the intuitive Brown-Brownsonverdict(B2)isinfactstronglysupportedbythethesisthatweare fundamentallyhumanorganisms: it is theoreticallyplausiblethatahumanorganismwouldindeed“gowiththecerebrum”intheseparation-and-attachment case. First, a large living cutting is takenfrom thehumanorganism.Second, theoriginal,nowmuch smaller,humanorganismhasalargeinferiororganismgraftedontoit.

8. Conclusion

We have already seen how (A) strongly supports the remnant ver-dict(B1).Sowecannowdrawtheadvertisedoverallconclusion:(A)

21. Againitshouldnotbeassumedthatthefusionofpathsofhuman-organism-characteristicactivityhappensimmediatelyuponphysicalattachment.Theremaybea“settlingin”periodduringwhichwesimplyhavetwohumanorgan-ismsstucktogether.

size.Butifinsteadabarofsoaphas1/5snippedoffdirectly,thenthebarofsoapshrinksdownto4/5of itssize,despite the fact that thesmallercuttingmightintrinsicallymatchthereducedentityinthefirstcase.Theseareduplicateswithquitedifferentorigins.Thefirst isalargebarofsoapshrunkdown.Thesecond isanewchunkofsoapcreatedbytakingacuttingfromaparentbarofsoap.

Inthecaseofasimplehomogenousmaterialconcretionlikeabarofsoap,dominanceinfissionreallyismeasuredbypreponderanceofmass.Thisdifferencewithhumanorganismfissionismetaphysicallyentirelysuperficial,butitislikelytohavemadetherighttheoreticalviewpointheredifficulttospot.Fromthepointofviewofpreservationofhumanorganismcapacities,alargevegetativeorganismisa“small-er” fragment than thecerebrum.Ahumanorganismcanbe rubbeddowntosuchafragment,andsuchafragmentcanbeanewcuttingtakenfromaparentorganism.

Itmaybeahelpfulexercisetoimagineananatomicalprojectionofthehumanorganismonwhichthespatialvolumeofapartispropor-tionaltothenumberofhuman-organism-characteristiccapacitiesreal-izedinthepart.Theprojectedimagecanthenbeusedtojudgedomi-nanceinfissionbycrudemeansofrelativesize.Itisplausiblethat,foradevelopedhumanorganism,thecerebrum-imageinthisprojectionwouldbe“unfolded”toanenormousextent.20

What about the attachmentphaseof theBrown-Brownson case?The attachment phase is also modeled by actual horticultural tech-niques. It ismetaphysically no different from certain cases of plant

20.Forsimplicity,thisdiscussionoffissionignoresthenicequestionofwhetherthefissionofpathsof kind-characteristic activitymusthappen immediately uponspatial separationof cerebrumand “cerebrum-complement”.Aswiththedisassembledwatch,onemight think that the improbablematchingofthe just-separated parts suffices for a single, but spatially forked, path ofpreservedhumanorganismcapacities.Consider theunlikelycapacities forimmunologicalco-operationbetweenthetwoparts.Considerthemanyca-pacities forbodily actionpreservedby theextremely specificharmonybe-tweenthebody-schemaofthemotorcortexandthephysicalstructureofthecerebrum-complement.The“stickingbacktogether”interventionneededtotriggertheseactivitiesisrelativelysimplecomparedtodelicatelyorganizedmatchingofthetwopartsofthescatteredobject.



The second plausible principle is this: verdicts about the persis-tenceofKs inparticularcasesprovideevidential support forclaimsabout which capacities can be sufficient, or dominant, forK-persis-tence.Forexample, the intuitiveverdict thatacomputercanpersistthroughalossofitsmetalcasingcanbetakenasevidencethatcertaincapacitiesaresufficientforthepersistenceofacomputer.

Itfollowsfromthesetwoplausibleprinciplesthattheanimalistisentitled to regard the familiar, strongly intuitive, verdicts aboutourpersistence in the remnantcase,and theseparation-and-attachmentcase,asfurtherevidencethatthecapacitiespreservedbythecerebrumaresufficient,anddominant,forthepersistenceofhumanorganisms.Thereisnothingtopreventananimalistfromusingintuitiveverdictsaboutourpersistenceaspartoftheevidenceforclaimsaboutwhatisenoughforthepersistenceofbiologicalorganismsofthekindweare.

Of course, this supplementary animalist response to the querywouldmakenosensewhatsoeveronthecommonassumptionthatani-malismisinconsistentwiththeintuitiveverdicts.But,ashasbeenar-guedinthispaper,thiscommonassumptiondoesnotseemtobetrue.22

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