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Implications of a strategic analysis:the operational strategy of LoyalistparamilitariesLyndsey Harris aa Centre for Applied Criminology , Birmingham City University ,Birmingham , UKPublished online: 10 Nov 2011.

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Implications of a strategic analysis: the operational strategy ofLoyalist paramilitaries

Lyndsey Harris∗

Centre for Applied Criminology, Birmingham City University, Birmingham, UK

(Received 24 May 2011; final version received 31 August 2011)

Drawing upon empirical evidence and applying a strategic theory approach tounderstanding Loyalist paramilitary activity, this article provides an analysis ofthe two main Loyalist organizations, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) andthe Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). It explores their tactics and operationalstrategy in historical context and offers an assessment of why both organizationshave remained relatively quiet despite the increased dissident Republicancampaign in Northern Ireland.

Keywords: Loyalist paramilitaries; strategic terrorism; strategic theory; UlsterDefence Association; Ulster Volunteer Force

Introduction

Traditional understandings of Loyalist paramilitarism have centered on the assumptionthat Loyalists, unlike Republicans, are incapable of strategic thinking. This perspectiveis prevalent in the media and populist discourse, and, until recently, academic discus-sion contributed to the debate that Loyalists simply applied violence irrationally withmindless sectarian motivations. This paper examines the military tactics and oper-ational strategy employed by the two main Loyalist paramilitary organisations, theUlster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) andreveals that, contrary to the traditional understandings of their activity, Loyalist para-militaries have, and continue to have, a ‘strategic tradition’.

Leading strategic analyst Smith (1997, p. 6) states that an assessment of a strategictradition should examine ‘schematically the evolution of a number of ideologicalthemes . . . which have a bearing upon the employment of the movement’s use ofarmed force’. Exposing the strategic tradition of Loyalist paramilitary groups involvesidentifying Loyalist political objectives; their perceived history; their relationship withthe British and Irish governments, and the Republican ‘movement’; any images thatencapsulate and enforce their ideology, and from which they draw strength; and theestablishment of their primary means of violence (Harris, 2008a, p. 306). The centralfocus of this paper is to concentrate on the latter aspect of their strategic tradition:how Loyalist paramilitaries employed military means in the hope of achieving theirideological goals. Exposing the military strategy of both organizations using a strategictheory approach will provide an explanation for Loyalist military inaction in the face of

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∗Email: Lyndsey.harris@bcu.ac.uk

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political AggressionVol. 4, No. 1, January 2012, 4–25

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increased dissident Republican campaigns (Frampton, 2010) in the current politicalclimate in Northern Ireland (NI).

The utility of a strategic theory approach

First and foremost, it is important to emphasize that, although the strategic approachseeks to offer a framework to analyze political actors, it is: ‘Too formalised to be anart: Too loose to be scientific’ (Smith, 1991, p. 11). Indeed, ‘Unlike the work ofgame theory – which uses mathematical equations and calculations to examine oreven predict outcomes of conflict scenarios – the strategic approach is based on aset of assumptions and principles that govern the way a political actor will, orshould, use the military instrument’ (Harris, 2006, p. 543). Stripped to its basic com-ponents the strategic approach involves identifying the means chosen by the actorsto achieve their desired goal or ‘ends’. It is understood that political actors maychoose to employ more than one means to achieve their desired ends. For example,a military campaign may be pursued alongside political diplomacy, both of whichare orchestrated with the same desired ends. The success of a political actor is notjudged on the morality of their military action, or even on the scale of devastationinflicted, but on an assessment of the actor’s ability to use their military instrumentto achieve their stated political goals.

Essentially, the strategic approach is concerned with explaining the choices anddecisions available to actors. A central part of this enquiry involves the strategicanalyst seeking to identify the value system of the chosen political actor. A strategictheory approach has established (Harris, 2008a, b, 2011) that the UDA’s valuesystem contained notions of Britishness, including the desire to maintain cultural prac-tices and the need to defeat the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to ensure theultimate core value of the defense of ‘their’ communities. Conversely, the UVF’s valuesystem can be identified as informed by notions of Britishness that translate into a para-military mindset requiring the defeat of the PIRA to maintain their ultimate value ofloyalty to the Crown and preservation of NI as a part of the UK. These differenceshave meant that at key moments in Ulster’s past the two organizations have differedin their response to a number of political situations; for example, the UDA presentedthe idea of an independent Ulster in 1979, which maintained links to the Britainthrough Commonwealth membership (New Ulster Political Research Group, 1979).The UVF, on the other hand, would not have considered this a viable option giventheir core value of wishing to maintain the union between Great Britain (GB) andNI. It can be argued that these differences in values have influenced organizationalapproaches in considering how, when and if they should cease to exist (Harris, 2011).

An important assumption of the strategic approach is that actors and their environ-ments can be usefully disaggregated and analyzed in turn. Consequently, the strategicenvironment is considered the determinant of the information available to an actor andthe structure within which actors operate. A benefit of the strategic approach, accordingto Neumann, is that it ‘enables the context to develop whilst preserving an overarchingrationale that organises the content in a systematic fashion’ (Neumann, 2003, p. 4). Thisis a significant observation in light of the aims of this article: the validity of empiricaldata collected in 2005 is confirmed in that the author sought to identify the preferences,rationale and belief systems of the two main Loyalist organizations.

Frieden (1999) highlights that actors’ preferences can be specified using threemethods – assumption, observation and deduction – and warns against failing to

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use a combination of techniques: if we assume that Loyalists are incapable of strategicthinking then this data will be invalid. The author observed Loyalist behavior by study-ing their statements and actions, and through semi-structured interviews of 50 UDA andUVF members, ex-members and Loyalist political party members on a snowballingbasis. The author made a concerted effort to avoid a Belfast-centered approach and con-sequently spoke to Loyalists across NI and from each of the UDA and UVF’s ‘brigade’areas.

Finally, deduction engages the use of pre-exisiting theories that determine featuresof an actor and predict that, in a set context, a particular set of preferences will arise. Forexample, a number of theories have been used in an attempt to understand the form ofterrorism employed by Loyalist paramilitaries, including ‘pro-state terror’ (competitionwith the state for resources; Bruce, 1992); secondary terrorism (‘reflex action’ repsonseto terrorism employed by the Republican movement’; Aughey & McIlheney, 1981);and conservative terrorism (wanting to maintain the status quo; Drake, 1996). Theweakness of this approach is that the deduced preferences will only be as good asthe theories themselves. The synthetic nature of the strategic approach means thatthe fusion of elements of each theory may reveal a greater understanding of Loyalistparamilitary action. Fundamentally, the strategic approach seeks to avoid thinkingabstractly about Loyalists and examine them using a framework of rational analysis.

Operational strategy of Loyalist paramilitaries

Target selection

This section examines target selection and the attempt, by the UDA and UVF, to usetactical armed force to achieve success at the strategic operational level of conflict.When asked who qualified as a legitimate target during the conflict, UDA and UVFrespondents demonstrated a unified response – ‘Republicans’. Respondent D (personalcommunication, 2005), a UDA member, stated:

Republicans: active Republicans; people who were trying to take away our birth rightfrom us. It didn’t necessarily have to be someone carrying a bomb; obviously it couldhave been someone like Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness, the leadership fromSinn Fein, because they were the brains; people on the financial side; some would sayor argue about Pat Finucane [solicitor murdered by the Ulster Freedom Fighters in Feb-ruary 1989] and things like that but they were part of the brains behind the organization –they might not have been a threat militarily – but they were definitely part of the overallstructure and they were the brains behind the whole organization, which was a threat to theLoyalist people.

This sentiment was echoed by UVF respondents who stated, ‘Republicans [were a legit-imate target] and, I suppose supporters of Republicans’ (Respondent C, personal com-munication, 2005); ‘Basically anybody who was prepared to attack the Protestantcommunity’ (Respondent O, personal communication, 2005); ‘Obviously anybodythat came under the PIRA and INLA [Irish National Liberation Army], IPLO [IrishPeople’s Liberation Organisation] and Sinn Fein that intelligence would suggest’(Respondent A, personal communication, 2005).

Bruce (1997) argues that problems with victim selection evident in NI reinforce thecategorization of Loyalist paramilitaries as being pro-state terrorists. He notes that,‘there are features of the nature of pro-state and anti-state terror that mean the formertype of movement is more likely to make those mistakes than the latter’ (1997,

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pp. 60–61). The problem with selecting targets was certainly raised by respondents andcomparisons were made with Republican targeting. For example, Respondent A2offered his analysis:

Republicans basically [were legitimate targets] but in the 70s there wasn’t that much intel-ligence. [P]IRA men didn’t walk about with [P]IRA written on them. It wasn’t until laterstages, which counteracts collusion, where Loyalists actually got information. The infor-mation that they got was common. To actually target [P]IRA men, we couldn’t get muchinformation, because we didn’t know any. Mostly it would have been nationalist commu-nities. (Personal communication, 2005)

However, despite the observation expressed by all respondents about the problems inidentifying Republican targets in the operational field, it is clear that the targeting ofthe wider nationalist community also existed as a specific aim rather than just an oper-ational mistake. For example, a number of media statements were issued throughout theearly 1990s highlighting who the Loyalist paramilitaries felt were legitimate targets,which often reflected the political environment: John Taylor (then senior member ofthe Ulster Unionist Party) stated at a Young Unionist meeting on September 3 1991,that one in three Catholics was ‘either a supporter of murder or worse still a murderer’.Shortly after this sweeping statement the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF – establishedin 1973 following discussions within the UDA about the need to have an organizationthat focused on the military imperatives rather than community activism, also as a strat-egy to avoid proscription of the UDA) issued an audience signal, via the media inOctober, stating that members of the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) would be con-sidered legitimate targets. This was met with condemnation and shortly after the UFFamended this saying that only GAA members with strong Republican links would betargeted. This action lends support to Drake’s assessment that the form of terrorismemployed by Loyalist paramilitaries is conservative in nature (Drake, 1996, p. 38).The main reasons for this, offered by respondents, included the notion that attackingCatholic nationalists and political supporters of the Republican movement would bea means of deterring support and also instilling ‘fear into the other community’:

People would maybe argue that ordinary Catholics were just targeted because they wereCatholics, but what must be understood is that that did happen, and I am not trying tocondone it in any shape or form . . . but it was a terrorist war and what you had to dowas put fear into the other community. Hopefully, the idea was to make the IRA stopdoing it but it didn’t happen for quite some time until people started talking and thingsdeveloped. During the bloody thirty year war, it was just atrocity after atrocity. (Respon-dent C, personal communication, 2005)

The fragile nature of Loyalist targeting was intrinsically linked with the military tacticsemployed by the UDA and UVF at the operational level.

Operational strategy and tactics

When asked if Loyalists paramilitaries possessed a military strategy, many participantsappeared to confuse overall military objectives with the tactical means of achievingthem. Therefore, as will be discussed, although respondents identified key phases ofstrategic aims at the operational level – which can be categorized as ‘defense and deter-rence’, ‘escalating the conflict’ and ‘no first strike’ – some identified problems in themeans (tactics) of trying to achieve this.

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To clarify the problems associated with the distinction between the term ‘tactics’and ‘strategy’ respondents were asked whether they believed the tactics used by Loy-alist paramilitaries remained constant throughout the conflict. Respondent D, a UDABrigadier, identified that:

They were basic tactics: do unto others as they do to you, but do it first. They had a certainamount of intelligence; they knew who were the most likely perpetrators in their areas andthey tried to deal with those individuals and they tried not to bring Republican familiesinto it: there were talks about bombing their houses, putting bombs under their cars; poi-soning their milk they were just talked about but the military people at the time said thatthey didn’t want to fight the dirty war the [P]IRA were fighting, they wanted to fight theindividual; they wanted to show the Republican people and the [P]IRA, itself, that theywere not the invincible people that they try and make out. Some of the operations thatthe UDA have carried out some of the Republicans say that it must be the SASbecause the Loyalists couldn’t have done it. But Loyalists did do it, they had amachine and they knew how to drive it and how to work it. They tried to overextend some-times and they got found out [by the security services]. I think overall, they handled them-selves quite well. (Personal communication, 2005)

The use of reactive tactics referred to by Respondent D highlights an important aspectof Loyalist operational strategy, which included trying to signal their own intent to theRepublicans and at the same time force them into a bargaining situation. This is betterexplained by UVF-aligned Respondent O (personal communication, 2005):

From my point of view the strategy [overall strategic aim of maintaining the union betweenGB and NI] was always the same and they could have increased activity but that was dama-ging to the state and that was something that was against the commitment: that we werealways there to defend the state and protect the state and it was difficult decisions weretaken at difficult times. I think that strategy was maintained from day one. The leadershipmaintained that status of saying this is where we are going, why we are going there and thisis how we are going there and I think that was accepted down the lines. I think had the strat-egy changed we would have gone into full blown mayhem. It was reactionary based onRepublicans and a decision that we wouldn’t be trampled on and to inform Republicansthat their actions had consequences [own emphasis] and I think that that strategy wascarried from day one. It moved the Republican movement into considering that thiscould be damaging to our people and we need to consider other ways. In doing that Ithink that is what brought them to a peace table. I think that had that strategy changedand a decision to bring out into an all-out civil war, I think the UVF philosophy thenwould have been for them to totally eradicate them and that scenario didn’t bode well forthe material well-being for the state and the decision taken at that time to be reactionaryand to put forward that agenda proved the right thing to do.

‘Defense and ‘deterrence’ and the role of sectarianism

It is important to re-address whether Loyalists were operating owing to a purely sectar-ian rationale. It is certainly true that the UDA/UFF and UVF had killed 506 Catholiccivilians between 1969 and 1989 (Bruce, 1992). Particularly horrifying attacks duringthis period of the conflict include those committed by the ‘Shankill Butchers’, underLenny Murphy’s command (Dillon, 1990), and the killing of 15-year-old DavidMcClenghan, who was mentally disabled, in July 1972 (Dillon & Lehane, 1973). Onboth of these occasions, a Loyalist spokesperson condemned the attacks and statedthat they went too far, yet Lenny Murphy is remembered honorably in Combat through-out the issues examined. Combat was a publication produced by the UVF and sold as afundraising mechanism in local communities.

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Without a doubt, sectarian-based killings or attacks have continued throughoutthe conflict, beginning with the very first killings committed by the UVF in 1966.These included Mrs Gould, John Scullion and the infamous killing of Peter Wardby Gusty Spence. According to Shirlow and Monaghan (2006), during the post-cea-sefire period (1995–2005), Loyalists have been responsible for the deaths of 39Catholic civilians. Furthermore, between 1966 and 2005 a breakdown in the percen-tage of deaths caused by Loyalist paramilitaries reveals that Catholics accounted for72% of the total deaths attributed to the UDA/UFF and 71% of UVF deaths. Ontheir own these figures strongly support the assertion that Loyalist paramilitaryaction is sectarian in nature and fundamental to any operational strategy. However,this is where academic understanding and debate about the nature of the NI conflictprovide insight into the strategic thinking of the Loyalist paramilitaries. O’Duffy(1995) argues that, when examining the Northern Ireland conflict, the use of theterm ‘sectarian’ can provide ‘mis-leading labels for the killing of civilians by para-military groups’. He warns that,

[o]nly if we accept that persistent, organized violence is an indication of the depth ofattachment to the ethno-nationalist cause rather than a reflection merely of antipathytowards the opposing community, or simply the work of criminals, can we lay the foun-dation for a regulation of this and other similar conflicts. (O’Duffy, 1995, p. 764)

If we wish to be blunt about the role of sectarianism in the formulation of Loyalist oper-ational strategy, UDA-aligned Respondent A8 highlighted a simple, yet poignantobservation, ‘well I mean let’s be honest. All the murder going on over here is sectarianif you strip it right down to it. I mean the UDA, if they shoot an [P]IRA man, he’s still aCatholic. If the [P]IRA shoots a UDA man he’s still a Protestant. All murders are sec-tarian if you take it that far’ (personal communication, 2005). Incidents such as BloodyFriday, July 1972, when the PIRA destroyed areas of the center of Belfast in a coordi-nated bombing campaign, appear to have removed any previous inhibitions about tar-geting innocent Catholics (Taylor, 1999; Respondent A24, personal communication,2005; Sammy Duddy, personal communication, 2005; Respondents C–F and I, per-sonal communication, 2005).

The key point about sectarianism is not whether it exists but whether it is central toLoyalist operational strategy. Simply, was it a random sectarian attack or was there alonger-term goal it was working towards? Admittedly, throughout the conflict, particu-larly in the early stages of the conflict, it appears that random attacks were being com-mitted, especially on a ‘tit for tat’ basis, but as stressed above, this can be mainlyattributed to the gradual emergence of the structure of the Loyalist organizations, fail-ings in intelligence gathering and interception, and the time it took to obtain a focus onmilitary objectives. UVF-aligned Respondent G (personal communication, 2005) fromCounty Londonderry, when asked whether the tactics used by Loyalists paramilitariesremained constant throughout the conflict, observed that the organization was limitedby the targets chosen at the onset of the conflict:

in the 1970s it became very sectarian but although saying that there was certainly a cam-paign against the south in the 1970s . . . it sort of diminished and fell away until the late1980s. In the early 1990s, the Loyalist campaign intensified and I think it was when theywere at their strongest. They certainly became more selective in their targeting and maybefor the first time there was an element of coordination between the various Loyalistgroups. So, I think that there wasn’t so much a varying of tactics but I think it became

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more that they became better at what they were doing and they were better armed, betterintelligence etc.

As illustrated in the above quote ‘Returning the serve’ campaigns are also a regularfeature of Loyalist tactics throughout the conflict, particularly during the 1980s(Taylor, 1999). This is an extension of sectarian tactics and explicitly linked to Loy-alist belief in ‘protecting’ their community, which one sees markedly following thecreation of the UFF and the 1975 UVF leadership coup, ‘The logic behind theUFF’s attempts at mass murder was, if only Protestants suffered from terroristattacks without retaliation in kind, there would be no disincentive for the IRA tobomb and kill at will until their objective was attained’ (North Belfast Prisoners’Aid, 1999, p. 38).

The justification given for these types of campaigns was that it was an attempt to‘maintain the balance of terror’ – with the objective being to provide ‘costly signals’to Republicans with the aim to:

frighten an enemy and his/her community to the point where they will accept the con-ditions of the aggressor in return for safety, or more simply, a reasonable chance thathe will not kill you. The [P]IRA had unquestionably terrified the Protestant community,and the choice was simple to surrender or fight back. (North Belfast Prisoners’ Aid, 1999,p. 38)

When interviewed in 2002, John White, offered a justification for retaliatory killings inthat, ‘Loyalists will respond because Loyalists will feel that if they don’t respond thenby the use of violence by Republicans they will gain concessions and I think Loyalistswill feel compelled to retaliate’. White’s assessment was echoed by 80% of UDA-affiliated members interviewed, who all provided insight into the use of military‘voice’ to as a means of conveying audience signals to the British government overfears that they were capitulating to Republican paramilitary pressure. This assertionsupports Drake’s (1996), O’Duffy’s (1995) and Cavanaugh’s (1997) analysis of theform of terrorism employed by Loyalist paramilitaries.

The reason for the reversion to ‘tit for tat’ and ‘returning the serve’ tactics at timesthroughout the conflict, with events such as Greysteel attack 1993, has often beenlinked with Bruce’s (1997) analysis that Sinn Fein or PIRA members are not asclearly identifiable targets for the Loyalists as the security forces are for the Republi-cans. However, although operational strategy may have changed, it is important tonote that similar tactics may be used to achieve their aims. Thus, to remain a visibleresistance to the PIRA, Loyalist operations had to be conducted with the aim ofhaving an impact on the communities the Republicans claimed to represent. Further-more, if we consider a strategic analyst’s interpretation of these events. it is clearthat these were tactics used with the intention of providing ‘costly signals’ to Repub-licans (we will continue targeting Catholics), and ‘audience signals’ to both the nation-alist community (everyone in the nationalist community must put pressure on the PIRAto end their armed campaign or else you will continue to be targeted) and British gov-ernment (do not give in to Republican terrorism and do not recede on your commitmentto the constitutional position of NI).

It is evident that Loyalists were employing a certain degree of strategic thinking andnot just aimlessly retaliating. This idea of maintaining the psychology of terror, andthus disorientation (Neumann & Smith, 2008), was also employed during anotherphase of operational strategy – escalation – which was alluded to when respondents

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referred to the changing nature of Loyalist paramilitary tactics; in essence it was ‘esca-lating the conflict’.

Escalation

Aughey and McIleney (1981) identify Loyalist paramilitaries as ‘secondary’ terrorists;this includes a description of Loyalists paramilitaries as being reactive in nature andincapable of imposing their own solutions to the conflict. The underlying hypothesisof this category is that Loyalists were simply mimicking Republican terror and,although at the turn of the 1980s the UDA did become more selective in their targeting,this was due to ‘individual mavericks’. It is quite clear from the responses gained whythis categorization of terrorism was given to Loyalist activity and tactics covering threeperiods of UDA activity, 1972–1973, 1974–1979 and 1979–1980: it was during theseperiod that the UDA/UFF and the UVF were involved in numerous tit-for-tat killingsand respondents did confirm that to a certain extent Loyalist paramilitaries were imitat-ing some elements of tactics employed by Republicans. Respondents were asked, ‘DidLoyalists respond to changes in PIRA tactics?’ Respondent B (personal communi-cation, 2005) summarized the majority of responses gained when discussing Loyalisttactics:

I think it would have been a measured response to what the [P]IRA had been doing. If theyhad inflicted some ‘spectaculars’ or losses on the Loyalist Protestant community then theUVF would have responded in kind: you have seen that from the likes of the Shankillbombing where there was pretty atrocious retaliations [by Loyalist paramilitaries] atthat time [early 1990s].

Respondent G from County Londonderry did not deny the copying of Republicantactics but highlights that they were very much mirrored because they were recognizedas being successful at the tactical level:

I would certainly say that certain Loyalists units I can speak for certainly mimicked[P]IRA tactics and the sort of weaponry they were using: the cell structure; intelligencegathering; the need-to-know basis of operations; car bombs etc. This was becausepeople in the leadership recognized and it emerged that the [P]IRA were so successfulin their tactics so it would have been foolish not to have copied to a certain extentwhat they were doing. (Personal communication, 2005)

Aughey and McIlheney’s (1983) accurate description of the reactive nature of Loy-alist tactics can be viewed from a different perspective if we map the key principles ofstrategic theory over military action employed by Loyalist paramilitaries. While it isaccurate to describe Loyalist tactics as reactionary owing to the use of ‘tit for tat’ kill-ings and mimicking the weaponry used by Republicans such as car bombing and shoot-ings, this fails to account for any strategic thinking behind their actions. Therefore, if weconsider that Loyalist paramilitaries had a firm understanding of their tactical capabili-ties and used the means available to them, this did not mean that they were ‘incapable ofimposing their own solution’ to the conflict. In conducting campaigns based on adefense and deterrence operational strategy we could argue that, following an examin-ation of the preferences of Republicans and the strategic environment, it was felt thatthis was the best course of action to take in order to achieve their overall organizationalvalues. This seems to be a logical option in disorientating and achieving a desired targetresponse. Therefore, Loyalists were acting in accordance with their own preferences,

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which included defending ‘their’ communities and trying to deter Republicans fromattacking British citizens, which was intrinsic in defeating the PIRA. The problemsquite clearly lie in use of the military instrument as a whole, which is linked to the tac-tical instruments available.

An examination of the merits of this strategy is extremely questionable outside ofthe mind-set of Loyalist paramilitarism and is discussed in more detail below. Loyaliststhemselves seem to have recognized the flaws in this operational strategy when wewitness the emergence of the escalation principle.

From the onset of the conflict until 1984, it is clear that Loyalist paramilitaries sawtheir role in the conflict as ‘secondary’ terrorists. However, following the imposition ofthe 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, the concept of a betrayal by the British governmentbegan to play very heavily on the minds of Loyalist paramilitaries (Harris, 2008b). Fol-lowing numerous press leaks of secret government talks with the PIRA in combinationwith issues such as the merging of the Ulster Defence Regiment and Royal IrishRangers, which was perceived by Loyalists as ‘another concession to Republicans’,and took place following a long public debate over issues of collusion betweenmembers of the security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries. In 1988, following theincreased Irish government involvement in NI’s affairs and the Hume/Adams talks,Loyalists identified the ‘Pan-Nationalist Front’, which opened up a different avenueto convey a number of signals. As a result, Loyalist paramilitaries intensified their oper-ational strategy with the expressed aim of the UVF, who were influenced by Progress-ive Unionist Party (PUP) negotiators, to ‘escalate the conflict to end the conflict’. Thisreaction supports the assertion of Neumann and Smith (2008), who describe the emer-gence of pro-state terrorists as a reaction to an apparent ‘appeasement of the moderates’,a consequence of a perceived power deflation of the British government. The UDAwere more concerned with escalation to defeat the PIRA. There is a subtle differencehere, as will be apparent, as the UVF were concerned with escalating the use of militaryaction in the hope of forcing the PIRA into negotiation; the UDA, on the other hand,wanted the total annihilation of the PIRA.

Gusty Spence and a small number of other influential Loyalists involved in the cre-ation of the PUP, discredited sectarianism as a motive for military action, and further-more, they advocated discussion with enemies in the higher ranks of the PIRA. As aresult, the UVF became politically orientated much earlier than the UDA; thus, oper-ational strategy was adjusted and it was decided to ‘up’ the campaign against the‘Pan-Nationalist’ front, while trying to gain some credibility in politics. Hence, theUVF/PUP was beginning to emulate Sinn Fein and PIRA’s dual use of military andpolitical voice (Spencer, 2008; Harris, 2008b).

The UFF, on the other hand, decided that the only way they were going to defeat theRepublicans was by adopting a pro-active military strategy. Following the rise to powerof the younger, militant men, such as Johnny Adair, the UFF adjusted their operationalstrategy. It was felt that they were not succeeding in defeating the PIRA and conse-quently failing in their overall strategic aim of protecting ‘their’ community. In spiteof the reasons why each Loyalist organization chose to adopt such an aggressive cam-paign, it certainly illustrates that new military capabilities were exhibited. An interviewwith a leading member of the UFF supports this:

I wouldn’t ever want to see sectarian tit for tat killings return. I think we would see a moreintelligent campaign. For example all these figures from the Republican movement whohave crawled out of the woodwork thinking it is now safe to show their faces and their

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hatred of Loyalist people would then find themselves on the front line. (Warrior, Autumn1998, p. 15)

The move towards selective targeting was emphasized in operational reports publishedin Combat (1991), which included statements similar to the following: ‘The UVF stressthat this is not a tit for tat campaign against the Roman Catholic population inN. Armagh. It is an on-going war against assassins of Loyalists and the UVF statethat no one is in danger because of their religion’.

Nevertheless, Loyalists still strove to use tactics aimed at maintaining the balanceof terror, and causing disorientation in the strategic environment, including the target-ing of politicians based in the Republic of Ireland, which was signaled in the media inMay 1993. Furthermore, the UDA continued targeting Catholics in response toRepublican attacks: Michael Stone attacked the Milltown cemetery in March 1988;he was an example of the more militant members who were to emerge later as thenew leaders of the UFF. Consequently, the UFF not only committed this attack asrevenge for the 1986 Enniskillen bombing and the murder of John McMichael (inaccordance with the ‘return of serve’ tactics), but they were also indicating the newoffensive strategy based on ‘escalating the conflict’ that they intended to pursue.Up until that point it is alleged that there was an agreement between Loyalist andRepublican paramilitary organizations that their ‘top table’ would be granted immu-nity from assassination (Taylor, 1999, p. 202). The UFF changed this and the pathtowards selective targeting was laid. Furthermore, a series of firebomb attacks inDublin by the UVF in 1992 made a very clear statement that the Loyalists werenot going to remain on the defensive, but take a proactive role in the conflict in anattempt to intensify it and destroy the enemy (Combat, 2002). The late DavidErvine, former leader of the PUP, summarized this change in strategy when inter-viewed as ‘let’s escalate the war to end the war’. Ervine’s response also went on tohighlight the UVF’s understanding of commitment issues. The UVF had maintaineda strategy of escalation with the expressed purpose of ‘ending’ the war, and as aresult of this they agreed, alongside the UDA under the banner of the Combined Loy-alist Military Command (CLMC), to observe a ceasefire in aid of facilitating theBrooke–Mayhew talks, which began on 29 April 1991:

I think we did relatively well and that led to the ceasefire of 1991 to coincide with theBrooke–Mayhew Talks (which of course failed and so too did the ceasefire). Therewas something interesting happening at that time too, every pundit, commentator andanalyst believed that the Loyalists couldn’t hold their ceasefire and they did. (Ervine, per-sonal communication, 2005)

The main differences between UVF and UDA operations were visible once they hadagreed through the CLMC that they were working towards an end to conflict in1991. Around the same time that the UFF received a change in leadership, the UVFwere developing political think tanks – ‘kitchen cabinets’, who decided that the bestway to end the conflict was to escalate it.

Loyalist paramilitaries did step up their operations against known Republicans andtargets in the Republic of Ireland. There were also clear cases where the tactic of targetingCatholic civilians remained in place: for example, in response to the October 1993 Shan-kill Bombing the UVF was responsible for a number of reprisal killings. UVF activityduring the period of 1991–1994 was less widespread than that of the UFF, whocarried out over two-thirds of the military activity. The new leadership within the

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UFF, quite void of internal political constraints, combined this offensive strategy withretaliations.

The selective targeting of Sinn Fein and PIRA men was successful numerically,with the UVF and UFF killing 26 members between 1989 and 1993, includingJohn Davy (Sinn Fein Councilor) and James Kelly (PIRA Volunteer). However,Catholic civilians were still targeted, as mentioned above, and between 1992 and1993 Loyalist surpassed the Provisional IRA in the number of their victims: in1992, Loyalists out-killed Republicans with the UDA/UFF killing 37 people to thePIRA’s 33; and in 1993 Loyalists killed 44, to the PIRA’s 36 (McKittrick, Kelters,Feeney & Thornton, 2001, pp. 1494–1496). The reason for Catholic civilians beingtargeted could be due to regional autonomy that still existed to a certain extentwithin the UDA, but primarily one is led to believe that this was a part of an ‘allout’ offensive against Republicans in an attempt to combine the psychology ofterror with a signal to the British and Irish governments that they would not accepta united Ireland, hence ensuring they maintained pressure on their target audiencewhile continuing a process of disorientation.

A number of significant signals are evident throughout this ‘escalation’ period. Inresponse to increased PIRA bombing campaigns in Britain, PIRA targeting of Protes-tant housing estates, and the Teebane bombing that killed eight Protestant workers inCounty Tyrone, the UFF issued a statement on 6 November 1992 stating that itstargets were now extended to include ‘the entire Republican community’. The state-ment itself was an audience signal, intended to convey a message to Republicansthat continued attacks on British citizens would face reprisal. The PIRA paid noheed to the message the UFF conveyed and on 13 November detonated a large carbomb in Coleraine town center. The UFF then responded with a costly signal andcarried through their threat of reprisal by killing three Catholic civilians in Belfast.The PIRA did not cease in their bombing campaign and December 1992 witnessed asustained Republican bombing campaign, affecting Belfast and Manchester. Againthe UFF continued with reprisal tactics, including a series of incendiary bombattacks on shops in Dublin and other border town areas. Although the PIRA called athree-day ceasefire over the Christmas period, the UDA issued a statement in whichthe organization threatened to increase its level of violence ‘to a ferocity never ima-gined’. This was a clear signal to the Republican paramilitaries that they would con-tinue with reprisal attacks, therefore emphasizing their commitment to militaryactivity if the PIRA continued with their military campaigns. Alongside the UDA state-ment, The Times reported on 12 January 1993 that the UDA was planning to target the‘pan-nationalist front’. The origins of the article are unclear but the message was takento include members of Sinn Fein, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), theIrish government, the PIRA and, as discussed above, the GAA. This intention was con-firmed in February when the UDA planted two incendiary bombs outside SDLP coun-cilors’ homes.

The Warrington Bombing of March 1993 indicated to Loyalist paramilitaries thatthe PIRA had no intention of ending their military campaign. In an attempt to furtherforce the PIRA into a bargaining position and to demonstrate their commitment tothe threat of increased violence, the UFF shot dead four Catholic workers (one ofwhom was later confirmed by the PIRA to have been a member of their organization)in Castlerock, and in a separate incident killed a Catholic civilian, 17-year-old DamienWalsh, and injured one other. However, the PIRA continued with their campaign andbombed Bishopsgate in London on 24 April 1993.

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Coinciding with the day of the Bishopsgate bombing, John Hume (the SDLP leader)and Gerry Adams (President of Sinn Fein) issued their first joint statement. It is clearfrom Loyalist paramilitary action that the combination of a PIRA bombing campaignand the fact that the SDLP was in negotiations with Sinn Fein was interpreted as indi-cation that there was a concerted campaign to unite nationalism and Republicanism tostrengthen their attempts at securing a united Ireland. The commitment level to thethreat of increased violence would therefore need to be maintained, in line with theescalation principle. On 1 May, the UFF killed a Sinn Fein party member (AlanLundy) who was working on a Sinn Fein Councilor’s (Alex Maskey) home in westBelfast. Furthermore, the UVF issued a statement on May 9 warning that politiciansin the Republic of Ireland were now legitimate targets. We could argue that theincreased level of violence and widening of targets by Loyalist paramilitaries reflectedthe increased disillusionment with the political situation in NI at the time. This was cer-tainly reflected in a CLMC statement issued on 17 May 1993 that confirmed that theywould be analyzing the local government election (19 May) to see if there was any ‘evi-dence of pan-nationalist candidates’ cooperating with each other.

The end of September 1993 played into the hands of Loyalist fears when the IrishTimes claimed that the Hume–Adams Initiative had asked the British government to tryand persuade Unionists that their best interests lay with being a part of a united Irelandand that Britain no longer held a long-term interest in the province. The UDAresponded in a failed attempt to convince Unionists to boycott government; this wasfollowed by a military response on 6 October, when the UFF carried out a gunattack in Twinbrook, west Belfast. Immediately after the attack, the UFF claimedthat this was in response to the Hume–Adams Initiative and reinforced their commit-ment to attack the ‘pan-nationalist front’. Towards the end of 1993, Loyalist paramili-taries were engaged in an operational campaign based on escalation in an effort toreinforce their commitment to increasing the level of violence, which also reflected afear for the future of NI’s constitutional position and the motivations of the Britishgovernment.

The CLMC issued a statement on 22 November in which they maintained that Loy-alist paramilitaries were preparing for war in case peace was ‘bought at any price’. Thisis quite clearly an audience signal intended for everyone within the strategic environ-ment. First, Loyalists were stating a bargaining position to the British government: ifthe government had committed a deal to end Republican terrorism based on apromise of a united Ireland in the future, then Loyalists would increase their level ofviolence and would not be duped. Second, it was a signal to the wider Loyalist com-munity that, if the British government was to betray them on the constitutional issue,they would not accept this and would ‘represent them’. Third, this can also be seenas a signal to the wider Republican and nationalist communities that Loyalist parami-litaries would not accept a united Ireland even if Republicans stopped their armed cam-paign. Finally, it was a clear signal to the PIRA that they were prepared to continueengaging them militarily. The commitment of this statement was highlighted twodays later when a large consignment of arms intended for the UVF was interceptedby British police at Teesport.

The Downing Street Declaration (DSD) of December 1993 was met initially withvery little resistance from Loyalist paramilitaries and on 25 January 1994 the CLMCannounced that it would adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude towards it. Although Wood(2006, p. 179) attributes the UDA response to the DSD to the fact that they were notexpecting such an initiative from the British and Irish governments, this reaction can

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be better understood if we consider the ambiguous reaction of Sinn Fein towards theDSD. Gary McMichael, a founding member of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), dis-cussed in his memoirs the desire of Loyalists to ‘study the reaction of Republicans’(McMichael, 1999, p. 51). The DSD combined with the announcement made by theBritish government leading up to the Brooke–Mayhew talks that they held ‘noselfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland’ consolidated the viewamongst Loyalists that the British government was not committed to maintaining theconstitutional position (McMichael, 1999). When considering the values of both Loy-alist organizations, it is little surprise, therefore, that violence increased throughout1994 with Loyalist paramilitaries, particularly the UFF, involved in various incidentssuch as the exploding of incendiary devices in Dundalk and Dublin, rocket and gunattacks on Sinn Fein offices in west Belfast, and attacks on SDLP and Sinn Fein coun-cilors. The CLMC issued a statement on 11 July 1994 conveying a strong message – inwhich there could be no mistaking its intention – that, if the PIRA ended its campaign,Loyalists would do the same.

The announcement of the PIRA ceasefire on 31 August 1994 followed a number ofPIRA operations on the mainland and the assassination of UDA members Joe Brattyand Raymond Elder. Loyalist paramilitaries, despite the CLMC statement issued inJuly, did not automatically stop their military operations. One of the major reasonsfor this can be found in the ability of the CLMC to determine the commitment of thePIRA to the ceasefire. McMichael summarized the understanding Loyalists had ofRepublican preference structure and of the nature of the strategic environment theywere now operating in, which was supported by Respondents O, M and A24:

The national evening newspaper, The Belfast Telegraph, carried the headline ‘IT’SOVER’, but we did not see it that way. An absence of violence is not peace. An[P]IRA ceasefire was not more important than the motives behind it or the strategy itmight be a part of. The mood within the Unionist community as a whole did not reflectthe relief that was undoubtedly there for it was masked by uncertainty and suspicion.Besides all the focus was on the [P]IRA ceasefire alone. That did not make a successfulpeace process. It had to be part of a larger equation. So eyes began to turn to Loyalistgroups. (McMichael, 1999, p. 63)

Furthermore, with the events of the previous year still fresh in their minds, Loyalistswere very wary that a secret deal may have been done by the British government.This was not an irrational response: an Ulster Marketing Survey poll reported in theBelfast Telegraph on 2 September 1994 indicated that 56% of respondents believedthat the Provisional IRA ceasefire was the result of a secret deal and a further 70%did not believe that the ceasefire would be permanent. The reaction of Loyalist parami-litaries varied: the UFF committed one further act of violence during this escalationphase, shooting dead a Catholic civilian John O’Hanlon. The UVF response wascharacterized by a deliberate attempt to provoke PIRA activity to enable an assessmentto be made of their commitment to the ceasefire. For example, on 4 September the UVFleft a car bomb outside a Sinn Fein office in west Belfast. This was followed four dayslater by a statement from the CLMC in which Loyalist paramilitaries sought assurancesthat no secret deal had been done by the British government and that the PIRA ceasefirewas permanent. Events that followed the CLMC’s 8 September statement demonstratethat Loyalist paramilitaries were employing costly signals to both the British govern-ment and the PIRA, and testing their commitment to the current process: the UVFexploded a 1.5 kg bomb on the Belfast to Dublin railway, which would have caused

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significantly more damage than the injury of two people if it had exploded properly.However, the key point here is that Loyalists (and there is a strong case to speculatethat, although claimed by the UVF, the UDA were also involved) were also signalingtheir commitment to continue with an operational strategy of escalation if the Repub-licans failed to maintain their ceasefire. The following month, after a lull in Loyalistactivity, the CLMC issued a formal declaration of ceasefire on 13 October 1994.

Controversially, John Taylor (a senior Ulster Unionist politician), despite his plea inOctober 1993 for Loyalists to desist from using violence, claimed that:

The loyalist paramilitaries achieved something which perhaps the security forces wouldnever have achieved, and that was they were a significant contribution to the [P]IRAfinally accepting that they couldn’t win . . . So I think this got the message over to the[P]IRA that no longer were they just going to be the one and only terrorist organization.(Cited in Taylor, 1999, p. 234)

Respondents claimed that they had succeeded, through a combination of selective tar-geting and escalating the terror, in bringing the PIRA to a ceasefire. This assertion isillustrated in issues of Combat throughout 2002, which have pages of ‘counter-terror-ist reports’ reminiscing about how active service units ‘bravely took the war toviolent Republicans’. It could certainly be argued that increased Loyalist activitydid indicate to Republicans that Loyalism would not disappear even if there was asettlement over the constitutional issue. The peace process that followed resultedin Loyalists having to concentrate on the use of political rather than military voice.Nevertheless, there was still an operational strategy enforced, which has been ident-ified as ‘no first strike’.

‘No first strike’

Insight into the thinking behind a ‘no first strike’ strategy is aided by the responsesobtained regarding why Loyalists entered into the ceasefire. The overriding featureof responses to this question is that, because of the value systems and aim of the organ-izations, they had little reason not to reciprocate a PIRA ceasefire because that wouldnot be in the best interests of their communities and the constitutional position. Therewas a slight variation in responses gained between UVF and UDA members: all UVF-associated participants maintained that the Loyalist ceasefire was the correct wayforward in 1994. However, UDA-aligned respondents indicated some reservationsthat they still held associated with the belief that they were on ‘top of their game’and that, unlike Republicans, they were not able to avenge the deaths of members oftheir organization. It is clear that one UDA Belfast Brigadier attributes some of the pro-blems of post-ceasefire discipline to this factor:

I wasn’t too long out of prison when it happened and I was against it to tell you the truth.Not against the ceasefire maybe, but against the way it happened – I heard about it on thenews. I don’t think it should have happened that way; I think there should have been moreconsultation with the membership and more dialogue with the people who fought thefight, the people in the country areas – everybody . . . The UDA didn’t deal with their pro-blems with Sinn Fein and they didn’t tie up their loose ends . . . there was outstandingdebts I believed, and still think, should have been sorted out before we got to that situationbecause the IRA was appeasing their hawks before they signed up to it and I think theLoyalist paramilitaries should have done the same [in reference to the killing of JoeBraddy and Ray Smallwood by Republicans]. Then I suppose it might have gone on

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but I think that under those circumstances it should have been dealt with. (Respondent, D,personal communication, 2005)

A common variable of leaderships was discussed by all UDA and UVF partici-pants when considering the reasons for entering into a ceasefire in 1994. The decisionto commit to a ceasefire in October 1994 was one made almost exclusively by theleadership of both organizations, under the CLMC umbrella, with very little discus-sion and contact made with grass-roots members. For example, Respondent G,from County Londonderry discussed the relationship between the leadership and vol-unteers in his response to the question, ‘Why did the UVF enter the ceasefire whenthey did?’

It was and that was the thing you see the command structure – we have no say. It is ruledfrom Belfast Brigade Staff and they had information from people like David Ervine, BillyHutchinson and they decided that the time was to call the ceasefire. They would have con-sulted along with the UDA through the CLMC. What I personally think, and not only mebut a lot of people involved in Loyalism, even at senior level would have said now is notthe time. A lot of people were caught up in the thing of peace and they were glad to see it.I think they will probably admit themselves that if they had sat down and give it morethought then maybe they wouldn’t be in the position today that we are in. (RespondentG, personal communication, 2005)

The above quotation neatly summarizes the general responses obtained by UVFmembers who suggested that a major reason for deciding to commit to the ceasefireincluded feeling ‘war weary’ (Respondents J and O, personal communication, 2005).UVF respondents, in particular, highlighted the belief that, because the PIRA hadagreed to a ceasefire, they no longer had a legitimate opponent to target using exclu-sively military means.

An acute understanding was conveyed from UVF respondents that a realization hadbeen made by PIRA and UVF leadership that the use of military tactics to achieve theiraims could not be sustained and that the optimal way forward was to pursue their valuesthrough exclusively political means:

I remember that in and around Belfast in the front line for 30 odd years, it was goingnowhere. Provies [PIRA] would be doing something like bombing and then the loyalistswould go in shooting up bars and restaurants – what did it really achieve? I think it justcame to a realization because of the older membership who had been there from day one –they sort of said to themselves what is this all about – they saw a window open for a pol-itical settlement and they went for it to give it a try. (Respondent N, personal communi-cation, 2005)

A senior UVF member supported this statement and conveyed an understanding thatthe Loyalist community was pressurizing Loyalist paramilitaries to commit to peace:

I think it was because it was the right thing to do. We had to create and there had to be acreation of an avenue for the exploration of peace and the actions of the ceasefire hadproven militarily that Loyalism was capable of going toe-to-toe in causing a lot ofharm to Republicanism. I think on the other hand we had to create an avenue foroption of a form of peace and it goes back to modeling ourselves as a people’s armyand what the people wanted. The explanation was that within the Loyalist communitythat people wanted peace, so we had to create that space where that could be explored.I think that, that was a part of what the ceasefires were. (Respondent O, personal com-munication, 2005)

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It is quite clear from the responses obtained from senior UVF members that a consider-ation of Republican preferences was made. This was attributed to the capabilities of theUVF leadership, who since the 1970s had been credited with examining possible exitstrategies from the conflict.

In comparison, the UDA Inner Council agreed to the ‘no first strike’ approach froma different angle: the responses obtained from senior members of the UDA alluded to ageneral position of ‘wait and see’ concerning their commitment to the ceasefire.Respondent T, for example, stated, ‘I think that . . . there was a small inclination of,“we’ll enter the ceasefire and we’ll see” – a watching brief’ (personal communication,2005).

Following an intense period of violent clashes over the controversial Drumcreeparade route in the summer of 1995 and interface violence, the CLMC issued a state-ment on 25 August declaring a ‘no first strike’ policy. This can be interpreted as anaudience signal intended to demonstrate that, while Loyalist were committed to theirceasefire, they would also continue with their watching brief and be prepared toreturn to defend ‘their’ communities or the constitutional position if attacked first. Itmay also have been intended to test the water regarding opinion from within theirown communities for a return to conflict.

The PIRA bombing of Canary Wharf in London on 9 February 1996 resulted in theCLMC having to reconsider its operational strategy. According to Wood (2006), theCLMC met weekly and offered reassurances to Loyalists to remain calm. Writing inThe Independent three days after the Canary Wharf bombing, McMichael gave aninsight into the thinking of the CLMC at the time:

The loyalist organizations have demonstrated remarkable restraint so far in difficult cir-cumstances. The CLMC is committed to a democratic resolution of the conflict;however, its members are compelled to defend their community from attack. The respon-sibility lies squarely at the feet of the IRA to avoid a return to war. Much will depend uponthe actions of Republicans in coming days and weeks, and Loyalists will be keeping theevolving situation under constant review. (McMichael, 1996, p.14)

The commitment to a ‘no first strike’ operational strategy by the leadership of the twomain Loyalist paramilitary groups was reinforced in the lead-up to the signing of theGood Friday/Belfast Agreement (1998). Nevertheless, some Loyalist paramilitarymembers continued engaging in military activity post-1994 ceasefire. The source ofthis activity was often splinter organizations such as the Loyalist Volunteer Force,who opposed negotiations with the PIRA and inclusion of Republicans in government,alongside disenchanted grass-roots members (Harris, 2011; Monaghan 2004;Neumann, 2004). However, the UVF leadership, following discussions with their mem-bership, led their organization to full decommissioning in June 2009. The UDA, owingto the fractured nature of leadership and dissident Republican activity, took longer todecommission, but eventually made the announcement alongside a declaration of itsdisbandment in January 2010 (Harris, 2011).

Dissident Republican activity and the Loyalist response

When considering Loyalist use of the military instrument, it was imperative to gaugefrom respondents why the UDA and UVF did not revert back to previous operationalstrategies when Republican splinter groups, such as the Real IRA (RIRA) and Conti-nuity IRA (CIRA), continued employing low-level military campaigns in the UK?

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Considering the commitment and emphasis made to ‘no first strike’, at face value thestrategic analyst would assert that the Omagh bombing of 1998 and continuedattacks on British targets by the RIRA throughout 2000–2001 would have prefaceda return to the use of the military instrument. However, upon reflection of the responsesgained, it is evident that the leadership of the UDA and UVF, alongside the influence ofpolitical parties and clergy, played an important role in ensuring that Loyalists did notrevert to military tactics. Essentially, Loyalists demonstrated an ability to distinguishbetween PIRA and dissident activity. It can be postulated that, owing to problemsthe leadership were facing in convincing members within their own organization ofthe need to remain committed to a ceasefire and support the Good Friday/BelfastAgreement (Harris 2011, 2008; Southern, 2011), the leadership identified a similarpattern occurring within the Republican movement that the RIRA and CIRA wereoutside of the control of the Provisional IRA leadership.

Respondents were asked whether they differentiated between dissident and PIRAactivity. An interesting pattern emerged, which reflected discussions that were totake place in the period during and subsequent to the dates on which respondentswere interviewed: although grass-roots members of the organizations – especially inthe border areas of NI – were less open to any distinction between the two forms ofRepublicanism, leadership figures, senior members of the UDA and UVF demonstratedan ability or, at least, a willingness to differentiate between dissidents and PIRAactivity. Reinforcing the military thinking identified during the final stages of oper-ational strategy, Jackie McDonald, the UDA leader in south Belfast, discussed theawareness of the futility of responding with violence to dissident activity,

But my response along with others was who are you going to kill? It’s not the pan nation-alist front anymore . . . You’re only going to alienate the nationalist community, whoagree with the loyalist community and the unionist community that we need to moveforward. Dissident Republicans really need loyalism to retaliate to give them oxygen tocarry on. (McDonald, 2009 cited in Spencer, 2011)

In identifying phases of operational strategy, we can see that Loyalists, unlike tra-ditional interpretations of their activity (Harris, 2006), were capable of strategic think-ing and applied their available military instrument with varying degrees of success. Theawareness of the need to escalate the level of violence demonstrates an ability to actstrategically. However, what is particularly poignant from the empirical evidence gath-ered is the influence of leadership both military and political in directing the UDA andUVF forward in trying to maintain their value systems, prevent a renewal of politicalviolence, and gain legitimacy for their long-term aims.

A campaign of strategic terrorism? The implications of a strategic analysis

The application of strategic theory to understand terrorism has helped us to identifywhere this theory may produce a novel way of interpreting Loyalist terrorist organiz-ations. Examining understandings of terrorism through a strategic theory paradigm,Neumann and Smith (2005, 2008) explore the modus operandi of strategic terrorism.They argue that a campaign of terrorism is a specific method that can be used whena belligerent is seeking to attain their ends. Three phases are identified. The first is dis-orientation, which involves ‘trying to alienate the authorities from their citizens byreducing the government to impotence in the eyes of the population and creating the

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impression that “those in power” are unable to cope with the situation of evolvingchaos’ (Neumann & Smith, 2008, p. 32). In the context of an analysis of Loyalist mili-tary strategy this would be the attempt to alienate the Republicans from support and alsoapply pressure on the British government to respond to Republican terrorism in amanner that reinforces Loyalist values of maintaining the union and protecting‘their’ communities. The second phase, target response, involves the capitulation ofthe PIRA. During this stage the response of the target may inadvertently help theactor to achieve their objectives. The third phase of strategic terrorism – ‘gaining legiti-macy’ – is vitally important for any terrorist campaign to claim victory. Neumann andSmith discuss how a terrorist actor may use the media and grass-roots agitation toconvey their political message but ultimately, ‘disseminating one’s message is not suf-ficient – people actually have to like what they hear. It is for this reason that ideologybecomes crucial factor in the third phase of a campaign of strategic terrorism’ (2008,p. 52).

Consequently, it is identified that at the third stage, a campaign of strategic terror-ism, moves into more ‘conventional’ political territory. Significantly, Neumann andSmith state that, ‘[u]nlike conventional politics, the process of gaining legitimacy isassisted and facilitated by the use of violence, which – the terrorists hope – willcreate an environment in which people are more receptive to challenges of the statusquo. Violence alone, however, will by no means guarantee victory’ (2008, p. 53).

The following section offers an analysis of Loyalist paramilitary ability to conduct asuccessful campaign of strategic terrorism and offers further insight into why Loyalistshave not responded to dissident Republican activity.

Disorientation

Discussion regarding the use of the military instrument and tactical choices made byLoyalist paramilitaries has revealed the changing operational strategy pursued. Theidentification that the operational strategy of both organizations consisted of fourphases – defense, deterrence, escalation (during the conflict), and ‘no first strike’ (inthe post-1994 CLMC ceasefire period) – contributes to limited material availableregarding the military dimension of the NI conflict (Smith, 1999). Furthermore, the tar-geting of Catholic and nationalist civilians throughout the three stages of the militaryconflict is better understood as a part of a campaign of strategic terrorism: as detailedabove, a realization was made that the targeting of civilians ultimately would notachieve the desire target response, which included the nationalist community exertingpressure upon the PIRA to cease their campaign. However, it did achieve disorientationin the political environment. There is little doubt that Loyalists did succeed in terroriz-ing the nationalist community. However, the continued use of this tactic during the tran-sition from defense to deterrence phase was meant to signal a more nuanced message toRepublican terrorists, which Taylor (1999) identifies as ‘returning the serve’. In thethird, escalated phase of the conflict, it is clear that Loyalists became more sophisticatedin the use of their military instrument and the implementation of more selective target-ing, which had more impact upon their main target audience – the PIRA.

Target response and gaining legitimacy?

In determining the success of Loyalist paramilitaries in gaining legitimacy within thestrategic environment of Northern Ireland, it has been demonstrated that the need for

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legitimacy is one that originates from a number of sources: primarily, this is from theiridentified enemy, the PIRA and their political representatives, Sinn Fein. Furthermore,as has been identified in previous publications discussing the strategic environment inNI (Harris, 2008b, 2011), gaining legitimacy from the British and Irish governments,the nationalist community, and also their own communities, was needed.

Most significantly for Loyalist paramilitaries in the post-Good Friday/BelfastAgreement era is the legitimacy UVF and UDA leaders have gained from the PIRA lea-dership. Loyalists active in interface areas have worked closely, on the ground, with alarge degree of success, with their Republican counterparts to appease any grass-rootsviolence (Harris, 2011; McAuley & Spencer, 2011). Furthermore, the acceptance of theGood Friday/Belfast Agreement (1998) by Sinn Fein, and the involvement of Loyalistrepresentatives in those negotiations, which removed Articles 2 and 3 and the IrishRepublic’s constitutional claim to NI, demonstrates some recognition by the Republi-can movement of Loyalist constitutional values. Nevertheless, a study completed byShirlow, Tonge and McAuley (2010) examining the attitude of Republican and Loyalistprisoners reveals that Republicans still do not credit Loyalist activity in the past orpresent and view them as instruments of the state.

However, it is interesting that respondents for this study recognized that they hadmore legitimacy within their own communities – particularly the UDA – during theheight of the Loyalist paramilitary campaigns in the 1970s than they had in the late1990s. As the UDA failed to offer a political alternative, the Democratic UnionistParty (DUP) were able to ‘demonize’ those who offered the UDA political analysisand UDA activity. Harris (2011) identifies that, although Ulster Political ResearchGroup (UPRG) and UDA-linked community groups did the work on the ground, atinterfaces, it was often the DUP politicians who claimed credit. Furthermore, thefailure of the UDP and independent electoral candidates linked to the UPRG toobtain any significant political support in elections from their own communities indi-cates a lack of legitimacy.

The UVF on the other hand traded on their ‘military’ reputation throughout the con-flict and, although the PUP was linked with the UVF, the transition to successful elec-toral politics did not occur on a large scale (Bruce, 2001; McAuley, 1996, 2003, 2004).Consequently, UVF members did not necessarily transfer their allegiance from one tothe other – this was particularly the case in rural areas – as many felt that political partyaffiliation went beyond their original remit as they identified themselves as purelysoldiers.

Thus analysis, through a strategic theory lens, suggests that both of the mainLoyalist terrorist organizations may be short-sighted as the strategic environmentwill continue to change but options – particularly in regards to target response andlegitimacy – for the use of their military instrument will be limited. NI has movedbeyond the use of violent means. In the current political climate, it seems unlikelythat Loyalist paramilitaries will ever regain the legitimacy to use military means toachieve the political aim of the constitutional status quo or protector of their commu-nities, and any move to do this will result in them being labeled as criminals ratherthan politically motivated actors.

While Loyalists did embark upon an escalated military campaign in the early 1990s,the author would argue that this escalation fueled an adverse response from their owncommunities, whose condemnation was strengthened every time Loyalist paramilitariesused their military instrument in the post-ceasefire period. It is not convincing that Loy-alists have managed to gain legitimacy even beyond the people they believed they

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represented. It is not necessarily Loyalists who have convinced Irish Republicans thatthey can live in the UK and accept the status quo: a change in British government strat-egies (Neumann 2003), devolution, and the intense political negotiations (O’Kane,2007) are, perhaps, all reasons for the current political situation in NI in 2011.

In identifying a ‘no-first strike’ operational strategy and moving to disband, theUDA and UVF can be credited with strategic thinking as they have identified thattheir values remain intact and that any further use of the military instrument wouldexpose them to alienation within the strategic environment. This is echoed by thoserespondents in leadership positions who identified a differing value system and pre-ference structure of dissident Republicans compared with the threat posed by thePIRA. Neumann and Smith (2008) remind us that the greatest challenge for terroristsoccurs at this stage of strategic terrorism: the organizations have to stop employingterrorism and become ‘conventional political activists once more’. This is the pointwhere most terrorist campaigns fail as the organizations are so rooted in theconcept of violent means that they cannot consider a change in their modus operandi(Neumann & Smith, 2008, p. 54). Furthermore, there were undeniably people whobecame so embroiled in the paramilitary lifestyle that the means became an end initself, confirming some of the journalistic reports on Loyalism (McDowell, 2001).However, it has been to the credit of the leadership of both organizations that Loyal-ists did not follow a continued escalated military campaign. Ultimately, respondentsstated (particularly UVF members) that they did not see a need to continue witharmed campaigns if the PIRA were no longer active – an assessment made afterexamining Republican preferences and possible target response. However, therewere also those, mainly UDA respondents, who identified that their own communitieswould not be receptive to a return to violence. The UDA’s failure to rally support fortheir political parties explains, in part, the rise in dissident activity within the organ-ization during 2007, but ultimately it reveals that they failed to fully implement a suc-cessful campaign of strategic terrorism as their ‘think tank’, the UPRG, is unlikely toever gain legitimacy. This point was confirmed by the political storm that ended in thewithdrawal of Conflict Transformation Initiative funding in 2007 once it was revealed£1.2 million was being given by the Northern Ireland Assembly to the communitygroup, Farset, to administer funds to facilitate conflict transformation discussions,which would involve the UDA.

Ultimately, Loyalist paramilitaries consider the threat posed by dissident Republi-cans to be one that is being countered by all available means by the British governmentand security services. Loyalist paramilitaries have been rendered defunct owing to thecombination of effective leadership, increased confidence in the security response, andthe fact their main adversaries have been embedded within a political framework thatcurrently secures the constitutional status quo of NI. Any attempt to reignite a terroristcampaign would ultimately fail as both organizations have now demonstrated an under-standing of their inability to gain legitimacy.

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank the organizers and participants of the 2009 CICA-STR PoliticalViolence and Collective Aggression: Considering the Past, Imagining the Future Conference,Belfast for comments and facilitation of an earlier draft of this paper. The author also thanksAndrew Stephenson for comments on manuscript and the anonymous reviewers. Research par-ticipants were either granted anonymity or agreed that their views could be attributed.

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Notes on contributorLyndsey Harris is a lecturer in Criminology and Security Studies with a background in Politics.Her doctorate examined Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. She is an executive commit-tee member of the Political Studies Association; a member of the Insurgency Research Group;an IUS Armed Forces and Society Fellow; a member of the Conflict Research Society; and partof the Centre for Applied Criminology at Birmingham City University.

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